United States District Court Southern District of New York
United States District Court Southern District of New York
United States District Court Southern District of New York
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.............................................
VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,
Plaintiff,
v.
15-cv-07433-RWS
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant.
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Laura A. Menninger
Jeffrey S. Pagliuca
HADDON, MORGAN, AND FOREMAN, P.C.
East 10th Avenue
Denver, CO 80203
303.831.7364
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 1
A. Plaintiff failed to identify her health care providers and produce their records prior to
her deposition, despite this Court’s order .................................................................... 3
B. Plaintiff failed to produce emails form her iCloud and hotmail accounts ....................... 6
E. Plaintiff has filed amended Rule 26 disclosures identifying new witnesses .................... 9
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Ganci v. U.S. Limousine, Ltd., No. 10-3027, 2011 WL 4407461, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2011)
..................................................................................................................................................... 1
Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 525-26 (6th Cir. 2008) ......................................................... 10
Hlinko v. Virgin Alt. Airways, No. 96 Civ. 2873(KMW)(THK), 1997 WL 68563, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 19, 1997) ....................................................................................................................... 2, 12
Miller v. Massad-Zion Motor Sales Co., No. 3:12 CV 1363, 2014 WL 4979349, at *2 (D. Conn.
Oct. 6, 2014) ............................................................................................................................... 2
Quantachrome Corp. v. Micromeritics Instrument Corp., 189 F.R.D. 697, 701 (S.D. Fla. 1999)10
Redwood v. Dobson, 476 F.3d 462, 467-68 (7th Cir. 2007) ........................................................... 9
Vincent v. Mortman, No. 04 Civ. 491, 2006 WL 726680, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Mar. 17, 2006) ....... 1
ii
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seeks leave of the Court to reopen the deposition of Plaintiff Virginia Giuffre, and as grounds
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff has engaged in an active effort to hide relevant information and prevent the fair
examination of Plaintiff on her claims. Due to these multiple and repeated discovery violations,
key information and documents were unavailable to Ms. Maxwell prior to Plaintiff’s depositions
on May 3, 2016. Some obviously relevant documents and disclosures remain concealed and are
the subject of pending frivolous efforts by Plaintiff to evade her discovery obligations.
Recently, Plaintiff completely changed her Rule 26(a) initial disclosures and added
multiple new witnesses while deleting many others. In addition, in the initial deposition,
Plaintiff’s counsel improperly prevented Plaintiff from testifying regarding key relevant non-
Finally, Plaintiff has now provided an errata sheet to her sworn depositions testimony in
which she materially and substantially contradicts her own testimony. For these reasons,
Plaintiff’s depositions must be reopened to examine her on newly discovered evidence and her
contradictory statements.
ARGUMENT
“A person who has previously been deposed in a matter may be deposed again, but only
with leave of the court.” Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Exeter Holdings, Ltd. v.
Haltman, No. CV135475JSAKT, 2016 WL 1180194, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2016) (quoting
Sentry Ins. v. Brand Mgmt. Inc., No. 10 Civ. 347, 2012 WL 3288178, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,
2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(B). Under Rule 30(a)(2)(B), courts “frequently permit a
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deposition to be reopened where the witness was inhibited from providing full information at the
first deposition” or “where new information comes to light triggering questions that the
discovering party would not have thought to ask at the first deposition.” Vincent v. Mortman,
No. 3:04 CV 491 (JBA), 2006 WL 726680, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 17, 2006) (quoting Keck v.
Union Bank of Switzerland, 1997 WL 411931, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1997). “Leave should be
granted to the extent that doing so is consistent with the factors set forth in Rule 26(b)(2), such as
'whether the second deposition of the witness would be unnecessarily cumulative, whether the
party requesting the deposition has had other opportunities to obtain the same information, and
whether the burden of a second deposition outweighs its potential benefit.’” Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors of Exeter Holdings, Ltd., 2016 WL 1180194, at *3 (quoting Sentry Ins.,
“Courts will typically re-open a deposition where there is new information on which a
witness should be questioned.” Id. (quoting Ganci v. U.S. Limousine, Ltd., No. 10-3027, 2011
WL 4407461, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2011)). This encompasses situations in which other
discovery has disclosed conflicting evidence on which a party should be questioned, when
discovery responses and relevant information are produced after the previous deposition, and
when affidavits produced conflict with the deponent’s previous testimony. See, e.g, Vincent v.
