AAAAACompiled Poli Digest

Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 1
CHAPTER III: of Sec. 122, NIRC. In effect, the Collector insists that
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE the acquisition of international personality is a condition
sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign
G.R. No. L-13250, October 29, 1971
country."
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ANTONIO
CAMPOS RUEDA
Upon appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, the CTA ruled
Antonio Campos Rueda was the administrator of the that the expression “foreign country” in Sec. 122 refers
estate of late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, a to a government of that foreign power which, although
Spanish national and Tangier resident, in the not an international person in the sense of international
Philippines. In the estate tax return he filed with the law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon
Collector of Internal Revenue, Rueda claimed the value intangible person properties of Philippine citizens not
of intangible personal properties as exempt from taxes residing therein, or whose law allows a similar
under the proviso of Sec. 122, NIRC: exemption from such taxes. It was therefore not
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by
of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the the Philippine Government in order to entitle the estate
time of his death was a resident of a foreign country of Estrella to the exemption benefits of Sec. 122.
which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer
tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible ISSUE: Whether Section 22, NIRC requires that the
person property of the Philippines not residing in that “foreign country” possesses an international personality
foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country to come within its terms.
of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his
death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or HELD:
death taxes of every character in respect of intangible No. The Supreme Court ruled that Tangier comes
personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines within the term “foreign country” of Sec. 122 because
not residing in that foreign country. independence is not a condition of statehood. The
following definitions of a State were provided by the
The Collector, however, denied the exemption and Court to justify Tangier’s statehood:
assessed the estate of deficiency estate and inheritance - it is a politically organized sovereign community,
taxes (amounting to P161, 874.95) for the transfer of independent of outside control, bound by penalties of
intangible personal properties in the Philippines. The nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting
Collector reasoned that there is no reciprocity between through a government functioning under a regime of law
Tangier and the Philippines because Tangier is a mere (Pound)
principality and not a foreign country within the meaning
- a sovereign person with the people composing it, FACTS:

viewed as an organized corporate society under a Conchita Romualdez-Yap filed a petition for certiorari to
government, with the legal competence to exact question her separation from the Philippine National
obedience to its commands (Willoughby) Bank. She was the Senior Vice President of the Fund
- a body-politic organized by common consent for Trust Department of PNB. While she was on leave of
mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the absence for medical reasons (April 1, 1986 – February
general welfare (Cooley) 20, 1987), PNB underwent reorganization (December 3,
- the juridical personification of the nation (Esmein) 1986 by virtue of the Revised Charter of PNB or
- a territorial society divided into government and Executive Order No. 80) that caused the abolition of the
subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy Fund Trust Department. As a result of the
over all other institutions (Laski) reorganization, Romualdez-Yap was notified of her
- a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, separation from service (effective February 1987,
politically organized, exercising by means of its though the letter erroneously stated 1986). She
government its sovereign will over the individuals within contested her separation in the Civil Service
it and maintaining its separate international personality Commission, arguing that her separation was made in
bad faith because, among others: (1) it was based on
The SC emphasized, however, that as long as there is her close identification with the previous regime, being
power entrusted to its government to maintain within its the sister of Imelda Marcos; (2) her separation was
territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into antedated on February 16, 1986, prior to the effectivity
international relations (McIver), international law does of Executive Order No. 80 on December 3, 1986; (3) the
not exact independence as a condition of statehood. Fund Transfer Department has recently been restored;
and (4) she was not extended preference in
Assuming that Tangier was bereft of international appointment to the positions in the new staff.
personality, jurisprudence supports the finding that Sec. The CSC and the Supreme Court upheld the validity of
122 treats even a principality as a foreign country. her separation.
Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara considered
California as a foreign country. In Kiene v. Collector of ISSUE: Whether the separation arising from
Internal Revenue, the tiny principality of Liechtenstein, reorganization was made in good faith
with hardly an international personality, was found to fall
under the exemption of Sec. 122. HELD: YES
1. Requirements for a valid reorganization
Reorganization is a management prerogative exercised
G.R. No. 104226, August 12, 1993 pursuant to a business judgment. While a distinction
CONCHITA ROMUALDEZ-YAP v. CIVIL SERVICE
can be made between a government bureau or office they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is
performing constituent functions (e.g. Customs) and a carried out in "good faith" if: (1) it is for the purpose of
government-owned or controlled corporation performing economy, or (2) to make bureaucracy more efficient. In
ministrant functions (e.g. PNB), the common test for those events, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or
their valid reorganizations is the test of good faith. separation actually occurs because the position itself
ceases to exist. Otherwise, an "abolition" is void ab
CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS are those which initio if it is nothing else but a separation or removal, is
constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security
in nature. These are functions which our government is of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith.
required to exercise to promote its objectives as
expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised 2. The reorganization of PNB was done in good
by it as an attribute of sovereignty. faith.
The SC found the following circumstances as indicative
On the other hand, MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS are of PNB’s good faith in pursuing reorganization:
those undertaken by way of advancing the general  it was by virtue of a valid law
interests of society, and are merely optional functions of  it was pursued to achieve economy considering
government. These are functions which it may exercise PNB’s critical financial situation at the time
to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity  the year "1986" stated in the notice of her separation
of the people. The option is exercised on the basis of from the service wa s a typographical error where
the following are the principles: (1) that a government PNB had submitted documents supporting its stand
should do for the public welfare those things which that the separation actually took effect on 16
private capital would not naturally undertake; and (2) February 1987.
that a government should do those things which by its  the later restoration of the Fund Transfer
very, nature it is better equipped to administer for the Department, which took effect after the lapse of over
public welfare than is any private individual or group of four years from the date it was abolished in 1987,
individuals (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine was primarily caused by the improved financial
Islands). Examples are commercial or universal capability and present needs of PNB
banking which is, not a governmental but, a private  the appointment of SVP Federico Pascual as head of
sector endeavor. the International Department, from among other
officers including Yap, is because his qualifications
Reorganization in either case must be made in good far exceeded those of the other candidates for the
faith. According to Dario v. Mison: Reorganizations in position, being a lawyer from the University of the
this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided Philippines, a Bachelor of Arts degree holder from
Ateneo de Manila, a Master of Laws graduate of The SC had ruled that NIA was liable as a government
Columbia Law School, and a Masteral Arts in Public entity exercising proprietary functions. Thus NIA filed a
Administration graduate of the London School of Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it is a
Economics; he had also undergone extensive governmental entity.
seminars at the International Department and had
been assigned in several foreign branches of PNB; ISSUE: Whether NIA is a government entity exercising
he held the second highest position of Executive governmental or proprietary functions.
Vice President and served as Acting President of
PNB; while Yap only holds a Bachelor of Science in HELD:
Commerce Degree from Assumption Convent and 1. NIA is a governmental entity exercising
has undergone only one seminar on Management proprietary functions.
and Leadership Training Program. Governmental functions are classified into governmental
/ constituent and proprietary / ministrant.
Assuming that her separation was made in bad faith, an GOVERNMENTAL / CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS
action for a quo warranto proceeding prescribes 1 year involve the exercise of sovereignty and are thus
from the questioned termination. She was separated considered as compulsory. PROPRIETARY /
from PNB on February 16, 1987 and it was only in 1989 MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS connote merely the
or about 2 years after when she brought the matter to exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as
the CSC. By her inaction in questioning her termination optional.
within a period of 1 year, she was considered to have
acquiesced to her separation from the service and 2. The operation of an irrigation system is a
abandoned her right to the position. proprietary function.
In the United States where its irrigation districts are
G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045, February 27, 1991 identical to Philippine irrigation systems, irrigation
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA districts are characterized, according to jurisprudence,
v. HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL as public quasi corporations organized to conduct a
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION business for the private benefit of the owners of land
Sps. Fontanilla sued the National Irrigation within its limits (Nampa v. Nampa & M. Irrig. Dist.).
Administration for damages, arising from the tortious act They are not considered as exercising sovereign
of its driver, Hugo Garcia. NIA denied liability, alleging functions where they furnish no facilities for the
that it is a government agency tasked with administration of the sovereign government and its
governmental functions and is, therefore, not liable for officers have no power or authority to exercise any of
the tortious acts of its driver who is not a special agent. the functions of the general government, or to enforce
any of the laws of the state or any of its other in its proprietary capacity, free from legislative
subdivisions, or collect taxes other than those assessed interference. Consequently, they are liable as any
by the district. They have no more power or authority private company would be for any negligence in laying
than that of the officers of a private corporation out of its pipes, in keeping them in repair, or in
organized for like purposes (Holderbaum vs. Hidalgo furnishing potable water through them.
County Water Improvement District). They are thus
considered as businesses because the land owners, as NIA was not created for purposes of local government.
members of the corporation, control the affairs of the NIA was created as a body corporate with a corporate
district and alone are benefited by its operations. While personality separate and distinct from the government
public benefit and public welfare may be found in the for the purpose of "constructing, improving,
operation of certain enterprises (like those engaged in rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation
the supply of electric power, or in supplying telegraphic, systems in the Philippines, including all communal and
telephonic, and radio communication, or in the pump irrigation projects." While it is essentially a
production and distribution of prime necessities,), and service agency of the government aimed at promoting
even though the service rendered caters to the public interest and public welfare, such fact does not
community as a whole and the goal is for the general make NIA essentially and purely a "government-
interest of society (NAWASA v. NWSA Consolidated function" corporation. Certainly, the state and the
Unions), the functions performed by such enterprises community as a whole are largely benefited by the
are basically proprietary in nature. Its general purposes services NIA renders, but these functions are only
are not essentially public in their nature, but are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is
incidentally so. the irrigation of lands.
G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001
Therefore, an irrigation district is the owner of its system
SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED v. COURT OF APPEALS and
in a proprietary rather than a public capacity, and must
the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership
(Nampa v. Nampa & M. Irrig. Dist.). According to An action for revival of judgment was instituted by the
McQuillin (The Law of Municipal Corporations), when Republic of the Philippines but which the Court
municipalities undertake to supply water at price, they dismissed, having found that the Republic was not the
are engaged in trade. Although the State may regulate real party in interest.
the service and rates of water plants owned and The issue began when Rafael Galvez obtained an
operated by municipalities, such property is not Original Certificate of Title over four lots in La Union.
employed for governmental purposes and in the He sold Lots 1 and 4 to Mamaril, Llana, Bustos and
ownership and operation thereof, the municipality acts Balatbat, who obtained TCTs in their names and who, in
turn, subsequently sold the same lots to Lepanto but simply a recognition of the need to create a body
Consolidated Mining Company. Lepanto obtained a corporate which will act only as its agent for the
TCT in its name. Meanwhile, unknown to Lepanto, CFI realization of its program. The MTD was dismissed thus
La Union ordered the cancellation of Galvez/s title over Shipside raised the issue before the Supreme Court.
the lots in a land registration case initiated by the
Republic of the Philippines. The Order was issued on ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines
February 1, 1963, but the same subjects lots were is a real party in interest and can thus claim the
unknowingly sold by Lepanto to Shipside Incorporated imprescriptibility of the State’s action – N
on October 28, 1963. Shipside had obtained a TCT in
its name and had been exercising proprietary rights HELD:
since then. The action to revive judgment has prescribed (CA
The CFI Order was contested by Galvez, but was Decision became final on October 23, 1973 while the
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The CA Decision action for revival of judgment was instituted only in
became final and executory on October 23, 1973. A 1999, or more than 25 years) under NCC 1144(3): an
writ of execution was issued and served upon the action upon a judgment "must be brought within 10
Register of Deeds. However, the writ had not been years from the time the right of action accrues."
executed for 24 years until the OSG, representing the
Republic of the Philippines, initiated a complaint for The Republic, represented by the OSG, cannot invoke
revival of judgment and cancellation of titles on April 21, imprescriptibility of State actions because the Republic
1999, against the successors-in-interest of Rafael is not the real party in interest, having transferred the
Galvez. ownership of Camp Wallace, which used to belong to
Shipside filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the government, to the Bases Conversion and
the Republic was not the real party in interest because Development Authority. Under Sec. 4 of R.A. 7227
the real property covered by the titles were allegedly (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), the
part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station) and under BCDA owns, holds and/or administers military
the ownership and administration of the Bases reservations including Wallace Air Station and, under
Conversion Development Authority under Republic Act Sec. 4, all areas covered by the Wallace Air Station are
No. 7227; and that the action has prescribed. The hereby transferred to the BCDA. Being the owner of the
Republic, however, countered that prescription does not areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the BCDA, not the
run against the State, which is still the real party in Government, which stands to be benefited if the land
interest because the transfer of the military reservations covered by Shipside’s title is cancelled.
to the Conversion Authority does not amount to an
abdication on the part of the Republic of its interests,
The Republic also cannot invoke the relationship of dismiss the complaint in E.B. Marcha would have
mere agency between the Government and BCDA. brought needless delay in the settlement of the matter
BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate since the PPA would have to re-file the case on the
and distinct from the government, having been created same claim already litigated upon. Such is not the case
as a body corporate and vested with the powers of a at bar since to allow the government to sue herein
corporation (Sec. 3, R.A. 7227). It is not a mere agency enables it to raise the issue of imprescriptibility, a claim
of the Government but a corporate body performing which is not available to the BCDA. The rule that
proprietary functions. While public benefit and public prescription does not run against the State does not
welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic and apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the
social development of Central Luzon, may be State for special purposes, it being said that when the
attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees,
certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the
basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of same category as ordinary persons (Kingston v. LeHigh
economic and social development of Central Luzon, in Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa 469). To hold otherwise is to
particular, and the country's goal for enhancement, in begin bad precedent as it would allow the Republic to
general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the prosecute, on behalf of government-owned or controlled
Government. Other corporations have been created by corporations, causes of action which have already
government to act as its agents for the realization of its prescribed, on the pretext that the Government is the
programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA arid the NIA, to real party in interest against whom prescription does not
count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these run, said corporations having been created merely as
entities, although performing functions aimed at agents for the realization of government programs.
promoting public interest and public welfare, are not G.R. No. L-32052, July 25, 1975
government-function corporations invested with PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO
governmental attributes. ADMINISTRATION v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
The Republic cannot also invoke E.B. Marcha Transport Labor claims (overtime compensations) were filed by
Co., Inc. v. IAC which held that the Republic is the laborers against the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
proper party to sue for the recovery of possession of Administration before the Court of Industrial Relations.
property, which, at the time of the institution of the suit, The claims were granted by CIR. PVTA sought to
was no longer held by the national government but by declare the nullity of the decision on the ground that CIR
the Philippine Ports Authority. In E.B. Marcha, the had no jurisdiction over it and that the Eight-Hour Labor
claims of the Republic and the Philippine Ports Authority Law did not apply to it being an agency exercising
against the petitioner therein were the same and to governmental functions.
The laborers of PVTA sued the latter before the CIR for
payment of their overtime services (in excess of the The distinction, however, between constituent and
regular eight hours a day rendered by them) by virtue of ministrant functions of governments as set forth in
the Eight-Hour Labor Law (C.A. No. 444). PVTA sought Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation has become
the dismissal of the suit on the following ground that it is futile in the era of welfare states where the increased
an agency exercising governmental functions and by responsibility to provide for the general welfare
such reason, the 8-Hour Labor Law does not apply to it necessitated the expanded role of government.
(lack of cause of action) and the CIR has no jurisdiction. According to Laski, "a definite increase in the profundity
The CIR ignored these defenses and ruled in favor of of the social conscience," resulted in "a state which
the laborers. seeks to realize more fully the common good of its
members." Chief Justice Makalintal explained in
ISSUES: Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Whether or not PVTA exercises governmental functions Administration v. Confederation of Unions in
–Y Government Corporations and Offices how the welfare
Whether or not agencies exercising governmental state concept and the policy for social justice has
functions fall outside the jurisdiction of the CIR and the blurred the distinction of the traditional functions of
operation of the Eight-Hour Labor Law – N governmental agencies: the increasing social
challenges of the times necessitated the government to
HELD: undertake private enterprise and initiative, in its
1. PVTA is an agency exercising governmental sovereign capacity, and to move towards a greater
functions. socialization of economic forces for the promotion of
Under its Charter (R.A. 2265), PVTA was established social justice. As the welfare state concept "is not alien
to, among others, promote the effective merchandising to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution", it is thus
of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets much more so under the present Charter (1987
so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a Constitution), which is impressed with an even more
basis of economic security; create, establish, maintain, explicit recognition of social and economic rights.
and operate processing, warehousing and marketing
facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling Functions of that sort [general welfare] "may not
and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will be strictly what President Wilson described as
enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return of their "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"),
investments; and improve the living and economic such as those relating to the maintenance of
conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco peace and the prevention of crime, those
industry. regulating property and property rights, those
relating to the administration of justice and the Accordingly, in Rubi v. Provincial Board, the Court found
determination of political duties of citizens, and that the modern period has shown a widespread belief
those relating to national defense and foreign in the amplest possible demonstration of government
relations. Under this traditional classification, activity. Edu v. Ericta ruled that laissez-faire was
such constituent functions are exercised by the rejected by the 1987 Constitution, having entrusted to
State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely our government the responsibility of coping with social
to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity and economic problems with the commensurate power
of the people — these latter functions being of control over economic affairs. The State could thus
ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare
the part of the government. through state action. Through such activities, "the
Nonetheless, the growing complexities of harsh contract which [does] obtain between the levels of
modern society, however, have rendered this the rich and the poor" may be minimized. There is no
traditional classification of the functions of longer any constitutional obstacle to a government
government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly reserved for private
The areas which used to be left to private enterprise. It is a response to a trend noted by Justice
enterprise and initiative and which the Laurel in Calalang v. Williams for the humanization of
government was called upon to enter optionally, laws and the promotion of the interest of all component
and only "because it was better equipped to elements of society so that man's innate aspirations be
administer for the public welfare than is any attained.
private individual or group of individuals",
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries 2. The exercise of governmental functions does not
and to be absorbed within activities that the exempt an agency from the operation of labor
government must undertake in its sovereign laws.
capacity if it is to meet the increasing social Naric Worker's Union v. Hon. Alvendia ruled that it is
challenges of the times. Here as almost precisely CIR and not ordinary courts that should pass
everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly upon labor controversies. On the other hand, the Eight-
towards a greater socialization of economic Hour Labor Law provides that it shall apply to all
forces. Here of course this development was persons employed in any industry or occupation,
envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, whether public or private.
by the Constitution itself in its declaration of
principle concerning the promotion of social
justice.
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Definition of police power (“the greatest and most
Transportation Commissioner v. HON. VICENTE G. powerful attribute of government”):
ERICTA in his capacity as Judge of the Court of “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere
First Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
TEDDY C. GALO (1970) general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be
Teddy Galo assails the constitutionality of subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
Administrative Order No. 2 (“the Reflector Law”) on the to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of
grounds that: 1. It violates the due process clause, the state." ~Calalang v. Williams
following the American principle of laissez faire, and 2. It “the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power. health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
and general welfare of the people." ~Primicias v.
The Reflector Law reads: "(g) Lights and reflector when Fugoso
parked or disabled. — Appropriate parking lights or
flares visible one hundred meters away shall be 2. Laissez faire principle no longer recognized in US.
displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such There was a period in American history where series
vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not of legislations tending to reduce economic inequality
well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger (e.g. in People v. Pomar, a provision providing for
passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty
be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other days after confinement; in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
similar warning devices either pasted, painted or a statute providing for minimum wages) were struck
attached to its front and back which shall likewise be down as violative of the due process clause, under the
visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No theory that individuals should have unrestricted freedom
vehicle not provided with any of the requirements in entering into contracts (laissez faire).
mentioned in this subsection shall be registered." But under Pres. Roosevelt’s “The New Deal
administration” the US Supreme Court began rejecting
ISSUE: W/N the “Reflector Law” violates the due the laissez faire doctrine.
process clause, following the American principle of
laissez faire. 3. Laissez faire doctrine had always been rejected in the
Philippines
HELD: No, it does not. The Laissez faire principle is Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro: “The doctrines of
rejected my contemporary American jurisprudence and laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the
by Philippine Constitution and jurisprudence. individual, as axioms of economic and political theory,
are of the past”
 “the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the ISSUE: W/N the “Reflector Law” (A.O.) is contrary to the
concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
government the responsibility of coping with social and HELD: No, it is not.
economic problems with the commensurate power of The A.O. states: “No motor vehicles of whatever style,
control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if
its commitment to promote the general welfare through not equipped with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either
state action. No constitutional objection to regulatory be factory built-in-reflector commercial glass reflectors,
measures adversely affecting property rights, especially reflection tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall
so when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded, have an intensity to be maintained visible and clean at
unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be
proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the visible 100 meters away at night."
Constitution.” penalty for non-compliance is rejection or suspension
Justice Laurel, concurring in Antamok Goldfields of vehicle’s registration and a fine.
Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, said that the  “It is a fundamental principle flowing from the
1935 Constitution did away with the laissez- doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not
faire doctrine. delegate its legislative power to the two other branches
”during the Commonwealth era, no constitutional of the government… What cannot be delegated is the
infirmity was found to have attached to legislation authority under the Constitution to make laws and to
covering such subjects as collective alter and repeal them…”
bargaining, 22 security of tenure, 23 minimum A distinction has rightfully been made between
wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation of delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily
tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of securities, 27 and involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which
control of public services.” constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of
authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised
4. “Galo thus could have profited by a little more under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid
diligence in the scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered objection call be made.
with not unexpected regularity, during all the while our ”The test is the completeness of the statute in all its
Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
such a shibboleth as laissez-faire…The Reflector Law is legislature…The legislature does not abdicate its
thus immune from the attack so recklessly hurled functions when it describes what job must be done, who
against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.”
constitutional test.” Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: "It is
well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of
laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may tapes. As such, the PCA will no longer require any
constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and the
and regulations to implement a given legislation and latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature as condition prior to establishment or operation of such
often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to mills or plants. Rather, it shall limit itself only to simply
anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex registering coconut product processors for the purpose
situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect. of monitoring their volumes of production, administration
All that is required is that the regulation should germane of quality standards.
to the objects and purposes of the law; that the The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of
regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated
the standards that the law prescribes ... " coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to
”It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed appeal to the Office of the President
together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic When petitioner received no reply from the Office of the
Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no President, they brought this suit for
doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety certiorari and mandamus before the SC.
which is the prime consideration in statutes of this PCA: case should be dismissed as they did not wait for
character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of President’s reply, thereby violating principle of
the power of petitioner as Land Transportation exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to
give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental ISSUE: W/N rule on exhaustion of administrative
purpose. remedies applies.
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT
HELD: No, it does not.
DESICCATORS v. PHILIPPINE COCONUT
“The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative
AUTHORITY
remedies before a party may seek judicial review…has
FACTS: obviously no application here. The resolution in question
the Philippine Coconut Authority issued on March 24, was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making
1993 Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the or legislative power. However, only judicial review of
withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all decisions of administrative agencies made in the
regulation of the coconut product processing industry. exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the
In its whereas clause, it stated that it is the policy of the exhaustion doctrine.”
State to promote free enterprise unhampered by
ISSUE: W/N PCA’s resolution is valid. subject to the approval of the President, in view of the
increased demand for desiccated coconut products in
HELD: No, it does not. the world's markets. This authorized the opening of new
 “The Philippine Coconut Authority is… an plants in "non-congested areas only as declared by the
independent public corporation . . . directly reporting to, PCA" and subject to compliance by applicants with "all
and supervised by, the President of the Philippines, and procedures and requirements for registration. This form
charged with carrying out the State's policy "to promote of "deregulation" was approved by President Aquino.
the rapid integrated development and growth of the  “These measures — the restriction in 1982 on entry
coconut industry…through a regulatory scheme set up into the field, the reduction the same year of the number
by law.” of the existing coconut mills and then the lifting of the
Through this scheme, the government, on August 28, restrictions in 1987 — were adopted within the
1982, temporarily prohibited the opening of new coconut framework of regulation as established by law "to
processing plants and, four months later, phased out promote the rapid integrated development and growth of
some of the existing ones in view of overproduction in the coconut industry.” The PCA could have only worked
the coconut industry which resulted in cut-throat under this structure.
competition, underselling and smuggling of poor quality  “In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the
products and ultimately in the decline of the export PCA adopted on March 24, 1993 the questioned
performance of coconut-based commodities. The resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate
establishment of new plants could be authorized only opening of new coconut processing plants but the virtual
upon determination by the PCA of the existence of dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure…In effect,
certain economic conditions and the approval of the the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on
President. these matters, but in case of violations of standards
On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the there would be nothing much it would do. “
existing plants was ordered by the government after Under the Revised Coconut Code, the role of the
finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of PCA is "To formulate and adopt a general program of
existing plants will not afford a viable solution to the development for the coconut and other palm oil industry
problem considering that the total available limited in all its aspects." And “To regulate the marketing and
market is not adequate to support all the existing the exportation of copra and its by-products by
processing plants, making it imperative to reduce the establishing standards for domestic trade and export..”
number of existing processing plants. By limiting the purpose of registration to merely
It was only on October 23, 1987 when the PCA "monitoring volumes of production [and] administration
adopted Resolution No. 058-87, authorizing the of quality standards" of coconut processing plants, the
establishment and operation of additional DCN plants, PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost
completely to market forces how the coconut industry Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte
will develop. The result can very well be a repeat of de Piedad, the Philippine Government directed its
1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a "free-for- treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of
all," resulting in cut-throat competition, underselling, the $80,000 of the relief fund in four installments of $20,000
production of inferior products and the like, which badly each.
affected the foreign trade performance of the coconut On account of various petitions of the originally
industry. intended beneficiaries of the money, the Philippine
In the first "whereas" clause of the questioned Government sued Monte de Piedad to recover the
resolution as set out above, the PCA invokes a policy of $80,000. The lower court ruled in favor of the
free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective Government.
regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape" as Monte de Piedad asserts:
justification for abolishing the licensing system. But free 1. The sum was actually a donation, not a loan,
enterprise does not call for removal of "protective 2. the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to
regulations." return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering
At all events, any change in policy must be made by it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty.
the legislative department of the government. The Hence, the present Philippine government cannot
regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond maintain this suit.
the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. 3. The Philippine Government has no competence to
institute the suit. The money was part of a charitable
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. EL subscription, whereby the donors were people in Spain,
MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA the donees were people in the Philippines, and the
Government was merely a trustee. It was never the
owner of the money, and therefore could not sue for its
About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the recovery as it is not the proper party.
treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of 4. Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when
the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June,
by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the
Islands on June 3, 1863. time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912
Subsequently, a central relief board was appointed to
distribute the money. It allotted $365,703.50 to the HELD:
various sufferers named in its resolution, which was 1. Evidence shows that the money was a loan, not a
published in the Official Gazette. donation.
The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to Mormon Church v US: “it is a most beneficient
the Governor-General its financial condition and its functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the
absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to
out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the those who cannot protect themselves.
Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital: this beneficient
board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to functions has not ceased t exist under the change of
be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the government from a monarchy to a republic; but that it
disposal of the relief board." The Monte de Piedad now resides in the legislative department, ready to be
agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes
approved by the Government of Spain, the same would of justice and right, and is a clearly capable of being
be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases
given to it as a donation. whatever.
3. The Philippine government has competence to sue.
2. The present Philippine government has the It would be impracticable for them to institute an
prerogative to enforce charities, as parens patriae action or actions either individually or collectively to
If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict recover the $80,000. The only course that can be
with the political character, constitution or institutions of satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again
the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their assume control of the fund and devote it to the object
force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the for which it was originally destined.
United States, but if they are among "that great body of To deny the Government's right to maintain this action
municipal law which regulates private and domestic would be contrary to sound public policy, as tending to
rights," they continued in force and are still in force discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of
unless they have been repealed by the present humanity and Christian benevolence in like instances in
Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear the future.
from their very nature and character. 4. The action has not and can not prescribe.
Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine U. S.vs. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway
Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved Co.: “the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a
upon he United States. Chancellor Kent: “In this sovereign government, is not bound by any statute of
country, the legislature or government of the State, limitations, unless Congress has clearly manifested its
as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of intention that it should be so bound”
public nature, by virtue of its general superintending the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal
authority over the public interests, where no other party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action,
person is entrusted with it.” . is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is
seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the

Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. RATIO:
Political and international law recognizes that all acts
Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan
and proceedings of a de facto government are good and
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the
the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese
Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila occupation may be considered de facto governments,
and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon supported by the military force and deriving their
refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a authority from the laws of war.
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had
invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually
judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without remain in force unless suspended or changed by the
an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war,
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil
Philippines (the Philippine government under the government or the regular administration of the laws.
Japanese). And if they were not valid, then it would not have been
necessary for MacArthur to come out with a
ISSUES: proclamation abrogating them.
1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions
made during the Japanese occupation were valid and The second question, the court said, hinges on the
remained valid even after the American occupation; interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation government” and whether or not he intended it to annul
MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts
regulations and processes of any other government in during the Japanese military occupation.m
the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are
null and void and without legal effect in areas of the IF, according to international law, non-political
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto
invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and governments are valid and remain valid even after the
proceedings of the courts; occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial
MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue processes, which would be in violation of international
hearing the cases pending before them. law.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired

A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan,
if any other possible construction remains.” as the said courts and laws creating and conferring
jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now,
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result it follows that the same courts may continue exercising
from a particular construction, or great mischief done, the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before
such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until
presume that such construction was not intended by the abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction
makers of the law, unless required by clear and upon them are repealed by the said government.
unequivocal words.”
DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of
Annulling judgments of courts made during the the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to
Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
should not be construed to mean that judicial
proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of SUMMARY OF RATIO:
any other governments.” 1. International law says the acts of a de facto
government are valid and civil laws continue even
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such during occupation unless repealed.
laws and institutions are continued in use by the 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other
occupant, they become his and derive their force from governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial
him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not proceedings because such a construction would violate
become, by being continued as required by the law of the law of nations.
nations, laws and courts of Japan. 3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue
hearing the case pending before it.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established
“law once established continues until changed by some through rebellion (govt gets possession and control
competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED through force or the voice of the majority and maintains
MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of itself against the will of the rightful government)
course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a through occupation (established and maintained by
change. military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the
enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government
of paramount force) against Perfecto for violation of Art 256 of the Penal
through insurrection (established as an independent Code: “Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame,
government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other
insurrection against the parent state) person in authority . . .,"
The CFI convicted Fernando, stating: “We now have
(source: no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority
http://danabatnag.wordpress.com/2008/12/04/co-kim- in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and
chan-v-valdez-tan-keh/) said provision, with other articles of the Penal Code,
had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. GREGORIO the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has, by a
PERFECTO majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of
the land to-day…” Fernando was convicted following the
Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. ruling in U.S. v Helbig.
Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which Issue: whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code,
constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall
in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or
from his office. Senate was convened and was informed other person in authority . . .," is still in force.
of the loss.
Subsequently, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by HELD: No, it is not.
Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as 1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on
follows: “Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code
for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of records That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law
which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that the Libel
Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal
indication that the author or authors of the crime will Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal
ever be discovered…To find them, it would not, Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults,
perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Senate itself,.. must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law.
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia
the said iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but Valdez, the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as
followed the example of certain Senators who secured "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject
their election through fraud and robbery.” of calumnia and injuria." It was found that those
The Senate then adopted a resolution referring the provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny
case to the Attorney-General. An information was filed
and insults in which the elements of writing and publicity political authority, as opposed to the American
entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law. conception of the protection of the interests of the
The Libel Law must have had the same result on public, have been obliterated by the present system of
other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance government in the Islands.
article 256. it must be noted that this article punishes contempts
against executive officials, although its terms are broad
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for
sovereignty over the Philippine son article 256 of the contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a
Spanish Penal Code. government based upon American principles. Our
It is a general principle of the public law that on official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some
acquisition of territory the previous political relations of authority greater than the people but it is an agent and
the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here servant of the people themselves. These officials are
used to denominate the laws regulating the relations only entitled to respect and obedience when they are
sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction.
 According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish The crime of lese majeste (crime against the crown,
Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain crimes against the Cortes and its members and against
to protect Spanish officials who were the the council of ministers) disappeared in the Philippines
representatives of the King. With the change of with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of
sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of the Crown have no place under the American flag.
government, as set up in the Philippines. It was in no
sense a continuation of the old, although merely for Vilas v. City of Manila
convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws Vilas, Trigas, and Aguado are creditors of Manila as it
were continued. The demands which the new existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands
government made, and makes, on the individual citizen (PI) to the US by the treaty of Paris. According to them,
are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of under its present charter, the Government of the PI is
the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted the same juristic person and liable upon the obligations
position that the citizen must speak of him only with of the old city. The Supreme Court of the Philippine
bated breath. Islands denied relief, holding that the present
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in
and fundamental principles of the American character no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality.
and system of government. Penalties out of all Thus it was elevated to the US Supreme Court.
proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a
distorted monarchical conception of the nature of
ISSUE:WON notwithstanding the cession of the PI to extinction or dissolution of corporations. The legal entity
the US followed by a reincorporation of the city, the survived both military occupation and cession. The
present municipality liable for obligations of old city. corporate identity and liability of the city was not
YES extinguished.
That there is a total abrogation of the former political
HELD: relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is
The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in
the property rights of the old city and to the right to conflict with the political character, constitution, or
enforce all its causes of action. There is identity of institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force,
purpose between Sp and Am charters and substantial is also plain. But it is equally settled in the same public
identity of municipal powers, area, and inhabitants. law that that great body of municipal law which
Argument against liability: Ayuntamiento of Manila was regulates private and domestic rights continues in force
a corporation entity created by the Sp government . until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. In Chicago,
When the sovereignty of Sp ceased, municipality, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, it was said:
ceased as well.--> analogy to doctrine of principal and 'It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted
agent, death of principal=death of agent upon by the United States, that whenever political
Dual Character of Municipal Corporations: jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are
1. Governmental: exercises by delegation a part of the transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the
sovereignty of the state municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are
2. Private/Business: mere legal entity or juristic person. intended for the protection of private rights, continue in
Stands for the community in the administration of local force until abrogated or changed by the new
affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes government or sovereign. By the cession, public
for which its governmental powers are conferred property passes from one government to the other, but
In view of the dual character of municipal corporations, private property remains as before, and with it those
there is no public reason for presuming their total municipal laws which are designed to secure its
dissolution as a mere consequence of military peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all
occupation or territorial cession. laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the
McKinley’s instruction: relinquishment or cession cannot political character, institutions, and constitution of the
in any respect impair the property or rights which by law new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a
belong to the peaceful possession of property of all cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power-and
kinds. the latter is involved in the former-to the United States,
Property rights of municipal corporations and individuals the laws of the country in support of an established
were safeguarded. The cession did not operate as an religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or
authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground
like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal
without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political
the country on other subjects would necessarily be instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese
superseded by existing laws of the new government Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are
upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the
affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of
and designed to secure good order and peace in the the United States of America, and therefore, null and
community, and promote its health and prosperity, void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No.
which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the
general, that a change of government leaves them in Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner
force until, by direct action of the new government, they has been deprived of his constitutional rights"; that
are altered or repealed.' Peralta is being punished by a law created to serve the
political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the
Peralta v. Director of Prisons Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are
Peralta, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in
Manila charged with the supervision and control of the the Revised Penal Code."
production, procurement and distribution of goods and The Solicitor General opined that the Court of Special
other necessaries, was prosecuted for the crime of and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the
robbery. He was found guilty and sentenced to life summary procedure prescribed therefor are tinged with
imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on August political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in
21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the
Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the
No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called Constitutional rights of accused persons under their
Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority legitimate Constitution.
conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the The features of the summary procedure adopted by
said Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial Ordinance No. 7, assailed by Peralta and the Solicitor
was the summary one established in Chapter II of General as impairing the constitutional rights of an
Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the accused are: that court may interrogate the accused
Executive Commission, made applicable to the trial and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in
violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the
section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7. questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if
from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it
appears that the defendant is guilty, he may be military government and was run by Filipinos and not by
immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the Japanese nationals is of no consequence. The so-called
sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and
of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and organized as a sovereign state independent from any
until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth
Supreme Court composed of three Justices. and reality, a government established by the belligerent
occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was
FIRST ISSUE: of the same character as the Philippine Executive
What is the nature and status of the government Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority
established in the Islands by the Japanese forces of was the same — the Japanese military authority and
occupation under the designation of Republic of the government. As General MacArthur stated in his
Philippines? proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which
has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-
In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and called government styled as the 'Republic of the
Dizon it washeld: Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943,
The Philippines Executive Commission, which was based upon neither the free expression of the peoples"
organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, will nor the sanction of the Government of the United
by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil States.' Japan had no legal power to grant
government established by the military forces of independence to the Philippines or transfer the
occupation and therefore a de facto government of the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the
second kind. As Halleck says, "the government latent sovereignty of the Filipino people, before its
established over an enemy's territory during the military military occupation and possession of the Islands had
occupation may exercise all the powers given by the matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or
laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means
subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is recognized in the law of nations.”
of little consequence whether such government be
called a military or civil government. Its character is the As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de
same and the source of its authority the same. In either facto government of the second kind (of paramount
case it is a government imposed by the laws of war and force), the question involved cannot be decided in the
so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth
the rest of the world those laws alone determine the Government; because the belligerent occupant was
legality or illegality of its acts." The fact that the totally independent of the constitution of the occupied
Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a territory in carrying out the administration over said
territory; and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme and must be promoted under all circumstances or
Court of the United States in the cases involving the conditions.
validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate
States, considered as de facto governments of the third SECOND ISSUE:
kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called The validity of the creation of the Court of Special and
Republic of the Philippines which is a de Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary
facto government of paramount force. The Constitution procedure adopted for that court
of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither
be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent It is well established in International Law that "The
occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the
the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of
entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of the conquering or conquered state, — it is drawn
nations. entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of
nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted
In the case of United States vs. Rice, the Supreme either through special tribunals, whose authority and
Court of the United States held that, by the military procedure is defined in the military code of the
occupation of Castine, Maine, the sovereignty of the conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and
United States in the territory was, of course, suspended, authorities of the occupied district."
and the laws of the United States could no longer be
rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a
inhabitants who remained and submitted to the governmental instrumentality of the belligerent
belligerent occupant. By the surrender the inhabitants occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to
passed under a temporary allegiance to the British create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
government, and were bound by such laws, and such Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not
only, as it chose to recognize and impose. And a court is of political complexion, for it is mere a
Oppenheim, in his Treatise on International Law, says governmental agency charged with the duty of applying
that, in carrying out the administration over the occupied the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its
territory and its inhabitants, "the (belligerent) occupant judgments and sentences may be of political
is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of complexion, or not depending upon the nature or
the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and character of the law so applied. There is no room for
the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the
purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest court in question.
THIRD ISSUE: He petitioned for habeas corpus on the theory that a

The validity of the sentence which imprisonment during Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the
the Japanese military occupation latter, aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason as
There is question as to the power or competence of the defined and penalized by Article 114 of the Revised
belligerent occupant to promulgate the law providing for Penal Code.
such procedure. For "the invader deals freely with the Laurel contends that sovereignty of the legitimate
relations of the inhabitants of the occupied territory government in the Philippines, and consequently, the
towards himself . . . for his security also, he declares correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was
certain acts, not forbidden by the ordinary laws of the then suspended.
country, to be punishable; and he so far suspends the Moreover, there was a change of sovereignty over
laws which guard personal liberty as is required for the these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
summary punishment of any one doing such acts." Republic.
FOURTH ISSUE: ISSUE:

If they were then valid, the effect on said punitive WON Laurel’s contentions were valid? NO.
sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the
restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government RATIO:
All judgments of political complexion of the courts during A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance
the Japanese regime, ceased to be valid upon the which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience
reoccupation of the islands by virtue of the principle or to his government or sovereign. This should not be
right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance
present case, the sentence which convicted the which a foreigner owes to the government of his current
petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be residence. This absolute allegiance to their government
considered as having ceased to be valid ipso facto is not abrogated by enemy occupation because the
upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is
General Douglas MacArthur. not transferred thereby to the occupier, remaining
vested in the legitimate government. What may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
Laurel v. Misa with the control and government of the territory
Anastacio Laurel was a detainee for alleged occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the
collaboration with the enemy during the Japanese occupant. The sovereignty itself is not suspended and
occupation. subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of
the inhabitants to their legitimate government or not exempt the occupant from complying with the
sovereign also subsists, and therefore there is no such Hague Regulation of not involving the population to take
thing as suspended allegiance, on which petitioner's part in the military operations against their own country.
contention rests. He also said that the Commonwealth was an
instrumentality of the US and had no sovereignty of its
Adopting the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance own and that treason committed against it or the US is
would lead to disastrous consequences for it would not treason against the sovereign and independent
sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a Republic of the Phil.
free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious
task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and Republic v. Villasor
independence.
Respondent judge Guillermo Villasor ordered in a
The second contention was also invalid since the previous case to release funds from bank accounts
change of government from Commonwealth to Republic belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines as
does not affect the prosecution of crime of treason compensation to two construction companies.
committed during the former, because it is an offense The Philippine government sought to reverse Villasor's
on the same government and sovereign people for Art. decision, on the ground that it did not authorize the
XVIII of the 1935 Constitution provided that upon the release of funds.
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the US, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines will be known as the ISSUE:WoN Villasor had the authority and jurisdiction to
Republic of the Philippines. order the release of funds as restitution for damages in
Dispositive: Petition was denied. a suit against the State?
PARAS, J., DISSENTING OPINION HELD/RATIO:

He said that in Peralta v. Director of Prisons, the SC No. Article XV, Section 16 of the 1935 Constitution
held that the Constitution of the Commonwealth says, "The State may not be sued without its consent."
Government was suspended during the Japanese Villasor awarded the money belonging to a component
occupation and that SC should hold that no treason of the government, the military, without the express
could have been committed during it because Art. 114 authorization from Congress. Villasor acted contrary to
of the RPC was not then in force. He also does not the Constitution, and thus acted in excess of jurisdiction.
agree with the majority that adopting theory of It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing
suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as
consequence for the reason that the suspension does well as its government is immune from suit unless it
gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a “buy-bust
must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: “A operation” conducted by the Philippine police narcotic
sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said
formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical to have been seized. The narcotic agents were
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo
against the authority that makes the law on which the (agent of US Drug Enforcement Agency) who became
right depends.” Sociological jurisprudence supplies an one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution.
answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent
decision, Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the
Republic of the Philippines, with its affirmation that “a Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is ‘trumped-up’ charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur
not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that Scalzo.
may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental
efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its ISSUE:WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be
multifarious functions are far greater if such a sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity
fundamental principle were abandoned and the conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. Relations
With the well known propensity on the part of our people
to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time RULING:The SC DENIED the petition.
and energy required to defend against law suits, in the Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions
absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such of the diplomatic mission involve the representation of
an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.” the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly
Judgment: Petition granted, judgment reversed. relations with the receiving state. Only “diplomatic
agents,” are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity
Minucher v. CA from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick
Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled
Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and to immunity is the determination of whether or not he
Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache,
continued to stay as head of the Iranian National Scalzo’s main function is to observe, analyze and
Resistance Movement. interpret trends and developments in their respective
fields in the host country and submit reports to their own
In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information ministries or departments in the home government. He
for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic
mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that

simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial The “buy-bust operation” and other such acts are
court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic indication that the Philippine government has given its
immunity is contentious. imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within
Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States
Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance
the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but scope of his official function or duties.
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be
barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from LASCO vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural
suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a Resources Exploration (UNFRFNRE)
state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. 23 February 1995
The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an
individual but for the State, in whose service he is,
under the maxim – par in parem, non habet imperium –
that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert  Petitioners were dismissed from their employment
jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if with UNRFNRE, which is a special fund and
the judgment against an official would require the state subsidiary of the UN.
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award,  UNRFNRE: Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over it
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity under the
the damages decreed against him, the suit must be 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
regarded as being against the state itself, although it the UN. This is backed up by a letter from the DFA
has not been formally impleaded. confirming this.
 1991- LA dismissed the complaint, MR denied.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be NLRC affirmed.
cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it  They then filed for certiorari without first seeking a
can be established that he is acting within the directives reconsideration of the NLRC. Certiorari was not
of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an proper because petitioners failed to ask for
indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between reconsideration but the SC gave due course
the two sovereigns. because of the implications in international law.
HELD/RATIO:
Petitioners: acts of mining exploration and exploitation YES. The diplomatic immunity of private respondent
are outside the official functions of an international was sufficiently established by the letter of the DFA,
agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Even recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE
assuming that private respondent was entitled to in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges
diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted that private and Immunities of the United Nations where the
respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration Philippine Government was a party. The issue whether
work and entered into a contract of employment with an international organization is entitled to diplomatic
petitioners. Moreover, it is a Constitutional mandate that immunity is a "political question" and such determination
the State shall afford full protection to labor and promote by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and
full employment and equality of employment quasi-judicial agencies. The courts can only assume
opportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3). jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly
waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at
OSG: UNRFNRE is covered by the mantle of diplomatic bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
immunity. It is a specialized agency of the UN and the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III,
under the UN Charter (Art. 105), it enjoys privileges and Sec. 4).
immunities necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. As a matter of state policy as expressed in the
The Philippines is a signatory to the Convention on the Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the
Privileges and Immunities Specialized Agencies of the generally accepted principles of international law (1987
UN in which Sec. 4 states that “the specialized Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the
agencies, their property and assets, wherever located United Nations and a party to the Convention on the
and by whomsoever held shall enjoy immunity from Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies
every form of legal process” and Sec. 5 states that “the of the United Nations, the Philippine Government
property and assets of the specialized agencies, adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the
wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be United Nations and its specialized agencies. Both
immune from search, requisition, confiscation, treaties have the force and effect of law.
expropriation and any other form of interference, Immunity is necessary to assure unimpeded
whether by executive, administrative, judicial or performance of their functions. The purpose is "to shield
legislative action.” the affairs of international organizations, in accordance
with international practice, from political pressure or
ISSUE: W/N UNRFNRE enjoys diplomatic immunity. control by the host country to the prejudice of member
States of the organization, and to ensure the
unhampered performance of their functions"
In the International Catholic Migration  1986- he was terminated from office due to alleged
Commission case, it was held that there is no conflict financial constraints. He was deemed entitled to
between the constitutional duty of the State to protect separation benefits.
the rights of workers and to promote their welfare, and  1987- he filed a complaint against SEAFDC-AQD for
the grant of immunity to international organizations. nonpayment of his separation pay and damages.
Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are now standard in  SEAFDC-AQD: NLRC has no jurisdiction since it is
the charters of the international organizations to an international organization and that Lazaga must
guarantee the smooth discharge of their functions. first secure clearances from the proper departments
UNRFNRE is not engaged in a commercial venture in for property or money accountability before any claim
the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances
project entered into by the government and the UN for had not yet been obtained him
mineral exploration in Dinagat Island. Its mission is not  LA (1988)- ordered SEAFD-AQD to pay separation
to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily pay and other employment benefits plus actual
thereby but to help improve the quality of life of the damages and attorney’s fees. NLRC affirmed.
people, including that of petitioners.
This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. ISSUE: W/N NLRC had jurisdiction.
Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United HELD/RATIO:
Nations states that "each specialized agency shall make NO. SEAFDC-AQD is an international agency beyond
a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) the jurisdiction of NLRC established by ASEAN
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of Countries with Japan to purpose of which is to
private character to which the specialized agency is a contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development
party." in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the
member governments of the Center. Being an
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center- intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its
Aquaculture Department vs. NLRC Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence
14 February 1992 and freedom from control of the state in whose territory
its office is located.
 1975-1983: Lazaga was employed by SEAFDC-AQD Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the
as Research Associate, Senior External Affairs Republic of the Philippines agreed to be represented by
Officer, then Head of the External Affairs Office. one Director in the governing SEAFDEC Council
(Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1) and
that its national laws and regulations shall apply only
insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of "an agreed among states may be vested with international
amount of money, movable and immovable property personality when two conditions concur, to wit:, that
and services necessary for the establishment and their purposes are mainly non-political and that they are
operation of the Center" are concerned (Art. 11.). It autonomous,i.e., not subject to the control of any state.
expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws Anent the issue of waiver of immunity, suffice it to say at
on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC- the moment that the petitioner has timely raised the
AQD. issue of jurisdiction. While the petitioner did not question
Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the the public respondent's lack of jurisdiction at the early
issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does stages of the proceedings, it, nevertheless, did so
not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has before it rested its case and certainly well before the
none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by proceedings thereat had terminated.
law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties
can provide one. Tijam v Sibonghanoy
15 April 1968
SEAFDEC v. Acosta,
NLRC  After being duly served with summons the
defendants filed their answer in which, after making
 SEAFDEC- filed MTC on the ground that NLRC had some admissions and denials of the material
no jurisdiction averments of the complaint, they interposed a
 NLRC- MTD denied, petitioner is not immune from counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by
suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international the plaintiffs.
organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not  RTC- found in favor of Tijam and a writ of execution
expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising was issued against the Surety’s bond. The Surety
the issue of jurisdiction. filed to deny the motion for execution and motion to
 SC (1992)- dismissed petition for certiorari quash the writ all denied by the cour
 CA affirmed the CFI. On MR, Surety filed its Motion
ISSUE: W/N the NLRC had jurisdiction. to Dismiss alleging that a month before the filing of
the case before the RTC, RA 296 or the Judiciary
HELD/ RATIO: Act of 1948 became effective. Under such law, the
NO. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. actions where the value of the subject-matter or the
(See first SEAFDEC case). AJ Isagani Cruz stated: amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00,
Certain administrative bodies created by agreement exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First
Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
decide the case. CA forwarded the case to the SC. opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead
of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion
ISSUE: W/N Surety may question the jurisdiction of to dismiss mentioned heretofore. It could have raised
the CFI. the question of the lack of jurisdiction but failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the
HELD/RATIO: court a quo as well as in the CA, it invoked the
NO. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
question in different ways and for different reasons. submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that the CA that it finally woke up to raise the question of
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have jurisdiction.
been done earlier. Furthermore, it has also been held International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja
that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too
late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting  On February 23, 1981, an Agreement was forged
his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, between the Philippines and then High
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, Commissioner for Refugees, providing for a refugee
when adverse. operating center in Bataan. ICMC was accredited by
The action was commenced in the CFI of Cebu on July the Philippine Government to operate the refugee
19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety operating center. On July 14, 1986, Trade Unions of
filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed
the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against Petition for Certification Election among the rank and
the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed
opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked the petition on the ground that it is an international
for an additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of organization registered with
its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic
relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of immunity.
jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them.  On February 7, 1987, the Med-Arbiter sustained
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack
against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) reversed the Med-Arbiter’s decision organizations, which determination has been

and ordered for the immediate conduct of the held to be political question
certification election. On July 15, 1988, ICMC’s conclusive upon the courts in order not to embarrass a
request for recognition as a specialized agency was political department of the government. The term
granted by the Dept. of Foreign Affairs including the “international organization” generally describes an
grant of corresponding diplomatic privileges and organization set up by agreement between two or
immunities, as evidenced by a MOA between the more states. They are organized mainly as a means
Philippine Government and ICMC. The latter then for conducting general international business in which
sought for the dismissal of the TUPAS petition for the member states have an interest. “Specialized
Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly agencies” are international organizations having
granted by the Philippine Government, through functions in particular fields, as mentioned in Articles 57
the DFA. and 63 of the UN Charter. There are basically three
propositions underlying the grant of international
ISSUE: W/N the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to international organizations: 1.international
immunities granted to ICMC extends to immunity institutions should have a status which protects them
from the application of Philippine labor laws. against control or interference by any
one government in the performance of functions or the
HELD/RATIO: effective discharge of which they
YES. There is no doubt that ICMC was granted are responsible to democratically constituted
immunity. Article II of the MOA between the Philippine international bodies in which all the nations concerned
Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have are represented; 2. No country should derive any
the status of a specialized agency. Article III, Sections 4 national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on
and 5 of the Convention on the Privileges and common international funds; and, 3. The international
Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN organization should, as a collectivity of States members,
General Assembly on Nov. 21, 1947 and concurred by be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official
the Senate on May 17. 1949, explicitly provides that business customarily extended to each other by its
specialized agencies, including their properties and individual member States. The theory behind all three
assets, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal propositions is said to be essentially institutional in
process. Moreover, DFA’s opinion expressing its view character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or
that the conduct of the Certification Election is volatile of privileges of individuals, but with the elements
ICMC’s diplomatic immunity constitutes a categorical of functional independence necessary to
recognition by the Executive Branch that ICMC indeed free international institutions from national control and to
enjoys immunities accorded to international enable them to discharge their responsibilities
impartially on behalf of all their members."The raison A certification election cannot be viewed as an
d’être for these immunities is the assurance of independent or isolated process. It could trigger off a
unimpeded performance of their functions by series of events in the collective bargaining process
the agencies concerned. The exercise of jurisdiction by together with related incidents and/or concerted
the Department of Labor over ICMC would defeat the activities, which could inevitably
very purpose of immunity accorded to the agency, involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any
which is to shield the affairs of international penal, civil and administrative proceedings.
organizations, in accordance with international practice,
from political pressure or control by the host country to KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA AT TAC SA IRRI v.
the prejudice a member States of the organization, and SECRETARY OF LABOR
to ensure the unhampered performance of their
functions.
These are two consolidated cases involving the validity
ICMC’s immunity does not deprive labor of its basic of the claim of immunity by the International Catholic
rights. ICMC employees are not without recourse Migration Commission (ICMC) and the International
whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of Rice Research Institute, Inc. (IRRI) from the application
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the of Philippine labor laws.
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides
that "each specialized agency shall make provision for HELD:
appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising There are basically three propositions underlying the
out of contracts or other disputes of private character to grant of international immunities to international
which the specialized agency is a party."Moreover, organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO
pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement Memorandum are stated thus:
between ICMC and the Philippine Government, 1) international institutions should have a status which
whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the protects them against control or interference by any one
Government is free to withdraw the privileges and government in the performance of functions for the
immunities accorded. The immunity granted being "from effective discharge of which they are responsible to
every form of legal process except in so far as in any democratically constituted international bodies in which
particular case they have expressly waived their all the nations concerned are represented;
immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification 2) no country should derive any national financial
election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the advantage by levying fiscal charges on common
reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. international funds; and
3) the international organization should, as a collectivity Section 8, 15 and Article XIII, Section 3 (supra), of the
of States members, be accorded the facilities for the 1987 Constitution; and implemented by Articles 243 and
conduct of its official business customarily extended to 246 of the Labor Code, 16 relied on by the BLR Director
each other by its individual member States. and by Kapisanan.
SANDERS v. VERIDIANO
The theory behind all three propositions is said to be
essentially institutional in character. "It is not concerned
with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but
with the elements of functional independence necessary Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of
to free international institutions from national control and the U.S. Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was the
to enable them to discharge their responsibilities commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base. Private
impartially on behalf of all their members. The raison respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent
d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of residence in the Philippines.
unimpeded performance of their functions by the
agencies concerned. Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both
employed as game room attendants in the special
The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC services department of the NAVSTA. On October 3,
and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international 1975, the private respondents were advised that their
character and respective purposes. The objective is to employment had been converted from permanent full-
avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance
host country in their internal workings. The exercise of proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S.
jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these Department of Defense. The hearing officer
instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-
which is to shield the affairs of international time status. However, in a letter addressed to petitioner
organizations, in accordance with international practice, Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's
from political pressure or control by the host country to report. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr.
the prejudice of member States of the organization, and Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and
to ensure the unhampered performance of their supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have
functions. proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be
difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though
ICMC's and IRRI's immunity from local jurisdiction by no the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case
means deprives labor of its basic rights, which are with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places
guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, 14 Article III, where others not involved in the case could hear."
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of
petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval official character will not suffice to insulate him from
Personnel explaining the change of the private suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a
respondent's employment status. So, private personal tort committed without or in excess of his
respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters authority. These well-settled principles are applicable
contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment not only to the officers of the local state but also where
of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their the person sued in its courts pertains to the government
personal and proprietary rights. However, petitioners of a foreign state, as in the present case. Assuming that
argued that the acts complained of were performed by the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants
them in the discharge of their official duties and that, have a right to the payment of damages, such award
consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their
under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the personal capacities but by the United States
motion was denied on the main ground that the government as their principal. This will require that
petitioners had not presented any evidence that their government to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
acts were official in nature. judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary
amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making
Issue/Held/Ratio: the action a suit against that government without its
W/N the petitioners were performing their official duties. consent
YES. REPUBLIC v. FELICIANO
Sanders, as director of the special services department

of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the
personnel, including the private respondents. Given the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985
official character of the letters, the petitioners were reversing the order of the Court of FirstInstance of
being sued as officers of the United States government Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980,
because they have acted on behalf of that government which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo
and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a
government and not the petitioners personally that is parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the
responsible for their acts. It is stressed at the outset that State.
the mere allegation that a government functionary is
being sued in his personal capacity will not ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:
automatically remove him from the protection of the law W/N the State can be sued for recovery and possession
of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state of a parcel of land.
wary in accepting "possessory information documents,

NO. A suit against the State, under settled as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing of alleged ownership of lands.
that the State has consented to be sued, either TAN v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory
language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be The Bureau of Forestry issued Notice No.
invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the 2087,advertising for public bidding a certain tract of
proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales.
sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be Herein petitioner-appellant Tan submitted his
construed in application after paying the necessary fees and posting
strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the the required bond therefore. Nine other applicants
Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the submitted their offers before the deadline. The proposed
State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. area was awarded to petitioner. Thereafter he was
Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of given an Ordinary Timber License. However, it was not
the legislative body. signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources as required. One of the bidders, Ravago
Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of
General,that the informacion posesoria registered in the Agriculture and Natural Resources praying that the
Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on license issued in the name of petitioner be cancelled or
September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory revoked on the ground that the grant thereof was
information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate irregular, anomalous and contrary to existing forestry
presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo laws, rules and regulations. The Secretary of Agriculture
Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the and Natural Resources revokes Tan‘s timber license.
alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original His motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made petition. Petitioner-appellant, in his petition, alleged that
only in case of loss of the original. These circumstances he has exhausted all his administrative remedies to no
raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of avail as respondents-appellees have failed, neglected,
the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent refused and continue to refuse to allow petitioner-
Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document appellant to continue operation in the area covered by
is the fact that "possessory information calls for an area his timber license.
of only100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by
respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares,
later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be
ISSUE/HELD: P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of

W/N petitioner has exhausted all administrative Metro Manila. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat
remedies before filing his petition to the Supreme Court. competition when it charged Metropolitan Waterworks
and Sewerage System lower than the standard
NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the minimum rates provided in the MOA. As a result,
CFI. Petitioner did not appeal the order of the PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of
respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural membership to VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil case against
Resources to the President of the Philippines, who the PC chief and PC-SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary
issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the Supervisory Unit for Security and Investigation
area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Agencies). PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to
Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that dismiss on the grounds that the case is against the
the President has the power to review on appeal the State, which had not given consent thereto.
orders or acts of the respondents, the failure of the
petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his ISSUE/HELD:
part to exhaust all available administrative remedies. W/N VMPSIs complaint against the PCChief and PC-
SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.
VETERANS MANPOWER v. COURT OF APPEAL YES. A public official may sometimes be held liable in
his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction,
VMPSI (Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-
Inc.) alleges that the provisions of RA5487 (Private SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were
Security Agency Law) violate the provisions of the performed as part of their official duties, without malice,
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had
combinations of restraint of trade and tend to favor and against them in their private capacities. Furthermore,
institutionalize the PADPAO (Philippine Association of the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
Detective and Protective Services, Inc.). Furthermore, that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12,
VMPSI questions the provision on requiring all private 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the
security agencies or company security forces to register State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued
as members of any PADPAO chapter organized within must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a
the region. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without
Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction
Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate over the public respondents.
per guard for8hours of security service per day at
PNB v. CIR
garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter
officer of said notice is therefore not in order. The Court
Petitioner’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment finds no merit in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201
was denied for lack of merit. What was sought to be has, since June 19, 1965, already repealed
garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is
Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the
Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court Ex-Officio Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk
which had become final and executory. A writ of of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of
execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. execution and notices of garnishment in an area
Manansala had previously been issued. He was the encompassing the whole of the country, including
counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Quezon City, since his area of authority is coterminous
Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the with that of the Court itself, which is national in
order assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the nature. ... At this stage, the Court notes from the record
appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as that the appeal to the Supreme Court by individual
authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution employees of PHHC which questions the award of
was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the attorney's fees to Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala, has
garnishment "may be public in character." The order of already been dismissed and that the same became final
August 26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the and executory on August 9, 1970. There is no longer
motion to quash, subject of this certiorari proceeding, any reason, therefore, for withholding action in this
reads as follows:” The Philippine National Bank moves case. [Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the
to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of merit. The
branch in Quezon City by the authorized deputy sheriff said Bank is therefore ordered to comply within five
of this Court. It contends that the service of the notice days from receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated
by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court May 6, 1970."
contravenes Section11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, There was a motion for reconsideration filed by
as amended which reads:"'All writs and processes petitioner, but in a resolution dated September 22,
issued by the Court shall be served and executed free 1970, it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.
of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person
authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs ISSUE/HELD/RULING: W/N the funds mentioned may
and processes of Courts of First Instance.' Following the be garnished
law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon
City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of
Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly
stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is
Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate
the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its
government, and that, as such, the same may not be funds may be levied upon or garnished
garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as
a government owned and controlled corporation. The PNB V CIR
NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and Facts:
separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant
to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October  Petition for certiorari was filed to assail the validity
23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been of a writ of execution granted in favour of Atty.
established — 'all the powers of a corporation under the Manansala (counsel for United Homesite
Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be Employees and Laborers Association—prevailing
sued and may be subjected to court processes just like party). The writ sought to garnish the money of
any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as People’s Homesite and Housing Corp. (a GOCC)
amended." deposited in PNB.
 PNB assailed the order on 2 grounds (1) that the
In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as
v. Manila Hotel Company, this Court, through Justice authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of
Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that execution was contrary to law and (2) that the
when the government enters into commercial business, funds subject of the garnishment "may be public
it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated in character”. CIR denied PNB’s motion to quash
like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular hence PNB filed this petition for certiorari.
business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the
government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign Issue/Held/Ratio:
character, so as to render the corporation subject to the 1. w/n People’s Homesite and Housing Corp. (a
rules of law governing private corporations." GOCC), can be considered a public fund and
in effect exempt from garnishment? NO
Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public
Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the General rule is that governmental funds are
doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental immune from garnishment however it is now
concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are settled in our jurisprudence that when the
immune from garnishment. It is an entirely different government enters into commercial business,
matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be
treated like any other corporation. By engaging Petitioners opposed and argued that NPC is
in a particular business thru the instrumentality performing merely proprietary functions and that
of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself under its own organic act, Sec.3 (d) of RA 6395, it
pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as can sue and be sued in any court.
to render the corporation subject to the rules of
law governing private corporations." If the Issue/Held/Ratio:
office or agency or entity has its own charter
vesting it a separate and distinct corporate 1. w/n NPC performs a governmental function with
existence then it can sue and be sued. respect to the management and operation of the
Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or Angat Dam? YES
garnished. 2. w/n NPC to sue and be sued under its organic
charter includes the power to be sued for tort?
YES
RAYO V CIF BULACAN
It is sufficient to say that the government has organized
a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it
to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A.
Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and
Facts: controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own,
 On Oct 26, 1978, during "KADING" the NPC, distinct and separate from that of the Government.
acting through its plant superintendent, Benjamin (National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR) Moreover,
Chavez, caused to opened simultaneously all the the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be
three floodgates of the Angat Dam as a result sued in any court"is without qualification on the
several towns in Bulacan were inundated (hardest cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort
hit in Norzagaray). About a hundred of residents claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.
died properties worth million of pesos destroyed
or washed away. Petitioners were one of the SSS v CA
many victims of the inundated town filed
complaint for damages against NPC and Chavez.
 NPC raised its defense that "in the operation of Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies
the Angat Dam it is performing a purely Facts:
governmental function hence it can’t be sued  March, 1963 spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro
without the express consent of the State. Concio Cruz were granted real estate loan of
P48,000 by SSS with their located at Lozada  RTC: ruled in favor of Spouses, enjoined SSS
Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal as collateral. from holding the sale and ordered them to pay
Spouses Cruz complied with their monthly the Spouses for Damages-P2,500.00 actual;
payments although there were times when delays P35,000.00 moral; P10,000.00 exemplary
were incurred in their monthly payments which PP5,000.00 attorney's fees.
were due every first 5 days of the month  CA: affirmed RTC’s decision but eliminated
 July 9, 1968, SSS filed for the foreclosure of the P5000 moral damages; SSS filed for MFR which
real estate mortgage executed by Spouses Cruz CA denied hence this appeal
on the ground:conditions of the mortgage have
been broken since October, 1967 with the default Issue/Held/Ratio:
on to pay in full the installments then due and
payable on the principal debt and the interest 1. w/n Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real
thereon (Indebtedness as of June, 1968 estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would
P10,702.58 excluding interests). Notice of have warranted the publications of the notices of
Sheriff's Sale was initially published in July 14, foreclosure? Not, necessarily.
1968 issue of the Sunday Chronicle. Records show that it was a certain 'Socorro J. Cruz'
 Before second publication Spouses Cruz wrote who was in arrears in the amount of P10,702.58 at the
SSS, demanding SSS to withdraw the foreclosure time the application for foreclosure of real estate
and discontinue the publication of the notice of mortgage was filed. SSS committed an error in picking
sale of their property claiming that plaintiffs were the record of 'Socorro C. Cruz'instead of the record of
up-to-date in the payment of their monthly 'SocorroJ. Cruz'. SSS, however, denied having
amortizations. Attempts of out of court settlement committed any error and insists that their motion for
failed. foreclosure covers the real estate mortgage of spouses
 On July 24, 1968, the Cruz spouses filed for David E. Cruz and Socorro C. Cruz. Court is convinced
damages and attorney's fees against SSS and that the foreclosure proceedings should have been on
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal allegingthat they the real estate mortgage of 'Socorro J. Cruz' and not
had fully paid their monthly amortizations and had Spouses Cruz.
not defaulted in any payment. SSS In its answer
stressed its right to foreclose the mortgage 2. w/n SSS can be held liable for damages? YES
executed in its favor by private respondents by  SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its
virtue of the automatic acceleration clause own.It has corporate powers separate and
provided in the mortgage contract. distinct from the Government. SSS' own
organic act specifically provides that it can sue
and be sued in Court. These words "sue and System are not confined to the payment of
be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a social security benefits.
legal action. So that, even assuming that the  SSS cannot be held liable for the damages as
SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as awarded RTC and CA as the basis used by
an entity performing governmental functions, the lower courts for the award of actual
by virtue of the explicit provision of the damages (cancelled trip abroad)were too
aforecited enabling law, the Government must speculative. It appears that Spouses Cruz's
be deemed to have waived immunity in passports had already expired and they did
respect of the SSS, although it does not not secure the necessary visas for their trip
thereby concede its liability. That statutory law abroad. No moral and temperate damages as
has given to the private-citizen a remedy for the negligence of SSS is not so gross as to
the enforcement and protection of his rights. warrant moral and temperate damages. With
The SSS thereby has been required to submit the ruling out of compensatory, moral and
to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its temperate damages, the grant of exemplary or
right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether corrective damages should also be set aside.
the SSS performs governmental or proprietary
functions thus becomes unnecessary to SAN FERNANDO LA UNION V FIRME
belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen
may bring a suit against it for varied
objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain Facts:
compensation in damages arising from Issue/Held/Ratio:
contract and even for tort.
 Even conceding that the SSS is not, in the  December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving
main, operated for profit, it cannot be denied a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot
that, in so far as contractual loan agreements and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a
with private parties are concerned, the SSS gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg
enters into them for profit considering that the and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump
borrowers pay interest, which is money paid truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La
for the use of money, plus other charges.In so Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the
far as it is argued that to hold the SSS liable impact, several passengers of the jeepney
for damages would be to deplete the benefit including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of
funds available for its covered members, the injuries they sustained 4 others suffered
suffice it to say, that expenditures of the varying degrees of physical injuries.
 A compliant for damages against, Third Party

Complaint and cross claims were filed. Test of liability of the municipality depends on whether
Respondent Judge Firme ordered Alfredo Bislig or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions. As
and Municipality of San Fernando to pay the heirs
emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla, the
of Banina with P1,500.00 as funeral expenses distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of
and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of
the late Laureano Baniña Sr., P30,000.00 as its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's Nevertheless, Municipality are not liable for the torts
fees. The complaint against Estate of Nieveras committed by them in the discharge of governmental
and Balagot was dismissed. Petitioners filed an functions and can be held answerable if it is shown that
they were acting in proprietary capacity. In the case at
MFR which respondent Judge Firme denied bar, the driver of dump truck was on his way to
hence this appeal on certiorari. Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the
repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets, a
Issue/Held/Ratio: governmental function. The municipality cannot be held
1. w/n municipality of San Fernando is suable? YES liable for the torts committed by its regular employee
who was then engaged in the discharge of
Under Art XVI sec 3 Constitutional Law, the State may governmental functions.
not be sued without its consent. Consent can be implied
or expressed. Expressed consent may be embodied in NIA V CA
a general such as Act No. 3038 which provides for the
standing consent of the State to be sued in cases of Facts:
money claims; or special law such as in the Merritt  1967 NIA constructed an irrigation canal on the
case. Implied consent is when government enters into property of Isabel and Virginia Tecson which
business contracts descending to the level of the other passed through Ventura’s landholdings as said
contracting party or when State files a complaint irrigation canal traverses the Cinco-Cinco Creek
opening itself to counter claim. Municipal Corporations which abuts said landholding. The irrigation canal
are suable because their charters grant them the has 2 outlets which provide private respondents’
competence to sue and be sued. landholdings with water coming from said canal
and at the same time serve to drain the excess
2. w/n municipality of San Fernando liable for torts? water of said landholdings.
NO
 In 1975 Ventura filed a complaint for the  Paragph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the
abatement of nuisance with damages against Philippines states that: “The State is responsible
petitioners NIA alleging that the outlets in like manner when it acts through a special
constructed on both sides of the irrigation canal agent; but not when the damage has been
were not provided with gates to regulate the flow caused by the official to whom the task done
of water from the canal to their landholdings properly pertains, in which case what is provided
which resulted to the inundation of said in article 2176 shall be applicable.” Article 2176
landholdings causing the destruction of the of said Code provides that: “Whoever by act or
planted crops and also prevented them from omission causes damage to another, there being
planting on their landholdings. fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
 Lower court ruled in favor of the Ventura and damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
ordered NIA to pay for damages of P35,000 and no pre-existing contractual relation between the
P5,000 attorney’s fee; CA affirmed. parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.” Thus, petitioners
Issue/Held/Ratio: are liable for the damages caused by their
1. w/n NIA is immune from suit for quasi-delict? NO negligent act.
NIA “is not immune from suit, by virtue of the express  In this case NIA constructed irrigation canals on
provision of P.D. No. 552 granted NIA the power “to the landholdings of the plaintiffs by scrapping
exercise all the powers of a corporation under the away the surface of the landholdings to raise the
Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent embankment of the canal. As a result of the
with the provisions of this Act.” Paragraph 4 of said law said construction, in 1967 the landholdings of the
also provide that petitioner NIA may sue and be sued in plaintiffs were inundated with water. Although it
court for all kind of actions, whether contractual or cannot be denied that the irrigation canal of the
quasi-contractual, in the recovery of compensation and NIA is a benefit to the Venturas, the delay of
damages as in the instant case considering that private almost 7 years in installing the safety measures
respondents’ action is based on damages caused by such as check gates, drainages, ditches and
the negligence of petitioners. paddy drains has caused substantial damage to
the annual harvest of the plaintiffs of about 30
2. w/n NIA is not liable for tort since it did not act cavans per hectare. The failure of NIA to provide
through a special agent as required under the necessary safeguards to prevent the
paragraph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code? NIA inundation of plaintiffs’ landholdings is the
is liable. proximate cause of the damages to the poor
farmers.
PNR v. IAC
G.R. No. 70547 January 22, 1993 forward or to take the opposite lane due to other
vehicles. The unmindful demeanor of the train engineer
in surging forward despite the obstruction before him is
Upon reaching the railroad crossing at Barrio Balungao, definitely anathema to the conduct of a prudent person
Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the afternoon of placed under the same set of perceived danger. Indeed:
August 10, 1974, got stalled and was hit by defendant's When it is apparent, or when in the exercise of
express train causing damages to plaintiff's bus and its reasonable diligence commensurate with the
passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three surroundings it should be apparent, to the company that
(53) others suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleging a person on its track or to get on its track is unaware of
that the proximate cause of the collision was the his danger or cannot get out of the way, it becomes the
negligence and imprudence of defendant PNR and its duty of the company to use such precautions, by
locomotive engineer, Honorio Cirbado, in operating its warnings, applying brakes, or otherwise, as may be
passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, reasonably necessary to avoid injury to him.
semaphores, signal lights, flagman or switchman to Likewise, it was established that the weather condition
warn the public of approaching train that would pass was characterized with intermittent rain which should
through the crossing, filed the instant action for have prompted the train engineer to exercise extra
Damages against defendants. The defendants, in their precaution. Also, the train reached Calumpit, Bulacan
Answer traversed the material allegation of the ahead of scheduled arrival thereat, indicating that the
Complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the train was travelling more than the normal speed of
collision was caused by the negligence, imprudence 30 kilometers per hour. If the train were really
and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo running at 30 kilometers per hour when it was
Hughes. approaching the intersection, it would probably not
have travelled 190 meters more from the place of
ISSUE: WON the PNR may be sued. YES the accident. All of these factors, taken collectively,
It was demonstrated beyond cavil in the course of the engendered the concrete and yes, correct conclusion
pre-trial hearings held for the purpose of stipulating on that the train engineer was negligent who, moreover,
crucial facts that the bus was hit on the rear portion despite the last opportunity within his hands vis-a-vis
thereof after it crossed the railroad tracks. Then, too the the weather condition including the presence of people
train engineer was frank enough to say that he saw the near the intersection, could have obviated the
jeep maneuvering into a parking area near the crossing impending collision had he slackened his speed and
which caused the obstruction in the flow of traffic such applied the brake..Withal, these considerations were
that the gravel and sand truck including the bus of addressed to the trial judge who, unlike appellate
herein private respondent were not able to move magistrates, was in a better position to assign weight on
factual questions. Having resolved the question of ensured so that service can be rendered at the
negligence between the train engineer and the bus minimum passenger and freight prices possible.
driver after collating the mass of evidence, the The charter also provides:
conclusion reached thereafter thus commands great Sec. 4. General powers. — The Philippine National
respect especially so in this case where respondent Railways shall have the following general powers:
court gave its nod of approval to the findings of the court (a) To do all such other things and to transact all such
of origin. business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or
PNR also failed to install a semaphore or at the very conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the
least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the public corporation; and
of the passing train amounts to negligence. (b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad
corporation under the Corporation Law. (This refers to
In Malong, Justice Aquino, speaking for the Court en Sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad
banc, declared: corporations, not reproduced in the Corporation Code.)
The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every
as a common carrier, was not immune from suit under corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its
Act No. 1510, its charter. corporate name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law
The PNR Charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as amended provides that every corporation has the power to sue
by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. and be sued in any court.
741, provides that the PNR is a government A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
instrumentality under government ownership during its formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
50-year term, 1964 to 2014. It is under the Office of the and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
President of the Philippines. Republic Act No. 6366 against the authority that makes the law on which the
provides: right depends (Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa vs.
Sec. 1-a. Statement of policy. — The Philippine National Polyblank, 205 U.S. 353, 51 L. 3d 834).
Railways, being a factor for socio-economic The public service would be hindered, and public safety
development and growth, shall be a part of the endangered, if the supreme authority could be
infrastructure program of the government and as such subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen and,
shall remain in and under government ownership during consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of
its corporate existence. The Philippine National the means required for the proper administration of the
Railways must be administered with the view of serving Government (The Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152, 19 L. ed.
the interests of the public by providing them the 129). (at pp.65-66).
maximum of service and, while aiming at its greatest To the pivotal issue of whether the State acted in a
utility by the public, the economy of operation must be sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR for the
purpose of engaging in transportation, Malong provides that every corporation has the power to sue
continued to hold that: and be sued in any court.
. . . in the instant case the State divested itself of its
sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is Issue: 1.WON the State acted in a sovereign capacity or
no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad corporate capacity when it created PNR.
Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. 2.WON PNR, being a gov’t instrumentality, is immune
It did not remove itself from the operation of Articles from suit.
1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers.
The correct rule is that "not all government entities, Decision: It acted in a corporate capacity. No, it is not
whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from immune from suit.
suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character
of the objects for which the entity was organized." Reasoning: SC held that the State divested itself of its
sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is
Malong v. IAC no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad
L-49930, Aug. 7, 1985 Company. MRC is not immune from suit according to its
PNR’s charter provides the ff: charter. The point is that when the government enters
SECTION 1-a. Statement of policy. - …The Philippine into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign
National Railways must be administered with the view of capacity and is to be treated like any other private
serving the interests of the public by providing them the corporation. “Suits against State agencies with relation
maximum of service and, while aiming at its greatest to matters in which they have assumed to act in a
utility by the public, the economy of operation must be private or nongovernmental capacity, and various
ensured so that service can be rendered at the suits against certain corporations created by the State
minimum passenger and freight prices possible. for public purposes, but to engage in matters
"SEC. 4. General powers. - The Philippine National partaking more of the nature of ordinary business
Railways shall have the following general powers: rather than functions of a governmental or political
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad character, are not regarded as suits against the State.”
corporation under the Corporation Law." (This refers to In this case the State has impliedly given its consent to
sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad be sued by engaging into a business activity.
corporations, not reproduced in the Corporation Code.)
Judgment: The order of dismissal is reversed and
Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for
corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its further proceedings.
corporate name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law
BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. THE BUREAU OF Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued;
PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern
engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the
G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961 Republic performing government functions.
FACTS: The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government

