Etude Fondapol Josef Konvitz Paradigm Shifts 2020-24-07
Etude Fondapol Josef Konvitz Paradigm Shifts 2020-24-07
Etude Fondapol Josef Konvitz Paradigm Shifts 2020-24-07
PARADIGM
SHIFTS
July 2020
fondapol.org
PARADIGM SHIFTS
Josef KONVITZ
The Fondation pour l’innovation politique
is a French think tank for European integration and free economy.
In addition, our blog “Trop Libre” (Too Free) casts a critical eye over
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monitoring of the effects of the digital revolution on political, economic
and social practices in its “Renaissance numérique” (Digital Renaissance)
section.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. 2020: A RUPTURE................................................................................................................................................................................9
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SUMMARY
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8
PARADIGM SHIFTS
Josef KONVITZ*
Josef Konvitz retired from the OECD in 2011 as Head of the Regulatory Policy Division.
He joined the OECD’s Urban Affairs Division in 1992, and led it from 1995 to 2003. Trained as an historian,
Konvitz was on the faculty of Michigan State University from 1973 to 1992.
He is also an Honorary Professor at the University of Glasgow and Chair of PASCAL International Observatory.
I. 2020: A RUPTURE
Crises bring to light strengths that were taken for granted, and weaknesses that
were long ignored. In a study for the Fondation pour l'innovation politique1,
I highlighted the urban dimension of the Covid-19 pandemic as the most recent
and spectacular example of a lethal, fast-moving cross-border risk. Soberly,
we acknowledge that things will never be the same again: we hope for the
better, but fear the worst. When there is great suffering which catches countries
unprepared, people are conflicted between a desire to return to normality and
a desire to redeem the loss of life and wealth by attempting to change things.
The outcome is finely balanced. Already in 2018, British economics journalist
Martin Wolf writing about the policy failures after the financial crisis of 2008,
warned that “A better version of the pre-2008 world will just not do. People do
not want a better past; they want a better future”2. Complacency, the burden
of conventional wisdom, reluctance to trust new ideas, and the power of vested
interests inhibited change in policy after 2008, and could do so again in the
2020s. Will there be greater momentum for a paradigm shift now that we are
counting the dead as well as the debt?
1. Josef Konvitz, Don’t Waste A Crisis, Fondation pour l’innovation politique, April 2020
(www.fondapol.org/en/etudes-en/dont-waste-a-crisis/).
2. Martin Wolf, “Why so little has changed since the financial crash”, Financial Times, 4 September 2018
(www.ft.com/content/c85b9792-aad1-11e8-94bd-cba20d67390c).
* Josef Konvitz just published Don't Waste A Crisis (Fondation pour l'innovation politique, April 2020). He is also
the author of Cities and Crisis (Manchester University Press, 2016) which draws on decades of academic study
of and professional engagement in managing crises.
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With the Covid-19 pandemic, we are confronted with this crisis at a unique
moment, a historic rupture between one period and another. During a crisis
such as this, we realize how invaluable infrastructure is, and what the risks of
under-supply are. This goes far beyond the production of masks, ventilators,
and of pharmaceuticals, or the numbers of beds in intensive care units (ICUs).
Many systems for telecommunication, transportation, water, power generation
and transmission, as well as hospitals – some built to last 100 or 150 years,
others for 25 or 50 years – are coming to the end of their useful life-cycle. In
2006, the estimated cost of renewal and modernization over 25 years was
$70 trillion, then 3.5% of global GDP3. Nothing near that level was being
invested before 2020. This is a classic example of a conjuncture, when a crisis
happens at the crossing of both short-term and long-term trends and major
technological innovations.
In 2008, commentators proclaimed that the State was back; they have done
so again in 2020. Better regulation usually comes after and not before the
catastrophe, but to get out of the recession, businesses will argue to scrap
regulations. To some, mostly on the political right, the return of the State
should be temporary; to others, essentially on the left, a greater role for the
| l’innovation politique
State should be permanent. Both seem to forget what Friedrich Hayek argued
in the 1960’s: it is not the quantum of regulation that matters, but what gets
regulated4. It is much worse when the government lightly regulates the wrong
things than when the level of regulation is higher but concerns all the right
things. The same can be said about deficits: it is the use of money that matters.
