Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Decision and Risk Analysis at Du Pont
Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Decision and Risk Analysis at Du Pont
Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Decision and Risk Analysis at Du Pont
Decision
Making
Under
Uncertainty
493
make large-scale quantitative analysis feasible. Since that time, Du Pont has embraced
formal decision-making analysis in all its businesses, and the trend is almost certain to
continue.
The article describes a typical example of decision analysis within the company.
One of Du Pont’s businesses, Business Z (so-called for reasons of confidentiality), was
stagnating. It was not set up to respond quickly to changing customer demands, and
its financial position was declining due to lower prices and market share. A decision
board and a project team were empowered to turn things around. The project team
developed a detailed timetable to accomplish three basic steps: frame the problem,
assess uncertainties and perform the analysis, and implement the recommended deci-
sion. The first step involved setting up a “strategy table” to list the possible strategies
and the factors that would affect or be affected by them. The three basic strategies
were (1) a base-case strategy (continue operating as is), (2) a product differentiation
strategy (develop new products), and (3) a cost leadership strategy (shut down the
plant and streamline the product line).
In the second step, the team asked a variety of experts throughout the company for
their assessments of the likelihood of key uncertain events. In the analysis step they then
used all of the information gained to determine the strategy with the largest expected
net present value. Two important aspects of this analysis step were the extensive use of
sensitivity analysis (many what-if questions) and the emergence of new “hybrid” strat-
egies that dominated the strategies that had been considered to that point. In partic-
ular, the team finally decided on a product differentiation strategy that also decreased
costs by shutting down some facilities in each plant.
By the time of the third step, implementation, the decision board needed little
convincing. Since all of the key people had been given the opportunity to provide input
to the process, everyone was convinced that the right strategy had been selected. All
that was left was to put the plan in motion and monitor its results. The results were
impressive. Business Z made a complete turnaround, and its net present value in-
creased by close to $200 million. Besides this tangible benefit, there were definite
intangible benefits from the overall process. As Du Pont’s vice president for finance
said, “The D&RA [decision and risk analysis] process improved communication within
the business team as well as between the team and corporate management, resulting in
rapid approval and execution. As a decision maker, I highly value such a clear and
logical approach to making choices under uncertainty and will continue to use D&RA
whenever possible.” ■
10.1 INTRODUCTION
n this chapter we will provide a formal framework for analyzing decision prob-
I lems that involve uncertainty. We will discuss the most frequently used criteria for
choosing among alternative decisions, how probabilities are used in the decision-
making process, how decisions made at an early stage affect decisions made at a later
stage, how a decision maker can quantify the value of information, and how attitudes
toward risk can affect the analysis. Throughout, we will employ a powerful graphi-
cal tool—decision trees—to guide the analysis. A decision tree enables the decision
maker to view all important aspects of the problem at once: the decision alternatives,
the uncertain outcomes and their probabilities, the economic consequences, and the
chronological order of events. We will show how to implement decision trees in Ex-
cel by taking advantage of a very powerful and flexible add-in from Palisade called
PrecisionTree.
A texts, all problems have three elements in common: (1) the set of decisions (or
strategies) available to the decision maker, (2) the set of possible outcomes
and the probabilities of these outcomes, and (3) a value model that prescribes results,
usually monetary values, for the various combinations of decisions and outcomes.
Once these elements are known, the decision maker can find an “optimal” decision,
depending on the optimality criterion chosen. Rather than discussing these elements in
the abstract, we introduce them in the context of the following extended example.
E XAMPLE 10.1
BIDDING FOR A GOVERNMENT CONTRACT
AT SCITOOLS
SciTools Incorporated, a company that specializes in scientific instruments, has been
invited to make a bid on a government contract. The contract calls for a specific number
of these instruments to be delivered during the coming year. The bids must be sealed (so
that no company knows what the others are bidding), and the low bid wins the contract.
SciTools estimates that it will cost $5000 to prepare a bid and $95,000 to supply the
instruments if it wins the contract. On the basis of past contracts of this type, SciTools
believes that the possible low bids from the competition, if there is any competition,
and the associated probabilities are those shown in Table 10.1. In addition, SciTools
believes there is a 30% chance that there will be no competing bids.
Solution
Let’s discuss the three elements of SciTools’ problem. First, SciTools has two basic
strategies: submit a bid or do not submit a bid. If SciTools submits a bid, then it must
decide how much to bid. Based on SciTools’ cost to prepare the bid and its cost to
supply the instruments, there is obviously no point in bidding less than $100,000—
SciTools wouldn’t make a profit even if it won the bid. Although any bid amount over
1
The problem with a bid such as $117,000 is that the data in Table 10.1 make it impossible to calculate the
probability of SciTools winning the contract if it bids this amount. Other than this, however, there is
nothing that rules out such an “in-between” bid.
Risk Profiles From Table 10.3 we can obtain risk profiles for each of SciTools’ deci-
sions. A risk profile simply lists all possible monetary values and their corresponding
probabilities. For example, if SciTools bids $120,000, there are two monetary values
possible, a profit of $20,000 or a loss of $5000, and their probabilities are 0.58 and
0.42, respectively. On the other hand, if SciTools decides not to bid, there is a sure
monetary value of $0—no profit, no loss.
A risk profile can also be illustrated graphically as a bar chart. There is a bar above
each possible monetary value with height proportional to the probability of that value.
For example, the risk profile for a $120,000 bid decision is a bar chart with two bars,
one above −$5000 with height 0.42 and one above $20,000 with height 0.58. The risk
profile for the “no bid” decision is even simpler. It has a single bar above $0 with
height 1. We have not shown these bar charts for this example because they are so
simple, but in more complex examples they can provide very useful information.
Expected Monetary Value (EMV) From the information we have discussed so far,
it is not at all obvious which decision SciTools should make. The “no bid” decision
is certainly safe, but it is certain to make zero profit. If SciTools decides to bid, the
probability that it will lose $5000 is smallest with the $115,000 bid, but this bid has the
smallest potential profit. Of course, if SciTools knew what the competitors were going
to do, its decision would be easy. However, this uncertainty is the defining aspect of the
problems in this chapter. The decision must be made before the uncertainty is resolved.
The most common way to make the choice is to calculate the expected monetary
value (EMV) of each alternative and then choose the alternative with the largest EMV.
The EMV is a weighted average of the possible monetary values, weighted by their
probabilities. Formally, if vi is the monetary value corresponding to outcome i and pi
is its probability, then EMV is defined as
EMV = vi pi
In words, EMV is the mean of the probability distribution of possible monetary out-
comes.
The EMVs for SciTools’ problem are listed in Table 10.4. They indicate that if
SciTools uses the EMV criterion for making its decision, it should bid $115,000, as
this yields the largest EMV.
It is very important to understand what an EMV implies and what it does not imply.
If SciTools bids $115,000, then its EMV is $12,200. However, SciTools will certainly
not earn a profit of $12,200. It will earn $15,000 or it will lose $5000. So what does the
EMV of $12,200 really mean? It means that if SciTools could enter many “gambles”
like this, where on each gamble it would win $15,000 with probability 0.86 or lose
$5000 with probability 0.14, then on average it would win $12,200 per gamble. In
other words, the EMV can be interpreted as a long-term average.
It might seem peculiar, then, to base a one-time decision on EMV, which represents
a long-term average. There are two ways to explain this apparent inconsistency. First,
most companies make frequent decisions under uncertainty. Although each decision
might have its own unique characteristics, it seems reasonable that if the company
plans to make many such decisions, it should be willing to “play the averages,” as
it does when it uses EMV as the decision criterion. Second, even if this is the only
such decision the company is ever going to make, decision theorists have proven that
under certain conditions, maximizing EMV is a rational basis for making this decision.
