Crump Multiparty Negotiation PDF
Crump Multiparty Negotiation PDF
Crump Multiparty Negotiation PDF
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InternationalNegotiation 8: 197-234, 2003. 197
© 2003 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the Netherlands.
Abstract. Despite considerable research on multiparty negotiation, no prior attempt has been
made to organize and describe knowledge from the various disciplines represented within this
field of study. The present article seeks to offer a comprehensive understanding of multiparty
negotiation. It establishes a foundation for a multiparty negotiation paradigm by building a
coherent multi-disciplinary framework. Development of this framework begins by defining
fundamental concepts and identifying essential dynamics that structure the field of multiparty
negotiation. This article then describes the building blocks and boundaries of the field. A
review of the three most developed multiparty negotiation bodies of literature or domains
- international negotiations, public disputes, and organizational and group negotiations -
follows. Similarities and differences between the three domains are identified, as are points
of theoretical integration. This examination of multiparty negotiation concepts and dynamics,
building blocks, boundaries, and domains constitutes a framework that defines multiparty
negotiation as a field of practice. The article also establishes a research agenda that will
contribute to the development of multiparty negotiation as an area of study.
The concept of "party" was adopted by the negotiation literature from legal
studies. In law, a party is the person who files a suit or the person against
whom a suit is filed, while that entity's agent is merely a participant (Yam
1999: 346). In the negotiation literature, party is defined more broadly. A
party is a participant in a conflict. Parties can be individuals, groups, organi-
zations, communities or nations (Rubin, Pruitt and Kim 1994: 257). This
is an incomplete definition, as a party has functional as well as structural
characteristics. Participants in a conflict or in the pursuit of an opportunity
(i.e., negotiation) can be parties to a negotiation or parties for a negotiation.
At a minimum, a party must be able to (1) make a decision or decisions
and (2) communicate such decisions. For example, the components of a
disintegrating coalition may each be parties, but the coalition itself may
be too conflict-ridden to make or communicate decisions. A disintegrating
coalition ceases to be a party at some point in a negotiation. Or, consider a
constituent that is not sufficiently organized to make a decision. For example,
"the public" is not a party under the proposed definition except when voting
in a public referendum.
A clear and concise definition for "party" is critical to the development of
a theory on multiparty negotiation. Researchers in this field should engage in
debate about how "party" is best conceptualized. This article operationalizes
"party" by focusing on an entity's ability to make and communicate decisions.
"Multiparty negotiation" is concerned with more than two parties, includ-
ing parties or entities on the same side (e.g., primary parties, representatives,
agents, advisers, coalitions of parties), on opposing sides (e.g., primary par-
ties, negotiators or disputants), on neutral sides (e.g., all arbitrators and some
mediators) and on other sides (e.g., powerful mediators, alternative negoti-
parties and a third party such as a mediator constitute both a bilateral and a
multiparty negotiation. The effect of a third party on negotiation process and
outcome is well documented (Elkouri and Elkouri 1985; Kressel and Pruitt
1989; Menkel-Meadow 2001; Miller 1994; Wall 1981; Wall, Stark and Stan-
difer 2001). However, the significance of an alternative party to negotiation
process and outcome only recently has become more apparent (see Giebels
1999; Giebels, De Dreu and Van de Vliert 1998; Pinkley 1995).
Another common multiparty negotiation situation involves three or
more distinct primary parties (Kramer 1991; Polzer, Mannix and Neale
1998; Zartman 1994), while coalition dynamics can structurally transform
such multilateral-multiparty negotiations into bilateral negotiations. Distinct
parties can and do combine or fuse, but an apparently unitary entity can also
fractionate or split (Midgaard and Underdal 1977; Raiffa 1982) into entities of
varying degrees of unity. Negotiations would be less complex if parties were
monolithic, but often they are not. Monolithic or unitary refers to the internal
nature of a party - the degree of internal conflict or cohesion due to similar or
different values, interests and/or opinions (Raiffa 1982). A party with a high
degree of cohesion is a "unitary party," characterized by consistently coherent
behavior and communication with a "single voice."