The action in question was — upon complaint of the created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No.
respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it
(NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
Arganda and Teodulo Toleran — filed by an acting Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with
prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein the execution of all printing and binding, including work
petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the incidental to those processes, required by the National
Acting Secretary of the Department of General Government and such other work of the same character
Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the
Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be
Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in authorized to undertake.
unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the
employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the ISSUE:
members of the complaining association petition, in the Whether or not the petitioners be sued.
exercise of their right to self-organization an
discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their HELD:
employment in order to discourage them from pursuing Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any
the union activities. corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing
cannot be sued. The record also discloses that the
The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and instant case arose from the filing of administrative
Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau
practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting
defenses, alleged, among other things, that Secretary of General Services. Said administrative
respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and
Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting
suspended pending result of an administrative the employees, of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of
investigation against them for breach of Civil Service their jobs against the order of the duly constituted
rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of officials.
duties and taxes. Thereafter, the customs appraiser

Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus made a return of duty.
are authorized to institute and investigate administrative
charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial Acting on the strength of an information that the
Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it, shipment consisted of "mosquito net" made of nylon
which is in effect a review of the acts of executive
dutiable under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and
officials having to do with the discipline of government
employees under them, would be to interfere with the Customs Code, the Office of the Collector of Customs
discharge of such functions by said officials. ordered are-examination of the shipment. A report on
the re-examination revealed that the shipment consisted
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is of 80 bales of screen net, each bale containing 20 rolls
granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the or a total of 1,600 rolls.
complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners
is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than Re-appraised, the shipment was valued at $10.15 per
the respondent court. yard instead of $.075 per yard as previously declared.
Furthermore, the Collector of Customs determined the
G.R. No. 42204
FAROLAN JR v.January
CTA 21, 1993
subject shipment as made of synthetic woven fabric with
FACTS: 100% ad valorem. Thus, Bagong Buhay Trading was
assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the
On January 30, 1972, the vessel S/S "Pacific Hawk" shipment in question.
with Registry No. 170 arrived at the Port of Manila
carrying, among others, 80 bales of screen net Since the shipment was also misdeclared as to
consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading. Said importation quantity and value, the Collector of Customs
was declared through a customs broker under Entry No.
8651-72 as 80 bales of screen net of 500 rolls with a forfeited the subject shipment in favor of the
gross weight of 12,777 kilograms valued at $3,750.00 government.
and classified under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-B of the
Tariff and Customs Code 2 at 35% ad valorem. Private respondent then appealed the decision of the
Collector of Customs by filing a petition for review with
Since the customs examiner found the subject shipment the Commissioner of Customs. Commissioner affirmed
reflective of the declaration, Bagong Buhay paid the
the Collector of Customs.
Upon review, the Court of Tax Appeals reversed the Re: liability: The SC opined that the Bureau of
decision of the Commissioner of Customs. It ruled that Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages
the Commissioner erred in imputing fraud upon private that the private respondent sustained with regard to
respondent because fraud is never presumed and thus its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondent's
concluded that the forfeiture of the articles in question claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of
was not in accordance with law. sovereign immunity. Since it demands that the
Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual
On August 20, 1976, private respondent filed a petition damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will
asking for the release of the questioned goods which fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has
this Court denied. In view of the fact that the goods been converted technically into a suit against the state.
were being exposed to the natural elements, release of
the goods was ordered.. On this point, the political doctrine that "the state may
not be sued without its consent," categorically applies.
Private respondent alleges that of the 143,454 yards (64 As an unincorporated government agency without any
bales) released to Bagong Buhay, only 116,950 yards separate juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of
were in good condition and the 26,504 yards were in Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an
bad condition. Consequently, private respondent inherent power of sovereignty, namely, taxation. As an
demands that the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the
for damages for the 43,050 yards 13 it actually lost. governmental function of collecting revenues which is
definitely not a proprietary function. Thus, private
TOPICAL ISSUE: whether or not the Collector of respondent's claim for damages against the
Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yards Commissioner of Customs must fail.
actually lost by private respondent. NO
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of
Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED. The Collector of Customs is
directed to expeditiously re-compute the customs duties
Re: forfeiture: Although it is admitted that indeed there applying Tariff Heading 39.02 at the rate of 35% ad
was a misdeclaration, such violation, however, does not valorem on the 13,600 kilograms of polyethylene plastic
warrant forfeiture for such act was not committed imported by private respondent.
directly by the owner, importer, exporter or consignee
as set forth in Section 2530, paragraph m,
subparagraph (3), and/or (4). MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., VS.
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE
the defendants herein cannot he sued under the first

two abovementioned categories of natural or juridical
FACTS: persons.
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court
of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre ISSUE:
Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value Whether or not defendant is immune from suit.
of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37
plus other damages. The defendants filed a motion to HELD:
dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial
persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. Relations had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, case, but not that the Bureau of Customs can be sued.
1964, dismissed the complaint on the ground that Said issue of suability was not resolved, the resolution
neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of stating only that "the issue on the personality or lack of
Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the personality of the Bureau of Customs to be sued does
order of dismissal. not affect the jurisdiction of the lower court over the
Appellant contends that not all government entities are subject matter of the case, aside from the fact that
immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as amendment may be made in the pleadings by the
operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is inclusion as respondents of the public officers deemed
discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be responsible, for the unfair labor practice acts charged by
sued by private individuals. petitioning Unions".
Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government
natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No.
authorized by law to be sued. Neither the Bureau of 2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it
Customs nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the Customs operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
Arrastre Service, is a person. They are merely parts of Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with
the machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs the execution of all printing and binding, including work
is a bureau under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81, incidental to those processes, required by the National
Revised Administrative Code); and as stated, the Government and such other work of the same character
Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the
Custom, set up under Customs Administrative Order (Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be
No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to authorized to undertake.
Dismiss, pp. 13-15, Record an Appeal). It follows that
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any void. Likewise, it pointed out that the attachment or
corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize
cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against DAR’s governmental functions to the prejudice of the
it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a public good.
suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, 4. NLRC temporarily suspended the enforcement
and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be and execution of judgment to enable DAR to source
sued without its consent, much less over its objection. It and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against
must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving it. It also dismissed the petition for injunction.
State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that 5. DAR filed a petition for certiorari claiming that
waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion for
will not be lightly inferred. refusing to quash the writ of execution. It faults the
NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim
DAR v. NLRC, November 11, 1993 against DAR, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More
importantly, DAR asserts that NLRC has disregarded
1. DAR and Sultan Security agency entered into a the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
contract for security services. However, several 6. On the other hand, the respondents, argue that
guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, DAR has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime Agency.
pay as well as for damages before the Regional
Arbitration Branch of CDO against the DAR and ISSUE: W/N DAR can be sued and be held liable. YES
Sultan Security Agency.
2. LA: found them jointly and severally liable with HELD:
Sultan Security Agency for the payment of the money 1. Generally, the State can’t be sued without its
claims. Since both didn't appeal, the decision became consent. The State’s consent may be given
final and executory. The LA then issued a writ of expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
execution commanding the city sheriff to enforce the made through general or special law.
judgment against their property. 2. The general law waiving the immunity of the state
3. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the
mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction Philippine government "consents and submits to be
with the NLRC contending that the LA didn’t acquire sued upon any money claims involving liability
jurisdiction over DAR thus the decision was null and arising from contract, express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private 7. When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in
parties." effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to
3. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
when the State itself commences litigation, thus 8. The universal rule that where the State gives its
opening itself to a counterclaimor when it enters into consent to be sued by private parties either by
a contract. general or special law, it may limit the claimant's
4. Here, the government is deemed to have descended action "only up to the completion of proceedings
to the level of the other contracting party and to have anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. However, of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
not all contracts entered into by the government since government funds and properties may not be
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction seized under writs or execution or garnishment to
must still be made between one which is executed in satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
the exercise of its sovereign function and another considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
which is done in its proprietary capacity public funds must be covered by the correspondent
5. But, in this case, the Department of Agriculture has appropriation as required by law.
not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION v.JOSE
from its being a governmental entity when it entered
TEODORO
into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in character
6. The claims of private respondents arising from the
Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. 1. These fees are said to have been due and payable to
Act No. 3083, gives the consent of the State to be the Capitol Subdivision Inc which owned the land
"sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability used by the NAC as airport, and thus the owner
arising from contract, express or implied but the commenced an action against PAL in 1951 to recover
money claim first be brought to the Commission on the amount.
Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, 2. PAL countered with a third party complaint against
provides the legal basis for the State liability but the the NAC, which at that time had been dissolved thus
prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof CAA was served with summons. The complaint
must still be pursued in accordance with the rules alleged that it had paid to the NAC the fees claimed
and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as by Capitol Division.
amended by P.D. 1445. 3. Sol Gen: filed a MTD on the ground that the court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the TPC because NAC
has lots its juridical personality and because agency
of the Phils, unincorporated and not possessing obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient
juridical personality under the law, is incapable of of converting them into unincorporated agencies.
suing and being sued. 2. Not all government entities, whether corporate or
4. E0 365, Sec 7: All records, properties, equipment, non corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from
assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities suits is determined by the character of the
and contracts of the National Airport Corporation obligations for which the entity was organized
abolished under this Order, are hereby transferred to, 3. Suits against state agencies with relation to matters
vested in, and assumed by, the Civil Aeronautics in which they have assumed to act in private or
Administration.All works, construction, and nongovernment capacity, and various suits against
improvements made by the National Airports certain corporations created by the state for public
Corporation or any agency of the National purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of
Government in or upon government airfields, the nature of ordinary business rather than functions
including all appropriations or the unreleased and of a governmental or political character, are not
unexpended balances thereof, shall likewise be regarded as suits against the state.
transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Administration. 4. The CAA comes under the category of a private
Sec 3 likewise empowers CAA to execute contracts entity. Although not a body corporate it was created,
of any kind and to grant concession rights. like the NAC, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a
ISSUE: W/N NAC/CAA may be sued business, even if revenues be not its prime objective
but rather the promotion of travel and the
HELD/RATIO: Yes. CAA should have been made the convenience of the travelling public.
defendant. 5. The CAA can not, claim for itself the privileges and
1. The above provisions confer upon the CAA the immunities of the sovereign state.
power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be 6. PAL’s third party-complaint is premised on the
sued is implied from the power to transact private assumption that the NAC is still in existence, at least
business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued for the limited object of winding up its affairs under
on its behalf, the CAA should have the power to Section 77 of the Corporation Law. By its abolition
prosecute and defend suits for and against the that corporation stands abolished for all purposes.
National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the No trustees, assignees or receivers have been
properties, funds and choses in action and assumed designated to make a liquidation and, what is more,
all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the NAC’s there is nothing to liquidate. Everything the National
creditors access to the courts of justice against the Airports Corporation had, has been taken over by the
CAA is to say that the government could impair the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
7. To all legal intents and practical purposes, the 3. NLRC affirmed LA decision but declared that: “In the
National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil event this decision is executed and/or enforced, and
Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal considering our finding that the real party respondent
representative, acting by the law of its creation upon is the United States Government through its Armed
its own rights and in its own name. The better Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such
practice then should have been to make the Civil execution be made subject to existing international
Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant agreements diplomatic protocol”
instead of the National Airports Corporation. The
error, however, is purely procedural, not put in issue, ISSUE: W/N jurisdiction was acquired over Larkins
and may be corrected by amendment of the HELD: No
pleadings if deemed necessary. 1. The "Agreement Between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America
Larkins v NLRC, February 23, 1995 Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known as the
R.P. — U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the
rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by
1. They filed a complaint with the NLRC against Philippine and American nationals inside the U.S.
Cunanan, owner of JAC Maintenance, Lt. Col military bases in the country.
Frankhauser and Larkin (both members US Air 2. The Agreement mandates that summonses and
Force who were assigned to oversee the other processes issued by Philippine courts and
dormitories) for illegal dismissal and underpayment administrative agencies for United States Armed
of wages. Cunanan was dropped as defendant by Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the
LA. The Labor Arbiter granted all claims of the Philippines could be served therein only with the
employees and ordered reinstatement with full back permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds
pages or separation pay if reinstatement is not giving his permission, he should instead designate
possible. another person to serve the process, and obtain the
2. Larkin appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court.
Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person The labor arbiter didn’t follow the procedure and
because no summons or copies of the complaints, instead addressed the summons to Frankhauser and
both original and amended, were ever served on her. NOT the Base Commander.
Larkins argued that the attempts to serve her with 3. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the
notices of hearing were not in accordance with the hearings to her. Notices of hearing are not
provisions of the R.P. — U.S. Military Bases summonses. The Labor Arbiter cannot acquire
Agreement of 1947. jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without
the latter being served with summons. In the Bosworth Memorandum of Agreement dated
absence of service of summons or a valid waiver September 5, 1985. If no agreement was reached or
thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the if the grievance procedure failed, the dispute was
Labor Arbiter are null and void. appealable by either party to a Joint Labor
4. Although Larkins appealed to the NLRC and Committee established in Article III of the Base
participated in the oral argument before the said Labor Agreement.
body, this does not constitute a waiver of the lack of 7. No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the LA over the
summons and a voluntary submission of her person case and the person of Larkins. Judgment is void.
to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have
raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, v.HON.
jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, June 10, 1988
relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of
jurisdiction. If an appearance before the NLRC is
precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said 1. Sanders, special services Director, and Moreau,
agency over the person of the defendant, then this commanding officer, disagreed with the hearing
appearance is not equivalent to service of summons officer’s report and asked for the rejection as Mr.
5. Also, NLRC admitted that the government of US is Rossi (one of the defendants) tends to alienate most
the real party respondent in this case. The 3 AGS coworkers and supervisors and have proven to be
where the appellees previously worked as dormitory difficult to supervise. Also, they were both under oath
attendants is just one of the various units of the not to discuss the case with anyone but they placed
United States Armed Forces inside the said military the records in public places.
base. 2. Both respondents filed in the CFI for damages
6. Under the "Agreement Between the Government of against Sanders claiming that the allegations were
the Republic of the Philippines and the Government libelous imputations that had exposed them to
of the United States of America Relating to the ridicule and caused them mental anguish. The
Employment of Philippine Nationals in the United private respondents made it clear that the petitioners
States Military Bases in the Philippines" otherwise were being sued in their private/personal capacity.
known as the Base Labor Agreement of May 27, Sanders, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
1968, any dispute or disagreement between the the acts complained of were performed by them in
United States Armed Forces and Filipino employees the discharge of their official duties thus the court
should be settled under grievance or labor relations had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of
procedures established therein (Art. II) or by the state immunity.
arbitration process provided in the Romualdez-
ISSUE: W/N court has acquired jurisdiction over 5. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was
both petitioners - NO write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence
1. The mere allegation that a government functionary is with the conversion of the private respondents' type
being sued in his personal capacity will not of employment even before the grievance
automatically remove him from the protection of the proceedings had even commenced. This act is
law of public officers and the doctrine of state clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the
immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of immediate superior of Sanders and directly
official character will not suffice to insulate him from answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving
suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a the special services department of NAVSTA In fact,
personal tort committed without or in excess of his the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary
authority. problems of the department and contained
2. Baer v. Tizon: MTD shouldn’t have been denied recommendations for their solution, including the re-
because it had been sufficiently shown that the act designation of the private respondents. There was
for which he was being sued was done in his official nothing personal or private about it.
capacity on behalf of the American government. The 6. Given the official character of the above-described
United States had not given its consent to be sued. letters, the petitioners were, legally speaking, being
3. Syquia v Lopez: granted MTD a complaint against sued as officers of the United States government. As
certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown they have acted on behalf of that government, and
to be acting officially in the name of the American within the scope of their authority, it is that
government. government, and not the petitioners personally, that
4. Here, it is clear that the acts for which the petitioners is responsible for their acts.
are being called to account were performed by them 7. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved
in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as that the claimants have a right to the payment of
director of the special services department of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by
NAVSTA, had supervision over its personnel, the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the
including the private respondents, and had a hand in United States government as their principal. This will
their employment, work assignments, discipline, require that government to perform an affirmative act
dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the
that the letter he had written (which included the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded,
libelous allegations) was in fact a reply to a request thus making the action a suit against that
from his superior, the other petitioner, for more government without its consent.
information regarding the case of the private 8. Festejo v. Fernando, the Court held that a bureau
respondents.M director could be sued for damages on a personal
tort committed by him when he acted without or in

excess of authority in forcibly taking private property WYLIE V RARANG [GR No. 74135 (May 28, 1992)]
without paying just compensation therefor although PONENTE: J. Gutierrez
he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was FACTS:
not necessary to secure the previous consent of the Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the Assistant
state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party Administrative Officer and Commanding Officer,
defendant, as it was not responsible for the respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic.
defendant's unauthorized act. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an employee in the
9. In the case at bar, the government of the United Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as the
States has not given its consent to be sued for the Merchandise Control Guard.
official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of
the American government itself that will have to the “Plan of the Day” a daily publication that featured
perform the affirmative act of appropriating the among others, an “action line inquiry”. On Feb. 3, 1978,
amount that may be adjudged for the private an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods
respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the
lack of jurisdiction. merchandise control inspector and that a certain
10. Even under the law of public officers, the acts of “Auring” was, in herself, a disgrace to the office.
the petitioners are protected by the presumption of Rarang, being the only person named Auring in the said
good faith, which has not been overturned by the office, went to press an action for damages against
private respondents. Even mistakes concededly Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That
committed by such public officers are not actionable Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry
as long as it is not shown that they were motivated was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the
by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad inadvertent publication.)
faith.
11. Since the questioned acts were done in the She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious,
Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach
performance of their official duties and the private her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public
respondents are themselves American citizens, it hatred, contempt and ridicule.
would seem only proper for the courts of this country
to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in
to treat it as coming under the internal administration performance of their official functions as officers of the
of the said base. US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval
Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State
US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction from being sued in the courts of another State
over the subject matter and the parties involved. without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and
Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages equality of States. Because the activities of states have
because acts were not official acts of the US multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them –
government, but personal and tortious acts (which are between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
not included in the rule that a sovereign country can’t be imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
was dismissed. extends only to acts jure imperii.
ISSUES There is no question, therefore, that the

1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine petitioners actively participated in screening the
Territory, in discharge of their official duties, are immune features and articles in the POD as part of their
from suit. official functions.
2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortuous act
while discharging official functions still covered by the Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of
principle of state immunity from suit? their official functions are immune from suit, then
it should follow that the petitioners may not be held
HELD/RATIO: liable for the questioned publication.
1. Yes, they are immune.
Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued
US government are immune from suit (but only when in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts
they are acting/ discharging their official functions. in publishing a libelous article.
Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 constitution provides that state 2. No.

may not be sued without its consent. But even Ratio. Our laws and, we presume, those of the
without this affirmation, court is still bound by the United States do not allow the commission of crimes
doctrine of incorporation. The doctrine is applicable in the name of official duty. The general rule is
not only to suits against the state but also to that public officials can be held personally
complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed by them in discharge of their official duties. performed in connection with official duties where
they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of
bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize  July 31, 1987: the Republic and PCGG filed with
irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a the Sandiganbayan for the reconveyance,
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the reversion, accounting, restitution and damages
Republic. against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and 60 other
defendants.
Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act  On the strength of the complaint, PCGG issued
or omission, causes damage to another, there being several sequestration orders, one of which covers
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage a Breguet Falcon 50 (aircraft).
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no o The Falcon jet was leased by Unichem
pre-existing contractual relation between the from Faysound Ltd. (a US company)
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by o The lease lapsed in 1987, Unichem should
the provisions of this Chapter. have returned in to the owner, Faysound.
o Cojuangco or any of the defendants has
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the not claimed ownership or interest in the
POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation Falcon jet
against the character and reputation of the o Unichem has not been sequestered, only
private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted the shared of Cojuangco in Unichem
that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly have been sequestered
recommended the deletion of the name Auring if
 1987: the lease has been expired for 2 years.
the article were published. The petitioners,
PCGG filed a Motion for Authority to Sell
however, were negligent because under their
Sequestered Aircraft pending Litigation with the
direction they issued the publication without
Sadiganbayan, because said aircraft was fast
deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra
deteriorating
vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious
o Sandiganbayan denied – saying that there
act which ridiculed the private respondent. The
was no justification, prima facie or
petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable
otherwise, for the seizure of the jet.
for the damages they caused the private respondent.
o PCGG filed petition for certiorari with the
SC. SC issued a TRO directing the
REPUBLIC v SANDIGANBAYAN [GR No. 142476
Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from
(March 20, 2001)]
enforcing its assailed Resolution
Ponente: J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
 Relying on the TRO, PCGG sold the aircraft to
FACTS:
Walter Fuller Aircraft, Inc.
 SC dismissed PCGG’s petition holding that "the Sandiganbayan in trust for the beneficial owner
decision to sell the aircraft is not within the limited and that PNB be immediately directed to release
administrative powers of the PCGGbut requires the funds on deposit to the Bureau of Treasury for
the sanction of the Sandiganbayan which can transmission to Walter Fuller Sales, Inc., with the
grant or withhold the same in the exercise of above Agreement and decisions of the US
sound discretion and on the basis of the evidence Federal Courts
before it." o Sandiganbayan denied the motion saying:
 FAYSOUND FILED WITH THE DISTRICT  (a) it does not appear from the
COURT OF ARKANSAN AN ACTION TO records that the person lawfully
RECOVER THE FALCON JET FROM FULLER entitled to the escrow deposit has
AIRCRAFT. been determined;
o The District Court ordered that the title to  (b) the motion contravenes the ruling
the Falcon jet be returned by Fuller to of the Supreme Court in Republic v.
Faysound Sandiganbayanrequiring the PCGG
o Fuller sued the Republic and PCGG for to deposit the proceeds of the sale of
breach of warranty and damages  a the sequestered aircraft with the
decision was rendered against the Republic PNB; and
and PCGG ordering them to pay Fuller the  (c) although the records disclose two
amount of $13,945,443.01 authenticated copies of foreign
 the PCGG, in order to settle the money judgments,there is no indication that
judgment against it, entered into an copies of the deed of sale of the
"Agreement"6with Fuller Aircraft providing, aircraft and the compromise
among others, that the Republic of the agreement have been duly
Philippines agreed to pay Fuller $11 million on authenticated.
October 15, 1996 and $3 million, in equal o MR by PCGG was denied
monthly installments, beginning November 15,  In the present petition: Republic contends that
1996 and ending October 15, 1997 in settlement respondent Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
of Fuller Aircraft's claim which, per decision discretion when it denied PCGG'S motion to
of the Texas Court, amounts to release the funds deposited in escrow with
$14,928,457.29. the PNB to the Bureau of Treasury for
 The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan an Ex- transmission to Fuller Aircraft.
Parte Motion to Withdraw the amount previously o The Sandiganbayan failed to file a
deposited with the PNB for the account of the comment on the instant petition. Thus, this
Court has no way of determining why it Correspondingly, petitioner Republic cannot be bound
failed to resolve in more than one by the terms of the said "Agreement" and thus, there
decade who is lawfully entitled to the can be no cause of action against it.
escrow deposit
In Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled that the
ISSUE/S: PCGG or any of its member may be held civilly
WON Republic is liable for “Agreement” with Fuller liable if they did not act in good faith and within the
Aircraft. NO. scope of their authority in the performance of their
official duties. Likewise, in Director of Bureau of
HELD/RATIO: Communications vs. Aligaen, this Court held that
As shown by the records, Faysound Ltd. is the owner unauthorized acts by its government officials or
of the Falcon jet. In fact, this is admitted by petitioner officers are not acts of the State.
Republic itself. As mentioned earlier, Cojuangco or any
of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0033 has no interest Petitioner must, therefore, take immediate appropriate
in it. Clearly, this aircraft was erroneously action against the PCGG personnel involved in the
sequestered. It is thus patently illegal for the PCGG unauthorized sale of the aircraft.
to sell it to Fuller Aircraft.
US v REYES [GR No. 79253 (March 1, 1993)
Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case, Ponente: J. Davide Jr.
we rule that petitioner Republic cannot be held liable FACTS:
under the "Agreement." It must be stressed that
petitioner did not authorize the PCGG to enter into • Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen,
such contract with Fuller Aircraft. Granting that the worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange
PCGG was so authorized, however, it exceeded its (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
authority. Worse, the sale of the aircraft was without headquarters in QC. She’s married to Edgardo, a
the approval of the Sandiganbayan. Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US
Navy & stationed in San Francisco.
• Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at
Moreover, inasmuch as the sale of the aircraft by the the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange
PCGG to Fuller Aircraft is void, it follows that the manager.
"Agreement" between the PCGG and Fuller Aircraft • Jan. 22, 1987 – Montoya bought some items from the
is likewise a nullity. retail store Bradford managed, where she had
purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was
already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will
ID checker approached her & told her that she needed also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have
to search her bags upon Bradford’s instruction. Montoya effective command over the facilities, US personnel,
approached Bradford to protest the search but she was employees, equipment & material. They further claim
told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine
on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect &
on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to
curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST.
was allowed to leave afterwards. 5500.1.
• Montoya learned that she was the only person • July 6, 1987 – Montoya filed a motion for preliminary
subjected to such search that day & she was informed attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave
by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG the country & was removing & disposing her properties
employees are not searched outside the store unless w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by
there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya RTC.
can’t recall any circumstance that would trigger • July 14, 1987 – Montoya opposed Bradford’s motion to
suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX
Bradford’s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful & highly-
and/or shoplifting. discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s authority; (2) due
• Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no to excess in authority and since her liability is personal,
action was taken. Bradford can’t rely on sovereign immunity; (3)
• Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due Bradford’s act was committed outside the military base
to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the
petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case
• May 13, 1987 – Summons & complaint were served on to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her
Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with authority.
USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds • RTC granted Montoya’s motion for the issuance of a
that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of
sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to
Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the present evidence & Bradford declared in default for
performance of her official functions under Phil-US failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya
Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless,
Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights, oppressive & against Montoya’s liberty guaranteed by
power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages,
P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual

expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining 2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing denying Bradford’s motion to dismiss. – NO
decision.
• Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to
employee thus not performing governmental functions. dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court.
Even if she were performing governmental acts, she Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action
would still not be covered by the immunity since she is necessary so that Court would be able to render a
was acting outside the scope of her authority. She valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause
his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
believes that this case is under RP courts’ jurisdiction allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred
because act was done outside the territorial control of the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But
the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have
where US has been given right to exercise its already brought this petition to the SC.
jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic
immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire 3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. – NO
into the factual circumstances & determine WON
Bradford is immune. Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec.
3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to
ISSUES/RATIO: complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
1. WON the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction – YES allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties
since it will require the state to perform an affirmative
Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages.
Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like This will be regarded as a case against the state even if
asking for Court’s permission) to intervene in the it has not been formally impleaded. But this is not all
present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to encompassing. It’s a different matter where the public
intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to official is made to account in his capacity as such for
dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State
By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against
subjected itself to RTC’s jurisdiction. officials by one whose rights have been violated by such
acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for Twelve people died and the heirs of these people
perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be are seeking for retribution. (the gist is that the
invoked where the public official is being sued in his people marched to Mendiola because of failed
private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This agrarian reforms and the police and military were
usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority there to defend the palace. There were shooting
or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public and no one knows who started it. End result =
official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or some people were killed.)
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf  Heirs of the deceased and the injured filed this
vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not case for damages.
conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or  President Aquino issued AO no. 11 which created
its agents in the Philippines merely because they have the Citizen’s Mendiola Commission and in their
acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their report the recommended the criminal prosecution
official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her of four unidentified, uniformed individuals. The
private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the most significant recommendation that they made
scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in was that the deceased and wounded victims of
the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. the Mendiola incident be compensated by the
government. This recommendation of the
4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. – NO commission was the basis of the claim for
damages by the petitioners.
First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic  February 23, 1988 the Solicitor General filed a
immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military motion to dismiss on the ground that the State
Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, cannot be sued without its consent. The petitioner
even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if maintained that the State has waived its immunity
they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, from suit and that the dismissal of the instant
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). action is contrary to both the Constitution and the
International Law on Human Rights.
REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL 220 SCRA 124
Petition for Certiorari to review the orders of the RTC Issue: WON the State has waived its immunity from
of Manila, Branch 9 suit.
Facts: Held: No
 This case deals with the tragedy that transpired
on January 22, 1987. Popularly known as the Ratio:
Black Thursday or the Mendiola Massacre.
 Immunity from suit is expressly provided in Article o When the suit is on its face against a
XVI , sec. 3. The principle is based on the very government officer but the case is such that
essence of sovereignty and on the practical ultimate liability will belong not to the officer
ground that there can be no legal right as against but to the government.
the authority that makes the law on which the  The ultimate liability in this case does not pertain
right depends. It also rests on reason of public to the government. Based on the investigation the
policy – that public policy would be hindered and military officials acted beyond their authority and
the public endangered, if the sovereign authority there was lack of jurisdiction by the government
could be subjected to law suits at the instance of forces in the use of firearms. The committed a
every citizen and consequently controlled in the prohibited act under BP 880 as there was
uses and disposition of the means required for unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the
the proper administration of the government. marchers.
 Recommendation made by the commission does
not in any way mean that liability automatically The court ruled before that an officer cannot shelter
attaches to the State. The purpose of the himself by plea that he is a public agent acting under
commission as provided for in AO 11 was to have the color of his office when his acts are wholly without
a body that will conduct an investigation of the authority.
disorder, deaths and casualties that took place.
The findings of the commission shall only serve
as the cause of action in the event that any party LANSANG vs. CA
decides to litigate his/her claim. FACTS: Private respondents were allegedly given office
 Consent to be sued may be given impliedly it and library space as well as kiosks area selling food
cannot be maintained that such consent was and drinks. One such kiosk was located along T.M.
given in this case. The commission was a fact Kalaw St., in front of the Army and Navy Club. Private
finding body. The commission was merely a respondent General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI)
preliminary venue and it wan not an end in itself. was to remit to NPDC, 40 percent of the profits derived
 The case does not qualify as a suit against the from operating the kiosks, without again anything shown
state. Some instances when a suit against the in the record who received the share of the profits or
State is proper are how they were used or spent.
o When the Republic is sued by name
o When the suit is against an unincorporated With the change of government after the EDSA
government agency Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC, herein
petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a written
notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private to evict GABI from Rizal Park, "the abusive and
respondents on February 29, 1988, petitioner capricious manner in which that authority was exercised
terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI amounted to a legal wrong for which he must now be
and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and held liable for damages"8 according to the Court of
the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. In Appeals. Hence, this petition.
another notice dated March 5, 1988, respondents were
given until March 8, 1988 to vacate. Issues:
1. WON the CA erred in not holding that private
The latter notice was signed by private respondent respondents’ complaint against petitioner, as
Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the
conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who is state which cannot be sued without its consent.
totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing 2. WON CA erred in not holding that petitioner’s act
the notice. He was allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva, of terminating respondent GABI’s concession is
then chief warden of Rizal Park, that he was merely valid and done in the lawful performance of
acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, official duty.
Iglesias as president was knowledgeable enough to run
GABI as well as its business. Held:
GABI's action for damages and injunction was 1. NO - The doctrine of state immunity from suit
subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the applies to complaints filed against public officials
complaint was actually directed against the State which for acts done in the performance of their duties.
could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the
trial court ruled that GABI could not claim damages
under the alleged oral lease agreement since GABI was
a mere accommodation concessionaire. As such, it RULE: Suit must be regarded : as one against the state
could only recover damages upon proof of the profits it where satisfaction of the judgement against the state
could realize from the conclusion. The trial court noted where the satisfaction of the judgement against public
that no such proof was presented. official concerned will require the state itself to perform
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision positive act, such as appropriation of the amount
of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
mere allegation that a government official is being sued
in his official capacity is not enough to protect such The rule does not apply where the public official is
official from liability for acts done without or in excess of charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful
his authority.7 Granting that petitioner had the authority and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are
not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability A canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5,
arising from acts committed in bad faith. It also does not 1967 wherein the bid of the Singkier Motor Service
apply when the official acts in his personal capacity, owned by respondent Felipe Singson was accepted.
although the acts complained of may have been
committed while he occupied a public position. After being approved by Secretary of Public Works, a
voucher for the payment of the parts reached the hands
Lansang is not being in his capacity as NPDC chairman of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit which later
but in his personal capacity. This is evident in paragraph approved it finding it just and reasonable. He approved
4 of the complaint which states that petitioner was sued the payment of for payment in the sum of P34,824.00,
allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. His
ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. reason for withholding the 20% was to submit the
voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising
2. NO - There was no evidence of any abuse of Auditor
authority on the part of Lansang. The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of
Public streets, Public parks are beyond the commerce P34,824.00 to respondent Singson.
of man. Rizal park is beyond the commerce of man and,
thus, could not be subject of a lease contract. GABI was Sayson received a telegram from the Supervising
allowed to occupy office and kiosk space in the park auditor who found that there was an overpricing on the
was a matter of accommodation by previous spare parts and equipments as shown in the vouchers.
administrators. Lansang may validly discontinue the Because of the failure of Singson to receive the balance
accommodation extended to private respondents, who of the purchase price, he filed for mandamus with the
may be ejected from the park when necessary. lower court which was granted. Thus this petition with
the SC.
Sayson v. Singzon
FACTS: ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in issuing the
In January,19,1967,
December 1973 the Office of the District Engineer mandamus sought for by respondent
requisitioned various items of spare parts for the repair
of a D-8 bulldozer which was signed by the District HELD/RATIO:
Engineer, Adventor Fernandez, and the Requisitioning Yes. mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the
Officer (civil engineer), Manuel S. Lepatan. It was also collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and action for specific performance. The suit disguised as
Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve
the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State,
which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in granting the
except with the consent of the State. motion to dismiss on the ground that it is a suit
What respondent should have done was to file his claim against the National Government
with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of
Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under HELD/RATIO: YES,
which money claim against the government may be filed The government is immune from suit without its
consent. If it appears that the action, would in fact hold it
liable, the doctrine calls for application.
Ministerio
FACTS: v. However, it is a different matter where the public official
Petitioners filed a complaint for payment of just
Cebu is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. An
1045 square meters, which the National Government action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or
through its authorized representatives took physical and the director of a State department on the ground that,
material possession of and used for the widening of the while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades
Gorordo Avenue, a national road. They also allege that the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
demanded either payment or return of the property to unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority
which which he does not have, is not a suit against the State.
defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
Auditor General did not reply. serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
citizen. Had the government followed the procedure
Defendants, through the Solicitor General filed a motion indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint
to dismiss on the ground that the suit in reality was one would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of
against the government and therefore should be the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender
dismissed, no consent having been shown. to the party entitled to such payment of the amount
fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the
The lower court dismissed the petition and held that it land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the
was a suit against the government. It was also held that public use defined in the judgment
although the suit was filed in the name of the Public
Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, they Department of Agriculture v NLRC
were filed against them in their official capacity and thus November 11, 1993
the action is one against the National Government.
Thus this petition for certiorari. In 1989, the Department of Agriculture and Sultan
Security Agency entered into a contract for security
services to be provided by the latter to the said The States' consent may be given expressly or
governmental entity. In 1990 a similar contract was impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
made with the same conditions except for the increase general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the
in the monthly rate of the guards. general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit
In September 1990, several guards filed a complaint for is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month government "consents and submits to be sued upon
pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, any money claims involving liability arising from
holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding basis of civil action between private parties."
DA jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has
Agency for the payment of money claims. This decision not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from
became final and executor. its being a governmental entity when it entered into the
The Labor Arbiter forthwith issued a writ of execution questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact,
against the vehicles of DA. A petition for injunction, performed any act proprietary in character. Moreover
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary the suit filed by the security guards is a money claim
writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the entered into in its governmental capacity and thus falls
NLRC. Petitioner alleged that the decision of the Labor under the purview of Act no. 3083 provided that the
Arbiter was null and void and had of no legal effect for money claim first be brought to the Commission on
the failure of Labor Arbiter to acquire jurisdiction over Audit.
petitioner.
G.R. No. 90478, November 21, 1991
NLRC refused to quash the writ of execution. Thus the
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
appeal on certiorari with the SC
ISSUE: WON the suit against the DA is a suit against FACTS:

the National Government which requires its consent The PCGG filed a case for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages against Bienvenido
HELD/RATIO: R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago etc.
No. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution Tantoco and party however questioned the case filed
that the State may not be sued without its consent. against them. The Sandiganbayn admitted their
However, such is rule is not absolute for it does not say Interrogatories and granted the motion for production
that the state may not be sued under any and inspection of documents.
circumstances. This was objected to by the PCGG. However, after
hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2)
Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying The suggestion that the State makes no implied waiver
reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of of immunity by filing suit except when in so doing it acts
documents), and the second, reiterating by implication in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-
the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on governmental capacity, is unacceptable.
the plaintiff. Thus the present petition for certiorari. It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of
The PCGG contends that none none of its members eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as
may be "required to testify or produce evidence in any distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis.
judicial proceeding concerning matters within its official Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where
cognizance," since it is covered by the State’s immunity private property has been taken in expropriation without
from suit. just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity
from suit cannot be set up by the State against an
ISSUE: WON the PCGG is covered under State action for payment by the owner
immunity?
G.R. Nos. L-71998-99 June 2, 1993
HELD: NO, they had impliedly waived it by instituting DE LOS SANTOS v. IAC
the case, the act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of
the exemption from giving evidence; by bringing suit it FACTS:
brings itself within the operation and scope of all the Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land which they
rules governing civil actions, including the rights and alleged to have been misappropriated without their
duties under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the knowledge or consent by Lorenzo Cadiente, who
absurd would have to be conceded, that while the constructed a road and a creek.
parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required Alleging that if completed, the road and the creek would
to "disgorge all the facts" within their knowledge and in "serve no public profitable and practicable purpose but
their possession, it may not itself be subject to a like for respondents' personal profit, to the great damage
compulsion. and prejudice of the taxpayers and the petitioners," the
The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense same petitioners invoked their rights under Art. IV Secs.
that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But 1 and 2, of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution
it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its and prayed for the issuance of restraining order or a writ
sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit, of preliminary injunction to stop the construction. An
descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The action for damages was also filed.
PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the The trial court ruled that since the construction was a
State, even while assuming to represent or act for the project by Minister of Public Works, the respondents
State cannot be sued without the consent of the State.
expropriation proceedings were initiated before

ISSUE: WON the state is immune from suit? construction of the projects began
Public respondents' belief that the property involved is
HELD: NO, it had impliedly given his consent. public, even if buttressed by statements of other public
Quoting MInisterio v CFI: officials, is no reason for the unjust taking of petitioners'
“The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit property, especially since it was under the Torrens
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an system in Santos’ name. A public infrastructure loses its
injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the laudability if, in the process of undertaking it, private
procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a rights are disregarded
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon Quoting Republic v Sandiganbayan, It can hardly be
payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain,
after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the the State exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from
amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon its proprietary rights of jus gestionis. Yet, even in that
the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the area, it has been held that where private property has
public use defined in the judgment. If there were an been taken in expropriation without just compensation
observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be
not be in the said plaint they are now. It is unthinkable set up by the State against an action for payment by the
then that precisely because there was a failure to owner.
abide by what the law requires, the government
would stand to benefit. It just as important, if not more G.R. No. 131544, March 16, 2001
so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of the EPG Construction v. Secretary Vigilar
officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is
not too much to say that when the government takes FACTS:
any property for public use, which is conditioned upon Ministry of Human Settlement, through the BLISS
the payment of just compensation, to be judicially Development Corporation, initiated a housing project on
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the a government property along the east bank of the
jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City. For this purpose,
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately the Ministry of Human Settlement entered into a
invoked. Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Ministry of
In this case, respondent government officials executed Public Works and Highways,2 where the latter
a shortcut in appropriating petitioners' property for undertook to develop the housing site and construct
public use is concerned. As in the Amigable case, no thereon 145 housing units.
By virtue of the MOA, the Ministry of Public Works and public funds, the records reveal that the verbal request
Highways forged individual contracts with herein and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas
petitioners for the construction of the housing units. led petitioners-contractors to undertake thecompletion
Under the contracts, the scope of construction and of the government housing project, despite the absence
funding covered only around "2/3 of each housing unit. of covering appropriations. On the principle of quantum
Due to the verbal assurance of the DPWH merui, it would be the apex of injustice and highly
Undersecretary, petitioners agreed to undertake and inequitable to defeat petitioners-contractors' right to be
perform "additional constructions"4 for the completion of duly compensated for actual work performed and
the housing units, despite the absence of appropriations services rendered, where both the government and the
and written contracts to cover subsequent expenses for public have, for years, received and accepted benefits
the "additional constructions” from said housing project and reaped the fruits of
While petitioners completed these agreements, even petitioners-contractors' honest toil and labor.
the verbal one, the Government failed and afterwards
refused to compensate them arguing that the contracts G.R. No. L-48214, December 19, 1978
were null and void due to the absence of proper SANTIAGO v. GOVT of PHIL
appropriation of public funds.
The government further argues that they are covered by FACTS:
State’s immunity from suit. Ildefonso Santiago filed an action against the
Government represented by the Director of the Bureau
ISSUE: WON respondents are covered by State of Plant Industry for the revocation of a deed of donation
immunity? executed by him and his spouse in with the Bureau of
Plant Industry as the donee.
HELD: NO As alleged, such Bureau, contrary to the terms of the
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot donation, failed to "install lighting facilities and water
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a system on the property donated and to build an office
citizen. Justice and equity sternly demand that the building and parking [lot] which should have been
State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this constructed and ready for occupancy on or before
particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be December 7, 1974. That led him to conclude that under
duly compensated — on the basis of quantum meruit — the circumstances, he was exempt from compliance
for construction done on the public works housing with such an explicit constitutional command.
project. The lower court however dismissed the case under the
In this case, although the verbal contracts are indeed rule that “the state cannot be sued without its consent.”
null and void due to lack of proper appropriation of
ISSUE: WON the state is immune from suit? final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its
adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can
HELD: NO only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of
While the court concedes that the general rule is for a the people, the repository of the sovereign power.
government body to be immune from suit and a party’s The judiciary under this circumstance has the grave
remedy would therefore be to file a claim with such responsibility of living up to the ideal of objectivity and
general office, this case falls under an exception. It impartiality, the very essence of the rule of law. Only by
would be manifestly unfair for the Republic, as donee, displaying the neutrality expected of an arbiter, even if it
alleged to have violated the conditions under which it happens to be one of the departments of a litigant, can
received gratuitously certain property, thereafter to put the decision arrived at, whatever it may be, command
as a barrier the concept of non-suitability. That would be respect and be entitled to acceptance.
a purely one-sided arrangement offensive to one's
sense of justice. Such conduct, whether proceeding GR. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916
from an individual or governmental agency, is to be MERRITT v. GOVERNMENT OF PHIL ISLANDS
condemned.
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot FACTS:
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a Merritt was riding on his motorcycle when he was hit by
citizen. the alleged failure to abide by the conditions a General Hospital ambulance causing extensive injury.
under which a donation was given should not prove an He therefore filed a case for tort against the
insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the consent Government. The Government however claims
likewise being presumed. Where there is consent, a immunity from suit.
suit may be filed. Consent need not be express. It
can be implied. ISSUE: WON the government is immune from suit?
The decision goes no further than to rule that a donor,
with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee, HELD: NO
is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it
the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a
heard. definite order or commission to perform some act or
Under the circumstances, the fundamental charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to
postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way. the claim Under CC1903(5).
It is made to accommodate itself to the demands of In this case, since the chauffeur of the ambulance was
procedural due process, which is the negation of not a special agent, the Government cannot be held
arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the liable without its consent.
REPUBLIC V. PURISIMA the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in
itself the source of the law on which such a right may be
predicated. "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the
government without its consent, as it has operated in
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be
defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and
civil suit for the collection of a money claim arising from ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants
respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all
factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so
At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines unavoidable in the determination of what principles must
Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the
Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for
court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of
or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance Co.,
government unless consent be shown, had been Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines]
applied in 53 other decisions. ***The consent, to be effective, must come from the
State acting through a duly enacted statute as
Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus,
First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn
dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari Administration agreed to had no binding force on
and prohibition. the government.
ISSUE: WON the respondent’s decision is valid FROILAN V. PAN ORIENTAL

RULING: No.
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the
explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present On March 7, 1947, Fernando A. Froilan purchased from
Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its the Shipping Administration a boat described as MV/FS
consent." 197 for the sum of P200,000.00, with a down payment
"The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this of P50,000,00. To secure payment of the unpaid
jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] balance of the purchase price, a mortgage was
Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist constituted on the vessel
concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates
The Republic of the Philippines, having been allowed to United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi
intervene in the proceeding, also prayed for the Kagawa, national of Japan
possession of the vessel in order that the chattel
mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed. For which reason the said Alien Property Custodian, on
Defendant Pan Oriental resisted said intervention, March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order vesting in
claiming to have a better right to the possession of the himself the ownership over two of the said lots, Lots
vessel by reason of a valid and subsisting contract in its Nos. 1 and 2.
favor, and of its right of retention, in view of the
expenses it had incurred for the repair of the said On July, 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property
vessel. Administrator (successor of the Alien Property
Custodian) issued a supplemental vesting order, vesting
As counterclaim, defendant demanded of the intervenor in himself title to the remaining Lots Nos. 3 and 4.
to comply with the latter's obligation to deliver the vessel
pursuant to the provisions of the charter contract. On August 3, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator (acting on behalf of the President of the
ISSUE: Can the Government be sued in a United States) executed two formal agreements, one
counterclaim? YES referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4,
whereby the said Administrator transferred all the said
HELD: The trial court dismissed the defendants four lots to the Republic of the Philippines upon the
counterclaim against the Republic on the ground, latter's undertaking fully to indemnify the United States
among others, that the state is immune from suit. On for all claims in relation to the property transferred, for
appeal, this Court held that the dismissal of the all such costs and expenses of administration.
counterclaim was untenable, because by filing its
complaint in intervention the Government in effect On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to
waived its right to non-suability. Arsenia Enriquez, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed on
November 15, 1948 a formal notice of claim to the
BROWNELL V. LIM property with the Philippine Alien Property
Administrator.
On March 7, 1950, the claim was disallowed by the
The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land Vested Property Claims Committee of the Philippine
situated in Tondo, City of Manila, with a total area of Alien Property Administrator,
29,151 square meters. The lands were, after the last
world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian of the The claimant, however, took no appeal to the Philippine
Alien Property Administrator, so the decision of the

committee became final US vs. Ruiz
JUSMAG v. NLRC
On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as
administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez,
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint
against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later with the Department of Labor and Employment on the
substituted by the Attorney General of the United ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed
States) for the recovery of the property in question with from service by JUSMAG
back rents.
ISSUE:Can JUSMAG be sued? NO
Plaintiff’s action was dismissed.
HELD: It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the
ISSUE: Can the plaintiff claim for damages? NO services of private respondent, it was performing a
HELD: The claim for damages for the use of the governmental function on behalf of the United States
property against the intervenor defendant Republic of pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated
the Philippines to which is was transferred, likewise, March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree with petitioner that
cannot be maintained because of the immunity of the the suit is, in effect, one against the United States
state from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the
against, or financial liability to, the Government and complaint. Considering that the United States has not
consequently cannot be entertained by the courts waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against
except with the consent of said government. Plaintiff JUSMAG cannot not prosper.
argues that by its intervention, the Republic of the
Philippines, in effect, waived its right of non-suability, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990
but it will be remembered that the Republic intervened UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M.
in the case merely to unite with the defendant Attorney SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES vs. HON.
General of the United States in resisting plaintiff's ELIODORO B. GUINTO
claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief INDONESIA v.
against any party in the answer in intervention it filed
CASE#1: Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa

Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for barber
services through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw.

Private respondents who have been concessionaires CASE#3: Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O'
inside Clark for years submitted their bids. Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested
The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon. The private following a buy-bust operation conducted by officers of
respondents filed a complaint in the court below to the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force
compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). As a result of
the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his
the barbershop concessions. employment. Defendants alleged that they had only
On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to done their duty in the enforcement of the laws of the
dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the
injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a RP-US Military Bases Agreement, and that they were
suit against the United States of America, which had not acting in their official capacity when they did the acts
waived its non-suability. The individual defendants, as complained of and that the complaint against them was
official employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also in effect a suit against the United States without its
immune from suit. consent.
CASE#2: Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages ISSUE: W the cases should be dismissed on the ground
for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force of immunity from suit - YES.
Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio
City. It was found during investigation that Genove had 1. General Principles: The rule that a state may not be
poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the sued without its consent is one of the generally
vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as accepted principles of international law that we have
club manager, suspended him and referred the case to adopted as part of the law of our land under the
a board of arbitrators, who found him guilty and constitution. Even without such affirmation, we would
recommended his dismissal. Col. David C. Kimball of still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
the PACAF Clark Air Force Base effected his dismissal. international law under the doctrine of incorporation.
Genove then filed a complaint in RTC Baguio. Under this doctrine, such principles are deemed
Defendants, joined by USA, alleged that Lamachia, as incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air condition and consequence of its membership in the
Station, was immune from suit for the acts done by him society of nations.
in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state
effect against the United States, which had not given its immunity is based on the justification given by Justice
consent to be sued. Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity
depends." There are other practical reasons for the that no such waiver may be implied.
enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they
state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the have acted in the discharge of their official functions as
added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in officers or agents of the United States. However, this is
parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign a matter of evidence. The charges against them may
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that
A contrary disposition would, in the language of a their acts are imputable to the United States of America,
celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the
In the case of the United States of America, the defendants are sought to be held answerable for
customary rule of international law on state immunity is personal torts in which the United States itself is not
expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases involved. If found liable, they and they alone must
Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows: satisfy the judgment.
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have
the rights, power and authority within the bases which 2. However, in Case#3, it is clear that the individually-
are necessary for the establishment, use, operation and named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of
defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
and all the rights, power and authority within the limits of operation. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they
the territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when
vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide they apprehended and later testified against the
access to them or appropriate for their control. complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties
It bears stressing at this point that this does not confer as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly
on the United States of America a blanket immunity for impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which
all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. has not given its consent to be sued.
Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are Luis Bautista invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code
also insulated from suit in this country merely because which holds the government liable if it acts through a
they have acted as agents of the United States in the special agent. The argument, it would seem, is
discharge of their official functions. premised on the ground that since the officers are
There is no question that the United States of America, designated "special agents," the United States
like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly government should be liable for their torts.
waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract But the circumstance that a state is suable does not
in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it
can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the of the United States when they investigated and later
state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United
waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff States government itself can claim such immunity. The
the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is reason is that by entering into the employment contract
liable. with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions,
The said article establishes a rule of liability, not it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from
suability. The government may be held liable under this suit.
rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of
the accepted forms of consent. 4. In Case#1, we also find that the barbershops subject
Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is of the concessions granted by the United States
not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in government are commercial enterprises operated by
the case at bar. No less important, the said provision private person's. They are not agencies of the United
appears to regulate only the relations of the local state States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable
with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These
Philippine government and not to foreign governments establishments provide for the grooming needs of their
impleaded in our courts. customers and offer not only the basic haircut and
shave (as required in most military organizations) but
3. In Case#2, the Court can assume that the restaurant such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure
services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee.
the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the Also, the barbershop concessionaires are under the
United States government in its proprietary capacity. terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United
Such services are not extended to the American States government fixed commissions in consideration
servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their
the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it respective areas.
appear that they are exclusively offered to these This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any
servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they immunity from the complaint filed by the private
are available to the general public as well, including the respondents in the court below.
tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to G.R. No. L-26400,, February 29, 1972
visit John Hay for this reason. VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs.NICOLAS CUENCA, as
So the officers cannot invoke the doctrine of state Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC
immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit FACTS:
against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper 1. Victoria Amigable owns a lot in Cebu City shown by a
even if it be established that they were acting as agents TCT No. T-18060 issued by Register of Deeds on
February 1, 1924. Without prior expropriation or government without thereby violating the doctrine of
negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Note: serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
these avenues were already existing in 1921. citizen. Had the government followed the procedure,
2. March 27, 1958 - Amigable's counsel wrote the petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now.
President of the Philippines requesting payment of the It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a
portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the failure to abide by what the law requires, the
government. The Auditor General disallowed it. government would stand to benefit.
3. February 6, 1959 - Amigable filed a complaint against 3. Considering that no annotation in favor of the
the Republic and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as government appears at the back of her certificate
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of of title and that she has not executed any deed of
ownership and possession of the 6,167 sqm of land. conveyance of any portion of her lot to the
4. July 29, 1959 - the court held that that it had no government, the appellant remains the owner of
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the the whole lot. As registered owner, she could
recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of bring an action to recover possession of the
her lot in question on the ground that the government portion of land in question at anytime because
cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006
plaintiff's money claim against the government; nor did it REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the
have jurisdiction over the claim for moral damages PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
because the government had not given its consent to be GOVERNMENT (PCGG) vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed (SECOND DIVISION) and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO
ISSUE: W Amigable may properly sue the government FACTS:

under the facts of the case - YES. Case remanded to 1. Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1, the PCGG
the court a quo for the determination of compensation issued writs placing under sequestration all business
1. Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu - where enterprises, entities and other properties, real and
the government takes away property from a private personal, owned or registered in the name of private
landowner for public use without going through the legal respondent Benedicto, including 227 shares in Negros
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI).
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the 2. So the PCGG representatives sat as members of the
Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which passed, a
resolution assessing a monthly membership due of 2. (relevant part) In a last-ditch attempt to escape
P150.00 for each NOGCCI share. The 227 sequestered liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes
shares were declared delinquent (bec. it could not pay state immunity from suit. As argued, the order for it to
the membership due) and so it had to be disposed of in pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix
an auction sale. monetary liability on a government agency, thus
3. Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy
Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al., the judgment claim. But, as Benedicto correctly
defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the
accounting, reconstitution and damages that PCGG exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the
filed with the Sandiganbayan against Roberto S. government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No.
Benedicto. On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the
and private respondent Benedicto entered into a plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be
Compromise Agreement, wherein Republic agreed and effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when
bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the
shares, impliedly recognizing that the shares of stock initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby
are not ill-gotten. descends to the level of a private individual and thus
4. Sandiganbayan came out with the herein first opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the
assailed Resolution directing PCGG to deliver to the latter may have against it. Petitioner Republic’s act of
Clerk of Court the 227 sequestered shares of [NOGCCI] filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a
free from all liens and encumbrances, or in default waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff
thereof, to pay their value. PCGG failed to comply. in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its
immunity against private respondent Benedicto’s
ISSUE: W Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion prayers in the same case.
in holding that the PCGG is at fault for not paying the In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with
membership dues on the 227 sequestered NOGCCI private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic
shares of stock, a failing which eventually led to the thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and
foreclosure sale thereof - NO. placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When
1. PCGG, as a receiver of the sequestered 227 shares, the State enters into contract, through its officers or
has the function to pay outstanding debts pertaining to agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose
the sequestered entity or property. It contends, and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority,
however, that membership dues owing to a golf club whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights
cannot be considered as an outstanding debt. and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued
even without its express consent, precisely because by
entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the 5. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and
level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction
from the very act of entering into such contract, breach with NLRC CDO, alleging that the writ issued was
of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired
other party to the agreement. jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void. The
G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993 petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE vs.THE seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al. petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of
the public good.
6. NLRC refused to quash the writ of execution. DAR
now filed a petition for certiorari. It argues: (1) that
FACTS: NLRC cannot assume jurisdiction over a money claim
1. Apr 1, 1989 - DAR entered into a contract for security against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the
services with Sultan Security Agency. On 13 September exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit; (2)
1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-
a complaint for underpayment of wages, etc. against the suability of the State.
DAR and Sultan Security Agency.
2. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on ISSUE: W DAR waived its immunity from suit by
31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the Agency - NO. Petiiton for Certiorari granted.
payment of money claims. The decision became final 1. The rule that "the State may not be sued without its
and executory. consent," is not really absolute for it does not say that
3. On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of the state may not be sued under any circumstances. On
execution commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only
execute the judgment against the property of the two conveys, "the state may not be sued without its
respondents. consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at
4. The City Sheriff levied on execution the motor times be sued.
vehicles of DAR. These units were put under the 2. The States' consent may be given expressly or
custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the general lawor a special law. Implied consent, on the
final settlement of the case, whichever would come first. other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
counterclaimor when it enters into a contract. In this 6. When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does
situation, the government is deemed to have descended thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution
to the level of the other contracting party and to have against it. tersely put, when the State waives its
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party
upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a
however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered liability.
into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973
which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON.
function and another which is done in its proprietary GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of
capacity. First Instanceof Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL
3. In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OFQUEZON CITY,
not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE
its being a governmental entity when it entered into the CLERK OF COURT,Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.
questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINOUNCHUAN, AND
performed any act proprietary in character. INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
4. But, be that as it may, the claims of private
respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday
pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from 1. July 3, 1961 - in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R, a
the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money decision was rendered in favor of P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd.,
claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving Corporation, and against the Republic for the amount of
liability arising from contract, express or implied.. . P1,712,396.40.
Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 2. June 24, 1969 - Honorable Guillermo P.Villasor,
327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of
1145, the money claim first be brought to the July 3,1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of
Commission on Audit. Rizal Province,Quezon City [as well as] Manila to
5. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides execute the said decision.
the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, 3. The Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein)
enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued servednotices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with
in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down several Banks,specially on the “monies due the Armed
in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445. Forces of the Philippines in theform of deposits
sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the saidWrit the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
of Execution” properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
4. The funds of the ArmedForces of the Philippines on garnishment tosatisfy such judgments, is based on
deposit with the Banks, particularly, withthe Philippine obvious considerations of publicpolicy. Disbursements
Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] of public funds must be covered by thecorresponding
their branches are public funds duly appropriated and appropriation as required by law. The functions and
allocated for thepayment of pensions of retirees, pay public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed
and allowances of military andcivilian personnel and for to be paralyzedor disrupted by the diversion of public
maintenance and operations of the ArmedForces of the funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 bythe appropriated by law.”
AFP Controller,…" 4. The above applies even to an attempted garnishment
of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee.
ISSUE: W the garnishment of the AFP funds were 5. Another reason is that moneys sought to be
proper - NO. garnished, as long as theyremain in the hands of the
1. The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the disbursing officer of the Government, belongto the
outset, did right in filing this certiorari and prohibition latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be
proceeding. What was done by respondent Judge is not entitled toa specific portion thereof. And still another
in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. Itis a reason which covers bothof the foregoing is that every
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from consideration of public policy forbidsit.
thejuristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well
as itsgovernment is immune from suit unless it gives its CITY OF CALOOCAN v.
consent.  Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the
2. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other
from a basicconcept is that public funds cannot be the positions via Ordinance 1749. The affected
object of a garnishmentproceeding even if the consent employees assailed the legality of the abolition.
to be sued had been previously grantedand the state  The CFI declared abolition illegal and ordered the
liability adjudged. reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and
3. Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego: “The the payment of their back-wages and other
universal rule that where the State gives its consentto emoluments. The City Government appealed the
be sued by private parties either by general or special decision but such was dismissed.
law, it maylimit claimant’s action ‘only up to the  The City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial
completion of proceedingsanterior to the stage of payment of her back-wages. The others were paid in
execution’ and that the power of the Courtsends when full.
 The City appropriated funds for her unpaid back RATIO:

salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City  Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment
refused to release the money to Santiago. The City by means of which the plaintiff seeks to subject to his
of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to claim property of the defendant in the hands of a
back wages. third person, or money owed by such third person or
 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one garnishee to the defendant.
of the motor vehicles of the City Government for  The rule is and has always been that all government
P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The funds deposited in the PNB or any other official
City Government questioned the validity of the motor depositary of the Philippine Government by any of its
vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general or
from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and special deposit, remain government funds and may
directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public not be subject to garnishment or levy, in the absence
auction 3 more vehicles. of a corresponding appropriation as required by law.
 The City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance Even though the rule as to immunity of a state from
0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14 suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when
claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. the judgment is rendered. Although the liability of the
Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at
to release the check but the City Treasurer can¶t do liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the
so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. judgment or not, and execution cannot issue on
 Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately a judgment against the state. Such statutes do
garnish the funds of the City Government of not authorize a seizure of state property to satisfy
Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. judgments recovered, and only convey an implication
Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but that the legislature will recognize such judgment as
the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof.
the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a
PNB liable for any damages which may be caused well-defined exception, that is, when there is a
by the withholding the funds of the city. corresponding appropriation as required by law.
 In such a case, the monetary judgment may be
ISSUE:WON the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, legally enforced by judicial process. Herein, the City
may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to Council of Caloocan already approved and passed
satisfy Santiago’s claim - YES Ordinance 0134, allocating the amount
of P439,377.14 for Santiago’s back-wages plus
interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the
exception. The judgmentof the trial court could then Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993
be validly enforced against such funds Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately
garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan
corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of
City of Caloocan v garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City
FACTS: In 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the
abolished the position of Assistant City Administrator garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB
and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The liable for any damages which may be caused by the
affected employees assailed the legality of the abolition. withholding the funds of the city.
The CF I in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered
the reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in
the payment of their back-wages and other PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to
emoluments. The City Government appealed the satisfy Santiago’s claim.
decision but such was dismissed. In 1986 the City paid
Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back- HELD: Garnishment is considered a specie
wages. The others were paid in full. In 1987 the City of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to
appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries subject to his claim property of the defendant in the
(supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to hands of a third person, or money owed by such third
release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan person nor garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and
argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. has always been that all government funds deposited in
On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine
public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities,
Government for P100,000.The amount was given to whether by general or special deposit, remain
Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity government funds and may not be subject to
of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding
exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule
motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power
public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered.
City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 Although the liability of the state has been judicially
which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself
Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution
issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such
check but the City Treasurer can’t do so because the statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to
satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an o However, respondent sheriff was informed that
implication that the legislature will recognize such a "hold code" was placed on the account of
judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction petitioner.
thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of o Private respondent then filed a motion praying
a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a for the court to order the bank to deliver to the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. sheriff the unpaid balance, while petitioner
also filed a motion to lift the garnishment.
In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally  While these motions are pending, a “Manifestation”
enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council was filed, informing the court that private respondent
of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance was no longer the owner of the subject property and
No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount that ownership to this has been transferred to
of P439,377.14for Santiago’s back-wages plus interest. Philippine Savings Bank, Inc.
This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The  A compromise agreement was made between
judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced private respondent and Philippine Savings Bank,
against such funds. Inc., which was then approved by the court. The
court further ordered PNB Buendia Branch to
immediately release to PSB the sum of
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI v. COURT OF P4,953,506.45 which corresponds to the balance of
APPEALS the appraised value of the subject property, from the
garnished account of petitioner but the bank failed to
 In lieu of an expropriation proceeding filed, comply as it was still waiting for proper authorization
petitioner Municipality of Makati opened a bank from the PNB head office enabling it to make a
account with the PNB Buendia Branch under disbursement for the amount so ordered.
petitioner's name containing the sum of  As the case was in the Supreme Court, petitioner
P417,510.00, pursuant to the provisions of PD. 42. raised for the first time that it had two accounts with
 After due hearing, the court fixed the amount of the PNB Buendia Branch: one was made exclusively for
property and ordered petitioner to pay such amount the expropriation of the subject property, and the
minus the advanced payments it has made. other is for statutory obligations and other purposes
 After this decision became final and executory, a writ of the municipal government
of execution was issued and a Notice of
Garnishment was served by respondent sheriff upon ISSUE: WON the balance of the appraised value of the
the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch. subject property may be levied upon the second
account of petitioner municipality - YES
which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents

RATIO: amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced
 Well-settled is the rule that public funds are not payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding
subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise writ of execution accompanied with a writ of
provided for by statute. garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was
o More particularly, the properties of a municipality, deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed
whether real or personal, which are necessary for by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration,
public use cannot be attached and sold at contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would
against the municipality. result in the disbursement of public funds without the
o Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses proper appropriation required under the law, citing the
and market fees, and which are intended primarily case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio. The RTC
and exclusively for the purpose of financing the dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the
governmental activities and functions of the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and
municipality, are exempt from execution. petitioner now filed this petition for review.
 The foregoing rule finds application in the case at
bar. Absent a showing that the municipal council ISSUE: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of
of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon
from its public funds an amount corresponding to the execution.
balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4,
1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in HELD: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders
Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of
execution may be validly effected on the public funds P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by
of petitioner deposited in the said account. respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which
are public fund and thereby are exempted from
execution without the proper appropriation required
under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this
jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are
Municipality of Makati v Court of not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise
FACTS: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from
portion of land owned by private respondents, Admiral taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended
Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the
the RTC of Makati determined the cost of the said land governmental activities and functions of the
municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the
showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed garnishee for a debt due to the defendant. The debtor
an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its stranger becomes a forced intervenor. The Director of
public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, an officer of the
under execution may be validly effected. However, this Government of the Philippine Islands, when served with
court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has the writ of attachment, thus become party to the
been in their use already. This Court will not condone action. It becomes a suit against the state without their
petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation consent.
arising from expropriation of land they are already
enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should In this case, immunity from suit was not waived because
be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. the Bureau entered into a business transaction with
BML. The Bureau is a service bureau, not engaged in
Pacific Products v Ong business.
FACTS:
PPI filed a case against Labrador; the Sheriff was It further was never proved that Labrador was doing
ordered to attach Labrador’s properties. business under the name BML trading.