These “certain conditions” relate to the decision maker’s attitude toward risk. As we
will discuss later in this chapter, if the decision maker is risk averse and the possible
monetary payoffs or losses are large relative to her wealth, then EMV is not the
appropriate decision criterion to use. However, the EMV criterion has proved useful in
the vast majority of decision-making applications, so we will use it throughout most
of this chapter.
Decision Trees By now, we have gone through most of the steps of solving SciTools’
problem. We have listed the decision alternatives, the uncertain outcomes and their
probabilities, and the profits and losses from all combinations of decisions and out-
comes. We have then calculated the EMV for each alternative and have chosen the
alternative with the largest EMV. All of this can be done efficiently using a graphical
tool called a decision tree. The decision tree that corresponds to SciTools’ problem
appears in Figure 10.1 (page 500). (This figure is actually part of an Excel spreadsheet
and was created with the PrecisionTree add-in. We will explain how it was created
shortly.)
Decision Tree Conventions To understand Figure 10.1, we need to know the following
conventions that have been established for decision trees.
1. Decision trees are composed of nodes (circles, squares, and triangles) and branches
(lines).
2. The nodes represent points in time. A decision node (a square) is a time when the
decision maker makes a decision. A probability node (a circle) is a time when the
result of an uncertain event becomes known. An end node (a triangle) indicates
that the problem is completed—all decisions have been made, all uncertainty has
been resolved, and all payoffs/costs have been incurred.
3. Time proceeds from left to right. This means that any branches leading into a node
(from the left) have already occurred. Any branches leading out of a node (to the
right) have not yet occurred.
4. Branches leading out of a decision node represent the possible decisions; the de-
cision maker can choose the preferred branch. Branches leading out of probability
nodes represent the possible outcomes of uncertain events; the decision maker has
no control over which of these will occur.
5. Probabilities are listed on probability branches. These probabilities are conditional
on the events that have already been observed (those to the left). Furthermore, the
probabilities on branches leading out of any particular probability node must sum
to 1.
6. Individual monetary values are shown on the branches where they occur, and
cumulative monetary values are shown to the right of the end nodes. (Actually,
PrecisionTree shows two values to the right of each end node. The top one is
the probability of getting to that end node, and the bottom one is the associated
monetary value.)
The decision tree in Figure 10.1 illustrates these conventions for a single-stage
decision problem, the simplest type of decision problem. In a single-stage problem
all decisions are made first, and then all uncertainty is resolved. Later in this chapter
Folding Back Procedure The solution procedure used to develop Figure 10.2 is called
folding back on the tree. Starting at the right of the tree and working back to the left,
the procedure consists of two types of calculations.
1. At each probability node, we calculate the EMV (sum of monetary values times
probabilities) and write it below the name of the node. For example, consider the
node (top right) after SciTools’ decision to bid $115,000 and after it learns that
The PrecisionTree Add-In Decision trees present a challenge for Excel. We must
somehow take advantage of Excel’s calculating capabilities (to calculate EMVs, for
example) and its graphical capabilities (to depict the decision tree). Fortunately, there is
now a powerful add-in, PrecisionTree developed by Palisade Corporation, that makes
the process relatively straightforward.2 This add-in not only enables us to build and
label a decision tree, but it performs the folding-back procedure automatically and then
allows us to perform sensitivity analysis on key input parameters.
The first thing you must do to use PrecisionTree is to “add it in.” You do this
in two steps. First, you must install the Palisade Decision Tools suite (or at least the
PrecisionTree program) with the Setup program on the CD-ROM accompanying this
book. Of course, you need to do this only once. Then to run PrecisionTree, there are
three options:
2
The educational version of PrecisionTree included with this book is slightly scaled down from Palisade’s
commercial version of PrecisionTree. The difference you are most likely to notice is that the educational
version permits only 50 nodes—of all types combined—in a decision tree.
FIGURE 10.3
Palisade Decision
Tools Toolbar
You will know that PrecisionTree is ready for use when you see its toolbar (shown
in Figure 10.4) and a PrecisionTree menu to the left of the Help menu. By the way, if you
want to unload PrecisionTree without closing Excel, use the PrecisionTree/Help/About
menu item and click on Unload. It’s a bit unconventional, but it works.
Using PrecisionTree PrecisionTree is quite easy to use—at least its most basic items
are—but it can be confusing at first. We will lead you through the steps for the SciTools
example. (The file SCITOOLS.XLS shows the results of this procedure, but you should
work through the steps on your own, starting with a blank spreadsheet.)
1. Inputs. Enter the inputs shown in columns A and B of Figure 10.5.
2. New tree. Click on the new tree button (the far left button) on the PrecisionTree
toolbar, and then click on any cell (say, cell A14) below the input section to start
a new tree. Click on the name box of this new tree (it probably says “tree #1”)
to open a dialog box. Type in a descriptive name for the tree, such as SciTools
Bidding, and click on OK. You should now see the beginnings of a tree, as shown
in Figure 10.6 (page 504).
3. Decision nodes and branches. From here on, keep the finished tree in Figure 10.2
in mind. This is the finished product we eventually want. To obtain decision nodes
FIGURE 10.4
PrecisionTree
Toolbar
FIGURE 10.5
Inputs for SciTools
Bidding Example
and branches, click on the (only) triangle end node to open the dialog box in Figure
10.7. Click on the green square to indicate that this is a decision node, and fill in
the dialog box as shown. We’re calling this decision “Bid?” and specifying that
there are two possible decisions. The tree expands as shown in Figure 10.8. The
boxes that say “branch” show the default labels for these branches. Click on either
of them to open another dialog box where you can provide a more descriptive
name for the branch. Do this to label the two branches “No” and “Yes.” Also, you
can enter the immediate payoff/cost for either branch right below it. Since there is
a $5000 cost of bidding, enter the formula
=-BidCost
right below the “Yes” branch in cell B19. (It is negative to reflect a cost.) The tree
should now appear as in Figure 10.9.
4. More decision branches. The top branch is completed; if SciTools does not bid,
there is nothing left to do. So click on the bottom end node, following SciTools’
decision to bid, and proceed as in the previous step to add and label the decision
FIGURE 10.7
Dialog Box for
Adding a New
Decision Node and
Branches
FIGURE 10.8
Tree with Initial
Decision Node and
Branches
FIGURE 10.9
Decision Tree with
Decision Branches
Labeled
FIGURE 10.10
Tree with All
Decision Nodes and
Branches
FIGURE 10.11 Decision Tree with One Set of Probability Nodes and Branches
Risk Profile of Optimal Strategy Once the decision tree is completed, PrecisionTree
has several tools we can use to gain more information about the decision analysis.
First, we can see a risk profile and other information about the optimal decision. To
do so, click on the fourth button from the left on the PrecisionTree toolbar (it looks
like a staircase) and fill in the resulting dialog box as shown in Figure 10.13. (You can
experiment with other options.) The Policy Suggestion option allows us to see only
that part of the tree that corresponds to the best decision, as shown in Figure 10.14
(page 508).
The Risk Profile option allows us to see a graphical risk profile of the optimal
decision. (If we checked the Statistics Report box, we would also see this information
numerically.) As the risk profile in Figure 10.15 (page 508) shows, there are only two
possible monetary outcomes if SciTools bids $115,000. It either wins $15,000 or loses
$5000, and the former is much more likely. (The associated probabilities are 0.86 and
0.14.) This graphical information is even more useful when there are a larger number
of possible monetary outcomes. We can see what they are and how likely they are.