Post-2008 pressures to reduce deficits by cutting expenditure and investment
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would turn up time and again in post-pandemic inquiries into the staffing of
hospitals, the production and stockpiling of medical supplies, as well as the
training and hiring of medical staff. Short-changing the future after 2008 has
been the most expensive mistake of all.
What may sound technical is in fact highly political because huge sums are
at stake. Decisions taken now and in the coming years will have far-reaching
effects, altering and then locking in factors of development and territorial
structures that will be very difficult to modify once in place. There were both
policy and market failures after 2008; there is no margin for error this time.
We need a better framework for economic governance that preserves the
advantages of a liberal economic order, the need to protect people where they
live and who, in the words of Woodrow Wilson in his first inaugural address
3. OECD, “Infrastructure to 2030: Telecom, Land Transport, Water and Electricity“, June 2006
(https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/infrastructure-to-2030_9789264023994-en#page1).
4. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition [1960], Ronald Hamowy, ed. v.17,
The Collected Works of F.A.Hayek, University of Chicago Press, 2011.
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in 19135, “can not alter, control or singly cope with [...] the consequences of
great industrial and social processes”. Wilson put deeds to words, doing what
had been considered impossible: creating the Federal Reserve Bank of the
United States, laying the foundation for the modern regulatory State, reducing
tariffs, organizing food relief to neutral States in World War I, and founding the
League of Nations. The struggle between authoritarian and liberal regimes and
market-based or controlled economies which, in his day, framed what may be
called the Second Thirty Years’ War (1914-1945), shaped the paradigm that
became dominant as a result of that great crisis. Wilson paid more attention to
long-term trends than to headline events. Today, he would probably be leading
the creation of a different multinational agenda: idealistic, but not utopian. A
paradigm shift to change priorities must have an inspiring vision. It starts with
facts and the values with which to interpret them.
Paradigm Shifts
We need paradigms. No one on their own can think through a complete
philosophy nor create a framework of rules and codes. These are learned,
usually uncritically. The value of a civilization is precisely to transmit a
framework which is roughly adequate for the times, and to assimilate the
lessons of experience about economic, social, political and environmental
systems which, because they are inherently dynamic, are liable to fail.
Paradigms usually appear abstract when written, even idealistic, but they are
in fact eminently practical, composed of tools that have been proven to work,
or that people believe will work. The critical objective of each paradigm is both
to give confidence to people that what they are doing is right and assure them
that they are going in the right direction.
Paradigms are very powerful problem-solving systems. They are
composed of basic principles which define priorities for both individuals
and societies, and specific techniques and methods which can then be
applied to problems as they arise. Most people want to get something
done, and care more about the application of key principles than the
principles themselves. Paradigms allow us to handle complexity, making
problem-solving easier, simpler. They focus energies, reduce uncertainty,
unleash creativity, set priorities but within a framework of agreed goals.
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Paradigms are internalized in norms and values, given expression in policies,
laws, rules, and implemented in institutions and organizations. Paradigms
operate far more effectively through voluntary compliance than through
constraint, penalty, or enforcement.
Each successive master paradigm for economic and social regulation is based
not only on the hope of something formidable to achieve, but also on fear of
something awful to avoid. This pairing of hope and fear is the mechanism that
gives coherence to a paradigm about what should or should not be regulated
by the government to keep the economy, society and the polity moving toward
a shared goal. “There can be no hope without fear, and no fear without hope”6,
wrote philosopher Baruch Spinoza. He further suggested that we want to
believe in what we hope for, and resist believing that what we fear may be
true7. There is a fine balance between fear and hope: it may be the case however
that fear encourages people to do what they must do more than hope does.
A paradigm always defines the security that a society seeks. It is not enough to
define the aspirational goal in positive terms: the key to knowing the goal to
which a society aspires is to know what it most fears, its nemesis. In the 19th
| l’innovation politique
century, the pursuit of secular progress guided public and private initiative;
in the 17th century, societies assessed themselves against religious and moral
criteria. In current Western societies, ours has been about economic security
first and foremost, based on more growth and less unemployment out of
fear that less growth and more unemployment will make society less stable
and States more vulnerable. Thus, economic goals have become a kind of
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meta-regulation, keeping the social structure and political system and not just
the economy in good order. New league tables of countries based on a mix
of better-living indicators exist alongside but have not displaced GDP and
economic measures.