In the mean time, BML Trading won a bid to supply the Petition dismissed.
Bureau of Telecommunications worth 10,500 for copper
PACIFIC PRODUCTS v. ONG
sulfate. This was garnished by the Sheriff as Labrador
was doing business under the name BML Trading. BML
however assigned its rights to Ong as Ong advanced  Petitioner Pacific Products filed an action for sum of
the necessary funds to purchase the copper sulfate. He money against Hilarion Labrador, doing business
filed a third party claim. under the name and style of BML Trading and
Supply. A court order was issued directing the Sheriff
ISSUE: of Manila to attach the properties of the latter.
Could the money payable to BML be garnished even if it  BML Trading won in a bid to supply the Bureau of
was still in the possession of the Bureau of Telecommunications with 15,000 pounds of
Telecommunications? bluestone copper sulfate worth P10,500.00.
Labrador, as agent of BML Trading delivered the
HELD: compound.
No. The notice of garnishment was made pursuant to an
order of attachment against Labrador’s property. By the
 Before the Bureau could release the payment to ISSUE: WON the garnishment was illegal and void –
BML Trading, the Sheriff of Manila garnished YES. Petition denied.
P9,111.70 out of the P10,500.00.
 Unknown to Pacific, BML Trading, through its RATIO:
attorney in-fact, H.D. Labrador assigned its tights  It is noted that the notice of garnishment served
over the P10,500.00 to respondent, Vicente Ong. upon the Bureau of Telecommunications was made
o It was Ong who advanced the necessary funds to pursuant to an order of attachment issued by the trial
purchase the copper sulfate and the parties court in the case for sum of money against Labrador.
agreed that the profits will be shared by BML At the time of such service, the amount against
Trading and Vicente Ong on a 40-60 percent which the notice was issued was still in the
basis. It was also their agreement that BML possession and control of the Bureau.
Trading will waive its share in the net profits o Petitioner contends that immunity from suit was
which may be realized from the transaction waived when the Bureau entered into a business
should it fail to secure the release of the payment. transaction with BML Trading since in this
 Pacific learned about the assignment only when a jurisdiction, it is "a well established doctrine that
copy of the third party claim filed by Ong with the when the Government engages in business, it
Office of the Sheriff of Manila was served on them. abdicates part of its sovereign prerogatives and
 H.D. Labrador was declared in default and was ascends to the level of a citizen".
ordered to pay Pacific the sum of P 9,111.70. The o This contention is not correct. Suability would
corresponding writ of execution was issued and the follow only if the contract entered into by the
Sheriff of Manila further garnished Pl,181.65 of the government is in the exercise of a proprietary as
P10,500.00 in the possession of the Bureau. distinguished from a governmental function. The
 Ong's third party claim was frustrated when Pacific Bureau is a service bureau and is not engaged in
filed an Indemnity Bond with the Office of the Sheriff. business.
 Ong filed an action for damages against Macario  By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually
Ofilada in his capacity as Sheriff of Manila, the sues the garnishee for a debt due to the defendant.
Pacific Products, and the First Quezon City The debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenor – a
Insurance. party to the action upon service of the writ of
 RTC dismissed the complaint but the CA reversed attachment. The State, by virtue of its sovereignty
the decision. Hence, the instant appeal by certiorari may not be sued in its own courts except by express
filed by Pacific. authorization by the Legislature, and to Subject its
officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly
what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that
moneys sought to be garnished, as long as it HELD:

remains in the hands of the disbursing officer of the  The functions of government have been classified
Government, belong latter, although the defendant in into governmental or constituent and proprietary or
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion ministrant. The former involves the exercise of
thereof. And still another reason which covers both sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter
of the foregoing is that every consideration of public connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions
policy forbids it. and thus considered as optional.
 The National Irrigation Administration is a
FONTANILLA v. MALIAMAN government agency with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the government. It is not a
mere agency of the government but a corporate
body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it
 In an earlier decision, National Irrigation may be held liable for the damages caused by the
Administration (NIA) was declared liable for the negligent act of its driver who was not its special
injuries, resulting in the death, of Francisco agent.
Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and o NIA was not created for purposes of local
Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or government. While it may be true that the NIA
negligence of NIA’s driver employee Hugo Garcia. was essentially a service agency of the
The Court held that NIA is a government agency government aimed at promoting public interest
performing proprietary functions. and public welfare, such fact does not make the
 NIA maintains, however, that it does not perform NIA essentially and purely a "government-
solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an function" corporation.
agency of the government tasked with governmental o NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing,
functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous improving, rehabilitating, and administering all
act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special national irrigation systems in the Philippines,
agent. For this, they have filed a motion for including all communal and pump irrigation
reconsideration. projects." Certainly, the state and the community
as a whole are largely benefited by the services
ISSUE: WON NIA may be held liable for damages the agency renders, but these functions are only
caused by its driver - YES incidental to the principal aim of the agency,
which is the irrigation of lands.
o NIA is a government agency invested with a
corporate personality separate and distinct from
the government. It has its own assets and Given the negligence in the supervision of the driver as
liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be he was travelling at a high speed, NIA is directed to pay
exercised by a Board of Directors. damages.
Fontanilla v Maliaman Petition granted.
FACTS: CHAPTER IV:

A pickup owned and operated by the National Irrigation FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
Administration driven officially of Hugo Garcia bumped a
bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla and Resituto
QUEZON CITY v ERICTA
Deligo. Fontanilla died as a result of his injuries.
Fontanilla’s parents sued Nia for damages. The trial
court directed NIA to pay damages and actual  Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 provides that: “At least 6%
expenses.
of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall
be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons
ISSUE:
who are paupers and have been residents of
Could the award for moral damages be awarded?
Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death,
to be determined by competent City Authorities.”.
HELD:
 For years, that section of the Ordinance was not
Yes. The solicitor general argues that Garcia was a
enforced but 7 years after enactment, the City
regular driver, not a special agent who was performing a
Council passed a resolution to request the City
job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability
Engineer to stop any further selling of lots where the
should not be borne by the government agency, but by
owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6%
Garcia himself.
space intended for paupers.
 Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a
The liability of the state has two aspects: its public or
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
governmental aspects were it is liable for the tortuous
mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to
acts of special agent only and its private or business
annul Sec. 9 of the Ordinance in question, alleging
aspects where it becomes liable as ordinary employer.
that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the
Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and
The NIA is an agency of the government exercising
the Revised Administrative Code.
proprietary functions by express provision of its charter.
conviction thereof the permit to operate and

ISSUE: WON Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 is a valid maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or
exercise of police power - NO cancelled”. The confiscatory clause and the penal
provision in effect deter one from operating a
HELD: memorial park cemetery.
 Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 cannot be justified under o It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate
the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If
license fee, and regulate such business, trades, and he is deprived of his property outright, it is not
occupation as may be established or practiced in the taken for public use but rather to destroy in order
City. to promote the general welfare.
 Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived o Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 is not a mere police
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers a person of his private property without due
of government by which the state interferes with the process of law, nay, even without compensation.
property rights, namely-. (1) police power, 
(2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.
 The police power of Quezon City is defined as “To ICHONG v HERNANDEZ
make such further ordinance and regulations not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties  Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to
conferred by this act and such as it shall deem Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. The said
necessary and proper to provide for the health and law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as
safety, …, and for the protection of property therein; well as corporations owned by foreigners from
and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines engaging from retail trade in our country. In effect it
or penalties as the City Council may prescribe nationalizes the retail trade business.
 The power to regulate does not include the power to  Petitioner Lao Ichong, for and in his own behalf and
prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
power to confiscate. partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of
o The ordinance in question not only confiscates RA 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial
but also prohibits the operation of a memorial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional.
park cemetery, because under Sec. 13 - o He alleges that the Act violates international
“Violation of the provision thereof is punishable and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon
Philippines, specifically the Treaty of Amity law and the same may never curtail or restrict
between the Philippines and China. the scope of the police power of the State.
ISSUE: WON RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police LUTZ v ARANETA

power – YES  Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the
RATIO: Sugar Adjustment Act, was enacted due to the threat
 Charter of the United Nations imposes no strict or to the sugar industry by the imminent imposition of
legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of export taxes upon sugar. It provides for an increase
their subjects and the Declaration of the Human of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a
Rights adopted by the United Nations General graduated basis, on each picul of sugar
Assembly contains nothing more than a mere manufactured, to stabilize the sugar industry so as to
recommendation or a common standard of prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its
achievement for all peoples and all nations preferential position in the US market.
o This can be inferred from the fact that  Walter Lutz, in his capacity as administrator of the
members of the United Nations Organizations, Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover
such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit from the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the
foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act; alleging
most nations of the world laws against that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being
foreigners engaged in domestic trade are levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry
adopted. exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public
 All that the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally
and China guarantees is the equality of treatment to levied.
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the  CFI dismissed the action, hence this appeal.
nationals of any other country."
o The nationals of China are not discriminating ISSUE: WON the tax levied under CA 567 is
against because nationals of all other unconstitutional – NO
countries, except those of the United States -
who are granted special rights by the RATIO:
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging  The tax provided for in CA 567 is not a pure exercise
in the retail trade. of the taxing power. The tax under said Act is levied
o Even supposing that the law infringes upon the with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
said treaty, the treaty is always subject to rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened
qualification or amendment by a subsequent sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the
great industries of our nation, o 2 – a petition by landowners and sugar

its promotion, protection, and advancement, planters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental
therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. against Proclamation 131 and EO 229.
Hence, the said objectives of CA 567 are of public Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian
concern and CA 567 is therefore constitutional. Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
 Even from the standpoint that CA 567 is a pure tax o 3 - a petition by owners of land which was
measure, it cannot be said that the devotion of tax placed by the DAR under the coverage of
money to experimental stations to seek increase of Operation Land Transfer.
efficiency in sugar production, utilization of by- o 4 – a petition invoking the right of retention
products and solution of allied problems, as well as under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands
to the improvements of living and working conditions not exceeding seven hectares.
in sugar mills or plantations, without any part of such  The petitioners in this consolidated petition are rice
money being channeled directly to private persons, and sugar landowners. All of which are agricultural
constitutes expenditure of tax money for private lands.
purposes.
ISSUE: WON the aforementioned legal measures are
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS v constitutional - YES
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
RATIO:
 There are traditional distinctions between the police
 This case (“land for the landless”) is a consolidation power and the power of eminent domain that
of several cases because they involve common legal logically preclude the application of both powers at
questions, including serious challenges to the the same time on the same subject. Recent trends,
constitutionality of specific laws. however, would indicate not a polarization but a
o 1 – a petition alleging the constitutionality of mingling of the police power and the power of
PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. eminent domain, with the latter being used as an
Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 implement of the former like the power of taxation.
hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. The o To the extent that the measures under
tenants were declared as full owners by EO challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
228 and as qualified farmers under PD 27. landowners, there is an exercise of the police
The petitioners now contend that President power for the regulation of private property in
Aquino usurped the legislature’s power. accordance with the Constitution. But where,
to carry out such regulation, it becomes
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
lands they may own in excess of the maximum of the farmer.
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under  A statute may be sustained under the
the power of eminent domain for which police power only if there is concurrence
payment of just compensation is imperative. of the lawful subject and the method.
The taking contemplated is not a mere The subject and purpose of the Agrarian
limitation of the use of the land. What is Reform Law is valid, however what is to
required is the surrender of the title to and the be determined is the method employed
physical possession of the said excess and all to achieve it.
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an ORTIGAS & CO. v COURT OF APPEALS
exercise not of the police power but of the
power of eminent domain.
o The promulgation of PD 27 by President  Petitioner Ortigas & Co. sold to a parcel of land in
Marcos was a valid exercise of police power Greenhills Subdivision IV to Emilia Hermoso.
and eminent domain. Conditions for the sale include restrictions on the use
o The power of President Aquino to promulgate of the land for the construction of residential housing
Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was only and the non-erection of signs and billboards for
authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory advertisement purposes. Such conditions were
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore annotated on the back of the title of the property.
it is a valid exercise of Police Power and  Respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from
Eminent Domain. Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty and
o RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of constructed a single story commercial building for
the regulation under CARP becomes Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
necessary to deprive owners of whatever  Petitioner filed a complaint against Hermoso,
lands they may own in excess of the seeking the demolition of the commercial structure.
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a The complaint was later amended to include a prayer
taking under the power of eminent domain for for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
which payment of just compensation is and impleaded Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P.
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a Hermoso Realty, the latter having 10% interest in the
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is lot.
required is the surrender of the title and the  The trial court issued the writ of preliminary
physical possession of said excess and all injunction, but the appellate court reversed the
decision upon Mathay’s special civil action for o Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights
certiorari, claiming that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 clauses will have to yield to the superior and
classified the area where the lot was located as legitimate exercise by the State of police
commercial area and said ordinance must be read power to promote the health, morals, peace,
into the August 25, 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete education, good order, safety, and general
exercise of police power. welfare of the people. Moreover, statutes in
exercise of valid police power must be read
ISSUE: WON the zoning ordinance can be read into the into every contract.
contract as a valid exercise of police power - YES  PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION v
DE GUZMAN
Ratio:
 The Court observed that the contract of sale was  The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima
entered into in August 1976, while the zoning College of Medicine that passed the Physician
ordinance was enacted only in March 1981. Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993
 Laws are to be construed as having only prospective by the Board of Medicine. Petitioner Professional
operation. Equally settled, only laws existing at the Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their
time of the execution of a contract are applicable names as successful examinees in the medical
thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are licensure examination.
specifically intended to have retroactive effect.  Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the
o A later law which enlarges, abridges, or in any grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees
manner changes the intent of the parties to the from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects
contract necessarily impairs the contract in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-
itselfand cannot be given retroactive effect Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne),
without violating the constitutional prohibition were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven
against impairment of contracts. Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and
 But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99%
exceptions. One involves police power. A law in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-
enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those
govern certain activities or transactions could be who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better
given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower than
vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is 90%. A comparison of the performances of the
applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to candidates from other schools was made. The Board
those already in existence. observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings
were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and
a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the equitable admission and academic
Physician Licensure Examination. requirements.But like all rights and freedoms
 The Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be
registration as physicians of all the examinees from so regulated pursuant to the police power of the
the Fatima College of Medicine. The PRC asked the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
NBI to investigate. The NBI found that the education, order, safety, and general welfare of
questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage
leads to the conclusion that they gained early access in the learned professions requiring scientific or
to the test questions. technical knowledge may be required to take an
 A statistical analysis concluded that there must be examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their
some unusual reason creating the clustering of chosen careers. This regulation takes particular
scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the
"strong enough to eliminate the normal variations public from the potentially deadly effects of
that one should expect from the examinees [of incompetence and ignorance among those who
Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy, would practice medicine.
etc."  To be granted the privilege to practice medicine,
 The respondents filed a special civil action for the applicant must show that he possesses all the
mandamus to compel the petitioners to proceed with qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
their oath taking ceremony. The RTC decided in their Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully
favor and the CA affirmed this decision. complied with all the conditions and requirements
imposed by the law and the licensing authority.
ISSUE: WON a writ of mandamus may lie - NO Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as
RATIO: being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will
 The function of mandamus is not to establish a not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable
right but to enforce one that has been established from a matter of right, which may be demanded if
by law. There must be a well-defined, clear and denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the
certain legal right to the thing demanded. It is long aforesaid requirements and conditions have been
established rule that a license to practice satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the
medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without
government. thwarting the legislative will.
 The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional CHAVEZ v ROMULO
right of every citizen to select a profession or
o The interests of the public generally, as

distinguished from those of a particular class,
 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a require the exercise of the police power; and
speech before the members of the PNP stressing the o The means employed are reasonably
need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to necessary for the accomplishment of the
avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the individuals.
issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of  It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the
Residence (PTCFOR). basis for its issuance was the need for peace and
 Acting on President Arroyo’s directive, respondent order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of
Ebdane issued the “Guidelines in the Implementation crimes, the President deemed it best to impose a
of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating
Residence” factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is
 Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner the interest of the public in general.
to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the  The assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) possession of firearms. What they proscribe is
to reconsider the implementation of the assailed merely the carrying of firearms outside of
Guidelines. However, his request was residence. However, those who wish to carry their
denied. Thus, he filed the present petition firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for
impleading the public respondents. a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable
regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated,
ISSUE: WON the issuance of the assailed guidelines is necessarily, crime incidents will be
a valid exercise of police power – YES curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for
RATIO: their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their
 Even if petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would
right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be difficult for criminals to roam around with their
be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the
the reach of the State’s police power. All property in PNP to apprehend them.
the state is held subject to its general regulations,
necessary to the common good and general welfare.
 The test for determining the validity of a measure is:
SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING CORPORATION
v BALITE PORTAL MINING
 Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted xhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the

Exploration Permit No. 133 over 4,491 hectares of mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area.
land, which included the Diwalwal area.  Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari,
 Thereafter, Congress enacted Republic Act No. prohibition and mandamus praying for
7076, or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act which the nullification of MO 97-03 on the ground that the
established a Small-Scale Mining Program to be "direct state utilization" espoused therein would
implemented by the DENR Secretary and created effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133;
the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) and that the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed
under the DENR Secretary's direct supervision and the unwarranted condition that certain studies
control. be conducted before mining and environmental laws
 A petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the are enforced by the DENR.
admission of a Mineral Production Sharing
Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was ISSUE: WON MO 97-03 impairs the petitioner’s rights
filed with the DENR Regional Executive Director, under EP 133 – NO
docketed as RED Mines Case.
 While the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper RATIO:
assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast  The challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt
Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation, which in turn “direct state utilization” as a policy in resolving the
applied for an integrated MPSA over the land Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum
covered by the permit. clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder
 The Mines and Geosciences Bureau accepted and was merely a study of this option and nothing
registered the integrated MPSA application of else. Consequently, the petition was premature. The
petitioner and thereafter, several cases were filed. said memorandum order did not impose any
 Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation
was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the cases whatsoever between and among the parties to the
were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators dispute.
tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting  With respect to the alleged “vested rights” claimed by
mining rights. The panel subsequently took petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably
cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being
consolidated with the cases. disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. Until a
 The DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order positive pronouncement is made in the Consolidated
No. 97-03 which Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a
provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and e
source of any conclusive rights that can be impaired determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby
by the issuance of MO 97-03. violating the due process clause of the Constitution; 2.
 Under no circumstances may petitioner’s rights the provision violates the constitutional prohibition
under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and against undue delegation of legislative authority,
absolute. EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
granted by the State, which may be amended, unspecified – and therefore unlimited - fines and other
modified or rescinded when the national interest so penalties on erring motorists. Therefore, MMDA has no
requires. This is necessarily so since the authority to confiscate licenses.
exploration, development and utilization of the MMDA: 1. a license to operate a motor vehicle is
country’s natural mineral resources are matters neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege
impressed with great public interest. Like timber subject to reasonable regulation under the police power
permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the in the interest of the public safety and welfare. 2.
grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the Revocation or suspension of this privilege does not
purview of the non-impairment of contract and due constitute a taking without due process as long as the
process clauses of the Constitution,since the State, licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation. He
under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, has 3 options: 1. Voluntaryily pay, file a protest with the
modify or amend the same, in accordance with the MMDA Adjudication Committee, 3. Request referral of
demands of the general welfare TVR to Public Prosecutor.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented
AUTHORITY, Petitioner, vs. DANTE O. Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining
GARIN, respondent. the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic
Atty. Dante Garin’s driver’s license was confiscated Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring
by the MMDA for illegal parking along Gandara St.. He motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any
was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR), requiring Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer
him to appear before the MMDA Traffic Operations confiscate drivers' licenses as a matter of course in
Center for appropriate action within 48 hours. cases of traffic violations
Garin claims: 1. In the absence of any IRR, Sec. 5(f)
of RA No. 7924 (MMDA’s charter), which authorizes it to
confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses in HELD:
the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations, grants 1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that
the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring the state may withhold in the exercise of its police
motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial power.
a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property ordinances and regulations for the general welfare
right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its
police power, in the interest of the public safety and Insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is
welfare, subject to the procedural due process understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to
requirements grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend
The power to license imports further power to or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any other
withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise
with prescribed conditions. of police power.
Commonwealth v. Funk: "Automobiles are vehicles of
great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an 3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with
element of danger to persons and property upon the the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
highways…e Legislature, in the exercise of the police regulations.
power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the
prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila
operated on the highways. One of the primary Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec.
purposes of a system of general regulation of the 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer
subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines
the competency of the operator of motor vehicles.” and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules
and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power. nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers'
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air regulations…
Village Association, Inc.,14we categorically stated that Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly
Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom
power, let alone legislative power, and that all its legislative powers have been delegated (the City of
functions are administrative in nature. Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded –
There is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that and in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or
empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate transport and traffic management.
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. All its functions are administrative in Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD
nature . here is no grant of authority to enact
R.A. No. 9257 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act) was private property. Compelling drugstore owners and
signed into law in 2004. Under Section 4(a), senior establishments to grant the discount will result in a loss
citizens are entitled to a grant of 20% discount from all of profit and capital because 1) drugstores impose a
establishments relative to the utilization of services in mark-up of only 5% to 10% on branded medicines; and
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants 2) the law failed to provide a scheme whereby
and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all drugstores will be justly compensated for the discount.
establishments. The establishment may claim the
discounts granted as tax deduction based on the net Held:
cost of the goods sold or services rendered. Based on the afore-stated DOF Opinion, the tax
Department Of Finance Director Lourdes Recente deduction scheme does not fully reimburse petitioners
clarified the meaning of tax deduction: Under the old for the discount privilege accorded to senior citizens.
Senior Citizens Act, the grant was in the form of a tax This is because the discount is treated as a deduction, a
credit, which necessitates that prior payments of taxes tax-deductible expense that is subtracted from the gross
have been made and the taxpayer is attempting to income and results in a lower taxable income.
recover this tax payment from his/her income tax due. In Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a
the Expanded Senior Citizens Act, the grant is in the deduction reduces the net income of the private
form of a tax deduction, the establishment concerned establishments concerned. The discounts given would
is allowed to deduct from gross income, in computing have entered the coffers and formed part of the gross
for its tax liability, the amount of discounts granted to sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A.
senior citizens. While in the former scheme government No. 9257. The permanent reduction in their total
shoulders 100% of the discount, in the current scheme revenues is a forced subsidy corresponding to the
government forgoes revenue equivalent to 32% taking of private property for public use or benefit. This
(marginal tax rate) of 20% discounts granted. constitutes compensable taking for which petitioners
Establishments thus shoulder some of the burden. would ordinarily become entitled to a just compensation.
A.O. No. 171 was then issued by the DOH, providing Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
the grant of 20% discount in the purchase of unbranded equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
generic medicines from all establishments dispensing expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the
medicines for the exclusive use of the senior citizens. owner’s loss. A tax deduction does not offer full
This was later expanded by A.O. 177 to both reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it
prescription and non-prescription medicines whether would not meet the definition of just compensation.
branded or generic. However, the State, in promoting the health and
Carlos SuperDrug asserts that Sec. 4(a) of RA 9257 welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon
is unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a
government program. The Senior Citizens Act was and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and
enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior the regulation of contracts and public utilities,
citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and continuously serve as a reminder that the right to
privileges to them for their improvement and well-being property can be relinquished upon the command of the
as the State considers them an integral part of our State for the promotion of public good.
society. The priority given to senior citizens finds its
basis in the Constitution (Article XV, Section 4; Article CAMARINES NOTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
XIII, Section 11) (CANORECO); RUBEN, N. BARRAMEDA; ELVIS L.
To implement the above policy, the law grants a ESPIRITU; MERARDO G. ENERO, JR.; MERCELITO B.
twenty percent discount to senior citizens. As a form of ABAS; and REYNALDO V. ABUNDO, petitioners, vs.
reimbursement, the law provides that business HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Executive
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to Secretary; REX TANTIONGCO; HONESTO DE JESUS;
senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax ANDRES IBASCO; TEODULO M. MEA; and VICENTE
deduction. LUKBAN, respondents.
 The law is a legitimate exercise of police power
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. “Police power” as been
described as “the most essential, insistent and the least - CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great under the provisions of P.D. No. 269, otherwise known
public needs.”It is “[t]he power vested in the legislature as the National Electrification Administration Decree.
by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all As of March 1995, its Officers (Pres  treas) were
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, Barrameda, Espiritu, Enero and Abas, respectively.
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not - In May 1995, CANONECO Directors Obias, Ochoa,
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be Pascua and Ilan held a special meeting of the Board of
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of Directors of CANORECO. The minutes of the
the subjects of the same.For this reason, when the meeting 5 showed that President Ruben Barrameda,
conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, Vice-President Elvis Espiritu, and Treasurer Marcelito
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power Abas were absent despite the fact that he had called the
because property rights, though sheltered by due attention of President Barrameda and Directors Abas
process, must yield to general welfare.” and Espiritu for the holding thereof, the three chose not
Moreover, the right to property has a social to appear.
dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides - In that meeting, those present declared all positions in
the precept for the protection of property, various laws the board vacant and thereafter proceeded to hold
elections, which resulted in the present directors’ being the business or commerce and that the power to
elected as the new officers. regulate does not include the power to take over,
- Barrameda, et al challenged the above resolutions and control, manage, or direct the operation of the business.
the election of officers by filing with the Cooperative 2.) Memorandum Order No. 409 removed them from
Development Authority (CDA) a Petition for Declaration their positions as members of the Board of Directors of
of Nullity of Board Resolutions and Election of Officers. CANORECO. The President does not have the authority
The CDA resolved the petition in favor of the petitioners to appoint, much less to remove, members of the board
and declared the election null and void. of directors of a private enterprise including electric
in defiance of the abovementioned Resolution of the cooperatives
CDA and with the active participation of some officials of
the National Electrification Administration (NEA), the ISSUE: May the Office of the President validly
group of Norberto Ochoa, et al forcibly took possession constitute an ad hoc committee to take over and
of the offices of CANORECO and assumed the duties manage the affairs of an electric cooperative?
as officers .
Fortunately, pursuant to the writ of execution and HELD:petition is impressed with merit.
order to vacate issued by the CDA, the petitioners were Having registered itself with the CDA pursuant to
able to reassume control of the CANORECO and to Section 128 of R.A. No. 6938 and Section 17 of R.A.
perform their respective functions. No. 6939, CANORECO was brought under the
However, the President of the Philippines issued coverage of said laws. Under Article 34 of the Code, the
Memorandum Order No. 409 constituting an Ad Hoc general assembly of cooperatives has the exclusive
Committee to temporarily take over and manage the power, which cannot be delegated, to elect or appoint
affairs of CANORECO, “to efficiently and effectively the members of the board of directors and to remove
address the worsening problem of the Camarines Norte them for cause.
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CANORECO) and in order Memorandum Order No. 409 clearly removed from
not to prejudice and endanger the interest of the people the Board of Directors of CANORECO the power to
who rely on the said cooperative for their supply of manage the affairs of CANORECO and transferred such
electricity” The present Board may be called upon to power to the Ad Hoc Committee, albeit temporarily.
render advisory services. Nothing in law supported the take-over of the
Petitioners: 1.) There is no provision in the management of the affairs of CANORECO, and the
Constitution or in a statute expressly, or even impliedly, "suspension," if not "removal," of the Board of Directors
authorizing the President or his representatives to lake and the officers thereof.
over or order the take-over of electric cooperatives. The Obviously there was a clear case of intra-cooperative
exercise thereof is generally limited to the regulation of dispute. Article 121 of the Cooperative Code is explicit
on how the dispute should be resolved: “be settled appointed in a manner agreed upon by the members.
amicably in accordance with the conciliation or Likewise, it runs counter to the policy set forth in Section
mediation mechanisms…”Should such a 1 of R.A. No. 6939 that the State shall, except as
conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall provided in said Act, maintain a policy of non-
be settled in a court of competent jurisdiction.” interference in the management and operation of
Even granting for the sake of argument that the party cooperatives.
aggrieved by a decision of the CDA could pursue an G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000
administrative appeal to the Office of the President on METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
the theory that the CDA is an agency under its direct v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.
supervision and control, still the Office of the President
could not in this case, motu proprio or upon request of a
party, supplant or overturn the decision of the CDA
Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with
validity the assailed Memorandum Order No. 409.
Police power is the power inherent in a government to Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) association of
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in
order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune
society. 15 It is lodged primarily in the legislature. By Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may MMDA notified BAVA that pursuant to MMDA’s
also be exercised by the President and administrative mandate to rarionalize the use of Metro Manila’s roads,
boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all Neptune St. would be opened to vehicular traffic. Thus,
municipal levels, including the barangay. 16 Delegation it requests BAVA to open the points of entry and exit on
of legislative powers to the President is permitted in that street. It also informed BAVA that the perimeter wall
Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of Article VI of the separating Neptune and Kalayaan ave, a public road,
Constitution. 17 The pertinent laws on cooperatives, would be demolished.
namely, R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No. BAVA instituted a case for injunction, asserting that
269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645 do not provide for MMDA has no authority to order the opening of a private
the President or any other administrative body to take road without a municipal ordinance.
over the internal management of a cooperative. MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune Street to
Furthermore, It violates the basic underlying principle public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed
enshrined in Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that with police power in the delivery of basic services in
cooperatives are democratic organizations and that their Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic
affairs shall be administered by persons elected or management which involves the regulation of the use of
thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and services and the scope of these services cover the
welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and
power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and
consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate management; (4) flood control and sewerage
Appellate Court. There is no need for the City of Makati management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation,
public. urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public
safety. The basic service of transport and traffic
HELD: management includes the following:
Police power is an inherent attribute of (b) Transport and traffic management which include the
sovereignty. police power is lodged primarily in the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any policies, standards, programs and projects to
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative rationalize the existing transport
power. The National Legislature, however, may operations,infrastructure requirements, the use of
delegate this power to the President and administrative thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient
boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal movement of persons and goods; provision for the
corporations or local government units. Once delegated, mass transport system and the institution of a system to
the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as regulate road users; administration and implementation
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering
Local government units exercise police power through services and traffic education programs, including the
their respective legislative bodies. institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan
With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in Manila"
1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special The scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the
development and administrative region" and the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. Thee powers of
Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
the region placed under "a development coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
authority" referred to as the MMDA. management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have of a system and administration. There is no syllable in
metro-wide impact and transcend local political R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it power, let alone legislative power.
would not be viable for said services to be provided by its functions are administrative in nature and
the individual local government units comprising Metro these are actually summed up in the charter itself: “The
Manila." 26 There are seven (7) basic metro-wide MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process

exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (“petitioner”), as member of
delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, an
without diminution of the autonomy of the local original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition
government units concerning purely local matters.“ and Mandamus to enjoin the MMDA from implementing
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang its “wet flag scheme” because:
cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA’s governing
involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it;
council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a
basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is summary punishment for jaywalking;
contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against
petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and
The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by (4) violates “pedestrian rights” as it exposes pedestrians
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the to various potential hazards.
MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Fernando: dismiss because of petitioner’s lack of
Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its standing to litigate and for violation of the doctrine of
authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of hierarchy of courts. Alternatively, contendeds that the
roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient Flag Scheme is a valid preventive measure against
movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads jaywalking.
and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the Francisco: the Court should take cognizance of the
scope of transport and traffic management. By no case as it raises issues of “paramount and
stretch of the imagination, however, can this be transcendental importance.”
interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-
making power, much less police power. Secondly, the HELD: Case dismissed.
MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. 1. No standing
Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present no showing of direct injury; no showing of illegal
MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) expenditure of money; no showing of clear statutory or
No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter constitutional violation to merit transcendental
possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on importance
the present MMDA. 2. Violated doctrine of hierarchy of courts
“petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
Ernesto Francisco v. Bayani Fernando in his capacity when he filed this petition directly with us. This Court’s
as Chairman of the MMDA jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while terminal facilities, President Arroyo issued E.O. 179,
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court designating MMDA as the implementing Agency for the
of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom project.
of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.” - Viron Transportation Co. filed a petition for declaratory
3. Flag scheme has legal basis relief, alleging that the MMDA was poised to issue a
All the cities and municipalities within the MMDA’s Circular closing all bus terminals in Metro Manila. Viron
jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted asserts that theMMDA’s authority to regulate traffic
anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic does not include the power to direct provincial bus
management codes with provisions for pedestrian operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus
regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for deprive them of the use of their property.
respondents’ implementation of schemes, or ways and -Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp),
means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and another provincial bus operator, asked the court to
similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for
administrative agency tasked with the implementation of transgressing the possessory rights of owners and
rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. operators of public land transportation units over their
Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual respective terminals. Averring that MMDA Chairman
determination of whether the Flag Scheme is a Fernando had begun to implement a plan to close and
reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances eliminate all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in
and similar enactments. This Court is not a trier of the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their
facts. The petition proffers mere surmises and operations to common bus terminals, Mencorp prayed
speculations on the potential hazards of the Flag for the issuance of a TRO.
Scheme. - MMDA asserts: there is no justiciable controversy in
the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of
G.R. No. 170656 the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination
MMDA v. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila. the E.O. is only an administrative directive to
G.R. No. 170657 government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, et al v. MENCORP to make available for use government property along
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC. EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that
the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the
Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not
- Pursuant to MMDA’s recommendation to decongest
between third persons.
traffic by eliminating bus terminals along Metro Manila’s
thoroughfares, and providing instead ,ass transport
HELD: The MMDA’s Motion for Reconsideration must E.O. No. 125,which former President Aquino issued
fail in the exercise of legislative powers, mandated the
1. There is a justiciable controversy DOTC to be the primary policy, planning,
The E.O. sets out in clear strokes the MMDA’s plan to programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating
"decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now and administrative entity to promote, develop and
located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and regulate networks of transportation and
providing more convenient access to the mass transport communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC
system to the commuting public through the provision of includes the power to
mass transport terminal facilities” establish and administer comprehensive and
Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and integrated programs for transportation and
Management to allocate funds of not more than one communications.
hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is
of the construction of the north and south terminals. And authorized to establish and implement a project such as
the E.O. was made effective immediately. the one subject of the cases at bar.
a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal By designating the MMDA as the implementing
had been drawn up, and construction of the terminal is agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped
already in progress. The MMDA in fact affirmed that the the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering
government had begun to implement the Project. E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
In another vein, the validity of the designation of
2. EO 179 involves 3rd persons MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of
Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the authority to it under R.A. No. 7924 (MMDA’s charter),
Project for which the concerned government agencies which merely grants MMDA with planning, monitoring,
are directed to coordinate their activities and resources, coordinating functions for the delivery of metro-wide
the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by services, including transportation and traffic
third persons like respondents would have to be management.
eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate In the case of MMDA v. Bel-Air, it was ruled that the
from the common bus terminals. It cannot be gainsaid MMDA has no legislative, police power. Hence, it has
that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on no authority to close terminals, and no authority to
respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would implement the project.
mean, among other things, the loss of income from the Even if it had police power, the test for valid police
operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. power is: (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
3. EO 179 is ultra vires. exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and Manila, filed a Petition with the BOT seeking to nullify
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
the means employed in this case (closing terminals), registration and operation of earlier models which were
as ruled in Lucena v JAC Liner, constitutes undue phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration,
taking of private property and creates monopolies. It they are roadworthy and fit for operation
thus failed to go for the less intrusive means. - Petitioners claim: 1.) they were denied procedural due
process as they were not called upon to submit position
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., papers nor summoned to attend any conference as
FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION regards the issuance of the BOT Circular, 2.) fixing the
CORPORATION v. THE BOARD OF ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive
TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon
BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are
subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition
should be taken into consideration at the time of
- The Board of Transportation (BOT) issued registration. Their right to substantive due process is
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which declares that no thereby violated, 3.) their right to equal protection of the
car beyond six years shall be operated as a taxi. All law is violated because the Circular is being enforced in
models older that 6 years are ordered withdrawn from Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi
public service and thereafter may no longer be industry.
registered and operated as taxis.
- Pursuant to the Circular, the Director of the Bureau of ISSUES:
Land Transportation issued an implementing Circular 1. W/N BOT violated petitioners’ right to Procedural
stating: all taxi units with year models over six (6) years and Substantive Due process.
old are now banned from operating as public utilities in 2. W/N BOT violated petitioners’ right to equal
Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be protection of the law.
considered as automatically dropped as public
utilities and, therefore, do not require any further HELD:
dropping order from the BOT. taxi units within the 1. No, it is not violated.
National Capitol Region having year models over 6 P.D. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the
years old shall be refused registration. power to fix just and reasonable standards,
- Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), a classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or
domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and
who are grantees of CPC to operate taxicabs within followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.
it provides procedural guidelines for said agency to in Metro Manila and only after the date has been
follow in the exercise of its powers: that it “may also can determined by the Board.”
conferences, require the submission of position papers The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially
or other documents, information, or data by operators or in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to
other persons that may be affected by the those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic
implementation of this Decree, or employ any other pressure and more constant use. This is of common
suitable means of inquiry.” knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not
it is clear from the provision, however, that the leeway the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so
accorded the Board gives it a wide range of choice in that infringement of the equal protection clause can
gathering necessary information or data in the hardly be successfully claimed.
formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort
mandatory that it should first call a conference or of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and
require the submission of position papers or other dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise, of its police
documents from operators or persons who may be power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health,
affected, this being only one of the options open to the morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare
Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of safety and welfare of society. CJ Fernando: "the
the Circulars is not violative of procedural due process. necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the
As regards substantive due process argument, it is exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if
impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can interests are disregarded"
open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, In so far as the non-application of the assailed
possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A Circulars to other transportation services is concerned,
reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause
vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all
of six years supplies that reasonable standard. and sundry. It applies to things or persons Identically or
similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object
2. No, it is not violated. or subject of the law provided classification is
it should be pointed out that implementation outside reasonable or based on substantial distinctions.
Metro Manila is also envisioned in the Circular, which
states: “its implementation outside Metro Manila shall be
carried out only after the project has been implemented
G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995

HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of issue a permit/license to Associated Development
Manila, and the City of Manila v. HON. FELIPE G. Corporation (ADC), allowing it to “operate the jai-alai”,
PACQUING, pursuant to Manila Ordinance No. 7065.
- Subsequently, Executive Secretary Guingona issued a
directive to then chairman of the Games and
Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr.
Background ~ to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or to withdraw
Charter of the City of Manila (1949): “The Municipal such grant of authority, to ADC to operate the jai-alai in
Board shall have the following legislative powers…To the City of Manila, until the following legal questions are
tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by properly resolved:
the public on…jai-alai…as well as grant exclusive rights 1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai
to establishments for this purpose, notwithstanding any franchisers issued by local governments is
existing law to the contrary. unconstitutional.
in 1951, EO 392 transferring the authority 2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power to
to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development
and Amusements Board. Corporation, whether the franchise granted is valied
in 1953, RA 954 criminalized the playing of jai-alai by considering that the franchise has no duration, and
persons without a LEGISLATIVE franchise. appears to be granted in perpetuity.
in 1971, Municipal Board of Manila nevertheless 3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a
passed Ordinance no 7065, authorizing the mayor to Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development
permit the ADC to establish and operate a Jai-alai in Corporation in view of executive Order No. 392 which
Manila. transferred from local governments to the Games and
in 1975, Marcos issued PD 771, revoking all powers Amusements Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai.
of local government to grant franchises for jai-alai and - ADC then filed a petition for prohibition, injunction,
other forms of gambling. That same year, PD 810 mandamus against Guingona and Sumulong seeking to
granted the Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional authority
Corporation A Franchise To Operate a Jai Alai in that had earlier been granted to ADC. This was granted
Manila. This franchise was cancelled by Aquino’s EO by Judge Reyes.
169.
ISSUES:
The case~ 1. whether or not intervention by the Republic of the
- In March-April 1974, Judge Pacquing of RTC Manila Philippines at this stage of the proceedings is proper
issued a series of orders ordering Mayor Alfredo Lim to
2. whether or not the Associated Development effectively revoked by Presidential decree No. 771
Corporation has a valid and subsisting franchise to which expressly revoked all existing franchises and
maintain and operate the jai-alai permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities
3. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments.
committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the On the other hand, ADC's position is that Ordinance
temporary restraining order (later converted to a writ of No. 7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manila
preliminary injunction) and the writ of pursuant to its delegated powers under it charter,
preliminary mandatory injunction Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely assails the
constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal
HELD: protection and non-impairment clauses
1. Yes, it is proper it will undoubtedly be a grave injustice to both parties
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals allowed in this case if this Court were to shirk from ruling on the
intervention even beyond the period prescribed in issue of constitutionality of PD No. 771. Such issue has,
Section 2 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled in our view, become the very lis mota in resolving the
in said case that a denial of the motions for intervention present controversy
would "lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to on the question of whether or not the government
the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a
purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State
the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if
should intervenors' claim be proven to be true." any, of its officials or agents
 the resulting injustice and injury in this case, should
the national government's allegations be proven correct, 2. No, it does not.
are manifest, since the latter has squarely questioned Petitioners argue that Republic Act No. 954 effectively
the very existence of a valid franchise to maintain and removed the power of the Municipal Board of Manila to
operate the jai-in favor of ADC. The national grant franchises for gambling operations. It is argued
government contends that Manila Ordinance No. 7065 that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954
which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct is used to refer to franchises issued by Congress.
jai-alai operations is void since Republic Act No. 954, ADC contends that Republic Act N. 409 (Manila
approved very much earlier than said Ordinance No. Chapter) gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board
7065 requires a legislative franchise, not a municipal to grant franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954
franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. does not specifically qualify the word "legislative" as
Assuming, arguendo, that the abovementioned referring exclusively to Congress, then Rep. Act No. 954
ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise was nonetheless did not remove the power of the Municipal Board
neither of the authorities relied upon by ADC to There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal
support its alleged possession of a valid franchise, protection clause since the decree
namely the Charter of the City of Manila and Manila revoked all franchises issued by local governments
Ordinance No. 7065 uses the word "franchise". It is without qualification or exception.
clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate
to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or 3. yes, there was grave abuse of discretion.
betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such Section 3, Rule 58 of the rules of Court provides for
power "to franchise". the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent
Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was judge should have taken judicial notice of Republic Act
the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 rule 129 of the
therefore means that a license or permit issued by the Rules of court. These laws negate the existence of any
City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, legal right on the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so
such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not as to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary
amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of injunction.
the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD v. COURT OF
national government to so operate. Even this power to APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING
regulate was removed from local governments and CORPORATION
transferred to the GAB in 1951.
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the
Revised Penal Code punishes gambling and betting
under Articles 195 to 199 thereof. Gambling is thus
generally prohibited by law, unless another law is - Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order
enacted byCongress expressly exempting or excluding directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from
certain forms of gambling from the reach of criminal law utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations
It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of which were discharging untreated wastewater directly
gambling do not promote public morals and welfare. into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros
Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It River.
breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest - The order was based on National Pollution Control
and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, Commission ("NPCC") and DENR reports which found
a vice and a social ill which government must minimize that Solar textile was bleaching, rinsing and dyeing
(if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic textiles with wastewater being directly discharged
development. untreated into the sewer. Solar’s Wastewater Treatment
Plant was noted unoperational and the combined HELD: The Board is sustained.
wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner
gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders: (a)
being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment
to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. Result of the analyses pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or
of the sample taken showed that the wastewater is welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such
highly pollutive discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards
- Solar went to the RTC QC on petition for certiorari with set by the [NPCC]."
preliminary injunction, asserting that its right to due it is not essential that the Board prove that an
process was violated. Under the Board's own rules and "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare,
regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte
effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if
public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed
life." The reprots made no finding of such a threat. "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]."
- Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it Inspections reports show that there was at
has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend least prima facie evidence before the Board that the
the operations of an establishment when there is prima effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the
facie evidence that such establishment is discharging maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical
effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there
exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and
NPCC. the reports before it concerning the effluent desist order issued by the Board.
discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River Also, previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch
provided prima facie evidence Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of
- RTC dismissed the petition, saying that appeal and Violation directing it to cease and refrain from carrying
not certiorari was the proper remedy, and that the out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant
Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner,
temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and seemed very casual about its continued discharge of
academic. CA reversed the RTC order. untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos
River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary
ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an
reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had operating condition.
been denied due process by the Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law
and regulations in situations like that here presented
precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of interprovincial movement of carabaos. The penalty is
pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef.
other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to
wait until protracted litigation ISSUE:
The relevant pollution control statute and Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it
implementing regulations were enacted and authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign carabeef being transported across provincial
power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare boundaries, thus denying due process
and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of
plant and animal life, commonly designated as the RULING:
police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so
ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield it would remain so conveniently resilient for due process
to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like is not an “iron rule.” Flexibility must be the best virtue of
those here involved, through the exercise of police guaranty. The minimum requirements of due process
power. are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may
Where the establishment affected by an ex not be dispensed with because they are intended as a
parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of safeguard against official arbitrariness.
the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must
hold a public hearing where such establishment would It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban
have an opportunity to controvert the basis of suchex not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their
parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently movement. The reasonable connection between the
available is really all that is required by the due process means employed and the purpose sought to be
clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have achieved by the question of measure is missing. Even if
here. The Board's decision rendered after the public there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being an
hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to outright confiscation and a supersedeas bond of
the Court of Appeal Php12,000.00. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
Ynot v. IAC (1987)
imposed punishment, thus denying the centuries-old
FACTS: guaranty of elementary fair play.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo in January 1984, when they There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these
were confiscated by the police station commander for animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if male
violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the
necessary permit) the EO will be conserving those still and other destinations. This was relaxed however with
fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory
improvident depletion. The Court opined that they do Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen
not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of
slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which
with no less difficulty in on province than in another. included an Artist’s Record Book which a performing
Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province will not artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines
them to another province will make it easier to kill them assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights
apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM
easily circumscribed by simply killing the animal. intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower
However, if the movement of the live animals for the court ruled in favor of EIAC.
purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either ISSUE:
to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid
meat.
HELD:
To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation
an invalid exercise of the police power because the is a valid exercise of police power. Police power
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not concerns government enactments which precisely
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
unduly oppressive. Due process is violated for the promote the general welfare or the common good. As
owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed
not seen fit to assert and protect his rights. Executive validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners
Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional, to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB
and the supersedeas bond is cancelled. requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or
was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare
JMM Promotion v. Court of Appeals of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was
FACTS: paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory Short of a total and absolute ban against the
banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan deployment of performing artists to “high risk”
destinations, a measure which would only drive Constitution upon the government against the taking of
recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the private property for public use without just
very least rationalizes the method of screening compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec,
performing artists by requiring the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a
reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police
limits deployment to only those individuals adequately power) of the Comelec over the information operations
prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment of print media enterprises during the election period to
as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible
at least lessens the room for exploitation by election.
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec (1995) ISSUE:
Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is
unconstitutional
FACTS: HELD:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as
unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to
directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of “taking” of private personal property without payment of
not less than one-half page for the common use of the just compensation required in expropriation cases.
political parties and candidates. The Comelec space Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has
shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, not been established by respondent Comelec,
among all candidates to enable them to make known considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to
their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their sell advertising space. The taking of private property for
platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also public use is authorized by the constitution, but not
be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution
election information. No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non- no showing of existence of a national emergency to take
profit organization of newspaper and magazine private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the
ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise

stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject
and lawful method
FACTS: The questioned ordinances having been enacted with
The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of
provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and out- Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the
of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from interference of the State. The first requisite for the
entering the city and are hereby directed to proceed to proper exercise of police power is thus present. This
the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of leaves for determination the issue of whether the means
their passengers; and (b) all temporary terminals in the employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to
City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting attain its professed objective were reasonably
from the effectivity of this ordinance. It also provides necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by
grand central terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably
assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally,
ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by
exercise of police power, an undue taking of private petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees,
property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition rentals and charges, such measure is unduly
against monopolies. oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court.
What should have been done was to determine exactly
ISSUE: where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.
Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an
valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful subject and equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights
lawful means are exercised within the framework of the law and the
laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is its
HELD: reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon
The local government may be considered as having its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were
properly exercised its police power only if the following measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public laws may be justified whenever they happen to be
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular effective.
class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the
means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and
Government
FACTS: of Quezon City v. Ericta the Ordinance in question. Respondent alleged that the
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City
"Ordinance Regulating The Establishment, Maintenance Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Administrative Code.
Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City
And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" ISSUE:
provides: Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the a valid exercise of police power
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity
burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have HELD:
been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid
to their death, to be determined by competent City exercise of police power. Section 9 cannot be justified
Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the
be developed and should be open for operation not license fee, and regulate such other business, trades,
later than six months from the date of approval of the and occupation as may be established or practiced in
application. the City.
For several years, the aforequoted section of the Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of
Ordinance was not enforced but seven years after the life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art.
enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the
passed a resolution to request the City Engineer, other hand, there are three inherent powers of
Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or government by which the state interferes with the
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent
the owners thereof have failed to donate the required domain, (3) taxation.
6% space intended for paupers burial.
The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-
The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that reads as follows:
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of the
ordinance would be enforced. “To make such further ordinance and regulations not
repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and
with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of proper to provide for the health and safety, …, and for
De la Cruz v. Paras
the protection of property therein; and enforce
obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as FACTS:
the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They
subsection (jj) of this section.” assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975
or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue,
The power to regulate does not include the power to Bulacan.
prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the
power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a right to engage in a lawful business for the said
memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of ordinance would close out their business. That
said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are
punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that not allowed to go out with customers.
upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and
maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued
cancelled’. The confiscatory clause and the penal against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84.
provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads
park cemetery. “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS
AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN
regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
exerted in order to merely regulate the use and JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of valid exercise of police power to promote general
his property outright, it is not taken for public use but welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were
rather to destroy in order to promote the general deprived of due process.
welfare.
ISSUE:
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue,
6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
a person of his private property without due process of occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant
law, nay, even without compensation. to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938
HELD: the decision was filed the judgment became final and

The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely executory. Nothwithstanding the Gonong decision, still
then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed violations of the said decision transpired, wherein there
ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had were several persons who sent complaint letters to the
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the Court regarding the confiscation of driver’s licenses
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, and removal of license plate numbers.
as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the
State. It cannot be said that such a On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11,
sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue Series of 1991, authorizing itself “to detach license
could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned
of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of
can be attained by a measure that does not encompass traffic in Metro Manila.”On July 2, 1991, the Court
too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in
achieved could have been attained by reasonable conflict with the decision of the Court, and that the Court
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. has received several complaints against the
Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should enforcement of such ordinance.
and can only regulate not prohibit the business of
cabarets. ISSUE:
W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance
Solicitor General v. MMA
No. 7, Series of 1998 are valid exercise of delegated
FACTS: power to local government acting as agents of
On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of the national legislature?
Metropolitan Traffic Command,West Traffic District vs.
Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the HELD:
license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring
not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and
Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality
permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-
43 in the case of stalledvehicles obstructing the public enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from
streets. Even the confiscation of driver’s licenses for removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except
traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating driver’s
by the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
Magtajas
FACTS: v. Pryce
For a municipal ordinance to be valid the following PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan
requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building
the belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc.,
Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or renovated and equipped the same and prepared to
oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not season.
be unreasonable; and 6) must be general
and consistent with public policy. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The
religious elements echoed the objection and so did the
In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were
under consideration did not pass the first criterion led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media
because it did not conform to existing law. PD 1605 trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an
does not allow either the removal of license plates or affront to the welfare of the city.
the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations
committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of
the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
sanctions. Thus local political subdivisions are able Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for
to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
legislative power from the national legislature (except prohibiting the operation of casinos.O n the other hand,
only that the power to create their owns ources of the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created
revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of
Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As territorial jurisdiction of thePhilippines. The Court of
delegates of the Congress, the local government unit Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the
cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of petition for review.
the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in
question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail ISSUE:
against the decree, which has the force and effect of a Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No.
statute. 3375-93 are valid
RATIO: o Must be general and consistent with public policy

No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political o Must not be unreasonable
subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the Therefore, the petition is DENIED and the challenged d
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is ecision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
expressly vested with the police power under what is
known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in City of Manila v. Laguio (2005)
Section 16 of the LGC. FACTS:
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development
There is a requirement, however, that the ordinances Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the
should not contravene a statute. Municipalgovernments business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin
are only agents of the national government. Local houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate
councils exercise only delegatedlegislative powers which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited
conferred on them by Congress as the national with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.
lawmaking body. The delegate cannotb e superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved
latter. It is a heresy to suggest thatt he local government an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain forms of
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where
have derived their power in the first place, and negate women are used as tools in entertainment and which
by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Casino tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants,
gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
the status of a statute that cann otbe amended or community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of
nullified by a mere ordinance. violation and conviction, the premises of the erring
• The morality of gambling is not prohibited by the establishment shall be closed and padlocked
constitution. Such discretion is given to the legislature. permanently.
In this case, PD 1869 allows the existence of legal
forms of gambling. The will of the national legislature June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower
cannot be subservient to local ordinances. Ordinances court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included
must conform to the following requirements for it to be motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments,
considered valid: be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several
o Must not contravene the constitution reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of
o Must not be unfair or oppressive police power and it constitutes a denial of equal
o Must not be partial or discriminatory protection under the law.
o Must not prohibit but it may regulate
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it
elevated to the Supreme Court. because immorality is not a thing, a building or
establishment; it is in the hearts of men.
ISSUES:
W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is
W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires. The Local
law Government Code merely empowers local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments
HELD: enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since
the requisites for a valid exercise of police power are All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental
not met. The prohibition of the enumerated personal and property rights adn impairs personal
establishments will not per se protect and promote the privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance
social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
itself eradicate the alluded social ills fo prostitution, unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently
adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless and enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten,
insupportable to bring within that classification sauna the City Council unde the Code had no power to enact
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void.
clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v
motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits which are not FACTS:
per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.
Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take 1964- Lakeview Development Corp. bought a parcel
place in the most innocent places.... Every house, of land in Carmona, Cavite. LDC was succeeded by
building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that Credito Asiatico Inc. LDC/CAI undertook to develop
matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply the property into a residential and industrial estate
because there are no "pure" places where there are thus it applied with the Municipal Council of Carmona
impure men. for an ordinance approving the zoning and
subdivision of the property,
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to  1976- Kapasiyahang Bilang 30 was approved
address the core issues of morality. Try as the granting the application and affirming the project. A
Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster consolidated survey was approved by the Bureau of
Lands. The housing project was registered with the their quitclaim. Thereafter, the plaintiffs and the CAI
National Housing Authority and was granted a filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
locational clearance from the Human Settlements  1991- TC granted the motion and dismissed the
Regulatory Commission and the Ministry of Local complaint.
Government and Community Development subject to  However, the project was again opposed by another
certain conditions. group of farmers claiming that since 1961, they had
 1980- the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite been occupying a parcel of public agricultural
declared certain areas including the subject land as land. They tilled the said agricultural lands and
industrial areas. planted it with rice, corn, vegetables, root crops, fruit
 1987- while developing a phase of the property, a trees and raised small livestock for daily survival.
complaint for damages with TRO and PI were filed The petitioners requested that the DAR order an
against CAI in the RTC of Cavite. The plaintiffs official survey of the aforesaid agricultural
therein alleged that they were the actual tillers of the lands. Pending resolution of their petition, the
land. The defendant had surreptitiously applied for petitioners and twenty (20) others banded together
the conversion of the 35.8-hectare portion of the and formed a group called Pasong Bayabas Farmers
aforesaid property from agricultural to residential and Association, Inc. (PBFAI) affiliated with Kalipunan ng
the same was granted by the Ministry of Agrarian Samahan ng Mamamayan, Inc. (KASAMA).
Reform but that the parties had earlier agreed that  1994- Domingo Banaag, in his capacity as President
the plaintiffs would remain in the peaceful of PBFAI, filed a petition for compulsory coverage of
possession of their farmholdings. Notwithstanding a portion of the CAI property under Rep. Act No.
such agreement, CAI ordered the bulldozing of the 6657.
property, by reason of which the plaintiffs suffered  The PBFAI-KASAMA, representing the farmers-
actual damages. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged tenants, filed a complaint for Maintenance of
that the bulldozing was done without any permit from Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with Damages
the concerned public authorities. with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and PI before
 CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into a the DAR Adjudication Board Reg. IV against CAI et
compromise agreement whereby CAI donated al.
parcels of land in consideration of the execution of  DARAB granted the TRO.
deeds of quitclaims and waivers.  CAI admitted that the CAI was the registered owner
 Despite the civil case, CAI went on with its project. of the property, but specifically denied that the
Meantime, the remaining plaintiffs entered into a plaintiffs were recognized by the CAI as tenants-
compromise agreement with CAI in which the latter occupants of the aforesaid property since
would execute Deeds of Donation in exchange for 1961. They asserted that the CAI did not consent to
the cultivation of the property nor to the erection of  Petitioners appealed. The appealed was transmitted
the plaintiffs’ houses. They further averred that the to the DARAB. Meantime some of them executed
CAI had entered into a compromise agreement with quitclaims waiving their rights from the property in
the occupants of the property. They also alleged that the suit. Thus CAI filed a Motion to
they secured a permit from the Municipal Planning Lift Status Quo Order and Motion to Dismiss alleging
and Development Offices before bulldozing activities that the status quo order illegally extended the
on the property were ordered. restraining order issued on September 13, 1996. It
 The defendants raised the following as their special was also alleged that the complainants-appellants
and affirmative defenses among others: (a) the were not qualified beneficiaries of the CARL. The
plaintiffs’ action is barred by the dismissal of their CAI asserted that the re-classification of the land use
complaint; (b) the plaintiffs had waived their rights was valid and legal, and concluded that since the
and interests over the property when they executed property was not agricultural, it was not covered by
deeds of waiver and quitclaim in favor of CAI; (c) the CARL and, thus, beyond the jurisdiction of the
then Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella had issued an DARAB.
Order dated July 3, 1979, converting the property  1997- DARAB reversed PARAD decision. MR
into a residential area and withdrawing the property denied.
from the coverage of the CARL. Finally, the  CA- reversed DARAB and reinstated the PARAB
defendants contended that the property had an 18% decision. The CA ruled that under RA6657, sec. 10,
slope and was undeveloped; as such, it was exempt all lands with 18% slope and over, except those
from the coverage of the CARL, under Section 10 of already developed, shall be exempt from the
Rep. Act No. 6657. coverage of the said Act. The CA noted that the
 1996- PARAD dismissed the complaint and found exception speaks of “18% in slope and undeveloped
that the plaintiffs abandoned and renounced their land.” Per report of the PARAD, the property subject
tenancy rights over the land in question and barred of the suit has an 18% slope and was still
from instituting the instant complaint on the ground undeveloped; hence, it falls within the exemption.
of Res Judicata; that the remaining 29 other plaintiffs And that as early as 1976, the land was already
were not bonafide tenants but mere interlopers on classified by the Municipality of Carmona as
the land in question and consequently not entitled to residential.
security of tenure. It declined to resolve the issue  Petitioners: the property subject of the suit is
whether or not the property was covered by RA 6657 agricultural land; hence, covered by the CARL. They
and on whether the conversion of the property to assert that the reclassification of the property made
non-agricultural was legal and efficacious. by the Municipal Council of Carmona was subject to
the approval of the HSRC, now the HLURB, as
provided for by EO648, sec. 5 but since there was no had no appellate jurisdiction over the appeals from
such approval, the said resolution was ineffective. the decision of the PARAD.
They argue that RA6657 sec. 65, the DAR is vested 
with exclusive authority to reclassify a landholding ISSUE (with regard to eminent domain):
from agricultural to residential. The petitioners submit W/N the subject property is covered by RA 6657 or
that the exclusive authority of the DAR is not the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
negated by RA7160, sec.60 (LGC). They also insist
that the conversion of the property under HELD/RATIO:
Kapasiyahang Blg30, was subject to the approval of NO. RA6657 provides that the CARL shall “cover,
the DAR, conformably to DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
of 1990. Moreover, the development of the property produced, all public and private agricultural lands.” As
had not yet been completed even after RA6657 took to what constitutes “agricultural land” it is referred to as
effect. Hence, it was incumbent upon the respondent “land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this
to secure an exemption thereto, after complying with Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994. commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the
 CAI: the property was validly reclassified by the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
Municipal Council of Carmona pursuant to its “Agricultural lands” are only those lands which are
authority under RA2264 or Local Autonomy Act of “arable and suitable agricultural lands” and “do not
1959. Until revoked, the reclassification made by the include commercial, industrial and residential lands.”
council remained valid. Per DOJ Opinion No. 40, Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the
Series of 1990, the private respondent was not undeveloped portions of the property cannot in any
required to secure clearance or approval from the language be considered as “agricultural lands.” These
DAR since the reclassification took place on June lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to
15, 1988, when RA6657 took effect. The respondent be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in
asserts that it had complied with all the requirements the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the
under PD 957, as amended. Morevore, other areas in question continued to be developed as a low-
agencies had already previously found the property cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snail’s pace. This
unsuitable for agricultural purposes. The respondent can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA
asserts that the petitioners-individuals are mere members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners
squatters and not tenants on the property of the from continuing with such development. The enormity of
private respondent. Hence, the PARAD had no the resources needed for developing a subdivision may
jurisdiction over the petition of the PBFAI, as well as have delayed its completion but this does not detract
the individual petitioners. Consequently, the DARAB
from the fact that these lands are still residential lands It bears stressing that in his Order, the Agrarian
and outside the ambit of the CARL. Reform Minister declared that the property was not
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity tenanted and not devoted to the production of palay
are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands and/or corn, and that the land was suitable for
previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the conversion to a residential subdivision. The order of the
effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than Minister was not reversed by the Office of the President;
respondent DAR. as such, it became final and executory. By declaring, in
RA2264, sec. 3 amending the Local Government its Decision of September 2, 1997, that the property
Code, specifically empowers municipal and/or city subject of the suit, was agricultural land, the petitioner
councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or DARAB thereby reversed the Order of Agrarian Reform
regulations in consultation with the National Planning Minister Estrella, issued almost eighteen (18) years
Commission. A zoning ordinance prescribes, defines, before, and nullified Resolution No. 30 of the Municipal
and apportions a given political subdivision into specific Council of Carmona, approved twenty-one (21) years
land uses as present and future projection of earlier, on May 30, 1976, as well as the issuances of the
needs. The power of the local government to convert or NHA, the HSRC, the HLURB, the Ministry of Local
reclassify lands to residential lands to non-agricultural Government and the National Planning
lands reclassified is not subject to the approval of DAR. Commission. Thus, the petitioner DARAB acted with
RA6657, sec. 65 relied upon by the petitioner applies grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or
only to applications by the landlord or the beneficiary for lack of jurisdiction.
the conversion of lands previously placed under the Dipdipio Earth-saver’s Multipurpose Association, Inc.
agrarian reform law after the lapse of five years from its et al v Sec. Gozun, DENR, et al.
award. It does not apply to agricultural lands already
converted as residential lands prior to the passage of
RA6657.
When Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella
confirmed the reclassification of the property by the Chico-Nazario,J.
Municipal Council of Carmona to non-agricultural land 30 March 2006
when he approved, on July 3, 1979, the application of
the private respondent/LDC for the conversion of 35.80
hectares of the property into non-agricultural land, he
did so pursuant to his authority under RA3844, as FACTS:
amended, by PD 815 and PD 946.  25 July 1987- Pres. Aquino promulgated EO279
which authorized the DENR Secretary to accept,
consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned entry into a private property and allow taking of land
corporations or foreign investors for contracts of without payment of just compensation.
agreements involving either technical or financial  Public respondents: Sec. 76 is not a taking provision
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue
and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate of which, the state may prescribe regulations to
recommendation of the Secretary, the President may promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
execute with the foreign proponent. order, safety and general welfare of the people. This
 1994- Pres. Ramos executed a Financial and government regulation involves the adjustment of
Technical Assistance Agreement with Arimco Mining rights for the public good and that this adjustment
Corp over areas in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino, curtails some potential for the use or economic
including Barangay Dipdipio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya. exploitation of private property. Public respondents
Subsequently, AMC consolidated with Climax Mining concluded that "to require compensation in all such
Limited to form a single company that now goes circumstances would compel the government to
under the new name of Climax-Arimco Mining regulate by purchase."
Corporation (CAMC), the controlling 99% of
stockholders of which are Australian nationals. ISSUE:
 1995- Pres. Ramos signed into law RA 7942 entitled, Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the
"An Act Instituting A New System of Mineral CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust
Resources Exploration, Development, Utilization and and unlawful taking of property without payment of
Conservation," otherwise known as the Philippine just compensation, in violation of Section 9, Article
Mining Act of 1995. III of the Constitution.
 2001- petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to
the DENR Sec. for the cancellation of the FTAA for HELD/RATIO:
the primary reason that RA7942 and its NO. The Mining Act was held to be valid. Sec. 76 of
Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are the Mining Act as well as the DENR IRR provided for
unconstitutional. just compensation.
 2002- Panel of Arbitrators of the Mining and The power of eminent domain is the inherent right
Geosciences Bureau rejected the demand for the of the state (and of those entities to which the power
cancellation of the CAMC FTAA.1avvphil.net has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private
 Petitioners: They assert that public respondent property to public use upon payment of just
DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing compensation. On the other hand, police power is the
Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. Although both police power and the power of (4) the property must be devoted to public
eminent domain have the general welfare for their use or otherwise informally appropriated or
object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two injuriously affected;
with the latter being used as an implement of the (5) the utilization of the property for public
former, there are still traditional distinctions between the use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
two. and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence property.
leads to a cogent deduction that where a property As shown by jurisprudence, a regulation which
interest is merely restricted because the continued use substantially deprives the owner of his proprietary rights
thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or where and restricts the beneficial use and enjoyment for public
property is destroyed because its continued existence use amounts to compensable taking. In the case at bar,
would be injurious to public interest, there is no the entry referred to in Sec. 76 and the easement rights
compensable taking. However, when a property interest under Sec. 75 of RA 7942 as well as the various rights
is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, to CAMC under its FTAA are no different from the
there is compensable taking. deprivation of proprietary rights. The CAMC FTAA
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the
results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and Exploration Contract Area, the full right of ingress and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent egress and the right to occupy the same. It also
reason appears why said power may not be availed of bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry
to impose only a burden upon the owner of the into private lands by surface owners or occupants
condemned property, without loss of title and thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, minerals therein.
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement The entry referred to in Section 76 is not just a
right of way. simple right-of-way which is ordinarily allowed under the
The requisites of taking in eminent domain provisions of the Civil Code. Here, the holders of mining
include (Castellvi v CA): rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting
(1) the expropriator must enter a private mining activities such as exploration, extraction and
property; processing of minerals. Mining right holders build mine
(2) the entry must be for more than a infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels,
momentary period. prepare tailing ponds, storage areas and vehicle depots,
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color install their machinery, equipment and sewer systems.
of legal authority; On top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are
accorded to them where they may build warehouses,
port facilities, electric transmission, railroads and other 2 December 1998

infrastructures necessary for mining operations. All
these will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the
affected areas the beneficial ownership of their lands.
Without a doubt, taking occurs once mining operations FACTS:
commence.
While the Court declared that Sec. 75 is a taking  Private respondent Helena Benitez is the registered
provision, this does not mean that it is unconstitutional owner of 2 parcels of land in Cavite.
on the ground that it allows taking of private property
without the determination of public use and the payment  1982- Philippine Human Resources Development
of just compensation. The taking to be valid must be for Center and the Japanese International Cooperation
public use. Public use as a requirement for the valid Agency entered into an agreement which involved
exercise of the power of eminent domain is now the establishment of a Construction Manpower
synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public Development Center.
welfare and public convenience. It includes the broader
notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use  1983- MOA between Benitez and PHRDC by which
as traditionally understood as "actual use by the public" she would lease and/or sell for a period of 20 years
has already been abandoned. Mining industry plays a the subject property in favor of PHRDC. It was
pivotal role in the economic development of the country granted permit by Benitez and the Philippine
and is a vital tool in the government’s thrust of Women’s University to undertake land development,
accelerated recovery. Irrefragably, mining is an industry electrical and road network installations and other
which is of public benefit. related works necessary to attain its
objectives...’. Pursuant thereto, the CMDF took
Republic of the Philippines possession of the property and erected buildings and
other related facilities necessary for its operations.
 After the lease contract expired, negotiations began

on the purchase of the property on a plain offer from
Benitez to sell the same. It was agreed that the
purchase price would be at P70 per sqm. In view of
this agreement, PHRDC prepared a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
Panganiban, J.
 However, for reasons known only to her, Benitez did ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. There
not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale thus reneging on being a deposit made by the plaintiff with the Philippine
her commitment to sell the lot in question. National Bank (PNB) in the amount of P708,490.00
which is equivalent to the assessed value of the
 1995- She and PWU demanded payment of rentals property subject matter hereof based on defendant’s
and to vacate the premises. It later filed an unlawful 1990 tax declaration, coupled with the fact that notice to
detainer suit against petitioner. defendant as landowner has been effected, the Motion
for Issuance of Writ of Possession should be granted.
 For failure to acquire the property, CMDF instituted a
complaint for eminent domain under EO1035. A writ The expropriation of real property does not include
of possession was issued by the Court but later mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although
quashed. eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there
may also be compensable taking of only some, not all,
of the property interests in the bundle of rights that
constitute ownership. In this case, it is manifest that the
ISSUE: petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public
interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of
W/N the respondent judge may quash a writ of eminent domain. In exercising this power, petitioner
possession on the ground that the expropriating intended to acquire not only physical possession but
government agency is already occupying the property also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own
sought to be expropriated. the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry
and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of
title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised
by an owner over the subject property. Its actual
HELD/RATIO: occupation, which renders academic the need for it to
enter, does not by itself include its acquisition of
NO. Sec. 7 of EO1035 (providing for the all the rights of ownership. Its right to possess did not
procedures and guidelines for the expeditious attend its initial physical possession of the property
acquisition by the government of private real because the lease, which had authorized said
properties or rights thereon for infrastructure and possession, lapsed. In short, petitioner wanted not
other government development projects) provides merely possession de facto but possession de jure as
that when the government or its authorized agent well.
makes the required deposit, the trial court has a
What will happen if the required writ of possession Corp (PSC). PSC was declared in default and the
is not issued? It would be absurd to require petitioner to RTC found in favor of Leviste.
first vacate the property in view of the adverse judgment
in the unlawful detainer case, and soon afterwards,  A writ of execution was issued. Two parcels of land
order the trial court to issue in petitioner’s favor a writ of in the name of PSC were sold at a public auction in
possession pursuant to the expropriation favor of Vines Realty Corp. A writ of possession was
proceedings. Such a scenario is a bureaucratic waste issued in favor of VRC. The writ included the power
of precious time and resources. This precisely is the lines of CANORECO standing on certain portions of
sort of pernicious and unreasonable delay of the subject property.
government infrastructure or development projects,
which EO 1035 intended to address by requiring the  Later, VRC moved for the removal and demolition of
immediate issuance of a writ of possession. Ineludibly, improvements on the land, including the electric
said writ is both necessary and practical, because mere posts. CANORECO opposed on the ground, among
physical possession that is gained by entering the other reasons, that petitioner was not a party to the
property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim case and therefore not bound by the judgment of the
of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way
possess, the expropriated property. Clearly, an agreements over said property.
ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the
State’s power of eminent domain.  RTC issued writ of demolition.
Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. CA  CANORECO filed with CA a petition for prohibition
with restraining order and preliminary injunction
20 November 2000 which was eventually denied. Meantime, the sheriff
went through with the demolition.
Pardo, J.
ISSUE:
FACTS:
W/N petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the
 Conrado Leviste filed with the RTC of Daet, CN a power lines located in the land sold at public
complaint for collection of a sum of money and auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of
foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter mortgage.
The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is

not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the
HELD/RATIO: installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the
land for an indefinite period deprives private
YES. The trial court failed to appreciate the respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons,
nature of electric cooperatives as public utilities. AmongVines Realty is entitled to payment of just
the powers granted to electric cooperatives by virtue of compensation, which must be neither more nor less
Presidential Decree No. 269 (creating the National than the money equivalent of the property.
Electrification Administration) includes the exercise the
power of eminent domain in the manner provided by law
for the exercise of such power by other corporations
constructing or operating electric generating plants and
electric transmission and distribution lines or systems.
Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with
the power of eminent domain. The acquisition of an
easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the
power of eminent domain. In Republic vs. PLDT, it was
held that: “the power of eminent domain results in the
taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears
why said power may not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of condemned property, National
without Power
Panganiban,
Corporation
J. v Manubay Agro-Industrial Development
loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that 18 August 2004
real property may, through expropriation, be subjected
to an easement of right-of-way." FACTS:
 1996- Napocor was to undertake an electrification
However, a simple right-of-way easement project in connecting Leyte to Luzon. In order to
transmits no rights, except the easement. Vines Realty carry out said project, it needed to build its
retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the transmission lines across certain lands owned by
use of the land. It can continue doing what it wants to private individuals including private respondent.
do with the land, except those that would result in  Napocor filed a complaint for expropriation before
contact with the wires. the RTC in order to acquire easement of right of
way over the land which MAIDC owns.
 RTC issued a writ of possession and directed the power company to acquire not just an easement of
sheriff to immediately place Napocor in possession a right of way, but even the land itself. Such
of said land. In determining the fair compensation, easement was deemed by the appellate court to be
the court appointed 3 commissioners to survey the a "taking" under the power of eminent domain. The
land. CA observed that, given their nature, high-powered
 Taking into consideration the condition, the electric lines traversing respondent’s property
surroundings and the potentials of respondent’s would necessarily diminish -- if not damage entirely
expropriated property, the RTC approved -- the value and the use of the affected property; as
Chairperson Minda B. Teoxon’s recommended well as endanger lives and limbs because of the
amount of P550 per square meter as just high-tension current conveyed through the lines.
compensation for the property. The trial court Respondent was therefore deemed entitled to a
opined that the installation thereon of the 350 KV just compensation, which should be neither more
Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project nor less than the monetary equivalent of the
would impose a limitation on the use of the land for property taken. Accordingly, the appellate found
an indefinite period of time, thereby justifying the the award of P550 per square meter to be proper
payment of the full value of the property. and reasonable.
 Further, the RTC held that it was not bound by the
provision cited by petitioner -- Section 3-A of ISSUE:
RA6395 (revising the Charter of the Napocor), as W/N the assessed compensation was just.
amended by Presidential Decree 938. This law
prescribes as just compensation for the acquired HELD/RATIO:
easement of a right of way over an expropriated YES. An easement of a right of way transmits no
property an easement fee in an amount not rights except the easement itself, and respondent
exceeding 10 percent of the market value of such retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of
property. The trial court relied on the earlier such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly
pronouncements of this Court that the observed by the CA, considering the nature and the
determination of just compensation in eminent effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on
domain cases is a judicial function. Thus, the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive
valuations made by the executive branch or the respondent of normal use of the property. For this
legislature are at best initial or preliminary only. reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just
 CA: affirmed the RTC holding that RA 6395, as compensation, which must be neither more nor less
amended by PD No. 938, did not preclude than the monetary equivalent of the land.
expropriation. Section 3-A thereof allowed the
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair question are still undeveloped raw land, it appears to
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the the Court that the just compensation of P550 per square
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but meter is justified. Both the Report of Commissioner
the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the Bulao and the commissioners’ majority Report were
meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey based on uncontroverted facts supported by
thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for documentary evidence and confirmed by their ocular
the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full inspection of the property. As can be gleaned from the
and ample. records, they did not abuse their authority in evaluating
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the evidence submitted to them; neither did they
the just compensation to which the owner of a misappreciate the clear preponderance of evidence.
condemned property is entitled is generally the market The amount fixed and agreed to by the trial court and
value. Market value is "that sum of money which a respondent appellate court has not been grossly
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner exorbitant or otherwise unjustified.
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received therefor." Such amount is
not limited to the assessed value of the property or to
the schedule of market values determined by the
provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these
values may serve as factors to be considered in the Republic
En Banc of the Philippines v PLDT
judicial valuation of the property. 27 January 1969
The nature and character of the land at the time of
its taking is the principal criterion for determining how FACTS:
much just compensation should be given to the
landowner. All the facts as to the condition of the  Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the
property and its surroundings, as well as its RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an
improvements and capabilities, should be considered. In agreement whereby telephone messages, coming
fixing the valuation at P550 per square meter, the trial from the United States and received by RCA’s
court had considered the Report of the commissioners domestic station, could automatically be transferred
and the proofs submitted by the parties. The price to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls
of P550 per square meter appears to be the closest collected by the PLDT for transmission from the
approximation of the market value of the lots in the Philippines to the United States.
adjoining, fully developed San Francisco Village  Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of
Subdivision. Considering that the parcels of land in Telecommunications set up its own Government
Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone
and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it
PLDT to enable government offices to call private disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the
parties. Its application for the use of these trunk lines Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was
was in the usual form of applications for telephone the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone
service, containing a statement, above the signature services, from the rest of the world, except the
of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules United States.
and regulations of the PLDT which are on file with  On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit
the Public Service Commission. One of the many against the defendant, Philippine Long Distance
rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished Telephone Company, in CFI of Manila praying in its
the telephone subscriber for his private use. The complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to
Bureau has extended its services to the general execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau,
public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned for the use of the facilities of defendant’s telephone
by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its system throughout the Philippines under such terms
(the Bureau’s) own schedule of rates. Through these and conditions as the court might consider
trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction
subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in against the defendant company to restrain the
the same way that the latter could make a call to the severance of the existing telephone connections
former. and/or restore those severed.
 1958- DoT entered into an agreement with RCA  CFI rendered judgment that it could not compel the
Communications, Inc. for a joint overseas telephone PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau
service whereby the Bureau would convey radio- because the parties were not in agreement; that
telephone overseas calls received by RCA’s station under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of
to and from local residents. But PLDT complained to Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to
the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau servicing government offices alone, nor was there
was violating the conditions under which their Private any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since
Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time
PLDT’s facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, that their use by the Bureau was to be public
for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was
the use of government offices but even to serve neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles
private persons or the general public, in competition of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice
with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that that would result from the disconnection of the trunk
if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent,
although it dismissed both the complaint and the telephone systems is not much different. In either case
counterclaims. private property is subjected to a burden for public use
and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the
ISSUE: Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national
May the PLDT be compelled to enter into an welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon
interconnection contract with the petitioner? payment of just compensation, there is no reason why
the State may not require a public utility to render
HELD/RATIO: services in the general interest, provided just
YES. Generally, parties cannot be coerced to enter into compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the
a contract where no agreement is had between them as beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the
to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. users of both telephone systems, so that the
Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the condemnation would be for public use.
essence of our contractual system, and by express
provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if Barangay San Roque, Talisay, Cebu v Heirs of
Panganiban
tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence. But 20 June 2000
while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the FACTS:
exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain,  Petitioner filed before the MTC a Complaint to
require the telephone company to permit expropriate property of the respondents.
interconnection of the government telephone  In an Order the MTC dismissed the Complaint on
system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that
government service may require, subject to the "eminent domain is an exercise of the power
payment of just compensation to be determined by to take private property for public use after payment
the court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent of just compensation”.
domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to,  The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed
and possession of, the expropriated property; but no before it, holding that an action for eminent domain
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be affected title to real property; hence, the value of
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the property to be expropriated, Concluding that
condemned property, without loss of title and the action should have been filed before the MTC
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, since the value of the subject property was less
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of than P20, 000.
right of way. The use of the PLDT’s lines and services  Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to the SC,
to allow inter-service connection between both raising a pure question of law.
Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna filed 2 complaints

ISSUE: for expropriation against Bardillon for the purpose of
Who has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain erecting a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of
or expropriation where the assessed value of the its constituents. The 1st complaint was filed before the
subject property is P20,000? MTC following the failure of the parties to reach an
agreement on the purchase offer but the complaint was
HELD/RATIO: dismissed for lack of interest for failure of the barangay
RTC. An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary to appear at the pre-trial. The 2nd complaint was filed
estimation. An expropriation suit does not involve the before the RTC but Bardillon filed an MTD on the
recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the ground of res judicata. The RTC judge denied the MTD
exercise by the government of its authority and right to holding that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
take private property for public use. True, the value of proceeding so res judicata does not apply. The CA also
the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary dismissed the petition on the same ground and ignored
terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just the RTC’s writ of possession despite the pending MR of
compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental the ruling dismissing the complaint.
to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is
determined only after the court is satisfied with the ISSUE:
propriety of the expropriation. In addition, The Who had jurisdiction?
government does not dispute respondents' title to or
possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question HELD/RATIO:
of who has a better title or right, for the government RTC.An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction
does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It of the RTC regardless of the value of the land because
merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to the subject of the action is the government’s exercise of
"appropriate and control individual property for the eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or estimation.
welfare may demand." Remanded to RTC. Since the MTC had no jurisdiction, res judicata
does not apply even if the order of dismissal may have
been an adjudication on the merits.
Devorah Bardillon
Panganiban, J. v Barangay Masili The requirements for the issuance of a writ of
30 April 2003 possession in an expropriation case are found in
Section 2, Rule 67. For LGUs, expropriation is also
FACTS: governed by Sec. 19 of the LGC. In expropriation
proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate
entry are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation dumping of waste materials altered the topography
sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act
the amount equivalent to 15% of the FMV of the on Pobre’s complaints and NPC continued with its
property to be expropriated based on its current tax dumping.
declaration. In this case, the issuance of the Writ of
Possession in favor the city after it filed the complaint  1979- NPC filed its second expropriation case
and deposited the amount required was proper because against Pobre for additional land are to be used for
it had complied with the foregoing requisites. The issue its well site. It deposited 10% of the total market
of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly value of the lots covered by the second
addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered
proceedings. the 5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial court’s
issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.
NAPOCOR v CA, Pobre
Carpio, J.  1984- Pobre filed MTD second complaint for
expropriation claiming that NPC damaged his
12 August 2004 property. He prayed for just compensation of all the
lots affected by NPC’s actions and for the payment
of damages.
FACTS:  1985- NPC filed MTD of the second expropriation

case on the ground that it had found an alternative
 Pobre was the owner of a parcel of land which he site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981
developed into a resort-subdivision which he the project within the Property due to Pobre’s
named the “Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision.” opposition.
 1972- Pobre leased lots in the subdivision to NPC  CFI-granted NPC’s MTC but allowed Pobre to
adduce evidence on his claim for damages. The
 1977- NPC filed its expropriation case against trial court admitted Pobre’s exhibits on the
Pobre to acquire a portion of his property. CFI damages because NPC failed to object. It denied
ordered the expropriation upon payment of P25 per NPC’s motion to reconsider the submission of the
sqm. While this first expropriation case was case for decision. It eventually found in favor of
pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the Pobre and ordered NPC to compensate him. CA
site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The affirmed.
Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of

recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of
ISSUE: Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to
be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before
W/N NPC must pay just compensation for the entire commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.
property.
It has been held that the usual procedure in the
determination of just compensation is waived when the
government itself initially violates procedural
HELD/RATIO: requirements. NPC’s taking of Pobre’s property without
filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and
YES. Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case paying him just compensation is a transgression of
restores possession of the expropriated land to the procedural due process. From the beginning, NPC
landowner. However, when possession of the land should have initiated expropriation proceedings for
cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is Pobre’s entire 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC did
neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the not. Instead, NPC embarked on a piecemeal
only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to expropriation of the Property. Even as the second
demand payment of just compensation. In this case, it is expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well
no longer possible and practical to restore possession aware of the damage that it had unleashed on the entire
of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer Property. NPC, however, remained impervious to
habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is Pobre’s repeated demands for NPC to abate the
worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. damage that it had wrought on his Property. NPC
Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second
physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter expropriation on the ground that it had found an
Property. The Court has ruled that if the government alternative site and there was stiff opposition from
takes property without expropriation and devotes the Pobre. NPC abandoned the second expropriation case
property to public use, after many years the property five years after it had already deprived the Property
owner may demand payment of just compensation. This virtually of all its value. NPC has demonstrated its utter
principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate disregard for Pobre’s property rights. Thus the SC
that private property shall not be taken for public use computed the compensation for the entire property
without just compensation. based on the valuation of the commissioners at 6%pa
interest plus temperate and exemplary damages.
This case ceased to be an action for expropriation
when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation.
whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be

done only on condition of providing a reasonably
compensation therefor.” It is the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use
MASIKIPDela
Lourdes v. Paz
CITY
Masikip
OFis the registered owner of a and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in
parcel of land, which the City of Pasig sought to government.
expropriate a portion thereof for the “sports
development and recreational activities” of the residents This power is lodged in the legislative branch of
of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. government. It delegates the power thereof to the
Masikip refused. LGUs, other public entities and public utility
corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations.
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and
expropriate said portion of land for the alleged purpose may exercise it only when expressly authorized by
that it was “in line with the program of the Municipal statute.
Government to provide land opportunities to deserving
poor sectors of our community.” Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for
court a complaint for expropriation. The Motion to the benefit of the poor and landless, upon payment of
Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
on the ground that there was genuine necessity to Constitution and pertinent laws.
expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the
Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of Provided:
merit. (1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised
unless a valid and definite offer has been previously
Hence, this petition. made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the
ISSUE: W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings
the property and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
least 15% fair market value of the property based on the
HELD: current tax declaration; and
Eminent domain is “the right of a government to take
and appropriate private property to the public use,
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be In the meantime, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
determined by the proper court, based on the fair issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of
market value at the time of the taking of the property the expropriated property to the Bulacan State
University.
There is already an established sports development and
recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig HELD:
City. Evidently, there is no “genuine necessity” to justify The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be
the expropriation. The records show that the an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate
Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public
which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance purpose. Fundamental to the independent existence of
No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution,
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound whose provisions are taken as being merely
Homeowner’s Association, a private, non-profit confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at
organization, not the residents of Caniogan. most, in the due exercise of the power. In the hands of
the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching
that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in many
REPUBLIC instituted
Petitioner v. expropriation proceedings over respects. It reaches to every form of property the State
544,980 square meters of contiguous land situated needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all
along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be separate interests of individuals in property are held
utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use of under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting
radio transmitter facilities for the “Voice of the upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession
Philippines” project. Petitioner made a deposit of of the property whenever the public interest so requires
P517,558.80, the sum provisionally fixed as being the it.
reasonable value of the property.
The bone of contention in the instant controversy

JESUS
is theIS LORD
TheCHRISTIAN
Municipality
SCHOOL
of Pasig
FOUNDATION,
needed an INC.
access
v. CITY
road.
OF PASIG
76,589-square meter property previously owned by Luis Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for
Santos, predecessor-in-interest of herein respondents, water and electricaloutlets. The municipality then
which forms part of the expropriated area. decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the property
It would appear that the national government failed to of the Ching Cuancos.
pay to herein respondents the compensation pursuant
to the foregoing decision. The municipality filed a complaint, against the Ching
Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under
Section 19 of the Local Government Code. The plaintiff expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for
alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31,
of its intention to construct an access road on a portion 1979.
of the property but they refused to sell the same
portion. The plaintiff appended to the complaint a The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly
photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo owned subsidiary of the National Development
Ching Cuanco. Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the
National Government, embarked on an expansion
ISSUE: W/N there was no due process? program embracing, among other things, the
HELD: construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The
Petition is granted. However, as correctly pointed out by construction of such steel mill was considered a priority
the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an and major industrial project of the government. Pursuant
ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No.
all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on
subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement
notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and
of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an reserving that land for the use and immediate
ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is occupancy of NSC.
thereby received and the parties are entitled to be
present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where, Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were
as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant
ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer
the court based on the said inspection has no probative Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated
weight. The findings of the trial court based on the November 16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to
conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be “negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf
rejected. of the Government, for the compensation of MCFC’s
present occupancy rights on the subject land.
IRONwas
ISA ANDcreated
STEELby PD
AUTHORITY
No. 272 in (ISA)
order,v.generally, to Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed.
develop and promote the iron and steel industry.
ISSUE: W/N the Government is entitled to be
PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA’s
counting from August 9, 1973. When ISA’s original term term.
HELD: When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the

Yes. Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers consequence of such expiry must be looked for, in the
or attributed normally associated with juridical first instance, in the charters and, by way of
personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No. supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation
272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or Code. Since in the instant case, ISA is a non-
comprehensive juridical personality separate and incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic,
distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities
appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency are properly regarded as folded back into the
or instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the Government and hence assumed once again by the
Government of the Philippines. It is common knowledge Republic, no special statutory provision having been
that other agencies or instrumentalities of the shown to have mandated succession thereto by some
Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, other entity or agency of the Republic.
that is to say, are incorporated agencies or In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation
instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or
without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a representative of the Republic of the Philippines
juridical personality distinct from the personality of the pursuant to its authority under PD 272.
Republic. The principal or the real party in interest is thus the
Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC, even
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an though the latter may be an ultimate user of the
agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a properties involved.
body corporate and juridical person vested with the full
panoply of powers and attributes which are From the foregoing premises, it follows that the
compendiously described as “legal personality.” Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA
When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of
expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the ISA’s statutory term did not by itself require or justify the
assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
are reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition
thereof, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, FILSTREAM
Filstream is the
INTERNATIONAL
registered ownerINC.
of or
v. CA
parcels of land
duties and functions, etc. to some other identified situated in Tondo Manila.
successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.
Filstream filed an ejectment suit before MTC Manila No. The City of Manila has the power of eminent
against the occupants of the said property on the domain as expressly granted by the Local Government
ground of termination of the lease contract and non- Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
payment of rentals. However, this power is not unlimited. The basic rules
Judgment was rendered for Filstream on Sept 14, 1993 still have to be followed, which are as follows: "no
ordering private respondents to vacate the premises person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
and pay back rentals to petitioner. without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1,
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1993, while the case is still 1987 Constitution); private property shall not be taken
pending before the MTC, the private respondents filed a for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against 9, 1987 Constitution)".
Filstream before RTC Manila. Subsequently on
November 5, 1993, the City of Manila approved The governing law that deals with the subject of
Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and
initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development
purchase, or other legal means the properties of and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 of which
Filstream, among others. The said properties were to be specifically provide the order of lands to be acquired for
sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area socialized housing which shows that private property is
pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the the last one that should be expropriated. Moreover,
City of Manila. Section 10 the same law provides for the modes of
acquisition an states that the modes include
City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain to "community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
expropriate the aforecited parcels of land owned by consolidation, land banking, donation to the
petitioner Filstream before RTC Manila. Pursuant to Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated
this, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession which purchase, and expropriation. Provided, however, That
ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed expropriation shall be resorted to only when other
premises to the City of Manila. modes of acquisition have been exhausted."
ISSUE: W/N the injunction issued is valid vis-a-vis Upon examination of the records, the court found that
whether or not the expropriation is valid. the City of Manila has not complied with Sections 9 and
10 of R.A. 7279. Filstream's properties were
HELD: expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the
City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the
acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279

have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of Republic filed the present case alleging that it is the
petitioner Filstream's right to due process which must owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the
accordingly be rectified. 1938 Decision in the expropriation case.
San Roque claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It
Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a also claimed that there was no valid expropriation
paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent because it was initiated by the executive branch without
domain for the general good considering that the right of legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation
the State to expropriate private property as long as it is was never consummated because the government did
for public use always takes precedence over the interest not actually enter the land nor were the owners paid any
of private property owners. However we must not lose compensation.
sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the
exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, HELD:
bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly construed
cannot override the guarantee of due process extended against the expropriator. The payment of just
by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. compensation for private property taken for public use is
In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State's
process requirements is in order. sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe
this requirement renders the taking ineffectual,
notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To
SAN
Certain ROQUE
parcels of REALTY
land were v. the subject of an disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental
expropriation proceeding initiated by the then power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Judge Felix Martinez rights.
ordered the initial deposit of P9,500.00 as pre-condition
for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. A Republic manifestly failed to present clear and
Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land. convincing evidence of full payment of just
However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not compensation and receipt thereof by the property
transferred to the government. owners. More importantly, if the Republic had actually
made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary
Eventually, the land was subdivided and new titles were course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of
issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the
were acquired by San Roque, which begun construction government on the certificate of title.
of townhouses on the subject parcels of land.
The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the for the Municipality of' Meycauayan to expropriate the
Republic's interest arising from the exercise of it's power aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and
or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land Merchandising Corporation for use as a public road.
Registration Act. There is no showing that the Republic Considering that in the vicinity there are other available
complied with the aforesaid registration requirement. road and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as
the lot in question and lying Idle, unlike the lot sought to
From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent be expropriated which was found by the Committee to
upon the Republic to cause the registration of the be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy
subject properties in its name or record the decree of equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining
expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does
fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed not appear to be very imperative and necessary and
to do so for 56 years. would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The
desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a
public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be
MUNICIPALITY
Philippine Pipes OF
and MEYCAUAYAN
Merchandising Corporation
v. filed fully and better attained by acquiring the other available
with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without
Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate
land to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to
equipment. expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity
In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, offered for sale for a wider public road to attain
passed Resolution to expropriate same land. It hereafter decongest (sic) of traffic because as observed by the
filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a special civil Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken
action for expropriation. will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and
Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the therefore, will not suffice to improve and decongest the
market value of the land, with the Philippine National flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area. ...
Bank, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor
of the petitioner. Since there is another lot ready for sale and lying Idle,
RTC issued an order declaring the taking of the property adjacent and on the western side of the strip of land,
as lawful. IAC affirmed. and extending also from Malhacan Road to Bulac Road
and most Ideal for a public road because it is very much
HELD: wider than the lot sought to be expropriated, it seems
From the foregoing facts, it appears obvious to this that it is more just, fair, and reasonable if this lot is the
Special Committee that there is no genuine necessity one to be expropriated.
BARDILLON
2 Complaints for eminent
v. BRGY
domain were filed by the Brgy
Masili for the purpose of expropriating a (144) square
meter-parcel of land owned by Bardillon. Bardillon
acquired from Makiling Consolidated Credit Corporation
the said lot pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Bardillon argues that the CA erred when it ignored the
RTC’s Writ of Possession over her property, issued
despite the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the
ruling dismissing the Complaint.
Held: Bardillon v Masili

Barangay Barangay
filedMasili
two complaints to expropriate a
SC not persuaded. 144 sqm parcel of land owned by Bardillon for a multi-
The requirements for the issuance of a writ of purpose hall; their first offer was 200,000. The case was
possession in an expropriation case are expressly and dismissed for the failure of reopndent and counsel to
specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the appear at pre-trial (MTC). The second complaint was
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local approved (RTC). The Court of Appeals affirmed the
government units, expropriation is also governed by ruling that the MTC had no jurisdiction and the RTC
Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, validly ruled.
in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for
authorizing immediate entry are as follows: ISSUE:
(1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in 1. Could the MTC have jurisdiction over the case?
form and substance; and No, An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the
(2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of RTC regardless of the value of the land because the
the fair market value of the property to be expropriated subject of the action is the government’s exercise of
based on its current tax declaration. eminent domain – a matter incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of 2. Did the CA err when it ignored the issue of entry
Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the upon the premises?
Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount No. The Writ of Possession was valid. The requirements
required was proper, because it had complied with the for the issuance of a writ of possession in an
foregoing requisites. expropriation case are governed by Rule 67, Section 2
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 19 of the
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a Local Government Code.
matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of
the expropriation proceedings. If petitioner objects to The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are 1) the
the necessity of the takeover of her property, she should filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has and substance 2) the deposit of the amount equivalent
the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of to 15% of the fair market value of the property to be
the right of eminent domain and to determine whether expropriated based on its current tax declaration.
there is a genuine necessity for it. Held: Petition denied. The expropriation is valid.