FIGURE 10.13
Dialog Box for
Information About
Optimal Decision
FIGURE 10.15
Risk Profile of
Optimal Decision
FIGURE 10.17
EMV versus
Production Cost for
Each of Two
Decisions
(bid or don’t bid). This type of graph is useful for seeing whether the optimal decision
changes over the range of the input variable. It does so only if the two lines cross. In
this particular graph it is clear that the “Bid” decision dominates the “No bid” decision
over the production cost range we selected.
The Tornado sheet shows how sensitive the EMV of the optimal decision is to
each of the selected inputs over the ranges selected. (See Figure 10.18 (page 510).)
The length of each bar shows the percentage change in the EMV in either direction,
so the longer the bar, the more sensitive this EMV is to the particular input. The bars
are always arranged from longest on top to shortest on the bottom—hence the name
tornado chart. Here we see that production cost has the largest effect on EMV, and bid
cost has the smallest effect.
Finally, the Spider Chart sheet contains the chart in Figure 10.19. It shows how
much the optimal EMV varies in magnitude for various percentage changes in the input
variables. The steeper the slope of the line, the more the EMV is affected by a particular
input. We again see that the production cost has a relatively large effect, whereas the
other two inputs have relatively small effects.
Each time we click on the sensitivity button, we can run a different sensitivity
analysis. An interesting option is to run a two-way analysis (by clicking on the Two
FIGURE 10.19
Spider Chart for
SciTools Example
Way button in Figure 10.16). Then we see how the selected EMV varies as each pair
of inputs vary simultaneously. We analyzed the EMV in cell C29 with this option,
using the same inputs as before. A typical result is shown in Figure 10.20. For each
of the possible values of production cost and the probability of no competitor bid, this
chart indicates which bid amount is optimal. (By choosing cell C29, we are assuming
SciTools will bid; the question is only how much.) As we see, the optimal bid amount
remains $115,000 unless the production cost and the probability of no competing bid
are both large. Then it becomes optimal to bid $125,000. This makes sense intuitively.
As the chance of no competing bid increases and a larger production cost must be
recovered, it seems reasonable that SciTools should increase its bid.
FIGURE 10.20
Two-Way Sensitivity
Analysis
PROBLEMS
decide on November 1 how many pairs of the subsequently selling pairs of the new tennis shoes.
manufacturer’s newest model of tennis shoes to order Also, perform sensitivity analysis on the optimal
for sale during the upcoming summer season. decision and summarize your findings. In
Assume that each pair of this new brand of tennis response to which model inputs is the expected
shoes costs the department store chain $45 per pair. earnings value most sensitive?
Furthermore, assume that each pair of these shoes can c. Generate a risk profile for the buyer’s optimal
then be sold to the chain’s customers for $70 per pair. decision.
Any pairs of these shoes remaining unsold at the end
of the summer season will be sold in a closeout sale Skill-Extending Problems
next fall for $35 each. The probability distribution of
7. In designing a new space vehicle, NASA needs to
consumer demand for these tennis shoes (in hundreds
decide whether to provide 0, 1, or 2 backup systems
of pairs) during the upcoming summer season has
for a critical component of the vehicle. The first
been assessed by market research specialists and is
backup system, if included, comes into use only if the
provided in Table 10.9. Finally, assume that the
original system fails. The second backup system, if
department store chain must purchase these tennis
included, comes into use only if the original system
shoes from the manufacturer in lots of 100 pairs.
and the first backup system both fail. NASA
engineers claim that each system, independently of
TABLE 10.9 Distribution of the others, has a 1% chance of failing if called into
Consumer Demand use. Each backup system costs $70,000 to produce
for Tennis Shoes and install within the vehicle. Once the vehicle is in
flight, the mission will be scrubbed only if the
Consumer
original system and all backups fail. The cost of a
Demand Probability
scrubbed mission, in addition to production costs, is
1 0.025 assessed to be $8,000,000.
2 0.050 a. Use the PrecisionTree add-in to identify the
3 0.075 strategy that minimizes NASA’s expected total
cost. Also, perform sensitivity analysis on the
4 0.100
optimal decision and summarize your findings. In
5 0.150 response to which model inputs is the expected
6 0.200 earnings value most sensitive?
7 0.175 b. Generate a risk profile for NASA’s optimal
8 0.100 decision.
8. Mr. Maloy has just bought a new $30,000 sport utility
9 0.075
vehicle. As a reasonably safe driver, he believes that
10 0.050 there is only about a 5% chance of being in an
accident in the forthcoming year. If he is involved in
an accident, the damage to his new vehicle depends
a. Formulate a payoff table that specifies the on the severity of the accident. The probability
contribution to profit (in dollars) from the sale of distribution for the range of possible accidents and
the tennis shoes by this department store chain for the corresponding damage amounts (in dollars) are
each possible purchase decision (in hundreds of given in Table 10.10 (page 514). Mr. Maloy is trying
pairs) and each outcome with respect to consumer to decide whether he is willing to pay $170 each year
demand. for collision insurance with a $300 deductible. Note
b. Use the PrecisionTree add-in to identify the that with this type of insurance, he pays the first $300
strategy that maximizes the department store in damages if he causes an accident and the insurance
chain’s expected profit earned by purchasing and company pays the remainder.
Solution
Clearly, the solution will vary from one employee to another, depending on the assessed
probability distribution of medical expenses. To illustrate, however, we will consider
an employee who assesses the distribution of yearly medical expenses shown in Table
10.12. These expenses include hospital visits, surgery, office visits, and prescriptions,
all of which are covered under the terms of the plans. As in the previous example, this
distribution is only an approximation of the real distribution, which would contain a
continuum of expenses. However, it is probably adequate for making a decision among
the three plans.
The next step is to determine the employee’s cost for each plan and each outcome.
For example, suppose that the employee chooses plan 1 and incurs $600 in expenses.
Then the total cost is the cost of the insurance plus the full amount of the first $500 in
expenses plus 10% of the last $100 in expenses, that is,
24(12) + 500 + 0.1(100) = $798
However, if this employee’s medical expenses are only $200, then the cost is
24(12) + 200 = $488
3
We assume that these terms apply only to the employee; that is, these are not family plans.
PRECISION
USING PRECISIONTREE
TREE
The decision tree can be formed with the following steps.
●
1 Inputs. Enter the inputs for the three plans and the probabilities from Table 10.12
in the top left portion of the spreadsheet (down to row 15). (See Figure 10.21 and the
file MEDICAL.XLS.)
●2 Cost table. For later use in the decision tree, calculate the costs to the employee
(not counting insurance premiums) in the range B19:D23. To do this, enter the formula
=IF($A19<=B$6,$A19,B$6+B$7*($A19-B$6))
FIGURE 10.21
Inputs and Cost
Table for Medical
Example
FIGURE 10.22
Decision Tree for
Medical Insurance
Example
The following example illustrates one method for using a continuous probability
distribution in a decision tree model.
E XAMPLE 10.3
PURCHASING LIGHTBULBS AT FRESHWAY
SUPERMARKETS
FreshWay, a chain of supermarkets, requires 24,000 fluorescent lightbulbs for its stores.
There are two suppliers of these lightbulbs. Supplies A offers them at $4.00 per bulb
and will replace the first 900 defective bulbs with guaranteed good ones for $3.00 each.
It will replace all defectives after the first 900 for nothing. Supplier B is similar. It will
charge $4.15 per bulb, replace the first 1200 defectives for $1.00 each, and replace all
defectives after the first 1200 for nothing. FreshWay plans to sell these lightbulbs for
$4.40 apiece and charge its customers nothing for replacement of defectives. The only
uncertainty is the number of defective bulbs from either supplier. Based on historical
data from each supplier, FreshWay believes that the percentage of defectives is normally
distributed with mean 4% and standard deviation 1% from supplier A, and mean 4.2%
and standard deviation 1.2% from supplier B. Which supplier should be chosen to
maximize FreshWay’s EMV?