A paradigm shift occurs when a society redefines its hopes and fears, usually
in the crucible of crises. This is why the tension between health and work
during the Covid-19 pandemic cuts so deep: two rival definitions of security,
one older, one newer, are at play. I use the word “rival” advisedly, implying
that to gain protection against some risks we expose ourselves to others. This
is at the core of the dilemma for numerous countries between returning to
work or remaining confined, and why there are politicians proclaiming that
the cure – confinement (quarantine/lockdown) – is worse than the disease
because it gives rise to an economic crisis. Not only is the dominant paradigm,
directed towards low unemployment, severely tested by the pandemic, but the
after-effects will also generate more social problems, further undermining the
6. “Non dari spem sine metu neque metum sine spe”, Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, III, “On the Origin and Nature of
the Emotions”, Propositons 48-52, 1677.
7. Josef Konvitz, Cities and Crisis, Manchester University Press, 2016, p. 227.
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paradigm in a downward spiral. From an economic perspective, it is a question
of trade-offs, finding the point at which the lockdown can be relaxed or ended
without generating unmanageable burdens on the healthcare system.
We know better how to look at health from an economic perspective than
how to look at the economy if security is redefined to put health and the
environment as the main risks to both social stability and political security. I
am not asserting that protection against risks to health or risks associated with
climate change is more important than protection against economic collapse
and unemployment. I am saying that society’s tolerance for environmental and
sanitary disasters has become narrower – risks we had lived with in the past
are now unacceptable – and that the 20th century paradigm shaped around
economic security cannot generate credible solutions alone.
The pandemic combines many issues: preventive health and treatment, social
and economic inequality, mobility, communication, energy, air and water
quality, the list lengthens, and for each issue there are competing agendas
promoting reforms in resource allocation and regulations. There will be
calls for better cross-sectoral policy integration. The theory makes sense,
but coordination has to start before policies are in place and not after.
Incoordination is also an element that characterizes the behavior of States:
Paradigm Shifts
we have had spectacular examples of what works and what does not, and of
failures of leadership when governments have persisted in the wrong course of
action when it manifestly was a disaster. National sovereignty will not change
the nature of the problems we face nor make them more manageable.
Historian Stanley Hoffmann wrote in 2004 that decades after World War II,
we are now “in a third universe of fears: universal, all-pervasive, globalized”,
citing not only weapons of mass destruction that “even small states can
produce and export throughout the globe, but also of world scourges such as
epidemics, drugs and arms trafficking, and of course, terrorists”. What they
have in common is the limited ability of nation-states to contain any of them8.
We know all too well what we fear. How can we control fear by creating a
practical framework that ensures our security?
We have been here before, just not recently enough. At the end of the 19th
century, following epidemics of cholera (Hamburg) and typhoid, or mass fires
(Boston, Chicago, Baltimore), civic leaders and engineers understood that
unless the entire city could be rebuilt on safer lines, even the rich would be at
risk. Philanthropic foundations, civic organizations, public-minded scientists,
engineers and a professional civil service together designed and implemented
health and safety regulations which applied to all. The definition of the public
interest transcended individual property rights which until then had limited
8. Stanley Hoffmann, “Thoughts on Fear in Global Society”, Social Research, 2004, vol. 71, n° 4, pp. 1023-1036.
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the regulatory power of the state; laws had to be changed, court cases were
won; some political parties that had been in power lost elections. Infectious
diseases, food shortages, high unemployment and crime concentrated in cities
receded. By the middle of the 20th century, applied economic theory supported
a paradigm based on urban economic growth and high rates of migration
and labor mobility. Today, over 75% of the population of medium and high-
income countries live in urban areas.
We should not be afraid of a paradigm shift. Even though it will be difficult
and stressful, political leaders will be called upon to make decisions which
may not be popular, and which will break with precedent. The problem is that
no one alive today took an active part in the last paradigm shift during and in
response to the Great Depression. The memoires and treatises by those who
were at the last paradigm frontier make interesting reading. History can guide
us. There have been several dramatic paradigm shifts in the Western world
since the 17th century. Once over, in about 25-30 years, paradigm shifts usher
in a longer period of more stable development until in turn they lose their
potency. A successful paradigm shift has helped Europe overcome barriers in
the past. This history should inspire us today.
| l’innovation politique
As the late urbanist Sir Peter Hall put it a quarter of a century ago, a paradigm
defines “not only the goals of economic policy and the kind of instruments
that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems
they are meant to be addressing”9. The dominant paradigm in much of the
world measures change against the rate of growth, GDP and employment. It
has had a long, good run since the Great Depression, lifting millions out of
poverty, suppressing the impact of recessions, and raising living standards.