Any unitary entity, even an individual, can have internal conflict that
affects presentation of unity, while a "complex party" - comprising two or
more distinct or monolithic parties - can achieve levels of cohesion that
result in unitary behavior (Midgaard and Underdal 1977; Raiffa 1982). Such
dynamics are structurally significant, as they can determine whether a negoti-
ation is bilateral or multilateral and biparty or multiparty. A multiparty frame
of reference may be useful in a negotiation that includes a party that is not
generally behaving as a unitary entity.
(4) Third Party Relations - Third parties do not own the problem/opportunity
under negotiation but assist primary parties towards an outcome, although
this outcome need not be an agreement. Such parties may be unbiased
and non-directive but need not be. Third parties can assist (facilitate)
primary parties intentionally or unintentionally. They are most often
described as mediational and/or arbitrational (Berman and Johnson 1977;
Davison 1974; Kressel and Pruitt 1989; Menkel-Meadow 2001; Miller
1994; Sheppard 1984; Susskind 2000; Touval 1975; Touval and Zartman
2001; Wall, Stark and Standifer 2001; Zartman and Touval 1985).
(5) Supporting Primary Party Relations - Primary parties may receive assist-
ance from parties that do not "own" the negotiation and are not third
parties. Assistance may come indirectly, such as through an alternative
negotiating partner, or directly, through advisers and agents (Chayes
1999; Giebels 1999; Mnookin and Susskind 1999; Neale and Bazerman
1991; Pinkley 1995; Salacuse 1995, 2000).
When the multiparty negotiation literature is compared to the list in
Table 1 it can be concluded that no other phenomena exist outside of this
five-part categorical set. This is not to suggest that other phenomena do not
exist - multiparty negotiation represents a large universe of behavior - rather,
no other phenomena have been documented in the literature.
These five phenomena represent the building blocks of multiparty negoti-
ation and assist to establish the field's boundaries. However, the "complexity
concept" can also be used to determine the boundaries of multiparty negoti-
ation. Complexity is central to multiparty negotiation. For example, "manage-
ment of complexity" is considered a paradigm for multilateral international
negotiations (Zartman 1994; Crump and Zartman 2003). The present study
contends that "degrees of complexity" is a central organizing construct for
the entire field of negotiation, including biparty, bilateral, multilateral and
multiparty negotiations. In establishing multiparty negotiation boundaries
this article moves from the least to the most complex form of negotiation.
The line between biparty and multiparty negotiation is ambiguous. It is
possible to identify negotiations that are "biparty-plus" and "minimalist-
multiparty" in nature. For example, in market-based negotiations, buyers
have choices with respect to whom they will engage in biparty, buyer-seller
negotiations; sellers who are not selected may serve as alternative negoti-
ating partners for a buyer (Neale and Bazerman 1991). "Alternative parties"
can influence biparty negotiation processes even when primary parties have
never met these alternative parties (Giebels 1999; Giebels, De Dreu and Van
de Vliert 1998; Pinkley 1995). Sometimes, multiparty negotiation analysis
cannot explain negotiation process and outcome without taking absent parties
into consideration, including alternative parties that primary parties have not
encountered. However, to be considered a party in a negotiation, at least one
primary party must be aware of this alternative party, and this knowledge
must materially influence negotiation behavior.
These phenomena are at the border of multiparty negotiation. The least
complex multiparty negotiation involves three negotiating individuals, where
two have previously established coalitional relations against the third. A
second type of multiparty negotiation with similar complexity would involve
two negotiating individuals being assisted by a third, mediating individual. In
both examples, complexity is minimized through clearly defined roles.