Solution
Let p be the percentage of lightbulbs that are defective. Then the profit to FreshWay
from buying from supplier A is
24,000(4.40 − 4.00) − (24,000 p)(3.00) if p ≤ 900/24,000
Profit =
24,000(4.40 − 4.00) − (900)(3.00) if p > 900/24,000
A similar expression holds for supplier B. The only random quantity in this expression
is p, which is normally distributed. The question is how we can model the continuous
distribution of p in a discrete decision tree—that is, a tree with a discrete number
FIGURE 10.23
Inputs and
Calculations for
Lightbulb Example
PRECISION
USING PRECISIONTREE
TREE
It is now straightforward to construct the decision tree shown in Figure 10.24 (page 520).
We enter the revenue from selling the bulbs and the cost of purchasing them in cells
B33 and B47. For example, the formula in cell B33 is
=Quantity*(SellingPrice-B7)
Then we link the monetary values below the probability branches to the relevant cells
in the D17:D26 range.
The EMVs for suppliers A and B are $7088 and $5027, so supplier A is the clear
choice. Evidently, the higher price charged by supplier B and its slightly higher mean
percentage of defects outweigh its better deal on replacing defectives. Of course, if
supplier B really wants to get FreshWay’s business, it could attempt to sweeten its deal
in a number of ways. Sensitivity analysis is useful to see how the EMV for supplier
B (in cell C47) is affected by the various input parameters. We tried this, varying the
inputs in cells B8, C8, D8, and B13 by PrecisionTree’s default values (10% in either
direction) and keeping track of the change in the EMV for supplier B. The tornado chart
in Figure 10.25 makes it very clear that the most important input is the unit purchase
cost. The effects of the other three inputs are practically negligible in comparison. If
supplier B wants FreshWay’s business, it will have to lower its unit purchase cost.
FIGURE 10.25
Tornado Chart to
Analyze the EMV
for Supplier B
PROBLEMS
S a problem where the decision maker must make at least two decisions that
are separated in time, such as when a company must decide whether to buy
information that will help it make a second decision. The following example illustrates
the typical situation.
E XAMPLE 10.4
MARKETING A NEW PRODUCT AT ACME
The Acme Company is trying to decide whether to market a new product. As in
many new-product situations, there is considerable uncertainty about whether the new
product will eventually “catch on.” Acme believes that it might be prudent to introduce
the product in a regional test market before introducing it nationally. Therefore, the
company’s first decision is whether to conduct the test market. Acme estimates that the
fixed cost of the test market is $3 million. If it decides to conduct the test market, it
must then wait for the results. Based on the results of the test market, it can then decide
whether to market the product nationally, in which case it will incur a fixed cost of
$90 million. On the other hand, if the original decision is not to run a test market, then
the final decision—whether to market the product nationally—can be made without
further delay. Acme’s unit margin, the difference between its selling price and its unit
variable cost, is $18 (in the test market and in the national market).
Acme classifies the results in either the test market or the national market as great,
fair, or awful. Each of these is accompanied by a forecast of total units sold. These sales
volumes (in 1000s of units) are 200, 100, and 30 for the test market and 6000, 3000,
and 900 for the national market. Based on previous test markets for similar products,
Acme estimates that probabilities of the three test market outcomes are 0.3, 0.6, and
0.1. Then, based on historical data from previous products that were test marketed
and eventually marketed nationally, it assesses the probabilities of the national market
outcomes given each possible test market outcome. If the test market is great, the
probabilities for the national market outcomes are 0.8, 0.15, and 0.05. If the test market
is fair, these probabilities are 0.3, 0.5, and 0.2. If the test market is awful, they are
0.05, 0.25, and 0.7. (Note how the probabilities of the national market outcomes tend
to mirror the test market outcomes.)
The company wants to use a decision tree approach to find the best strategy.
PRECISION
USING PRECISIONTREE
TREE
The inputs for the decision tree appear in Figure 10.26 (page 526). (See file ACME.
XLS.) The only calculated values in this part of the spreadsheet are in row 28, which
follow from equation (10.1). Specifically, the formula in cell B28 is
=SUMPRODUCT(B22:B24,$B$16:$B$18)
which we copy across row 28. The tree is then straightforward to build and label, as
shown in Figure 10.27 (page 527). Note how the fixed costs of test marketing and
marketing nationally appear on the decision branches where they occur, so that only
the selling profits need to be placed on the probability branches. Also, the probabilities
on the various probability branches are exactly those listed in Figure 10.26.
The interpretation of this tree is fairly straightforward if we realize that each value
just below each node name is an EMV. For example, the 807 in cell B43 is the EMV for
the entire decision problem. It means that Acme’s best EMV is $807,000. As another
example, the 5910 in cell D47 means that if Acme ever gets to that point—the test
market has been conducted and it has been great—the EMV for ACME is $5,910,000.
Each of these EMVs has been calculated by the folding-back procedure we discussed
earlier, starting from the right and working back toward the left. PrecisionTree takes
EMVs at probability nodes and maximums at decision nodes.
We can also see Acme’s optimal strategy by following the “TRUE” branches from
left to right. Acme should first run a test market. If the test market results are great,
then the product should be marketed nationally. However, if the test market results are
only fair or awful, the product should be abandoned. In these cases the prospects from
a national market look bleak, so Acme should cut its losses. (And there are losses. In
these latter two cases, Acme has spent $3,000,000 on the test market and has recouped
only $1,800,000 or $540,000 on test market sales.)
The risk profile from the optimal strategy appears in Figure 10.28 (page 528). It
is based on the data in Figure 10.29 (page 528). (These were obtained by clicking on
PrecisionTree’s “staircase” button and selecting the Statistics and Risk Profile options.)
We see that there is a small chance of two possible large losses (approximately $73
million and $35 million), there is a 70% chance of a moderate loss of about $1 or $2
million, and there is a 24% chance of an $18.6 million profit. Of course, the net effect
is an EMV of $807,000.
You might argue that the large potential losses and the slightly higher than 70%
chance of some loss should persuade Acme to abandon the product right away—without
a test market. However, this is what “playing the averages” with EMV is all about.
Since the EMV of this optimal strategy is greater than 0, the EMV of abandoning the
product right away, Acme should go ahead with this optimal strategy if the company is
indeed an EMV maximizer. In Section 10.8 we will see how this reasoning can change
if Acme is a risk-averse decision maker—as it might be with multimillion dollar losses
looming in the future!
Expected Value of Sample Information The role of the test market in the Acme
marketing example is to provide information in the form of more accurate probabilities
of national market results. Information usually costs something, as it does in Acme’s
problem. Currently, the fixed cost of the test market is $3 million, which is evidently not
too much to pay because Acme’s best strategy is to conduct the test market. However,
we might ask how much this test market is worth. This is easy to answer. From the
decision tree in Figure 10.27, we see that the EMV from test marketing is $807,000
better than the decision not to test market (and then abandon the product). Therefore, if
the fixed cost of test marketing were any more than $807,000 above its current value,
FIGURE 10.29
Distribution of
Profit/Loss from the
Optimal Strategy
Acme would be better not to run a test market. Equivalently, the most Acme would be
willing to pay for the test market (as a fixed cost) is $3.807 million.
This value is called the expected value of sample information, or EVSI. In
general, we can write the following expression for EVSI:
EVSI = EMV with free information − EMV without information
In Acme’s problem, the EMV with free information is $3.807 million (just don’t charge
for the test market fixed cost), and the EMV without any test market information is $0
(because Acme abandons the product when there is no test market available). Therefore,
EVSI = $3.807 − $0 = $3.807 million
Expected Value of Perfect Information The reason for the term sample is that the
information does not remove all uncertainty about the future. That is, even after the
test market results are in, there is still uncertainty about the national market results.