Lagcao v Judge
Petitioners bought
Labraland from the City of Cebu. After No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’
acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the property as the site of a socialized housing project.
lot only to discover that it was already occupied by
squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997, petitioners instituted Specifically, the ordinance is against the Constitution
ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The and RAs that call for a particular order priority in
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu acquiring land and expropriating only when other modes
City, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the of acquisition have been exhausted. The singling out of
squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed petitioner’s small property was plain oppression and
the MTCC’s decision and issued a writ of execution and showed manifest partiality against petitioners as only
order of demolition. few squatters would benefit. The ordinance failed to
show any reasonable relation between the end sought
However, when the demolition order was about to be and means adopted.
implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two
letters4 to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the HELD: PETITION GRANTED.
demolition on the ground that the City was still looking
for a relocation site for the squatters.
Manila v Chinese Community
An ordinance was soon passed, identifying lots for FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for
socialized housing, including the contested lot. The the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the
ordinance appropriated ~6M for the lot. conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff
claims that it is necessary that such public improvement
Petitioners filed an action for nullity of Ordinance 1843 be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and
for being unconstitutional. that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Is Cebu City ordinance no. 1843 violative of
substantive due process Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation
Yes. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent was not necessary because other routes were available.
domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be They further claimed that the expropriation of the
of public character. Government may not capriciously or cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to
arbitrarily choose which private property should be them and to all those persons owing and interested in
expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all the graves and monuments that would have to be
why petitioners’ property was singled out for destroyed.
expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity
impelled the particular choice or selection. Ordinance The lower court ruled that the said public improvement
was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in government offices but even to serve private persons or
question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the the general public, in competition with the business of
right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that PLDT. They gave notice and disconnected the trunk
the courts have no right to inquire and determine the lines being rented by the Bureau.
necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an
appeal. Petitioner commenced a suit against PLDT praying for
the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and demand interconnection between the Government
hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. Telephone System and that of PLDT so that the
Government Telephone System could make use of the
HELD: The courts have the power of restricting lines and facilities. PLDT compels it cannot be
the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable compelled to enter into this contract without any prior
necessities of the case and for the purposes designated agreement.
by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or
entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it ISSUE:
must comply with the conditions accompanying the Can an interconnection between PLDT and the GTS be
authority. The necessity for conferring the authority a valid object for expropriation?
upon a municipal corporation toexercise the right
of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the HELD: Yes, in an exercise of eminent domain, the
legislature. But whether or not the Republic may require the telephone company to permit
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a interconnection as the needs of the government service
particular case under the conditionsimposed by the may require, subject to payment of just compensation.
general authority, is a question that the courts have the The use of lines and services to allow inter-service
right to inquire to. connection between the telephone systems is similar to
an easement of right of way.
Republic vThe
FACTS: PLDTBureau of Telecommuncations set up a
Government Telephone System using its equipment but Ayala de Roxas v City
renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government FACTS:
offices to call private parties. PLDT complained that the Plaintiff wanted to construct a terrace on her property; it
bureau was violating the conditions of the would be over a 3m strip of land between her house and
interconnection referring to the rented trunk lines, the edge of the canal of Sibacon. Her application for
because the government used the liens not only for permit was denied because the City Engineer said the
city wanted that 3m of land as a place of discharging

and landing goods and as a place of shelter for HELD: No. While the mayor has the authority to
shipwrecked persons and fishermen, and to be a regulate property in the interest of general welfare, the
towpath state may not permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property to preserve or assure the
ISSUE: Did this constitute a deprivation of property? aesthetic appearance of the community. Every structure
that may be erected would interfere with the view. The
HELD: Yes. No one shall be deprived of property until appellants would be constrained to let their land remain
after proper indemnity; if this requisite has not been idle.
fulfilled the courts must protect and resotre possession
to the injured party. The easement intended would Further, the power of the municipal council to require
amount to expropriating preventing exclusive use. The building permits rests upon fire limts. There is no
question here is not the establishment of an easement showing of these fire limits. They had no authority to
which might be objected by an action in court, but a promulgate the said ordinance.
mere act of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the
city of Manila because it is an attempt to suppress NPC v Gutierrez
without due process of law real rights attached to FACTS: NPC was a GOCC with the power of eminent
ownership. domain for the construction and operation of electric
transmission lines. NPC had to pass the lands of
The City of Manila and City Engineer must issue a Gutierrez, et al. The negotiations for easement were
license allowing her to construct her terrace. unsuccessful and eminent domain proceedings were
started. They were paid P973.00.
People v Fajardo
FACTS: Fajardo and Babilonia were convicted for ISSUE: Should NPC pay simple easement fee or full
violating Ordinance 7 of the Municipality of Baao, compensation for the land traversed by its transmission
Camarines Sur, for constructing a building destroying lines?
the view of the public plaza, without a permit. Fajardo,
the former mayor, built the property even after denial of HELD: Full compensation. The transmission lines
the permit because they needed a place of residence perpetually deprive defendants of their proprietary
very badly, their former house having been destroyed rights, as they will not be allowed to plant anything
by a typhoon. higher than three meters; the high-tensino current also
poses a danger to life and limbs. The acquisition of
ISSUE: Was the ordinance valid? easement falls within the purpose of eminent domain,
as it deprives defendants of ordinary use of their ISSUE:

property. 1. WON the taking of property has taken place when
the condemnor has entered and occupied the
It must be noted that even if petitioner only sought an property as lessee.
easement of right of way, the power of eminent domain No the property was deemed taken only when the
may be exercised although title was not transferred to expropriation proceedings commenced.
the expropriator. The elements of taking are: Requisites for valid taking:
expropriator must enter a private property, entry must
be for more than a momentary period, entry must be
Republic v Castellvi under warrant or color of authority, property must be
FACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has devoted to public use or otherwise informally
been rented and occupied by the government (AFP) in appropriated, and utilization of the property must be in
1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter commenced such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
expropriation proceedings. During the assessment of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
just compensation, the government argued that it had
taken the property when the contract of In the case at bar, these elements were not persent
leasecommenced and not when the proceedings begun. when the government entered and occupied the
If the time of taking was the government’s lease, the property under a contract of lease.
price would be P.20/sqm, while if the time of taking
followed Castellvi’s interpretation the price would be 2. What is just compensation?
P15/sqm. The owner maintains that the disputed land It is to be deermined as of the date of filing the
was not taken when the government commenced to complaint. In the instant case, the taking must be
occupy the said land as lessee because the essential reckoned when the complaint for eminent domain was
elements of the taking of property under the power of filed.
eminent domain namely (1) entrance and occupation by A price of P5/sqm is fair.
condemnor upon the private property for more than a
monetary period and (2) devoting it to public use in such Amigable v cuenca
Keywords: Power of eminent domain; taking in the
a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all constitutional sense
beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.
FACTS:
 Victoria Amigable owner of Lot in Banilad Estate,
Cebu City reflected no annotation in favor of the
government of any right or interest in the property
appears at the back of the TCT. Without prior to be sued; and 4) that it was the province of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government Cebu that appropriated and used the area hence
used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167 Amigable has no cause of action against the
square meters, for the construction of the Mango defendants.
and Gorordo Avenues.  CFI ruled that it doesn’t have jurisdiction as the
 It appears that said avenues were already government cant be sued without its consent;
existing in 1921 although they were in bad Amigable appealed.
condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and
beautiful avenues that they are now and that the Issue/Held/Ratio:
tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the
formal construction in 1. w/n Amigable may properly sue the government?
1925. YES
 1958, Amigable's counsel wrote the President for  Where the government takes away property from
payment of the portion of her lot which had been a private landowner for public use without going
appropriated by the government. The claim was through the legal process of expropriation or
indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly
it. maintain a suit against the government without
 1959, Amigable filed against the Republic of the thereby violating the doctrine of governmental
Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity immunity from suit without its consent. The
as Commissioner of Public Highways for the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit
recovery of ownership, possession of the 6,167 cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
square meters of land traversed by the Mango injustice on a citizen. Had the government
and Gorordo Avenues and for compensatory followed the procedure indicated by the governing
damages in the sum of P50,000.00. law at the time, a complaint would have been filed
 Defendants filed a joint answer 1) that the action by it, and only upon payment of the compensation
was premature, the claim not having been filed fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party
first with the Office of the Auditor General; 2) that entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may
the right of action for the recovery of any amount it have the right to enter in and upon the land so
which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had condemned, to appropriate the same to the public
already prescribed; 3) that the action being a suit use defined in the judgment. It is not too much to
against the Government, the claim for moral say that when the government takes any property
damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid for public use, which is conditioned upon the
basis since Government had not given its consent payment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to of P.D. No. 772 (the Anti-Squatting Law); (4) that the
the jurisdiction of a court. Considering that no trial court convicted petitioner of the offense and
annotation in favor of the government appears at imposed a fine of P 1,500.00 on him; (5) that, despite
the back of her certificate of title and that she has such judgment and repeated demands to vacate,
not executed any deed of conveyance of any Velarma continued occupying the property, compelling
portion of her lot to the government, the appellant her to bring the suit.
remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered RTC: Ordered Velarma to vacate the property. Trial
owner, she could bring an action to recover court found that Panascola had satisfactorily
possession of the portion of land in question at established her ownership over the parcel of land in
anytime because possession is one of the question and that Velarma occupied Panascola’s land
attributes of ownership. without authority of law and against the will of the owner
 However, since restoration of possession of said through strategy and stealth. The argument of Velarma
portion by the government is neither convenient that Panascola has no cause of action against him since
nor feasible at this time because it is now and has it was already the municipality that owns the lot by virtue
been used for road purposes, the only relief of an agreement between the former owner Publio
available is for the government to make due (husband of Pansacola) to exchange the subject lot
compensation which it could and should have with an abandoned road and bridge of the Municipality
done years ago. To determine the due of Mauban (recorded in the minutes of a meeting of
compensation for the land, the basis should be Sangguniang Bayan), failed. But trial court held that
the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. Velarma’s claim was unwarranted as there was no deed
 For damages, Amigable is entitled of legal had ever been executed to perfect the deal between the
interest on the price of the land from the time it municipality and Publio therefore Panascola remained
was taken up to the time that payment is made by the owner of the property. CA affirmed.
the government.
Facts:
Velarma v Issue/Held/Ratio:
This case arose from an “ejectment suitfiled by 1. w/n Velarma’s agreement to sell the property to
Pansacola against Velarma before RTC which alleged: the government as evidenced by the minutes of a
(1) that sometime in May 1981, Velarma surreptitiously meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan, absent a
built his dwelling on a portion of her land at Barangay formal deed, constitute a sufficient ground to
Lual, Quezon (2) that the matter was reported to the defeat a forcible entry suit? NO
Barangay Captain who conducted several conferences Although Publio Pansacola signified before the
but Velarma still refused to vacate (3) that Panascola Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban his agreement to the
filed Criminal Case against Velarma in 1986 for violation transfer of that portion of his land traversed by the new
provincial highway and its shoulder in exchange for a  For the alleged failure of respondent NHA to
corresponding portion of the old abandoned provincial comply with the said order, petitioners filed a
road, there was no execution of any deed to perfect the complaintfor forfeiture of rights before RTC and
agreement. An engineer was appointed to survey the alleged that NHA had not relocated squatters
old abandoned road, but this act does not in any from the Metro Manila on the expropriated lands
manner convey title over the abandoned road to the in violation of the stated public purpose for
Pansacola spouses nor extinguish their ownership over expropriation and had not paid the just
the land. No evidence was introduced by Velarma to compensation fixed by the court.
show that the survey was actually undertaken and a  NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial
specific portion of the abandoned road partitioned and amount to herein petitioners and that the
conveyed to the Pansacolas. It must be stressed that expropriation judgment could not be executed in
the agreement to transfer the property was made in view of several issues: 1) concerning capital
1974. More than twenty years later, no actual transfer gains tax; 2) registration fees and other expenses
had yet been made. Unless and until the transfer is for the transfer of title to respondent NHA and for
consummated, or expropriation proceedings instituted attorney's fees of Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, Jr.,
by the government, Panascola continues to retain collaborating counsel for petitioners.
ownership of the land.  Ocular inspections showed that: 1) only one of
Keywords: Public benefit is now synonymous with the lots is already occupied by relocatees whose
REYES
public V CAor public benefit; Relocation site for
welfare houses are made of light materials with very few
informal settlers was converted into a low-cost housing houses partly made of hollow blocks. The
project. relocatees were relocated only in 1994; 2)most of
Facts: the area is almost occupied by houses and
structures, most of which are made of concrete
 1977, NHA filed separate complaints for the materials are not being occupied by squatters
expropriation of sugarcane lands in Dasmariñas,  TC dismissed the complaint filed and held that:
Cavite belonging to the petitioners. The stated (1) respondent NHA is not deemed to have
public purpose of the expropriation was the abandoned the public purpose for which the
expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement subject properties were expropriated because the
Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocation of squatters involves a long and
relocated from Metro Manila. TC granted the tedious process. It ruled that respondent NHA
expropriation and the payment of just actually pursued the public purpose of the
compensation. expropriation when it entered into a contract with
Arceo C. Cruz involving the construction of low
cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to synonymous with "public interest,""public
qualified low income beneficiaries; (2) there is no benefit,""public welfare," and "public
condition imposed in the expropriation judgment convenience."
that the subject properties shall revert back to its  The act of NHA in entering into a contract with a
original owners in case the purpose of real estate developer for the construction of low
expropriation is terminated or abandoned; (3) the cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to
payment of just compensation is independent of qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be
the obligation of herein petitioners to pay capital taken to mean as a deviation from the stated
gains tax; and (4) in the payment of just public purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has
compensation, the basis should be the value at it that the expropriation of private land for slum
the time the property was taken. CA affirmed. clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to
Issue/Held/Ratio: private homeowners, commercials firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other
1. w/n NHA failed to comply with the conditions and private concerns.
in effect forfeited its right to expropriate? NO  Moreover, the Constitution itself under Section 1,
 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that:
exercise of the power of eminent domain over "SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest
private properties upon payment of just priority to the enactment of measures that protect
compensation. More specifically, section 9, Article and enhance the right of all the people to human
III states that private property shall not be taken dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
for public use without just compensation. The inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
constitutional restraints are public use and just equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
compensation. Petitioners cannot insist on a the common good. To this end, the State shall
restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of require the acquisition, ownership, use and
the Constitution by contending that the contract disposition of property and its increments."
for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated  When land has been acquired for public use in
public use. It is now settled doctrine that the fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise
concept of public use is no longer limited to of eminent domain or by purchase, the former
traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea owner retains no rights in the land, and the public
that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of use may be abandoned, or the land may be
"use by the public" has been abandoned. The devoted to a different use, without any impairment
term "public use" has now been held to be
of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to  However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot
the former owner." 434 to Jimenez as PEZA was not the registered
owner of the covering TCT No. T-14772 but
Facts: Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March
ESTATE OF JIMINEZ V PEZA
Issue/Held/Ratio: 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a "Motion to
Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993.
 1981, PEZA filed an expropriation proceedings on TC annulled the said compromise agreement and
3 parcels of riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A
the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco to the petitioner. Disagreeing with the said order
de Malabon Estate, is registered in the name of PEZA movedfor its reconsideration but it was
Salud Jimenez. Jimenez contended that said lot denied.
would only be transferred to a private corporation,
Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be Issue/Held/Ratio:
utilized for a public purpose. RTC then released
Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the 1. Having upheld the rescission of the compromise
expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. agreement, what is then the status of the
PEZA then appealed to CA. expropriation proceedings? The situation of the
 Jimenez offered a compromise with PEZA parties will revert back to status before the
namely: 1) Withdrawal of PEZA’s appeal with execution of the compromise agreement, that is,
respect to Lot 1406-A in consideration of the the second stage of the expropriation
waiver of claim for damages; 2) swap of Lot 1406- proceedings, which is the determination of the
B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772 just compensation.
since PEZA has no money yet to pay for the lot. Expropriation proceedings involve 2 phases. The first
The swap arrangement recognized the fact that phase ends either with an order of expropriation (when
the lot 1406-B is considered expropriated in favor the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public
of the government based on Order of the purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or
Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However, an order of dismissal. Either order would be a final one
instead of being paid the just compensation for since if finally disposes of the case. The second phase
said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid concerns the determination of just compensation to be
with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772. PEZA ascertained by 3 commissioners. It ends with an order
approved the compromise agreement was signed fixing the amount to be paid to the dependant.
by Jadiniano. In the case at bar, the first phase was concluded
already order of expropriation became final and the
parties subsequently entered into a compromise and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to
agreement regarding the mode of payment of just expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be
compensation. When respondent failed to abide by the questioned. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the
terms of the compromise agreement trial court could incorporation of the expropriation order in the
only validly order the rescission of the compromise compromise agreement did not subject said to
agreement anent the payment of just compensation rescission but instead constituted an admission by
inasmuch as that was the subject of the compromise. Jimenez of Peza’s authority to expropriate the subject
However, on August 4, 1991, the trial court gravely parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was
abused its discretion when it ordered the return of Lot expropriated. It is crystal clear from the contents of the
1406-B. It, in effect, annulled the Order of Expropriation agreement that the parties limited the compromise
dated July 11, 1991 which was already final and agreement to matter of just compensation to petitioner.
executory. The trial court gravely abused its discretion Said expropriate order is not closely intertwined with the
by setting aside the order of expropriation which has issue of payment such that failure to pay by respondent
long become final and executory and by ordering the will also nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No
return of Lot 1406-B to the petitioner. Its action was statement to this effect was mentioned in the
clearly beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final agreement. The Order was mentioned in the agreement
and executory order. A final and executory order can only to clarify what was subject to payment.
only be annulled by petition to annual the same on the
ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdictionor a 2. w/n PEZA expropriated for Public use? YES
petition for relief from a final order or judgment under Peza has the legal authority to expropriate the subject
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public
that effect was filed. purpose. The term "public use" has acquired a more
According to Jimenez, the appellate court erred in comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the
interpreting "original demand" as the fixing of just term signifying strict use or employment by the public
compensation. Jimenez claims that the original demand has been added the broader notion of indirect public
is the return of Lot 1406-B as stated in petitioner's benefit or advantage. PEZA expropriated the subject
motion to dismissthe complaint for expropriation land for the construction of terminal facilities, structures
inasmuch as the incorporation of the expropriation order and approaches thereto. The authority is broad enough
in the compromise agreement subjected the said order to give the respondent substantial leeway in deciding for
to rescission. Since the order of expropriation was what public use the expropriated property would be
rescinded, the authority of respondent to expropriate utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, respondent
and the purpose of expropriation have again become leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the
subject to dispute. Once the first order becomes final rest was made a transportation terminal. Said public
purposes were even reaffirmed by Republic Act No. premises to the City of Manila. Filstream filed a
7916, a law amending respondent PEZA's original Motion to Dismiss the complaint for eminent
charter. domain and a motion to Quash the Writ of
Facts: Possession, which were denied by the RTC,
FILSTREAM V CA
 Filstream is the registered owner of or parcels of along with the 2 MR's subsequently filed.
land situated in A. Rivera St. in Tondo Manila. In Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
1993, Filstream filed an ejectment suit before which was denied for procedural flaws.
MTC Manila against the occupants of the said  The decision of the MTC on the ejectment case
property on the ground of termination of the lease became final and upon motion of Filstream, the
contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment MTC issued a Writ of Execution and Notice to
was rendered for Filstream on Sept 14, 1993 vacate the premises. Private respondents filed a
ordering private respondents to vacate the Motion to Recall/Quash the Writ of Execution and
premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. The Notice to Vacate alleging the existence of a
respondents appealed before the RTC and then supervening event in that the properties subject of
CA, which both affirmed the MTC decision. the dispute have already been ordered
 On May 25, 1993, while the case is still pending condemned in an expropriation proceeding in
before the MTC, the private respondents filed a favor of the City of Manila for the benefit of the
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange qualified occupants thereof, thus execution shall
against Filstream before RTC Manila. On be stayed. MTC denied the motion and upheld
November 5, 1993, the City of Manila approved the Writ and the Notice. On April 22, 1996, the
Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. trial court issued an order commanding the
Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation, demolition of the structure erected on the
expropriation, purchase, or other legal means the disputed premises, that prompted the private
properties of Filstream, among others. The said respondents to file a Petition for Certiorari and
properties were to be sold and distributed to Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land temporary restraining order and preliminary
Use Development Program of the City of Manila. injunction, which was granted. A Petition for
 On May 23, 1994, respondent City of Manila filed Certiorari was subsequently filed by City of Manila
a complaint for eminent domain to expropriate of in another RTC branch to reverse the MTC
the subject land owned by petitioner Filstream decision denying the motion to quash the writ of
before RTC Manila. Pursuant to this, the trial execution. Thereafter, the cases filed by the
court issued a Writ of Possession which ordered respondent and the City of Manila were
the transfer of possession over the disputed consolidated and an injunction was issued
against the writ of execution. These cases were be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
however dismissed by RTC upon motion of process of law, nor shall any person be denied
Filstream for violation of the SC Circular against the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1,
forum shopping. Thereafter, Filstream filed an Ex- 1987 Constitution); private property shall not be
parte Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of taken for public use without just compensation
Demolition and Ejectment, which as granted. (Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution)".
 As a consequence of the dismissal of the  The governing law that deals with the subject of
consolidated cases, private respondents filed a expropriation for purposes of urban land reform
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer and housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order Development and Housing Act of 1992) and
and preliminary injunction before the Court of Sections 9 of which specifically provide the order
Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the same of lands to be acquired for socialized housing
and directed the MTC of Manila to desist from which shows that private property is the last one
implementing the order of demolition dated that should be expropriated. Moreover, Section
January 23, 1997, unless otherwise directed. 10 the same law provides for the modes of
Thus, Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari acquisition an states that the modes include
before the Supreme COurt seeking to nullify the "community mortgage, land swapping, land
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals which assembly or consolidation, land banking,
granted herein private respondents' prayer for a donation to the Government, joint-venture
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the same agreement, negotiated purchase, and
being null and void for having been issued in expropriation. Provided, however, That
grave abuse of discretion. expropriation shall be resorted to only when other
modes of acquisition have been exhausted."
Issue/Held/Ratio:  Upon examination of the records, the court found
1. w/n the injunction issued is valid vis-a-vis w/n the that the City of Manila has not complied with
expropriation is valid? NO Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279. Filstream's
properties were expropriated and ordered
 The City of Manila has the power of eminent condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans
domain as expressly granted by the Local any showing that resort to the acquisition of other
Government Code and the Revised Charter of the lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved
City of Manila. However, this power is not futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner
unlimited. The basic rules still have to be Filstream's right to due process which must
followed, which are as follows: "no person shall accordingly be rectified.
 Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate
a paramount interest in exercising its power of possession of the property. Manosca argued that the
eminent domain for the general good considering intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
that the right of the State to expropriate private incidentally, that the act would constitute an application
property as long as it is for public use always of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
takes precedence over the interest of private or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary
property owners. However we must not lose sight to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987
of the fact that the individual rights affected by the Constitution.Manosca’s petition was denied hence this
exercise of such right are also entitled to certiorari.
protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of
this superior right cannot override the guarantee Issue/Held/Ratio:
of due process extended by the law to owners of 1. w/n “public use” requirement of Eminent Domain
the property to be expropriated. In this regard, is present in the attempted expropriation by the
vigilance over compliance with the due process Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so
requirements is in order. declared by NHI as a national historical
landmark? YES
 Eminent domain is an inherent power of

sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any
constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in
our Constitution on the subject are meant more to
regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the
power. It is a right to take or reassert dominion
over property within the state for public use or to
Keywords: Public use; historical landmark of Felix meet a public exigency.
Manalo, founder of INC  Manosca assert that the expropriation has failed
Facts: to meet the guidelines set by this Court in the
Manosca inherited a piece of land at P. Burgos Street, case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration,
Calzada, Taguig, (492 square meters) The parcel was (a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of number of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of
Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo social and economic reform.
anddeclared
MANOSCAtheV CA land to be a national historical  The purpose in setting up the marker is
landmark. Republic of Phil filed an urgent motion for the essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture

of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate
his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni
Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit
may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo than by most others could well be true but
such a peculiar advantage still remains to be
merely incidental and secondary in nature. Keywords: Public Use; it is the Municipality of
MODAY V
Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit Bunawan has the authority to expropriate not the Sang.
from the expropriation of property does not Panlalawigan
necessarily diminish the essence and character of Facts:
public use.  SB of Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing
the Mayor to expropriate a hectare of land owned
by Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers
Center and Other Government Sports Facilities."
The resolution was approved by Mayor but later
disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
commenting that there are still available lots for
the establishment of the center. Despite this, the
municipality still filed a petition for Eminent
Domain.
 RTC granted municipality's motion to take
possession of the land. The lower court held that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to
declare the resolution invalid leaves it effective. It
added that the duty of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is merely to review the ordinances
and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337, old
Local Government Code and that the exercise of
eminent domain is not one of the two acts
enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the
approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
 Municipality of Bunawan had erected three and institute condemnation proceedings for public
buildings on the subject property: the Association use or purpose.
of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal  The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of
Motorpool, both wooden structures, and the Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action
Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made which does not render said resolution null and
of concrete. void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of
 Moday sought to reverse the decision and declare B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang
Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal
Bunawan is null and void. resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is
beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or
Issue/Held/Ratio: the Mayor to issue.
1. w/n the municipality may expropriate private  The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the
property by virtue of a municipal resolution which authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No.
was disapproved by the Sangguniang 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has
Panlalawigan? YES, municipality can expropriate. the power to exercise the right of eminent domain
and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to
 Eminent domain, the power which the promulgate said resolution, pursuant to Section 9
Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that
case, is a fundamental State power that is Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and
inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's could be used as lawful authority to petition for
right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory the condemnation of petitioners' property.
sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose.
 The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise
the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is
expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, the local Government Code in force at the
time expropriation proceedings were initiated.
Section 9 of said law states: Sec. 9. Eminent
Domain. — A local government unit may, through
its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain
through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation

proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
Facts:
MUN. OF PARANAQUE V V.M. REALTY legislative branch of government, which may delegate
Municipality of Paranaque issued SB Resolution for the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and
complaint for expropriation against VM Realty Corp over public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the
two parcels of land for the purpose of alleviating the power to expropriate private property only when
living conditions of the underprivileged by providing authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s
homes for the homeless through a socialized housing control and restraints, imposed “through the law
project. It was stated purpose that petitioner declined conferring the power or in other legislations.”In this
the offer of negotiated sale by the Municipality. RTC case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs
finding the complaint for expropriation sufficient in form the power of eminent domain thus, the following
and substance granted it. essential requisites must concur before an LGU can
In 1994, respondent argued that (a) the complaint failed exercise the power of eminent domain:
to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative
to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of
RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or
cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
or res judicata. TC denied the petition and the MFR private property.
hence this appeal. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public
use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor
Issue/Held/Ratio: and the landless.
1. w/n resolution duly approved by the municipal 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required
council has the same force and effect of an under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other
ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation pertinent laws.
case of a valid cause of action? NO 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made
Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated,
municipal council for the purpose of initiating an but said offer was not accepted.
expropriation case “substantially complies with the In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to
requirements of the law” because the terms “ordinance” exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
and “resolution” are synonymous for “the purpose of resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
bestowing authority on the local government unit
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be previous case (i.e. final judgment dismissing an
authorized through an ordinance. expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the offer precludes another suit raising the same issue) it
Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from
authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is thereafter complying with this requirement, as
clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the prescribed by law, and subsequently exercising its
law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely power of eminent domain over the same property.
seeks to implement it.
DAR
7. LA: v found
NLRCthemNovember
jointly and
11, severally liable with
2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for Sultan Security Agency for the payment of the
dismissal of case is not applicable when public money claims. Since both didn't appeal, the decision
interest is primarily involved? NO became final and executory. The LA then issued a
All the requisites for the application of res judicata are writ of execution commanding the city sheriff to
present in this case. There is a previous final judgment enforce the judgment against their property.
on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving 8. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and
identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of
which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction injunction with the NLRC contending that the LA
over it. Be that as it may, the Court holds that the didn’t acquire jurisdiction over DAR thus the decision
principle of res judicata, which finds application in was null and void. Likewise, it pointed out that the
generally all cases and proceedings,cannot bar attachment or seizure of its property would hamper
the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private and jeopardize DAR’s governmental functions to the
property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an prejudice of the public good.
inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to 9. NLRC temporarily suspended the enforcement and
exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by execution of judgment to enable DAR to source and
a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it.
domain is plenary and, like police power, can “reach It also dismissed the petition for injunction.
every form of property which the State might need for 10. DAR filed a petition for certiorari claiming that
public use.” Thus, the State or its authorized agent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion for
cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by refusing to quash the writ of execution. It faults the
reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim
requirement. While the principle of res judicata does against DAR, which, it claims, falls under the
not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a More importantly, DAR asserts that NLRC has
disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of 13. But, in this case, the Department of Agriculture
the State. has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
11. On the other hand, the respondents, argue that from its being a governmental entity when it entered
DAR has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security fact, performed any act proprietary in character
Agency. 14. The claims of private respondents arising from
the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money
ISSUE: W/N DAR can be sued and be held liable claims. Act No. 3083, gives the consent of the State
HELD: YES to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving
9. Generally, the State can’t be sued without its liability arising from contract, express or implied but
consent. The State’s consent may be given the money claim first be brought to the Commission
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be on Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act No.
made through general or special law. 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability
10. The general law waiving the immunity of the state but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction
from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the
Philippine government "consents and submits to be rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as
sued upon any money claims involving liability amended by P.D. 1445.
arising from contract, express or implied, which could 15. When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in
serve as a basis of civil action between private effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to
parties." prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
11. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded 16. The universal rule that where the State gives its
when the State itself commences litigation, thus consent to be sued by private parties either by
opening itself to a counterclaimor when it enters into general or special law, it may limit the claimant's
a contract. action "only up to the completion of proceedings
12. Here, the government is deemed to have anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power
descended to the level of the other contracting party of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. since government funds and properties may not be
However, not all contracts entered into by the seized under writs or execution or garnishment to
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
distinction must still be made between one which is considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and public funds must be covered by the correspondent
another which is done in its proprietary capacity appropriation as required by law.
NATIONAL
5. These fees areAIRPORTS
said to haveCORPORATION
been due and payable vs.JOSE HELD/RATIO: Yes. CAA should have been made the
TEODORO
to the Capitol Subdivision Inc which owned the land defendant.
used by the NAC as airport, and thus the owner 1. The above provisions confer upon the CAA the
commenced an action against PAL in 1951 to power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be
recover the amount. sued is implied from the power to transact private
6. PAL countered with a third party complaint against business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued
the NAC, which at that time had been dissolved thus on its behalf, the CAA should have the power to
CAA was served with summons. The complaint prosecute and defend suits for and against the
alleged that it had paid to the NAC the fees claimed National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the
by Capitol Division. properties, funds and choses in action and assumed
7. Sol Gen: filed a MTD on the ground that the court all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the NAC’s
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the TPC because NAC creditors access to the courts of justice against the
has lots its juridical personality and because agency CAA is to say that the government could impair the
of the Phils, unincorporated and not possessing obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient
juridical personality under the law, is incapable of of converting them into unincorporated agencies.
suing and being sued. 2. Not all government entities, whether corporate or
8. E0 365, Sec 7: All records, properties, equipment, non corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from
assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities suits is determined by the character of the
and contracts of the National Airport Corporation obligations for which the entity was organized
abolished under this Order, are hereby transferred 3. Suits against state agencies with relation to matters
to, vested in, and assumed by, the Civil Aeronautics in which they have assumed to act in private or
Administration.All works, construction, and nongovernment capacity, and various suits against
improvements made by the National Airports certain corporations created by the state for public
Corporation or any agency of the National purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of
Government in or upon government airfields, the nature of ordinary business rather than functions
including all appropriations or the unreleased and of a governmental or political character, are not
unexpended balances thereof, shall likewise be regarded as suits against the state.
transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Administration. 4. The CAA comes under the category of a private
Sec 3 likewise empowers CAA to execute contracts entity. Although not a body corporate it was created,
of any kind and to grant concession rights. like the NAC, not to maintain a necessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a
ISSUE: W/N NAC/CAA may be sued business, even if revenues be not its prime objective
but rather the promotion of travel and the employees and ordered reinstatement with full back
convenience of the travelling public. pages or separation pay if reinstatement is not
5. The CAA can not, claim for itself the privileges and possible.
immunities of the sovereign state. 5. Larkin appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor
6. PAL’s third party-complaint is premised on the Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person
assumption that the NAC is still in existence, at least because no summons or copies of the complaints,
for the limited object of winding up its affairs under both original and amended, were ever served on her.
Section 77 of the Corporation Law. By its abolition Larkins argued that the attempts to serve her with
that corporation stands abolished for all purposes. notices of hearing were not in accordance with the
No trustees, assignees or receivers have been provisions of the R.P. — U.S. Military Bases
designated to make a liquidation and, what is more, Agreement of 1947.
there is nothing to liquidate. Everything the National 6. NLRC affirmed LA decision but declared that: “In the
Airports Corporation had, has been taken over by the event this decision is executed and/or enforced, and
Civil Aeronautics Administration. considering our finding that the real party respondent
7. To all legal intents and practical purposes, the is the United States Government through its Armed
National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such
Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal execution be made subject to existing international
representative, acting by the law of its creation upon agreements diplomatic protocol”
its own rights and in its own name. The better
practice then should have been to make the Civil ISSUE: W/N jurisdiction was acquired over Larkins
Aeronautics Administration the third party defendant Held: No
instead of the National Airports Corporation. The 8. The "Agreement Between the Republic of the
error, however, is purely procedural, not put in issue, Philippines and the United States of America
and may be corrected by amendment of the Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known as the
pleadings if deemed necessary. R.P. — U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the
rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by
Larkins
4. Theyv NLRC
filed aFebruary
complaint23, 1995
with the NLRC against Philippine and American nationals inside the U.S.
Cunanan, owner of JAC Maintenance, Lt. Col military bases in the country.
Frankhauser and Larkin (both members US Air 9. The Agreement mandates that summonses and
Force who were assigned to oversee the other processes issued by Philippine courts and
dormitories) for illegal dismissal and underpayment administrative agencies for United States Armed
of wages. Cunanan was dropped as defendant by Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the
LA. The Labor Arbiter granted all claims of the Philippines could be served therein only with the
permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds 13. Under the "Agreement Between the Government
giving his permission, he should instead designate of the Republic of the Philippines and the
another person to serve the process, and obtain the Government of the United States of America
server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court. Relating to the Employment of Philippine Nationals in
The labor arbiter didn’t follow the procedure and the United States Military Bases in the Philippines"
instead addressed the summons to Frankhauser and otherwise known as the Base Labor Agreement of
NOT the Base Commander. May 27, 1968, any dispute or disagreement between
10. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the United States Armed Forces and Filipino
the hearings to her. Notices of hearing are not employees should be settled under grievance or
summonses. The Labor Arbiter cannot acquire labor relations procedures established therein (Art.
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without II) or by the arbitration process provided in the
the latter being served with summons. In the Romualdez-Bosworth Memorandum of Agreement
absence of service of summons or a valid waiver dated September 5, 1985. If no agreement was
thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the reached or if the grievance procedure failed, the
Labor Arbiter are null and void. dispute was appealable by either party to a Joint
11. Although Larkins appealed to the NLRC and Labor Committee established in Article III of the
participated in the oral argument before the said Base Labor Agreement.
body, this does not constitute a waiver of the lack of 14. No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the LA over
summons and a voluntary submission of her person the case and the person of Larkins. Judgment is
to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have void.
raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in
relation to and as a result of the DALE
issue
SANDERS,
of the lackAND
of A.S.3. MOREAU,
Sanders, JR, special
vs.HON.
services
REGINO
Director,
T. VERIDIANO
and Moreau,II June 10,
jurisdiction. If an appearance1988 before the NLRC is commanding officer, disagreed with the hearing
precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said officer’s report and asked for the rejection as Mr.
agency over the person of the defendant, then this Rossi (one of the defendants) tends to alienate most
appearance is not equivalent to service of summons coworkers and supervisors and have proven to be
12. Also, NLRC admitted that the government of US difficult to supervise. Also, they were both under oath
is the real party respondent in this case. The 3 AGS not to discuss the case with anyone but they placed
where the appellees previously worked as dormitory the records in public places.
attendants is just one of the various units of the 4. Both respondents filed in the CFI for damages
United States Armed Forces inside the said military against Sanders claiming that the allegations were
base. libelous imputations that had exposed them to
ridicule and caused them mental anguish. The NAVSTA, had supervision over its personnel,
private respondents made it clear that the petitioners including the private respondents, and had a hand in
were being sued in their private/personal capacity. their employment, work assignments, discipline,
Sanders, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed
the acts complained of were performed by them in that the letter he had written (which included the
the discharge of their official duties thus the court libelous allegations) was in fact a reply to a request
had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of from his superior, the other petitioner, for more
state immunity. information regarding the case of the private
respondents.M
ISSUE: W/N court has acquired jurisdiction over 5. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was
both petitioners NO write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence
1. The mere allegation that a government functionary is with the conversion of the private respondents' type
being sued in his personal capacity will not of employment even before the grievance
automatically remove him from the protection of the proceedings had even commenced. This act is
law of public officers and the doctrine of state clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the
immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of immediate superior of Sanders and directly
official character will not suffice to insulate him from answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving
suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a the special services department of NAVSTA In fact,
personal tort committed without or in excess of his the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary
authority. problems of the department and contained
2. Baer v. Tizon: MTD shouldn’t have been denied recommendations for their solution, including the re-
because it had been sufficiently shown that the act designation of the private respondents. There was
for which he was being sued was done in his official nothing personal or private about it.
capacity on behalf of the American government. The 6. Given the official character of the above-described
United States had not given its consent to be sued. letters, the petitioners were, legally speaking, being
3. Syquia v Lopez: granted MTD a complaint against sued as officers of the United States government. As
certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown they have acted on behalf of that government, and
to be acting officially in the name of the American within the scope of their authority, it is that
government. government, and not the petitioners personally, that
4. Here, it is clear that the acts for which the petitioners is responsible for their acts.
are being called to account were performed by them 7. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved
in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as that the claimants have a right to the payment of
director of the special services department of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by
the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad
United States government as their principal. This will faith.
require that government to perform an affirmative act 11. Since the questioned acts were done in the
to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the
necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, performance of their official duties and the private
thus making the action a suit against that respondents are themselves American citizens, it
government without its consent. would seem only proper for the courts of this country
8. Festejo v. Fernando, the Court held that a bureau to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and
director could be sued for damages on a personal to treat it as coming under the internal administration
tort committed by him when he acted without or in of the said base.
excess of authority in forcibly taking private property
without paying just compensation therefor although
he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was Lagcao
1. However,
v Judge
when
Labra
they
GRtook
155746
possession of the lot, it
not necessary to secure the previous consent of the was already occupied by squatters thus petitioners
state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party instituted ejectment proceedings against the
defendant, as it was not responsible for the squatters. MTC issued demolition order.
defendant's unauthorized act. 2. When it was about to be implemented, Mayor Garcia
9. In the case at bar, the government of the United requested the deferment on the ground that the City
States has not given its consent to be sued for the was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters
official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any thus the MTCC issued orders suspending the
judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is demolition.
the American government itself that will have to 3. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension
perform the affirmative act of appropriating the period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu
amount that may be adjudged for the private City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as
respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
lack of jurisdiction. 4. Then, the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No.
10. Even under the law of public officers, the acts of 1772 which included Lot 1029 among the identified
the petitioners are protected by the presumption of sites for socialized housing.
good faith, which has not been overturned by the 5. Ordinance No. 1843 was then enacted by the SP of
private respondents. Even mistakes concededly Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to
committed by such public officers are not actionable initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition
as long as it is not shown that they were motivated of Lot 1029 to be used for the benefit of the
homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual 4. There are two legal provisions which limit the
occupants thereof. exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be
6. Petitioners then filed with the RTC then the CA after deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
it was dismissed, an action for declaration of nullity process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
of Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional as equal protection of the laws;and (2) private property
it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the shall not be taken for public use without just
purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor compensation.
contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated 5. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the
in the Constitution.They allege that it will benefit only power of eminent domain is not absolute. Section 19
a handful of people of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise
must comply with the provisions of the Constitution
ISSUE: W/N this expropriation contravenes the 6. Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or
Constitution yes piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of
1. Local government units have no inherent power of small lots to accommodate no more than a few
eminent domain and can exercise it only when tenants or squatters is certainly not the
expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of condemnation for public use contemplated by the
RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his
government units the power to expropriate. property for the convenience of a few without
Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to perceptible benefit to the public.
Section 19 of RA 7160: Eminent Domain. “A local 7. RA 7279 is the law that governs the local
government unit may, through its chief executive and expropriation of property for purposes of urban land
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof
of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or provide the priorities in the acquisition of land. It shall
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, be made in the ff order:
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the a. Those owned by the Government or any of its
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws” subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
2. Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the including government-owned or controlled
expropriation of petitioners’ lot was enacted by the corporations and their subsidiaries;
SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the b. Alienable lands of the public domain;
homeless and low-income residents of the City. c. Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
3. However, the local government units do not possess d. Those within the declared Areas or Priority
unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites,
domain in seeking solutions to this problem.
and Slum Improvement and Resettlement was P1,100.00 per sqm or a total of P8,800,000.00
Program sites which have not yet been acquired; and prayed that the trial court direct NPC to pay
e. Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and them said amount.
Services or BLISS which have not yet been 2. Court then granted issuance of a writ of possession.
acquired; and At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that
f. Privately-owned lands. the controversy would be limited to determining the
8. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate actual land area taken by NPC and the just
petitioners’ property without any attempt to first compensation to be paid by NPC. TC appointed the
acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of commissioners and they submitted their report
RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that finding that the property classified as unirrigated
the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA Riceland shall have a FMV of P500 per sqm
7279 were first exhausted (land assembly or considering that the property is situated 900 meters
consolidation, land banking, donation to the from the town proper.
Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated 3. TC appointed as commissioners, Atty. Alog, Atty.
purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, Castillo, and Ms. Regadio, to determine the fair
That expropriation shall be resorted to only when market value of the land, as well as the total area
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted) taken by NPC from respondents.
9. Prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there a. Atty. Castillo and Ms. Ragadio – the property
was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy classified as unirrigated riceland shall have a
petitioners’ property as required by Section 19 of RA fair market value of P500.00 per square meter
7160. petitioners had already obtained a favorable b. Atty. Alog submitted his report recommending
judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of that NPC pay the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles an
their property. The judgment in this ejectment case easement fee of P20,957.88 and the Spouses
had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of Chiong be paid total easement fees of
execution and an order of demolition. P9,187.05.The affected properties of the Heirs
of Agrifina Angeles were assessed by Atty.
Alog to have a fair market value of P22.50 per
National
1. In their
Power
answer,
Corporation
they pointed
v Spouses
outChiong
that NPC had square meter, while those of the Spouses
GRalready
152436entered and taken possession of a portion of Chiong were assigned a fair market value of
their realty with an area of 4,000 square meters, P15.75 per square meter.
more or less (Lot A) and wanted to occupy another 4. Court then gave due course to the report of Atty
4,000 square meters of the adjacent property (Lot B). Castillo and Ms. Ragadio.
Respondents said that the FMV for both properties
5. Dissatisfied, NPC filed a special civil action for Answer, the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles, alleged that
certiorari with the appellate court: it alleged that the petitioner had actually occupied an area of 4,000
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion square meters wherein it constructed structures for
amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction when it: its transmission lines and was seeking to occupy
(a) directed NPC to pay just compensation for the another 4,000 square meters. Petitioner failed to
land taken without first issuing an order of controvert this material allegation.
expropriation; (b) adopted the compensation 4. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the
recommended by the two commissioners without a general rule is that the just compensation to which
hearing; and (c) directed petitioner to pay the full the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the
market value of the property instead of a mere market value.
easement fee. 5. Market value is that sum of money which a person
6. CA: dismissed. NPC moved for reconsideration. desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
ISSUE: W/N full market value of the property instead of price to be given and received therefor.
easement fee should be paid 6. The rule, however, is modified where only a part of a
HELD: YES certain property is expropriated. In such a case the
1. A formal hearing or trial was not required for the owner is not restricted to compensation for the
petitioner to avail of its opportunity to object and portion actually taken. In addition to the market value
oppose the majority report. Petitioner could have of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover for
filed a motion raising all possible grounds for the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining
objecting to the findings and recommendations of the part of the property. At the same time, from the total
commissioners. It could have moved the trial court to compensation must be deducted the value of the
remand the report to the commissioners for consequential benefits
additional facts. Or it could have moved to expunge 7. In fixing the valuation at P500.00 per square meter,
the majority report, for reasons petitioner could the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court had
muster. Petitioner, however, failed to seize the considered the reports of the commissioners and the
opportunity to register its opposition. proofs which included the fair market value of
2. The fair market value of the 4,000 square meters P1,100.00 per square meter proffered by the
occupied by the petitioner was fixed by the trial court respondents.
at P500.00 per square meter. The appellate court 8. This valuation by owners of the property may not be
affirmed the said valuation. binding upon the petitioner or the court, although it
3. NPC the expropriation was not to be limited for the should at least set a ceiling price for the
purpose of easement of right-of-way. In fact, in their compensation to be awarded.
9. The trial court found that the parcels of land sought ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST
to be expropriated are agricultural land, with minimal COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM
improvements. It is the nature and character of the THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF
land at the time of its taking that is the principal THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION.
criterion to determine just compensation to the 1. the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the
landowner. Hence, the trial court accepted not the contested property was built only on October 6,
owners valuation of P1,100 per square meter but 1981, several years after the property had been
only P500 as recommended in the majority report of registered on May 13, 1976. Accordingly, prior
the commissioners. expropriation proceedings should have been filed
and just compensation paid to the owner thereof
before it could be taken for public use.
Eslaban
1. Now, vDeDeOnorio
Onoriodemanded payment for the taking of 2. the rule is that where private property is needed for
GRher146062
property but when Eslaban refused, she filed a conversion to some public use, the first thing that the
complaint against him before RTC praying for government should do is to offer to buy it.If the
compensation for the portion of her property used in owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree on
the construction of the canal. the price and the other conditions of the sale, a
2. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, voluntary transaction can then be concluded and the
filed an Answer, in which he admitted that NIA transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial
constructed an irrigation canal over the property of action. Otherwise, the government will use its power
the plaintiff and that NIA paid a certain landowner of eminent domain, subject to the payment of just
whose property had been taken for irrigation compensation, to acquire private property in order to
purposes, but petitioner interposed the defense that: devote it to public use.
the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal 3. it is the market value which should be paid or "that
was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters; sum of money which a person, desirous but not
and respondent was not entitled to compensation for compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not
the taking of her property considering that she compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be
secured title over the property by virtue of a given and received therefor."
homestead patent under C.A. No. 141. 4. just compensation means not only the correct
3. TC: ordered the National Irrigation Administration to amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also
pay de Onorio 107k as just compensation. Petitioner the payment of the land within a reasonable time
appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision from its taking. Without prompt payment,
hence this petition. compensation cannot be considered "just" for then
the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his 9. In this case, the proper valuation for the property in
land while being made to wait for a decade or more question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level
before actually receiving the amount necessary to for 1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by
cope with his loss. the commission (composed of the provincial
5. In the Ansaldo case, there are instances where the treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato)
expropriating agency takes over the property prior to constituted by the trial court to make an assessment
the expropriation suit, in which case just of the expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a
compensation shall be determined as of the time of per hectare basis.14
taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of
eminent domain.
6. It is now provided that ― SEC. 4. Order of CIRFor
1. v Central
said taxable
Luzon Drug
period, Corporation
the corporation
June 26,
reported
2006 a
expropriation. ― If the objections to and the defense net loss of 20,963 in its corporate income tax return.
against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the As a consequence, the corporation did not pay
property are overruled, or when no party appears to income tax for 1995.
defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue 2. It then claimed the amount of 219,778 should be
an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff applied as a tax credit, it filed a claim for refund in
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be the amount of 150,193. This amount represents the
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described tax credit allegedly due to the corporation under RA
in the complaint, upon the payment of just 7432.
compensation to be determined as of the date of the 3. CTA: even if the law treats the discounts granted to
taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, senior citizens as a tax credit, it cannot apply when
whichever came first. there is no tax liability or the amount of the tax credit
7. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the is greater than the tax due. In the latter case, the tax
property may be appealed by any party aggrieved credit will only be to the extent of the tax liability.
thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the Likewise, no refund can be granted because there
court from determining the just compensation to be was no tax which was erroneously or illegally
paid.After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff collected.
shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the 4. CA: the 20% discount given to senior citizens which
proceeding except on such terms as the court deems is treated as a tax credit is considered just
just and equitable. compensation and, as such, may be carried over to
8. Thus, the value of the property must be determined the next taxable period if there is no current tax
either as of the date of the taking of the property or liability.
the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."
ISSUE: Whether the 20% sales discount may be to the taxpayer, Sec. 4 of the law speaks only of a
claimed as a tax credit or as a deduction from gross tax credit, not a refund.
sales 7. The tax credit benefit granted to the establishments
1. RA 7432 provides, “the grant of twenty percent can be deemed as their just compensation for private
discount from all establishments relative ... purchase property taken by the State for public use. The
of medicines anywhere in the country: Provided, privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not
That private establishments may claim the cost as come directly from the State, but rather from the
tax credit. private establishments concerned.
2. The above provision explicitly employed the word
"tax credit." Nothing in the provision suggests for it to
mean a "deduction" from gross sales.
3. Thus, the 20% discount required by the Act to be
given to senior citizens is a tax credit, not a Panesa.v Visayas
Establish State
experimental
College offields
Agriculture
deduction from the gross sales of the establishment November
b. Construct
27, 1996 buildings laboratories and housing
concerned. facilities for the personnel of the Root Crops
4. Accordingly, when the law says that the cost of the Center; and
discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means c. integrate and conduct country-wide
that the amount -- when claimed – shall be treated researches on root crops.
as a reduction from any tax liability. 2. Respondent VISCA deposited the amount of
5. The tax credit that is contemplated under the Act is a P74,050.00 with the Philippine National Bank
form of just compensation, not a remedy for taxes representing the assessed value of the lands for
that were erroneously or illegally assessed and taxation purposes as determined under PD No. 76.
collected. In the same vein, prior payment of any tax 3. VISCA prayed in its complaint that a writ of
liability is not a precondition before a taxable entity possession be issued since P.D. No. 42 allows the
can benefit from the tax credit. The credit may be entity expropriating the land to take possession
availed of upon payment of the tax due, if any. thereof upon deposit with the PNB of the amount
Where there is no tax liability or where a private equivalent to the assessed value of the subject
establishment reports a net loss for the period, the properties.
tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the 4. Petitioners filed their answer to the complaint. They
next taxable year. alleged that (1) the lands sought to be expropriated
6. It must also be stressed that unlike in Sec. 229 of the were not within the area specified under PD No.
Tax Code wherein the remedy of refund is available 1107; (2) the amount of P74,050.00 did not
constitute just compensation; (3) P.D. No. 794
providing that the just compensation shall not be in subject properties appear clear and explicit. The
excess of the current and fair market value declared contention of the petitioners that PD 42 applies only
by the owner or administrator, or such market value to untenanted lands is not convincing for there is
as determined by the provincial assessor, which is nothing in PD 42 that indicates this.
lower, was unconstitutional; (4) P.D. No. 1107 was 8. Petitioners filed for petition of review and likewise
also unconstitutional for impairing the freedom of assailed the constitutionality of PD 1107 on the
contract and violating the equal protection clause; grounds that it impairs the freedom of contract
and (5) there was no public necessity for the guaranteed by the Constitution; it violates the equal
acquisition by VISCA of petitioners' lands. protection of law and the tenurial security guaranteed
5. 1298 tenants filed a motion to intervene alleging that by the Constitution and it runs counter to the
they were tenant-tillers and occupants of the lands agrarian laws.
involved in the expropriation proceedings, their
tenure of work as tenants being secured and ISSUE: W/N VISCA is entitled to a writ of
protected by law, they cannot be removed from their possession NO
landholdings through eminent domain. TC granted 1. The finding of the CA insofar as it found that VISCA
the intervenors’ motion to which VISCA filed its reply. has the right to a writ of possession upon compliance
It denied that they were tenants and that their with the requirements of P.D. No. 1533 in relation to
reliance to the decree was misplaced since the P.D. Nos. 1107 and 42, i.e., payment of an amount
proscription therein against the ejectment or removal equivalent to 10% of the amount of compensation for
of tenants is applicable as regards landowners, the property which is, under P.D. 42, the amount
landholders and agricultural lessors and not as equivalent to the assessed value of the subject
regards the State or those acting for and in its behalf. property for purposes of taxation, has been rendered
6. TC denied motion for the issuance of a writ of ineffectual by the ruling in Export Processing Zone
possession because expropriation was not one of Authority v. Dulay
the causes provided for in the agrarian laws. PD 42 2. P.D. No. 1533 determines the just compensation in
was only applicable to untenanted private properties expropriation cases to be the fair and current market
and that there is doubt as to whether the lands to be value declared by the owner of the property sought
expropriated were indeed within the area indicated to be expropriated or such market value as
by PD 1107 to be proper for expropriation. determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
7. CA: dismissed the expropriation case as it was Thus, the determination of just compensation, by
tainted with GAD when it denied immediate virtue of the enactment of P.D. No. 1533, was
possession of the properties. The authority of the converted from being a judicial prerogative to an
petitioner to take immediate possession of the executive decision. Because the executive
determination of just compensation in eminent formerly owned by the Manotok Realty, Inc. Juliano
domain proceedings renders the courts inutile in a is a prospective beneficiary of the Bliss Project being
matter which under the Constitution is reserved to undertaken by the National Housing Authority at the
them for final determination, SC declared P.D. No. site in question. Therefore, when the complaint in
1533 to be unconstitutional and void. this case was filed on September 13, 1982, Manotok
3. In the instant case, VISCA deposited an amount with Realty Services, Inc. was no longer the owner of the
the PNB representing the assessed value of the premises in question and as correctly contended by
lands for taxation purposes as determined under Juliano, the relation between Juliano and Belen were
P.D. No. 76. On the basis of this deposit, VISCA also deemed terminated.
prayed in its complaint that a writ of possession be 3. Belen appealed to the CA which was resolved
issued, the same being sanctioned under P.D. No. against him.
42 which allows the entity expropriating the land to 4. The Appellate Court took account of Presidential
take possession thereof upon deposit with the PNB Decree No. 1670 as the decisive factor in
of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of determining the "pivotal and decisive issue —
the subject properties for purposes of taxation. whether Manotok Realty, Inc., Belen’s lessor, has
4. In the light of the declared unconstitutionality of P.D. retained ownership of the lot in question, the
No. 76, P.D. No. 1533 and P.D. No. 42 insofar as expropriating law invoked by Juliano (PD 1670)”.
they sanction executive determination of just 5. The decision declared that by virtue of the decree,
compensation in expropriation cases, it is imperative Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased to be the owner of the
that any right to the immediate possession of the land, including the lot leased to Belen, and could not
subject property, accruing to VISCA, must be firmly interfere with the possession, administration, control
grounded on a valid compliance with Section 2 of and disposition of the NHA; its only right being to
Rule 67 – that there must be a deposit with the claim the just compensation thereof; that as a result,
National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in
subject property as provisionally and promptly question also ipso facto ended, as well as the
ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction sublease between Belen and Juliano, since a
of the proceedings. sublease can never extend beyond the duration of
the sublessor's lease of the sublessor. Belen
appealed by certiorari to the SC
Belen
1. MTC:
v CA
ordered Juliano to vacate the property. He
March
appealed11,
to the RTC. RTC reversed the judgment. ISSUE: W/N Manotok Realty was still the owner of the
2. RTC: PD No. 1670 has expropriated real property land considering it didn’t receive money as payment for
along the Estero de Sunog-Apog, Tondo, Manila the subject property yet
HELD: yes determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.

1. PD 1670 is unconstitutional for being violative of the Here, there is no mention of any market value
owners’ right to due process of law. The decrees do declared by the owner. Sections 6 of the two decrees
not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or peg just compensation at the market value
procedure by which the petitioners can question the determined by the City Assessor.
propriety of the expropriation of their properties or 7. PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance
the reasonableness of the just compensation. Having thereon and in accordance therewith must also be
failed to provide for a hearing, the Government deemed void ab initio, including particularly the
should have filed an expropriation case under Rule taking of possession of the property by the National
67 of the Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so. Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the
2. But it did not deem it necessary because the same into a housing project and the selection of the
enactment of the questioned decrees which beneficiaries thereof.
rendered, by their very passage, any questions with
regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot
and academic. In effect, the properties under the Republic
1. The lands
(DAR)
werev CA
valued by Land Bank however, in the
decrees were "automatically expropriated." October
Statement
30, 1996
of Agricultural Landholdings which ACIL
3. This becomes more evident when the NHA wrote the corporation filed with DAR, a lower Fair Value
Register of Deeds and requested her to cancel the Acceptable to Landowner was stated and that based
certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said on this statement, Land Bank valued the land
Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to uniformly.
support its request. 2. ACIL rejected the government’s offer, pointing out
4. The Court observed that contrary to Rule 67 and that nearby lands planted to the same crops were
established precedents, the decrees provided for the valued at the higher price per hectare.
determination of just compensation at a time earlier 3. ACIL then filed a Petition for Just Compensation in
than that "of the actual taking of the government or at the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. It
the time of the judgment by the court, whichever prayed that DAR be ordered to pay 24, 717.40
came first." instead of the 15, 311 which was stated on the
5. Apart from this, the fixing of the value of the property statement ACIL filed with DAR.
was left by the decrees to the City Assessor. 4. RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that ACIL
6. In P.D. No. 76, P.D. No. 464, P.D. No. 794, and P.D. should have appealed to the DAR Adjudication
No. 1533, the basis for determining just Board. ACIL moved for reconsideration but its motion
compensation was fixed at the market value was denied thus it filed a petition for certiorari with
declared by the owner or the market value the CA contending that a petition for just
compensation under RA 6657 falls under the 3. The provision of §50 must be construed in harmony
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. CA with this provision by considering cases involving the
granted his petition. It remanded the case to the RTC determination of just compensation and criminal
for further proceedings. cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657.
5. In turn, DAR filed this petition for review on certiorari. 4. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot
be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain
ISSUE: W/N in cases involving claims for just (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over
compensation under RA 6657 an appeal from the criminal cases.
decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB 5. EPZA v. Duly - the valuation of property in eminent
must first be made before a landowner can resort to domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot
RTC be vested in administrative agencies
HELD: N 6. Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer
1. §50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies —
and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and rules of procedure cannot — it is noteworthy that the
exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was
involving the implementation of agrarian reform," adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of
of the Department of Agriculture and the Department an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the
of Environment and Natural Resources. However, matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as
§57 provides: The Special Agrarian Courts shall Special Agrarian Court.
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all 7. Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the
petitions for the determination of just compensation Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal determining the value of lands placed under land
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall reform and the compensation to be paid for their
apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian taking. Through notice sent to the landowner
Courts, unless modified by this Act. pursuant to §16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes
2. Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a
Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive summary administrative proceeding is held and
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional
a. (1) "all petitions for the determination of just (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the
compensation to landowners" and case may be, depending on the value of the land,
b. (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses fixes the price to be paid for the land.
under [R.A. No. 6657]."
8. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he compensation because it formulated an opinion of its
may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special own as to the value of the land in question without
Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold
the determination of compensation cases under R.A. hearings for the reception of evidence.
No. 6657.
ISSUE: W/N the court can dispense with the
assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an
Meralco
1. But despite
v Pineda
the opposition, the court issued an order expropriation proceeding and determine for itself
Febauthorizing
13, 1992 MERALCO to take or enter upon the the just compensation
possession of the property. Private respondents then HELD: YES
filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that 1. Sec. 5 of Rules 67, ROC: Upon the entry of the order
they are entitled to be paid 40 pesos per sqm and of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more
prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum of than three competent and disinterested persons as
71k from MERALCO’s deposit account with the PNB. commissioners to ascertain and report to the court
This they did 3x and Judge Pineda then granted the the just compensation for the property sought to be
motion of withdrawal. taken.
2. The court then stressed that it will appoint 2. Sec. 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten days,
commissioners to determine just compensation or or even before the expiration of such period but after
dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a all the interested parties have filed their objections,
credible real estate broker, or the judge himself the court may, after hearing, accept the report and
would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for
own as to the value of the land in question. cause shown, it may recommit the same to the
Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he commissioners for further report of facts; or it may
must base it upon competent evidence." set aside the report and appoint new commissioners,
3. The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part;
court's act of determining and ordering the payment and it may make such order or render such judgment
of just compensation to private respondents without as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential
formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to
reasonable value of the property constitutes a the defendant just compensation for the property so
flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to taken.
due process. 3. Binan case: There are2 stages in every action of
4. It stressed that respondent court ignored the expropriation.
procedure laid down by the law in determining just
a. The first is concerned with the determination of indispensable to allow the parties to present
the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the evidence on the issue of just compensation.
power of eminent domain and the propriety of 8. Contrary to the submission of private respondents,
its exercise in the context of the facts involved the appointment of at least 3 competent persons as
in the suit. commissioners to ascertain just compensation for
b. The second phase of the eminent domain the property sought to be taken is a mandatory
action is concerned with the determination by requirement in expropriation cases.
the Court of "the just compensation for the 9. While it is true that the findings of commissioners
property sought to be taken." This is done by may be disregarded and the court may substitute its
the Court with the assistance of not more than own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so
three (3) commissioners. for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners
4. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis have applied illegal principles to the evidence
of the evidence before, and findings of, the submitted to them or where they have disregarded a
commissioners would be final, too. It would finally clear preponderance of evidence, or where the
dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the excessive
issue. 10. Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a
5. Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the substantial right that may not be done away with
valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property capriciously or for no reason at all.
declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per 11. Prior to the determination of just compensation,
hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement the property owners may rightfully demand to
on Subdivision and Housing Projects”. He arrived at withdraw from the deposit made by the condemnor in
the amount of just compensation on its own, without eminent domain proceedings. Upon an award of a
the proper reception of evidence before the Board of smaller amount by the court, the property owners are
Commissioners. Private respondents as landowners subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the
have not proved by competent evidence the value of award of a larger sum, they are entitled to a
their respective properties at a proper hearing. judgment for the amount awarded by the court.
6. Likewise, MERALCO has not been given the 12. The respondent judge's act of determining and
opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have ordering the payment of just compensation without
been presented by private respondents. the assistance of a Board of Commissioners is a
7. In an expropriation case such as this one where the flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to
principal issue is the determination of just due process and is a gross violation of the mandated
compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is rule established by the Revised Rules of Court.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. 8. June 29, 1981 - CA modified the trial court's decision
MAURA SANTOS and 43 more claimants and adopted the commissioners' report. It added 6%
G.R. No. 57524, January 08, 1986 legal rate of interest from February 7, 1969, the date of
1. 66,096 square meters of land in Parañaque and the filing of the complaint.
Muntinlupa claimed by 44 persons is being 9. Republic contends that CA erred in disregarding the
expropriated, for the widening and construction of fact that 14 out of the 44 claimants already sold their
interchanges in the Manila South Diversion Road. lots to the Republic at P40 a square meter.
2. The Appraisal Committee of Rizal fixed at P40 per
square meter. The Government deposited that amount Issue: What is the correct valuation of the expropriated
with the provincial treasurer who deposited it in the land - only P40 per square meter for the expropriated
Philippine National Bank. Some respondents, including lands.
Maura Santos, withdrew the amounts.
3. CFI Rizal granted the fiscal's motion fixing the 1. We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court
provisional value at P2,641,190. erred in relying on the commissioners' report whose
4. A writ of possession was issued to the Republic of recommendation was not substantiated by trustworthy
the Philippines. 14 claimants did not object to the evidence.
valuation of P40 a square meter. They were paid the 2. Also, the appraisal of P100 a square meter for the
amounts due to them at that price land of Alcaraz was made about eight months after the
Those sales were contemporaneous sales convincingly filing of the instant expropriation case.
indicative of the fair market value of the lands at the 3. The statement in the 1970 report of the
time of the expropriation in the later part of 1968 or early commissioners that according to the owners of adjoining
in 1969. lots the prices per square meter ranged from P150 to
6. As to those who did not settle at the price of P40 a P200 and that subdivision lots in the vicinity were being
square meter, the trial court, pursuant to section 5, Rule sold at P85 to P120 a square meter was not based on
67 of the Rules of Court, appointed three any documentary evidence. It is manifestly hearsay.
commissioners to determine the just compensation. The Moreover, those prices refer to 1970 or more than a
commissioners in their report dated October 2, 1970 year after the expropriation was effected.
recommended that the just compensation for the lands 4. In the case of Maura Santos, it should be noted that
should be P100 a square meter except the land of the expropriation undeniably increased the value of the
Maura Santos with an area of 25,909 square meters remainder of her land with an area of 121,700 square
which should be evaluated at P60 a square meter. meters. She was already paid P1,036,360 for her
7. May 13, 1972 - trial court fixed P100 a square meter expropriated land.
as the uniform price to be paid to the claimants
5. Furthermore, the commissioners should not have 4. However, the trial court dropped Sps Dela Cruz and
glossed over the undisputed fact that 14 claimants out their mortgagee, Metrobank, as parties-defendants in
of 44 had willingly sold their lands to the Government at view of the Motion to Intervene filed by
P40 a square meter as fixed by the provincial Appraisal respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed
Committee of which the provincial assessor was a ownership of the land sought to be expropriated from
member. Evidently, they were satisfied that that was a respondents spouses Dela Cruz. As to the just
reasonable price. compensation for the property of Saulog, successor-in-
6. According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not interest of the Dela Cruz spouses, the trial court ordered
bound by the commissioners' report. It may make such the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise
order or render such judgment as shall secure to the agreement.
plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right5. Meanwhile, trial court issued an Order directing the
of condemnation, and to the defendant just constitution of a Board of Commissioners with respect
compensation for the property expropriated. to the property of respondent S.K. Dynamics.
6. October 05, 1999. - commissioners recommended
that the fair market value of the real properties is
1. NAPOCOR
G.R. No. 156093,
decided
February
to acquire
2, 2007an easement of right- P10,000.00 per square meter. However, the
of-way over POWER
NATIONAL portions CORP.
of landv.SPOUSES
within the DELA
areas CRUZ,
of METROBANK,
commissioners did Dasmariñas,
not afford the
Cavite
parties the opportunity
Dasmariñas and Imus, Cavite for the construction and
Branch, to introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct
maintenance FERRER,
REYNALDO of the proposed
and S.K.Dasmariñas-Zapote
DYNAMICS MANUFACTURER
230 hearings
CORP. before them. Upon the submission of the
kV Transmission Line Project. commissioners’ report, petitioner was not notified of the
2. November 27, 1998 - petitioner filed a Complaint for completion or filing of it nor given any opportunity to file
eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of its objections to it.
right-of-way against respondents as registered owners. 7. December 28, 1999 - RTC Order fixed the just
The affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625 compensation to be paid by petitioner at PhP 10,000.00
square meters, respectively, or a total of 84.425 square per square meter. Napocor filed Motion for
meters. Reconsideration claiming it is exorbitant, unjust and
3. NAPOCOR deposited PhP 5,788.50 to cover the unreasonable. RTC denied this MR, explaining that the
provisional value of the land in accordance with Section price for 1999 must be considered, which is the time
2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Then it filed an Urgent when the writ of possession was issued.
Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of 8. CA affirmed RTC: The nature and character of the
Possession, which the trial court granted in its March 9, land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to
1999 Order, which was granted. determine just compensation to the land owner. CA
noted that since the property underwent important
changes and improvements, "the highest and most may only do so for valid reasons, that is, (1) where the
profitable use of the property is good for residential and commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
commercial purposes. evidence submitted to them, (2) where they have
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or (3)
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate
1) W the respondents were denied due process - Yes. or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the
1. The fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to commissioners is a substantial right that may not be
afford the parties the opportunity to present their own done away with capriciously or for no reason at all."
evidence should have impelled the trial court to 4. There are very specific rules for expropriation cases
disregard the commissioners’ findings. The absence of that require the strict observance of procedural and
such trial or hearing constitutes reversible error on the substantive due process because expropriation cases
part of the trial court because the parties’ (in particular, involve the admittedly painful deprivation of private
petitioner’s) right to due process was violated. property for public purposes and the disbursement of
2. Based on Rule 67 Sec. 6-8, it is clear that in addition public funds as just compensation for the private
to the ocular inspection performed by the two (2) property taken. Therefore, it is insufficient to hold that a
appointed commissioners in this case, they are also Motion for Reconsideration in an expropriation case
required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine cures the defect in due process.
just compensation; and to provide the parties the
following: (1) notice of the said hearings and the 2) W the valuation of just compensation was correct -
opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to No.
introduce evidence in their favor during the said 1. In this case, the commissioners arrived at the figure
hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue of P10, 000 in question after their ocular inspection of
their respective causes during the said hearings. the property, wherein they considered the surrounding
3. The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just structures, the property’s location and, allegedly, the
compensation for the property sought to be taken is a prices of the other, contiguous real properties in the
mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the area.
instant expropriation case, where the principal issue is 2. It is settled that just compensation is to be
the determination of just compensation, a hearing ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
before the commissioners is indispensable to allow the coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
parties to present evidence on the issue of just proceedings. Where the institution of the action
compensation. While it is true that the findings of precedes entry into the property, the just compensation
commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the
may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter complaint.
3. The commissioners’ report itself is flawed considering prior just compensation case involving a parcel of land
that its recommended just compensation was pegged adjacent to the property subject of this case.
as of October 5, 1999, or the date when the said report 5. The Court of Appeals ruled that the SAC should have
was issued, and not the just compensation as of the refrained from taking judicial notice of its own decision
date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, or as
in Civil Case No. 7171 in resolving just compensation in
of November 27, 1998. The period between the time of the present case, especially because it disregarded the
the filing of the complaint (when just compensation other factors set in RA 6657. According to the Court of
should have been determined), and the time when the Appeals, the SAC should have judiciously made an
commissioners’ report recommending the just independent finding of fact and explained the legal basis
compensation was issued (or almost one [1] year after thereof, hence the CA remanded the case to the trial
the filing of the complaint), may have distorted the court “for proper and judicious determination of just
correct amount of just compensation. compensation, appointing for that purpose a set of
commissioners.”
6. Sps allege that the remand of the case would give
G.R. No. 170422, March 07, 2008 LBP undue opportunity which it already had during the
1. 7 August
SPS. EDMOND 2001LEE- Sps
andHuang
HELEN received
HUANG a notice
v. LAND proceedings
BANK OF aTHE quo, and which opportunity it failed to
informing them that their landholdingis covered by the take advantage of. Also, it argues that R.A. No. 6657
government’s compulsory acquisition scheme pursuant does not at all require the SAC to consider all the seven
to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. factors enumerated therein in its determination of just
6657). compensation.
2. 1 June 2001 - Sps received from the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) a copy of the notice of land ISSUE: W remand of the case is proper for the
valuation and acquisition which contains an offer of determination of proper valuation - YES.
P315,307.87 as compensation for 3.195 hectares of the
property. Petitioners rejected the offer. 1. SAC’s reliance on the valuation made by the
3. DARAB conducted a summary administrative appraisal company is misplaced, since the valuation
proceeding to etermine the valuation and compensation was not arrived at using the factors required by the law
of the subject property. DARAB ordered the LBP to pay and prescribed by the AO No. 5.
petitioners the original amount offered by DAR.
4. Aggrieved, Sps filed an original petitionfor the 2. Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 which enumerates the
determination of just compensation before the Regional factors to be considered in determining just
Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan. They offered the compensation reads:
appraisal report presented in Civil Case No. 7171, a
SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In appointment of commissioners in the instant case. CA,
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition in its decision, stated:
of the land, the current value of like properties, its x x x Consequently, when the Regional Trial
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court determines
the owner, tax declarations, and the assessment made just compensation, it is mandated to apply the Rules of
by government assessors shall be considered. The Court. xxx SAC should have appointed competent
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and disinterested commissioners to assist it in
and the farmworkers and by the Government to the valuating the property in question.
property as well as the non- payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institutions on The Court of Appeals seems to imply that the
the said land shall be considered as additional factors appointment of commissioners is mandatory in
to determine its valuation. agrarian reform cases. We do not agree. While the
These factors have already been incorporated in a basic Rules of Court provisions apply to proceedings in
formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power special agrarian courts,it is clear that unlike in
under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. This formula has to expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court the
be considered by the SAC in tandem with all the factors appointment of a commissioner or commissioners is
referred to in Section 17 of the law. discretionary on the part of the court or upon the
instance of one of the parties. And when the court does
3. We find that the factors required by the law and resort to the commissioners-type of appraisal, it is not
enforced by the DAR Administrative Order were not circumscribed to appoint three commissioners, unlike
observed by the SAC when it adopted wholeheartedly the modality under Rule 67.
the valuation arrived at in the appraisal report. However,
this is not to say that the Court favors the valuation With the remand of the case, it is now up to the SAC, or
given by LBP. We find that LBP’s valuation is too low to the parties, to determine if there is a need to avail of
vis-á- vis the value suggested by the appraisal commissioners to arrive at the proper valuation of the
company. All told, we find that the remand of the case is subject land.
in order to better determine the proper valuation of the
subject property.
G.R. No. 118712, October 6, 1995 2. Private respondents are landowners whose
RELEVANT: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURTlandholdings OF APPEALS,were PEDRO
acquired L.
by YAP,
the DARHEIRS
and subjected
OF EMILIANO F.
4. We clarify,
SANTIAGO,
however, AGRICULTURAL
that we are not inMANAGEMENT
accord with & DEVELOPMENT
to transfer schemes
CORP.
to qualified beneficiaries under the
the declaration of the Court of Appeals on the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Aggrieved by the
G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995 alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F.
SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL.
respect to the valuation and payment of compensation Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority
for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used.
private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for 5. DAR/ Landbank maintain that the word "deposit" as
Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely to the
mandatory injunction. They sought to compel DAR to act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening
finally determine the just compensation of their of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting
properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable
bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", form of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9,
"reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. discretion since it merely exercised its power to
3. Private respondents argued that Administrative Order promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the
No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction declared policies of RA 6657.
and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits
the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of
depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank
designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land
before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as
provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private
respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the
Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or
"reserved" the compensation in their names as
landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking
possession of the property, the compensation must be
depositedin cash or in bonds.
4. DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate
of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial
compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the
ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175
SCRA 343).Landbank declared that the issuance of the
Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular
ISSUE/HELD: Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in