Mortman, No. 04 Civ. 491, 2006 WL 726680, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Mar. 17, 2006) (allowing
plaintiff to reopen deposition when one witness' deposition contradicted defendants' deposition
and medical records); Keck, 1997 WL 411931, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1997) (deposition
reopened where affidavit provided evidence conflicting with witness testimony); Sentry Ins.,
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Requests to reopen depositions routinely are granted after a deponent materially changes
her prior testimony in contradiction to previous sworn testimony. Miller v. Massad-Zion Motor
Sales Co., No. 3:12 CV 1363, 2014 WL 4979349, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct. 6, 2014); Hlinko v. Virgin
Alt. Airways, No. 96 Civ. 2873(KMW)(THK), 1997 WL 68563, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1997).
“In addition, courts will also re-open a deposition ‘where the witness was inhibited from
providing full information at the first deposition.’” Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
Exeter Holdings, Ltd., 2016 WL 1180194, at *3 (quoting Miller, 2014 WL 4979349, at *2 (D.
Conn. Oct. 6, 2014)). All of these factors are present in this case, necessitating the re-opening of
Plaintiff’s deposition.
A. Plaintiff failed to identify her health care providers and produce their
records prior to her deposition, despite this Court’s order
On April 21, 2016 this Court ordered Plaintiff to produce her medical records and
identify all of her health care providers from 1999 to present and produce their medical records.
Menninger Decl., Ex. A at 20-21. Undersigned counsel diligently followed up via phone and
correspondence and requested that all information relating to Plaintiff’s medical treatment be
provided prior to Plaintiff’s May 3, 2016 deposition precisely so that the deposition would not
need to be reopened. Menninger Decl., Ex. B. On April 29, 2016, after telling this Court that
she had disclosed all of her health care providers, Plaintiff served Second Amended
Supplemental Responses & Objections, identifying 15 new health care providers. Menninger
Decl., Ex. C at 18-20.1 For some providers, records were produced; for many, they were not. Id.
1
Treatment providers identified included 1) Dr. Steven Olson, 2) Dr. Chris Donahue, 3) Dr. John Harris 4) Dr.
Majaliyana 5) Dr. Wah, 6) Dr. Sellathuri, 7) Royal Oaks Medical Center, 8) Dr. Carol Hayek, 9) NY Presbyterian
Hospital, 10) Campbelltown Hospital, 11) Sydney West Hospital, 12) Westmead Hospital, 13) Dr. Karen Kutikoff,
14) Wellington Imaging Associates, and 15) Growing Together.
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light, and the information that has yet to be produced, justifies the reopening of Plaintiff’s
deposition.
B. Plaintiff failed to produce emails form her iCloud and hotmail accounts
By interrogatory, Plaintiff was asked to identify “email address, email account, cellphone
number and cellphone provider, social media account and login or screen name, text or instant
messaging account name and number, that You have used, applied for or been supplied between
1998 and the present.” Menninger Decl., Ex. C at 8-9. Plaintiff responded, identifying a single
email address and three telephone numbers. Plaintiff’s counsel verified those discovery requests
Maxwell uncovered Plaintiff has used at least three other email accounts – one on iCloud, one on
live.com, and one on hotmail.com during the relevant time periods. Plaintiff’s counsel confesses
that prior to being confronted on the issue, they never reviewed the emails in the accounts for
relevant information. Menninger Decl., Ex. J. The claims that counsel did not know these email
accounts exist is belied by the fact that they have now included “privileged” communications
from at least one of the accounts on their privilege log demonstrating and indicating there are
probably privileged communications in the account they have not reviewed. Thus, they both
knew about the accounts and corresponded with Plaintiff using those accounts, yet failed to
It was not until Ms. Maxwell subpoenaed records from Apple on June 8, 2016, that – two
days later – Plaintiff finally produced emails from the iCloud account. Menninger Decl., Ex. K.