Therefore, we might go one step further and ask how much perfect information is
worth. We can imagine perfect information as an envelope that contains the true final
outcome (of the national market). That is, either “the national market will be great,”
“the national market will be fair,” or “the national market will be awful” is written
inside the envelope. Admittedly, no such envelope exists, but if it did, how much would
Acme be willing to pay for it?
We can answer this question with the simple decision tree in Figure 10.30. Now
the probability node on the left corresponds to opening the envelope. Its probabilities
are the same as before (when there is no test market available). Note the reasoning
here. Acme doesn’t know what the contents of the envelope will be, so we need a
probability node. However, once the envelope is opened, the true national market
outcome will be revealed. At that point Acme’s decision is fairly obvious. If it learns
that a national market will be great, it knows the product will be profitable and will
market it. Otherwise, if it learns that the national market will be fair or poor, it knows
that there will be a loss from marketing nationally, so it will abandon the product.
Folding back in the usual way produces an EMV of $7.65 million.
Now compare this $7.65 million with the EMV in the top part of Figure 10.27 that
results from no test market, namely, $0. The difference, $7.65 million, is called the
expected value of perfect information, or EVPI. It represents the maximum amount
the company would pay for perfect information about the final outcome (of the national
market). In general, the expression for EVPI is
EVPI = EMV with free perfect information − EMV with no information
In Acme’s case this expression becomes
EVPI = $7.65 − $0 = $7.65 million
The EVPI may appear to be an irrelevant concept since perfect information is almost
never available—at any price. However, it is often useful because it represents an upper
bound on the EVSI for any potential sample information. That is, no sample information
can ever be worth more than the EVPI. For example, if Acme is contemplating an
expensive test market with an anticipated fixed cost of more than $8 million, then
there is really no point in pursuing it any further. The information gained from this test
market, no matter how reliable it is, cannot possibly justify its cost because its cost is
greater than the EVPI. ■
Skill-Building Problems 40% chance that its annual maintenance cost will be
$300. The CPA’s office manager believes that the
19. The senior executives of an oil company are trying repairperson will issue a satisfactory report on the
to decide whether to drill for oil in a particular field first machine with probability 0.50.
in the Gulf of Mexico. It costs the company a. Provided that the CPA wishes to minimize
$300,000 to drill in the selected field. Company the expected total cost of purchasing and
executives believe that if oil is found in this field its maintaining one of these two machines for a
estimated value will be $1,800,000. At present, this 1-year period, which machine should she
oil company believes that there is a 50% chance that purchase? When, if ever, would it be worthwhile
the selected field actually contains oil. Before for the CPA to obtain the repairperson’s review
drilling, the company can hire a geologist at a cost of the first machine?
of $30,000 to prepare a report that contains a b. Compute and interpret the expected value of
recommendation regarding drilling in the selected sample information (EVSI) in this decision
field. There is a 55% chance that the geologist problem.
will issue a favorable recommendation and a c. Compute and interpret the expected value of
45% chance that the geologist will issue an perfect information (EVPI) in this decision
unfavorable recommendation. Given a favorable problem.
recommendation from the geologist, there is a 75% 21. FineHair is developing a new product to promote
chance that the field actually contains oil. Given an hair growth in cases of male pattern baldness. If
unfavorable recommendation from the geologist, FineHair markets the new product and it is
there is a 15% chance that the field actually successful, the company will earn $500,000 in
contains oil. additional profit. If the marketing of this new
a. Assuming that this oil company wishes to product proves to be unsuccessful, the company will
maximize its expected net earnings, determine its lose $350,000 in development and marketing
optimal strategy through the use of a decision costs. In the past, similar products have been
tree. successful 60% of the time. At a cost of $50,000, the
b. Compute and interpret the expected value of effectiveness of the new restoration product can be
sample information (EVSI) in this decision thoroughly tested. If the results of such testing are
problem. favorable, there is an 80% chance that the marketing
c. Compute and interpret the expected value of efforts of this new product will be successful. If the
perfect information (EVPI) in this decision results of such testing are not favorable, there is a
problem. mere 30% chance that the marketing efforts of this
20. A local certified public accountant must decide new product will be successful. FineHair currently
which of two copying machines to purchase for her believes that the probability of receiving favorable
expanding business. The cost of purchasing the first test results is 0.60.
machine is $4500, and the cost of maintaining the a. Identify the strategy that maximizes FineHair’s
first machine each year is uncertain. The CPA’s expected net earnings in this situation.
office manager believes that the annual maintenance b. Compute and interpret the expected value of
cost for the first machine will be $0, $150, or $300 sample information (EVSI) in this decision
with probabilities 0.35, 0.35, and 0.30, respectively. problem.
The cost of purchasing the second machine is c. Compute and interpret the expected value of
$3000, and the cost of maintaining the second perfect information (EVPI) in this decision
machine through a guaranteed maintenance problem.
agreement is $225 per year. 22. Hank is considering placing a bet on the upcoming
Before the purchase decision is made, the showdown between the Penn State and Michigan
CPA can hire an experienced copying machine football teams in State College. The winner of this
repairperson to evaluate the quality of the first contest will represent the Big Ten Conference in the
machine. Such an evaluation would cost the CPA Rose Bowl on New Year’s Day. Without any
$60. If the repairperson believes that the first additional information, Hank believes that each team
machine is satisfactory, there is a 65% chance that has an equal chance of winning this big game. If he
its annual maintenance cost will be $0 and a 35% wins the bet, he will win $500; if he loses the bet, he
chance that its annual maintenance cost will be will lose $550. Before placing his bet, he may decide
$150. If, however, the repairperson believes that the to pay his friend Al, who happens to be a football
first machine is unsatisfactory, there is a 60% chance sportswriter for the Philadelphia Enquirer, $50 for
that its annual maintenance cost will be $150 and a Al’s expert prediction on the game. Assume that Al
I and probability nodes. The decision maker makes a decision, some uncertain out-
comes are observed, the decision maker makes another decision, more uncertain
outcomes are observed, and so on. In the resulting decision tree, all probability branches
at the right of the tree are conditional on outcomes that have occurred earlier, to their
left. Therefore, the probabilities on these branches are of the form P( A|B), where B
is an event that occurs before event A in time. However, it is sometimes more natural
to assess conditional probabilities in the opposite order, that is, P(B| A). Whenever
this is the case, we require Bayes’ rule to obtain the probabilities we need on the tree.
Essentially, Bayes’ rule is a mechanism for updating probabilities as new information
becomes available. We illustrate the mechanics of Bayes’ rule in the following example.
[See Feinstein (1990) for a real application of this example.]
E XAMPLE 10.5
DRUG TESTING COLLEGE ATHLETES
If an athlete is tested for a certain type of drug usage (steroids, say), then the test result
will be either positive or negative. However, these tests are never perfect. Some athletes
who are drug free test positive, and some who are drug users test negative. The former
are called false positives; the latter are called false negatives. We will assume that 5%
Solution
Let D and N D denote that a randomly chosen athlete is or is not a drug user, and
let T + and T − indicate a positive or negative test result. We are given the following
probabilities. First, since 5% of all athletes are drug users, we know that P(D) =
0.05 and P(N D) = 0.95. These are called prior probabilities because they represent
the chance that an athlete is or is not a drug user prior to the results of a drug
test. Second, from the information on drug test accuracy, we know the conditional
probabilities P(T + |N D) = 0.03 and P(T − |D) = 0.07. But a drug-free athlete tests
either positive or negative, and the same is true for a drug user. Therefore, we also have
the probabilities P(T − |N D) = 0.97 and P(T + |D) = 0.93. These four conditional
probabilities of test results given drug user status are often called the likelihoods of
the test results.
