BONILLA V. BARCENA [G.R. No.

L-41715 June 18, 1976, 71 SCRA 491]

DOCTRINE:
- From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property,
subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto
except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs
acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to
the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate
or intestate proceedings.
- The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage
sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally
property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action
which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected
being incidental.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil Case No. 856, entitled
Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the motions for reconsideration of its order dismissing the
complaint in the aforementioned case.

Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, filed a civil
action in the CFI of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.

Defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of said motion, the counsel of
plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to include certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the complaint
was granted and, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.

Defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and,
therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion was heard. In said hearing, counsel of plaintiff confirmed the
death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners
herein. But the court immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in
interest and has no legal personality to sue.

Counsel of plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing the complaint and moved to set aside the order of the
dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

The court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel of plaintiff for lack of merit. Counsel for deceased
plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the said minors be allowed to substitute their deceased mother,
but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed
a second motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint, claiming that the same is in violation of
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not children of the deceased be allowed to substitute the deceased plaintiff.

RULING:
If the plaintiff dies, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of
the proceeding can be substituted.
Rule 16, Sec 3 ROC states, “whenever a party to a pending case dies… it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform
the court promptly of such death… and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or
other legal representative.” This duty was complained with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff but the court,
instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the petition on the ground that a dead person has no legal
personality to sue. Art 777 NCC provides “the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent.
When Fortunata therefore died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation was not extinguished but was
transferred to her heirs upon death.

RULING:
The SC reversed and set aside the orders of respondent court, dismissing the complaint and denying the MR of said
order of dismissal.

While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the
case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9,
1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31,
1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If
thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of
the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending
case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name
and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was complied with
by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena
died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however,
instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal
personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the
heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they
cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the
determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or
contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of
their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or
right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted
to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties
in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as
parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for
the deceased, within such time as may be granted ... ." The question as to whether an action survives or not
depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive the wrong
complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely
incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the
property and rights of property affected being incidental. Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the
deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and
principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the
duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be
substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased
plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under the same
Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear,
to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. In the instant
case the respondent Court did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a
legal representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be
substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them because their
father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court refused the request for
substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave error
because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel
for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act
as guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not
complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.

Facts: A civil action to quiet title over certain parcels of land was instituted by Fortunata Barcena. A motion to dismiss the complaint was
filed by the defendants on the ground that Fortunata is dead therefore has no legal capacity to sue. Counsel for the plaintiff asked for the
substitution of her minor children and her husband. The Court, however, dismissed the case on the basis that a dead person cannot be a real
person in interest and has no legal personality to sue.

Issue: whether the heirs may be parties in interest who may substitute the deceased in an action to quiet title over certain parcels of land?

Held: Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that he right to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. From
the moment of death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of the property subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their right thereto, except as provided for by the law. The moment of death is the determining
factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the
property of the deceased vest in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate and intestate proceedings.

When Fortunata died, her claim on right to the parcels of land in litigation was not extinguished but was transmitted to her heirs upon her
death. The heirs have acquired interest in the properties in litigation and become parties in interest in the case. There is therefore no reason
for the court not to allow the substitution as they are now the real parties in interest in the case at bar.