In recent years, however, this paradigm has also widened the gap between
leading regions on the productivity frontier, and lagging regions which may
never catch up.
9. "… not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very
nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing" (Peter A. Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and
the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain", Comparative Politics, vol. 25, n° 3, April 1993, pp. 279,
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hall/files/hall1993_paradigms.pdf).
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We describe cities as economic motors. Perhaps, in terms of the economy, a
black box is a better metaphor because economists measure their output but do
not observe what is going on inside. Economic models based on national units
cannot help decision-makers analyze the many variables that make one city
different from another. As a result, national economic policy, which operates
through top-down sectors, is indifferent to the needs of particular cities and
regions. At best, in our current paradigm, spatial change is a dependent
variable, something that happens as a result of other policies on interest rates,
social welfare, transportation, energy, taxation, labor markets, immigration,
or even innovation.
The reason why macroeconomic policy is spatially blind is simple: mainstream
macroeconomic and structural policies assume that spatial change is slow, at
least compared with economic trends and political cycles, and is therefore
largely irrelevant in macroeconomic policy-making. Government action is
more often remedial, addressing conditions which past policies or market
forces aggravated, rather than proactive.
Policies have not caught up with the fact that spatial change, principally driven
by rapid urban growth, has accelerated even before the public became aware
of climate change. People see many different aspects of it just in France: peri-
Paradigm Shifts
urban growth, the decline of small town centers, coastal erosion, deforestation,
logistical parks and retail complexes on greenfield sites, undersupply of new
housing in areas of demand and abandonment in areas of decline, the paving
over of green space, the construction of high speed rail lines and highways,
all within the last 40 years. To cite just one figure: between 1990 and 2000,
the increase of artificial surfaces for housing, urban parks, industry, transport
in the 27 member states of the European Union was around 1,000 square
kilometers per year, exceeding the size of Berlin, and increasing at a rate
four times greater than population growth. Aside from new infrastructure,
much of this has happened incrementally and without any effort to assess the
cumulative effect, especially on energy and water.
The assumption that spatial change is slow, while occasionnaly valid, is not
now. Spatial change – which we may also call environmental change - has
accelerated in recent decades, and now has itself become a driver of other policy
developments. This explains some of the mismatch between the objectives of
economic policy and the issues that policymakers and politicians confront.
We face the cost of coping with the Covid-19 pandemic before having made
good on the economic and social damage of the financial crisis of 2008. Both
in 2008 and 2020, many countries had well-performing economies when
the crisis began; others were more fragile; almost all have suffered a shock.
The rate of economic growth, while still positive, had been about half what
it was before 2008 when the pandemic erupted. In most Western countries,
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including the United States, household wealth in real terms has not increased
in nearly twenty years. The GDP fell by 2.7% in the United States and by
4.2% in the European Union in 2009; the decline in 2020 will be greater.
Not only was the GDP per person lower in 2011 than in 2007 in every G7
country (excluding Germany); in many countries average household income
was no greater in 2018 than in 2000. For the first time in a century, the average
income of young Americans has stopped growing faster than that of their
parents10. Regional disparities within countries are worse, and they are not
self-correcting through classical economic measures11. At the same time, many
cities and regions are exposed to disasters for which they are unprepared, and
which, since circa 1990, are more frequent and costly.
We are thus caught on the horns of a dilemma. A belief in prosperity, the
very cornerstone of the 20th century paradigm, is no longer convincing to
many. Growth may exacerbate regional, urban and environmental problems,
but without growth, the cost of confronting global warming, not to mention
population ageing, emerging health problems, or the artificial intelligence
revolution, will be more difficult. The struggle to reconcile economic and
environmental objectives is an intellectually sophisticated effort marked
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more by “trade-offs” than “win-win” outcomes. These are not very satisfying
to many who never enjoyed abundance and who may find the appeal of
populism and a strong leader, leading to the centralization of decision-making
in undemocratic, authoritarian regimes, more attractive.