(1) W the opening of trust account is acceptable form of allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the
payment - NO. landowner as compensation for his property because,
1. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows: as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private very specific that the deposit must be made only in
Lands — "cash" or in "LBP bonds".
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the (3) W private respondents are entitled to withdraw the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the
no response from the landowner, upon the final resolution of the case -
deposit with an accessible bank designated by 1. DAR's contention is premised on the alleged
the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP distinction between the deposit of compensation under
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final
take immediate possession of the land and shall compensation as provided under Section 18 of the
request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a same law. To further bolster the contention petitioners
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of cite the following pronouncements in the case of
the Republic of the Philippines. . "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs.
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be Secretary of Agrarian Reform:"
made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere xxx The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer
does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit of possession and ownership of the land to the
can be made in any other form. If it were the intention government on receipt by the landowner of the
to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of
deposit, that should have been made express, or at the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is landowner. No outright change of ownership is
allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) contemplated either. xxx
of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the The ruling in the "Association" case merely recognized
term "deposit". the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be
undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a deviation
(2) W the DAR Administrative circular is constitutional - from the traditional mode of payment of compensation
NO. and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not,
1. DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to however, dispense with the settled rule that there must
enact rules and regulations when it issued
be full payment of just compensation before the title to 3. Mangondato demanded compensation from
the expropriated property is transferred. NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR refused to compensate
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit insisting that the property is public land and that it had
of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and already paid ‘financial assistance’ to Marawi City in
determination of just compensation under Section 18 is exchange for the rights over the property.
unacceptable. 4. More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the
To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate fact that the property belongs to Mangondato. On
the amounts already deposited in their behalf as August 14, 1990, NAPOCOR’s board passed
compensation for their properties simply because they Resolution No. 90-316 resolving that Mangondato be
rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that paid the base price of P40.00 per square meter for the
they have already been deprived of the possession and 12,132 square meter portion (P485,280.00) plus 12%
use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of interest per annum from 1978 (P698,808.00) pending
eminent domain. the determination whether P100.00 per square meter is
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between the fair market value of the property. So Mangondato
provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final was paid P1,184,088.00.
compensation under Section 18 for purposes of 5. March, 1992 - the parties executed a Deed of Sale Of
exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the A Registered Property where NAPOCOR acceded to
same. The immediate effect in both situations is the Mangondato’s request of provisional payment of
same, the landowner is deprived of the use and P100.00 per square meter excluding interest and
possession of his property for which he should be fairly without prejudice to Mangondato’s pursuance of claims
and immediately compensated. for just compensation and interest. Mangondato was
paid P1,015,412.00 in addition to the P1,184,088.00
earlier paid to him by NAPOCOR which payments total
RECKONING POINT OF MARKET VALUE OF THE P2,199,500.00 for the 12,995 square meter land.
PROPERTY = date of filing the complaint, unless 6. However, Mangondato still demanded that he be
filing came after actual taking paid P300 oer square meter because his land was
classified as industrial.
7. July 7, 1992 - Mangondato filed before the lower
G.R.
2. NAPOCOR
No. 113194. alleged
March that
11, 1996
the land was until then court Civil Case No. 605-92 against NAPOCOR seeking
possessed and
NATIONAL POWER
administered
CORPORATION
by Marawi City,
v. soCOURT
that in OFto APPEALS
recover theandpossession
MACAPANTON
of the property and the
exchange for the city’s waiver and quitclaim of any right payment of a monthly rent of P15,000.00 from 1978
over the property, NAPOCOR had paid the city a until the surrender of the property.
‘financial assistance’ of P40.00 per square meter.
8. July 27, 1992 - Napocor filed Civil Case No. 610-92 determined as of 1978, then We would be sanctioning a
which is a Complaint for eminent domain against deceptive scheme whereby NAPOCOR, for any reason
Mangondato over the subject property other than for eminent domain would occupy another’s
9. Mangondato answered that he treats the property and when later pressed for payment, first
P2,199.500.00 so far received by him as partial negotiate for a low price and then conveniently
payment for the rent for the use of his property. expropriate the property when the land owner refuses to
Mangondato prayed that he be compensated in accept its offer claiming that the taking of the property
damages for the unauthorized taking and continued for the purpose of eminent domain should be reckoned
possession of his land from 1978 until the filing of the as of the date when it started to occupy the property
Complaiant. Furthermore, he argues that should the and that the value of the property should be computed
lower court order the expropriation of the subject as of the date of the taking despite the increase in the
property, that the just compensation for the land be meantime in the value of the property.”
reckoned from the time of the filing of the expropriation
case. RATIO:
10. The lower court ordered NAPOCOR to deposit with 1. The general rule in determining “just compensation”
the Philippine National Bank the amount of in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the
P10,997,500.00, provisionally fixing the value of the date of the filing of the complaint. Normally, the time of
land at P500.00 per square meter. NAPOCOR opposed the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for
the provisional value quoted by the lower court saying expropriation. Hence, many rulings of this Court have
that the basis of the provisional value of the land should equated just compensation with the value of the
be the assessed value of the property as of the time of property as of the time of filing of the complaint
the taking which in this case is 1978. consistent with the above provision of the Rules. So too,
where the institution of the action precedes entry into
ISSUE: What is the correct basis for the valuation of just the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained
compensation: (1) 1992 or at the time of filing of as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
complaint for eminent domain, or (2) 1978 or at the time 2. The general rule, however, admits of an exception:
of taking. where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the
date it was taken and not at the date of the
HELD: Here, SC followed the general rule (filing commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The
complaint), because only in 1992 did petitioner manifest exception finds application where the owner would be
its intention to exercise the power of eminent domain. given undue incremental advantages arising from the
SC affirmed the CA when the latter held that: “If We use to which the government devotes the property
decree that the fair market value of the land be
expropriated -as for instance, the extension of a main intent nor the expropriation contemplated by law. This is
thoroughfare. a simple attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale.
3. Side Issue: Where is there "taking" of property? Obviously, the petitioner neglected and/or refused to
This Court has defined the elements of “taking” as the exercise the power of eminent domain.
main ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to
domain in Republic v. Castelvi: recover possession and petitioner filed its Complaint to
“A number of circumstances must be present in the expropriate, did petitioner manifest its intention to
‘taking’ of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) exercise the power of eminent domain.
the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the
entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should G.R.
1. Clarita
No. 146062,
Vda. de June
Enorio
28, 2001
is the owner of a lot in
be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the Barangay M. Roxas,
SANTIAGO ESLABAN,
Sto. Niño,
JR. South
v. CLARITA
Cotabato. VDA. DE
property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise 2. October 6, 1981 - Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the
the utilization of the property for public use must be in main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting
such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all a 24,660 square meter portion thereof.
beneficial enjoyment of the property.” 3. 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed
Here, in this case, the petitioner’s entrance in 1978 was between respondent and the NIA. The NIA then paid
without intent to expropriate or was not made under respondent the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way
warrant or color of legal authority,for it believed the damages. Respondent subsequently executed an
property was public land covered by Proclamation No. Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she
1354. When the private respondent raised his claim of waived any compensation for damages to crops and
ownership sometime in 1979, the petitioner flatly improvements which she suffered as a result of the
refused the claim for compensation, nakedly insisted construction of a right-of-way on her property
that the property was public land and wrongly justified 4.The same year, petitioner offered respondent the sum
its possession by alleging it had already paid “financial of P35,000.00 by way of amicable settlement.
assistance” to Marawi City in exchange for the rights 5. Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her
over the property. Only in 1990, after more than a property, but petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly,
decade of beneficial use, did the petitioner recognize respondent filed on December 10, 1990 a complaint
private respondent’s ownership and negotiate for the against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court,
voluntary purchase of the property. A Deed of Sale with praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of
provisional payment and subject to negotiations for the P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her
correct price was then executed. learly, this is not the
property used in the construction of the canal taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
constructed by the NI whichever came first.
2. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the
WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST property may be appealed by any party aggrieved
COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the
THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF court from determining the just compensation to be
THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION - TAKING! paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not
1. There are instances where the expropriating agency be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding
takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in except on such terms as the court deems just and
which case just compensation shall be determined as of equitable.
the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the 3. Thus, the value of the property must be determined
action of eminent domain. either as of the date of the taking of the property or
Before its amendment in 1997, Rule 67, §4 provided: the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."
Order of condemnation. When such a motion is 4. Even before the new rule, however, it was already
overruled or when any party fails to defend as required held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgosthat
by this rule, the court may enter an order of the price of the land at the time of taking, not its value
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful after the passage of time, represents the true value to
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint the Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation
upon the payment of just compensation to be to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the
determined as of the date of the filing of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its
complaint. . . . taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was
It is now provided that ― allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and
SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. ― If the objections to it was respondent who filed the complaint.
and the defense against the right of the plaintiff to 5. Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by
expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party many factors. It may be enhanced on account of its
appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court taking for public use, just as it may depreciate. As
may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the observed in Republic v. Lara:
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the
be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be
in the complaint, upon the payment of just enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken;
compensation to be determined as of the date of the the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have
depreciated its value thereby; or there may have been a 3. July 10, 1990 - the court fixed the provisional value of
natural increase in the value of the property from the the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of
time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to 63,220square meters of respondents' property, to be
general economic conditions. The owner of private deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.
property should be compensated only for what he Petitioner deposited the amount on August 29, 1990.
actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation 4. September 5, 1990 - trial court issued a writ of
shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he possession in favor of petitioner, and, on September 11,
loses is only the actual value of his property at the time 1990, the court's deputy sheriff placed petitioner in
it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be possession of the subject land
paid can be truly just, i.e., "just" not only to the 5. April 5, 1991 - the trial court issued an order
individual whose property is taken, "but to the public, appointing three (3) commissioners to aid the court in
which is to pay for it" . . . . the reception of evidence to determine just
In this case, the proper valuation for the property in compensation for the taking of the subject property.
question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for 6. May 19, 1993 - the trial court rendered judgment
1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by the fixing the amount of just compensation to be paid by
commission (composed of the provincial treasurer, petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220
assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by square meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal
the trial court to make an assessment of the interest thereon computed from September 11, 1990,
expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per when petitioner was placed in possession of the land,
hectare basis. plus attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the
proceedings. Petitioner then appealed to CA, which
G.R.
1. March
No. 129998,
21, 1990December
- NPC originally
29, 1998
instituted with RTC affirmed the RTC.
for eminent domain,
NATIONAL POWER laterCORPORATION
amended on October
v. LOURDES
11,
1990, for the taking for public use of five (5) parcels of ISSUE: W the valuation of the commissioners is correct
land, owned or claimed by respondents, with a total - No, because they based the valuation on adjacent
aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the residential lots.
expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station. 1. The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are
2. Respondents are the registered owners/claimants of undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land,
the five (5) parcels of land sought to be expropriated, bereft of any improvement. Except for the Henson
situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga. family, all the other respondents were admittedly farmer
Petitioner needed the entire area of the five (5) parcels beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the
of land, comprising an aggregate area of 58,311 square Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has
meters, for the expansion of its Mexico Subdivision. been re-classified as residential. The nature and
character of the land at the time of its taking is the property will bring if exposed for sale in the public
principal criterion to determine just compensation market.
to the landowner.
2. In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals In computing just compensation for expropriation
fixed the value of the land at P400.00 per square meter, proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the
which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent fully taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint not at
developed subdivision, the Santo Domingo Village the time of the rendition of judgment which should be
Subdivision. The land in question, however, was an taken into consideration. 4 Section 4, Rule 67 of the
undeveloped, idle land, principally agricultural in 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure provides that
character, though re-classified as residential. justcompensation is to be determined as ofthe date of
3. Unfortunately, the trial court, after creating a board of the taking or the filing of the complaint whichever came
commissioners to help it determine the market value of first. On this matter, the appellate court is correct in
the land did not conduct a hearing on the report of the disregarding petitioner's claim.
commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market
value of subject land in an amount equal to the value of
lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision. This CITY
DAVIDE, OFJR.,CEBU
C .J: vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA
finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was DEDAMO
FACTS: On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of
even higher than the recommendation of anyone of the Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against
commissioners. respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo.
The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land for
a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public
REPUBLIC v KER CO. [GR No. 136171 (July 2, 2002)] road which shall serve as an access/relief road of
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ker Company was Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum
given a decision for fair just compensation. Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel
Roads in Cebu City. The lower court fixed the amount
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the valuation for of just compensation at P20,826,339.50.
the lot Sites are excessive and unreasonable. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in
Justcompensation cannot be measured by the fixing the amount of just compensation at
assessed value of the property as stated in the P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be
tax declaration and schedule of market values. For the based on the prevailing market price of the property at
purpose of appraisal, the fair market value of the the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
property is taken into account and such value refers
to the highest price in terms of money which a
The petitioner did not convince the Court of instituted expropriation proceedings for its
Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision in acquisition.
toto.  She wrote respondent (then Surigao City Mayor)
Salvador Sering a letter proposing an amicable
ISSUE: Whether or not just compensation should be settlement for the payment of the portion taken
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. over by the city. They subsequently met with
Mayor Sering to discuss their proposal but the
HELD: NO. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to mayor rebuffed them in public and refused to pay
the point of reckoning for the determination of just them anything.
compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which  A second letter was sent to sought the Mayor’s
expressly provides that just compensation shall be reconsideration but they were again turned down.
determined as of the time of actual taking.  respondents admitted the existence of the road in
question but alleged that it was constructed way
The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National back in the 1960s during the administration of
Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not former Mayor Pedro Espina. At that time, the lot
categorically rule in that case that just compensation was owned by the spouses Vicente and Josefa
should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. Fernandez who signed a road right-of-way
We explicitly stated therein that although the general agreement in favor of the municipal government.
rule in determining just compensation in eminent However, a copy of the agreement could no
domain is the value of the property as of the date of the longer be found because the records were
filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: completely destroyed and lost when the Office of
where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the the City Engineer was demolished by typhoon
date it was taken and not at the date of the Nitang in 1994.
commencement of the expropriation proceedings."  RTC ordered the City to pay spouses
Nepomuceno the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s
fees, and the further sum of P3,260.00 as
 Maria Paz v Nepomuceno
NEPOMUCENO CITY OF SURIGAO [GR No. 146091
filed a complaint to (July 28,
compensation for the portion of land in dispute,
recover a 652 sq. m. portion of her 50,000 sq. m. with legal interest thereon from 1960 until fully
lot which was occupied, developed and used as a paid, and upon payment, directing her to execute
city road by the city government of Surigao. Maria the corresponding deed of conveyance in favor of
Paz alleged that the city government neither the said City.
asked her permission to use the land nor o The claims for moral and exemplary
damages are denied for lack of basis
 CA modified the RTC decision and held that As pointed out in Republic v. Lara, the reason for this
petitioners were entitled to P30,000 as moral rule is:
damages for having been rebuffed by Mayor The owner of private property should be compensated
Sering in the presence of other people. It also only for what he actually loses; it is not intended
awarded petitioners P20,000 as attorney’s fees that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss
and litigation expenses considering that they were or injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of
forced to litigate to protect their rights and had to his property at the time it is taken. This is the only
travel to Surigao City from their residence in way the compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e.,
Ormoc City to prosecute their claim. The CA "just" not only to the individual whose property is taken,
affirmed the decision of the trial court in all other "but to the public, which is to pay for it."
respects. Thus, the value of petitioners’ property must be
 SPOUSES NEPOMUCENO claim that, in fixing ascertained as of 1960 when it was actually taken. It is
the value of their property, justice and equity as of that time that the real measure of their loss may
demand that the value at the time of actual fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall earn
payment should be the basis, not the value at the interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected,
time of the taking as the RTC and CA held. They conformably with other principles laid down by case law.
demandP200/sq. m. or a total sum of P130,400 Article 1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case
plus legal interest. of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of the
currency at the time of the establishment of the
ISSUE: obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no
WON, as alleged by spouses Nepomuceno, it is the agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict
amount at time of payment which should be the basis. application only to contractual obligations. In other
words, a contractual agreement is needed for the
HELD/RATIO: effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that to alter the value of the currency.
where actual taking is made without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings and the owner NATIONAL
seeks POWER CORPORATION v ANGAS [GR. Nos. 60225-26 (May 8,
recovery of the possession of the property prior to the FACTS:
filing of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the  On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974,
property at the time of taking that is controlling for petitioner National Power Corporation, a
purposes of compensation. government-owned and controlled corporation
and the agency through which the government
undertakes the on-going infrastructure and
development projects throughout the country, money as adjudged in the joint decision dated
filed two complaints for eminent domain against June 15, 1979.
private respondents with the Court of First  Petitioner complied with said order and deposited
Instance. the sums of money with interest computed at 6%
 Both cases were jointly tried upon agreement of per annum.
the parties. On June 15, 1979, a consolidated  February 10, 1981, one of the private
decision in Civil Cases Nos. 2248 and 2277 was respondents [Pangonatan Cosna Tagol], through
rendered by the lower court, declaring and counsel, filed with the trial court an ex-
confirming that the lots mentioned and described parte motion in Civil Case No. 2248 praying, for
in the complaints have entirely been lawfully the first time, that the legal interest on the just
condemned and expropriated by the petitioner, compensation awarded to her by the court be
and ordering the latter to pay the private computed at 12% per annum as allegedly
respondents certain sums of money as just "authorized under and by virtue of Circular
compensation for their lands expropriated "with No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to
legal interest thereon until fully paid." Two PD 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court
consecutive motions for reconsideration of the that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the
said consolidated decision were filed by the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall
petitioner. The same were denied by the be computed at 12% per annum."
respondent court.  February 11, 1981, the lower court granted the
 Petitioner did not appeal the aforesaid said motion allowing 12% interest per annum.
consolidated decision, which became final and  Subsequently, the other private respondents filed
executory. motions also praying that the legal interest on the
 May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents just compensation awarded to them be computed
[Sittie Sohra Batara] filed an ex-parte motion for at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the
the execution of the June 15, 1979 decision, lower court issued on March 10, 1981 and August
praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the 28, 1981 orders bearing similar import.
unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the lands  NPC moved for a reconsideration of the lower
expropriated from her, including legal interest court's last order dated August 28, 1981, alleging
which she computed at 6% per annum. The that the main decision had already become
said motion was granted by the lower court. final and executory with its compliance of
Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner depositing the sums of money as just
to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of compensation for the lands condemned, with
legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said
main decision can no longer be modified or the term "judgments" in the said circular, claiming that
changed by the lower court; and that PD 116 is such term refers to any judgment directing the payment
not applicable to this case because it is Art. of legal interest, which term includes the questioned
2209 of the Civil Code which applies. judgment of the lower court in the case at bar.
 January 25, 1982, the lower court denied
petitioner's, motion for reconsideration. The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury
Law, as well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416, should
ISSUE: be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or
WON in the computation of the legal rate of interest on forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the
just compensation for expropriated lands, the law principle of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, where
applicable is Central Bank Circular No. 416 which general terms follow the designation of particular things
fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum. or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will
be construed to comprehend those things or persons of
HELD/RATIO: the same class or of the same nature as those
NO. specifically enumerated.
Central Bank Circular No. 416 reads: The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give
By virtue of the authority granted to it under effect to both the particular and general words, by
Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended, treating the particular words as indicating the class and
otherwise known as the "Usury Law," the the general words as including all that is embraced in
Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated said class, although not specifically named by the
July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of particular words.
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or credits and the rate allowed in Applying the said rule on statutory construction to
judgments, in the absence of express contract as Central Bank Circular No. 416, the general term
to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent "judgments" can refer only to judgments in cases
(12%) per annum. involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the Central
Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of Obviously, therefore, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and
money, goods or credits. his has already been settled in not Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable
several cases decided by this Court. Private to the case at bar. Said law reads:
respondents, however, take exception to the inclusion of
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment situated in the Sitios of Ablang, Saguingan and
of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay, Pinamunghilan, Barrio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva
the indemnity for damages, there being no Ecija.
stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of  In line with the CARP of the government, Wycoco
the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of voluntarily offered to sell the land to the
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9
percent per annum. million.
 After the DAR’s evaluation of the application and
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions the determination of the just compensation by the
requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in Land Bank of the Philippines, a notice of intention
connection with any delay in the performance of the to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property for
obligation arising therefrom other than those covering P1,342,667.46 was sent to Wycoco ( modified to
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. P2,280,159.82).
 The area which the DAR offered to acquire
In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not excluded idle lands, river and road located
a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the
expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public DAR to indorse the case to the Department of
purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for
regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a
court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The summary administrative proceeding.
legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just  Pending litigation, DARAB requested Land Bank
compensation for the properties expropriated is to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco
manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the and deposited the compensation offered by DAR.
delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind In the meantime, the property was distributed to
of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower farmer-beneficiaries.
court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by  Wycoco decided to forego with the filing of the
way of damages, and not by way of earnings from required pleadings, and instead filed on April 13,
loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply. 1993, the instant case for determination of just
compensation with the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City.
WYCOCO v CASPILLO [GR No. 146733 (January 13, 2004)]
FACTS:  The trial court rendered a decision in favor of
 Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present
hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice land evidence in support of the land valuation
inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the compensation estopped them from questioning
prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold the jurisdiction of the special agrarian court. The
in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to pre-trial order limited the issues to those not
150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took disposed of by admission or agreements; and the
judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation entry thereof controlled the subsequent course of
for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at action.
P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of
P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual Besides, the issue of whether Wycoco violated
damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest. the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
was rendered moot and academic in view of the
ISSUES: DARAB’s dismissal of the administrative case to
(1) WON the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court, give way to and in recognition of the court’s
validly acquired jurisdiction over the instant case for power to determine just compensation.
determination of just compensation.
(2) Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, WON the 2. NO.
compensation arrived at is supported by evidence. In arriving at the valuation of Wycoco’s land, the
(3) WON Wycoco can compel the DAR to purchase the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged
entire land subject of the voluntary offer to sell. prevailing market value of agricultural lands in
(4) WON the awards of interest and damages for Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of
unrealized profits is valid. its intention to take judicial notice thereof.
HELD/RATIO: Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of

1. YES. Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the
The trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over trial court should have allowed the parties to
Wycoco’s complaint for determination of just present evidence thereon instead of practically
compensation. It must be stressed that although assuming a valuation without basis. While market
no summary administrative proceeding was held value may be one of the bases of determining just
before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily
legal mandate of initially determining the value of arrived at without considering the factors to be
Wycoco’s land pursuant to Executive Order No. appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of
405, Series of 1990. What is more, DAR and the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the
LBP’s conformity to the pre-trial order which current value of like properties, its size, shape,
limited the issue only to the determination of just location, as well as the tax declarations thereon.
Since these factors were not considered, a where there was prompt and valid payment of just
remand of the case for determination of just compensation. Conversely, where there was
compensation is necessary. The power to take delay in tendering a valid payment of just
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with compensation, imposition of interest is in order.
caution especially where the case involves a vast This is because the replacement of the trust
tract of land. Care must be taken that the account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso
requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable facto cure the lack of compensation; for
doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved essentially, the determination of this
in the negative. compensation was marred by lack of due
process.
3. NO.
The DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the Accordingly, the just compensation due Wycoco
entire property voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The should bear 12% interest per annum from the
power to determine whether a parcel of land may time LBP opened a trust account in his name up
come within the coverage of the Comprehensive to the time said account was actually converted
Agrarian Reform Program is essentially lodged into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts. The
with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages basis of the 12% interest would be the just
by the DAR’s non-acquisition of the approximately compensation that would be determined by the
10 hectare portion of the entire land which was Special Agrarian Court upon remand of the
found to be not suitable for agriculture is no instant case. In the same vein, the amount
justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole determined by the Special Agrarian Court would
area. also be the basis of the interest income on the
cash and bond deposits due Wycoco from the
4. PARTLY MERITOUS time of the taking of the property up to the time of
In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed actual payment of just compensation.
an interest of 12% per annum on the just
compensation due the landowner. It must be The award of actual damages for unrealized
stressed, however, that in these cases, the profits should be deleted. The amount of loss
imposition of interest was in the nature of must not only be capable of proof, but must be
damages for delay in payment which in effect proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. The
makes the obligation on the part of the claim must be premised upon competent proof or
government one of forbearance. It follows that the upon the best evidence obtainable, such as
interest in the form of damages cannot be applied receipts or other documentary proof. None having
been presented in the instant case, the claim for B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was included and received partial
unrealized profits cannot be granted. payment. Seven of the eight houses of the Knechts
were demolished and the government took possession
of the portion of land on which the houses stood. Since
DE KNECHTinstant
Facts: The v CAcase[GR isNo.an108015
unending
(Maysequel
20, to the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining
several suits commenced almost twenty years ago house, Salem filed a case against them for unlawful
involving a parcel of land located at the corner of the detainer. As defense, the Knechts claimed ownership of
south end of EDSA and F.B. Harrison in Pasay City. the land and building. The Municipal Trial Court
The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht however ordered the Knechts' ejectment thus their
and her son, Rene Knecht. On the land, the Knechts residence was demolished.
constructed eight houses, leased out the seven and
occupied one of them as their residence. In 1979, the The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of the
government filed for the expropriation of Knechts’ property and allege that they must be given just
property. The government wanted to use the land for compensation.
the completion of the Manila Flood Control and
Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA ISSUE: Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners
towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City Treasurer of the land at subject.
of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay
real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. As HELD: The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were
a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer not the ownersanymore of the said land. The Knechts'
sold the property at public auction for the same amount right to the land had been foreclosed after they failed to
of their deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were redeem it one year after the sale at public auction.
respondent Spouses Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the Since the petitions questioning the order of dismissal
Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro were likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals and
and Flor Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Subsequently, this Court, theorder of dismissal became final and res
Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent judicata on the issue of ownership of the land.
Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17, 1983, Petitioners contended that they did not receive notice of
the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 their tax delinquency. Neither did they receive notice
authorizing the national government to expropriate of the auction sale. However, this question has been
certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. previously raised in the cases which have been already
The property of the Knechts was part of those set aside. The court is not a trier of facts. Res judicata
expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. The government gave has already set it. The Knechts therefore are not the
out just compensation for the lands expropriated under lawful owners of the land and are not any longer
accountable for just compensation given by the expropriating a tract of land of an area of about
government. 1,100,463 square meters, commonly known as
the site of Camp Tomas Claudio. Said land is
Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an located in the municipality of Parañaque,
action. It is a rule that precludes parties from relitigating Province of Rizal, and lies along the water front of
Issue actually litigated and determined by a prior and Manila Bay, a few miles south of the city of
final judgment. It pervades every well-regulated system Manila. It is stated in communication of the
of jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds Governor-General that the property in question is
embodied in various maxims of the common law — one, desired by the Government of the Philippine
public policy and necessity, that there should be a limit Islands for military and aviation purposes.
to litigation; and another, the individual should not be  Numerous persons are named in the complaint as
vexed twice for the same cause. When a right of fact defendants because of their supposed ownership
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of of portions of the property intended to be
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial expropriated. In the list of persons thus impleaded
has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it appear the names of the three petitioners herein,
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the namely, the Visayan Refining Co., Dean C.
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. To Worcester, and Fred A. Leas, who are severally
follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public owners of different portions of the property in
peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals question.
and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition of  Visayan Refining, Worcester and Leas nterposed
the parties to the preservation of the public tranquility. a demurrer, questioning the validity of the
proceedings on the ground that there is no Act of
Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or the Philippine Legislature authorizing the exercise
order is final; (2) the judgment or order is one on the of the power of eminent domain to acquire land
merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction for military or aviation purposes.
over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there is  Contemporaneously with the filing of their
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, demurrer, the same parties moved the Court of
of subject matter and of cause of action. First Instance to revoke its order of September
15, giving the plaintiff provisional possession.
This motion is based substantially on the same
 Sept.REFINING
VISAYAN 13, 1919: vthe
CAMUS [GR No. L-15870
Governor-General directed( December 3,
ground as the demurrer, that is, the lack of
1919)]the Attorney-General to cause condemnation legislative authority for the proposed
proceedings to be begun for the purpose of expropriation, but it contains one additional
allegation to the effect that the deposit in of the land, upon such deposit being made, by the
court of the sum of P600,000, had been made proper orders and a mandate, if necessary.
without authority of law.
SEC. 3. . . . Upon the payment by the plaintiff to
ISSUE: the defendants of the compensation awarded by
WON title has passed to the Government. the sentence, or after the tender of said sum to
the defendants, and the payment of the costs, or
HELD/RATIO: in case the court orders the price to be paid into
The provisions which deal with the giving of immediate court, the plaintiff shall be entitled to appropriate
possession when the Government of the Philippine the land so condemned to the public use
Islands is the plaintiff are found in Act No. 2826, which specified in the sentence. In case payment is
is in part as follows: made to the court, the clerk of the same shall be
liable on his bond for the sum so paid and shall
SEC. 2. When condemnation proceedings are be obliged to receive the same.
instituted by or in favor of the Insular Government
. . . in any competent court of the Philippines, the In connection with the foregoing provisions found in
plaintiff shall be entitled to enter immediately laws enact under the American regime is to be
upon the land covered by such proceedings, after considered the following provision of the Civil Code:
depositing with the provincial treasurer the value
of said land in cash, as previously and promptly ART. 349. No one may be deprived of his
determined and fixed by the competent court, property unless it be by competent authority for
which money the provincial treasurer shall retain some purpose of proven public utility and after
subject to the order and final decision of the payment of the proper compensation.
court: Provided, however, That the court may Unless this requisite has been complied with, it
permit that in lieu of cash, there may be deposited shall be the duty of the court to protect the owner
with the provincial treasurer a certificate of of such property in its possession or to restore its
deposit of any depository of the Government of possession to him, as the case may be.
the Philippine Islands, payable to the provincial
treasurer on sight, for the sum ordered deposited Taken together the laws mentioned supply a very
by the court. The certificate and the sums complete scheme of judicial expropriation, deducing the
represented by it shall be subject to the order and authority from its ultimate source in sovereignty,
final decision of the court, and the court shall providing in detail for the manner of its exercise, and
have authority to place said plaintiff in possession
making the right of the expropriator finally dependent finally made dependent absolutely upon the payment of
upon payment of the amount awarded by the court. compensation by him. (Sec. 3, Act No. 2826; sec. 247,
Code Civ. Proc.).
While we bear in mind the cardinal fact that just
compensation must be made, the further fact must REPUBLIC
not FACTS:
v SALEM INVESTMENT CORP. [GR No. 137569 (June 23,
be overlooked that there is no organic or constitutional  BP 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation
provision in force in these lands Islands requiring that of parcels of lands in the names of defendants in
compensation shall actually be paid prior to the this case, including a portion of the land,
judgment of condemnation. consisting of 1,380 square meters, belonging to
Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the  Five years thereafter, Milagros and Inocentes De
preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be la Rama entered into a contract with intervenor
apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in Alfredo Guerrero whereby the De la Ramas
this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute assurance agreed to sell to Guerrero the entire property.
that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken  Guerrero file with the RTC of Pasay a complaint
from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. It is for specific performance against De la Rama.
true that in rare instances the proceedings may be  While this case for specific performance was
voluntarily abandoned before the expropriation is pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed the
complete or the proceedings may fail because the present case for expropriation pursuant to BP
expropriator becomes insolvent, in either of which cases 340. Among the defendants named in the
the owner retains the property; and if possession has complaint were Milagros and Inocentes De la
been prematurely obtained by the plaintiff in the Rama as registered owners of Lot 834, a portion
proceedings, it must be restored. It will be noted that of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the expropriated
the title does not actually pass to the expropriator property. Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00
until a certified copy of the record of the judgment representing 10 percent of the approximate
is recorded in the office of the register of deeds market value of the subject lands, a writ of
(sec. 251, Code Civ. Proc.). Before this stage of the possession was issued on August 29, 1990 in
proceedings is reached the compensation is favor of the government.
supposed to have been paid; and the court is  As already stated, the De la Ramas and Guerrero
plainly directed to make such final order and entered into a contract to sell with respect to Lot
judgment as shall secure to the defendant just 834. This lot has an area of 4,075 square meters.
compensation for the land taken. (Sec. 246, Code This contract was executed on December 14,
Civ. Proc.). Furthermore, the right of the expropriator is 1988, after B.P. Blg. 340 was passed
authorizing the expropriation of a portion of the expropriated property and ordered payment to
land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, of the De him of just compensation for the taking of the
la Ramas. The only issue in this case is who, land.
between the De la Ramas and Guerrero, is/are
entitled to receive payment of just ISSUE: WON Guerrero is entitled to receive just
compensation for the taking of 920 square compensation.
meters of the land in question?
o The De la Ramas claim that they should HELD/RATIO:
receive the amount of just compensation YES.
because when they agreed to sell Lot 834 Expropriation may be initiated by court action or by
in 1988 to Guerrero, it did not include the legislation.[25] In both instances, just compensation is
portion expropriated by the Republic since, determined by the courts.
at that time, such portion had been
expropriated by the government by virtue of The expropriation of lands consists of two stages. As
B.P. Blg. 340, which took effect on explained in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia:
February 17, 1983. The first is concerned with the
o On the other hand, Alfredo Guerrero determination of the authority of the plaintiff
argues that the title to the expropriated to exercise the power of eminent domain
portion of Lot 834 did not immediately pass and the propriety of its exercise in the
to the government upon the enactment of context of the facts involved in the suit. It
B.P. Blg. 340 in 1983, as payment of just ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the
compensation was yet to be made before action, "of condemnation declaring that the
ownership of the land was transferred to plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
the government. As a result, petitioners still property sought to be condemned, for the
owned the entire Lot 834 at the time they public use or purpose described in the
agreed to sell it to Guerrero. Therefore, complaint, upon the payment of just
since Guerrero obtained ownership of Lot compensation to be determined as of the
834, including the 920 square meters date of the filing of the complaint". . . .
expropriated by the government, he has the The second phase of the eminent domain
right to receive the just compensation over action is concerned with the determination
the said property. by the court of "the just compensation for
 Pasay City RTC, Br. 111, declared Guerrero the the property sought to be taken." This is
rightful owner of the 920-square meter
done by the court with the assistance of not including the expropriated area, which was then owned
more than three (3) commissioners. . . . by the De la Ramas.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that It is true that the contract to sell did not convey to
expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, Guerrero the subject parcel of land described therein.
it is only upon payment of just compensation that title However, it created an obligation on the part of the De
over the property passes to the government. Therefore, la Ramas to convey the land, subject to the fulfillment of
until the action for expropriation has been completed the suspensive conditions therein stated. The
and terminated, ownership over the property being declaration of this contract’s validity, which paved the
expropriated remains with the registered owner. way for the subsequent execution of the Deed of
Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights Absolute Sale on March 8, 1994, following the order of
pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of the Regional Trial Court for its execution, by the Clerk of
his property, subject to the power of the State ultimately Court, Branch 113, Pasay City, effectively conveyed
to acquire it through expropriation. ownership of said parcel of land to Guerrero.
In the case at hand, the first stage of expropriation

was completed when B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted CITY OF MANILA v ROXAS [GR No. L-39671 (June 29,
FACTS:
providing for the expropriation of 1,380 square meters of  The City of Manila appeals from the orders of the
the land in question. The constitutionality of this law was Court of First Instance of Manila awarding to two
upheld in the case of Republic v. De Knecht. In 1990, private property owners whose lands were taken
the government commenced the second stage of by expropriation proceedings, an allowance for
expropriation through the filing of a petition for the the taxes paid to the City of Manila under protest,
determination of just compensation. This stage was covering a period of time between the
not completed, however, because of the intervention dispossession of the owners and the taking of title
of Guerrero which gave rise to the question of by the city.
ownership of the subject land. Therefore, the title to the
expropriated property of the De la Ramas remained with ISSUE:
them and did not at that point pass to the government. WON taxes paid by the owner after taking by
expropriator are reimbursable.
As to the Contract to Sell
As the trial court in the case for specific performance HELD/RATIO:
ruled, the contract to sell covered the entire Lot 834, YES.
While taxes are assessed against the holder of the title, situated, that the income derivable therefrom is a
the owner of the property is entitled to the beneficient full equivalent for interest, taxes, and
use of his property until title changes. If pursuant to law, assessments. Such is the case where the
immediate possession may be taken, the withholding property has been fully improved and rented, and
this right from the owner must be compensated for as where there has been no loss of tenancy or
well as the formal taking. diminution of rental pending the condemnation
proceedings.
In In re Mayor, etc., of City of New York it is said that:
Certainly it would not be "just compensation" to There is no error in a court's awarding, as part of the
take a man's land, and compel him to pay the just compensation required by law, the amount of taxes
taxes and assessments thereafter levied on the and assessments paid covering the period where the
property, while at the same time withholding the original owner had merely the naked legal title. Where
purchase price. . . . Upon the city's theory, all benefits have been taken away, the corresponding
therefore, the owner must not alone be deprived burdens should be assumed by the State.
of the unrestricted use of his property and of
the ad interim use of his money, but he must also Republic Republic
Petitioner of the Philippines
instituted expropriation
v Court of proceedings
compelled to pay for its police protection, and for in the RTC of Bulacan for the land situated along
Appeals
public movements charged against it as a benefit, MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for
during all the period of delay, for which he is in no the continued broadcast operation and use of radio
way responsible, and which he is powerless to transmitter facilities for the “Voice of the Philippines”
shorten. It will be seen that, if this theory be project.
correct, the owners award would be constantly RTC condemned the land and had it expropriated upon
diminished by each year's delay, until, if the the payment of just compensation by the Republic.
period were long enough, it would be entirely The issue arose in relation 76,589-square meter
wiped out. It can hardly be contended that a property previously owned by Luis Santos, predecessor-
theory which, logically followed out, would under in-interest of herein respondents, which forms part of
any possible circumstances produce such a the expropriated area. They allege that after the lapse of
result, affords a satisfactory basis for an award of five years, the Republic failed to pay them their just
"just compensation." compensation for the expropriated area.
During this period, Pres Estrada also issued
. . . The power may be allowed the unrestricted proclamation No. 22 which transferred 20 hectares of
use of the premises after taking, and the said property to Bulacan State University and another 5
premises maybe of such a character, and so
hectares was dedicated for the propagation of Philippine independent title;] thus, by giving notice to all claimants
carabaos. to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a
Petitioner filed its manifestation that it would be judicial process for securing better title against all the
depositing the amount equivalent to the just world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.
compensation of the property. Respondent filed a The court also cited Valedhueza v Republic, wherein it
counter motion to raise the price of the property or an was held that “both by virtue of the judgment, long final,
option to have the property returned to them. in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon
RTC issued the assailed order of returning the property their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover
to the respondents. CA affirmed this decision. possession of their expropriated lots - which are still
devoted to the public use for which they were
ISSUE: WON respondents are entitled to the return of expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value
the expropriated property for the failure of petitioner to of the same.”
pay the just compensation for it. The case cited by respondents which is Sorsogon v Vda
de Villaroya, wherein the court ordered the return of the
HELD/RATIO: property does not apply in the case at hand. That case
No, The right of eminent domain is usually understood involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to
to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty merely delegated and of limited application.
for a public purpose
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the
conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not Republic
The petitioner,
v Vicente
Republic instituted expropriation
required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. proceedings with the CFI of Cebu for Lots 932 and 939
Lim
Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City
merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession owned by the Denzons, for the purpose of establishing
of the property, and the defendant asserts title or a military reservation for the Philippine Army. RTC
interest in the property, not to prove a right to ordered the land to be expropriated upon payment of
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the just compensation.
taking. In arguing for the return of their property on the For failure of the petitioner to pay the just
basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that compensation, in 1961, Valdehueza and Panerio, the
the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of successor in interest of the Denzons filed a suit for
an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy damages and recovery of possession of the land
of rescission might perhaps apply After condemnation, against AFP. CFI ruled in favor of Valdehueza and
the paramount title is in the public under a new and Panerio but held that they were not entitled to the return
of the property because of the notation in the TCT which While it is true that all private properties are subject to
stated that, “subject to the priority of the National the need of government, and the government may take
Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the
Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a occasion demands, however, the Constitution
reasonable market value.” They were ordered to guarantees that when this governmental right of
execute a deed of sale in favor the Republic. expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by
In 1964, since the Republic still failed to pay the just compensation. From the taking of private property by
compensation Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged the the government under the power of eminent domain,
land to Vicente Lim, who later foreclosed the mortgage there arises an implied promise to compensate the
in 1976 for the former’s failure to pay. owner for his loss.
In 1991, Lim instituted a suit for quieting of title against There are two stages in expropriation. The first stage
AFP and the Republic. The RTC held that Lim was the determines the authority to exercise the power of
absolute and exclusive owner of the property. This eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
decision was sustained by the CA. context of the facts involved in the suit. The second
A petition for certiorari was filed with SC but the SC phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with
affirmed the CA decision. A second motion for the determination by the court of the just compensation
reconsideration was filed. for the property sought to be taken. It is only upon the
completion of these two stages that expropriation is said
ISSUE: WON the Republic has retained ownership of to have been completed.
the land despite its failure to pay respondent’s The recognized rule is that title to the property
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation. expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the
HELD/RATIO: justcompensation, and that “non-payment of just
As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does
mandated the Republic to pay respondent’s not entitle the private landowners to recover possession
predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16, 248.40 as of the expropriated lots.” However, the facts of the
“reasonable market value of the two lots in question.” present case do not justify its application. It bears
Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just
decades to pass without obeying this Court’s mandate. compensation twice; the first was in the expropriation
Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven
to private rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but
countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private construe the Republic’s failure to pay just compensation
property. as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such
circumstance, recovery of possessionis in order. In HELD/RATIO:

cases where the government failed to pay just No. PD No. 1670, together with a companion decree,
compensation within five (5)years from the finality numbered 1669 — which attempted to expropriate by
of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, similar legislative fiat another property, the so-called
the owners concerned shall have the right to "Tambunting Estate" — was struck down by this Court
recover possession of their property. This is in as "unconstitutional and therefore, null and void.
consonance with the principle that “the government The Court found that both the decrees, being "violative
cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.” of the petitioners' (owners') right to due process of law,"
failed "the test of constitutionality," and that, additionally,
they were tainted by another infirmity as regards "the
Belen
A fire vrazed
CA their properties. Upon Juliano’s pleas, he determination of just compensation."
was allowed to build another house in the property for a PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance
period of 2 ½ years. However, after the stipulated thereon and in accordance therewith must also be
period, he still refused to vacate and thus a suit was deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of
filed against him wherein the court (MTC) ordered him possession of the property by the National Housing
to vacate the premises. Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a
In the appeal to RTC, the decision was reversed. Belen housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries
appealed but this was dismissed upon the expropriation thereof.
of the said property by Presidential Decree No. 1670.
His appeal with the CA was also denied. The decision
declared that by virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty, Filstream International
Petitioner Filstream is vthe
CAowner of adjacent parcels of
Inc. ceased to be the owner of the land, including the lot land situated
January 23, 1998
in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila.
leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an ejectment suit
possession, administration, control and disposition of before MTC of Manila against private respondents on
the National Housing Authority (NHA); It also held that the grounds of termination of the lease contract and
Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in non-payment of rentals. MTC ordered respondents to
question also ipso facto ended, as well as the sublease vacate the premises and pay the back rentals. This
between Belen and Juliano. Thus the appeal on decision was affirmed by the RTC and CA upon which
certiorari with the SC the decision became final and executory.
However, pending the earlier a case, a negotiation has
ISSUE: WON there was valid expropriation of the already taken place between Mayor Lim of Manila and
property Filstream for the acquisition by negotiation of said
property. The said properties were to be sold and
distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to WON petitioners were denied due process of law by
the Land Use Development Program of the City of the CA when it outrightly dismissed its petition for
Manila. Thus the city of Manila filed a suit for eminent failure to submit clear and readable copies.
domain with the RTC of Manila. Filstream filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and HELD/RATIO:
that this was filed only to circumvent the decision in the Yes. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural
ejectment suit and that the price offered was too low rules in this case would defeat rather than meet the
and thus violative of the just compensation provision. ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and held the land substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal
expropriated upon payment of just compensation by the filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their
public respondents. Appeal to the CA was denied for property rights over the disputed premises which have
failure to submit clearer and readable copies. Thus the been expropriated and have in fact been ordered
petition for review on certiorari with the SC. condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect, the
During this period, Filstream filed for motion for dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation
execution for the ejectment suit which became final. The proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds is
private respondents filed for a motion to quash or stay tantamount to a deprivation of property without due
the execution due to the supervening event which is the process of law as it would automatically validate the
expropriation the said property which was denied. Thus expropriation proceedings which the petitioner is still
private respondents filed for a writ of preliminary disputing. Where substantial rights are affected, as in
injunction with the RTC which was granted. The case this case, the stringent application of procedural rules
for issuance of writ of execution and petition for may be relaxed if only to meet the ends of substantial
certiorari with RTC were consolidated. A motion to justice.
dismiss was filed by Filstream for violation of Supreme Rather than simply dismissing the petition summarily for
Court Circular No. 04-94 (forum shopping). non-compliance with respondent court’s internal rules,
Filstream then filed for writ of demolition which was respondent CA should have instead entertained
granted. Private respondents then filed petition for petitioner Filstream’s petition for review on Certiorari,
certiorari and prohibition with the CA which granted a and ordered petitioner to submit the corresponding
preliminary injunction. Filstream now files a petition pleadings which it deems relevant and replace those
for certiorari with the SC to nullify the resolutions of which are unreadable.
the CA. The two cases were consolidated.
ISSUE: Biglang
The Biglang-awa’s
Awa v areJudge
the registered owners of certain
parcels of land situated in Talipapa, Novaliches,
Bacalla
Quezon City. The government needed to expropriate pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a
part of the aforesaid property of petitioner for the hearing to determine the provisional sum to be
construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension deposited,
Petitioner received notice from the respondent Republic Thus, , the only requisites for authorizing immediate
to submit documents to determine just compensation of entry in expropriation proceedings are: (1) the filing of a
the property and failure to do so would give rise to an complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
expropriation proceeding for said property. Petitioner substance; and (2) the making of a deposit equivalent to
failed to submit the said documents and thus the the assessed value of the property subject to
Republic through the DPWH filed with RTC an expropriation. Upon compliance with the requirements
expropriation suit for the said properties. the issuance of the writ of possession becomes
The respondent deposited the amount for the “ministerial.
compensation of the properties of the petitioners and The issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Rule
thus the RTC issued a writ of possession. An order to 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure alone
vacate the premises was also issued to petitioners. The is neither “capricious” nor “oppressive”, as the said rule
petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration on the affords owners safeguards against unlawful deprivation
ground that respondent failed to comply with the of their property in expropriation proceedings, one of
provisions of E.O. 1035 (1985), relating to the conduct which is the deposit requirement which constitutes
of feasibility studies, information campaign, detailed advance payment in the event expropriation proceeds,
engineering/surveys, and negotiation prior to the and stands as indemnity for damages should the
acquisition of, or entry into, the property being proceedings fail of consummation.
expropriated. This was denied the RTC. Thus a petition
for certiorari was filed with the SC.
Francia
RTC ruled
v Municpality
that the ofexpropriation
Meycauayan was for a public
ISSUE: purpose
March 24,and
2008that it would improve the flow of vehicular
WON the right to due process of the petitioners was traffic during rush hours. It ordered that writ of
violated by respondent Republic possession be issued upon deposit of 15% of the fair
market value of the property.
HELD/RATIO: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
No. Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took RTC for failure to hold a hearing to determine the
effect on July 1, 1997. The trial court may issue a writ of existence of a public purpose. CA nullified the order of
possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount expropriation but retained the writ of possession. Thus
equivalent to the assessed value of the property, the appeal to the SC.
Respondents allegethat they had been the bona fide

ISSUE: WONprior determination of the existence of a occupants of the said parcel of land for more than 40
public purpose was not necessary for the issuance of a years; that the expropriation of Lot 1-C would result in
writ of possession their dislocation, it being the only residential land left to
them by their deceased mother; and that the said lot
HELD/RATIO: was exempt from expropriationbecause RA. No. 7279
Before a local government unit may enter into the provides that properties consisting of residential lands
possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it not exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized
must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in cities are exempt from expropriation. Dividing the said
form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit parcel of land among them would entitle each of them to
with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair only about 50 square meters of land.
market value based on its current tax declaration. The After petitioner had made a deposit, RTC issued a writ
law does not make the determination of a public of possession to petitioner. Respondents filed for a
purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ petition for certiorari with the CA. CA held that said
of possession. properties were not exempt from execution.
Nevertheless, the other modes of acquisition of lands
City of
The City
Manila
Council
v Serrano
of Manila enacted Ordinance no. 7833, enumerated in §§9-10 of the law must first be tried by
authorizing
June 20, 2001
the expropriation of certain properties in the city government before it can resort to expropriation
Manila’s first district in Tondo. One of the properties as was held in Filstream v CA. Thus petitioners were
sought to be expropriated was Lot 1-C belonging to enjoined from expropriating the said property. Hence
Felisa De Guia. this petition.
After her death, the estate of Feliza de Guia was settled
among her heirs by virtue of a compromise agreement, ISSUE: WON the CA erred when it held that there had
which was duly approved by the regional trial court, been no compliance with §§9 and 10 of RA. no. 7279.
branch 53, manila in its decision, dated May 8, 1986.
The property was subsequently sold on January 24, HELD/RATIO:
1996 to Demetria de Guia to whom TCT no. 226048 Yes. The ruling in Filstream was necessitated because
was issued. an order of condemnation had already been issued by
Petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for the trial court in that case. Thus, the judgment in that
expropriation, with the RTC of Manila, against the case had already become final. In this case, the trial
supposed owners of the lots covered by TCT nos. court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of
70869 (including Lot 1-C), possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine
whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the
requirements provided in RA. no. 7279. It is, therefore, may immediately take possession of the property in
premature at this stage of the proceedings to find that accordance with Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160
petitioner resorted to expropriation without first trying Judge Legaspi held in abeyance the issuance of the writ
the other modes of acquisition enumerated in §10 of the of possession until after the trial on the merits of the
law. case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
Whether petitioner has complied with these provisions was denied. Thus the filing of this petition.
requires the presentation of evidence, although in its
amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: WON petitioner is entitled to the
complied with the requirements. The determination of writ of possession
this question must await the hearing on the complaint Yes. The requisites for authorizing immediate entry in
for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the an expropriation suit are as follows: (1) the filing of a
condemnation of the properties sought to be complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
expropriated substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent
to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property to be expropriated based on its current tax
City07
On of March
Iloilo v 2001,
Judgethe
Legaspi
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the declaration. Upon compliance with these requirements,
City of Iloilo
November 25,enacted
2004 Regulation Ordinance No. 2001- the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial
037 granting authority to its City Mayor to institute In City of Manila v. Serrano this Court ruled that
expropriation proceedings on Lot No. 935, registered in “hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not
the name of Manuela Yusay petitioner indeed complied with the requirements
On 14 March 2001, Mayor Malabor wrote the heirs of provided in Rep. Act No. 7279. x x x The determination
Manuela Yusay, through Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del Rosario, of this question must await the hearing on the complaint
Administratrix of the estate made a formal estate to for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the
purchase the property for P250 per square meter for the condemnation of the properties sought to be
purpose of converting the same as an on-site relocation expropriated.” From the foregoing, it is clear that an
for the poor and landless residents of the city in line with evidentiary hearing must be conducted if compliance
the city’s housing development program with the requirements for socialized housing has been
Later Petitioner City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor made. This hearing, however, is not a hearing to
Jerry P. Treñas, filed an Amended Complaint for determine if a writ of possession is to be issued, but
Eminent Domain against private respondents. whether there was compliance with the requirements for
On 11 April 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance socialized housing.
of Writ of Possession alleging that since it has For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements
deposited 15% of the fair market value of the property are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of
the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In Volcanology that the thermal mineral water and steam
fact, no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial
possession. The sufficiency in form and substance of or industrial use. NPC is a public corporation created to
the complaint for expropriation can be determined by generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other
the mere examination of the allegations of the power and to transmit electric power nationwide and is
complaint. authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the
right of eminent domain
WON there has been a waiver on the part of Initially in 1972, it leased 11 lots from Pobre for a period
petitioner to ask for immediate possession since it of one year. However, in 1975, it filed an expropriation
took the latter eight (8) months and twelve (12) days case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 square-
from the filing of the Amended Complaint, and nine meter portion of the Property to which the court granted
(9) months and thirteen (13) days from the filing of upon payment of just compensation. NPC began drilling
the Original Complaint, before it filed the Motion for operations and construction of steam wells. NPC
Issuance of Writ of Possession. dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon
No, Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 does not put a time by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials
limit as to when a local government may immediately altered the topography of some portions of the Property.
take possession of the real property. As long as the NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints and NPC
expropriation proceedings have been commenced and continued with its dumping.
the deposit has been made, the local government unit Thirdly, on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its
cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an
of possession. additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is
the property subject of the petition. NPC needed the lot
for the construction and maintenance of Naglagbong
Well Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation No. 7396 and
Republic Act No. 5092
Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for
NAPOCOR
Pobre is the
v Pobre
owner of a 68,969 square-meter land expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his
("Property")
August 12, 2004
located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the
Tiwi, Albay which he later began developing as a resort- lots affected by NPC's actions and for the payment of
subdivision, which he named as "Tiwi Hot Springs damages.
Resort Subdivision." On 1985, NPC also filed a motion to dismiss on the
In 1965, NPC started to become interested in the ground that it had found an alternative site and that it
property after it was certified by the Commission on
had already abandoned the said project in Pobre’s

property.
The RTC granted G.R.the motion
No. 139495.
to dismiss
November
but without
27, 2000 Chiongbian filed a complaint for reconveyance of a
prejudice to Pobre’sMACTAN-CEBU
allegation in relation
INTERNATIONAL
to damages he AIRPORT
parcel AUTHORITY
of land that she(MCIAA)
sold byv.eminent
COURT domain
OF APPEALS
to the and
incurred. RTC later VIRGINIA
ruled in favor
CHIONGBIAN
of Pobre and ordered government to expand the Lahug Airport in Cebu. Since
NPC to pay the value iof the property and for Pobre to the project never pushed through, Chiongbian said that
execute the deed of sale upon full payment. she was assured by NAC that she or her heirs would be
Motion for reconsideration with the RTC was denied. CA given the right of reconveyance for the same price once
affirmed RTC decision. Thus petition with the SC. the land would no longer be used.
ISSUE: WON petitioner had the right to dismiss its ISSUE: WON the land can be reconveyed?
own complaint in eminent domain cases. HELD: NO
No, NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 17 1 The terms of the judgment are clear and unequivocal
of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses his right and grant title to Lot No. 941 in fee simple to the
under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of Republic of the Philippines. There was no condition
the complaint once the defendant had served on the imposed to the effect that the lot would return to
plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment CHIONGBIAN or that CHIONGBIAN had a right to
before the plaintiff could file his notice of dismissal of repurchase the same if the purpose for which it was
the complaint. Pobre's "motion to dismiss/answer," filed expropriated is ended or abandoned or if the property
and served way ahead of NPC's motion to dismiss, was to be used other than as the Lahug airport.
takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the CHIONGBIAN cannot rely on the ruling in Mactan Cebu
same applies. International Airport vs. Court of Appeals wherein the
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the presentation of parol evidence was allowed to prove the
plaintiff's matter of right to dismiss the complaint existence of a written agreement containing the right to
precisely because the landowner may have already repurchase. Said case did not involve expropriation
suffered damages at the start of the taking. The proceedings but a contract of sale. This Court
plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss the consequently allowed the presentation of parol evidence
complaint has always been subject to court approval to prove the existence of an agreement allowing the
and to certain conditions right of repurchase based on the following ratiocination
CHIONGBIAN’s testimony shows that she had no
1 SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff
without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a personal knowledge of the alleged assurance made by
motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without the Republic of the Philippines that Lot No. 941 would
prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff
who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. A
class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court.
be returned to her in the event that the Lahug Airport Inc., Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc., and Security
was closed. Bank Corp.) submitted their competitive proposal to the
Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent, PBAC.
the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer 7) 1996 October 2, PBAC notified AEDC that Paircargo,
and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which had pre-qualified.
are to constitute the contract.[26] A judicial compromise 8) 1997 February 27, Paircargo Consortium
has the force of law and is conclusive between the incorporated into PIATCO.
parties[27] and it is not valid and binding on a party who 9) 1997 April 1, DOTC submitted the concession
did not sign the same.[28] Since CHIONGBIAN was not agreement for the second-pass approval of the NEDA-
a party to the compromise agreements, she cannot ICC.
legally invoke the same. 10) 1997 July 9, the DOTC issued the notice of award
for the project to PIATCO. July 12, the Government and
PIATCO signed the 1997 Concession Agreement.
AGAN JR. V. 11) 1998 November 26, the Government and PIATCO
FACTS:
PIATCO signed ARCA.
1) 1989 August, DOTC engaged Aeroport de Paris 12) Government and PIATCO signed three
(ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the NAIA to Supplements to the ARCA dated 27 Aug 1999, 4 Sept
determine whether the present airport can cope with the 2000, and 22 June 2001.
traffic development up to the year 2010. 13) 2002 Sept 17, the workers of the international airline
2) ADP submits its Draft Final Report to the DOTC on service providers filed a petition for Prohibition. Other
December 1989. petitioners followed filing.
3) 1994 October 5, Asia’s Emerging Dragons Corp. 14) 2003 March 6, PIATCO informed the Court that
(AEDC) submitted an unsolicited proposal to the PIATCO commenced arbitration proceedings before the
Government through DOTC/MIAA for the development International Court of Arbitration pursuant to Sec 10.02
of NAIA Terminal III under a BOT agreement. of the ARCA.
4) 1996 February 13, the NEDA passed Board
Resolution No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT III ISSUE :WON the Concession Agreement is
project. unconstitutional?
5) 1996 July 23, the Prequalification Bids and Awards HELD: YES
Committee invited all bidders to a pre-bid conference on Sec. 5.10 of the 1997 Concession Agreement violates
Jul 29. Second pre-bid confe was held on August 29. Article XII, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
6) 1996 September 20, the Paircargo Consortium The Constitutional provision allows for temporary
(composed of People’s Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., takeover of public facilities in times of national
emergency. Since the takeover is temporary and reasonable regulation and supervision and should not
extends only to the operation of the business and not violate the rights of third parties.
the ownership, government is not required to There are service providers at the NAIA I with existing
compensate the owner. Neither can the owner claim just contracts with the MIAA valid until 2010; since the 1997
compensation for the use of the business and its Concession Agreement says PIATCO is not bound to
properties because the takeover is in exercise of the honor existing contracts with MIAA, transferring
State’s police power and not of its power of eminent operations from NAIA I to NAIA III would unduly
domain. prejudice them. “PIATCO cannot, by law and certainly
The 1997 Concession Agreement, on the other hand, not by contract, render a valid and binding contract
says that in the event of a takeover, “Concessionaire nugatory. PIATCO, by the mere expedient claiming an
shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for the exclusive right to operate, cannot require the
duration of the temporary takeover…” Government to break its contractual obligations to the
“PIATCO cannot, by mere contractual stipulation, service providers.”
contravene the Constitutional provision on temporary
government and obligate the government pay
reasonable cost for the use of Terminal and/or Terminal G.R.
A Complaint
No. 146587,
was filed
July due
2, 2002
to the fact that a sum of 1m
Complex. remained unpaid
REPUBLIC v. CAby the government.
Police power is the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers. Its exercise must not be ISSUE:
unreasonably hampered nor its exercise be a source of (1) WON the property was taken under eminent
obligation by the government in the absence of damage domain? YES
due to arbitrariness of its exercise. (2) WON the previous owner can recover the
Also, The 1987 Constitution strictly regulates property? NO
monopolies. Art XII, Sec. 19 says: The State shall (3) WON interest should be paid by the Republic
regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest along with the just compensation? YES
so requires.
The 1997 Concession Agreement gave PIATCO the HELD:
exclusive right to operate a commercial international (1) The right of eminent domain is usually understood to
passenger terminal within the island of Luzon, with the be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to
exception of already existing terminals such as those in appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty
the Subic Bay Freeport, Clark Special Economic Zone, for a public purpose. Fundamental to the independent
and in Laoag City. This privilege, however, is subject to existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the
Constitution, whose provisions are taken as being
merely confirmatory of its presence and as being In determining “public use,” two approaches are utilized
regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In –
the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its (1) public employment or the actual use by the
scope matching that of taxation, even that of police public, and
power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form (2) public advantage or benefit.
of property the State needs for public use and, , all It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to
separate interests of individuals in property are held constant growth, which is to say that as society
under a tacit agreement or implied reservation vesting advances, its demands upon the individual so
upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession increases, and each demand is a new use to which the
of the property whenever the public interest so requires resources of the individual may be devoted.
it. In this case, the expropriated property has been shown
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a
in the nature of the expropriation proceedings. significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for
conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in
required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. line with the requirements of public purpose.
Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect Respondents question the public nature of the utilization
merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out
of the property, and the defendant asserts title or that its present use differs from the purpose originally
interest in the property, not to prove a right to contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings.
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the The argument is of no moment. The property has
taking. assumed a public character upon its expropriation.
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner
(1) the taking must be for public use, of the property, is well within its rights to alter and
(2) just compensation must be given to the private decide the use of that property, the only limitation being
owner of the property. that it be for public use.
These twin proscriptions have their origin in the (2)as ruled in Valdehueza v Republic, “plaintiffs are not
recognition of the necessity for achieving balance entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots -
between the State interests, on the one hand, and which are still devoted to the public use for which they
private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market
restraining the former and affording protection to the value”
latter. In this case, petitioner has occupied, utilized an
exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the
judgment. The right of the expropriatory authority is far computed from the time petitioner instituted
from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which condemnation proceedings and “took” the property.
the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in
remproceeding, condemnation acts upon the
property.After condemnation, the paramount title is in G.R. Rosa
Sta No. Realty
112526,was
October
the registered
12, owner of two
the public under a new and independent title; thus, by parcels of land that according to petitioner, were
2001
giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, watersheds which respondents usurped its rights.
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process These respondents sought an easement of right of way
for securing better title against all the world than may be over the area and petitioned DAR for compulsory
obtained by voluntary conveyance. acquisition, which Sta Rosa objected to since the area
(3) The constitutional limitation of “just was not appropriate for agricultural purposes.
compensation” is considered to be the sum DARAB however ruled in favour of the acquiisiton and
equivalent to the market value of the property, ordered payment to Sta Rosa.
broadly described to be the price fixed by the
seller in open market in the usual and ordinary ISSUE: WON the property is covered by CARP despite
course of legal action and competition or the fair fact that part of it is a watershed area?
value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at HELD: remanded to DARAB
the time of the actual taking by the government. RA 6657 provides for two modes of acquisition: (1)
Thus, if property is taken for public use before compulsory (2) voluntary.
compensation is deposited with the court having In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries
include interests on its just value to be computed from must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall
the time the property is taken to the time when send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a
court. conspicuous place in the municipal building and
In fine, between the taking of the property and the barangay hall of the place where the property is located.
actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a
the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) deed of transfer in favor of the government and
the position he was in before the taking occurred. surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days
In this case, the lower court was correct in imposing from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land
interests on the zonal value of the property to be Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the
purchase price.
If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer
a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative beneficiary
proceedings to determine just compensation for the In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the
land. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding property in question. However, payment of just
payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response compensation was not in accordance with the
from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation procedural requirement. The law required payment in
in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done
DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and by DAR.
cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the Furthermore, there is still uncertainty as to the proper
name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall classification of the land. While The authority of the
then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two classification is an exercise of its police power, due to
notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and proof showing that the the disputed parcels of land may
letter of invitation be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage
(2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner of CARP because of its very high slopes, the Court
The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the
coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference, issue.
and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are
steps designed to comply with the requirements of
administrative due process. The implementation of the G.R. No. Paris
Florencia 139083,
is theAugust
registered
30, owner of a parcel of
CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and land tenanted by respondents who are recipients of
2001
the power of eminent domain. Emancipation Patents. Paris argues that since she is
POLICE POWER: To the extent that the CARL entitled to a retention of seven (7) hectares under P.D.
prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an 27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares each for her
exercise of police power for the regulation of private children under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
property in accordance with the Constitution. Law (CARL), the tenants are not supposed to acquire
EMINENT DOMAIN: But where, to carry out such the subject land and the Emancipation Patents
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in precipitately issued to them are null and void for being
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a contrary to law.
taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking She argues that her homesteads are exempt from land
contemplated is not mere limitation of the use of the reform. In support of her position, she cites the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and cases Alita v. CA8 and Patricio v. Bayug,9 in which the
physical possession of the excess and all beneficial
Court ruled that homesteaders had a superior right to of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
cultivate their homesteads as against their tenants. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, from which we quote:
". . . In any event, assuming that the petitioners have
ISSUES: not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under PD
(1) WON Paris’ lands are exempt from land reform? NO No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new
(2)WON Paris’ is entitled to just compensation? YES retention rights provided for by RA No. 6657, which in
fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by
HELD: the decree."
(1) Petitioner's heirs, however, are not entitled to awards of
PD 27, which provides the retention limit, states: three (3) hectares each, since they are not actually
"In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not tilling the parcels or directly managing the farm
more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is (2)
cultivating such area or will now cultivate it." Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already
Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is deemed owners of the land they till, they are still
not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the required to pay the cost of the land, including interest,
landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them.
or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondents
In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention complied with the requirement of full payment of the
is present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the subject cost of the parcels of land. As they themselves
parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not admitted, their value had not even been determined yet.
cultivating them, nor will she personally cultivate any In the absence of such determination, the Court cannot
part thereof. Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no right to rule that just compensation has already been fully paid.
retain any portion of her landholdings
neither petitioner nor her heirs are personally cultivating
the subject homesteads. The DAR and the CA found G.R. No.
The province
155746,
of Cebu
Octoberdonated
13, 2004
to the city of Cebu
that respondents were the ones who had been parcels ofv LABRA
LAGCAO land which the petitioners purchased on
cultivating their respective portions of the disputed instalment basis. However, problems as to their
properties. ownership ensued. First, the Province of Cebu tried to
However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in reacquire the land from which the petitioners were able
accordance with Section 6 of RA 6657, which requires to get a favourable decision from the court. Second, the
no qualifying condition for the landowner to be entitled lot they purchased had squatters which they instituted
to retain such area. This ruling is in line with Association ejectment proceedings against but during a request of
deferment of the demolition by the City to find another
location for the squatters, the Sagguninang Panlungsod exhausted all other modes of acquisition and made a
of Cebu passed a resolution that identified Lot 1029 as valid and definite offer.
a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279. The petition is therefore granted in favour of petitioners
Thus the present petition by the petitioners alleging that to reacquire their land.
the expropriation of the property is unconstitutional?
ISSUE: WON the property may be subject to G.R. No.