Given these priors and likelihoods, we want posterior probabilities such as
P(D|T +), the probability that an athlete who tested positive is a drug user, or
P(N D|T −), the probability that an athlete who tested negative is drug free. They
are called posterior probabilities because they are assessed after the drug test results.
This is where Bayes’ rule enters. We will develop Bayes’ rule in some generality and
then apply it to the present example.
Let A be any “information” event, such as the result of a drug test, and let
B1 , B2 , . . . , Bn be any mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of events. That is, exactly
one of the Bi ’s must occur. To apply Bayes’ rule, we assume that the prior probabilities
P(B1 ), P(B2 ), . . . , P(Bn ) are given, as are the likelihoods P( A|Bi ) for each i. Then
we want the posterior probabilities P(Bi | A) for each i. Bayes’ rule shows how to find
these. For any i, we have
P( A|Bi )P(Bi )
P(Bi | A) = Bayes’ rule
P( A|B1 )P(B1 ) + · · · + P( A|Bn )P(Bn )
This formula says that a typical posterior probability is a ratio. The numerator is
a likelihood times a prior, and the denominator is the sum of likelihoods times
priors.
Before illustrating Bayes’ rule numerically, we make two other observations about
the terms in Bayes’ rule. First, we can use the multiplication rule of probability to write
any product of a likelihood and a prior as
P( A|Bi )P(Bi ) = P( A and Bi )
The probability on the right, that both A and Bi occur, is called a joint probability.
Second, we can use the definition of conditional probability directly to write
P( A and Bi )
P(Bi | A) =
P( A)
Therefore, the probability in the denominator of Bayes’ rule is really just the probability
of A:
P( A) = P( A|B1 )P(B1 ) + · · · + P( A|Bn )P(Bn )
As we will see shortly, this natural by-product of Bayes’ rule will come in very handy
in decision trees.
FIGURE 10.31
Bayes’ Rule for
Drug-Testing
Example
Note that a negative test result leaves little doubt that the athlete is drug free.
The posterior probability that the athlete is drug free, given a negative test result, is
0.996. However, there is still a lot of doubt about an athlete who tests positive. The
posterior probability that the athlete uses drugs, given a positive test result, is only
0.620. This asymmetry occurs because of the prior probabilities. We are fairly certain
that a randomly selected athlete is drug free because only 5% of all athletes use drugs.
It takes a lot of evidence to convince us otherwise. This initial bias, plus the fact that
the test produces a few false positives, means that athletes with positive test results still
have a decent chance (probability 0.380) of being drug free. Is this a valid argument
4
The Bayes2 sheet in this file illustrates how Bayes’ rule can be used when there are more than two
possible test results and/or drug user categories.
Solution
We have already discussed the uncertain outcomes and their probabilities. Now we need
to discuss the decision alternatives and the monetary values—the other two elements
of a decision analysis. We will assume that there are only two alternatives: perform
drug testing on all athletes or don’t perform any drug testing. In the former case we
assume that if an athlete tests positive, this athlete is barred from sports.
The “monetary” values are more difficult to assess. They include
■ the benefit B from correctly identifying a drug user and barring him or her from
sports
■ the cost C1 of the test itself for a single athlete (materials and labor)
■ the cost C2 of falsely accusing a nonuser (and barring him or her from sports)
■ the cost C3 of not identifying a drug user (either by not testing at all or by obtaining
a false negative)
■ the cost C4 of violating a nonuser’s privacy by performing the test
It is clear that only C1 is a direct monetary cost that is easy to measure. However,
the other “costs” and the benefit B are real, and they must be compared on some scale
to enable administrators to make a rational decision. We will do so by comparing
everything to the cost C1 , to which we will assign value 1. (This does not mean that the
cost of testing an athlete is necessarily $1; it just means that we will express all other
costs as multiples of C1 .) Clearly, there is a lot of subjectivity involved in making these
comparisons, so sensitivity analysis on the final decision tree is a must.
Before developing this decision tree, it is useful to form a benefit–cost table for
both alternatives and all possible outcomes. Because we will eventually maximize
expected net benefit, all benefits in this table have a positive sign and all costs have
a negative sign. These net benefits appear in Table 10.25 (page 536). The first two
columns are relevant if no tests are performed; the last four are relevant when testing
is performed. For example, if a positive test is obtained for a nonuser, there are three
5
Again, see Feinstein (1990) for an enlightening discussion of this drug-testing problem at a real
university.
costs: the cost of the test (C1 ), the cost of falsely accusing the athlete (C2 ), and the cost
of violating the nonuser’s privacy (C4 ). The other entries are obtained similarly.
The solution with PrecisionTree shown in Figure 10.32 is now fairly straightfor-
ward. (See the file DRUG.XLS.) We first enter all of the benefits and costs in an input
section. These, together with the Bayes’ rule calculations from before, appear at the
top of the spreadsheet. Then we use PrecisionTree in the usual way to build the tree
and enter the links to the values and probabilities.
6
The university in the Feinstein (1990) study came to the same conclusion.
Skill-Building Problems that the company will gain $500,000. If she decides
to fire this vice-president but he is not the informer,
26. Consider a population of 2000 individuals, 800 of
the company will lose his expertise and still have an
whom are women. Assume that 300 of the women
informer within the staff; the CEO estimates that
in this population earn at least $60,000 per year, and
this outcome would cost her company about $2.5
200 of the men earn at least $60,000 per year.
million. If she decides not to fire this vice-president,
a. What is the probability that a randomly selected
she estimates that the firm will lose $1.5 million
individual from this population earns less than
whether or not he actually is the informer (since in
$60,000 per year?
either case the informer is still with the company).
b. If a randomly selected individual is observed to
Before deciding whether to fire the
earn less than $60,000 per year, what is the
vice-president for finance, the CEO could order lie
probability that this person is a man?
detector tests. To avoid possible lawsuits, the lie
c. If a randomly selected individual is observed to
detector tests would have to be administered to all
earn at least $60,000 per year, what is the
company employees, at a total cost of $150,000.
probability that this person is a woman?
Another problem she must consider is that the
27. Yearly automobile inspections are required for
available lie detector tests are not perfectly reliable.
residents of the state of Pennsylvania. Suppose that
In particular, if a person is lying, the test will reveal
18% of all inspected cars in Pennsylvania have
that the person is lying 95% of the time. Moreover,
problems that need to be corrected. Unfortunately,
if a person is not lying, the test will indicate that the
Pennsylvania state inspections fail to detect these
person is not lying 85% of the time.
problems 12% of the time. Consider a car that is
a. In order to minimize the expected total cost of
inspected and is found to be free of problems. What
managing this difficult situation, what strategy
is the probability that there is indeed something
should the CEO adopt?
wrong that the inspection has failed to uncover?
b. Should the CEO order the lie detector tests for all
28. Consider again the landowner’s decision problem
of her employees? Explain why or why not.
described in Problem 3. Suppose now that, at a cost
c. Determine the maximum amount of money that
of $90,000, the landowner can request that a
the CEO should be willing to pay to administer
soundings test be performed on the site where
lie detector tests.
natural gas is believed to be present. The company
that conducts the soundings concedes that 30% of 30. A customer has approached a bank for a $10,000
the time the test will indicate that no gas is present one-year loan at a 12% interest rate. If the bank does
when it actually is. When natural gas is not present not approve this loan application, the $10,000 will
in a particular site, the soundings test is accurate be invested in bonds that earn a 6% annual return.