Every major dimension of the pandemic has called attention to problems
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that call for maps as well as graphs, so important is the territorial dimension:
tele-working, transport by sea, air, rail, car, bicycle, racial and socioeconomic
disparities that explain the vulnerability of different groups, the distribution
and capacity of healthcare, chains of supply, migrant workers… and the list
lengthens when climate-change issues are added.
Better management of space has become imperative. Macroeconomic and
fiscal policies, regulatory and technical measures as well as well-functioning
institutions are preconditions, necessary but not sufficient to go beyond
piecemeal measures. The State has always been essential to each paradigm
since the Renaissance, and has survived every paradigm shift. The paradigm
in place is however more deeply embedded in the workings of the State which
now absorbs between 30% and 60% of the economy.
10. Aida Caldera-Sánchez, Alain de Serres and Naomitsu Yashiro (2016), “Reforming in a difficult macroeconomic
contest: A review of the issues and recent literature”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 21 April 2016,
No. 1297 (www.worldscientific.com/doi/10.1142/S1793993317500028); Aida Caldera- Sánchez, Alain de Serres,
Filippo Gori, Mikkel Hermansen, Oliver Röhn, “Strengthening Economic Resilience: Insights from the Post-1970
Record of Severe Recessions and Financial Crises”, OECD Economic Policy Paper n°. 20, December 2016
(www.oecd.org/economy/growth/Strengthening-economic-resilience-insights-from-the-post-1970-record-of-
severe-recessions-and-financial-crises-policy-paper-december-2016.pdf).
11. OECD, OECD Regions and Cities at a Glance 2018, OECD, Paris, October 2018
(https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-regions-and-cities-at-a-glance-2018_reg_cit_glance-
2018-en). Previous editions appeared in 2011, 2013 and 2016.
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The State needs the economy to perform closer to its potential in order to
collect taxes and reduce the extent to which it is supporting the economy
through debt; at the same time the State faces the burden of investing in the
transition to the next paradigm. We are past the Reagan-Thatcher era when a
massive reduction in the size and role of the State was an option. Task forces,
councils and special committees can compensate on an ad-hoc basis but do
nothing to reform the organization of government to cope with crisis – both in
the short and long-term – as the new norm. In all that I have read about why a
paradigm shift is at once desirable and necessary, I have not read any analysis
on how a new type of state is likely to emerge once the transition is complete.
The condition of the economy and the geopolitical balance among the major
regions of the world in a year’s time are unknown. Our societies may be
exhausted, just at the time when a major effort will be needed if we are to
Paradigm Shifts
adopt different, and hopefully better ways in which to work and live. Even
if the pandemic ends in a year or two, the effects of the crisis will be with
us for an even longer period, reflected not only in the health of hundreds of
thousands, the loss of employment and the closure of firms, etc., but also
in altered priorities and the reallocation of resources. It will take years to
unravel the interlocking pieces that sustain one paradigm and put in place the
framework for its successor. There is no neat chronological separation between
this crisis and the post-crisis period: only years henceforth will be able to look
back and see where the turning point was.
We are where we are. Macroeconomic uncertainty, which was high in 2008
and during the long, slow recovery, is now “the highest in modern history12”.
Uncertainty at an intolerable level can be paralyzing. We face the prospect
that global risks, whether in financial systems, global warming and rising sea
levels, health, or technological networks, can only be controlled somewhat,
their effects mitigated. This pandemic has led to calls for a greater role for the
nation-state while highlighting its artificiality in a global crisis. Subnational
units – cities and regions – are not equally vulnerable but depend on national
one-size fits all policies. The idea that the EU has not done enough sits alongside
polls that show greater support for Europe. Something has to give. Measured
12. Robin Wigglesworth, “Coronavirus creates biggest economic uncertainty in decades”, Financial Times,
20 April 2020 (www.ft.com/content/4d77ab77-0ff0-46ff-b30e-ae712c582457).
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in terms of future liabilities, if preventive, proactive measures are not taken, the
cost will be colossal. This was clear to me a year ago when I prepared a draft of
this essay. The Coronavirus pandemic has made the issue all the more urgent.