The City
137152,
of January
Mandaluyong
29, 2001 filed expropriation
expropriation? proceedings
CITY OFagainstMANDALUYONG
defendants for urbanv land reform
purposes. The respondents argued that they had no
HELD: NO right to expropriate due to the ff:
While housing is one of the most serious social (1) Not for a public purpose
problems of the country, local government units do not (2) Lots are too small and petitioner already has a lot
possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of of other lots for socialized housing
eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. (3) the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set
is (1) genuine necessity and (2) that necessity must be by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00
of public character. per square meter.
RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation The TC ruled in the favour of respondents, stating that
of property for purposes of urban land reform and they were “small property owners” thus exempt from
housing. Sec 9 and 10 provide for (1) order in expropriation. This was affirmed by CA thus the present
acquisition of land (2) priority in modes of acquisition. petition.
In this case, the order was not followed. Private lands
rank last in the order of priority for purposes of ISSUE: WON the lands may be expropriated?
socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation HELD: NO
proceedings may be resorted to only after the other Due to the passage of the Urban Det and Housing Act,
modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with all city and municipal govts were
these conditions is mandatory because these are the (1) mandated to conduct an inventory of all lands and
only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private improvements within their respective localities
property against what may be a tyrannical violation of (2) identify lands for socialized housing and
due process when their property is forcibly taken from resettlement areas for the immediate and future
them allegedly for public use. needs of the underprivileged and homeless in the
The City of Cebu failed to establish that (1) no other urban areas,
land is appropriate for their housing projects and (2) (3) acquire the lands
(4) dispose of said lands to the beneficiaries of the

program Tan v. Delseeks
Petitioner Rosario
declaration
(237 SCRA
of unconstitutionality of
Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the RA7496 (also known as Simplified Net Income
following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable Taxation) due to violation of the following constitutional
lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or provision:
abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the
Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement expressed in the title thereof.
and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be
acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands. progressive system of taxation.
They also may be acquired through the following The petitioner stressed that it violates the equal
modes: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) protection clause as it only imposed taxes upon one
land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) who practice his profession and not to those who are
donation to the government; (6) joint venture engaged to single proprietorship.
agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . .
expropriation. . property without due process of law, nor shall any
The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
(a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted; ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7496 violates the
(b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are aforestated provision of the constitution
exempt from such acquisition. HELD:
In this case, the SC found that the respondents fell The SC ruled in the negative. The said law is not
under “small property owners” which is define: “those arbitrary; it is germane to the purpose of the law and;
whose only real property consists of residential lands applies to all things of equal conditions and of same
not exceeding three hundred square meters (300 sq.m.) class.
in highly urbanized cities and eight hundred square It is neither violative of equal protection clause due to
meters (800 sq.m.) in other urban areas." The partition the existence of substantial difference between one who
of the property six months after the filing of the practice his profession alone and one who is engaged
expropriation case, terminated the co-ownership by to proprietorship. Further, the SC said that RA 7496 is
converting into certain and definite parts. Consequently, just an amendatory provision of the code of taxpayers
the share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 where it classifies taxpayers in to four main groups:
square meter limit set in R.A. 7279 Individuals, Corporations, Estate under Judicial
Settlement and Irrevocable Trust. The court would have HELD: The ruling case law rules that the legislature is
appreciated the contention of the petitioner if RA 7496 without power to appropriate public revenue for anything
was an independent law. But since it is attached to a but public purpose. The taxing power must be exercised
law that has already classified taxpayers, there is no for public purposes only and the money raised by
violation of equal protection clause. taxation can be expended only for public purposes and
not for the advantage of private individuals.
PASCUAL
Antonio Subdivision
v. SECRETARY
is owned by OF
the respondent,
PUBLIC Jose In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the
Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the Philippines. feeder roads depend upon whether the said roads were
Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to public or private property when the bill was passed by
the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by congress or when it became effective. The land which
the council, subject to a condition that the donor would was owned by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a
submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation
the names of two of the street. did not cure the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a
However, the donation was not executed, which judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede
prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said
calling attention the approval of RA 920. appropriation.
The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse OSMENA v. ORBOS (220 SCRA
the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question 703)
Later, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability
were private property at the time of passage and account," by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) 1024, and
approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the ordered released from the National Treasury to the
construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio. Ministry of Energy.
Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void President Corazon C. Aquino, amending PD 1956,
and the alleged deed of donation be declared promulgated Executive Order No. 137, expanding the
unconstitutional. grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for
Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ possible cost under recovery incurred due to the
of preliminary injunction. reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the
amount of the under recovery being left for
determination by the Ministry of Finance.
ISSUE: hether or Not the deed of donation and the Petitioner argues, among others, that "the monies
appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are collected pursuant to P.D. 1956, as amended, must be
constitutional. treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or
a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a
specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, this Court upheld
'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the the legality of the sugar stabilization fees and explained
purpose indicated, and not channeled to another their nature and character, viz.: “The tax collected is not
government objective." Further, that since "a 'special in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a
fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing regulatory purpose, to provide a means for the
power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily
although the use thereof is limited to the special in the exercise of the police power of the State.”
purpose/objective for which it was created." Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may
be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise
ISSUES: of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the
1. Whether or not the powers granted to the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) under P.D. 1956, as treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the
amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of general fund; and while it is placed in what the law
the State. NO. refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review
HELD: The OPSF was established precisely to protect of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures
local consumers from the adverse consequences that comply with the constitutional description of a "special
such frequent oil price adjustments may have upon the fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.
economy. Thus, the OPSF serves as a pocket, as it
were, into which a portion of the purchase price of oil PUNSALAN v. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA
and petroleum products paid by consumers as well as
some tax revenues are inputted and from which LLADOC v. CIR
amounts are drawn from time to time to reimburse oil
companies, when appropriate situations arise, for GEROCHE v. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
increases in, as well as underrecovery of, costs of crude
importation. The OPSF is thus a buffer mechanism
through which the domestic consumer prices of oil and Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA,
petroleum products are stabilized, instead of fluctuating stating that the imposition of the universal charge on all
every so often, and oil companies are allowed to end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts
recover those portions of their costs which they would to taxation without representation for not giving the
not otherwise recover given the level of domestic prices consumers a chance to be heard and be represented.
existing at any given time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the universal charge is a tax.
The amount of the fee or charge is properly considered

HELD: NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, in determining whether it is a tax or an exercise of the
but an exaction in the exercise of the State’s police police power. The amount may be so large as to itself
power. That public welfare is promoted may be gleaned show that the purpose was to raise revenue and not to
from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which enumerates the regulate, but in regard to this matter there is a marked
policies of the State regarding electrification. Moreover, distinction between license fees imposed upon useful
the Special Trust Fund feature of the universal charge and beneficial occupations which the sovereign wishes
reasonably serves and assures the attainment and to regulate but not restrict, and those which are inimical
perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal and dangerous to public health, morals or safety. In the
charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the latter case the fee may be very large without
country’s electric power industry), further boosting the necessarily being a tax
position that the same is an exaction primarily in pursuit Evidently, the Manila Municipal Board considered the
of the State’s police objectives practice of hygienic and aesthetic massage not as a
useful and beneficial occupation which will promote and
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and is conducive to public morals, and consequently,
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; imposed the said permit fee for its regulation
but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised does not make the
imposition a tax. COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS v. CITY OF
ISSUE: Whether there is a distinction between
The taxing power may be used as an implement of Ordinance 3358 and Ordinances 3634, 3301 and 3816,
police power. The theory behind the exercise of the to prevent refund to the company.
power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the HELD: Generally, the term “tax” applies to all kinds of
general welfare and well-being of the people. exactions which become public funds. Legally,
however, a license fee is a legal concept quite distinct
from tax: the former is imposed in the exercise of
PHYSICAL THERAPY ORGANIZATION v. police power for purposes of regulation, while the latter
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA is imposed under the taxing power for the purpose of
raising revenues. Ordinance 3358 prescribes municipal
license fees for the privilege to engage in the business
of selling liquor or alcohol beverages; considering that
the sale of intoxicating liquor is (potentially) harmful to
public health and morals, and must be subject to injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition
supervision or regulation by the State and by cities and sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing
municipalities authorized to act in the premises. On the real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for
other hand, Ordinances 3634 , 3301 and 3816 imposed public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.
taxes on the sales of general merchandise, wholesale Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local
or retail, and are revenue measures enacted by the Government Code expressly withdrew the tax
Municipal Board of Manila. exemption privileges of “government-owned and-
controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the Local
Both a license fee and a tax may be imposed on the Government Code. Respondents also argue that a
same business or occupation, or for selling the same basic rule of statutory construction is that the express
article, without it being in violation of the rule against mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others.
double taxation. The contrary view of the Treasurer in An international airport is not among the exceptions
its letter is of no consequence as the government is not mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government
bound by the errors or mistakes committed by its Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim
officers, specially on matters of law. that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from
The company, thus, is not entitled to refund real estate tax.
MIAA’s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY vs. owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax
COURT OF APPEALS itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is
that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage,
since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax creditor.
Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable
years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency ISSUE:
was estimated at P624 million. WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt
The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, from real estate tax under existing laws? Yes. Ergo, the
issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of
Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant to such
Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the assessments, are void.
Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the
real estate tax delinquency. HELD:
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition 1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled
for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary Corporation
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled No one can dispute that properties of public dominion
corporation but an instrumentality of the National mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like “roads,
Government and thus exempt from local taxation. canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports”
capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands
stockholders or voting shares. and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA
no members. A non-stock corporation must have Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
members. dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with of the Philippines.
corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public
functions. MIAA is like any other government use because they are used by the public for
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is international and domestic travel and transportation.
vested with corporate powers. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other
When the law vests in a government instrumentality charges from the public does not remove the character
corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for
a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is public use.
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it The charging of fees to the public does not determine
remains a government instrumentality exercising not the character of the property whether it is of public
only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines
MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent property of public dominion as one “intended for public
domain, police authority and the levying of fees and use.” The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers,
charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises “all the as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines,
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the
insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does
provisions of this Executive Order.” not change the character of MIAA as an airport for
public use. Such fees are often termed user’s tax. This
2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by means taxing those among the public who actually use
the Republic a public facility instead of taxing all the public including
a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion those who never use the particular public facility.
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of
public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the
Republic of the Philippines. Commerce of Man
The Court has also ruled that property of public toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air
dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot Transportation into a separate and autonomous body.
be the subject of an auction sale. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the
not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over
public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on MIAA’s assets adverse to the Republic.
execution or auction sale of any property of public
dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable
Essential public services will stop if properties of public Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned
dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
and auction sale. This will happen if the City of subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has
Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a
of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment taxable person following are exempted from payment of
of real estate tax. the real property tax.
c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings
MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from
Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by
12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is
instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties subject to real estate tax.
owned by the Republic. n MIAA’s case, its status as a
mere trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is Defensor-Santiago v Guingona GR No. 134577 (18
clearer because even its executive head cannot sign the November 1998)
deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic. Only the (political question)
President of the Republic can sign such deed of
conveyance.
Petitioners herein filed a petition for quo warranto calling
d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a for the Court to annul the election of Senator Juan
Reorganization Flavier as the Senate Minority Floor Leader and
The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the declaring Senator Francisco Tatad as the rightful holder
Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to of that position.
transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the The Eleventh Congress was composed of 10
Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely senators from LAMP, 7 senators from Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP, 2 independents, and 1 each from LP, Aksyon HELD: The Court took cognizance of the case despite
Demokrasya, PRP, and Gabay Bayan. During its first protestations from the respondents of a political
regular session, Senator Fernan was declared the duly question. Jurisdiction being determined by the
elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. allegations in the pleading or petition, the Court said
Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of that the allegation of petitioners of a violation of the
Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of Constitution made for a case over which it had a prima
the minority, he was assuming the position of minority facie jurisdiction. The petition calls for an interpretation
leader. He explained that those who had voted for or application of the Constitution and whether the
Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only Senate President had correctly construed the meaning
those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, of the words “minority” and “majority” which, under the
belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested Court's expanded duty under Article VIII, falls within the
that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP scope of the Court's jurisdiction.
Party, numbering 7 and thus also a minority, had The Court then observed that the Constitution did
chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. not provide for the manner of selecting other officers of
Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that Congress apart from the Senate President and the
he had received a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD- Speaker of the House. All that the Charter says is that
UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator '[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may
Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the deem necessary.' Thus, the method of selecting such
Senate President formally recognized Senator officers must be prescribed and is a prerogative of the
Guingona as the Senate Minority Leader. houses of Congress themselves. Notably, the Rules of
It is the petitioners' position that when the the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority
Constitution says that the Senate President shall be and minority leaders and neither is there an open clause
elected by “a majority” of its members, then those who providing specifically for such offices nor prescribing the
did not vote for the Senate President would constitute manner of creating them or of choosing the holders
the minority. Thus, by recognizing the Lakas-NUCD- thereof. In the absence of constitutional or statutory
UMDP senators as the minority block, the Constitution guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any
has been violated. basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of
the Senate relative thereto. This Court has no authority
ISSUE: (1) WON the Court has jurisdiction over the to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive
case; (2) WON there has been a violation of Section realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles
16(1), Article 16 of the Constitution. that it is bound to protect and uphold.
Thus, while adherence to the Constitution is a
proper question for the Court, this case does not
actually present a question which the Court can pass HELD: The Court ruled in favor of petitioner. A
upon. Nonetheless, the Court, calling upon its duty “to legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern
of discretion,” declared that the Senate President did which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but
not abuse his discretion in recognizing the Lakas- should be reserved for public control and administration,
NUCD-UMDP senators as the minority block in view of either by the government directly, or by public agents,
the fact that it is one of the minority groups in the under such conditions and regulations as the
Senate. PETITION DISMISSED. government may impose on them in the interest of the
public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on
(Also see: Bagatsing v Committee on Privatization, which the grant of the franchise may be made.
Sanidad v COMELEC 73 SCRA 333, and Romulo v In the case at bar, the agreement entered into by
Yniquez 141 SCRA 263) PAGCOR and SAGE, in essence, gives SAGE the
privilege to actively participate, partake and share
Jaworksi v PAGCOR GR No. 144463 (14 January PAGCOR’s franchise to operate a gambling activity.
2004) The grant of franchise is a special privilege that
constitutes a right and a duty to be performed by the
Respondent PAGCOR was created by PD 1869 and grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities
was granted a franchise “To establish and operate clubs arbitrarily and whimsically but must abide by the limits
and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its terms and
sports, gaming pools (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) conditions. While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter
and such other forms of amusement and recreation to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it
including games of chance.” On 31 March 1998, the is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or
PAGCOR entered into an agreement with its co- share its franchise, much less grant a veritable
respondent SAGE Corporation whereby it granted the franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR
latter authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting can not delegate its power in view of the legal principle
station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as
Gaming facilities to service local and international there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been
bettors. expressly authorized to do so.
Petitioner sought the nullification of the contract
claiming among other that PAGCOR had no power to (See also: Lim v Pacquing 240 SCRA 649)
grant SAGE the authority to operate gambling activities
via the internet. Garcia v Executive Secretary 211 SCRA 219, GR No.
157584
Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI

On 27 November 1990, Cory issued EO 438 which of the Constitution provides as follows: "(2) The
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem. This and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
additional duty was imposed across the board on all export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
imported articles, including crude oil and other oil duties or imposts within the framework of the national
products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 development program of the Government." There is
increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to
EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty authorize the President "subject to such limitations and
except that crude oil and other oil products continued to restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within
be taxed at 9%. Petitioner Garcian, avers that EO 475 specific limits""tariff rates . . . and other duties or
and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Sec 24 of imposts . . . ."
Art 6 of the Constitution which provides: "All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing (See also: Philippine Interisland Shipping Association v
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and CA GR No. 100481, 22 January 1997 where the
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Legislature delegated the power to fix rates to the
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur President who may then exercise such power directly
with amendments." He contends that since the without first withdrawing the earlier delegation made to
Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in the Philippine Ports Authority.)
Congress, the President may not assume such power of
issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in Rodriguez v Gella 92 Phil 603, GR No. L-6266
the nature of revenue-generating measures. (same; emergency powers delegated to the President)
ISSUE: WON EO 475 and 478 are constitutional. On 16 December 1941, Congress, pursuant to Section
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, 26, Article VI of the then Constitution, passed CA 671,
the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, "declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war
like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the involving the Philippines and authorizing the President
Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
does not follow, however, that therefore Executive emergency." Subsequently, Congress filed HB 727
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be intending repeal CA 671 but which the President vetoed
characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to on the ground that war was still subsisting as a fact due
the President, that they must be enacted instead by the to the Korean War.
Subsequently still, the President issued EO 545 exercise of emergency powers under Section 17, Art
and 546 appropriation funds for various purposes. XII)
Petitioners seek to invalidate the issuances.
People v Vera 65 Phil 56, GR No. L-45685
(same; delegation to the people; delegation to local
ISSUE: WON the EO’s are valid.
governments)
HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the
EO’s issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered
ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in
emergencies or calamities emanating from the last Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated
world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower
such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he
merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of
to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the
president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Congress must be given due weight. For it would be Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge
absurd to contend otherwise. For "while Congress might Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the
delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor
able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its Unjieng under probation because, among other things,
powers than to take them back. This is not right and is Act No. 4221, the Probation Law, is an undue
not, and ought not to be the law." Act No. 671 may be delegation of legislative power in that it subjects the
likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the effectivity of the measure to the absolute discretion of
consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that the provincial boards in Section 11 thereof: “This Act
he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same shall apply only in those provinces in which the
way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the respective provincial boards have provided for the
relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can salary of a probation officer.”
it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is
coupled with interest. ISSUE: WON there is an undue delegation of legislative
power.
(See also David v Macapagal-Arroyo which HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as
distinguishes the power of the President to declare a pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition
“state of emergency” under Sec 18, Art VII and the of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because
there is no set standard provided by Congress on how
provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of

probation. The provincial boards are given absolute Respondent POEA issued Board Resolution 1 in
discretion which is violative of the constitution and the January 1998, mandating the increase compensation
doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a and benefits the provided for in POEA's Standard
violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The Employment Contract for Seafarers. Thus, the contract
challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which now provides that:
reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those  in case of death, the employer should pay the
provinces in which the respective provincial boards beneficiaries in the amount of $50,000 and
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at additional $7000 to each child under 21 but not
rates not lower than those now provided for provincial more than 4 children;
fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the  if done within war or warlike area, it should be
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction doubled.
of the Probation Office. This only means that only
provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation Petitioners filed an action seeking to nullify the
officer may have a system of probation within their resolution contending that the POEA does not have the
locality. This would mean to say that convicts in power and authority fix rates for compensation and
provinces where no probation officer is instituted may benefits as the same is a function of the Legislative.
not avail of their right to probation.
(Note: The decision said that Legislatures may validly HELD: The Court found the issuance of Board
leave the determination of the applicability of measures Resolution 1 valid. While the making of laws is a non-
to the people [so-called option laws] but that such laws delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress,
can only be of local application. The effectivity of laws of the latter may nonetheless validly delegate the authority
general application cannot without running afoul of non- to promulgate rules and regulations to administrative
delegation and equal protection.) agencies in implementing a given legislation and
(See also: Osmena v Orbos, Tablarin v Gutierrez 152 effectuate its policies. This is because the legislature
SCRA 730, Eastern Shipping v POEA 166 SCRA 533, may sometimes find it impractical, if not impossible, to
and, in contrapposto, Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center anticipate all the situations that may be met in carrying
v Garcia) the law into effect. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the objects and
Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v POEA 243 purpose of the law and that the regulation is not in
SCRA 666, GR. No. 114714 contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
(same; delegation to administrative bodies) prescribed by the law. This is power of subordinate
legislation.
(Note: It goes without saying that for there to be a valid does not penalize the sale of rice, palay, or corn at any
delegation of the rule-making power, the law effecting price. It is only the EO which provided for that. Thus, Act
such a delegation must be complete in itself and must 2868 was incomplete when it was passed by the
provide for sufficient standards that the administrative Legislature as it did not state any clear cut policy which
agency can follow.) the Executive was then to enforce. It left the
determination of the policy with the Executive.
U.S. v Ang
(Note: In Tang Ho 43 vPhil
Calalang 1, GR No.
Williams, theL-17122
Court held that
(same; same;as
something tests for valid
general asdelegation; completeness
“public interest” test)
or “public
welfare” was sufficient as a policy statement.)
On
Ynot30vJuly
IAC 1919, the Philippine
148 SCRA 659, GR Legislature
No. L-74457passed Act
No. 2868 authorizing the Governor General
(same; same; same; sufficient standards to issue the
test)
necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of rice, palay, and corn. Pursuant to this Act,
on 1 August 1919, the Governor General issued EO 53 Then President Marcos issued EO 626-A, making the
fixing the price at which rice should be sold. interprovincial transport of carabaos and carabeef as
Subsequently, respondent Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, well as the slaughtering of caraboas in a manner not
sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of complying with EO 626 illegal. Petitioner Ynot was
eighty centavos, a price much higher than that apprehended transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to
prescribed by the EO. He was thus charged and found Iloilo and pursuant to EO 626-A, the animals were
guilty of violating EO 53. summarily confiscated.
Respondent now challenges the validity of the Petitioner challenges the validity of EO 626-A
issuance. insofar as it imposes a penalty without according the
ownder the right to be heard. Furthermore, petitioner
HELD: The Court found in favor of respondent. Act No. challenges the exercise by Persident Marcos of
2868 is an invalid delegation of legislative power legislative power under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
because it is not a complete issuance in and of itself. Constitution.
The completeness of a measure can be determined if,
upon leaving the hands of the Legislature, nothing is left HELD: The Court struck down the measure because it,
for the Executive and its administrative agencies but to among others, was an undue delegation of legislative
enforce the policy enunciated therein. In the case at bar, power. The Court observed that the Chairman of the
it will be observed that what the respondent violated is National Meat Inspection Commission or, as the case
EO 53 and not Act 2868. As a matter of fact, the Act may be, the Director of Animal Industrey were given
authority to dispose of the confiscated animals/meat standard by which the President may exercise the
products by distributing them to charitable and similar power to reorganize, such standard may nonetheless be
institutions ”as they may see fit.” The Court found this to abstracted from other statutes which have been enacted
be a “roving commission” which provided the Executive on the same subject. For example, in RA 5435, the
officers so empowered with a wide and sweeping President was given the power to reorganize the
authority, unrestrained by the usual standard and Executive Department “to promote simplicity, economy,
reasonable guidelines or limitations to be observed in efficiency in government to enable it to pursue its
executing their mandate. Such authority, the Court said, programs consisted with the national goals for
is too laden with danger of partiality, abuse, and accelerated social and economic development.” The
corruption. The Court said that the Executive's authority Creation and subsequent reorganization of
had to be “canalized” within banks to keep it from administrative regions have been by the President
overflowing. pursuant to the authority granted to him by the law. The
(See also: de la Llana v Alba 112 SCRA 294, Demetria choice of President is logical because the division
v Alba 148 SCRA 208, Lozano v Martinez 146 SCRA intended to facilitate the administration of executive
323) departments and local governments. It has been
traditionally lodged in the President. By conferring the
Chiongbian the
President v Orbos 245 SCRA
power 253, GR
to merge No. 96754
existing regions,
(same; same; same; same)
Congress merely followed a pattern set in previous
legislation. There is no abdication by Congress of its
legislative power in conferring on the President the
Section 13 of RA 6734 authorized the President to power to merge administrative regions
merge existing administrative regions. Thus, President
Aquino issued EO 429, “Providing for the
Gerochi v Department
Reorganization of Energy
of the GR No. Regions
Administrative 159796, 17in
July 2007
Mindanao.” Petitioners seek the nullification of the
(same;
subjectsame; same; same)
EO contending that the provision allowing the
President to merge existing administrative regions did
not provide for a sufficient standard by which the Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001. On April
President may exercise such power. Hence, the 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-
provision was an undue delegation of legislative power. Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with
respondent ERC a petition for the availment from the
HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. It said that Universal Charge of its share for “Missionary
while RA 6734 does not explicitly provide for the Electrification.” Subsequently, NPC filed another petition
praying for the proposed share from the Universal its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains
Charge for the Environmental Charge be approved for sufficient standards.
withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund manged by the Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides
PSALM. The ERC approved the petitions, authorizing that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a
that collection of the same from the end-users on a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved
monthly basis and, eventually, the withdrawal of up to by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-
P70M from the STF. On the basis of the same, the users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount
Panay Electric Company, Inc. charged petitioner and all to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount
other end-users with the Universal charge which was nevertheless is made certain by the legislative
reflected in their monthly electric bills. parameters provided in the law itself. Moreover,
Petitioners now come before the Court to assail contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not
the Universal Charge provided for in the EPIRA to be enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of
implemented through the IRR in that the charge is in the the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is complete and
nature of a tax and the power of taxation is a strictly passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative
legislative function. Thus, delegating the same to and power.
administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional. Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others,
to ensure the total electrification of the country and the
HELD: All that is required for the valid exercise of this quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply
power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be of electric powerand watershed rehabilitation and
germane to the objects and purposes of the law and management the requirements for valid delegation, as
that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but they provide the limitations on the ERC's power to
inconformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its C. THE INCORPORATION CLAUSE
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 113, GR No. L-5
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
(doctrine of incorporation)
have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during
and prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First
finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila
entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon
refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a remain in force unless suspended or changed by the
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war,
invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did
judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil
an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to government or the regular administration of the laws.”
take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings And if they were not valid, then it would not have been
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the necessary for MacArthur to come out with a
Philippines (the Philippine government under the proclamation abrogating them.
Japanese). The second question, the court said, hinges on
the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not judicial proceedings and government” and whether or not he intended it to annul
decisions made during the Japanese occupation were all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts
valid and remained valid even after the American during the Japanese military occupation. If, according to
occupation; (2) Whether or not the October 23, 1944 international law, non-political judgments and judicial
proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared proceedings of de facto governments are valid and
that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other remain valid even after the occupied territory has been
government in the Philippines than that of the said liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be
effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy in violation of international law.
occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A
judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; (3) And statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of
whether or not if they were not invalidated by nations if any other possible construction remains.”
MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue xxx xxx xxx
hearing the cases pending before them. Annulling judgments of courts made during the
Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and
HELD:Political and international law recognizes that all violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said
acts and proceedings of a de facto government are should not be construed to mean that judicial
good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of
and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese any other governments.”
occupation may be considered de facto governments, xxx xxx xxx
supported by the military force and deriving their Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally
authority from the laws of war. acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually and courts of the Philippines had become courts of
Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and Relevant ISSUE: WON the pertinent international
conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law
force until now, it follows that the same courts may of the land and may be implemented by DOH through
continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases the RIRR.
pending therein before the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws HELD: Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Constitution,
creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are international law can become domestic law by
repealed by the said government. transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation)and
Pharmaceutical or incorporation (mere constitutional
Healthcare Association of the
Philippines v Duque GR No. 173034, 9 October 2007 and
declaration i.e treaties). Admittedly, the ICBMS
WHA what
(same; resolutions were“generally
constitutes not treaties as they
accepted have not
principles of
been concurred
international law”) by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as
required under Section 21, Article 8. However, the
ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through
PHAP filed this petition for certiorari seeking to nullify a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code
the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.
(RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code) claiming that the RIRR is On the other hand, the Court ruled that DOH
not valid as it contains provisions that are not failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA
constitutional and go beyond the scope of the Milk resolutions are customary international law that may be
Code. The Milk Code was issued by President Cory deemed part of the law of the land. For an international
Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states established that such rule is being followed by states
that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the because they consider it as obligatory to comply with
International Code of Marketing and Breastmilk such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions,
Substitutes (ICBMS), a code adopted by the World although signed by most of the member states, were
Health Assembly (WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member
also adopted severel resolutions to the effect that states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code,
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for
permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding
issued the assailed RIRR. up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for
breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as
domestic law nor are they followed in our country as
well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of

their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be HELD: The Court resolved to deny the petition. The
classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms, provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the
principles and practices that influence state behavior. Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the
Soft law is not part of international law. Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by
the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern
Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain,
and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal
In re: Garciain2 the
profession SCRA 984 (15 August
Philippines. 1961)is a Filipino
Applicant
(same; in conflicts between international
citizen desiring to practice the legal profession law inand
the
municipal law, municipal law should be upheld)
Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his
own country and is not entitled to the privileges
extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the
Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty
law in the Philippines without submitting to the required invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to
bar examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that the laws and regulations of the contracting state in
he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal
parentage. He had taken and finished the course of profession.
“Bachillerato Superior” in Spain and was approved,
selected and qualified by the “Insitututo de Cervantes” The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the
for admission to the Central University of Madrid where Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state could
he studied and finished the law course, graduating there not have been intended to modify the laws and
as “Licenciado en derecho”. Thereafter he was allowed regulations governing admission to the practice of law in
to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that the Philippines, for reason that the Executive
under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Department may not enroach upon the consitutional
Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines,
entitled to the practice the law profession in the and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules
Philippines without submitting to the required bar being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
examinations.
ISSUE:WON
Gonzales v aHechanova
treaty can 9
modify
SCRA regulations
230, GRgoverning
No. L-
admission
21897 to the Philippine Bar
agreements not authorized by previous legislation,

Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two without completely upsetting the principle of separation
executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the of powers and the system of checks and balances
importation of rice without complying with the requisite which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
of securing a certification from the Nat’l Economic
Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. As regards the question whether an executive or an
Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 international agreement may be invalidated by our
tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the
planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive providing that the SC may not be deprived "of its
agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the
RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees
"the Rice and Corn Administration or any other of inferior courts in “All cases in which the
government agency. constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
or executive order or regulation is in question". In other
ISSUE:Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
executive agreements entered into by Macapagal. treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of
HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Congress.
Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The (See also: Ichong v Hernandez 101 Phil 115)
former may not interfere in the performance of the
legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
Secretary of Justice v Lantion GR No. 139465, 18
his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
January 2000
enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by
(same; same)
indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between
a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received
time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for
contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance
justification can be given as regards executive with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential
Decree No. 1069, “Prescribing the Procedure for Philippine Government to comply with the
Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in provisions of the treaty and its equally significant
a Foreign Country and the established Extradition role of protection of its citizens of its right of due
Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and process. The processes outlined in the treaty and in the
the Government of the United States of America,” the presidential decree already pose an impending threat to
department proceeded with proceeded with the a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as the
designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his
technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand,
the presidential decree and the treaty. The respondent granting due process to the extradition case causes
requested for a copy of the official extradition request as delay in the process. The rule of pacta suntservanda,
well as the documents and papers submitted therein. one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep
information is confidential in nature and that it is their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of
premature to provide such document as the process is incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals
not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. are confronted with situations in which there appears to
Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
not yet available. provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state.
Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a
ISSUE: (1)WON private respondent can be granted situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable
access to the official extradition request and documents and a choice has to be made between a rule of
with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
thereto; (2) WON private respondent's entitlement to dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of decrees that rules of international law are given equal
the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition standing, but are not superior to, national legislative
Treaty enactments. In this case, there is no conflict between
international law and municipal law. The United States
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the private and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the
respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition suppression and punishment of crime in their respective
request and its supporting papers and to give him a jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord
reasonable period of time within which to file his common due process protection to their respective
comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition
exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the
Law precludes the rights of due process from a right to bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable
prospective extradite or absolute right. A license authorizing a person to enjoy
(See also: Philip Morris, Inc v CA) a certain privilege is neither a property nor property
right. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the
basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order
E. DUTY OF GOVERNMENT; PEOPLE TO DEFEND in the society. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the
THE STATE issuance of the Guidelines is the interest of the public in
general.
Chavez v Romulo GR No. 157036 (9 June 2004)
(duty of government; people to defend state; right to bear
arms)
Pursuant to PGMA’s speech stressing the need for a

nationwide gun ban in all public places, PNP Chief
Ebdane issued the “Guidelines in the Implementation of
the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of
Residence.” It revoked all existing Permits to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence(PTCFOR), subject to
renewal. Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun owner to
whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the DILG
to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
Guidelines. His request was denied. Thus, he went to
court to challenge the constitutionality of the guidelines.
ISSUES: (1) WON the revocation of the PTCFOR's

pursuant to the Guidelines is a violation of the people’s
right to property; (2) WON the issuance of the assailed
Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power
HELD: The Court ruled against petitioner. The right to

bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a
constitutional right. Being a mere statutory creation, the
VI. BILL OF RIGHTS 'No Strike and No Lockout.'" The Court of Industrial
Relations found PBMEO’s officers guilty of unfair labor
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. practice.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973) The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CIR. It
ruled that the demonstration held by petitioners on
March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their
PBMEO, a legitimate labor union, decided to stage a employer, herein private respondent firm, said
mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of
in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to their freedom of expression in general and of their right
be participated in by the workers in the first, second and of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in
third shifts. PBM informed PBMEO that the particular before the appropriate governmental agency,
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, municipality of Pasig. They exercised their civil and
however, that any demonstration for that matter should political rights for their mutual aid and protection from
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the what they believe were police excesses.
Company. It also warned the PBMEO representatives It also ruled that while the Bill of Rights also protects
that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, property rights, the primacy of human rights over
who without previous leave of absence approved by the property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms
Company, particularly the officers present who are the are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may
for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an survive," permitting government regulation only "with
illegal strike. Petitioners and their members numbering narrow specificity."
about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite
the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights
workers should not be required to participate in the 229 SCRA 117 (1994)
demonstration and that the workers in the second and Simon, Jr. (in his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City)
third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration. sent a "Demolition Notice" to respondents (officers and
Hence, PBM with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Inc) in
relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all which they were given a grace-period of three (3) days
of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for within which to vacate the questioned premises of North
EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being
private respondents were informed that their stalls enforced or redressed in a civil action."
should be removed to give way to the "People's Park." Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the
Afterwards, private respondents filed a letter-complaint right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late establishment or administration of government, the right
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what
along North EDSA. Acting on the complaint, the CHR are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari
directed the petitioners to "desist from further stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order erected by private respondents on a land which is
would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." The planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss stating that the than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon
Commission's authority should be understood as being City which is a busy national highway. The consequent
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply
and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is
in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the
privilege to engage in business." The CHR denied the first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be
motion to dismiss. that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove
The Court ruled that the extent of CHR's investigative discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this
power is limited to “all forms of human rights violations instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order
involving civil and political rights." for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
The term "civil rights," has been defined as referring — carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
"(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil
state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
and are not connected with the organization or
administration of government. They include the rights of Republic v. Sandiganbayan
property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, 407 SCRA 10 (2003)
freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil The AFP Anti-Graft Board was created by the
rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices by AFP personnel. Based on its mandate, the
AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged a "subordinate" of President Marcos as contemplated
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General under EO No. 1, which created PCGG. Mere position
Josephus Ramas and his alleged mistress Elizabeth held by a military does not make him a "subordinate" as
Dimaano. The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture this term was used in EO No. 1, absent any showing
against Ramas, but the same was amended to implead that he enjoyed close association with former President
Dimaano as co-defendant. After so many Marcos. The Court disagreed with the petitioner's claim
postponements due to inability of petitioner to show that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case
further evidence, private respondents filed their motion before the completion of the presentation of petitioner's
to dismiss based on Republic vs. Migrino. In the Migrino evidence. According to the Court, the petitioner had
case, the Court held that the PCGG does not have almost two years to prepare its evidence; however, it
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence
by reason of mere position held without showing that by filing numerous motions for postponements and
they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos. extensions. Based on these circumstances, obviously
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the amended complaint petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete
and ordered the return of the confiscated items to presentation of its evidence. The Court also ruled that
respondent Dimaano. It remanded the records of the the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized
case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the subject items. The search warrant did not
the evidence warrants and also referred the case to the particularly describe the items seized. The seizure of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a these items was therefore, void, and unless these items
determination of any tax liability of respondent Dimaano. are contraband per se, which they are not, they must be
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise returned to the person from whom the raiding team
denied. Hence, this petition for review seeking to set seized them.
aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
The primary issue for resolution herein is whether Ermita-Malate Motel and Motel Operators Assn. v. City
PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing Mayor, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for
unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379. The other The City of Manila enacted an ordinance requiring
issues involved the propriety of the dismissal of the patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal
case before the presentation of evidence and the information such as name, gender, nationality, age,
legality of the search and seizure. address and occupation before they could be admitted
The Supreme Court affirmed the questioned resolutions to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This ordinance was
of the Sandiganbayan. The Court ruled that the PCGG enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful
had no jurisdiction to investigate Ramas as he was not to public morals. Petitioners challenged the
constitutionality of the ordinance alleging that the transients and guests of these establishments by
ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
unreasonable and violative of due process. The City registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby
answered that the challenged ordinance bears a open to public view at all times, and by introducing
reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to several other amendatory provisions calculated to
curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
police power. The trial court ruled that the ordinance as transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the
unconstitutional. license fees was intended to discourage
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
Supreme Court held that the mantle of protection other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the
associated with the due process guaranty does not income of the city government."
cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a
police power measure being specifically aimed to Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 124 (1919)
safeguard public morals is immune from such
imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.) filed an action for the issuance
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold of a writ of mandamus against Joaquin Natividad,
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, Philippine
scope of police power which has been properly Islands, to compel him to issue a certificate of Philippine
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the registry to the petitioner for its motor vessel Bato. The
least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his
great public needs." reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co.,
There is no question but that the challenged Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain the Philippine Islands. Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.) argues
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its
of the then Councilor Herminio Astorga included as property without due process of law because by the
annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming passage of the law the company was automatically
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not
existence of motels, which "provide a necessary use. The issue is whether the Government of the
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the
and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and registry of vessels in its coastwise trade to corporations
thrill seekers." The challenged ordinance then having alien stockholders.
"proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
The Supreme Court ruled that the right to due process consular missions of foreign countries, or in the
is universal in their application to all persons within the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences Government and any foreign government, and those
of race, color, or nationality. The word "person" includes working in their respective households, and members of
aliens. Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination,
within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their who are not paid monetarily or in kind. Respondents
property is concerned. challenged the constitutionality of said ordinance on the
However, the apparent purpose of the Philippine ground that is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable,
Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of
act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore,
encourage Philippine ship-building. Hence, while Smith, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of
Bell & Co Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, the Constitution. The trial court held the ordinance as
is entitled to the protection afforded by the-due process unconstitutional.
of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s
Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of decision and ruled that the ordinance in question
the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations violates the due process of law and equal protection
such as Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., the right to register rule of the Constitution.
vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a
belong to that vicious species of class legislation which permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold
must always be condemned, but does fall within or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic
authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
police power, and so does not offend against the means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines
constitutional provision. as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978) deprived of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter
The City of Manila enacted an ordinance which of protection under the due process and equal
prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
participate in any position or occupation or business citizens.
enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or
casual, without first securing an employment permit Buck v Bell, 274 US 200 (1926)
from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of
P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or
Life includes the right of an individual to his body in its swamped with incompetence . . . Three generations of
completeness free from dismemberment and extends to imbeciles are enough."
the use of God-given faculties which make life Rubi v Provincial Board of Mindoro 39 Phil 660 (1919)
enjoyable.
Liberty includes the right to exist and the right to be free
Facts : Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who
from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. It includes
was committed to a state mental institution. Her
the right to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways.
condition had been present in her family for the last
three generations. A Virginia law allowed for the sexual Facts: Rubi and various other Manguianes in the
sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial
"health of the patient and the welfare of society." Before governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from
the procedure could be performed, however, a hearing their native habitat and to established themselves on a
was required to determine whether or not the operation reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to
was a wise thing to do. remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they
Issue: Did the Virginia statute which authorized escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a
sterilization deny Buck the right to due process of the reservation made to that end and for purposes of
law and the equal protection of the laws as protected by cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a
the Fourteenth Amendment? Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. These
reservations, as appears from the resolution of the
Held: The Court found that the statute did not violate Provincial Board, extends over an area of 800 hectares
the Constitution. Justice Holmes made clear that Buck's of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which
challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved about 300 Manguianes are confined.
but on the process of the substantive law. Since
sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the
occurred (at which the patient and a guardian could be reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial
present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because
the Supreme Court of Appeals had reviewed the case, if he escaped from the reservation.
so requested by the patient. Only after "months of An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of
observation" could the operation take place. That was Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging
enough to satisfy the Court that there was no that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of
Constitutional violation. Citing the best interests of the Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally
state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of
Virginia's in order to prevent the nation from "being section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: "With
the prior approval of the Department Head, the
provincial governor of any province in which non- power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the
a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes
selected by him and approved by the provincial board,” an advancement of the public interests, for, besides
was challenged. promoting peace and good order among landowners in
particular and the people in general, it helps increase
Issue: Whether or not the said law is constitutional.
the industries of the country, and makes for the
Held: By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court development of the natural resources, with the
sustained the constitutionality of this section of the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And
Administrative Code. The reasons for the section these ends are pursued in a special manner by the
included (1) it was an attempt for the advancement of State through the exercise of its police power.
the non-Christian people of the province (2) the only
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the
successful method for educating the Manguianes was to
provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory
oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The
nor class legislation, and stated among other things:
Solicitor-General added the following; (3) The protection
". . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is
of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public
unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of
forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
their own good and the general good of the Philippines.
Among other things, it was held that the term "non- Nor can one say that due process of law has not been
Christian" should not be given a literal meaning or a followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
religious signification, but that it was intended to relate law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
to degrees of civilization. The term "non-Christian" it the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to according to the regular methods of procedure
geographical area, and more directly to natives of the prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class."
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the
other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine
Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the
Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Property is anything that can come under the right of
Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents
insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police
more than
Terrace the things
v. Thompson, it owns;
263 U.S. it includes the right to
197 (1923) become citizens, one class being permitted, while the
secure, use, and dispose of them. other is forbidden, to own and as defined.
Facts: US citizens wanted to lease their agricultural The court disagreed with appellants and ruled that the
land to Nakatsuka, a Japanese farmer. A Washington case involved the privilege of owning or controlling
statute disqualified aliens who had not in good faith agricultural land within the State. The quality and
declared intention to become citizens of the United allegiance of those who own, occupy and use the farm
States from taking or holding interests in land in the lands within its borders are matters of highest
State for farming or other purposes. It provided that importance, and affect the safety and power of the State
upon the making of such prohibited conveyance the itself. The Terraces, who are citizens, have no right
land shall be forfeited to the State and the grantors be safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment to lease
subject to criminal punishment, and the alien also, if he their land to aliens lawfully forbidden to take or have
failed to disclose the nature and extent of his interest. such lease.
Citizens owning land in Washington and an alien Nuñez v Averia GR No L-38415 (1974)
Japanese, desirous of consummating a lease to the Public office is not property but one unlawfully ousted
alien for farming, sued to enjoin the state attorney from it may institute an action to recover the same,
general from taking criminal and forfeiture proceedings, flowing from the de jure officer’s right to office.
as he threatened to prosecute them. Complainants Facts: Nuñez contested the election results for the
alleged that the restriction violated the federal and state Mayoralty of Tarnate, Cavite on the ground of fraud,
constitutions and conflicted with a treaty with Japan. irregularities, and corrupt practices. The original
protestee was Edgardo Morales who was ambushed
Issue: Is the act repugnant to the due process clause or
and killed, hence succeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
de Leon.
Amendment?
Nuñez’s protest was denied on the ground that it was
Held: No. Appellants contend that the act contravenes moot and academic, citing the Presidents General
the due process clause in that it prohibits the owners Order 3&4 to remove from office all incumbent
from making lawful disposition or use of their land, and government officials and employees.
makes it a criminal offense for them to lease it to the
alien, and prohibits him from following the occupation of Issue: Were the dismissal orders valid?
farmer; and they contend that it is repugnant to the
equal protection clause in that aliens are divided into Held: The Court in its unanimous joint decision en
two classes -- those who may and those who may not banc in the similar cases
of Paredes, Sunga and Valley has already declared
such dismissal orders as "clear error," ruling that "(I)t Bince v COMELEC GR No 111624-25 (1995)
must be emphasized that the `right' of the private The court has recognized while public office is not
respondents to continue in office indefinitely arose not property to which one may acquire a vested right, it is
only by virtue of Section 9 of Art. XVII of the New nevertheless a protected right.
Constitution but principally from their having been Facts:
proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a  The elections for the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of
result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if Pangasinan, 6th District was composed of 10
in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their municipalities.
respective positions and consequently, have no right to
hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their  Private Respondent Micu objected to the
privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should inclusion of the Certificates of Canvass for San
not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given Quintin, on the ground that it contained false
to them by said constitutional provision," and that "(I)t is statements.
erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Art. XVII of
 The Provincial Board of Canvassers ruled against
the New Constitution, the term of office of the private
Micu. Micu appealed to the COMELEC which
respondents expired, and that they are now holding
credited Micu with 1,535 votes and Bince with
their respective offices under a new term. We are of the
1,055 votes from San Quintin.
opinion that they hold their respective offices still under
the term to which they have been elected, although the  Micu and the Municipal Board of Canvassers filed
same is now indefinite." petition for correction of votes. Bince ultimately
had 27,370 votes and Micu had 27,369 votes.
The Court further stressed therein that "(T)he Bince was not proclaimed winner because of the
Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as absence of authority from COMELEC and filed a
in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who formal motion for such authority.
had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the
herein private respondents to the respective offices  COMELEC promulgated an order directing the
which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to PBC to continue with the canvass and proclaim
question would be tantamount to giving a stamp of the winning candidates.
approval to what could have been an election victory
characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote  The PBC acted on the petitions for correction,
buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the allowing such.
Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the
 Bince appealed arguing the PBC had no
ballot."
jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
 MICU filed an urgent motion for the PBC to nevertheless, a protected right
reconvene and proceed with canvass. Bince filed (BERNAS J., The Constitution of the
a petition for preliminary injunction and alternative Republic of the Philippines, vol. I, 1987 ed.,
prayer for proclamation as winner. 40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543
[1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil. 432
 The PBC Chairman filed a petition with [1924]). Due process in proceedings before
COMELEC seeking a definite ruling as to who the respondent COMELEC, exercising its
should be proclaimed, as there were corrections quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice
already made in a separate sheet of paper of the and hearing, among others. Thus, although
Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate
of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan which cases, the power to annul or suspend the
corrections if to be considered by the Board in its proclamation of any candidate. We had
canvass and proclamation, Micu will win by 72 ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on
votes. On the other hand, if these corrections will Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3 March
not be considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. 1988), Reyes vs. Commission on
will win by one (1) vote. Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3 March 1988)
and Gallardo vs. Commission on
 Bince was proclaimed winner. Micu filed an
Elections (G.R. No. 85974, 2 May 1989)
urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul
that the COMELEC is without power to
Proclamation. The COMELEC ruled in his favor
partially or totally annul a proclamation or
and annulled the proclamation of Bince.
suspend the effects of a proclamation
 Bince filed for certiorari, arguing the COMELEC without notice and hearing.
resolution was promulgated without prior notice  Micu filed a motion to hear the pending incidents
and hearing. The court ruled [relevant to left in court. Both parties filed their respective
syllabus] position papers. The COMELEC ruled that Bince
was to be proclaimed winner.
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office
without due process of law. Although public  Micu filed an MR which was granted.
office is not property under Section 1 of the
Issue: Who was entitled to the seat?
Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III,
Held: Micu. In Tayug, the total votes received by
1987 Constitution), and one cannot acquire
petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486
a vested right to public office (CRUZ, I.A.,
when it should only have been 2,415. Petitioner Bince,
Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it is,
in effect, was credited by 71 votes more.
In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his
but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the SOV counsel, public respondent Provincial Board conducted
reflected the total number of votes as 2,185. On the a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During
other hand, the same SOV indicated that private the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was
respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he actually allowed to present evidence, testimonial and
received only 2,888, hence was credited in excess of 4 documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence
votes. presented, the responden t Provincial Board passed
Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner
respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in the from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the sixth district of Ecija.
Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and assumption
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
into public office was therefore flawed from the
with prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to
beginning, the same having been based on a faulty
annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public
tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not
respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending
commit grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the
him from office and to enjoin public respondent from
illegal proclamation.
enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive
As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect
suspension and from proceeding further with the
to insignificant disputes plaguing this Court. Trifles such
administrative case. According to petitioner, the order of
as the one at issue should not, as much as possible,
preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No.
reach this Court, clog its docket, demand precious
51 issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-
judicial time and waste valuable taxpayers' money, if
handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of
they can be settled below without prejudice to any party
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a
or to the ends of justice.
hearing and investigation of the truth or falsity
Crespo v Provincial Board 160 SCRA 66 (1988) of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In
Facts: Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of
issuing the order of preventive suspension, the
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On
respondent Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has
25 January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed
grossly violated the fundamental and elementary
against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for
principles of due process. On 3 May 1971, this Court
harassment, abuse of authority and oppression.
issued a preliminary injunction.
As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to
why he should not be dealt with administratively, Issue: Was petitioner denied due process?
with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance Held: Yes. In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc.
with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. 6 this Court held: It is a principle in American
jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in would be impossible without the right to notice and to be
this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade board. The emphasis on substantive due process and
or calling is a "property right and the other recent ramifications of the due process clause
wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget
The right is considered to be property within the that due process was initially concerned with
protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process fair procedure. Every law student early learns in law
of law. school definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat.
Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was
518) that due process is the equivalent of law of the
issued without giving the petitioner a chance to
land which means "The general law; a law which hears
be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he
before it condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and
was not fully notified of the scheduled hearing,
renders judgment only after trial ... that every citizen
respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum,
shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under
contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for
the protection of the general rules which govern
the petitioner mayor made known by a request in
society. A sporting opportunity to be heard and the
writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his
rendition of judgment only after a lawful hearing by a
desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation
coldly neutral and impartial judge are essential elements
of the said petitioner mayor at the usual time of the
of procedural due process.
respondent Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire
of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner The petition, however, has become moot and academic.
mayor to appear as requested by him, he failed to Records do not show that in the last local elections held
appeal." The contention of the Provincial Board cannot on18 January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public
stand alone in t he absence of proof or evidence to office.
support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on

15 February 1971, nothing therein can be gathered that,
Republic v Rosemoor Mining & Development Corporation GR No
in issuing the assailed order, the written explanation
A149927
mining
(2004)license that contravenes a mandatory
submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The
provision of law under which it is granted is void. Being
assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the
a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights
evidence presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco.
in the holder. Thus, without offending the due process
In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said: From the and teh non-impairment clauses of the Constitution it
earliest inception of institutional government in our can be revoked by the State in the public interest.
country, the concepts of notice and hearing have been Facts: Four respondents were granted permission to
fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice look for marble deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-
Bato. When they discovered deposits in Mount Mabio, - On August 21, 1983, Ninoy Aquino was cold-
they applied for and were granted such license, but it bloodedly killed while under escort away by
was later cancelled. soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the
The Trial Court opined that it was a property right Manila International Airport. His brain was
protected under due process, which required notice and smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the
hearing. The cancellation therefore was held to be back of his head by a murderous assassin,
unjust. notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, and cited airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and
the non-impairment of obligations and contracts. "from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically
Issue: Did the cancellation of license violate due impossible to get inside (such) a cordon."
process for being without due notice and hearing? - The military investigators reported within a span
The license can be revoked or rescinded by executive of three hours that the man who shot Aquino was
action because it is not a contract, property or a a communist-hired gunman, and that the military
property right protected by the due process clause. The escorts gunned him down in turn. Marcos
license itself provides such condition. It can be validly instantly accepted the military version and
revoked by the state in an exercise of police power in repeated it in a nationally televised press
accordance with the Regalian doctrine. conference that he gave late in the evening of
It also was not a bill of attainder, a legislative act August 22, 1983, wherein he said, in order to
inflicting punishment without judicial trial. The induce disbelief that the military had a hand in the
proclamation only declared the nullity of a license, not killing, that "if the purpose was to eliminate
guilt or punishment. Aquino, this was not the way to do it."
Even if it was an executive act by President Aquino, she - Due to the public outrage that followed, Marcos
was validly exercising legislative powers under the was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to
Provisional Constitution of 1986. investigate the assassination. The Board
submitted their minority and majority reports to
the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. The
C. Jian - minority report, submitted first, was received
93 - 3 cases (Pedro to Kwong Sin) congenially and cordially by Marcos who treated
94- 4 cases (Yu Eng Cong to Javier) the report as if it were the majority report instead
of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it
SATURNINA GALMAN, et al, petitioners vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, to respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution
Facts:
respondents (1986) through the legal system" and for trial in the
TEEHANKEE, C.J.: Sandiganbayan. In contrast, when the majority
report was submitted Marcos coldly received the - Galman’s widow, et al filed the present action
authors and could scarcely conceal his instant alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and
rejection of their report with the grim statement Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities
that "I hope you can live with your conscience constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
with what you have done." justice and gross violation of the constitutional
- Both majority and minority reports were one in rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people
rejecting the military version that Rolando Galman of the Philippines to due process of law. They
was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent
evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando the interest of the people when he failed to exert
Galman had no subversive affiliations." They genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and
were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the important testimonial and documentary evidence
staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan
that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in
assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the SWAT favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded
troopers who gunned down Galman and the with the gravest doubts the sincerity of
soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the government to find out the truth about the Aquino
service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with assassination." They pray that the SC retrain the
one another, gave a perjured story to us Sandiganbayan Sandiganbayan from rendering a
regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. decision on the merits in the pending criminal
Aquino and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman cases and that judgment be rendered declaring a
himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the
the product of a military conspiracy, not a Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an
communist plot. impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor.
- The only difference between the two reports is - Although the SC initially granted a TRO, it later
that the majority report found all the twenty-six withdrew the same. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
private respondents case headed by then AFP issued its decision acquitting all the accused of
Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the the crime charged, declaring them innocent and
military conspiracy, while the minority report totally absolving them of any civil liability. It in
would exclude nineteen of them and limit as effect convicted the very victim Rolando Galman
plotters "the six persons who were on the service (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy
stairs while Senator Aquino was descending, and contrary to the very information and evidence
one General Custodio as the crime could not submitted by the prosecution.
have been planned without his intervention.
- In their second motion for reconsideration, they courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and
included the revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if
Manuel Herrera as reported in the Manila Times they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice,
entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," where he revealed deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the
that Marcos ordered the Sandiganbayan and truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose
Tanodbayan and the prosecution panel headed judges are sworn and committed to render impartial
by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or
(People v Custodio) against the 26 accused and protection of aright or the prevention or redress of a
produce a verdict of acquittal. wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the
- Respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case
and invoked that the issues had become moot at bar where the people and the world are entitled to
and academic because of the rendition of the know the truth and the integrity of our judicial system is
Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all at stake. In life, as an accused before the military
respondents- accused on December 2, 1985, tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he
- The SC appointed a 3-member commission to was entitled to due process of law and trial in the
hear and receive evidence of the charges of regular civil courts before an impartial court with an
collusion and other relevant matters, andsubmit unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy is the victim of the
their findings to the Court. The Commission, upon "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the
reviewing the evidence found that the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties
proceedings in the Aquino-Galman case had plead once more for due process of law and are trial
been vitiated by lack of due process and before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.
recommended that the prayer for declaration of The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a
mistrial in people v Custodio be granted. mock trial - the non-trial of the century -and that the
predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and
Issues: void ab initio
1. W/N the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan should .Second Issue – NO, IT DOES NOT.
be declared a mistrial. Ratio
2. W/N a retrial would constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's
setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or
Held: acquittal where the prosecution which represents the
First Issue – YES, IT SHOULD BE sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and process. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to
due process is thereby violated. The cardinal precept is was already foregone conclusion, they could not cope
that where there is a violation of basic constitutional with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers
rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate
serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed and threaten its witnesses, secure the irrecantation or
over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear
jurisdiction. and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a
Reasoning "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its
- Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after months time or less than a year, pursuant to the
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of "the
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards
without the express consent of the accused. The lower (it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand
court was not competent as it was ousted of its and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of
to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on
terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for making assurances that if given a certain period, they
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts will be able to produce their witnesses," Herrera
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its
and does not expose the accused to a second evidence" and cited other pending cases before
jeopardy.- More so does the rule against the invoking respondent court that were pending trial for a much
of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we longer time where the" dizzying tempo" and "fast pace"
have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the were no tmaintained by the court. Manifestly, the
authoritarian president ordered respondents prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due
Sandiganbayan and Tanod bayan to rig the trial and process of law with a partial court and biased
closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian
absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused. President to assure the carrying out of his instructions.
Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal
which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In
the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless encashed and delivered to Marcos’ personal
thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible secretary. No receipt was issued.
and unspeakable affront to the society andthe people. - The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as
To paraphrase Brandeis: If theauthoritarian head of the described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves,
government becomes the law breaker, he breeds “out of the ordinary” and “not based on the
contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a normal procedure”. Not only were there no
law unto himself, he invites anarchy. vouchers prepared to support the disbursement,
Dispositive the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no
Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is PNCC receipt for the P55 Million was presented.
granted. It was even affirmed that were no payments made
judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings to PNCC by MIAA.
in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of - Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying
acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010and 10011 with the MARCOS Memorandum.
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Issue:
Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases W/N the Sandiganbayan violated Tabuena’s rights when
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and it propounded several questions to witnesses.
with careful regard for the requirements of due process,
so that the truth maybe finally known and justice done to Held:
all. Yes IT DID
While going over the records, we were struck by the
LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
Facts:
SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, questioning of a defense witness and of the accused
respondents.
- Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay themselves.
FRANCISCO,
directly J.:
to the president’s office and in cash what
the MIAA owes the Philippine National Simply consider the volume of questions hurled by the
Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which Sandiganbayan. Atty. Andres asked sixteen (16)
Tabuena replied, “Yes, sir, I will do it.” This order questions on direct examination. Prosecutor Viernes
was followed by a Presidential memorandum only asked six (6) questions on cross-examination After
repeating said order. the defense opted not to conduct any re-direct
- Tabuena, caused the release of P55 Million of examination, the court further asked a total of ten (10)
MIAA funds through a manager’s check for said questions Questions from the court after Tabuena’s
amount payable to Tabuena, which was cross-examination totalled sixty-seven (67), more than
five times Prosecutor Viernes’ questions on cross-
examination (14), and more than double the total of Facts:

direct examination and cross-examination questions - Imelda Marcos, was Minister of Human
which is thirty-one. The questions of the court were in Settlement while Jose P. Dans, Jr. was the
the nature of cross examinations characteristic of Minister of Transportation and Communication.
confrontation, probing and insinuation.i[ The two served as ex oficio Chairman and Vice-
Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail
This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to Transport Authority (LRTA). Marcos was also
question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
upon any material point which presents itself during the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc.
trial of a case over which he presides But not only (PGHFI).
should his examination be limited to asking - Marcos, in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI,
“clarificatory” questions, the right should be sparingly and Jose P. Dans, Jr. as Vice Chairman of LRTA,
and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should signed the Lease Agreement by virtue of which
stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor LRTA leased to PGHFI a parcel of land.
intervening in the conduct of the trial. - Marcos, as Chairman of PGHFI then signed a
Sublease Agreement with Transnational
Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in Construction Corporation (TNCC).
fact can one avoid the impression that the - Marcos was subsequently charged for entering
Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more into subject Lease Agreement alleged to be
precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the government.
Justices cross-examined the witnesses supplementing - The Sandiganbayan convicted Marcos of the
those made by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding charge after it found that the rental price
the latter’s questions in length. stipulated in the Lease Agreement was unfair and
unreasonably low in contrast to the rental rate in
The “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” requirement of the Sub-lease Agreement with the TNCC.
due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta - It appeared, however, that during the deliberation
when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the period the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
dual role of magistrate and advocate. composed of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and
Associate Justices Balajadia and Atienza could
not agree on whether to convict or acquit the
IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. The Honorable petitioner in the five (5) criminal cases pending
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE against her. Unlike Garchitorena and Balajadia,
PHILIPINES, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
Atienza was in favor of exonerating Marcos. As Third. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not also allow
there was no unanimity of votes, Presiding informal discussion of cases. The deliberations in case
Justice Garchitorena formed a Special Division of at bar did not appear on record. The informal discussion
five (5) justices composed of himself, Balajadia, of the three justices came to light only when petitioner
Atienza, Amores, and del Rosario. moved to inhibit Presiding Justice Garchitorena after her
- It was found that Presiding Justice Garchitorena conviction.
and Justices Balajadia and del Rosario lunched
together in a Quezon City restaurant where they Fourth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the
discussed petitioner's cases in the absence of presence of a non-member in the deliberation of cases.
Justices Atienza and Amores and in the presence
of a non-member of the Special Division. Thereat, Fifth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the
Presiding Justice Garchitorena, and Justices, exclusion of a member of a Division, whether regular or
Balajadia and del Rosario agreed with the special, in the deliberation of cases. Justices Atienza
position of Justice Atienza to acquit Marcos in and Amores were members of the Special Division but
some cases, and convict her in others. After the were not present when petitioner's cases were
meeting, Garchitorena dissolved the Special discussed over lunch in a Quezon City restaurant. In
Division. effect, Atienza and Amores were disenfranchised. They
were denied their right to vote for the conviction or
Issues: acquittal of petitioner.
W/N Sandiganbayan violated Marcos’ right to due
process. These irregularities violated the right of petitioner to be
tried by a collegial court. Pursuant to the rules of
Held: Sandiganbayan, petitioner cannot be convicted except
ABSOLUTELY. upon the vote of three justices, regardless of whether
First. Section 4, Rule VI categorically provides that her cases are before a regular division of three (3)
"sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or justices or a Special Division of five (5) justices. It is
division, shall be held in its principal office in the indispensable that their vote be preceded by discussion
Metropolitan Manila where it shall try and determine all and deliberation by all the members of the division.
cases filed with it. Before the deliberation by all, any opinion of a justice is
but tentative and could be changed. It is only after all
Second. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not allow the justices have been heard should the justices reach a
unscheduled discussion of cases. judgment. No one opinion can be denigrated in
importance for experience shows that an opinion that
starts as a minority opinion could become the majority As a general rule, a void decision will not result in the
opinion after the collision of views of the justices. The acquittal of an accused. The case ought to be
right of the petitioner, therefore, is the right to be heard remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
by all the five justices of the Special Division. She is for a void judgment does not expose an accused to
entitled to be afforded the opinion of all its members. double jeopardy. But the present case deserves a
different treatment considering the great length of time it
In the case at bar, Presiding Justice Garchitorena had has been pending with our courts.
already created the Special Division of five (5) justices
in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices More than six (6) years passed but petitioner's
in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a prosecution is far from over. To remand the case to the
vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, Sandiganbayan will not sit well with her constitutional
especially the new justices in the persons of Justices right to its speedy disposition. Section 16, Article III of
Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view the Constitution assures "all persons shall have the right
of the cases against her. to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
We reject the rationalization that the opinion of Justice
Amores was of de minimis importance as it cannot The rationale for both Section 14(2) and section 16 of
overturn the votes of the three justices convicting the Article III of the Constitution is the same, "justice
petitioner. This is a mere guesswork. The more delayed is justice denied." Violation of either section
reasonable supposition is that said opinion could have should therefore result in the acquittal of the accused.
changed the opinions of the other justices if it is based Imelda R. Marcos is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense
on an unbiased appreciation of facts and an undistorted charged.
interpretation of pertinent laws. That minority opinion
could sway the opinion of this Court towards the
acquittal of petitioner.
Prescinding from those premises, it is indisputable that

the decision of the First Division of the respondent
Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is void for
violating her right to substantive and procedural due
process of law.
GEORGE I. RIVERA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE Practices Act. The penalty imposed was forced
Facts:
COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, resignation without benefits.
- George I. Rivera, the Manager of Corporate
respondents. - On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit
Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which
("LBP"), was charged by the LBP President with reduced the penalty to suspension for 1 year.
dishonesty and violation of Anti-Graft laws on the - On appeal by Rivera and LBP to the CSC, the
basis of affidavits by Lao and Perez. CSC sustained the decision of the LBP.
- Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing - Rivera claims he was denied due process when
Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier
application with LBP, that he could facilitate the participated in her capacity as the Board
processing, approval and release of the loan if he Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken
would be given a 10% commission (which he action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also
received). He also received from Lao, a Wynner took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in
investor, P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to the resolution of petitioner's motion for
the United States, as well as additional funds for reconsideration with the CSC.
his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and
pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong. Issues:
- Rivera was further charged with having served W/N Rivera was denied due process.
and acted, without prior authority required by
CSC Memo Circ. 1025 as the personal consultant Held:
of Lao and as consultant in various companies YES, HE WAS.
where Lao had investments. He drew and In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of
received salaries and allowances approximately Appeals, 8 the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
P20,000.00 a month. and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after
- After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera it had been established that the case concerned an
guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he
the best interest of the service in accepting handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director
employment from a client of the bank and in of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of
thereby receiving salaries and allowances in administrative justice," the Court said:
violation of CSC Rules. He was also found to In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate
have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing
paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
different view or there would be no real review of the pay US $200.00 for alleged excess baggage
case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a without issuing any receipt. A confrontation took
biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since place where Singson was asked by the security
being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken officer to empty his pockets. The dollars paid by
in his first view of the case. Ms. Kondo were not found in his possession.
However, when the lower panel of the check-in
counter he was manning was searched, $265
Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should was found.
have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit - Singson was administratively charged and
herself totally from any participation in resolving investigated by a committee formed by PAL,
Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning which found him guilty and recommended his
and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due dismissal. PAL dismissed Singson.
process. - Singson then lodged a complaint, which was
heard by the Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino who
The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not found PAL’s evidence in terminating Singson’s
participate in MSPB's decision is unacceptable. It is not employment insufficient. Thus, he ordered
denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in Singson’s reinstatement.
MSPB's resolution denying the motion for - On appeal to the NLRC (Raul Aquino was by this
reconsideration of MSPB's decision. time the presiding commissioner), the judgment
was reversed. Singson’s Motion for
The case should be remanded to the CSC for resolution Reconsideration was denied (this time, Aquino
without the participation of Commissioner Gaminde. had no part).
- Singson assails the Resolution of the NLRC on
MIGUEL SINGSON, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR account of Commissioner Raul T. Aquino's
Facts:
RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. participation in reviewing and reversing on appeal
(PAL), respondents. was
- Singson employedby PALas Traffic his own decision as labor arbiter
Representative Passenger, Handling Division.
His duty consisted of checking in passengers and Issue:
baggage for a particular flight. On June 7, 1991 W/N Singson was denied due process.
he was assigned to serve the check-in counter of
Japan Air Lines (JAL) for Flight 742. Held:
- Mrs. Lolita Kondo, a passenger of Flight 742 filed YES, HE WAS
a complaint alleging that Singson required her to
In the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by
Relations , the Court laid down the requisites of substantial evidence presented at the hearing or at
procedural due process in administrative proceedings, least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the
to wit: parties.
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present one's case and submit evidence in support Singson was denied due process when Commissioner
thereof; Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; Second Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PAL's
(3) the decision must have something to support itself; appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a former
(4) the evidence must be substantial; labor arbiter.
(5) the decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the Under Rules of Procedure of NLRC, litigants are entitled
record and disclosed to the parties affected; to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial
(6) the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on right from the start of the process of review.
its own independent consideration of the law and facts Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case
subordinate; under review. He should have inhibited himself from
(7) the Board or body should, in all controversial any participation in this case.
questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues The resolution of the respondent NLRC is void for the
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. Division that handed it down was not composed of three
impartial commissioners. The right of petitioner to an
In addition, administrative due process includes: impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he
(a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the filed his appeal. His right is to an impartial review of
institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's three commissioners.
legal right;
(b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his NLRC decision set aside and remanded.
rights and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence
in his favor; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIO
(c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him HERIDA y BERNABE @ “JUN TAGAY” and NONITO JAMILA,
reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, JR., y CANTO accused,
Facts:
and one of competent jurisdiction; and - During a barangay fiesta, witnesses heard
several gunshots. Shortly thereafter, they saw
Julio Herida, and Edmund and Rene Tracilla intensively questioned witnesses of the defense. When
stabbing and hacking Herlito Delara, who appellant took the stand, 63 questions were added, with
eventually died. 27 or approximately 43% asked by the judge.
- Herida and Jamila denied any participation in the
killing and claimed that it was Delara who The intensive questioning of the witnesses, however,
attempted to kill Herida when he started firing his was necessary. The sworn affidavits of the material
revolver at him, allegedly because of a witnesses were adopted as their direct testimonies,
misunderstanding arising from carpentry job on subject to cross-examination. Since affidavits are
Delida’s house that Herida failed to do. generally taken ex parte and are often incomplete or
- The trial court acquitted Jamila but found Herida even inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries by the
guilty of murder. investigating officer, the trial court had to ask many
- Among Herida’s assigned errors is that the trial questions to clarify important matters. The judge’s
court judge exhibited bias or prejudice against behavior under this circumstance cannot be considered
him. He points out that over seventy percent biased or prejudiced. Judges are, after all, not mere
(70%) of the testimonies of the prosecution’s referees in a boxing bout, whose only task is to watch
material witnesses were elicited by the judge, and decide the results.
while the cross-examination of the defense
witnesses was to a large extent conducted by the Judges have as much interest as counsel in the orderly
judge himself. He submits that under these and expeditious presentation of evidence and have the
circumstances, his right to a fair and impartial trial duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the
was violated. issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by
witnesses, and address the points that are overlooked
Issue: by counsel.
W/N Herida’s right to a fair and impartial trial was Disposition: Proclamation 420 is valid, except for the tax
violated by alleged bias on the part of the judge. exemption.
Held:
NO
The transcripts of the proceedings show that the trial PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIETO
court did intensively question the witnesses. For Facts:
ADORA, accused-appellant.
instance, of the 182 questions asked of prosecution PANGANIBAN, J.:
- Marieto Adora was charged with the alleged rape
eyewitness, 79 or roughly 43% of the total came from of Cecilia Cotorno, his brother-in-law’s daughter
the judge. However, we note that the judge also
who had been under his care and custody in a trial judge. Under our system of legal procedure
Rapu-Rapu, Albay since the latter was a child. where he is judge of both the law and the facts, it is
- Cecilia was raped by Adora on 4 occasions, and often expedient or even necessary in the due and
always under the threat that Cecilia or her aunt faithful administration of justice for the presiding judge,
would be beheaded. Cecilia only broke her in the exercise of sound discretion, to question a
silence about the rapes when it was discovered witness in order that his judgment may rest upon a full
that she was pregnant. and clear understanding of the facts.
- Adora claims that the interventions of the trial “We do not believe that the trial judge transgressed the
court showed that the judge had sided with the permissible limits of what questions he could propound
prosecution; thus, he was denied his to a witness. The trial judge sought to elicit information
constitutional right to a fair trial. He argues that: on whether appellant used sufficient “intimidation” on
1. the trial judge directed the prosecutor as to who the victim. He wanted only to elucidate how the witness
should be called in as witnesses; appeared to the court as she was testifying on the
2. he disallowed as misleading a question propounded stand. That the answers of the witness formed part of
by the defense counsel, without waiting for an objection the decision is not a proof of prejudgment or bias
from the prosecution; towards the prosecution.
3. the questions propounded by the court on witnesses
were not clarificatory, but were in the nature of a direct “We believe he merely performed his function to ferret
examination. out the truth so his decision would be cogent and based
on facts. Thus, we hold that the scales of justice had
Issue: remained equal throughout the trial and appellant had
W/N such acts by the judge showed bias on his part. been given a fair hearing characterized by the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.”
Held:
NO People v. Castillo (1998)
“Trial judges must be accorded a reasonable leeway in
directing questions to witnesses as may be essential to Facts: Around 1AM on May 5, 1993, Eulogio Velasco,
elicit relevant facts and to make the record speak the floor manager of Cola Pubhouse along EDSA, was
truth. . In such an effort, a judge may examine or cross- sitting outside the pub while talking w/ his co-worker.
examine a witness. He may seek to draw out relevant Soon, their customer Tony Dometita came out of the
and material testimony though that testimony may tend pub and informed him that he’ll be on his way home.
to support or rebut the position taken by one or the However, when he was about an arm’s length from
other party This is not only the right but also the duty of Eulogio, appellant Robert Castillo came out from
nowhere and suddenly and w/o warning stabbed Tony allusions of bad moral character, which could not be
w/ a fan knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for objected to by defense counsel, because they have
help, appellant stabbed him once more, hitting him on been ventilited by the judge himself.
the left hand. Eulogio placed a chair between the two to
stop Castillo from further attacking Tony. HELD: Whether the judge was impartial. YES
Tony ran away but appellant pursued him. Eulogio The allegation of bias and prejudice is not well-taken. It
came to know later that Tony had died. His body was is a judge’s prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory
found outside the fence of Iglesia ni Cristo, EDSA. questions to ferret out the truth. On the whole, the Court
Medico-legal officer testified that the proximate cause of finds that the questions propounded by the judge were
Tony’s death was the stab wound on his chest. merely clarificatory in nature. Questions which merely
clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant
Appellant Robert Castillo claims that decedent Tony evidence are within judicial prerogative. Moreover,
was attacked by 2 malefactors as testified by one jurisprudence teaches that allegations of bias on the
Edilberto Marcelino, a tricycle driver, who saw men part of the trial court should be received with caution,
ganging up on Tony by the compound of Iglesia ni especially when the queries by the judge did not
Cristo. prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge’s
queries is determined not necessarily by their
TC did not appreciate Castillo’s defense of alibi and quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the
held that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such
strength, the accused having surprised and attacked w/ questioning. In this case, appellant failed to
a deadly weapon. And although treachery was present, demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions
it also held that this was absorbed by abuse of superior propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such
strength. questions and the answers thereto were eliminated,
appellant would still be convicted.
Appellant declares that the trial judge was biased
against him, for propounding questions that were well There was no showing that the judge had an interest,
within the prerogative of the prosecution to explore and personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at
ask. He alleges that the trial judge took over from the bar. He is therefore presumed to have acted regularly
prosecution and asked questions in a leading manner, and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the ‘cold
interrupted the cross-examination to help the witness neutrality of an impartial judge’ implicit in the guarantee
give answers favorable to the prosecution, and asked of due process. That the trial judge believed the
questions which pertained to matters of opinion and evidence of the prosecution more than that of the
defense, does not indicate that he was biased. He testimony. The details he supplied to the trial court were
simply accorded greater credibility to the testimony of of such nature and quality that only a witness who
the prosecution witnesses than to that of the accused. actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish.
What is more, his testimony was corroborated as to its
People v. Larranaga (2003) material points by several disinterested witnesses who
also identified the appellants. Most of them are neither
Facts: friends, relatives nor acquaintances of the victim's
Appellants assailed before the Supreme Court the family. As the Court reviewed closely the transcript of
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City finding stenographic notes, it could not discern any motive on
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of their part why they should testify, against the appellants.
kidnapping and serious illegal detention committed In the same vein, it was improbable that the prosecution
against the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong and would tirelessly go through the rigors of litigation just to
sentencing each of them to the penalties of two (2) destroy innocent lives. Thus, as between the appellants'
reclusiones perpetua. Among other things, the mere denial and the positive identification and
appellants questioned the sufficiency of the evidence of testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court was
the prosecution. convinced that the trial court did not err in according
weight to the latter. Anent appellants' alibi, a thorough
Held: The Court reviewed the records exhaustively and examination of the evidence for the defense showed
found no compelling reason why it should deviate from that the appellants failed to meet the requirements of
the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the trial time and place. They failed to establish by clear and
court. There was a clear and overwhelming evidence convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
that appellants, who are private individuals, forcibly them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the
dragged the victims into the white car, beat them so Chiong sisters were abducted. In view of the foregoing,
they would not be able to resist, held them captive the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court but with
against their will, and raped them. Marijoy was thrown to modifications as to the penalty imposed and the award
a deep ravine, resulting to her death, while Jacqueline of damages. Considering that the victims were raped,
has remained missing until now. Discharged state that Marijoy was killed and that both victims were
witness Davidson Valiente Rusia positively identified the subjected to dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the
appellants as the malefactors. His detailed narration of death penalty on the appellants was, according to the
the circumstances leading to the horrible death and Court, in order.
disappearance of Jacqueline has all the earmarks of
truth. Despite the rigid cross-examination conducted by, Topical: Appellants imputes bias and partiality to Judge
the defense counsel, Rusia remained steadfast in his Ocampo when he asked questions and made
comments when the defense witnesses were testifying. FACTS: On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the
Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a Civil Service Commission that Paitim, Municipal
judge may properly intervene during trial to promote Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional
expeditious proceeding, prevent unnecessary waste of examination for Cruz after the latter had previously
time and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear up obscurities. failed in the said examination three times. The CSC
The test is whether the intervention of the judge tends to found after a fact finding investigation that a prima facie
prevent the proper presentation of a cause or the case exists against Paitim for DISHONESTY, GRAVE
ascertainment of the truth in the matter where he MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE
interposes his questions or comments. Records show BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.
that the intervention by way of comment of Judge
Ocampo during the hearing was not only appropriate The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering
but was necessary. One good illustration is his a general denial of the material averments of the
explanation on alibi. Seeing that the appellants' counsel "Formal Charge." They also declared that they were
were about to present additional witnesses whose electing a formal investigation on the matter. The
testimonies would not establish the impossibility of petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss
appellants' presence in the scene of the crime, Judge averring that if the investigation will continue, they will
Ocampo intervened and reminded appellants' counsel be deprived of their right to due process because the
of the requisites of alibi, thus: . . . Surely, we cannot Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the
fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively reminding Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time. On
appellants' counsel of the parameters of alibi to ensure November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an
that there will be an orderly and expeditious "Investigation Report and Recommendation "finding the
presentation of defense witnesses and that there will be Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their
no time wasted by dispensing with the testimonies of dismissal from the government service. Petitioners
witnesses which are not relevant. Remarks which maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction
merely manifest a desire to confine the proceedings to to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in
the real point in issue and to expedite the trial do not accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A,
constitute a rebuke of counsel. Title 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC
is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all
administrative cases where the penalty imposed is
removal or dismissal from the office and where the
CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2001) complaint was filed by a private citizen against the
government employee.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can
was violated when the CSC acted asinvestigator, not,therefore, claim that there was a denial of due
complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time. process much less the lack of jurisdiction on thepart of
the CSC to take cognizance of the case.
HELD: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the
CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an
impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision
was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of Tejano v. Ombudsman (2005)
administrative bodies, being considered experts in their Facts: A report of Philippine National Bank (PNB)
field, are binding on the Supreme Court. The records Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan, dated 15 October
clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly 1992, discovered an alleged unfunded withdrawal in the
investigated by the CSC. After a careful examination of amount of P2.2 million by V&G Better Homes
the records, the Commission finds respondents guilty Subdivision (V&G). It implicated Vice President
asc harged. The photograph pasted over the name Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., the petitioner herein, Executive
Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller
July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of Jane Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch,
Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of including Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of
Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from V&G, as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of
the signature of Gilda Cruz. Petitioners' contention that P2.2 million of PNB funds. The resolution by the Graft
they were denied due process of law by the fact that the Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended
CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and the filing of the proper information for violation of
judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was affirmed by
untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, Office of the
mandated to hear and decide administrative case Special Prosecutor, Deputy Special Prosecutor and
instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor. A
including actions of its officers and the agencies reinvestigation was granted. The Special recommended
attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, the dismissal of the case, concurred by the Deputy
Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Special Prosecutor. On 10 December 1999,
Administrative Code of 1987.It can not be denied that Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier
the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that participated in the initial preliminary investigation as
a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them. Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation
They were properly informed of the charges. for the dismissal of the case with the marginal note
Theysubmitted an Answer and were given the “assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the
case aggressively.” Petitioner attributes partiality on the of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman
part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the
the reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should
that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary have delegated the review to his Deputies pursuant to
investigation of the same when he was a Special Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770
Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the
filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan. In earlier recommending the filing of information, then
Special Prosecutor Desierto was already convinced,
Issue: Whether Desierto acted with grave abuse of from that moment, that probable cause exists to indict
discretion the accused. It becomes a farfetched possibility that in
a subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman
Ratio: Yes. Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, Desierto would make a turnabout and take a position
committed grave abuse of discretion. The officer who contradictory to his earlier finding.
reviews a case on appeal should not be the same
person whose decision is under review. InZambales Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a
Chromite Mining Company v. Court of Appeals, the dispute may not review his decision on appeal. In order
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer
Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been might not turn out to be farce, the reviewing officer must
established that the case concerned an appeal of the perforce be other than the officer whose decision is
Secretary’s own previous decision, which he handed under review; otherwise, there could be no different
down while he was yet the incumbent Director of view or there would be no real review of the case. The
Mines. The SC has equally declared void a decision decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;
rendered by the Second Division of the National Labor inevitably, it would be the same view since being
Relations Commission, because one of its members, human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his
Commissioner Raul Aquino, participated in the review of first view of the case.
the case which he had earlier decided on as a former
labor arbiter. Likewise, the SC struck down a decision of Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good
Presidential Executive Assistance Jacobo Clave over a Government concedes the applicability of the prohibition
resolution of the Civil Service Commission, in which he, on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier
then concurrently its Chairman, had earlier concurred. decided, thus:
Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in
Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation the objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such judge
of the instant case and having recommended the filing should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be
prohibited from handling the case. A judge must not the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an
only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial
His actuation must inspire that belief. review of three commissioners. The denial of
petitioner’s right to an impartial review of his appeal is
This is an instance when appearance is as important as not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due
reality. process.
The same rule of thumb should apply to an investigating