Plaintiff still has failed to review or produce any documents from her live.com account or her
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hotmail account.3 Plaintiff’s attorneys claim they cannot access these accounts, or that those
accounts have been closed. See Doc. #207. Through the service of a subpoena on Microsoft,
Ms. Maxwell’s counsel has learned this is untrue. The hotmail account remains “active” and
Microsoft has preserved the information in that account. Ms. Maxwell’s counsel provided the
release from Microsoft so that the emails can be accessed. Menninger Decl. Ex. L. Plaintiff has
refused to execute the release to permit the document production. The hotmail account is active,
can be accessed, and Plaintiff has simply failed to review these accounts for relevant information
The limited information produced from the iCloud account shows that responsive
information exists. The production includes Plaintiff’s communications with FBI agent Jason
Richards in 2014 and suggests that Plaintiff was in regular communication with him at various
times, particularly in mid-2014. Despite this, few pieces of correspondence with Agent Richards
have been produced. Plaintiff also produced an email to Christina Pyror of the FBI but not any
The iCloud account also discloses a previously undisclosed potential witness, Sharon
March 2015 (well after the alleged defamatory statement), Plaintiff for the first time was doing
something to attempt to make Victims Refuse Silence look like a real organization. This timing
is important because it demonstrates Plaintiff was not in the purported profession of helping
victims prior to the alleged defamatory statements (January 2015), and therefore cannot claim
that the alleged defamatory statement related to her profession at the time the statement occurred.
3
Ms. Maxwell has issued subpoena for records from all of these accounts. Plaintiff had filed a motion for protective
order, and thus is still trying to prevent access to relevant discovery.
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uncovered in Plaintiff’s previously hidden accounts, including her hotmail account. What is
clear is that Ms. Maxwell has had no opportunity to depose Plaintiff about these issues,
In the April 21, 2016, hearing, the Court also ordered that Plaintiff produce records
relating to her employment history, including identifying her employer, dates of employment,
nature of employment and earnings. Menninger Decl., Ex. A at 25. These documents are
directly related to Plaintiff’s damages claims for lost earnings and loss of earning potential – i.e.
Plaintiff’s own actual historic earnings necessarily informs the basis for any claimed loss of
earnings. Based on the resumes provided by Plaintiff in discovery, Ms. Maxwell also requested
personnel record releases for all employers listed on Plaintiff’s resume, which were provided on
April 29, 2016. Prior to Plaintiff’s deposition, no employment records had been produced.
At Plaintiff’s deposition, Plaintiff admitted that much of her resume was fabricated and
replete with lies. Menninger Decl., Ex. D at 67-90. At least 3 of the employers included on the
resume were jobs she never held – she researched the internet to find places where she might
have worked, listed them as actual jobs, and then fictionalized her job description. With respect
to other employers, she expanded the end date of employment to fabricate a continual work
history. Plaintiff ultimately admitted that she has not held a single paid employment position
since 2006.
employment history. Through employment records releases (requested well before Plaintiff’s
deposition), Ms. Maxwell obtained employment records from Employment and Training
Australia, one of Plaintiff’s non-fabricated employers. Those records include pay history,
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showing that Plaintiff’s wage rate was under $28,000 per year.4 Until now, Ms. Maxwell has not
had the information necessary to examine Plaintiff on this lost income aspect of her damages
claims.
In the April 21, 2016, hearing, the Court also ordered Plaintiff to turn over her education
records. Again, this information, or forms to permit the release of the information, were
provided well in advance of the Plaintiff’s scheduled deposition, specifically February 12, to
permit full examination on these issues. Again, Plaintiff did not provide the releases until mere
days before her deposition, and only after this Court’s order. Since Plaintiff’s deposition,
various education documents have been obtained through those releases, specifically documents
from Plaintiff’s various high schools, including Wellington High School, Royal Palm High, and
Survivor’s Charter School. The records contain substantial information conflicting with
Plaintiff’s previous testimony. Ms. Maxwell is entitled to examine Plaintiff on this previously
undisclosed evidence.