90% of the time. Without additional information, the bank believes
a. Given that the landowner pays for the soundings that there is a 4% chance that this customer will
test and the test indicates that gas is present, what default on the loan, assuming that the loan is
is the landowner’s revised estimate of the approved. If the customer defaults on the loan, the
probability of finding gas on this site? bank will lose $10,000.
b. Given that the landowner pays for the soundings At a cost of $100, the bank can thoroughly
test and the test indicates that gas is not present, investigate the customer’s credit record and supply a
what is the landowner’s revised estimate of the favorable or unfavorable recommendation. Past
probability of not finding gas on this site? experience indicates that in cases where the
c. Should the landowner request the given customer did not default on the approved loan, the
soundings test at a cost of $90,000? Explain why probability of receiving a favorable recommendation
or why not. If not, when (if ever) would the on the basis of the credit investigation was 77/96.
landowner choose to obtain the soundings test? Furthermore, in cases where the customer defaulted
29. The chief executive officer of a firm in a highly on the approved loan, the probability of receiving a
competitive industry believes that one of her key favorable recommendation on the basis of the credit
employees is providing confidential information to investigation was 1/4.
the competition. She is 90% certain that this a. What course of action should the bank take to
informer is the vice-president of finance, whose maximize its expected profit?
contacts have been extremely valuable in obtaining b. Compute and interpret the expected value of
financing for the company. If she decides to fire this sample information (EVSI) in this decision
vice-president and he is the informer, she estimates problem.
34. A manufacturer must decide whether to extend b. Should the manufacturer routinely obtain credit
credit to a retailer who would like to open an rating reports on those retailers who seek credit
account with the firm. Past experience with new approval? Why or why not?
accounts indicates that 45% are high-risk customers, c. Compute and interpret the expected value of
35% are moderate-risk customers, and 20% are sample information (EVSI) in this decision
low-risk customers. If credit is extended, the problem.
manufacturer can expect to lose $60,000 with 35. A television network earns an average of $1.6
a high-risk customer, make $50,000 with a million each season from a hit program and loses an
moderate-risk customer, and make $100,000 with a average of $400,000 each season on a program that
low-risk customer. If the manufacturer decides not turns out to be a flop. Of all programs picked up by
to extend credit to a customer, the manufacturer this network in recent years, 25% turn out to be hits
neither makes nor loses any money. and 75% turn out to be flops. At a cost of C dollars,
Prior to making a credit extension decision, the a market research firm will analyze a pilot episode
manufacturer can obtain a credit rating report on the of a prospective program and issue a report
retailer at a cost of $2000. The credit agency predicting whether the given program will end up
concedes that its rating procedure is not completely being a hit. If the program is actually going to be
reliable. In particular, the credit rating procedure a hit, there is a 90% chance that the market
will rate a low-risk customer as a moderate-risk researchers will predict the program to be a hit. If
customer with probability 0.10 and as a high-risk the program is actually going to be a flop, there is a
customer with probability 0.05. Furthermore, the 20% chance that the market researchers will predict
given rating procedure will rate a moderate-risk the program to be a hit.
customer as a low-risk customer with probability a. Assuming that C = $160,000, identify the
0.06 and as a high-risk customer with probability strategy that maximizes this television network’s
0.07. Finally, the rating procedure will rate a expected profit in responding to a newly
high-risk customer as a low-risk customer with proposed television program.
probability 0.01 and as a moderate-risk customer b. What is the maximum value of C that this
with probability 0.05. television network should be willing to incur in
a. Find the strategy that maximizes the choosing to hire the market research firm?
manufacturer’s expected net earnings. c. Compute and interpret the expected value of
perfect information (EVPI) in this decision
problem.
R mization criterion when large amounts of money are at stake. These decision
makers are willing to sacrifice some EMV to reduce risk. Are you ever willing
to do so personally? Consider the following scenarios.
1. You have a chance to enter a lottery where you will win $100,000 with probability
0.1 or win nothing with probability 0.9. Alternatively, you can receive $5000 for
certain. How many of you—truthfully—would take the certain $5000, even though
Utility Functions
We begin by discussing an individual’s utility function. This is a mathematical function
that transforms monetary values—payoffs and costs—into utility values. Essentially,
an individual’s utility function specifies the individual’s preferences for various mon-
etary payoffs and costs and, in doing so, it automatically encodes the individual’s
attitudes toward risk. Most individuals are risk averse, which means intuitively that
they are willing to sacrifice some EMV to avoid risky gambles. In terms of the utility
function, this means that every extra dollar of payoff is worth slightly less to the in-
dividual than the previous dollar, and every extra dollar of cost is considered slightly
more costly (in terms of utility) than the previous dollar. The resulting utility functions
are shaped as shown in Figure 10.33. Mathematically, these functions are said to be
increasing and concave. The increasing part means that they go uphill—everyone
prefers more money to less money. The concave part means that they increase at a
decreasing rate. This is the risk-averse behavior.
There are two problems involved in implementing utility maximization in a real
decision analysis. The first is obtaining an individual’s (or company’s) utility function;
we will discuss this below. The second is using the resulting utility function to find the
best decision. This second step is actually quite straightforward. We simply substitute
Monetary value
E XAMPLE 10.6
ASSESSING THE UTILITY FUNCTION FOR A
SMALL BUSINESS
John Jacobs owns his own business. Because he is about to make an important decision
where large losses or large gains are at stake, he wants to use the expected utility
criterion to make his decision. He knows that he must first assess his own utility
Solution
Susan first asks John for the largest loss and largest gain he can imagine. He answers
with the values $200,000 and $300,000, so she assigns utility values U (−200,000) = 0
and U (300,000) = 1 as anchors for the utility function. Now she presents John with
the choice between two options:
■ Option 1: Obtain a payoff of z (really a loss if z is negative).
■ Option 2: Obtain a loss of $200,000 or a payoff of $300,000, depending on the flip
of a fair coin.
Susan reminds John that the EMV of option 2 is $50,000 (halfway between
−$200,000 and $300,000). He realizes this, but because he is quite risk averse, he
would far rather have $50,000 for certain than take the gamble in option 2. Therefore,
the indifference value of z must be less than $50,000. Susan then poses several values
of z to John. Would he rather have $10,000 for sure or take option 2? He says he’d
rather take the $10,000. Would he rather pay $5000 for sure or take the gamble in op-
tion 2? (This is like an insurance premium.) He says he’d rather take option 2. By this
time, we know the indifference value of z must be less than $10,000 and greater than
−$5000. With a few more questions of this type, John finally decides on z = $5000 as
his indifference value. He is indifferent between obtaining $5000 for sure and taking
the gamble in option 2. We can substitute these values into equation (10.3):
U (5000) = 0.5U (−200,000) + 0.5U (300,000) = 0.5(0) + 0.5(1) = 0.5
Note that John is giving up $45,000 in EMV because of his risk aversion. The EMV of
the gamble in option 2 is $50,000, and he is willing to accept a sure $5000 in its place.
The process would then continue. For example, since she now knows U (5000) and
U (300,000), Susan could ask John to choose between these options:
■ Option 1: Obtain a payoff of z.
■ Option 2: Obtain a payoff of $5000 or a payoff of $300,000, depending on the flip
of a fair coin.
If John decides that his indifference value is now z = $130,000, then with equa-
tion (10.3) we know that
U (130,000) = 0.5U (5000) + 0.5U (300,000) = 0.5(0.5) + 0.5(1) = 0.75
Note that John is now giving up $22,500 in EMV because the EMV of the gamble in
option 2 is $152,500. By continuing in this manner, Susan can help John assess enough
utility values to approximate a continuous utility curve. ■
E XAMPLE 10.7
DECIDING WHETHER TO ENTER RISKY
VENTURES AT VENTURE LIMITED
Venture Limited is a company with net sales of $30 million. The company currently
must decide whether to enter one of two risky ventures or do nothing. The possible
Solution
We will assume that Venture Limited has an exponential utility function. Also, based
on Howard’s guidelines, we will assume that the company’s risk tolerance is 6.4% of
its net sales, or $1.92 million. (We’ll do a sensitivity analysis on this parameter later
on.) We can substitute into equation (10.4) to find the utility of any monetary outcome.