The logic of sectoral silos and redistributive fiscal measures has been
overwhelmed. Economists and epidemiologists, as Gillian Tett commented,
belong to separate communities when “almost all of the important decisions
in modern democracies require this ‘silo-busting’ analysis” 13. The convergence
of disciplines should generate innovative syntheses, not binary choices.
No paradigm can function without experts to whom people defer, be they
theologians in the 17th century, philosophers in the 18th, or economists in the
20th. The pandemic has put the authority of experts into question. Wearing a
mask to prevent the spread of the Covid-19 has become a form of political
expression in parts of the United States. Whose expertise will be authoritative
in the 21st century? While waiting for the answer, we must improve the design
of policies and services within the framework of the paradigm that exists, not
because it works well but because we do not yet have a better one.
The historical evidence about paradigm shifts is beyond doubt: the process
| l’innovation politique
For all that it has cost in lives and budget deficits, however, the Coronavirus
pandemic has destroyed neither the physical nor the human stock of capital
on which our future welfare depends. As Andy Haldane, Chief Economist of
the Bank of England noted in an appeal for support for the social sector, the
crisis may actually have renewed our stock of social capital which is so critical
to how we get things done 14. We will need it.
13. Gillian Tett, “How much should it cost to contain a pandemic?”, Financial Times, 22 April 2020
(www.ft.com/content/9a74f748-8427-11ea-b872-8db45d5f6714).
14. Andy Haldane, “Reweaving the social fabric after the Covid-19 crisis”, Financial Times, 24 April 2020
(www.ft.com/content/fbb1ef1c-7ff8-11ea-b0fb-13524ae1056b).
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Much will depend on what will emerge as a consensus about our greatest
hopes and worst fears, setting priorities. The next big paradigm must:
- Reduce the level of uncertainty;
- Limit risks at a level which is tolerable;
- Generate confidence in the people and institutions that govern legitimately
and democratically;
- Create widely shared benchmarks for comparisons between places and over
time, a cosmopolitan vision of humanity.
Since the Renaissance, at several major junctures, the West has reinvented
itself by adopting a new paradigm that initiated a major period of growth
and development, in part by resolving problems that people had considered
intractable and dangerous, and in part by creating institutions and moral
frameworks that let people work cooperatively toward major, shared goals.
This is where we are again, but with one significant difference: ours is a
multipolar age, and our problems are global. In the past, the West could act on
its own and for itself and export its paradigm to much of the rest of the world.
Its strategic genius may well be to develop a paradigm that enough countries
and people in the world will welcome, for the benefits it will bring them.
Paradigm Shifts
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Paradigm Shifts
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novembre 2019, 60 pages
Les attentats islamistes dans le monde, 1979-2019
Fondation pour l’innovation politique, novembre 2019, 80 pages
Vers des prix personnalisés à l’heure du numérique ?
Emmanuel Combe, octobre 2019, 68 pages
2022 le risque populiste en France
Un indicateur de la protestation électorale
Dominique Reynié, octobre 2019, 44 pages
La cour européenne des droits de l’homme, protectrice critiquée des « libertés invisibles »
| l’innovation politique
27
L’avenir de l’hydroélectricité
Jean-Pierre Corniou, novembre 2018, 64 pages
Retraites : Leçons des réformes italiennes
Michel Martone, novembre 2018, 48 pages
Les géants du numérique (2) : un frein à l’innovation ?
Paul-Adrien Hyppolite et Antoine Michon, novembre 2018, 84 pages
Les géants du numérique (1) : magnats de la finance
Paul-Adrien Hyppolite et Antoine Michon, novembre 2018, 80 pages
L’intelligence artificielle en Chine : un état des lieux
Aifang Ma, novembre 2018, 60 pages
Alternative für Deutschland : établissement électoral
Patrick Moreau, octobre 2018, 72 pages
Les Français jugent leur système de retraite
Fondation pour l’innovation politique, octobre 2018, 28 pages
Migrations : la France singulière
Didier Leschi, octobre 2018, 56 pages
La révision constitutionnelle de 2008 : un premier bilan
Hugues Hourdin, octobre 2018, 52 pages
Préface d’Édouard Balladur et de Jack Lang
| l’innovation politique
29
L’actif épargne logement
Pierre-François Gouiffès, février 2017, 48 pages
Réformer : quel discours pour convaincre ?