Finally, on June 1, 2016, weeks after her deposition and in the final month of the fact
discovery period, Plaintiff filed her “Third Revised” Rule 26 disclosures. She has expanded her
list of witnesses with relevant information from 69 specific witnesses to 87. She curiously
removed witnesses previously disclosed. With regard to all of these witnesses, she fails to
identify who they are and what information they allegedly have that is relevant to the case. The
stock description for each person is “Has knowledge of Ghislaine Maxwell and Jeffery Epstein’s
sexual trafficking conduct and interaction with underage minors.” Menninger Decl, Ex. N at 14.
4
Plaintiff’s Rule 26(a) disclosure claims lost income as “estimated lost income of $180,000 annually, Present value
of $3,461,000 to $5,407,000. This is based solely on the “average” earning of a woman Plaintiff’s age. Obviously,
any actual lost earnings must be based on Plaintiff’s own earning history and work records, which is vastly different.
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These disclosures provide no actual information, such as the type of alleged knowledge, basis of
the knowledge or how the information is in any way relevant to this single count defamation
case. She also has amended her document disclosures list but has failed to produce any of the
new documents she has identified, despite repeated requests for these documents. Id. at 16.
These late disclosures are clearly improper and should be stricken under Rule 37(c), a
matter for a different motion. Nevertheless, these material changes include witnesses that were
obviously known to Plaintiff since the inception of the case. Ms. Maxwell is entitled to question
Plaintiff on these disclosures to determine what, if any, relevant information these newly
In total, Plaintiff has produced over 256 additional documents since her deposition, and
other documents have been obtained through previously withheld releases. As will be briefed
separately, there are multiple additional documents that have still not been produced. Of the
responses and her sworn deposition testimony. This is precisely the type of situation that
Plaintiff was instructed by her attorney not to answer certain questions during her
deposition without basis. The questions did not seek privileged information, were completely
It is axiomatic that counsel at a deposition “may instruct a deponent not to answer only
when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present
a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2); Redwood v. Dobson, 476 F.3d 462,
467-68 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Counsel for the witness may halt the deposition and apply for a
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protective order, see [Rule 30(d)(3)], but must not instruct the witness to remain silent.”);
Quantachrome Corp. v. Micromeritics Instrument Corp., 189 F.R.D. 697, 701 (S.D. Fla. 1999)
(counsel “may instruct the witness not to answer or may halt the deposition. Fed.R.Civ.P.
30(d)(3). Counsel may do so, though, only if he intends to move for a protective order under
Rule 30(d)(3)”); Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 525-26 (6th Cir. 2008) (“despite the lack of
relevancy of the questions to the claims asserted, absent a privilege or protective order, a
deponent must answer questions posed at a discovery deposition”). Where counsel improperly
instructs a witness not to answer, courts routinely require the deposition to be reopened. Keck,
At Plaintiff’s first deposition, Plaintiff was instructed not to answer three different areas
of inquiry where there was simply no basis for claiming any privilege or right to protection.
Plaintiff has never moved for a protective order on these lines of inquiry because there is no
First, Plaintiff was asked to identify any statements printed or published by Sharon
Churcher, the Daily Mail reporter who spent several days meeting with Plaintiff and published
numerous stories regarding Plaintiff in 2011 and thereafter. Plaintiff testified that despite her
very close relationship with Ms. Churcher, she no longer trusts Ms. Churcher and that Churcher
did not accurately report portions of what Plaintiff told her. Menninger Decl., Ex. D at 216-26.
When Plaintiff was asked to describe the statements Ms. Churcher reported that were inaccurate,
Plaintiff’s counsel refused to allow testimony unless Plaintiff was given all of Ms. Churcher’s
articles and had a chance to review them. Menninger Decl., Ex. D at 215-26. He refused to let
Plaintiff testify based on her own independent recollection. Id. This is simply improper, and
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The second area of inquiry on which Plaintiff was prohibited from testifying was her
communications with law enforcement since 2014, in particular regarding Ms. Maxwell.