officer conducting a preliminary investigation. This is
the reason why under Section 1679 of the former
Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice,
who has supervision over the prosecution arm of the Samartino v. Raon (2002)
government, is given ample power to designate another
prosecutor to handle the investigation and prosecution Facts: Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G.
of a case when the prosecutor handling the same is Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse,
otherwise disqualified by personal interest, or is unable respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo,
or fails to perform his duty. who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the
properties left by the deceased was her one-half share
The fact that the motion for reconsideration of in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite. On January
Ombudsman Desierto’s disapproval of the 03 November 25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner
1999 memorandum of Special Prosecutor Jesus Micael Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment. They
recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. alleged that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo,
21654 was denied by another reviewing officer, she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a
Ombudsman Marcelo, does not cure the infirmity of period of five years counted from 1986; that the said
Ombudsman Desierto’s actuation. As stressed lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that
in Singson v. NLRC: petitioner refused to vacate the property despite
demands therefor.
. . . The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the
fact that the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of
was denied by two commissioners and without the petitioner. At the time of service of summons at
participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of petitioner’s house, he was not at home as he was then
petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from confined at the National Bureau of Investigation
Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), defendant cannot be served promptly in person.
Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996, where he was Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by
undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally
dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be
officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court made in the proof of service. This is necessary because
with a certification that petitioner will be unable to substituted service is in derogation of the usual method
comply with the directive to answer the complaint within of service.
the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six
months for him to complete the rehabilitation program In the case at bar, the sheriff’s Return of Summons
and before he can be recommended for discharge by simply states:
the Rehabilitation Committee. The trial court, despite This is to certify that on this date: 26th day of January I
the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted have caused the service of summons, together with the
respondents’ motion to declare petitioner in default and attached complaint and its annexes issued in the above
ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. entitled case upon defendant REGALADO SAMARTINO
thru ROBERTO SAMARTINO, Brother of the defendant
Issue: Whether the summons were properly served to acknowledge receipt of said court processes by affixing
Sarmartino his signature at the lower left portion of the original
summons hereto attached.
Held: No. n actions in personam, summons on the
defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to Clearly, the above return failed to show the reason why
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, personal service could not be made. It failed to state
by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons that prompt and personal service on the defendant was
personally to defendant is impossible, service may be rendered impossible. It was not shown that efforts were
effected by leaving copies of the summons at the made to find the defendant personally and that said
defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some efforts failed; hence the resort to substituted service. As
person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or stated above, these requirements are indispensable
by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
place of business with some competent person in method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it
charge thereof. Otherwise stated, service of summons seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a
upon the defendant shall be by personal service first suit even though notice of such action is served not
and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served upon him but upon another whom law could only
in person will substituted service be availed of. The presume would notify him of the pending proceedings.
substituted service should be availed only when the For this reason, failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully
comply with the requirements of substituted service error in declaring the electric cables as scrap. The
renders said service ineffective. general manager, apparently appeased by Honrado’s
apology, issued a memorandum acknowledging receipt
Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in of his letter of apology and exculpated him of any
the records of this case is it shown that petitioner’s wrongdoing. However, the company through its counsel
brother, on whom substituted service of summons was filed on 9 July 1993 a criminal complaint for frustrated
effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion qualified theft against Honrado and herein petitioner De
residing at petitioner’s residence. los Santos. The complaint however was subsequently
dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig for lack
There being no valid substituted service of summons, of evidence. On 23 August 1993, upon request of Top-
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person Flite, alleged manpower agency of De los Santos,
of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of CAMARA STEEL terminated his services.
summons is not only required to give the court
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to Aggrieved by his illegal termination, De los Santos
afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim sought recourse with the Labor Arbiter who on 29 March
made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules 1994 rendered a decision ordering respondent
regarding the service of summons is as much an issue CAMARA STEEL to reinstate Delos Santos CAMARA
of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due STEEL went to the NLRC for recourse. Top-Flite filed
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to a Motion for Intervention praying that it be permitted to
be heard and submit any evidence one may have in intervene in the appeal as co-respondent and,
support of his defense. It is elementary that before a accordingly, be allowed to submit its own memorandum
person can be deprived of his property, he should first and other pleadings. Respondent CAMARA STEEL
be informed of the claim against him and the theory on empathically argues that Top-Flite, although impleaded
which such claim is premised. as respondent in NLRC-NCR Cases, subject of the
present appeal, was never summoned for which reason
it was deprived of procedural due process, therefore the
Delos Santos v. NLRC (2001) case should be remanded.
Facts: On 3 May 1991 petitioner De los Santos (janitor) Issue:Whether jurisdiction over Top-Flit was acquired.
was illegally dismissed for alleged frustrated qualified Yes.
theft when he was moving to the adjacent lot of the
company upon instruction of a certain Narciso. Narciso Held: CAMARA STEEL obviously wants to impress
Honrado admitted responsibility for the haul and his upon the SC that Top-flite, being a necessary party,
should have been summoned and the failure to do so litigation and flagellate him into submission with the lash
would justify the remand of the case to the Labor of technicality.
Arbiter. However, the records show that Top-Flite was
not only impleaded in the aforementioned case but was Bautista v. CA (2004)
in fact afforded an opportunity to be heard when it
submitted a position paper. This much was admitted by Facts: On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E.
Top-Flite in par. 5 of its Motion for Intervention where it Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and Socorro L. Angeles
stated that "movant submitted its position paper in the filed a complaint against respondent Manila Papermills,
cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph but the International, Inc., for quieting of title. This complaint
Presiding Arbiter ignored the clear and legal basis of was later amended to implead respondents Adelfa
the position of the movant." In other words, the failure Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo and Nelly
of Top-Flite to receive summons was not a fatal Javellana.
procedural flaw because it was never deprived of the
opportunity to ventilate its side and challenge petitioner Petitioners alleged in their Amended Complaint that
in its position paper, not to mention the comment which they have been in actual and uninterrupted possession
it submitted through counsel before the SC. It moved to of Lot 5753 of the Imus Estate; that they discovered that
intervene not because it had no notice of the the land was covered by a reconstituted title in the
proceedings but because its position paper allegedly name of respondents; and that the said title and the
was not considered by the Labor Arbiter. While derivatives thereof are spurious. Hence, they prayed
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be that they be declared the absolute owners of the land in
acquired by service of summons, it can also be acquired dispute.
by voluntary appearance before the court which
includes submission of pleadings in compliance with the After several delays spanning more than two years, the
order of the court or tribunal. A fortiori, administrative case was finally set for trial. However, on May 2, 2002,
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement to
by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements subject cancel the hearing on the ground that Atty. Michael
to the observance of fundamental and essential Macaraeg, the lawyer assigned to the case was in the
requirements of due process in justiciable cases United States attending to an important matter.
presented before them. In labor cases, a punctilious
adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in The trial court denied petitioners motion for
the interest of the workingman. A remand of the case, postponement and considered them as having waived
as the NLRC envisions, would compel petitioner, a lowly the presentation of their evidence. Petitioners claim that
worker, to tread once again the calvary of a protracted the arbitrary acts of the trial court have resulted in the
denial of their right to due process, and that the Court of Moreover, the grant of a motion for continuance or
Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not postponement is not a matter of right. It is addressed to
commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the the sound discretion of the court. Action thereon will not
challenged Orders. be disturbed by appellate courts, in the absence of clear
and manifest abuse of discretion resulting in a denial of
Petitioners further aver that the trial judge displayed substantial justice. In other words, we cannot make a
“noticeable partiality and prejudice” in dealing with their finding of grave abuse of discretion simply because a
case, by granting several continuances to respondents court decides to proceed with the trial of a case rather
while denying petitioner’s Urgent Motion for than postpone the hearing to another day, because of
Postponement. They cite four instances wherein the absence of a party. That the absence of a party
respondents were granted extensions to file responsive during trial constitutes a waiver of his right to present
pleadings and two instances wherein respondents’ evidence and cross-examine the opponent’s witnesses
requests for postponement were similarly granted. is firmly supported by jurisprudence. To constitute grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Issue: Whether the trial court acted arbitrarily. No. jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to postpone the
hearing must be characterized by arbitrariness or
Held: Far from being tainted with bias and prejudice, an capriciousness.
order declaring a party to have waived the right to
present evidence for performing dilatory actions upholds
the court’s duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the
deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of Eastern Broadcasting v Dans, Carreon, et al.
one party. Gutierrez, J.
Facts:
19 July 1985
Petitioners’ contention that they were denied due  Petitioner is asking to reopen the Radio Station
process is not well- taken. Where a party was afforded DYRE which was summarily closed on grounds of
an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but national security.
failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due  The petitioner contended that it was denied due
process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is process when it was closed on the mere
accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed allegation that the radio station was used to incite
of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violating the people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was
constitutional guarantee. held and not a bit of proof was submitted to
establish a factual basis for the closure. The
petitioner was not informed beforehand why
administrative action which closed the radio in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; f.
station was taken against it. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its
 No action was taken by the respondents (Minister own independent consideration of the law and facts of
of Transportation and Communication, the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
Commissioner of National Telecomm, etc.) to subordinate; g. The Board or body should, in all
entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of controversial questions, render its decision in such
the closure action. The petitioner also raised the manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
issue of freedom of speech. various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision
 Petitioner’s president subsequently filed a Motion rendered.]
to withdraw petition since it had sold the station (2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no
and that the new owner was granted the requisite controlling and precise definition of due process, it
license and franchise to operate said radio furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government
station. action must conform in order that any deprivation of life,
 However, the SC found the need to resolve the liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be
issue for guidance of the lower courts. 3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are
entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech
Issue: and expression clause. The test for limitations on
W/N due process was observed in the closure of freedom of expression continues to be the clear and
DYRE. present danger rule — that words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
Held/Ratio: clear and present danger that they will bring about the
NO. Guidelines laid down by the SC: substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to
(1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative prevent.
proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tibay v. (4) The clear and present danger test, however, does
Court of Industrial Relations should be followed before not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing
a broadcast station may be closed or its operations interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
curtailed. [a. the right to a hearing, which includes the Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies
right to present one's cause and submit evidence in have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast
support thereof; b. The tribunal must consider the corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain
evidence presented; c. The decision must have frequency without regard for government regulation or
something to support itself; d. The evidence must be for the rights of others. All forms of communication are
substantial; e. The decision must be based on the entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained expression clause.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must Antonio de los Reyes against him this time with
take the particular circumstances of broadcast media the Tanodbayan for the same charges.
into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether  1980- The Tanodbayan referred the complaint of
by government or through self-regulation by the industry de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service
itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. Roberto P.
handling. Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and
The government has a right to be protected against Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation
broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently Report recommending appropriate legal action on
overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to the matter.
organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread  Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against
uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be him, claiming immunity from prosecution by virtue
informed. Radio and television would have little reason of PD 1791, but the motion was denied. MR also
for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, denied.
obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since  By 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were
they are the most convenient and popular means of with the Tanodbayan for final disposition.
disseminating varying views on public issues, they also  1985- the Tanodbayan approved a resolution
deserve special protection. recommending that informations be filed against
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is petitioner before the Sandiganbayan. Accordingly,
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy five informations were filed against him.
(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection  Petitoner filed with the Sandiganbayan a
given to all forms of media by the due process and consolidated motion to quash the informations on
freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. the follow grounds:
Tatad v Sandiganbayan 1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due
Yap, J. process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of
Facts:
21 March 1988 the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of
 Tatad, as Secretary of the Department of Public jurisdiction to file the informations;
Information, was charged with alleged violations 2. Prescription of the offenses charged 3 of the 5 cases;
of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft 3. The facts charged where he allegedly failed to file
and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973 do
was taken on said report. not constitute an offense;
 Five years later, he resigned. Two months 4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant
thereafter, another complaint was lodged by
 Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was
resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash. around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation
MR denied. was accepted by Pres. Marcos. By October 25, 1982, all
 Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was
violated the constitutional mandate of "due already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it
process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved
unduly prolonging the termination of the by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the
preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding criminal informations against the
corresponding informations only after more than a accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations
decade from the alleged commission of the were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all
purported offenses, which amounted to loss of against petitioner Tatad alone.
jurisdiction and authority to file the informations A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the
impression that political motivations played a vital role in
Issue: activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in
Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were,
due process and the right to "speedy disposition" only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with
of the cases against him as guaranteed by the President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established
Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of investigation, which require the submission of affidavits
the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
after the trial? respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan
referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Held/Ratio: Command for finding investigation and report.
YES. Antonio de los Reyes’ original complaint, which There was such blatant departure from the established
was termed a report, was filed in 1974. Coming to the procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve
case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on an office directly under the President in the
record and are largely undisputed. The "report" was prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion
made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of that the prosecution was politically motivated.
1979 when it became widely known that Secretary Prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving
Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had the impression that their noble office is being used or
resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or
1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and
complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice
even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all

litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, Inocencio Gonzales v CSC
powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the Puno, J.
established procedure may the public's perception of 2 September 1993
the of the prosecutor be enhanced. Facts:
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under  Gonzales was employed at the Agricultural
preliminary investigation cannot be justified on the basis Training Institute of the Department of Agriculture
of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) for 36 years. On his 25th year of service, he
prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve received a merit award recognizing his
a case under preliminary investigation by him from its continuous, dedicated, and faithful service in the
termination. While this period fixed by law is merely government. On his 30th year, he repeated the
"directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be feat. His record of service is without any wart of
disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute malfeasance or misfeasance in office.
impunity. It certainly cannot be assumed that the law  1990- He had to visit his children in the US so he
has included a provision that is deliberately intended to took several leaves of absences.
become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.  On June 25, 1990, petitioner wrote to the Director
There was violation of the constitutional right of the of ATI requesting approval of a leave without pay
accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the starting from the second week of July to
requirements of the law governing the conduct of December 31,1991. He cited as additional reason
preliminary investigation, including substantial his desire to take advantage of ". . . a physical
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law check-up free of charge due to my childrens'
for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part medical plan benefits". The letter was personally
of the procedural due process constitutionally delivered by petitioner's wife. It carried his
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the address in US.
broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the  For unknown reason, the Director of ATI did not
constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of act on the letter-request. It was neither approved
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights nor disapproved. Three (3) months later, ATI
(both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the started acting adversely on petitioner's request.
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's  ATI's Assistant Director and OIC wrote to
constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years petitioner declaring him absent without official
cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light leave for more than thirty (30) days and warning
of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. him that should he not report within five (5) days
from receipt of the letter, he would be dropped
from the rolls. The letter was addressed at Be that as it may, petitioner's third argument where he
petitioner's house in QC. The letter, however, was invokes the protection of the due process clause of the
returned to sender (ATI). Constitution should be sustained.
 What ATI did was to publish a notice of similar CSC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1985 is the
import in the October 4, 11 and 18, 1990 issues governing rule on notice before an employee can be
of the Philippine Journal, a newspaper, of general dropped from the rolls due to absence without
circulation. On October 24, 1990, ATI dropped leave, viz:
petitioner from its rolls. He was not furnished a 4. The agency should notify in writing the employee,
copy of the order. who is absent without leave (AWOL) for thirty (30) days,
 When he came back from the US and reported for to report within five (5) days from receipt of notice,
work on November 19, 1990, he found out that otherwise, he shall be dropped from the rolls.
Mercedes Puruganan had been appointed to his The Circular does not specifically state where the notice
position. By himself, he protested to the Civil shall be sent. In the case at bar, ATI knew that
Service Commission on December 14, 1990. His petitioner was staying in the US. The letter of June 25,
letter-protest was endorsed to the Merit Systems 1990 of the petitioner requesting this leave clearly
Protection Board (MPSB) for appropriate action. carried his address in the United States. The records do
On April 30, 1991, the Board ruled that petitioner not show that the officials of ATI denied knowledge of
was duly notified before he was dropped from the petitioner's correct address. Despite this knowledge,
roll. His appeal was dismissed. His motion for however, the letter of ATI's Asst. Director and OIC was
reconsideration was rejected. Petition to the CSC inexplicably mailed to his house in QC. The letter was
was denied. not received by petitioner per certification of the
Postmaster of the Bureau of Post of Quezon City.
Issue: The disputed ruling cuts too deeply on petitioner's right
W/N petitioner was accorded due process before he to continue his employment in the government and
was dropped from the rolls. unduly dilutes the protection of due process. To be sure,
the cavalier attitude of respondent Commission is
Held/Ratio: deplorable considering that on line is the thirty six (36)
NO. It ought to be self-evident that security of tenure long years of faithful and dedicated, service to the
can not be a shield against absences without proper government of the petitioner. Nothing less than strict
approval by the authorities. Leaves are matters of compliance with the demands of due process should
private convenience and cannot prejudice public have been demanded by the respondent Commission
service. Their approval is discretionary as it depends on from the officials of ATI in light of the equities of the
the higher needs of public service. case. Nor can we give our concurrence to the further
ruling of the respondent Commission that the denial of inspect and investigate its license as well as work
due process to the petitioner was cured by the permits and health certificates of its staff,
publication of said notice in three (3) issues of the  The inspection resulted in stoppage of work in the
Philippine Journal. Notice by publication might have night club and restaurant operations.
been proper if the address of petitioner were unknown.  Later, Mayor Lim refused to accept application for
Since the officials of ATI knew the whereabouts of business license and work permits for that year.
petitioner, they have no legal warrant to notify him thru  Bistro interposes that municipal corporations
the newspapers. cannot prohibit operations of nightclubs. They
There are other acts, both covert and overt, which show may regulate but not prevent.
that ATI officials did not accord fair treatment to the  RTC- issued preliminary injunction.
petitioner. Petitioner filed his request for leave without  Lim, however, issued an order closing Bistro’s
pay on June 25, 1990 while still in the United States. operations.
Though petitioner has no right to presume that his  Bistro filed a contempt case against Lim which
request would be granted, nonetheless it was no less a was later withdrawn in exchange that the
duty on the part of officials ATI to act immediately on the preliminary injunction be respected.
request, if only because petitioner was abroad and
 Lim- filed a motion to dissolve the injunction
needed reasonable time and resources to return to the
alleging that the power of the mayor to inspect
Philippine on a five (5) day call. The OIC did not explain
and investigate commercial establishments and
why all of a sudden the "exigencies of the service"
staff is implicit in Manila’s revised charter and in
required the immediate return of the petitioner. If the
the LGC.
"exigencies of the service" were real why was he
 RTC- denied motion
allowed to go on leave. Worse still, the order dropping
 CA- denied Lim’s petition. A writ of PI may issue if
petitioner from the rolls was never sent to him.
Petitioner did not also know he had been replaced till he the act sought to be enjoined will cause
returned to the Philippines on November. irreparable injury to the movant or destroy the
status quo before a full hearing can be held on
the merits.
Alfredo Lim and Rafelito Garayblas v CA Issue:

Carpio, J.
Facts: W/N Bistro was denied due process.
12 August 2002
 Bistro filed a petition before the RTC against
Held/Ratio:
Mayor Lim who allegedly instructed policemen to
YES. Injunction proper.
There was no due process in the order to close the  Petitioner: no illegal dismissal, the closure of the
business. Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific branch was virtue of a lawful order of the LG.
violation of conditions of its business licenses or  Unicraft and its counsel failed to appear before
permits. He refused to grant the license even without the Voluntary Arbitrator who found in favor of
considering whether the legal prerequisites were met. private respondents.
The authority of mayors to issue business permits is  Unicraft filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
beyond question (LGC and Manila Charter). The power of Appeals contending that they were denied
to refuse to issue such license and permits is premised opportunity to be heard in the proceedings before
on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for issuance the voluntary arbitrator. CA remanded to the VA.
of such license and permits. The mayor must observe  Instead of conducting further proceedings,
due process by giving the applicant notice and however, the voluntary arbitrator filed a comment
opportunity to be heard. praying, inter alia, that he be declared to have lost
The mayor indeed had authority to inspect and jurisdiction over the case upon rendition of the
investigate for violations of conditions but does not have judgment
power to order a police raid on these establishments on  CA re-examined the stipulation of the parties and
guise of inspection or investigation. Lim acted beyond thereafter rendered the assailed resolution
his authority. allowing, among others, the partial execution of
the decision of the voluntary arbitrator with
Unicraft Industries v CA respect to the award of separation pay and
Ynares-Santiago, J. attorney’s fees. MR denied.
Facts:
26 March 2001
 Private respondents were employees of Unicraft Issue:
for at least over a year, performing work W/N Unicraft was denied due process.
necessary and desirable to its operation. Its
principal office was in Apao, Mandaue City and Held/Ratio:
when it opened a branch in Lapu-Lapu, private NO, it was not accorded due process at the VA level
respondents were transferred there. because it was not able to present evidence as can
 Unicraft however failed to comply with certain be gleaned from the stipulation entered into by the
requirements and it was ordered closed by the parties before the CA. This is an acknowledgment by
local government thus effecting the mass both parties that the proceedings before the VA have
dismissal of private respondents. not been completed. Despite this, the Court of Appeals
 Private respondents: contended that they were rendered the assailed resolution ordering the immediate
dismissed because of their union activities. execution of the award of separation pay and attorney’s
fees. Prior to that, the VA filed a comment contending  The evidence for the prosecution tends to show
that he had lost jurisdiction over the case after he that on or about February 18, 1992, up to May 31,
rendered judgment. While under the law decisions of 1992 at Quezon City, accused Jane Caras
voluntary arbitrators are accorded finality, the same may obtained from complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza
still be subject to review, such as here where there was on installment various gift checks and purchase
a violation of petitioners’ right to due process and to be orders from Uniwide Sales and in payment
heard. thereof, the accused issued to the complainant
In spite of statutory provisions making “final” the the checks in question which were drawn against
decisions of certain administrative agencies, the SC has Philippine Commercial Bank.
taken cognizance of petitions questioning these  When the checks were presented for deposit or
decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of encashment, they were all dishonored for the
discretion, violation of due process, denial of reason “Account Closed”. Despite repeated
substantive justice, or erroneous interpretation of the verbal and written demands made on her to
law where brought to our attention. replace the dishonored checks with cash, she
The right of due process is fundamental in our legal failed and refused to do so.
system and we adhere to this principle not for reasons  The accused admitted that she issued the fifteen
of convenience or merely to comply with technical (15) checks. She claimed, however, that they
formalities but because of a strong conviction that every were given to Marivic Nakpil,]alleged sister of the
man must have his day in court. In its most basic sense, complainant, as “guarantee deposit,” that is, for
the right to due process is simply that every man is every gift check and purchase order given to the
accorded a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Its very accused, she issued personal checks to
concept contemplates freedom from arbitrariness, as guarantee its payment. The checks are not to be
what is required is fairness or justice. It abhors all encashed nor deposited with any bank. With
attempts to make an accusation synonymous with regard to Check No. 017769 in the amount of
liability. P540,316.35, accused claimed that she entrusted
Jane Caras v CA and People of the the said check to Marivic Nakpil in blank, with her
Philippines signature but without any amount or numerical
Facts:
Quisumbing, J. figures on the face of the check.
 Jane
2 October Caras was charge in 15 related cases of
2001  On May 13, 1994, the Court found her guilty of all
violation of the BP22. charges.
 When arraigned on August 16, 1993, accused  MR denied by TC. CA affirmed.
Caras pleaded “not guilty”. Thereafter, trial
proceeded.
 Petitioner denies having received any notice that maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements for the
the checks she issued had been dishonored by payment of the check within five banking days after
the drawee bank receiving notice that such check had been
dishonored. Thus, it is essential for the maker or drawer
Issue: to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so she could
On due process, W/N failure to give notice of pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its
dishonor is a denial of due process. payment within the period prescribed by law.
The notice of dishonor, as held in Lao v. Court of
Held/Ratio: Appeals, may be sent by the offended party or the
YES. ). The absence of a notice of dishonor drawee bank. Complainant testified that she hired
necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to lawyers to prepare and send the demand letters. The
preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, prosecution presented and marked in evidence two
procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice letters demanding payment which were purportedly sent
of dishonor be actually served on to petitioner. However, the prosecution presented no
petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and evidence that would establish petitioner’s actual receipt
the basic postulates of fairness require - that the of any demand letter which could have served as notice
notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received to petitioner. None of the letters contained an indication
by her to afford her the opportunity to avert that they were actually received by petitioner. No
prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. (Lao v CA) acknowledgement receipt or return card for the first and
Absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of second demand letters were offered in evidence. Such
the dishonor of her checks and was given the omission and neglect on the part of the prosecution is
opportunity to make arrangements for payment as fatal to its cause.
provided for under the law, she cannot be convicted of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the prosecution Mariveles Shipyard v CA
to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of Quisumbing, J.
dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal. Facts:
11 November 2003
Knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the  In October 1993, petitioner corporation, Mariveles
bank is presumed from the act of making, drawing, and Shipyard Corp., engaged the services of Longest
issuing a check payment of which is refused by the Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. to
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented render security services at its premises. Longest
within 90 days from the date of issue. However, this Force deployed its security guards at petitioner’s
presumption may be rebutted by the accused- shipyard at Mariveles, Bataan. According to
petitioner. Such presumption does not hold when the petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms
of the security contract with Longest Force Procedure which provided that: If the Labor
(LF). However, it found the services Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after
unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to the parties have submitted their position papers
terminate its contract with LF. In turn, LF and supporting documents, he shall issue an
terminated the security guards (private Order to that effect and shall inform the parties,
respondents). stating the reasons therefor…
 Thus these private respondents filed a
complaintfor illegal dismissal, underpayment of w Issue:
ages, nonpayment of overtime pay, premium pay W/N petitioner was denied due process.
forholiday and rest day, service incentive leave
pay, 13th month pay, and attorney’s fees against Held/Ratio:
LF and petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. NO, he was given ample opportunity to present his
Meanwhile, LF filed a crossclaim against side. The essence of due process is simply an
petitioner. Petitioner denied liability on account opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative
of illegal dismissal, stressing that no employer- proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
employee relationship existed between it and the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
private respondents. They also wanted the cross- ruling complained of. Not all cases require a trial-type
claim be dismissed. hearing. The requirement of due process in labor cases
 The Labor Arbiter declared LF and petitioner before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are
jointly and severally liable to pay the money given the opportunity to submit their position papers to
claims of complainants. It also ordered LF to which they are supposed to attach all the supporting
reinstate to former or equivalent positions the documents or documentary evidence that would prove
respondents without loss of seniority rights and their respective claims, in the event the Labor Arbiter
privileges with full backwages. determines that no formal hearing would be conducted
 NLRC affirmed in toto. CA denied petitioner’s or that such hearing was not necessary. In any event,
special civil action for certiorari. as found by the NLRC, petitioner was given ample
 Petitioner avers that there was denial of due opportunity to present its side in several hearings
process of law when the Labor Arbiter failed to conducted before the Labor Arbiter and in the position
have the case tried on the merits. Petitioner adds papers and other supporting documents that it had
that the Arbiter did not observe the mandatory submitted. We find that such opportunity more than
language of the then Sec. 5(b) Rule V (now satisfies the requirement of due process in labor cases.
Section 11, per amendment in Resolution No. 01-
02, Series of 2002) of the NLRC New Rules of
VALLADOLID v. INCIONG The fact that the Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor
issued on December 26. 1979 lacks a statement of facts
FACTS: and conclusions of law does not equate to the violation
JRM owned Tropicana and Copacabana hotels. of the constitutional requirement set forth in Article 8,
However, it only had controlling interest in Tropicana, as section 14, which is required of decisions or courts of
Copacabana was managed by its owners (siblings Yu). record. However, the assailed order is not a decision of
The two hotels became direct competitors. Pertinent a court of record. The Ministry of Labor is an
financial and business information was being leaked administrative agency with quasi-judicial functions, with
from Copacabana to Tropicana. Ricardo Valladolid (pet) rules of procedure mandated to be non-litigious,
was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone summary, and non-technical. As the Deputy Minister
switchboard operator. He was subsequently transferred was in full accord with the findings of fact and the
to the position of clerk-collector. He was suspected to conclusions of law drawn from shoes facts by the
be the leak who sends important information to the Regional director, there was no necessity of discussing
competitor. anew the issues raised therein.
Order of May 2, 1979 (December 26, 1979): In

response to the application for clearance and
Valladolid’s complaint for Illegal Dismissal, the Regional
director issued this order. The Deputy Minister of Labor, FERNANDEZ v. NLRC
in a succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding
“no sufficient justification or valid reason to alter, modify, FACTS:
much less reverse the Order appealed from”. Reynaldo worked as a bus driver for Nelbusco, Inc. On
February 28, 1993, the airconditioning unit of the bus
Contention c/o JRM: The order of Hon. Amado Inciong which Reynaldo was driving suffered a mechanical
(resp) failed to state the facts and conclusion of law breakdown. The company told Reynaldo to wait until
upon which it is based, thus unconstitutional. the airconditioning unit was repaired. No other bus was
assigned to Reynaldo to keep him gainfully employed.
Memorandum decision: Only dispositive portion is Reynaldo continued reporting to his employer’s office
authored by the SC. The rest is copied from the for work, only to find out that the airconditioning unit had
decision of the lower court. Not prohibited, still valid, but not been repaired. More than six months elapsed but
it is not encouraged. Reynaldo was not given work. He filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal. The NLRC ruled that there was no
HELD: illegal dismissal.
against him were not yet final and executory as they

HELD: were still on appeal.
As earlier noted, the essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard, to explain one’s side, or to ISSUE: W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling court is necessary before Torres can be validly
complained of. In the case at bar, private respondents rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of
were given ample opportunity to do just that but they his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
failed, for unknown reasons, to avail themselves of such balance of his original sentence.
opportunity. They themselves moved that they be
allowed to present additional affidavits on August 19, HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1991, but they never did; no valid reason was given for 1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the
their failure to do so. Their contention that the labor terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
arbiter failed to rule on their motion deserves scant executive acts, which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
consideration. It is axiomatic – in fact, it is plainly 2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a
commonsensical – that when a counsel asks for an condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of
extension of time within which to file a pleading, he must such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not
be ready with that pleading on the date specified in his subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
motion, even absent a resolution or order disposing of Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
his motion. consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised
TORRES v. GONZALES Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no
FACTS: judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, 3. Because due process is not semper et ubique
Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial
Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring that due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for
the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him for violating the which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of
conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a
constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;"
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned
Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him respondent was called over the phone by a leading
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the
or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the cases against two Members of the Court." Statements
RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, of the respondent saying that the SC’s order '"heightens
minimum period, upon a convict who “having been the people's apprehension over the justice system in
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall this country, especially because the people have been
violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes
President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner go scot-free” was publicized in leading newspapers.
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. explain in writing why he should not be punished for
contempt of court for making such public statements
ZALDIVAR v. SANDIGANBAYAN reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get
FACTS: some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the
The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and
Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked
cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the
Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987 Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on
Constitution, respondent’s powers as Tanodbayan have responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
been superseded by the creation of the Office of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot
Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special expect due process from this Court, that the Court has
Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly.
investigation and file cases only when so authorized by The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court
the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
by the respondent wherein he included statements Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of
which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for
This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than
a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and
slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That contempt charges."
he "was approached and asked to refrain from
ISSUE: W/N there was a violation of the freedom of defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US.
speech/expression. The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition
treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there.
HELD: Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against
There was no violation. The Court did not purport to him as well as the extradition request by the USA. The
announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising
simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a
Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to
contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez.
degrade the administration of justice."
ISSUE: W/N Jimenez is deprived of due process.
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the
"balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the HELD:
statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case
nature and were made in such a manner and under against Jimenez refers to an impending threat of
such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible deprivation of one’s property or property right. No less is
limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the this true, but even more so in the case before us,
authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty,
a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and
the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited
the judicial system of a country and the destruction of property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in
the standards of professional conduct required from incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has
some implications to the society. GOV’T OF USA v. PURUGANAN
FACTS:
SEC OF JUSTICE v. JUDGE RALPH LANTION This petition is a sequel of the case of Secretary of
Justice v. Judge Lantion.
FACTS:
Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging HELD: No Violation of Due Process
from tax evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the before those proceedings could be completed, it was
conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not hindered from continuing with the due processes
amount to a violation of his right to due process. We prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due
iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process now has thus become hollow. He already had
process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of
time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for taking it, he ran away.
a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition In this light, would it be proper and just for the
case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard government to increase the risk of violating its treaty
is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his
full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed
Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process
and fundamental fairness. that he had previously shunned pales against the
government’s interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no obligations and in cooperating with the world community
arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his in the suppression of crime. Indeed, “constitutional
liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights
detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced
(1) the DOJ’s filing in court the Petition with its against exigent and palpable government interests.”
supporting documents after a determination that the
extradition request meets the requirements of the law GOV’T OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge’s
independent prima facie determination that his arrest FACTS:
will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of The Philippines and Hong Kong signed an “Agreement
a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons.
is under the court’s custody, to apply for bail as an ”Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the
exception to the no-initial-bail rule. Hong Kong Court. Department of Justice (DOJ)
received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a
It is also worth noting that before the US government request for the provisional arrest of private respondent
requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings Muñoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the
had already been conducted in that country. But National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn,
because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The NBI an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
agents arrested and detained him. Muñoz filed a petition certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
for bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, Jr.
holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
extradition cases and that private respondent is a high Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed
“flight risk.” After Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself that a new standard which he termed “clear and
from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private extradition cases. According to him, this standard
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
Order denyinghis application for bail and this was but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
granted by respondent judge. potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing
evidence” that he is not a flightrisk and will abide with all
ISSUE: the orders and processes of the extradition court.In this
W/N the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion case, there is no showing that private respondent
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing presented evidence to show that he is nota flight risk.
private respondent to bail? Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
HELD: court to determine whether privaterespondent may be
No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in evidence.”
allowing private respondent to bail. Accordingly,
although the time-honored principle of pacta sunt ROXAS v. VASQUEZ
servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into FACTS:
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region it Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a
does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five
guaranteed by the Constitution. More so, where these units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards Committee
rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd.,
also by international conventions, particularly the manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the contract
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the was executed between PC-INP and Tahei Co. The COA
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy
in the amounts indicated on the disbursement voucher
and the purchase order. Consequently, the DILG Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived
Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated
against the respondents. After preliminary investigation, the complaint against them without their knowledge.
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended Due process of law requires that every litigant must be
the indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be
review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor present and defend himself in person at every stage of
recommended the dismissal of the complaints against the proceedings.
Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. Formal
charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against
Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espeña
and Santos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal Ortigas v Lufthansa
information. Flores and Tanchanco moved for a Facts:
J. Barredo
reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the Francisco Ortigas, and defendant Lufthansa German
Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the Airlines, appealed from the decision of the Court of First
dismissal of the charges against Flores and Tanchanco. Instance of Manila, condemning the defendant to pay
In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor plaintiff an indemnity for the former's failure to "comply
made a sudden turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil and with its obligation to give first class accommodation to a
Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused. Filipino passenger holding a first class ticket," This was
due to giving of the space instead to a Belgian and the
ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of the petitioners as accused improper conduct of its agents in dealing with him which
violated their right to due process. was filled with discrimination.
HELD: During the trial, there were several postponements of

It appears that the charge against respondents was the trial from both sides. Three hearings were
previously dismissed. For this reason, there being no postponed on the request of the plaintiffs, 4 on the
motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said request of both parties, and 10 on the request of
respondents ceased to be parties. Consequently, the respondents.
mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those
previously indicted, without questioning the dismissal of Due to so many postponements made by the
the charge against the said respondents, could not and respondent, including the no-show of their European
should not be made the basis for impleading them as employees as witnesses, the case tilted out of their
accused in this case without violating their right to due favor. One of their witnesses was stricken from the list
process. due to his non-appearance in the day that the cross-
exam on him was to be finished and the judge moved witnesses on the date set. Under the circumstances, the
for a finality regarding the postponements (ie. no excuse given by defendant that the witnesses could not
postponements were to be made again) leave their respective stations and places of work to
attend the trial is plainly unacceptable. There was
Ortigas claimed that while in Rome, the discrimination enough time and opportunity for defendant to have
against him took place. Moreover, when he asked for a made the corresponding adjustments in the
seat change to first class during the stop overs, he assignments of its personnel so as to enable its
wasn’t given any. He was only given the option when he witnesses to be in court.
was already in Hong Kong, about 3 hours only from
Manila. As it is, there was actually no basis at all for the
exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge in a
Issues: manner favorable to it. Trials may be postponed
1. WON the lower court acted in grave abuse of because of the absence of evidence only when such
discretion when it denied the defendant’s motion for absence is justified. Mere absence is not a justification
postponement on Sept 24, 1966. in itself. Section 4 of Rule 22 is sufficiently clear on this
2. WON the lower court erred in striking out the point. It provides that "A motion to postpone a trial on
testimony of one of the defendants witnesses even if his the ground of absence of evidence can be granted only
testimony was not finished upon affidavit showing the materiality of evidence
3. WON the lower court erred in making the defendant expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has
pay indemnities been used to procure it." This means that it must be
Held: No to all. Judgment modified raising damages shown to the court that due diligence had been
from 100k to 150k. exercised in either securing the presence of the
evidence (witnesses) or preventing the absence thereof.
Ratio:
1. The case had been pending for about three years Indeed, even if such reason were given earlier on
and had actually suffered during that period even more September 24, 1966 the court would have been as well
than the usually permissible number of continuances, justified in denying the requested postponement. We
quite often to suit the convenience of defendant's cannot see any reason why, despite its having
counsel. Notice of the September 28, 1966 schedule knowledge of the date of the hearing about a month
had been served on counsel the month previous. It must before, defendant did not see to it that its expected
be assumed that due preparations and arrangements witnesses were not assigned to do duty on the day they
were to be made since the receipt of that notice to were supposed to appear in court. We cannot believe
insure the presence in Manila for the expected
Lufthansa could be so undermanned that such a simple Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it
adjustment of its personnel had to be "impossible." is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly
cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to
2. The right of a party to cross-examine the witnesses of cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of
his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not
cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal and cannot be done or completed due to causes
cases. The express recognition of such right of the attributable to the party offering the witness, the
accused in the Constitution does not render the right of uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered
parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is incompetent.
an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by
the fundamental law. In the case at bar, however, the Supreme Court has not
opted not to rely exclusively on the foregoing
Subject to appropriate supervision by the judge in order considerations. In order to satisfy as to whether or not
to avoid unnecessary delays on account of its being defendant stands to be irreparably prejudiced by the
unduly protracted and to needed injunctions protective impugned action of the trial court relative to the
of the right of the witness against self-incrimination and testimony of Lazzari, the justices have just the same
oppressive and unwarranted harassment and gone over the transcript thereof. After considering the
embarrassment, a party is absolutely entitled to a full same, they claimed that even his direct testimony,
cross-examination as prescribed in Section 8 of Rule without taking into account anymore his answers to the
132 thus: "Upon the termination of the direct cross-examination questions of counsel for plaintiff,
examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the cannot be of much weight in establishing the defenses
adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct in defendant's answer.
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient
fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and However, the trial court's action cannot be categorized
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the as arbitrary or oppressive or as amounting to a grave
reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the abuse of discretion. To be sure, this second order was
issue." Until such cross-examination has been finished, but a logical consequence of the previous order denying
the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as defendant's motion for postponement. With such denial,
complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form the next thing in order was to declare the presentation
part of the evidence to be considered by the court in of evidence of the defendant terminated. Accordingly, it
deciding the case. was necessary to determine what evidence could be
considered to be for the defendant. And so when
counsel for plaintiff asked the court to strike out the
testimony so far given by Lazarri, there was practically Amas, Kidapawan, Cotabato. Attached to these
no alternative for the court but to grant the same. appointment papers were photocopies of certificates of
Indeed, defendant's counsel could not and did not offer eligibility of the teachers.
any objection thereto.
Director Gantungan U. Kamed noticed that the
3. In the light of all the foregoing, there can be no doubt certificates of eligibility were of doubtful authenticity.
as to the right of Ortigas to damages, both moral and The signature of Civil Service Commission Director
exemplary. Precedents We have consistently adhered Elmer R. Bartolata and the initials of the processors of
to so dictate. said certificates were clearly forgeries. Director Kamed
Lopez- According to the Court, such omission placed initially forwarded five (5) appointments to Civil Service
plaintiffs in a predicament that enabled the company to Regional Office No. XII for verification of their R.A. 6850
keep the plaintiffs as their passengers in the tourist eligibilities and for appropriate action through an
class, thereby retaining the business and promoting the indorsement letter dated September 26, 1991.
company's self-interest at the expense of, Upon verification of the records of CSRO No. XII, it was
embarrassment, discomfort and humiliation on the part found that said applications for civil service eligibility
of the plaintiffs. under R.A. 6850 were disapproved. However, the
certificates of eligibility they submitted were genuine as
These precedents, as may be seen, apply four-square their control number belonged to the batch issued to
to herein plaintiffs case. Defendant's liability for willful CSRO No. XII by the CSC Central Office. But the
and wanton breach of its contract of carriage with records showed that these certificates were never
plaintiff is, therefore, indubitable. issued to any one.
Two separate investigations were conducted by Director
Cesar P. Buenaflor of Regional Office No. 12 of the Civil
Service Commission in Cotabato City: (1) on how the
R.A. 6850 certificates were issued/released from the
Office, and (2) on how the teachers got said certificates,
The teachers concerned were asked to report to the
Emin v. De Leon Office and bring the original copies of their certificates of
J. Quisimbing eligibility. On several dates, the teachers appeared and
Facts: Sometime in the year 1991, appointment papers gave their sworn statements pointing to petitioner as the
for a change of status from provisional to permanent person who gave them the R.A. 6850 certificates of
under Republic Act No. 6850 of teachers were eligibility they had attached to their appointments for a
submitted to the Civil Service Field Office-Cotabato at fee. Upon finding a prima facie case, petitioner was
formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. applying only to persons or things of the same kind or
In his sworn letter dated April 8, 1992 to the CSC class as those specifically mentioned.Had Congress
Regional Director, petitioner denied the accusation. His intended to exclude an NFE Division Supervisor from
motion to dismiss was denied. the coverage of R.A. 4670, it could have easily done so
Teacher witnesses for the prosecution Alforjas and by clear and concise language.
Delgado identified petitioner and a certain Teddy Cruz As petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670, it is the
as the persons who facilitated their applications for R.A. Investigating Committee that should have investigated
6850 eligibility. The other witnesses corroborated his case conformably with Section 9 of R.A. 4670, now
Alforjas’ and Delgado’s testimonies. They all identified being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS
petitioner as the person who helped them obtain the Order No. 33, S. 1999, otherwise known as the DECS
fake certificates of eligibility. Rules of Procedure. However, at this late hour, the
In its resolution, the CSC found Emin guilty. In his proceedings conducted by the public respondent CSC
amended petition, he raised before the CA the twin can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under
issues of (1) whether the CSC had original jurisdiction the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now
over the administrative cases against the public school barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over his
teachers; and (2) whether petitioner was accorded due case.
process. The CA dismissed the appeal. Here what is crucial, in our view, is that the Civil Service
Commission had afforded petitioner sufficient
ISSUE: opportunity to be heard and defend himself against
(1) whether or not the CSC has original jurisdiction over charges of participation in faking civil service eligibilities
the present case; of certain teachers for a fee. Not only did he answer the
(2) whether or not petitioner was accorded due process. charges before the CSC Regional Office but he
participated in the hearings of the charges against him
Under Section 2 of R.A. 4670, the exclusions in the to the extent that we are left with no doubt that his
coverage of the term “teachers” are limited to: (1) public participation in its proceedings was willful and voluntary.
school teachers in the professorial staff of state colleges Equally unmeritorious is petitioner’s contention that he
and universities; and (2) school nurses, school was denied due process. He avers that he was not
physicians, school dentists, and other school employees allowed cross-examination. It is well to remember that in
under the category of “medical and dental personnel”. administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, general words and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative
following an enumeration of persons or things, by words due process cannot be fully equated with due process in
of a particular and specific meaning, are not to be its strict judicial sense.
Nothing on record shows he asked for cross- Complaint for damages against respondent Eastar
examination as most of the submissions were written. In Resources (Asia) Corporation with the RTC Cebu. The
our view, petitioner cannot argue that he has been respondent in its Answer, denied all the material
deprived of due process merely because no cross- averments of the complaint and interposed a
examination took place. The rule is well established that compulsory counterclaim amounting to P29,000,000.
due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded After the presentation of witnesses, the petitioners filed
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of their formal offer of evidence. The petitioners rested
the controversy or given opportunity to move for a their case after their documentary evidence was
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. admitted by the court.
In the present case, the record clearly shows that The respondent then presented one witness, Mary C.
petitioner not only filed his Counter-Affidavit during the Maquilan. On March 29, 1994, the respondent prayed
preliminary investigation, and later his Motion to for time to make their formal offer of evidence. The court
Dismiss. He also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of granted the respondent’s motion and gave it a period of
the Order of the Commission. The essence of due fifteen (15) days to do so. The court then granted the
process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity petitioners a period of ten (10) days from service of the
to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek said formal offer within which to file their comment
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. thereon. The petitioners declared in open court that they
Neither is there merit in petitioner’s assertion that he would be presenting rebuttal evidence, and prayed that
was denied the right to due process when the CSC the hearing for the said purpose be set at 9:00 a.m. of
Regional Office, according to him, acted as investigator, May 4, 1994. The case was reset to June 1, 1994.
prosecutor, judge and executioner. The report submitted The respondent filed its formal offer of evidence and
by Atty. Rosell based on the hearing where Director sent a copy thereof to the petitioners on June 1, 1994.
Buenaflor sat as hearing officer, was merely When the case was called for the presentation of the
recommendatory in character to the Civil Service petitioners’ rebuttal evidence on the said date, the new
Commission itself. Such procedure is not unusual in an counsel for the petitioners manifested her desire to
administrative proceeding. recall the respondent’s witness, Mary Maquilan, for
Petition is denied. further cross-examination. She reasoned that she was
Rodson Phil. v. CA not satisfied with the cross-examination of the previous
counsel, and asked for time to file the necessary
motion. The court granted the same, and gave her
Facts: On July 19, 1990, petitioners Rodson fifteen (15) days to do so. The court also gave the
Philippines, Inc., Eurasia Heavy Industries, Inc., respondent a period of ten (10) days from receipt
Autographics, Inc. and Peter Y. Rodriguez, filed a thereof within which to file its comment or opposition.
The court held in abeyance the resolution of the to testify under Section 9 of Rule 23 of the Revised
respondent’s formal offer of evidence until such time Rules of Court.
that the petitioners’ motion to recall Maquilan for further In its Order, Judge Martin A. Ocampo inhibited himself
cross-examination was resolved. On June 24, 1994, the upon motion of the petitioners from further hearing the
petitioners filed their motion to recall Maquilan as a case. The case was re-raffled to Branch 11, presided by
witness for further cross-examination. Judge Isaias P. Dicdican. After a review of the records,
In the meantime, Judge Juaban retired from the the trial court discovered that the petitioners’ motion to
government service. Judge Martin A. Ocampo was recall Mary Maquilan had already been denied; that the
appointed presiding judge of the RTC of Cebu City, petitioners had not yet filed their comment on the
Branch 7. The hearing of the petitioners’ motion to recall respondent’s formal offer of documentary evidence;
the witness was set for hearing on March 26, 1996. and, that the said formal offer of evidence had not yet
During the hearing, the counsel for the petitioners called been resolved by the court. The TC issued an Order
the attention of the court to the fact that they had not yet admitting the respondent’s documentary evidence for
filed their comment on the respondent’s formal offer of the purposes they were offered.
evidence. The petitioners filed a Motion to Defer the Hearing Set
After the hearing, the court issued an order denying the and prayed that they be given a chance to file their
petitioners’ motion to recall Maquilan as witness for written objection to the formal offer of evidence filed by
additional cross-examination, without prejudice to the the respondent. The trial court denied the motion and
petitioners’ recalling the latter as a hostile witness on ruled that the ten-day period given to the petitioners per
the presentation of its rebuttal evidence. its Order of March 29, 1994 had long since elapsed. It
In the meantime, the petitioners failed to file their emphasized that the order holding in abeyance its ruling
comment on the respondent’s formal offer of evidence. on the respondent’s formal offer of evidence did not toll
The court, likewise, failed to resolve the said incident the ten-day period for the filing of the petitioners’
despite the denial of the petitioners’ motion to recall comment thereon.
Maquilan for additional cross-examination. The petitioners, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari
On April 1, 1996, the trial court sent a subpoena to and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The appellate
Maquilan, requiring her to appear before the court and court rendered its assailed Decision and dismissed the
to testify as a hostile rebuttal witness for the petitioners. petition for being devoid of merit.
The respondent filed its urgent motion to quash the ISSUE: WON the court erred when it resolved the
subpoena on the ground that the witness was a resident respondent's formal offer of evidence and admitted
of Quezon City, which was more than fifty (50) such documentary evidence before they could file
kilometers away and, as such, could not be compelled their comment or opposition thereto.
Petitioners assert that during the hearing of March 26, documentary evidence was truly ripe for resolution.
1996, the petitioners called the attention of the court to Hence, We hold, that far from gravely abusing his
the fact that they had not yet filed their comment on the discretion, the respondent judge acted prudently and
respondent’s formal offer of evidence, and that the court judiciously.
declared that there was no need for them to do so as The petitioners failed to append to their petition at bar a
yet because of the unresolved motion. They copy of their motion for reconsideration of the July 17,
emphasized that even after the court denied their 1997 Order of the trial court, admitting the documentary
motion to recall Maquilan as witness and ordered them evidence offered by the respondent. The said pleading
to present her as a hostile witness on rebuttal evidence, is very relevant in this case, because we could there
the court still failed to resolve the respondent’s formal discern if the petitioners had prayed for a chance to file
offer of evidence. their comment on or opposition to the admission of the
SC ruled that the petitioners were amply accorded the respondent’s documentary evidence, and incorporated
chance and/or opportunity to register their objections to therein their objections to the said motion, if any.
the private respondent’s offer of evidence. For as early Even considering the merits of the case, the petition
as May 27, 1994, the petitioners were already charged must still fail.
with knowledge or notice that they were being required Irrefragably, the petitioners had until June 12, 1994
to file their comments and/or objection to the offer of within which to file their comment on the respondent’s
evidence. Nevertheless, it appears that action on the formal offer of evidence. The ten-day period within
offer was put on hold pending the resolution of the which to file such comment was not suspended by the
motion to recall a witness. Resultantly, since the filing and, thereafter, the pendency of the petitioners’
disposition of the motion to recall was made the motion to recall Maquilan as a witness for additional
condition sine quanon for further action on the private cross-examination. What was merely suspended by
respondent’s offer of evidence, the petitioners should such motion was the trial court’s resolution of the
have lost no time in submitting their comment to the respondent’s formal offer of evidence. The petitioners
offer once, or as soon as the court denied on March 29, failed to file their comment within the period therefor.
1996, their motion to recall Ms. Maquilan for further Indeed, Judge Martin Ocampo erred in declaring that
cross-examination. the respondent’s formal offer of evidence was
Even during the time that the petitioners were supposed prematurely filed, and that the petitioners need not yet
to file their motion to recall, they had already played fast file their comment thereon because of the petitioners’
and loose with court processes. Even then, as correctly unresolved motion. The respondent had already
argued by the respondent, there was actually no more presented its lone witness, Maquilan, who already
time to suspend, as it had long expired on June 12, testified on direct and cross-examination. Hence, the
1997, for which reason the respondent’s formal offer of respondent was obliged to formally offer its
documentary evidence as provided by Section 35, Rule had been held and that both parties had waived the
132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. raffle of the case and reset the hearing on the
It bears stressing that the petitioners still have the right application for the issuance of a writ of injunction. The
to adduce rebuttal evidence to controvert or overcome judge gave another time to file her comment again.
the probative weight of the respondent’s documentary
evidence. Moreover, since the petitioners were aware During the hearing on the application for the issuance of
that the respondent had a counterclaim of P29,000,000, a writ of preliminary injunction, none of the lawyers
it behooved them to observe diligence and vigilance in appeared. Hence, respondent judge considered it
filing their comment without delay. However, by their submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary
own negligence, the petitioners failed to file the said injunction. Hence, this complaint for gross ignorance of
comment. As such, the petitioners are not entitled to a law, abuse of discretion and conduct unbecoming a
writ of certiorari to shield themselves from their own judge.
omission and negligence. It must be stressed that he
who comes to court for equitable relief must do so with Issues:
clean hands. 1) Whether or not TRO ex parte is allowed in the instant
AILINANG MAROHOMBSAR VS. JUDGE SANTOS ADIONG case.
G.R. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004
Facts: 2) Whether or not trial-type hearing is essential to due
Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in the process.
civil case for injunction. The case was filed by Yasmira
Pangadapun questioning the legality of Marohombsar’s 3) Whether or not respondent judge erred in ordering
appointment as Provincial Social Welfare Officer of the the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
DSWD-ARMM. Prior to his appointment, Pangadapun
used to occupy said position. Held:
1) A TRO is generally granted without notice to the
Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge opposite party and is intended only as a restraint on him
issued a TRO and set the hearing on the application for until the propriety of granting a temporary injunction can
the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Summons, be determined. It goes no further than to preserve the
together with a copy of the complaint and a notice, was status quo until that determination. Respondent judge
also served on both parties. Marohombsar filed an ex was justified in issuing the TRO ex parte due to his
parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun assessment of the urgency of the relief sought.
was given the time to comment. Respondent judge
issued an order stating that a preliminary conference
2) In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual QUINTOS v. COMELEC

requirement of prior notice and hearing before injunction
may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo V. Quintos and private
petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial- respondent Jose T. Villarosa were candidates for
type hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type Governor of Occidental Mindoro in the May 14, 2001
hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential elections. Private respondent was declared winner with
to due process. 57,136 votes. Petitioner lost to private respondent by
1,093 votes.
In the present case, complainant was able to move for a Petitioner filed with the COMELEC an election protest
reconsideration of the order in question, hence her right claiming that massive fraud and illegal electoral
to due process was not in anyway transgressed. We practices were committed in the contested precincts
have ruled that a party cannot claim that he has been during the registration, the voting and the counting of
denied due process when he has availed of the the votes.
opportunity to present his position. On June 15, 2001, private respondent filed his Answer
with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim.
The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a Private respondent’s counsel moved that the Regional
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any Trial Court of Mamburao be allowed to take first custody
evidence he may have in support of his defense. It is a of the Contested Ballot Boxes before their transmittal to
rule that a party cannot claim that he has been denied the COMELEC. The Comelec denied the motion.
due process when he was given the opportunity to From the COMELEC’s Order, private respondent filed a
present his position. Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Private respondent stated that petitioner identified only
3) As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his one (1) ballot box as subject of his protest. Private
official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action respondent, however, identified thirteen (13) ballot
even though such acts are erroneous, provided he acts boxes from the same municipality in his counter-protest.
in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge, or Thus, the total number of Contested Ballot Boxes, both
any other member of the bench for that matter, is in the protest and counter-protest, is 14. Private
presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner respondent explained that the Contested Ballot Boxes
that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an were also the subject of two municipal election protests
impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process. both filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao,
and both handled by counsel of private respondent. The
RTC ordered them to be brought before the court the
Contested Ballot Boxes.
Private respondent averred that if COMELEC applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to

Resolution No. 2812 were strictly implemented, the explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
resolution of the election protests in the Municipality of reconsideration of the assailed action or ruling.
Paluan would suffer undue delay. The COMELEC would Petitioner cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due
take first custody of the 14 Contested Ballot Boxes. The process since the COMELEC gave petitioner the
resolution of the election protests in the Municipality of chance to be heard in his motion for reconsideration.
Paluan would have to wait for the COMELEC to The COMELEC, in issuing the Assailed Orders allowing
complete its revision of the ballots in the Contested the Regional Trial Court to take prior custody of the
Ballot Boxes. Contested Ballot Boxes, did not act without or in excess
On August 27, 2001, the COMELEC rendered the of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
Assailed Order granting private respondent’s In giving the Regional Trial Court first access to the
Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration Contested Ballot Boxes, the COMELEC sought to
subject to guidelines. prevent delay in the resolution of the two protest cases
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the pending before the trial court. However, first access by
Order of the COMELEC dated August 27, 2001. the Regional Trial Court is only limited to the period of
On September 12, 2001, the COMELEC denied time when the COMELEC is still revising other protested
petitioner's Motion. ballot boxes. The primary concern for such arrangement
is the expeditious disposition of protest cases, which is
TOPICAL ISSUE: Whether the failure to give petitioner underscored in Section 3 of COMELEC Resolution No.
the opportunity to comment or oppose private 2812.
respondent’s Manifestation and Motion for Partial
Reconsideration is a denial of due process.
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC issued the
Assailed Order of August 27, 2001 without giving him
the opportunity to comment or oppose the motion for VILLARUEL, JR. v. FERNANDO
partial reconsideration. This, bewails petitioner, violates
his right to due process. FACTS: Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. is the former
The Solicitor General correctly stated that there was no Assistant Secretary of the Air Transportation Office
denial of due process since petitioner subsequently filed (“ATO”), Department of Transportation and
a motion for reconsideration which the COMELEC Communication (“DOTC”).
considered and acted on, albeit unfavorably, in the
Order dated September 12, 2001. The essence of due Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E.
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as Abarca, Jr. (“Abarca”), and Marilou M. Cleofas are the
Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and Administrative Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner
Assistant, respectively, of the Civil Aviation Training failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their
Center (“CATC”). The CATC is an adjunct agency of the mother unit.
ATO tasked to train air traffic controllers, airway Respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and
communicators and related civil aviation personnel for Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory
the local aviation industry as well as for the Southeast Injunction against petitioner which the TC granted.
Asian and Pacific region. For petitioner’s continued failure to comply with the writ
of preliminary injunction, respondents moved to cite
Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995 petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to
addressed to the respondents, detailing them to the declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer
Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal within the period prescribed in the trial court’s order of
effective 2 May 1995. 26 January 1996.
Respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia On 28 May 1996, the trial court granted the motion and
and Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco through declared petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The trial
petitioner requesting for reconsideration of the detail court issued a bench warrant against petitioner.
order. On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
order, respondents reported to the Office of (“OSG”), filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
Undersecretary Cal at DOTC. Court of Appeals assailing the trial court’s order finding
Without acting on respondents’ request for petitioner guilty of indirect contempt.
reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on 19 The TC declared petitioner in default for his failure to file
July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under an answer to the petition for mandamus and
“preventive suspension” for 90 days without pay damages.The TC ordered Villaruel to pay.
pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct. Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG,
On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return to The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non-
their mother unit since more than 90 days had already extendible extension until 13 December 1996 within
lapsed. Respondents also sought the intervention of the which to file petitioner’s memorandum. However, the
Ombudsman in their case. Secretary Garcia replied to OSG failed to file the memorandum.
the Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum On 13 March 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a
dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall Resolution dismissing petitioner’s appeal for failure to
respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia file the required memorandum. The OSG, through
declared that the law does not sanction the continuous Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr., filed a Motion for
detail of respondents. Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the
same. The Resolution became final and executory on appellate courts correctly ruled that the negligence of
14 June 1997. the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects such
Consequently, the respondents filed a Motion for negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court
Execution with the trial court. Although served a copy of from becoming final and executory.
the motion for execution, the OSG did not file any In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner
opposition. suffered serious injustice to exempt him from the
On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution client. Petitioner did not even attempt to refute the
and to Suspend Sheriff’s Sale. In his motion, petitioner respondents’ allegations in the petition for mandamus
alleged that the trial court’s decision never became and damages.
final and executory as the trial court deprived him of Moreover, petitioner is not entirely blameless for the
his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the dismissal of his appeal. After the OSG’s failure to file
OSG failed to file petitioner’s memorandum in CA-G.R. the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages
SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his appeal. and to have the order declaring petitioner in default
The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG
for certiorari and dismissed the same in the Decision with another lawyer.
dated 30 September 1998. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the appellate court denied the BORROMEO BROS. ESTATE v. GARCIA
motion in a Resolution of 3 December 1998.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied due process. FACTS:
The negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner On August 17, 1938, Patricia Ruedas Vda. De Andrada
of the effects of such negligence and prevent the (Patricia) executed, for valuable consideration, a
decision of the trial court from becoming final and document granting a road right of way to spouses Gil
executory. In short, the OSG’s negligence binds Garcia and Teresa Escaño de Garcia (Garcia couple)
petitioner. over Lot No. 6-H-2.
The petition has no merit.
Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be On September 28, 1938, Patricia sold the property to
heard and this opportunity was not denied petitioner. petitioner. The Deed of Sale contained a provision that
Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as “the purchase of Lot No. 6-H-2 was subject to the right
in the Court of Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity to of way granted by me (Patricia Ruedas Vda. de
present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly, Andrada) to the spouses Gil Garcia and Teresa Escaño
petitioner’s former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. de Garcia.”
This negligence, however, binds petitioner. The trial and
On April 17, 1952, the Garcia couple went to the Court copy of the Order of July 23, 1997. Petitioner entered its
of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu and moved for the special appearance and filed a “Motion for
annotation of the August 17, 1938 document executed Reconsideration and Recall” and expressed “caution”
by Patricia on TCT No. RT-3972. that it was not necessarily submitting itself to the
jurisdiction of the cadastral court. Petitioner contended
Petitioner retained ownership over Lot No. 6-H-2 that the Order of the Court dated July 23, 1997 violated
whereas the estate of the late Garcia couple (Garcia its fundamental right to substantive and procedural due
Estate) was inherited by Vicente E. Garcia and Jose E. process, that the petition of respondent was for specific
Garcia from whom respondent acquired his title in 1996. performance of a private agreement cognizable only by
an ordinary court and not a cadastral court, and that the
Sometime after acquiring the Garcia Estate, respondent petition of respondent was a procedural shortcut to
came across the 1952 documents that granted to the enforce a stale order citing Rule 39, Section 6 of the
deceased Garcia couple a road right of way through Rules of Court, the statute of limitations and
petitioner’s Lot No. 6-H-2. Thus, on May 19, 1997, prescription.
respondent filed, before the RTC of Cebu, a cadastral
court, a petition captioned “Engineer Edgar John A. The cadastral court denied petitioner’s motion for
Garcia v. The Register of Deeds of Cebu City reconsideration. The court held that firstly, there was no
G.I.R.O. Rec. No. 5988, Lot No. 6-H-2.” They want to violation of substantial or procedural due process as the
inscribe and annotate in the TCT No. RT-3972 a road court furnished petitioner its Order of July 23, 1997, it
right of way. heard petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in open
court, and allowed both parties to submit their
The cadastral court issued on June 6, 1997 an Order respective memoranda including documentary exhibits
requiring the Register of Deeds “to inform this [c]ourt prior to its ruling on the motion. Secondly, the
regarding the status of the aforementioned title. promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or The
Property Registration Decree of 1979 eliminated the
In its Comment/Manifestation, the Register of Deeds distinction between the general jurisdiction of the RTC
informed the cadastral court that Lot No. 6-H-2 covered and its limited jurisdiction when acting as a Land
by TCT No. RT-3972 is registered under herein Registration Court.
petitioner’s name and that it “appears to be clean and
devoid of any encumbrance/annotations.” The Court of Appeals held that the evidence on record
shows the existence of an easement of right of way in
On July 23, 1997, the cadastral court issued an Order favor of respondent.
granting the petition of respondent. Petitioner received a
On July 9, 1999, petitioner filed its motion for

reconsideration but the appellate court denied it in its Suntay v. People
Resolution of August 9, 1999.
FACTS:
ISSUE: WON petitioner was denied due process. NO On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia
Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint
The SC finds against petitioner. against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney
of Quezon City, alleging that on June 21, 1954, the
The cadastral court did not deny petitioner of its right to accused took Alicia Nubla, with lewd design,
due process of the law. The essence of due process is somewhere near the UP compound in Diliman and had
found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and carnal knowledge of her, and Alicia being a minor of 16
submit any evidence in support of one’s defense. What years old
the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be
heard.As long as a party is given the opportunity to On Dec. 15, 1954, after investigation, Asst City Atty
defend his interests in due course, he would have no recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that
reason to complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23
that makes up the essence of due process. December 1954 attorney for the complainant addressed
a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he
The records reveal that the cadastral court furnished took exception to the recommendation of the Assistant
petitioner its Order of July 23, 1997, which reiterated its City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaint for
previous order of April 17, 1952 through former Judge seduction be filed against the herein petitioner.
Ignacio Debuque. More importantly, the cadastral
court heard petitioner’s motion for reconsideration On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was
in open court wherein both parties presented their granted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs
respective arguments to defend their rights and the
court likewise allowed the parties to file their respective On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines
memoranda prior to ruling on the motion for for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where he is at
reconsideration. present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955 the
offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint
Indeed, deprivation of the right to due process cannot charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in
be successfully invoked where a party was given the the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after
chance to be heard on his Motion for Reconsideration [20] preliminary investigation had been conducted
as what happened in the instant case.
On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence
motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due
such government agencies as may be concerned, process of law.
particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior
the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he hearing
may be dealt with in accordance with law."
Ruling:
On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion
(Exhibit D). On 7 March 1955 the respondent Secretary The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The
cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order of
him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to the respondent Court directing the Department of
cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the
compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so
criminal charges against him. that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," is not
beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. the respondent
However, this order was not implemented or carried out Court did not specify what step the respondent
in view of the commencement of the proceeding in Secretary must take to compel the petitioner to return to
order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. the Philippines to answer the criminal charge preferred
On 5 July 1955 counsel for the petitioner wrote to the against him.
respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken
by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for
motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider its Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already
order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955 the issued may not be exercised at whim. But here the
respondent Secretary denied counsel's request and on petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a criminal
15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for charge for seduction and although at first all Assistant
reconsideration. Hence this petition. City Attorney recommended the dismissal of the
complaint previously subscribed and sworn to by the
Petitioner’s Claim: father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that
 while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion no final action had been taken by the City Attorney of
in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot Quezon City as the case was still under study.
be exercised until after hearing," because the right to
travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the
And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His suddenly process of clause of the Constitution, then a writ of
leaving the country in such a convenient time, can preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative
reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate of the said clause.
attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore,
he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.
the law should join together to bring him back to
justice." In issuing the order in question, the respondent Co v Barbers 290 SCRA 717
Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice 1. Quirino Congressman Cua filed a complaint
would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the before the Office of the Ombudsman against Gov
exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined Castillo-Co and Engr Ringor alleging that in the
from carrying it out. course of its investigation in aid of legislation, the
HoR Committee on Good Government chaired by
Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the him uncovered some irregularities in the purchase
reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport of heavy equipment by the Governor & the
were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a Provincial Engineer
passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and 2. The equipment purchased was not brand new as
left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the required, there was overpricing, lack of public
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his bidding, lack of inspection, advance payment
discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot prior to delivery and an attempt to cover up the
be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in irregularities.
withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process 3. Co and Ringoer were then placed under
does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. preventive suspension for 6 months, a week after
the complaint was filed. It was signed by the
When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it director and approved by the deputy
upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious Ombudsman. Both filed for motions for
criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing reconsideration contending they were deprived of
maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite due process because they weren’t afforded the
to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing opportunity to controvert the evidence against
does not violate the due process of law clause of the them before the suspension order was issued. It
Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in was rejected thus this petition for review.
him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of Issue: W/N they were deprived of due process NO
because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing 1. A preventive suspension, however, can be
should always be held in order to comply with the due decreed on an official under investigation after
charges are brought and even before the charges transactions. Credit limit: 20,000 pesos and 3000
are heard since the same is not in the nature of a US dollars
penalty, but merely a preliminary step in an 2. He went to Hong Kong in 1986 and bought
administrative investigation. several Gucci items which amounted to 4,030 HK
2. Lastimosa case: suspension was not a dollars = 523 US dollars. He paid with his card.
punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty 3. The saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed
and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive De Leon and other shoppers of different
measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was
administrative investigation. If after such blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation of
investigation, the charges are established and the the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but
person investigated is found guilty of acts the latter simply did not honor it and even
warranting his removal, then he is removed or threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a
dismissed. This is the penalty. pair of scissors.
3. The immediate issuance of such order is required 4. Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming
in order to prevent the subject of the suspension that he suffered much torment and
from committing further irregularities. Such embarrassment on account of EBC’s wrongful act
prompt action, moreover, is in consonance with of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card
Section 15 of RA 6770 which exhorts the while at the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon
Ombudsman to: xxx give priority to complaints filed a complaint for damages against EBC.
filed against high ranking government officials 5. Answer: card in excess of credit limit already,
and/or those occupying supervisory positions, Calderon failed to settle said prior credit
complaints involving grave offenses as well as purchase.
complaints involving large sums of money and/or 6. TC: "defendant bank was negligent if not in bad
properties. faith, in suspending, or ‘blacklisting’ plaintiff’s
credit card without notice or basis, thus it was
Equitable Banking Corporation v Calderon GR 156168 (DISHONOR ordered to pay damages. CA affirmed the
OF CALDERON’S CREDIT CARD, NOT TO EXCEED HIS decision.
APPROVED CREDIT
1. Calderon, a LIMIT
businessman engaged in several Issue: W/N EPB was negligent/in bad faith for
business activities here and a broad, and a suspending the card without notice N
stockholder of PLDT is a seasoned traveler. He 1. Question: Was moral damages proper despite its
was issued an Equitable International Visa card finding that petitioner’s actions have not been
which can be used for both peso and dollar attended with any malice or bad faith? NO
2. Moral damages - include physical suffering, purchases were accommodated. He was even
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, late in his payment.
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral 6. Although he deposited 14,000 US dollars the day
shock, social humiliation and similar injury. he left for Hong Kong, he did not bother to
3. Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of request the bank for the reinstatement of his
contract, moral damages are recoverable only if credit card privileges for dollar transactions, thus
the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad the same remained under suspension."
faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence 7. As issuer of the card, the bank has the option to
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of decide whether to reinstate or altogether
his contractual obligations. terminate a credit card previously suspended on
4. Here, the CA ruled that no malice or bad faith considerations which the bank deemed proper,
attended petitioner’s dishonor of respondent’s not the least of which are the cardholder’s
credit card. For, as found no less by the same payment record, capacity to pay and compliance
court, petitioner was justified in doing so under with any additional requirements imposed by it.
the provisions of its Credit Card Agreement with That option, after all, is expressly embodied in the
respondent, paragraph 3 of which states: same Credit Card Agreement, paragraph 12 of
a. xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to which unmistakably states: “The issuer shall
exceed his/her approved credit limit, likewise have the option of reinstating the card
otherwise, all charges incurred including holder’s privileges which have been terminated
charges incurred through the use of the for any reason whatsoever upon submission of a
extension CARD/S, if any in excess of new accomplished application form if required by
credit limit shall become due and the issuer and upon payment of an additional
demandable and the credit privileges shall processing fee equivalent to annual fee”
be automatically suspended without notice 8. tThe provision on automatic suspension without
to the CARDHOLDER in accordance with notice embodied in the same Credit Card
Section 11 hereof. Agreement is couched in clear and unambiguous
5. As to the suspension without notice, prior to the term, not to say that the agreement itself was
incident, Calderon made credit purchases in entered into by respondent who, by his own
Japan and Hongkong in the previous year account, is a reputable businessman engaged in
amounting to 14 thousand US dollars while business activities here and abroad.
having only a deposit of 3,639 US dollars but
even though they exceeded his limit, these Housing Authority v Evangelista GR 140945 2005
1. Petitioner filed a case for recovery of real property 6. TC: auction issued in the name of Salindon where
originally awarded to a certain Adela Salindon. Sarte was the buyer is null and void thus TCT in
After Salindon’s death, her heirs executed an favor of Sarte should be cancelled. Any transfer
extra-judicial settlement where the property was (including any assignment) is also declared null
transferred to the Florendos. However, the award and void.
in favor of Salindon was nullified and set aside for 7. Evangelista (respondent/assignee) then filed with
having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and the CA a petition for annulment of the trial court’s
with grave abuse of discretion and thus petition judgment particularly the nullity of the transfer
was declared the owner of the property. alleging extrinsic fraud as ground. Since he
2. Despite the decision, the property was auctioned wasn’t a party to the civil case, he was prevented
off by the QC Treasurer’s Office for unpaid real from ventilating his cause, right or interest over
property taxes by the Florendos. The highest the property and thus the judgment was NOT
bidder was a certain Sarte. binding upon him.
3. Because the Register of Deeds refused to ISSUE: W/N the judgment declaring void the
register the final deed of sale issued by the City assignment bound Evangelista No
Treasurer, Sarte filed a petition for issuance of 1. Lack of jurisdiction refers to either lack of
title and confirmation of sale, which was granted jurisdiction over the person of the defending party
by the RTC. Register of Deeds issued TCT in the or over the subject matter of the claim, and in
name of Sarte who divided the property into two either case, the judgment or final order and
lots. resolution are void. A trial court acquires
4. Now, petitioner filed a case against Sarte. While it jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
was pending, Sarte executed in favor of either by his voluntary appearance in court and
Evangelista (respondent), a Deed of Assignment his submission to its authority or by service of
covering the 1st lot. TCT was then issued in his summons.
name. 2. In this case, it is undisputed that Evangelista was
5. Although it was annotated that there was an never made a party to the Civil Case. It is basic
adverse claim. Petitioner then filed a motion for that no man shall be affected by any proceeding
leave to file supplemental complaint seeking to to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case
include respondent Evangelista, Northern Star are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.
Agri-Business and BPI as defendants but the trial 3. Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial court’s
court denied the motion. Thus it instead filed a decision decreed that “(A)ny transfers,
complaint for ANNULMENT of the Deed of assignment, sale or mortgage of whatever nature
Assignment. of the parcel of land subject of this case made by
defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or 1. Young acquired by purchase Insular Savings
assigns before or during the pendency of the Bank from the Licaros family for 65,000,000.00.
instant case are hereby declared null and void. Young et al obtained 55% equity while Jorge Go
4. , together with any transfer certificates of title et al owned 45%. The bank then granted them
issued in connection with the aforesaid loans (153000000) secured by promissory notes.
transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon 2. Araneta, a stockholder of the Bank, wanted to
City who is likewise ordered to cancel or cause purchase 99.82% of its outstanding capital stock
the cancellation of such TCTs.” for 340M on the condition that the ownership of
5. It will be the height of inequity to allow the hsares will be consolidated in Young’s name.
respondent’s title to be nullified without being Araneta paid Young 14M as downpayment.
given the opportunity to present any evidence in Young then bought from Go et al their 45% equity
support of his ostensible ownership of the in the Bank for 153M. to pay this, he obtained a
property. Much more, it is tantamount to a short-term loan of 170M from the International
violation of the constitutional guarantee that no Corporate Bank to finance the purchase.
person shall be deprived of property without due 3. However, Araneta backed out and demanded the
process of law. return of the downpayment. Meanwhile, Young’s
6. It was already after Evangelista acquired the loan from Interbank became due. Young entered
property and after TCT No. 122944 was issued in into a Credit Agreement with Insular Life for
his name that petitioner’s adverse claim (Entry 200M. To secure the loan, he executed a deed of
No. 7159) and a notice of lis pendens (Entry No. Pledge of 1,324,864 shares which represented
1367) were annotated. 99.82% of the outstanding capital stock of the
7. It should also be pointed out that it was in bank.
petitioner’s Affidavit of Adverse Claim that Civil 4. He likewise executed a promissory note in favor
Case No. Q-91-10071 was indicated, not the of Insular Life in the same amount. The Credit
judgment. As records show, at the time the Agreement provides that Insular Life shall have
notice of lis pendens and adverse claim was the prior right to purchase the shares owned by
annotated, the Deed of Assignment has already young and those owned by other stockholders.
been entered into by respondent and Sarte, and Thereafter, Insular Life and Insular Life Pension
TCT No. 122944 was already issued in Fund informed Young of their intention to acquire
Evangelista’s name on December 21, 1994. 30% (Young’s) and 12% (other SHs) of the
Bank’s outstanding shares
Insular Life Assurance Co v Young GR 140964 2002 5. Insular Life and Young then entered into a MOA
where Insular Life and its Pension Fund agreed to
purchase common shares for a total warranties and failed to comply with his
consideration of 198M. However, it had obligations. Dismissed. Hence this petition.
discovered some irregularities in the Bank’s 9. The CA reversed the decision ruling that the MOA
“kiting operations”. Young took the responsibility is binding because it was not validly rescinded.
and offered to the bank the 45% of his holdings Insular failed to notify Young in exercising its
as security. option to rescind the MOA. The Appellate Court
6. Young admitted that due to business reverses, he then concluded that Young's loan with Insular Life
shall not be able to pay his obligations under the is deemed fully paid based on the representation
Credit Agreement between him and Insular thus and warranty in the MOA that "the entire
he unconditionally and irrevocably waive the proceeds of the sale shall be used to pay off the
benefit of the period of the loan. Thereafter, outstanding debt of Robert T. Young to Insular
Insular Life instructed its counsel to foreclosure Life. Likewise, it also concluded that the loans of
the pledge constituted upon the shares. IL then the other respondents have been fully paid.
informed Young. A public auction was conducted Issue: W/N the MOA was enforceable and that the loan
wherein Insular Life appropriated to itself, not only have been fully paid upon foreclosure of the pledge
the original 1,324,864 shares, but also the NO.
250,000 shares subsequently issued by the Bank 1. The CA construed the MOA as a contract of sale.
and delivered to Insular Life by way of pledge But contrary to the findings of the CA, the MOA
because there only IL submitted its bid for the first provisions negate the existence of a perfected
auction sale and a subsequent auction sale. contract of sale. The MOA is merely a contract to
7. Young and his associates filed with the RTC a sell since the parties therein specifically
complaint against the bank, IL for annulment of undertook to enter into a contract of sale if the
notarial sale, specific performance and damages stipulated conditions are met and the
alleging that the notarial sale conducted is void as representation and warranties given by Young
it does not comply with the requirement of notice prove to be true. The obligation of petitioner
of the second auction sale. Insular Life to purchase, as well as
8. RTC: dismissed the complaint and ordered the the concomitant obligation of Young to convey
respondents to pay the Bank their respective to it the shares, are subject to the fulfillment of the
loans. They appealed to the CA which reversed conditions contained in the MOA.
the decision. Petitioners filed a motion for 2. Once the conditions, representation and
reconsideration contending that the MOA warranties are satisfied, then it is incumbent upon
executed is not enforceable considering that the parties to perform their respective obligations
Young committed fraud, misrepresented on the under the contract. Conversely, in the event that
these conditions are not met or complied with, no that led to the conclusions of the court. It must be
obligation on the part of either party arises. observed that those respondents did not contest
3. Since no sale transpired between the parties, the petitioners' counterclaim against them.
Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Insular
Life purchased 55% of the total shares of the Lorbes v CA GR 139884
Bank under the MOA. Consequently, its findings
that the debt of Young has been fully paid and 1. petitioners mortgaged their land to the Carloses.
that Insular Life is liable to pay for the remaining A year later, the mortgage obligation had
45% equity have no basis. It must be increased and fearing foreclosure of the property,
emphasized that the MOA did not convey title of they asked their son-in-law for help. Delos Reyes
the shares to Insular Life. If ever there was agreed to rdeem the property but because he
delivery of the said shares to Insular Life, it was didn’t have money at the time, he asked his family
because they were pledged by Young to Insular friend, Cruz, an employee of Land Bank for help.
Life under the Credit Agreement. 2. It was agreed that petitioners will sign a deed of
4. The Court of Appeals also erred in declaring that sale conveying the mortgaged property in favor of
the auction sale is void since petitioners failed to Cruz and thereafter, Cruz will apply for a housing
send a separate notice for the second auction. loan with Landbank using the subject property as
Based on Article 2112 of the Civil Code, there is collateral.
no prohibition in the law against the sending of 3. Landbank issued a letter of guarantee in favor of
ONE NOTICE for the 1st and 2nd public auction. the Carloses informing them that the loan has
5. Petitioners contend that the CA likewise erred been approved. TCT was cancelled and
when it declared in its decision that the transferred in the name of Cruz. Years later,
unpaid accounts of the other respondents petitioners notified delos Reyes that they were
have been fully paid. ready to redeem the property but the offer was
6. There is no showing how the CA reached such refused. Thus it filed a complaint for reformation
conclusion. In doing so, the Court of Appeals of instrument and damages claiming that the
violated the constitutional mandate that "no deed was merely a formality to meet the
decision shall be rendered by any court without requirements of the bank for the loan.
expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the 4. Summons and a copy of the complaint were
law on which it is based." served upon private respondents on August 1,
7. Indeed, due process demands that the parties to 1994. Cruz/Delos Reyes filed their answer
a litigation be informed of how it was decided with beyond the reglamentary period, or only on
an explanation of the factual and legal reasons September 1, 1994. Thus, on September 5,
1994, petitioners filed a motion to declare private 2. The issuance of orders of default should be the
respondents in default, which the trial court exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only
granted in an order dated September 16, 1994. in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the
On September 30 of the same year, petitioners defendant to comply with the orders of the trial
presented their evidence ex parte before the trial court.
court 3. In this case, the RTC was indeed remiss in
5. TC: in favor of the petitioners upon finding that denying private respondents’ motion to lift the
the deed of absolute sale didn’t reflect the true order of default and to strike out the evidence
intention of the parties. presented by petitioners ex parte, especially
6. CA reversed the decision: Cruz/Delos Reyes considering that an answer was filed, though out
were denied due process by the refusal of the trial of time.
court to lift the order of default against them, and 4. The default order of the RTC was immoderate
that the transaction between petitioners and Cruz and in violation of private respondents’ due
was one of absolute sale, not of equitable process rights. However, the violation was of a
mortgage. It also held the RTC decision to be degree as to justify a remand of the proceedings
constitutionally infirm for its failure to clearly and to the trial court, first, because such relief was not
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is prayed for by private respondents, and second,
based. The reformation of the Deed of Absolute because the affirmative defenses and evidence
Sale is improper because there is no showing that that private respondents would have presented
such instrument failed to express the true before the RTC were capably ventilated before
intention of the parties by reason of mistake, respondent court, and were taken into account by
fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident in the the latter in reviewing the correctness of the
execution thereof. evaluation of petitioners’ evidence by the RTC
ISSUE: (topic) W/N there was denial of due process and ultimately, in reversing the decision of the
YES RTC.
W/N there the deed of absolute sale is an equitable 5. Applying the foregoing considerations to the
mortgage YES instant case, the Court finds that the true intention
1. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be between the parties for executing the Deed of
liberal in setting aside orders of default for Absolute Sale was not to convey ownership of the
judgments of default are frowned upon, unless in property in question but merely to secure the
cases where it clearly appears that the reopening housing loan of Cruz, in which petitioners had a
of the case is intended for delay. direct interest since the proceeds thereof were to
be immediately applied to their outstanding the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where
mortgage obligation to the Carloses. the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity
6. Understandably, the Deed of Absolute Sale and date-for then the date of publication is material for
its supporting documents do not reflect the true determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth
arrangement between the parties as to how the day following its publication-but not when the law itself
loan proceeds are to be actually applied because provides for the date when it goes into effect.
it was not the intention of the parties for these  Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct
documents to do so. The sole purpose for only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the
preparing these documents was to satisfy Land fact of publication. Considered in the light of other
Bank that the requirement of collateral relative to statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion
Cruz’s application for a housing loan was met. is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude
the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
Tanada v Tuvera (ratio copied from a digest! ) even if the law itself provides for the date of its
 On April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity effectivity
for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding Issue: W/N publication is still required in the light of the
force and effect. clause "unless otherwise provided"
 Respondents contend that publication in the Official
Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the 1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of
their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since effectivity and not to the requirement of
the presidential issuances in question contain special publication itself, which cannot in any event be
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, omitted. This clause does not mean that the
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable legislature may make the law effective
for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect without its previous publication.
after fifteen days following the completion of their 2. The legislature may in its discretion provide that
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or
provided. extended. Publication requirements applies to 1)
 The interpretation given by respondent is in accord all statutes, including those of local application
with this Court's construction of said article. In a long and private laws; 2) presidential decrees and
line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the