These examples, representing least-complex multiparty negotiations,
serve to establish the inner boundary. Where does the outer boundary lie -
what is the most complex multiparty negotiation? There is general agree-
ment in the literature that multilateral negotiations in the international domain
present the greatest degree of complexity. For example, the Uruguay GATT
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations formally began in
Uruguay in September 1986 with 1,200 official delegates (1,200 negotiators)
from over 70 countries (70 primary parties), accompanied by 300 journalists
(some journalists likely engaged in facilitative behavior). By December 1990,
a GATT meeting in Belgium included over 100 governments, 90 ministers,
1,500 official delegates and as many more advisers, and the same number of
journalists. They gathered to finalize a 400-page agreement that represented
the distillation of 1,300 proposals and working papers. However, key parties
(the U.S. and the EU) found this agreement unacceptable and consequently
extended negotiations for three more years. An agreement to establish the
World Trade Organization (WTO) was formally concluded by more than 100
governments in Morocco in April 1994 (Hampson with Hart 1995; Landau
2000; Zartman 1994). The most-complex multiparty negotiation boundary
lies somewhere in this location although theoretically there is no "most
complex" limit. The GATT example simply identifies the edge of the known
universe of empirical cases.
considered here are often embedded in a larger context such that additional
parties often become involved as negotiations proceed.
The following discussion introduces the fundamental nature of each multi-
party negotiation domain, while considering (1) the academic disciplines
involved, (2) each domain's dominant constructs, variables and thematic
elements, and (3) critical research questions and areas for future investigation.
InternationalNegotiation
Public Disputes
(Bronder and Pritzl 1992; Spekman, Forbes, Isabella and MacAvoy 1998).
The "strategic analysis" stage may focus on seeking solutions to external
problems (e.g., protecting existing markets, sharing risk), but a review of
this literature suggests that substantial attention is devoted to establishing
inter-organizational relations to attain some objective or synergy - especially
the achievement of competitive advantage (Bronder and Pritzi 1992; Das
and Teng 1998; Spekman, Forbes, Isabella and MacAvoy 1998). Given their
overarching focus on building a cooperative structure to achieve competi-
tive advantage, strategic alliances generally have a gain-frame orientation. In
comparison, public disputes can have either a gain-frame or loss-frame orient-
ation, but resource-deficient disputes - and the accompanying task of dividing
scarce resources - indicate a preponderance of loss-frame negotiations. This
difference can affect the way parties behave and negotiate. For example, the
way a negotiation is framed can affect the way that risk is perceived, which
is a contributing factor in determining risk-seeking or risk-avoiding behavior.
Gain-framing can contribute to risk-seeking behavior and is more likely to
result in agreement. Loss-framing can contribute to resistance in concession
making and risk-avoiding behavior and is less likely to result in an agreement
(Neale and Bazerman 1991, 1992).
Such dynamics can explain partially why third parties are fundamental
to the public dispute process, as the challenges of reaching agreement in
this setting require higher degrees of "dispute-resolution technology." Such
dynamics can also provide insight into the factors that contribute to strategic
alliance failure rates of around 50 percent (Inkpen and Ross 2001), as there
may be a relationship between "mutual gain-framing" and the development
of agreements that lack durability in complex negotiations.
What are the barriers to settlement when engaged in a complex multiparty
inter-organizational negotiation that is generally structured as a loss-frame?
If agreement is reached, what are the implications for agreement imple-
mentation, especially concerning factors such as relational stability and
agreement durability? What are the barriers to settlement when engaged
in a complex multiparty inter-organizational negotiation that is generally
structured in a gain-frame? If agreement is reached, what are the implic-
ations for agreement implementation, especially concerning factors such
as relational stability and agreement durability? Can insights gained from
one, general type of complex multiparty negotiation have relevance for the
other type? Integration through specific, theoretical linkage points in the
public dispute literature, the inter-organization collaboration literature and
the strategic alliance literature can enhance understanding while providing
a degree of control over complex inter-organizational multiparty negoti-
ations. In addition, research into cognitive heuristics such as gain/loss-frames
parties) and agents have different attitudes toward risk within a specific nego-
tiation. For example, relations between two or more primary parties on the
same side and engaged in a coalition are normally structured through risk-
sharing, while principal-agent relations are structured through an exchange
- often involving financial compensation. Agent compensation is often based
on a fee for service, salary or retainer, while an agent normally has a degree of
independence that is greater than the independence common in an employee-
employer supervisory relationship. With this independence comes a concern
that agent and principal interests are not always aligned, while agents are
most effective when their interests are aligned with those of the principal.