For example, the gain from doing nothing is $0, and its utility is
U (0) = 1 − e−0/1.92 = 1 − 1 = 0
As another example, the utility of a $1 million loss is
U (−1) = 1 − e−(−1)/1.92 = 1 − 1.683 = −0.683
These are the values we use (instead of monetary values) in the decision tree.
PRECISION
USING PRECISIONTREE
TREE
Fortunately, PrecisionTree takes care of all the details. After we build a decision tree
and label it (with monetary values) in the usual way, we click on the name of the tree
(the box on the far left of the tree) to open the dialog box in Figure 10.34. We then fill
in the utility function information as shown in the upper right section of the dialog box.
This says to use an exponential utility function with risk tolerance 1.92. It also indicates
that we want expected utilities (as opposed to EMVs) to appear in the decision tree.
FIGURE 10.34
Dialog Box for
Specifying the
Exponential Utility
Criterion
The completed tree for this example appears in Figure 10.35 (page 546). (See
the file VENTURE.XLS.) We build it in exactly the same way as usual and link
probabilities and monetary values to its branches in the usual way. For example, there
is a link in cell C22 to the monetary value in cell A10. However, the expected values
shown in the tree (those shown in color on your screen) are expected utilities, and the
optimal decision is the one with the largest expected utility. In this case the expected
utilities for doing nothing, investing in the less risky venture, and investing in the more
risky venture are 0, 0.0525, and 0.0439. Therefore, the optimal decision is to invest in
the less risky venture.
Note that the EMVs of the three decisions are $0, $0.175 million, and $0.4 million.
The latter two of these are calculated in row 14 as the usual “sumproduct” of monetary
values and probabilities. So from an EMV point of view, the more risky venture is defi-
nitely best. However, Venture Limited is sufficiently risk averse, and the monetary val-
ues are sufficiently large, that the company is willing to sacrifice EMV to reduce its risk.
How sensitive is the optimal decision to the key parameter, the risk tolerance? We
can answer this by changing the risk tolerance (through the dialog box in Figure 10.34)
and watching how the decision tree changes.7 You can check that when the company
becomes more risk tolerant, the more risky venture eventually becomes optimal. In
fact, this occurs when the risk tolerance increases to approximately $2.075 million. In
the other direction, when the company becomes less risk tolerant, the “do nothing”
decision eventually becomes optimal. This occurs when the risk tolerance decreases
to approximately $0.715 million. So the “optimal” decision depends heavily on the
attitudes toward risk of Venture Limited’s top management.
Certainty Equivalents Now suppose that Venture Limited has only two options. It
can either enter the less risky venture or receive a certain dollar amount x and avoid
7
We show the risk tolerance in cell B5, but the values in the decision tree are not linked to that cell. We
need to go through the dialog box to change the risk tolerance.
FIGURE 10.36
Decision Tree with
Certainty Equivalents
PROBLEMS
10.7 CONCLUSION
n this chapter we have discussed methods that can be used in decision-making
I problems in which future uncertainty is a key element. Perhaps the most important
skill we can gain from this chapter is the ability to approach decision problems
that include uncertainty in a systematic manner. This systematic approach requires the
decision maker to list all possible decisions or strategies, list all possible uncertain
outcomes, assess the probabilities of these outcomes (possibly with the aid of Bayes’
rule), calculate all necessary monetary values, and finally do the calculations necessary
to obtain the best decision. If large dollar amounts are at stake, it might also be necessary
to perform a utility analysis, where the decision maker’s feelings toward risk are taken
into account. Once the basic analysis has been completed, using “best guesses” for the
various parameters of the problem, a sensitivity analysis should be conducted to see
whether the best decision continues to be best within a range of problem parameters.
PROBLEMS
find the company’s best decision and the whether there is a significant market
corresponding expected cost. ■ the process development costs, including
b. If the company has 500 units, what should it do? presanction engineering
What is the expected cost for the entire fleet? ■ the commercial development costs, both before
c. Suppose that the company has different types of and after the board’s sanction
units. For example, the cost of an oil change ■ the venture value (net present value) if successful
might be higher for some, or the cost of a failure The estimates of these values are shown in Table
might be higher or lower. Run a sensitivity 10.33. Again, the plus-or-minus values indicate the
analysis on any of the parameters you believe company’s considerable uncertainty about the
might be “key” parameters and see whether the values. All values are in millions of dollars.
optimal decision changes in ways you would The timing of events is as follows:
anticipate. ■ Decide whether to abandon product now. (This is
69. Based on Hess (1993). A company that is heavily really the only nontrivial decision the company
involved in R&D projects believes it might have the will make.) If not, then:
■ Spend on research and marketing development. If
potential to develop a very lucrative commercial
product that would (if successful) reduce pulp mill marketing development indicates an insignificant
water pollution. At the current stage, however, market for the product or research indicates that
everything is quite uncertain, and the company is the process is technically infeasible, cut expenses
trying to decide whether to go ahead with its R&D and quit. Otherwise:
■ Spend on process and commercial development.
or abandon the product. The following are the
primary risks: If company board then declines to sanction
money for plant, cut expenses and quit.
■ Would market tests confirm that there is a
Otherwise:
significant market for the product? ■ Spend on further commercial development. By
■ Could the company develop a new process for
this time, the company has made all of its
making this product—that is, is it technically decisions. If the venture turns out to be a
feasible? commercial success, then it gains the venture
■ Even if there is a significant market and the
value for a success (less expenses so far).
process is technically feasible, would the Otherwise, the company has lost the money spent
company’s board sanction the new plant so far, but that is all.
capital necessary to produce the product on a Analyze the company’s problem. Obviously,
commercial scale? with the high degree of uncertainty, sensitivity
■ Assuming the answers to the above questions are
analysis is the key. Note that there are many
all yes and the plant is built, would the venture uncertainties about the input parameters in
turn out to be successful? Tables 10.32 and 10.33. In fact, there are far too
We assume that each of these questions has a many to allow you to try every combination.
yes or no answer. The probabilities of yes answers Therefore, just try a few combinations that you
are shown in Table 10.32. The plus-or-minus value believe might be the most important.
Price Decrease
$0
Decrease in May
Probability
0.5
actually need the timber from this land until the $60,000 0.3
beginning of July, but its top executives fear that $120,000 0.2
another company might buy the land between now
and the beginning of July. They assess that there is 1
chance out of 20 that a competitor will buy the land the probabilities of the possible price decreases dur-
during May. If this does not occur, they assess that ing May. Table 10.38 shows the conditional proba-
there is 1 chance out of 10 that the competitor will bilities of the possible price decreases in June, given
buy the land during June. If Westhouser does not take the price decrease in May. For example, if the price
advantage of its current option, it can attempt to buy decrease in May is $60,000, then the possible price
the land at the beginning of June or the beginning of decreases in June are $0, $30,000, and $60,000 with
July, provided that it is still available. respective probabilities 0.6, 0.2, and 0.2.
Westhouser’s incentive for delaying the pur- If Westhouser purchases the land, it believes
chase is that its financial experts believe there is a that it can gross $3 million. (This does not count the
good chance that the price of the land will fall signif- cost of purchasing the land.) But if it does not pur-
icantly in one or both of the next two months. They chase the land, it believes that it can make $650,000
assess the possible price decreases and their proba- from alternative investments. What should the com-
bilities in Tables 10.37 and 10.38. Table 10.37 shows pany do?