Menninger Decl. Ex. D at 244-45. Counsel refused to let Plaintiff answer these questions despite
this Court’s order that Plaintiff was to turn over all documents concerning communications with
law enforcement, excepting only Plaintiff’s own statements to law enforcement which would be
provided for in camera review. Menninger Decl., Ex. A at 24. Rather than complying with this
very clear order, Plaintiff’s counsel refused to provide any documents regarding communications
with law enforcement agencies (including their own), and submitted all documents for in camera
review. Ms. Maxwell is entitled to all documents concerning contacts with law enforcement
(both her attorney’s communications, which have been ordered to be produced, and her own
statements, which the Court should order be produced), and to question Plaintiff regarding the
same.
The third question Plaintiff was prohibited from answering concerned her consultations
with an undisclosed psychiatrist sometime after 2015. Plaintiff’s counsel indicated this is a
consulting expert. Even if that is the case, Ms. Maxwell is entitled to the identity of this health
care provider. Manzo v. Stanley Black & Decker Inc., No. CV 13-3963 JFB SIL, 2015 WL
B.F. Diamond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179, 181–82 (D. Md. 1976) (same); Eisai Co. v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc., 247 F.R.D. 440, 441–42 (D.N.J. 2007) (same).
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The final and perhaps most compelling reason to reopen Plaintiff’s deposition is the fact
that Plaintiff filed an errata sheet for her deposition in which she materially contradicts her prior
sworn testimony. Menninger Decl., Ex. M. A court may reopen a deposition if the changes to
the transcript are made without adequate reasons, or if they are so substantial as to render the
transcript incomplete or useless. See Hlinko, 1997 WL 68563, at*1 (citing Allen & Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 341 (S.D.N.Y.1970)); see also Miller, 2014 WL
4979349, at *2.
her actual sworn testimony by changing “yes” answers to “no,” and indicating “clarification of
answer” as the basis for total revision. A vast majority of the 20 changes regard a very specific
date testified to by Plaintiff in her deposition that has a profound impact in this matter, as her
attorneys are fully aware. Specifically, Plaintiff was confronted with the fact that on no less than
10 occasions she has sworn under oath she met Ms. Maxwell in 1999, when she was 15 years
old. This is a lie. Plaintiff pinpoints this date based on the fact that she was working at the Mar-
A-Lago spa. Discovery has uncovered that Plaintiff did not work for the Mar-A-Lago until
2000, and Plaintiff’s self-prepared resume states that it was not until August of 2000 when she
was 17 years old. Plaintiff had been well coached on how to answer to the prior perjured
testimony, being prompted to claim that her sworn statements were a “mistake,” and that she
only learned her dates of employment at the Mar-A-Lago through discovery. Menninger Decl.,
Ex. D at 26. The question was then posed about when she “learned” of her mistake based on
discovery, to which Plaintiff clearly and unequivocally responded on no less than six occasions
that she learned her dates of employment at Mar-A-Lago in mid-2015 – before many of her
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sworn statements. After a break in the deposition and being coached by her counsel, Plaintiff
pulled back on her conviction regarding the date, and became less certain of the time frame, but
still put the time frame in late 2015. Id. at 66. After her deposition, she completely changed the
date she “learned” she was employed at Mar-A-Lago in 2000 to a firm date of mid-February
2016, over six months later than the date to which she originally testified based on her own
This is not the only substantive and completely contradictory change in the testimony.
Plaintiff revised her very clear and distinct answer that she traveled to France three times to
claims that she travelled to France “a few” times, and modified the credentials of her mental
health care provider – the previously undisclosed Dr. Judith Lightfoot – from psychiatrist to
psychologist.
The impact of the original (presumably true) testimony is a matter for another motion, as
is the effect of the true reasons the changes were made. For purposes of this motion, what is
important is that substantive contradictory changes by errata require that, at a minimum, Plaintiff
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Ms. Maxwell requests that the Court permit
Plaintiff’s deposition to be reopened for up to seven additional hours of examination, and order
that Plaintiff pay the costs and fees associated with deposition pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
30(d)(2).
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Respectfully submitted,
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on June 20, 2016, I electronically served this DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
REOPEN DEPOSITION OF PLAINTIFF VIRGINIA GIUFFRE via ECF on the following:
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