Methods have been devised to "coalign" agent and primary party interests
through performance-based contracts or a contingency fee (Eisenhardt 1989;
Lax and Sebenius 1986; Rubin and Sander 1988; Thompson 2001; Watkins
1999). Such methods actually shift some outcome risk from the primary
party to the agent. Performance-based contracts can transform an agent into
another primary party when an agent accepts significant outcome risk, as
this type of arrangement results in the agent becoming an outcome owner.
The relationship between agent compensation and principal-agent interest
co-alignment has received substantial consideration in the literature (see
Eisenhardt 1989; Pratt and Zeckhause 1985), although this research does not
adequately consider the implications of such dynamics for the study of nego-
tiation. For example, the potential role transformation from agent to primary
party has implications for the cross-fertilization of knowledge. An agent who
accepts significant outcome risk in a negotiation may be better perceived as an
entity engaged in a coalition relationship with its constituent, as both are now
involved in a risk-sharing arrangement. Might coalition theory have some
relevance to such dynamics? Is coalition theory more robust in explaining
"agent-principal" relations when the agent has accepted significant outcome
risk? Could it be that similar phenomena are the focus of investigation
when some scholars study division of coalition gains, while others study
agent-principal distribution of gains (agent compensation theory)? Such ques-
tions should receive consideration, as there is the potential for knowledge
cross-fertilization and theoretical integration. This latter point is especially
significant considering the lack of research into principal-agent relations in
a negotiation context and the wealth of knowledge on divisions of gains in
coalition relations.
The second major area of study in this domain considers negotiations
within an organization or intra-organizational negotiation (Bacharach and
Lawler 1980; Jameson 1999; Kramer 1991; Lax and Sebenius 1986; Lewicki,
Sheppard and Bazerman 1986; Rahim 2001; Walton and McKersie 1965).
Theoretical Integration
Within the multiparty negotiation literature there is recognition of the need for
greater theoretical integration (Polzer 1996; Polzer, Mannix and Neale 1998).
Also noted is a relationship between advances in the field and increasing
degrees of integrative complexity in the field (Kramer 1994). Organizing
the multiparty negotiation literature into domains facilitates identification of
common phenomena or recurring patterns and provides a basis for enga-
ging in theoretical integration. For example, of the phenomena that are
most common, what is the relationship between these phenomena and the
theories that can explain them? Answers to these questions will contribute to
theoretical integration in the emerging field of multiparty negotiation.
Third-party behavior and coalition behavior were identified in every
domain (the latter is often conceptualized as alliance behavior in the interna-
tional domain and consensus building in the public dispute domain). Yet, the
third-party literature and the coalition literature hardly ever intersect (Crump
1997). Only the rare scholar contributes to both fields (e.g., Murnighan 1978,
1986; Raiffa 1982; Wilkinson 1976, while more recent examples include
Curran and Sebenius 2003; Watkins 2003 in this volume of International
Negotiation). However, coalition and third-party phenomena have the poten-
tial to intermingle and integrate. Some of a mediator's leverage derives from
the very nature of a three-sided process. Like any triangle, the shape of
a mediated negotiation contains the potential for a coalition to be formed
(Touval 1994: 51). Specifically, three parties may interact when dealing
with a common issue, and a possibility exists that two parties may form
a coalition against the other or that one party may mediate between the
other two parties. Mediational and coalitional behavior can occur in a single
period of interaction in a negotiation (Belliveau and Stolte 1977; Kries-
berg 1991; Touval 1975; Van de Vliert 1981; Wilkinson 1976). While the
present study is not the first to recognize a relationship between third-party
behavior/theory and coalition behavior/theory, it is the first to recognize the
significance of this link as a point of integration for the field of multiparty
negotiation. After reviewing the multiparty negotiation literature by domains
it may be concluded that third-party theory and coalition theory are two of the
major theories in this field of study. This specific point of integration could
contribute to the development of a comprehensive multiparty negotiation
model - a development that would further contribute to the establishment
of a paradigm of multiparty negotiation.