Christophe de Voogd, février 2017, 52 pages
De l’assurance maladie à l’assurance santé
Patrick Negaret, février 2017, 48 pages
Hôpital : libérer l’innovation
Christophe Marques et Nicolas Bouzou, février 2017, 44 pages
Le Front national face à l’obstacle du second tour
Jérôme Jaffré, février 2017, 48 pages
La République des entrepreneurs
Vincent Lorphelin, janvier 2017, 52 pages
Des startups d’État à l’État plateforme
Pierre Pezziardi et Henri Verdier, janvier 2017, 52 pages
Vers la souveraineté numérique
Farid Gueham, janvier 2017, 44 pages
Repenser notre politique commerciale
Laurence Daziano, janvier 2017, 48 pages
Mesures de la pauvreté, mesures contre la pauvreté
| l’innovation politique
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Un outil de finance sociale : les social impact bonds
Yan de Kerorguen, décembre 2013, 36 pages
Pour la croissance, la débureaucratisation par la confiance
Pierre Pezziardi, Serge Soudoplatoff et Xavier Quérat-Hément,
novembre 2013, 48 pages
Les valeurs des Franciliens
Guénaëlle Gault, octobre 2013, 36 pages
Sortir d’une grève étudiante : le cas du Québec
Jean-Patrick Brady et Stéphane Paquin, octobre 2013, 40 pages
Un contrat de travail unique avec indemnités de départ intégrées
Charles Beigbeder, juillet 2013, 8 pages
L’opinion européenne en 2013
Dominique Reynié (dir.), Éditions Lignes de Repères, juillet 2013, 268 pages
La nouvelle vague des émergents : Bangladesh, Éthiopie, Nigeria, Indonésie,
Vietnam, Mexique
Laurence Daziano, juillet 2013, 40 pages
Transition énergétique européenne : bonnes intentions et mauvais calculs
Albert Bressand, juillet 2013, 44 pages
La démobilité : travailler, vivre autrement
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Retour sur l’alliance soviéto-nazie, 70 ans après
Stéphane Courtois, juillet 2009, 16 pages
L’État administratif et le libéralisme. Une histoire française
Lucien Jaume, juin 2009, 12 pages
La politique européenne de développement :
une réponse à la crise de la mondialisation ?
Jean-Michel Debrat, juin 2009, 12 pages
La protestation contre la réforme du statut des enseignants-chercheurs :
défense du statut, illustration du statu quo.
Suivi d’une discussion entre l’auteur et Bruno Bensasson
David Bonneau, mai 2009, 20 pages
La lutte contre les discriminations liées à l’âge en matière d’emploi
Élise Muir (dir.), mai 2009, 64 pages
Quatre propositions pour que l’Europe ne tombe pas dans le protectionnisme
Nicolas Bouzou, mars 2009, 12 pages
Après le 29 janvier : la fonction publique contre la société civile ?
Une question de justice sociale et un problème démocratique
Dominique Reynié, mars 2009, 22 pages
La réforme de l’enseignement supérieur en Australie
Zoe McKenzie, mars 2009, 74 pages
Les réformes face au conflit social
Dominique Reynié, janvier 2009, 14 pages
L’opinion européenne en 2009
Dominique Reynié (dir.), Éditions Lignes de Repères, mars 2009, 237 pages
Travailler le dimanche : qu’en pensent ceux qui travaillent le dimanche ?
Sondage, analyse, éléments pour le débat
Dominique Reynié, janvier 2009, 18 pages
Stratégie européenne pour la croissance verte
Elvire Fabry et Damien Tresallet (dir.), novembre 2008, 124 pages
Défense, immigration, énergie : regards croisés franco-allemands
sur trois priorités de la présidence française de l’UE
Elvire Fabry, octobre 2008, 35 pages
39
THE FONDATION
POUR L’INNOVATION POLITIQUE
NEEDS YOUR SUPPORT
To reinforce its independence and carry out its mission, the Fondation
pour l’innovation politque, an independent organization, needs the
support of private companies and individuals. Donors are invited
to attend the annual general meeting that defines the Fondation
orientations. The Fondation also invites them regularly to meet its staff
and advisors, to talk about its publication before they are released, and
to attend events it organizes.
Thank you for fostering critical analysis on the direction taken by France
and helping us defend European integration and free economy.
PARADIGM SHIFTS
By Josef KONVITZ
fondapol.org
ISBN :