Integration of coalitional and mediational theory/behavior may not be
so common in some domains (e.g., settings that depend on formal contrac-
tual mediators) and therefore may be less relevant for some negotiation and
mediation practitioners. Concurrently, other settings tolerate and even accept
third parties with alignments to a primary party. We first became aware of
such phenomena through the international domain (Touval 1975; Touval and
Zartman 1989; Zartman and Touval 1985) followed by the organizational
domain (Carnevale 1986; Conlon 1988; Conlon, Carnevale and Murnighan
1994; Murnighan 1986). In addition, third parties that are aligned to one or
more primary parties are common in cultures that are highly formal (on a
formal - informal scale) and that also seek to avoid conflict. Such cultures
(e.g., Japan) are dependent on the use of introductions for making initial
contact with others. Should problems emerge several years later, the "intro-
ducer" will often feel obligated to act as a "go-between" or informal mediator.
In cross-cultural negotiations, for example, it is not unusual for one party to
loose contact with its future mediator (often a Western party), while the other
party (often the Japanese) maintain and nurture this important business rela-
tionship. Relational or alignment dynamics between this "go-between" and
the primary parties could be one factor in explaining settlement (Crump 1998;
Gestland 1999), although this is another area that requires greater empirical
attention.
At a theoretical level the relationship between coalition behavior/theory
and third-party behavior/theory could provide a foundation for a compre-
hensive model of multiparty negotiation.
Conclusion
question: how are negotiation outcomes achieved and explained (see Young
1991; Zartman 1988).
Many researchers seek to identify and understand the vast array of
elements that are conceptualized as negotiation, while progress must also be
made in integrating these elements into some form of comprehensive under-
standing. Unfortunately, insufficient work has been devoted to this latter task
in the field of multiparty negotiation. Such work is especially critical as this
field of study advances through increasing degrees of integrative complexity.
The framework presented in this study serves as a foundation for building a
paradigm of multiparty negotiation. How should such developments proceed?
Scholars devoted to advancing the field of multiparty negotiation should
strive to build structural models that establish order within the complexity.
Descriptive models that identify the nature of critical theoretical relation-
ships are required, as this is an important step in developing a multiparty
negotiation paradigm and advancing the development of multiparty negoti-
ation theory and practice. Predictive and prescriptive theory, built on causal
relationships, depends upon well-grounded descriptive theory or structural
models (Pruitt 1995). The aim of the present article is to begin the process of
responding to this important gap in the literature.
In this regard, the proposed framework holds the potential to assist in
developing a comprehensive model of multiparty negotiation. For example,
five multiparty negotiation building blocks were identified utilizing "party"
and "relations between parties" as conceptual constructs - (1) primary party
relations, (2) cooperative relations between parties on the same side, (3) non-
cooperative relations inside a "single party" that is not behaving as a unitary
entity, (4) third-party relations and (5) relations that provide support to a
primary party. The present article argues that all parties within defined multi-
party negotiation boundaries will have the fundamental characteristics of one
of these five types. No other phenomenon has been or will be observable in
any domain in any negotiation, past, present or future. This is a large claim.
Variations within each party type exist. For example, there are clear differ-
ences between a third party with and without power, a third party with and
without outcome interests and a third party with and without a bias (partiality)
toward one or more primary parties. All these examples depict an entity
playing the functional role of a third party. However, it is also important
to acknowledge that a "third party with power and outcome interests" can
transform into a "primary party" (e.g., a helpful mediating neighbor suddenly
becomes your competitor) as negotiations proceed, as there is a similarity
between a third party with power and outcome interests, and a primary
party engaged in some form of mediational behavior. Role transition does
not weaken the validity of this five-part taxonomy of building blocks unless
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