same are validly delegated by the legislature or
directly conferred by the Constitution; 3)
Administrative rules and regulations for the
purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation; 4) Charter of
a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects
only the inhabitants of that place; 5) Monetary
Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central
Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
3. Further publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws.
4. The Supreme Court declared that all laws as
above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
published in full in the OG, to become effective
only after 15 days from their publication, or on
another date specified by the legislature in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Republic v Express Telecommunications archived application filed almost 8 years ago thus
all evidence are outdated and should no longer
1. On December 29, 1992 – BAYANTEL filed an be used as basis of the necessity.
application with the NTC (Nati’l Telecomm 4. May 3, 2000 – NTC issued an Order granting
Comm) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS
Necessity to install, operate and maintain a digital service applying Rule 15 Section 3 of its 1978
Cellular Mobile Telephone System. Prior to the Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom then
issuance of any notice of hearing by the NTC with filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and
respect to Bayantel’s original application, prohibition seeking the annulment of the order
Bayantel filed an urgent ex-pate motion to admit reviving the application of Bayantel and the Order
an amended application. Subsequently hearings granting Bayantel a provisional authority to
were conducted. construct, install, operate and maintain a
2. Before Bayantel could complete the presentation nationwide CMTS.
of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order (Dec 5. CA granted and dismissed Bayantel’s amended
1993) stating that in view of the recent grant of 2 application without prejudice to the filing of a new
separate Provisional Authorities in favor of CMTS application. MR filed by the NTC and
ISLACOM and GMCR Inc., which resulted in the Bayantel. Meanwhile, Extelcom filed a motion for
closing out of all available frequencies for the partial reconsideration, praying that NTC Memo
service being applied for by Bayantel, and in Circular (allocating frequency bands to new public
order that the case may not remain pending for telecommunication entities which are authorized
an indefinite period of time, the case was ordered to install, operate and maintain CMTS) be also
archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if declared void. CA dismissed all the motions.
and when the requisite frequency becomes 6. In the present petition, Extelcom contends that
available. the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules
3. On 17 May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte of 1993 because these Revised Rules deleted the
Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of phrase “on its own initiative”, a provisional
new frequency bands for CMTS operators. On authority may be issued only upon filing of the
February 1, 2000, the NTC granted Bayantel’s proper motion before the Commission.
motion to revive the latter’s application and set 7. The NTC, on the other hand, issued a certification
the case for hearings on February. EXTELCOM to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised
filed an Opposition with Motion to Dismiss praying Rules have not been published in a newspaper of
for the dismissal of Bayantel’s application arguing general circulation, the NTC has been applying
that Bayantel’s motion sought the revival of an the 1978 Rules.
ISSUE: W/N the 1993 Revised Rules should be applied Administrative Register, does not cure the defect
NO related to the effectivity of the Administrative
1. The absence of publication, coupled with the Order.
certification by the Commissioner of the NTC 5. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at
stating that the NTC was still governed by the all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 contents of the laws.
Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of 6. The Administrative Order under consideration is
the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. one of those issuances which should be
The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to
with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of enforce and implement an existing law pursuant
no moment. to a valid delegation.
2. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 7. Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a
1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with newspaper of general circulation is a condition
the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations
the rules force and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2, can take effect.
Section 3 thereof merely states: Filing. --- (1) 8. This is explicit from Executive Order No. 200,
Every agency shall file with the University of the which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, and
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copes of which states that:Laws shall take effect after
every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the fifteen days following the completion of their
date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
within three (3) months from the date shall not newspaper of general circulation in the
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided
any party or persons. 9. Citing Tanada v Tuvera: Administrative rules and
3. The National Administrative Register is merely a regulations must be published if their purpose is
bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
the Office of the President, Congress, all valid delegation. The only exceptions are
appellate courts, the National Library, other public interpretative regulations, those merely internal in
offices or agencies as the Congress may select, nature, or those so-called letters of instructions
and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover issued by administrative superiors concerning the
publication and mailing or distribution costs. rules and guidelines to be followed by their
4. The fact that the amendments to Administrative subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and 10. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be
published by the UP Law Center in the National published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation before it can the NHA shall be final after the lapse of 15 days
take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself from date of receipt. It is only appealable to the
mandates that said Rules shall take effect only President and if there is no appeal within 30 days,
after their publication in a newspaper of general the decision is deemed affirmed.
circulation. 5. Tropical, availing of this decree, appealed to the
11. In the absence of such publication, President. No copy of the appeal was furnished to
therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs. respondent NHA.
6. Cordova then filed a motion for execution, to
which NHA issued a Writ of Execution. The
Tropical Homes Inc v NHA 152 SCRA 540 (appeal) President failed to act on the appeal thus this
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
1. Tropical Homes entered into a contract with ISSUE: W/N PD 1344 is unconstitutional on grounds
Cordova for the sale to the latter of a lot at Better that it deprives Tropical access to courts of law and the
Living Subdivision. A 10% downpayment upon manner of appeal is violative of due process NO
the execution of the contract was required and 1. The petitioner has not clearly shown how a ruling
the balance payable monthly. The contract upon the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1344 will in
provided that upon default in payment of any any way affect the correctness of the decision
installment within 90 days from its due date, the rendered against him. There is no discussion
contract will be automatically cancelled. whatsoever on the merits of the original case. As
2. Since there was non-payment for a period of 7 far as the records show, the NHA decision
months already, the contract was cancelled and appears to be fair and correct.
all earlier payments were considered forfeited in 2. Moreover, the resolution promulgated by
favor of the corporation. Cordova then filed a respondent NHA, was issued before the passage
letter complaint with the Investigating Committee of the questioned decree. The writ of execution it
of the Dept of Trade asking for a refund issued, as admitted by the petitioner in its
3. The case was then referred to the NHA which memorandum, did not in anyway rely upon P.D.
issued the resolution: refund Cordova. MR filed No. 1344.
by Tropical, but denied. 3. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part
4. In the meantime, PD 1344 was passed providing of due process, except where it is granted by
that the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to statute in which case it should be exercised in the
hear and decide cases covering unsound real manner and in accordance with the provisions of
estate business practices, claims involving law.
refund, specific performance, etc. The decision of
4. In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and 3. In view of this apparent discrimination, the students
not constitutional origin. contacted respondent Deputy Ombudsman for
5. The fact that P.D. No. 1344 does not specifically Mindanao, Cesar E. Nitorreda who was impelled to
provide for judicial review of NHA decisions proceed to the DECS Office to admonish petitioner for
affirmed or reversed by the President, does not not conferring with both parties at the same time in
necessarily preclude judicial review. order to hear both sides of the controversy. Thereafter,
6. On the issue of "affirmance-by-in action," failure petitioner presided over the conference between the
on the part of the President to act upon an appeal Arriesgados and the aggrieved students.
does not necessarily mean that the appealed 4. March 29, 1994 - petitioner submitted to the Office of
decision automatically becomes final and the Ombudsman a report wherein he claimed that he
executory. Access to the courts of law may still be had succeeded in facilitating an amicable settlement
made as mentioned above. Therefore, any such between the parties. However, private respondents’
decision is far from being final and executory. affidavit-complaintattested that as a result of the said
DR. RAMON Y. ALBA, petitioner, dispute, they were barred from taking the final
vs. examinations and participating in the graduation rites.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, CESAR Y. 5. The Office of the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty
NITORREDA,
Nature: et al.,
motion for respondents.
reconsideration of violating Section 4(b), (c) and (e) of R.A. 6713,
FRANCISCO, J.:
1. Respondents were among the twenty five (25) Complaints’ averments were confirmed by the school
graduating students of the Arriesgado Institute of itself, thru School Principal Ma. Clara Arriesgado, that
Medical Sciences Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI). They the complaining student were not allowed to take the
sought the intervention of petitioner in settling a dispute final examination until and unless they agree to the
with the said school arising from the implementation of withdrawal of the case they filed in this Office against
certain school policies. herein respondent .
2. On their scheduled meeting, private respondents and 6. When petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
the other complaining students travelled all the way denied, he filed an “Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or
from Tagum, Davao to the DECS Office in Davao City. Prohibition With Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Their presence in the said office was duly noted by Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction”
DECS Administrative Officer V, Aquilina Granada who with this Court.
advised them that petitioner will forthwith meet with Issue:
them. However, instead of conferring with the W RA 6770 is unconstitutional for failure to provide the
aggrieved students, petitioner instead met with the right to appeal - NO.
Arriesgado spouses-owners of AIMSFI - who admittedly Held/ Ratio:
did not even have a previous appointment.
1. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section 27 of qualified members of the said homeowners'
R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative association.
Order No.7 for their failure to provide for the right of 3. To give way to the construction, the members of the
appeal in certain cases from the decision of the said homeowners' association had to vacate the area
Ombudsman, maintaining that the same is tantamount which they were occupying as the medium size housing
to a deprivation of property without due process of law. project and row houses were supposed to be completed
As regards this threshold matter, suffice it to say that within 540 days from June 1995.
this Court has consistently held that: 4. When the period for construction lapsed, petitioner
“The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of and the members of the homeowners' association
due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may demanded the completion of the said housing project
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance but the same allegedly fell on deaf ears.
with” the provisions of the law.” 5. Alleging that the demands have been ignored,
2. Apparently, therefore, the constitutional requirement petitioner filed on May 17, 1999 an administrative
of due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the complaint against Mayor Abalos, Jr. for violation of
denial of the right to appeal for the essence of due Section 5 (a) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to Standards for Public Officials and Employees) for failing
present evidence in support of one’s case. to act promptly on letters and requests sent by the
The Office of the Ombudsman is vested by law with the public.
power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, and a 6. July 21, 1999 - Office of the Ombudsman rendered a
perusal of the said rules of procedure in administrative Decision dismissing the administrative complaint "for
cases manifest sufficient compliance with the insufficiency of evidence."
requirements of due process. 7. September 10, 1999. - The Motion for
Reconsideration therefrom was likewise denied. The
[G.R. No. 142888. June 6, 2001] order was received by petitioner on October 15, 1999.
EVELIO P. BARATA, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN ABALOS, JR., 8. November 4, 1999 - petitioner appealed by way of a
OFFICEPetition
Nature: OF THE for OMBUDSMAN and the COURT OF APPEALS,
Review in Certiorari petition for review on certiorari with this Court in G.R.
respondents.
1. Petitioner heads the San Miguel Bukid Homeowners' No. 140272. The Second Division denied the petition in
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Association, Inc. whose members have occupied a the Resolution of November 24, 1999 in view of A.M.
certain parcel of land in Mandaluyong City. No. 9-2-02-SCand the ruling in the case of Fabian vs.
2. Sometime in March 1995, the City Government of Desierto.The resolution was received by petitioner on
Mandaluyong initiated the construction of medium size January 18, 2000.
condominiums and row houses for the benefit of 9. February 1, 2000 - petitioner filed a "Petition for
Review on Certiorari" with the CA which rendered a
Decision dated April 10, 2000 dismissing the petition on (2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed
the ground that the decision exonerating respondent prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for
mayor of administrative charge is not appealable and reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days
that the petition was filed out of time. from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
Issue: reconsideration shall be entertained.
W CA erred in ruling that the Ombudsman's decision of Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when
an administrative charge is not appealable - NO. supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any
1. Petitioner claims that respondent court erred in ruling order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
that it has no appellate authority to review the decision public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
of the Ombudsman arguing that pursuant to the than one month's salary shall be final and
decision of this Court in Fabian vs. Desierto, decisions unappealable.
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
should be taken to the Court of Appeals. He insists that directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
the Ombudsman’s decision absolving respondent may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
Abalos of thecharge against him is appealable. petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of
In his Reply, petitioner stresses that the Office of the the written notice of the order, directive or decision or
Ombudsman should not restrict the right of appeal denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
allowed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770 nor limit the power of with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
review of this Court. He contends that whether the The above rules may be amended or modified by the
decision of the Ombudsman is for conviction or acquittal Office of the Ombudsman as the interest may require."
of the respondent, it should be reviewed by this Court. 3. It is clear that any order, directive or decision of the
2. Section 27 of R.A. 6770 provides: Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of public
"SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - (1) All censure, or reprimand, or suspension of not more than
provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are one month's salary shall be final and unappealable.
immediately effective and executory. The last paragraph in Section 27 which provides that in
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or all administratively disciplinary cases, orders, directives,
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and appealed to the Supreme Court was rendered invalid
shall be entertained only on any of the following and ofno effect in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto which
grounds: laid down the rule that said Section 27 cannot validly
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
affects the order, directive or decision; Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases without violating the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which 24, 1999 precisely in view of the ruling in the Fabian
increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without case. Simply put, the correct recourse was to the Court
its advice and concurrence. of Appeals and not to this Court.
Thus, appeals from decisions of the Office of the This notwithstanding, even on the assumption that
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should appeal is allowed, the same can no longer prosper. As
be brought to the Court of Appeals under the provisions correctly pointed out by private respondent, sincethe
of Rule 43. The only provision affected by the Fabian Order dated September 10, 1999 of the Ombudsman
ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the denying the motion for reconsideration was received by
proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as petitioner on October 15, 1999, petitioner had until
the proper mode of appeal; all other matters included in October 25, 1999 to appeal in accordance with Section
said Section 27, including the finality or non-finality of 27, R.A. 6770 or at the most, until November 24, 1999,
decisions, are not affected and still stand. if he availed of the 30-day extension provided under
4. Pursuant to AO No. 7, where the respondent is Section 2, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
absolved of the charge, the decision shall be final and Procedure. However, the petition was filed with the
unappealable. It is implicit in Section 27, and with Court of Appeals only on February 1, 2000, way beyond
greater reason, that decisions of the Ombudsman the reglementary period.
absolving the respondent of the charge, should be final [G.R. No. 109721. March 11, 1999]
and unappealable. FELIX A. SAJOT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
Needless to state, in appropriate cases involving PEOPLEpetition
Nature: OF THE toPHILIPPINES,
set aside arespondents.
resolution of the Court of
oppressive or arbitrary action, the complainant is not Appeals
deprived of a legal recourse by certiorari under Rule 65 1. April 23, 1991 - RTC Branch 118, Pasay City,
of the Rules of Court which apply suppletorily to the convicted petitioner and Antonio Tobias in Criminal
Rules of Procedures of the Office of the Ombudsman. Case NO. 97-12635, of estafa.
5. The same case teaches that the failure to provide 2. Antonio Tobias appealed the decision to the Court of
for the right of appeal in certain cases from the Appeals,and, thereafter, filed an appellant's brief, which
decision of the Ombudsman is not a denial of due appeal is now pending therein.
process for the right to appeal is not a natural right 3. June 24, 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a
nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory notice of appeal through Attorney Mariano Cervo.
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner Subsequently, the trial court elevated the records to the
and in accordance with the provisions of the law. It Court of Appeals.
should be recalled that the Second Division of this Court 4. February 21, 1992 - petitioner filed with the Court of
in G.R. No.140272 denied the appeal by way of petition Appeals a "Petition for Extension of Time to File Brief,"
for review on certiorari in its Resolution dated November asking for an additional thirty-day period to file
appellant's brief, which the court granted.On March 20, 2. In Sps. Lawa vs. Court of Appeals, we said:
1992, petitioner filed a "Petition for Second Extension of "True, appeal is an essential part of our judicial system.
Time to File Brief", which the court likewise As such, courts should proceed with caution so as not
granted.Again, on May 14, 1992, he filed a "petition for to deprive a party of the right to appeal, particularly if
Third Extension of Time to File Brief." The court granted the appeal is meritorious. Respect for the appellant's
the motion. right, however, carries with it the correspondent respect
5. November 27, 1992 - CA resolved to dismiss for the appellee's similar rights to fair play and justice.
petitioner's appeal for failure to file his brief within the The appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing
third extension granted by the court. Petitioner could party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down
not give any plausible explanation for his failure to file in the Rules of Court."
brief. 3. In Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
6. March 12, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for "Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
reconsideration, alleging that his counsel, Attorney adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
Mariano H. G. Cervo, never submitted the brief because thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while
of "utter and gross ignorance of procedure and/or the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
negligence or omission, intentional or otherwise, in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never
performance of his avowed professional duty." intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate
7. March 30, 1993 - CA denied the motion for being a the rules with impunity. The liberality in the
prohibited pleading. Petitioner received a copy of the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in
resolution on April 12, 1993. proper cases and under justifiable causes and
Issue: W Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion circumstances."
in dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to file While litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a
appellant's brief - truism that every case must be prosecuted in
1. Rule 50, Section 1 (e) of the Revised Rules of Court accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
provides - orderly and speedy administration of justice.
"Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal - An Appeal 4. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals denied
may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own him the right to due process when it dismissed his
motion or on that of the appellee, on the following appeal because of his counsel's negligence.
grounds: We do not agree. Petitioner was himself guilty of
xxx neglect. He was aware of his conviction and of the
(e) Failure of appellant to serve and file the required requirement of filing an appellant's brief. His excuse
number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the that he relied on the services of his counsel and that he
time provided by these Rules;" was busy is "flimsy". Were we to accept his excuse,
this Court would have to open cases dismissed many Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph
years ago on the ground of counsel's neglect. In many Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as
cases, the fact is that counsel's negligence is matched OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De
by his client's own negligence." Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus
Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio,
Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma ,
docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757.
4. Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN dated February 21, 2001. The other respondents
(THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits. The
PHILIPPINE
Nature: NATIONAL
two petitions POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL
for certiorari and a petition for Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary
LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.
habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. investigation of the complaints and on April 4, 2001,
26558 for SR.,
CALLEJO, plunder
J.: wherein petitioner is one of the issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia, that
accused together with former President Joseph E. Joseph Estrada, petitioner and several others be
Estrada, Jose “Jinggoy” P. Estrada and several others. charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
1. April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Erap Muslim 5. April 4, 2001 - the Ombudsman filed with the
Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation, Sandiganbayan several Informations against former
received on its behalf a donation in the amount of P200 President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his
Million from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson post as President, including one for plunder.
through the latter’s assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. 6. April 5, 2001 - petitioner obtained a copy of the
2. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the Ombudsman’s Joint Resolution finding probable cause
said amount to the Foundation’s treasurer who later against him for plunder. The next day, he filed a Motion
deposited it in the Foundation’s account with the for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation. This was
Equitable PCI Bank. denied on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
3. In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson amended Information charging petitioner with plunder
publicly accused then President Joseph E. Estrada and had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan.
his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, 7. Also on April 5, 2001, petitioner filed with the
including its operation on the illegal numbers game Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To
known as jueteng. This triggered the filing with the Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and
Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of
including Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accused’s Motion
versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To
docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft
Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of by petitioner had already been resolved in its April 25,
the Charges against accused Edward Serapio. 2001 Resolution finding probable cause to hold
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding petitioner and his co-accused for trial.Petitioner filed a
probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of motion for reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001
arrest for the accused, including petitioner. The Resolution.
Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, 11. June 1, 2001 - the Sandiganbayan issued a
including petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well
June 27, 2001. as all the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558
In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain
the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which of waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan,
was set for hearing on May 4, 200. For his part, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the
petitioner’s co-accused Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada filed on case in the manner it determines best conducive to
April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case,
that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right. directed the other accused to participate in the said bail
8. May 4, 2001 - during the hearing for the Urgent hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of
Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is
of the arraignment earlier than the June 27, 2001 adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered
schedule. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the automatically reproduced at the trial.
hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioner’s 12. However, Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June
petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001. 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due to pending
9. May 17, 2001 - four days before the hearing on incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing
petitioner’s petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an to June 26, 2001.
urgent motion for early arraignment of all three accused, 13. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again
and a motion for joint bail hearings. Petitioner proceed because on said date petitioner filed a motion
questioned this in the hearing on his petition for bail. So to quash on the grounds that as against him, the
Sandiganbayan reset the hearing to enable the court to amended Information does not allege a combination or
resolve the prosecution’s pending motions as well as series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as
petitioner’s motion that his petition for bail be heard as against him, the amended Information does not allege a
early as possible, which motion the prosecution pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful
opposed. scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in to have
10. May 31, 2001 - the Sandiganbayan issued a been illegally received or collected does not constitute
Resolution denying petitioner’s April 6, 2001 Urgent “ill-gotten wealth” as defined in Section 1(d) of Republic
Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed
Act No. 7080; and the amended Information charges 16. July 10, 2001 - just before his arraignment in
him of bribery and illegal gambling. Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner manifested to the
By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for
holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to reconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying
withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution his motion to quash and for the deferment of his
contended that petitioner’s motion to quash the arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared
amended Information was antithetical to his petition for that there was no provision in the Rules of Court or in
bail. the Sandiganbayan’s rules granting the right to
14. The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of petitioner to file a motion for the reconsideration of an
accused and the hearing on the petition for bail of interlocutory order issued by it and ordered petitioner to
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 orally argue his motion for reconsideration. When
to enable it to resolve the pending incidents and the petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with
motion to quash of petitioner. However, even before the his arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead, impelling
Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions of the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
petitioner and the prosecution, petitioner filed with this 19. July 20, 2001 - petitioner filed with the Court a
Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148769,
and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in
that the Court declare void the questioned orders, excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan on his amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its
claim that he was thereby effectively denied of his right July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash,
to due process. Petitioner likewise prayed for the notwithstanding the fact that material inculpatory
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be allegations of the amended Information against him do
declared to have waived their right to present evidence not constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is
in opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on charged, under the said amended Information, for more
the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of than one offense.
petitioner’s guilt of plunder, that he be granted 20. August 9, 2001 - petitioner filed with the Court
provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings. another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
15. July 9, 2001 - the Sandiganbayan issued a 149116, assailing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution
Resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash the dated 31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001
amended Information. Petitioner, through counsel, Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June 25, 2001
received on said date a copy of said resolution. The Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of its
motion to fix bail filed by Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada was May 31, 2001 Resolution.
also resolved by the Sandiganbayan.
21. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed preliminary investigations. Citing Raro v.
grave abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus motion Sandiganbayan:
to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his ‘x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a
arrest as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case No. policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
26558; to conduct a determination of probable cause; investigations, and leaves to the investigating
and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
reinvestigation of the charges him. Petitioner exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient
asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally evidence as will establish ‘probable cause’ for filing of
disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed grave information against the supposed offender.”
abuse of discretion in charging him with plunder. He 2. Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the
further argues that there exists no probable cause to Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that matter
support an indictment for plunder as against him. committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their
He asserts that while this Court does not ordinarily look resolution and joint resolution, respectively. Petitioner
into the existence of probable cause to charge a person failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds
for an offense in a given case, it may do so in no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
exceptional circumstances, which are present in this Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding
case: (1) to afford adequate protection to the probable cause against petitioner for plunder. Neither
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying
administration of justice or to avoid oppression; (3) petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation.
when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of 3. Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of
authority; and (4) where the charges are manifestly petitioner’s omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan noted
false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.[36] that a preliminary investigation was fully conducted in
Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds for a accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of
reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the the Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18,
questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman 23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman
disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the Act of 1989); and that all the basic complaints and
charge of plunder and committed errors of law or evidence in support thereof were served upon all the
irregularities which have been prejudicial to his interest. accused.It was in light of such findings that the
Issue: Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis for the
W Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion allegation that accused therein (including petitioner)
in denying petitioner’s omnibus motion - NO. were deprived of the right to seek a reconsideration of
1. Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s Resolution dated April 4, 2001
the Ombudsman’s discretion in the conduct of finding probable cause to charge them with plunder
after the conduct of preliminary investigation in to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
connection therewith. crime has been committed and was committed by the
In addition, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
Ombudsman’s resolution, but failed to show in his establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
motion that there were newly discovered evidence, or definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
that the preliminary investigation was tainted by errors certainty of guilt."
of law or irregularities, which are the only grounds for 6. Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the
which a reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s resolution prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct
may be granted. preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to
4. It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary said officer’s finding and determination of probable
investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a cause, since the determination of the existence of
right conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. The
investigation does not impair the validity of the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner
Information or otherwise render the same defective and failed to establish that the preliminary investigation
neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with
case or constitute a ground for quashing the irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint
Information. If the lack of a preliminary investigation resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the
does not render the Information invalid nor affect the facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.
jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason PEDRO E. BUDIONGAN, JR., Municipal Mayor; et. al petitioners,
can it be said that the denial of a motion for vs.HON. JACINTO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., Asst. Special Prosecutor
reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust I; et al. respondents.
Nature: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing
the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it the Memorandum Jof the Office of the Special
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
be said that petitioner had been deprived of due Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman
process. He was afforded the opportunity to refute the 1. The Municipality of Carmen, Bohol appropriated the
charges against him during the preliminary amount of P450,000.00 for the purchase of a road roller
investigation. for the municipality. However, the Municipal
5. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely Development Council through Resolution No. 3
to determine whether a crime has been committed and recommended that the amount of P450,000.00 be
whether there is probable cause to believe that the realigned and used for the asphalt laying of Bernaldez
person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof Street. Discussion thereon was deferred.
and should be held for tria. As the Court held in Webb 2. February 6, 2002 - Municipal Treasurer, Fulgencio V.
vs. De Leon, “[a] finding of probable cause needs only Paña, issued a Certificate of Availability of Funds for the
project. Thereafter, the Office of the Municipal Engineer Sandiganbayan (1) for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
prepared a Program of Works and Cost Estimates duly No. 3019 against the petitioners docketed as Criminal
noted/approved by Municipal Budget Officer Taciana B. Case No. 28075 and (2) for violation of Section 3(h) of
Espejo and Mayor Budiongan. R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan docketed as
3. March 6, 2002 - Mayor Budiongan issued the Notice Criminal Case No. 28076.
of Award and Notice to Commence Work in favor of 8. Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the
Herbert Malmis General Merchandise and Contractor, information charging them with violation of Sec. 3(e) of
Inc, after public bidding. The Sangguniang Bayan R.A. No. 3019. In a Resolution dated June 10, 2005, the
passed Resolution authorizing Mayor Budiongan to sign Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quashand
and enter into contract with Malmis relative to the above remanded Criminal Case No. 28075 to the Office of
project in the amount of P339,808.00. So Malmis the Ombudsman for amendment of the Information. It
commenced with the project. held that although Malmis benefited from the contract,
4. Thereafter, it was discovered that there was yet no the same is not unwarranted considering that the project
ordinance approving the realignment of the funds. was implemented, executed and completed.
Thus, on May 17, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan 9. June 27, 2005 - an Amended Information was filed
passed Ordinance No. 8 approving the realignment of charging petitioners with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
the fund. On June 14, 2002, Malmis was paid the No. 3019, alleging that petitioners, by prematurely
contract price. awarding to Malmis the project despite the absence of
5. July 3, 2002 - respondents filed a complaint against funds specifically appropriated for such purpose, and
the petitioners before the Office of the Deputy thereafter paying the contract price from the Municipal
Ombudsman for Visayas alleging illegality in the Treasury which was originally appropriated for the
conduct of the bidding, award and notice to commence purchase of a road roller, caused damage and undue
work since there was no fund appropriated for the injury to the government. The Sandiganbayan admitted
purpose. the Amended Information in its Resolution dated August
6. July 31, 2003 - the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman 18, 2005.
found probable cause and recommended the filing of an 10. On even date, petitioners filed with the
information for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File
Penal Code against the petitioners. Motion for Reinvestigationarguing that the above
7. Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and Informations were filed without affording them the
Reinvestigation Bureau of the Office of the Special opportunity to file counter-affidavits to answer/rebut the
Prosecutor, issued the assailed Memorandum dated modified charges. On September 20, 2005, the
April 28, 2004, modifying the charge. Thus, two Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the motion
separate Informations were filed before the insofar as Criminal Case No. 28076 is concerned. It
held that it is too late in the day to remand the case for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the
reinvestigation considering that Budiongan had already Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the
been arraigned and the case had long been set for pre- case.
trial proceedings, with both parties having filed their 2. Petitioners were not deprived of due process
respective briefs. As regards Criminal Case No. 28075, because they were afforded the opportunity to refute the
the Sandiganbayan noted that although the conduct of charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The
the preliminary investigation was regular, petitioners modification of the offense charged did not come as a
however were not given the opportunity to seek surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the
reconsideration of the modified charges.Thus, it granted same set of facts and the same alleged illegal acts.
leave to the petitioners to file with the Office of the Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered
Special Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration (not a evidence nor impute commission of grave errors or
motion for reinvestigation) of the said office's serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to
Memorandum dated April 28, 2004. warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case
11. Petitioners maintain that the modification of the as required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of
charge from violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.Thus, the
Code to violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No. modification of the offense charged, even without
3019 denied their rights to due process since they affording the petitioners a new preliminary investigation,
were not given the opportunity to answer and present did not amount to a violation of their rights.
evidence on the new charge in a preliminary 3. Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is
investigation. deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it
Issue: W the Petitioners were denied the opportunity to before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
present counter-evidence in a new preliminary Petitioner Budiongan was arraigned in Criminal Case
investigation - NO. No. 28076 on March 28, 2005. He was also arraigned
1. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a together with the rest of the petitioners under the
constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 28075 on
statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does December 2, 2005.
not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise 4. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely
render the same defective. It does not affect the to determine whether a crime has been committed and
jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a whether there is probable cause to believe that the
ground for quashing the Information. If absence of a person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof
preliminary investigation does not render the and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause
Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
over the case, then the denial of a motion for than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their
on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to
and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the
certainty of guilt." Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular
5. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is an integral No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical
component of the Ombudsman and is under the latter's persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts
supervision and control. Thus, whatever course of abroad without prior authorization from the Central
action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to Bank.It also required all residents of the Philippines who
approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the habitually earned or received foreign currencies from
investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his invisibles, either locally or abroad, to report such
discretionary powers based upon constitutional earnings or receipts to the Central Bank. Violations of
mandate. Generally, courts should not interfere in such the Circular were punishable as a criminal offense
exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review under Section 34 of the Central Bank Act.
the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in 2. (9) additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and
prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it, Benedicto with the same offense, but involving different
save in cases where there is clear showing of grave accounts, were filed with the Manila RTC.
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of 3. January 3, 1992 - (11) more Informations accusing
jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman. Absent any Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the same offense, again
showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same
any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary court. The Informations were similarly worded as the
investigation, as in the instant case, courts as a rule earlier indictments, save for the details as to the dates
must defer to said officer's finding and determination of of the violations of Circular No. 960, the identities of the
probable cause, since the determination of the dummies used, the balances and sources of the
existence of probable cause is the function of the earnings, and the names of the foreign banks where
prosecutor. these accounts were maintained.
ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners, 4. All of the aforementioned criminal cases were
vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR., consolidated before Branch 26 of the said trial court.
1.PRESIDING
December JUDGE, REGIONAL
27, 1991 TRIAL
- Mrs. COURT
Imelda OF MANILA,
Marcos and 5. Meanwhile, Central Bank issued Circular No. 1318
BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for violation which revised the rules governing non-trade foreign
QUISUMBING, J.:
of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 relation to Section 34 exchange transactions. It took effect on January 20,
of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as 1992.
amended) in five Informations. Docketed as Criminal
6. August 24, 1992 - Central Bank, pursuant to the 11. September 6, 1994 - the trial court denied
government’s policy of further liberalizing foreign petitioners’ motion. Petitioners then filed a motion for
exchange transactions, came out with Circular No. reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this
1356 which amended Circular No. 1318. Circular No. motion on October 18, 1994.
1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central Bank 12. November 21, 1994 - petitioners moved for leave to
approval for foreign exchange-funded expenditures file a second motion for reconsideration. The trial court
obtained from the banking system. denied petitioners’ motion and set the consolidated
7. Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, cases for trial on January 5, 1995.
contained a saving clause, excepting from their 13. Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition,
coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of with similar prayers for temporary restraining orders
Circular No. 960 and, in the case of Circular No. 1353, and/or writs of preliminary injunction were respectively
violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular No. with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found
1318. no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
8. September 19, 1993 - the government allowed Judge in denying petitioners’ respective Motions to
petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to return to the Quash, except that with respect to Criminal Case No.
Philippines, on condition that they face the various 91-101884, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED
criminal charges instituted against them, including the for lack of merit.
dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter Issue:
cases. (1) W the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to
9. February 28, 1994 - petitioners Benedicto and Rivera Quash for absence of a valid preliminary investigation? -
were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty to the charges NO.
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos 1. Petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation
had earlier entered a similar plea during her by the Department of Justice was invalid and in violation
arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992. of their rights to due process. Petitioners argue that
10. August 11, 1994 - petitioners moved to quash all the government’s ban on their travel effectively prevented
Informations filed against them. Their motion was them from returning home and personally appearing at
grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, the preliminary investigation. Benedicto and Rivera
extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular further point out that the joint preliminary investigation
No. 960, prescription, exemption from the Central by the Department of Justice, resulted to the charges in
Bank’s reporting requirement, and the grant of absolute one set of cases before the Sandiganbayan for
immunity as a result of a compromise agreement violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set
entered into with the government. before the RTC for violation of Circular No. 960.
2. Preliminary investigation is not part of the due right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes
process guaranteed by the Constitution. It is an inquiry and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to Revised Penal Code.
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been 2. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof. recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary
Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is investigation on the ground that his warrantless arrest
personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was
can be waived, either expressly or by implication. The conducted before the information was filed, which is
waiver extends to any irregularity in the preliminary violative of his rights, the same was granted but later on
investigation, where one was conducted. reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of
3.Petitioners have expressly waived their right to Appeals.
question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary 3. The appellate court in sustaining the decision of the
investigation or to ask for a new preliminary lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was
investigation. Petitioners admit posting bail immediately valid in view of the fact that the offense was committed,
following their return to the country, entered their the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists
respective pleas to the charges, and filed various valid information for murder filed against petitioner.
motions and pleadings. By so doing, without 4. Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for
simultaneously demanding a proper preliminary review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
investigation, they have waived any and all
irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary Issues:
investigation. The trial court did not err in denying the W the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful -
motion to quash the informations on the ground of want No.
of or improperly conducted preliminary investigation. W petitioner waived his right to preliminary
The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a investigation - No.
ground to quash the information. 
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING vs. COURT OF APPEALS RULING:
1. The general rule on arrest provides that the same is
1. An information was filed charging herein petitioner legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However,
Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of there are instances specifically enumerated under the
Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself law when a warrantless arrest may be considered
together with his two lawyers to the police upon lawful. Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein
obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of
However, he was immediately detained and denied his said rule.
2. The police were not present at the time of the

commission of the offense, neither do they have Doctrine: The right of a person to preliminary
personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or investigation is recognized by the law and is governed
has been committed not to mention the fact that by the Rules of Court. However, the failure to accord
petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the this right does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of
penal institution. the information; the case is merely suspended, and the
3. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution prosecutor directed to conduct the proper investigation.
that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions Nature: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a of Court, assailing two Ordersof the Sandiganbayan
preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. 1. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an
In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a Orderdated September 19, 1995, naming the following
preliminary investigation to determine whether is as respondents: Benjamin Arao, Frederick Winters,
probable cause that a crime has been committed and Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the
that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to city jail warden of Pagadian City.
prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation 2. Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated January 15,
brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the 1998,recommending the prosecution of “the
accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived aforenamed respondents” for violation of Article 269 of
of. the Revised Penal Code and Section 3-a in relation to
4. On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended.
to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop
prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted,
is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it although he was not one of the original respondents
before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995.
The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the
right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment recommendation.
and he, through his counsel denied answering 3. April 16, 1998 - Order of Arrest was issued by the
questions before the court unless they were afforded Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner,
the proper preliminary investigation. however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial
5. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On
allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to the same day, he filed a “Motion To Remand Case To
preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary
information charging the latter of the crime of murder. Investigation.”
G.R. Nos. 138859-60. February 22, 2001
ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP, petitioner, vs. The Honorable
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
4. June 8, 1998 - Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of 2. The Rules of Court requires such investigation before
petitioner for his alleged failure to submit himself to the an information for an offense punishable by at least four
jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. years, two months and one day may be filed in court.
5. August 8, 1998 - petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, The old Rules, on the other hand, mandates preliminary
grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. investigation of an offense cognizable by the regional
In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the trial court.
Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the 3. Petitioner is charged in Criminal Case No. 24524 with
Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019. Such offense is
himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. punishable with, among other penalties, imprisonment
24525 was concerned. of six years and one month to fifteen years.Under the
6. February 15, 1999 - On the scheduled arraignment, aforecited Rules, whether in the old or the revised
petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been version, he is entitled to a preliminary investigation.
accorded preliminary investigation. 4. It is undisputed, however, that before the Information
7. The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s plea for against petitioner was filed, no preliminary investigation
preliminary investigation. had been conducted. In fact, the Office of the
Issue: W the Sandiganbayan, despite being informed of Ombudsman admitted that “petitioner was denied of his
the lack of preliminary investigation with respect to right to preliminary investigation.”We find no basis for
petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 24524, committed grave the Sandiganbayan’s ruling that petitioner “had not
abuse of discretion in proceeding with his arraignment - given timely notice nor any statement of the alleged
YES. inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the
Held: Information.”
1. Preliminary investigation is “an inquiry or proceeding 5. First, there was no showing that petitioner was
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to notified of the charges filed by Erlinda Fadri. As earlier
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been noted, he had not been named as a respondent in the
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, September 19, 1995 Order. After learning of the filing of
and should be held for trial.”The Court explained that the Information against him when he was served a
the rationale of a preliminary investigation is to “protect Warrant of Arrest, petitioner did not dally. He
the accused from the inconvenience, expense and immediately informed the Sandiganbayan that no
burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the preliminary investigation had been conducted in regard
reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first to him. Several months later, moments before his
ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a arraignment, he reiterated his prayer that the
competent officer." preliminary investigation be conducted. In this light, the
Sandiganbayan erred in saying that he had not given Rules of Court for conducting preliminary investigation.
the court timely notice of this deficiency. The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it
6. Even assuming that prior to the filing of the deals merely with the finality of orders, directives and
Information, petitioner had known that the proceedings decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman -- not the
and the investigation against his co-accused were deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary
pending, he cannot be expected to know of the investigation.
investigator’s subsequent act of charging him.
Precisely, he had not been previously included therein YUSOP v SANDIGANBAYAN
and, consequently, he had not been notified thereof. February 22, 2001
7. In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that “the Facts:
right to preliminary investigation is waived when the Acting on an Affidavit-Complaintfiled by a certain Erlinda
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of Fadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued
entering a plea at arraignment.” Conversely, if the an Orderdated September 19, 1995, naming the
accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the following as respondents: benjamin Arao, Fredireck
petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived. Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay
8. Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The Order
of petitioner’s right to preliminary investigation. Under also required respondents, within ten days from receipt
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal thereof, to submit their counter-affidavits and other
Procedure, “[a]n application for or admission to bail shall pieces of contraverting evidence.
not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his
arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a
from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence Resolution dated January 15, 1998, recommending the
of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, prosecution of "the aforenamed respondents" for
provided that he raises them before entering his plea. x violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and
x x.” Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act
9. We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is No. 3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of
substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one of the
to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of
right to due process.Hence, preliminary investigation the original respondents mentioned in the Order of
with regard to him must be conducted. September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
10. We disagree with the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on approved the recommendation. Accordingly, two
Section 27 of Republic Act 6770.This provision cannot Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They
justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24524 (violation
of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and 24525 (unlawful arrest 1. Whether the Sandiganbayan, despite being
under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code). informed of the lack of preliminary investigation
with respect to petitioner, In Criminal Case No.
On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the 24524, committed grave abuse of discretion in
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner, proceeding with his arraignment?
however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial
Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On 2. Is the filing of the bail bond constitutive of a
the same day, he filed a "Motion To Remand Case To waiver for seeking the right of preliminary
The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary investigation?
Investigation."
Held: Petition is partly meritorious remanded in
In Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan Sandiganbayan for conduct of Preliminary investigation.
denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to
submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. Annent to the first issue. We disagree with the
Sandiganbayan's reliance on Section 27 of Republic Act
On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, 6770.This provision cannot justify the evasion of the
grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for
In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the conducting preliminary investigation. The law does not
Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the sanction such interpretation, for it deals merely with the
Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted finality of orders, directives and decisions of the Office
himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. of the Ombudsman -- not the deprivation of the
24525 was concerned. substantive right to a preliminary investigation.
Moreover, petitioner cannot be bound by the
On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999, Ombudsman's January 15, 1998 Resolution, which
petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been recommended the filing of charges. He was not a party
accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed to the case and was not accorded any right to present
Orders, the Sandigabayan rejected his claim and evidence on his behalf.
proceeded with the arraignment.
In any event, even the Ombudsman agrees that
Hence, this recourse. petitioner was deprived of this right and believes that
the basic rudiments of due process are complied with.”
Issue : For its part, the Sandiganbayan opted to remain silent
when asked by this Court to comment on the Petition.
Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma

Anent to the second issue: Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that "the right Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, John Does and
to preliminary investigation is waived when the Jane Does, with the crime of Plunder.
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a plea at arraignment." Conversely, if the The Ombudsman moved to amend the Information
accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the twice - initially, to introduce changes in the Information
petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived. (including a change in the appellation of the
accused Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a Uy to John Doe a.k.a. as Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio
waiver of petitioner's right to preliminary Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy), and thereafter, to include Jaime
investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the C. Dichaves as accused; the Sandiganbayan granted
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the motions.
"[a]n application for or admission to bail; shall not In the course of the proceedings, the Ombudsman filed
bar the accused from challenging the validity of before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Motion
his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued dated 8 January 2002[8] seeking, among others, the
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or issuance of a warrant of arrest against Victor Jose Tan
questioning the absence of a preliminary Uy alias Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
investigation of the charge against him, provided Uy. The Ombudsman alleged that no warrant of arrest
that he raises them before entering his plea. xxx." had been issued against the accused John Doe who
was designated in the Information as Eleuterio Tan,
We stress that the right to preliminary investigation Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy; and that, in order not to
is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To frustrate the ends of justice, a warrant of arrest should
deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full issue against him after he had been identified to be also
measure of his right to due process.Hence, preliminary using the name Victor Jose Tan Uy with address at
investigation with regard to him must be conducted. 2041 M. J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City. Allegedly, a
positive identification had been made through
VICTOR JOSE TAN UY v OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN photographs, as early as the Senate Impeachment Trial
July 27, 2008 against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, that
FACTS: John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
charging former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mr. Uy and VICTOR JOSE TAN UY are one and the
together with Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, Charlie “Atong” same person.
The petitioner’s response was a Petition to Conduct ISSUE:

Preliminary Investigation[10] filed with WON the Ombudsman complied with the basic
the Ombudsman. The petitioner argued that: requirements of due process and the prevailing rules
(1) he was not subjected to a preliminary and jurisprudence on preliminary investigation.
investigation or to any previous inquiry to
determine the existence of probable cause HELD/RATIO:
against him for the crime of plunder or any other NO.
offense, as: A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is
a. he was not included as respondent in either placed on trial to secure the innocent against hasty,
of the two Ombudsman cases – bases of malicious, and oppressive prosecution; to protect him
the criminal proceeding; from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well
b. neither his name nor his address at No. as from the trouble, expenses, and anxiety of a public
2041 M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City was trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having
mentioned at any stage of the preliminary to conduct useless and expensive trials. While the right
investigation conducted in the criminal is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a component
cases; of due process in administering criminal justice. The
c. the preliminary investigation in the cases right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
that led to the filing the case was before being bound for trial and before being exposed to
conducted without notice to him and the risk of incarceration and penalty is not a mere formal
without his participation; or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the
d. he was not served any subpoena, whether accused's claim to a preliminary investigation is to
at his address at No. 2041 M.J. Cuenco deprive him of the full measure of his right to due
Avenue, Cebu City or at any other address, process.
for the purpose of informing him of any
complaint against him for plunder or any Thus, as in a court proceeding (albeit with appropriate
other offense and for the purpose of adjustments because it is essentially still an
directing him to file his counter-affidavit; administrative proceeding in which the prosecutor or
(2) dictates of basic fairness and due process of law investigating officer is a quasi-judicial officer by the
require that petitioner be given the opportunity to nature of his functions), a preliminary investigation is
avail himself of the right to a preliminary subject to the requirements of both substantive and
investigation since the offense involved is non- procedural due process.
bailable in character.
In light of the due process requirement, the standards - Velasquez was charged with acts of lasciviousness
that at the very least assume great materiality and upon the person of AIRA VELASQUEZ, MARY JOY
significance are those enunciated in the leading case OCAMPO and KIMBERLY VELASQUEZ; and rape of
of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. This MARY JOY OCAMPO. Velasquez pleaded not guilty to
case instructively tells us - in defining the basic due the charges against him, whereupon the cases were
process safeguards in administrative proceedings - consolidated and jointly tried.
that the decision (by an administrative body) must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or The evidence for the prosecution:
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the - In October 1994, Mary Joy (stepdaughter of accused),
parties affected; only by confining the then 13 years of age, slept in a room she shared with
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to Velasquez, her mother Angelina, and her two half-
the parties, can the latter be protected in their right brothers. When she woke up in the morning, she found
to know and meet the case against them; it should the accused beside her on the floor, her mother having
not, however, detract from the tribunal’s duty to actively left for the market. He kissed her on the mouth and the
see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to breasts. Then he raised her shirt, pulled down her
use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence shorts and underwear, and kissed her private parts.
and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the Afterward, he inserted his middle finger into Mary Joy’s
controversy. vagina. Mary Joy felt a sharp pain and tried to resist by
kicking him, which made the latter remove his finger
Mindful of these considerations, we hold that the although he continued kissing her. He then left, but not
petitioner’s right to due process has been violated. before warning her to keep quiet and not to tell anyone
what he had done to her.
PEOPLE v VELASQUEZ
G.R. Nos. 132635 & 143872–75 - 2 weeks later, still in October, while Mary Joy was
MENDOZA; February 21, 2001 watching television alone in the living room, Velasquez
NATURE approached her and, though she tried to evade him, he
- An appeal from the decision of the RTC of Angeles succeeded in forcing her to their room. He lowered her
City, convicting Lamberto Velasquez of (1) acts of shorts and underwear, raised her shirt and bra, and
lasciviousness committed against his granddaughter started kissing her. Then he inserted his middle finger
Aira Velasquez; and (2) rape of his stepdaughter Mary into her vagina and later had sexual intercourse with
Joy Ocampo her. Up to April 1997, Velasquez continuously molested
Mary Joy, sometimes forcing her to masturbate him and
FACTS at other times licking her vagina.
accused’s advances because of his strength and

- Regail (daughter of accused) has a daughter named threats. To prevent a recurrence of the event, Mary
Aira, 2 years old. On April 16, 1997, at 3PM, while Grace moved out of their house and went to live with
Regail was folding clothes, Aira walked into the room her aunt in Angeles City. Kimberly was around Aira’s
crying. Aira complained that her grandfather did age, and Regail remembered hearing that pus had also
something to her, which she demonstrated by opening come out of the child’s vagina. When she told her about
her right leg and moving one of her right fingers toward Dr. Buyboy’s findings, Mary Grace lost no time and took
her vagina. Regail did not want to believe her daughter Kimberly to Dr. Buyboy, who made the same findings.
and thought that her father was just joking with the
latter. However, Aira started to cry. In the days that - Angelina and Loida went to the police station to make
followed, she noticed that Aira complained of pain in her a report and brought the children to the Ospital ng
vagina while taking a bath. When Regail asked her why Angeles for physical examination. They went back to
her vagina hurt, Aira said it was because of the things the Mabalacat Police Station and gave their statements.
her grandfather had been doing to her vagina, showing They went to the NBI for another physical examination.
her mother what had been done to her.On vagina. She
also noticed that her daughter was running a fever, and The evidence for the defense:
that her vagina was red and swollen. She took Aira to - Accused denied the allegations against him. He said
Dr. Lydia Buyboy, who told her that her daughter had there were always several people in their house at any
lacerations in her vaginal area and that she had time, and so it was impossible for him to have an
probably been fingered. However, the doctor declined to opportunity to molest any of the complainants. He
give a medical certificate as she did not want to get believed that Mary Joy had accused him because he
involved in any case. always noticed whenever she came home late and
scolded her. As for Mary Grace’s complaint, he claimed
- Mary Grace Ocampo( stepdaughter of accused), he was in fact the one who caught Kimberly playing with
Angelina’s daughter, married Ranold, accused’s son by her organ and that he reported this to Kimberly’s
first wife Caridad and Regail’s brother. Mary Grace parents. He believes that Regail filed the complaint
testified that she had been molested by her stepfather against him because he had scolded her and punished
when she was 9 years old. She recalled when, as a new her when she went out on a date with a married man,
couple, Angelina and accused spent the night at an and again when she went out with her cousin after she
aunt’s house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Mary Grace had married Meryll Robertson. As to Roan, he claimed
was with them. According to Mary Grace, accused went he never molested her. Of his granddaughter Aira,
to her side, raised her clothes, and fondled her breasts. accused-appellant said that she was a liar and a
His hands went lower. She was unable to resist naughty child.
2. WON the trial court erred in admitting the testimony

- On April 30, 1997, during Loida Kellow’s despedida, of Regail Velasquez. NO.
he was drinking with his friends when he developed a 3. WON the trial court erred in giving credibility to Mary
headache and decided to sleep. At around 10PM, he Joy Ocampo’s testimony. YES.
was awakened by his son Renel who gave him glass of
bitter liquid to drink. The drink contained sleeping pills. HELD
After taking one sip, he set it aside. When he woke up 1. NO.
the next morning, he looked for his family, but they were It is an established jurisprudence that the issue of lack
not around. He got home at 8PM, but there was still no of or a defective preliminary investigation should be
sign of them. raised before or during trial and such statutory right to
a preliminary investigation is deemed waived when
- The following day, he went to Manila. He pawned his appellant, as in this case, failed to claim it before
watch and ring and bought a ticket on the Super Ferry plea.
10. At 9PM, he sailed for Cebu and stayed with his
eldest son, Rolando Velasquez. Three weeks later, he Moreover, in appellant’s arguments, it is unclear
learned of the cases filed against him from the whether this alleged motion for preliminary investigation
newspapers and television. However, because he had which was denied by the trial court was anchored on the
no job and no money, he was unable to return to lack of it or merely a defect thereon or a mere motion for
Pampanga to clear his name. He was found in Cebu reinvestigation. When it does not appear from the
and arrested in July. record that a preliminary investigation was not granted
the accused, it must be presumed that the proceedings
- The accused presented several witnesses to testify in the trial court were in accordance with law. So that
that he is a man of good repute, and to corroborate his where no objection has been made at the trial, appellant
story. must be taken to have waived his right to a preliminary
investigation if in fact he was not given the benefit
TC RULING: thereof. Failing to raise the issue of lack of preliminary
The accused was convicted of (1) acts of lasciviousness investigation during the trial, appellant is now estopped
committed against his granddaughter Aira Velasquez; to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. At any
and (2) rape of his stepdaughter Mary Joy Ocampo rate, absence of preliminary investigation merely affects
the regularity of the proceedings but does not affect the
ISSUES trial court’s jurisdiction or impair the validity of the
1. WON the trial court erred in denying the accused information.
of his right to preliminary investigation. NO.
JUDY ANN SANTOS v PEOPLE other sources, such as movies and product
August 26, 2008 endorsements; the estimated tax liability arising from
FACTS: petitioner's underdeclaration amounted to
BIR Commissioner Parayno, Jr. wrote DOJ Secretary P1,718,925.52, including incremental penalties; the
Gonzales a letter regarding the possible filing of criminal non-declaration by petitioner of an amount equivalent to
charges against Judy Ann Santos. The letter read: at least 84.18% of the income declared in her return
was considered a substantial underdeclaration of
“I have the honor to refer to you for preliminary income, which constituted prima facieevidence of false
investigation and filing of an information in court if or fraudulent return under Section 248(B) of the NIRC,
evidence so warrants, the herein attached Joint Affidavit as amended; and petitioner's failure to account as part
of RODERICK C. ABAD, STIMSON P. CUREG, VILMA of her income the professional fees she received from
V. CARONAN, RHODORA L. DELOS REYES under sources other than ABS-CBN and her underdeclaration
Group SupervisorTEODORA V. PURINO, of the of the income she received from ABS-CBN amounted to
National Investigation Division, BIR National Office manifest violations of Sections 254 and 255, as well as
Building, BIR Road, Diliman, Quezon City, Section 248(B) of the NIRC, as amended.
recommending the criminal prosecution of MS. JUDY
ANNE LUMAGUI SANTOS forsubstantial ISSUE:
underdeclaration of income, which constitutes WON the CTA First Division committed grave abuse of
asprima facie evidence of false or fraudulent discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash.
return under Section 248(B) of the NIRC and
punishable under Sections 254 and 255 of the Tax HELD/RATIO:
Code.” NO.
The Petition for Review which petitioner intended to file
In said letter, BIR Commissioner Parayno summarized before the CTA en banc relied on two grounds: (1) the
the findings of the investigating BIR officers that lack of authority of Prosecuting Attorney Torrevillas to
petitioner, in her Annual Income Tax Return for taxable file the Information; and (2) the filing of the said
year 2002 filed with the BIR, declared an income of Information in violation of petitioner's constitutional
P8,033,332.70 derived from her talent fees solely from rights to due process and equal protection of the laws.
ABS-CBN; initial documents gathered from the BIR
offices and those given by petitioner's accountant and Petitioner's argument must fail in light of BIR
third parties, however, confirmed that petitioner received Commissioner Parayno's letter dated 19 May 2005 to
in 2002 income in the amount of at least DOJ Secretary Gonzales referring "for preliminary
P14,796,234.70, not only from ABS-CBN, but also from investigation and filing of an information in court if
evidence so warrants," the findings of the BIR officers

recommending the criminal prosecution of petitioner. In (g) He shall also have charge of the prosecution of all
said letter, BIR Commissioner Parayno already gave his crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of city
prior approval to the filing of an information in court ordinances, in the Court of First Instance and the
should the DOJ, based on the evidence submitted, find municipal courts of the city, and shall discharge all the
probable cause against petitioner during the preliminary duties in respect to the criminal prosecutions enjoined
investigation. Section 220 of the NIRC, as amended, by law upon provincial fiscals.
simply requires that the BIR Commissioner approve the
institution of civil or criminal action against a tax law (h) He shall cause to be investigated all charges of
violator, but it does not describe in what form such crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances
approval must be given. In this case, BIR and have the necessary information or complaints
Commissioner Parayno's letter of 19 May 2005 already prepared or made against the persons accused. He or
states his express approval of the filing of an any of his assistants may conduct such investigations
information against petitioner and his signature need not by taking oral evidence of reputable witnesses, and for
appear on the Resolution of the State Prosecutor or the this purpose may issue subpoena, summon witnesses
Information itself. to appear and testify under oath before him, and the
attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant
Still on the purported lack of authority of Prosecution witness may be enforced by application to the municipal
Attorney Torrevillas to file the Information, petitioner court or the Court of First Instance. No witness
asserts that it is the City Prosecutor under the Quezon summoned to testify under this section shall be under
City Charter, who has the authority to investigate and obligation to give any testimony which tend to
prosecute offenses allegedly committed within the incriminate himself.
jurisdiction of Quezon City, such as petitioner's case.
Evident from the foregoing is that the City Prosecutor
The Court is not persuaded. Under Republic Act No. has the power to investigate crimes, misdemeanors,
537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City, the City and violations of ordinances committed within the
Prosecutor shall have the following duties relating to the territorial jurisdiction of the city, and which can be
investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses: prosecuted before the trial courts of the said city. The
SEC. 28. The City Attorney - His assistants - His charge against petitioner, however, is already within the
duties. – exclusive original jurisdiction of the CTA, as the
Information states that her gross underdeclaration
xxxx resulted in an income tax deficiency of P1,395,116.24,
excluding interest and penalties. The City Prosecutor
does not have the authority to appear before the CTA,

which is now of the same rank as the Court of Appeals. [T]he power or authority of the Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuño, Jr. and his deputies in the Department
In contrast, the DOJ is the principal law agency of the of Justice to prosecute cases is national in scope; and
Philippine government which shall be both its legal the Special Prosecutor's authority to sign and file
counsel and prosecution arm. It has the power to informations in court proceeds from the exercise of said
investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute person's authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
offenders and administer the probation and correction
system. Under the DOJ is the Office of the State Moreover, there is nothing in the Revised Quezon City
Prosecutor whose functions are described as follows: Charter which would suggest that the power of the City
Prosecutor to investigate and prosecute crimes,
Sec. 8. Office of the Chief State Prosecutor. - The Office misdemeanors, and violations of ordinances committed
of the Chief State Prosecutor shall have the following within the territorial jurisdiction of the city is to the
functions: exclusion of the State Prosecutors. In fact, the Office of
the State Prosecutor exercises control and supervision
(1) Assist the Secretary in the performance of powers over City Prosecutors under Executive Order No. 292,
and functions of the Department relative to its role as otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987.
the prosecution arm of the government;
As regards petitioner's second ground, the Court is
(2) Implement the provisions of laws, executive orders unconvinced.
and rules, and carry out the policies, plans, programs
and projects of the Department relative to the First, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases; the information which is evident on its face. The same
cannot be said herein.
(3) Assist the Secretary in exercising supervision and
control over the National Prosecution Service as Second, petitioner cannot claim denial of due process
constituted under P.D. No. 1275 and/or otherwise when she was given the opportunity to file her affidavits
hereinafter provided; and and other pleadings and submit evidence before the
DOJ during the preliminary investigation of her case and
(4) Perform such other functions as may be provided by before the Information was filed against her. Due
law or assigned by the Secretary.[54] process is merely an opportunity to be heard. In
As explained by CTA First Division in its Resolution addition, preliminary investigation conducted by the
dated 11 May 2006: DOJ is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on
the merits. Its sole purpose is to determine whether a selling of securities without prior registration with the
crime has been committed and whether the respondent SEC; and that its actions are potentially damaging to the
therein is probably guilty of the crime. It is not the local mutual fund industry. Notwithstanding the BSP
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the directive, SCB continued to offer and sell GTPMF
parties' evidence. Hence, if the investigating prosecutor securities in this country. Petitioner learned that the
is already satisfied that he can reasonably determine SCB had been prohibited by the BSP to sell GPTMF
the existence of probable cause based on the parties' securities. Petitioner filed with the DOJ a complaint for
evidence thus presented, he may terminate the violation of Section 8.1 of the Securities Regulation
proceedings and resolve the case. Code against private respondents but was denied
holding that it should have been filed with the SEC.
Third, petitioner cannot likewise aver that she has been
denied equal protection of the laws. Issue: Whether the SEC has jurisdiction over the case.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue Held: Yes. A criminal charge for violation of the
favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute.
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Hence, it must first be referred to an administrative
Recognizing the existence of real differences among agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the
men, the equal protection clause does not demand doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and of the administrative tribunal, where the
conditions, both as to the privileges conferred and question demands the exercise of sound administrative
liabilities enforced. discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and
expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine
BAVIERA v PAGLINAWAN technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities
February 8, 2007 Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is
Facts: SCB acted as a stock broker, soliciting from local particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for
residents foreign securities called GTPMF. These any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and
securities were not registered with the SEC and were regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where
then remitted outwardly to SCB-Hong Kong and SCB- the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall
Singapore. The Investment Capital Association of the indorse thecomplaint to the DOJ for preliminary
Philippines (ICAP) filed with the SEC investigation and prosecution.
a complaint alleging that SCB violated the Revised
Securities Act, particularly the provision prohibiting the AGUIRRE v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
March 3, 2008
FACTS: Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the
On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor dismissed the petition
criminal complaint for the violation of Revised Penal stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio
Code particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any
to Republic Act No.7610 against respondents Pedro reversible error in the questioned resolution.
Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several
John/Jane Doe alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the ISSUE:
apparent instructions of respondents Michelina Aguirre- 1. Whether or not the respondents are liable for the
Olondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted, crime of mutilation
prospected, facilitated solicited and/or procured the 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr. ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave
Agatep on the intended mutilation via bilateral abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
vasectomy of Laureano Aguirre. excess of jurisdiction when the latter affirmed
the public prosecutor’s finding of lack of
Olondriz denied that the prospected, scouted, probable cause for respondents Pedro
facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual
mutilated or abused his common law brother, Laureano to stand trial for the criminal complaints of
Aguirre. She further contends that his common law falsification and mutilation in relation to
brother went through a vasectomy procedure but that Republic Act No. 7610.
does not amount to mutilation.
RULING:
Dr. Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal 1. No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised
personality to file a case since she is only a common Penal Code provides that:
law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the
person of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of
Vasectomy does not in any way equate to castration reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua
and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an shall be imposed upon any person who
organ in the context of law and medicine. shall intentionally mutilate another by
depriving him, either totally or partially, of
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged some essential organ for reproduction.
did not amount to mutilation, the vasectomy operation
did not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be The executive department of the government is
punished by prision mayor in its medium accountable for the prosecution of crimes, its principal
and maximum periods. obligation being the faithful execution of the laws of the
land. A necessary component of the power to execute
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows the laws is the right to prosecute their violators, the
that the elementsof mutilation under the first paragraph responsibility of which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence,
of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that the determination of whether or not probable cause
there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused
necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the
caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no
the offended party of some essential organ for compulsion to file a particular criminal information
reproduction. where he is not convinced that he has evidence to
prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence
According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did at hand points to a different conclusion.
not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized above, i.e. [t]he vasectomy operation did not Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a
in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive wide range of discretion, the discretion of whether,
organ, which is still very much part of his physical self. what and whom to charge, the exercise of which
depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are
2. No. Probable cause has been defined as the best appreciated by (public) prosecutors. And this
existence of such facts and circumstances as Court has consistently adhered to the policy of non-
would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations,
on the facts within the knowledge of the and to leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of latitude of discretion in the determination of what
the crime for which he was prosecuted. The term constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor cause for the filing of an information against the
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely supposed offender.
based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is,
the belief that the act or omission complained of The court’s duty in an appropriate case, therefore, is
constitutes the offense charged. A finding of confined to a determination of whether the assailed
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to executive determination of probable cause was done
stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting from a grave
abuse of discretion. For courts of law to grant the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the by Larry Aguirre before he was vasectomized; or the
reversal of the finding of whether or not there exists fact that the latter was not consulted. The lack of the
probable cause to file an information, the one seeking two preceding attendant facts do not in any way amount
the writ must be able to establish that the investigating to falsification, absent the contention that it was made to
prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and appear in the assailed report that said consent was
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal obtained. That would have been an untruthful
hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would statement. Neither does the fact that the Psychiatric
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to Report state that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of Disorder by the same token amount to falsification
law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough. Excess of because said report does not put forward that such
jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the finding arose after an examination of the concerned
case but has transcended the same or acted without patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he reasoned
authority. that though the vasectomy rendered Larry unable to
procreate, it was not the permanent damage
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present contemplated under the pertinent provision of the penal
petition, the reasons of the Assistant City Prosecutor in code.
dismissing the criminal complaints for falsification and
mutilation, as affirmed by the DOJ, is determinative of We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ and the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Assistant City Prosecutor was not shown in the present
case.
In ruling the way he did – that no probable cause for
falsification and mutilation exists - the Assistant City ROQUE v OMBUDSMAN
Prosecutor deliberated on the factual and legal milieu of May 12, 1999
the case. He found that there was no sufficient evidence Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process
to establish a prima facie case for the crimes of law and to speedy trial, the Constitution commands
complained of as defined and punished under Articles the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on
172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code complaints filed against public officials. Thus, the failure
in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, respectively. of said office to resolve a complaint that has been
Concerning the crime of falsification of a private pending for six years is clearly violative of this mandate
document, the Assistant City Prosecutor reasoned that and the public officials' rights. In such event, the
the circumstances attendant to the case did not amount aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the
to the crime complained of, that is, the lack of consent complaint.
been filed with the appropriate court against

FACTS: the herein Petitioner"
 Petitioners are Schools Division Superintendents
 COA conducted an audit on the P9.36 million ISSUE:
allotments released by the DECS Regional Office Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay
No. XI to its division offices in resolving [the] complaints against petitioners
 As a result of the audit, auditors found some (respondents therein) which violated their constitutional
major deficiencies and violation of the Anti-Graft right to [a] speedy disposition of cases.
and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
3019), violations of COA Circular Nos. 78-84 and HELD/RATIO:
85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 and Section 88 of YES.
PD No. 1445. As a general rule, the performance of an official act or
 affidavits of complaint were filed before the Office duty, which necessarily involves the exercise of
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against petitioners discretion or judgment, cannot be compelled
 the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found by mandamus. This Court, however, has held that the
the complaints proper for a preliminary rule does not apply "in cases where there is gross
investigation abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable
 petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits excess of authority.” In First Philippine Holdings
Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, the Court explained:
 Two Information for violation of Sec. 3(g) and
Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 were filed before the
Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel
Sandiganbayan, Manila. The Informations
a discretionary act. But where there is "gross
charged several respondents, among whom was
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable
petitioners.
excess of authority" equivalent to denial of a
 On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the
settled right to which petitioner is entitled, and
instant petition for mandamus premised on
there is "no other plain, speedy and adequate
the allegation that "[a]fter the initial Orders
remedy, the writ shall issue.
finding the cases proper for preliminary
investigation were issued on June[,] 1991 and
Clearly, the delay of almost six years disregarded the
the subsequent submission of their counter-
ombudsman's duty, as mandated by the Constitution
affidavits, until the present[,] or, more than six
and RA 6770, to act promptly on complaints before him.
(6) years, no resolution has been issued by
More important, it violated the petitioners' rights to due
the Public Respondent [and no] case [has]
process and to a speedy disposition of the cases filed
against them. Although respondents attempted to justify The controversial act done was in relation to the
the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to purchase and repair of a vessel which was also
review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Note that
Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost pending the case, he won the election and became the
six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints. incumbent governor once again.)
Petitioner filed a motion to suspend preliminary
We are not persuaded by respondents' arguments that investigation dated September 3, 1987 on the ground
the Petition for Mandamus became moot and academic that upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
when the Complaints were resolved by the Office of the present Tanodbayan has been transformed into the Of
Ombudsman for Mindanao and the Informations were the Special Prosecutor and has, therefore, lost his
filed. The same contention was rejected in Tatad v. power to conduct preliminary investigation.
Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court declared that long Before his arraignment, petitioner also filed a motion to
and unexplained delay in the resolution of the criminal quash the information in the cases filed against him
complaints against petitioners was not corrected by the which was denied by the Sandiganbayan. He filed a
eventual filing of the Informations. motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Thus
he filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with the
Although petitioners prayed only for the issuance of a SC for being issued with grave abuse of discretion
ruling directing the dismissal of Ombudsman cases, this amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (G.R. Nos.
Court, in the interest of the speedy disposition of cases, 116259-60)
resolves to dismiss the above cases directly. This ruling No TRO was issued for his petition, thus his
is in line with Angchangco, in which the Court dismissed arraignment proceeded and the prosecution moved to
the complaints outright, although petitioner therein suspend him while the case is pending which was
sought merely to compel the ombudsman to do so. initially opposed by petitioner but said opposition was
SOCRATES V SANDIGANBAYAN later withdrawn.
In the interim, petitioner also filed a motion to include as
Facts: principals other officers involved in the purchase of the
vessel in question. He argued that the non-inclusion of
Petitioner is the incumbent governor of Palawan until these co-principals violates his right to due process and
the respondent Rodriguez was appointed as Acting equal protection of the laws which thus rendered the
Governor in his stead, after the EDSA Revolution in informations null and void. The court without deciding
1986. Two complaints for violation of RA 3019 was filed on his motion, granted the motion to suspend him
by respondent Rodriguez and other provincial board pendent lite for a period of 90 days.
members of Palawan with the Office of the Tanodbayan.
He filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied Ombudsman a reply to complainant’s
and he filed a petition for certiorari with the SC (2 nd manifestation;
certiorari) which was consolidated with his first petition 4) Thus preliminary investigation was started on
for certiorari. June 25, 1990. Respondents then, including the
In relation to G.R. Nos. 116259-60 his ,ain argument is accused herein, were required to submit counter-
that the respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction affidavits;
over the case on the ground that an inordinate delay of 5) Interrupting preliminary proceedings again,
six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary petitioner, on August 13, 1990, filed a motion to
investigation and the subsequent filing of the dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds:
informations against petitioner constitutes a violation of (a) That the Honorable Ombudsman has no
his constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the jurisdiction over the person of respondent; and
case and due process of law pursuant to the Tatad (b) That the complaint does not conform substantially
doctrine to the prescribed form.
Issues: The private complainant was, as a matter of right,
WON there was violation of due process due to the granted a period of time within which to oppose the
6 year dea;ay in the termination of the preliminary motion. The prosecution necessarily had to ponder on
investigation? the motion after protracted deliberations;
Held/Ratio: 6) On April 1, 1991, counsel for the accused filed an
No, the record shows that delay in the filing of the “Appearance and Motion for Extension of Time to
Informations in these cases was caused, not by inaction File Appropriate Pleading.” Counsel prayed that
of the prosecution, but by the following actuations of the “respondents be granted an extension of twenty
accused: (20) days within which to comply with the order of
1) Initially preliminary investigation was held in March 11, 1991”;
abeyance on account of the motion of petitioner, 7) The petitioner filed a motion to quash/dismiss on
entitled “Motion to Suspend Preliminary December 17, 1991. This pleading was received
Investigation.” Until an Ombudsman has been by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman only on
appointed January 13, 1992. It took some time for the
2) Preliminary investigation was interrupted when prosecution to resolve the motion and there never
private complainant, then Governor Victoriano J. was any intimation on the part of the accused that
Rodriguez, filed on April 24, 1989, a letter- the accused was invoking his right to a speedy
manifestation correcting the complaint disposition of the complaint against him. The
3) Only on September 22, 1989 did the accused in motion to quash/dismiss was in fact denied by the
these cases file with the Office of the prosecution in an order dated January 20, 1990;
8) A motion for reconsideration having been filed for discriminating against the National Labor
thereafter, the Informations in these cases were Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National
after all filed on September 16, 1992, but only Workers' Brotherhood; that important documents
after the ruling of the prosecution on the motion to attached are inaccessible to the respondents
quash/dismiss. which are of such far-reaching importance and
Thus, from the aforementioned sequence of events, it effect that their admission would necessarily
can be gleaned that it was the petitioner’s delaying mean the modification and reversal of the
tactics which caused the delay of the termination judgment rendered herein.
of the preliminary investigation.
ISSUE
ANG TIBAY V CIR WON the union was denied procedural due process
February 27. 1940 by the CIR
J. laurel
Facts:
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. moved for Held/Ratio:
the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of Yes, motion for new trial granted
this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for a new trial. They argued that: Indeed, CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical
1) Teodoro's claim that there was shortage of rules of procedureand the Act requires it to "act
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary according to justice and equity and substantial merits of
for him to temporarily lay off the members of the the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
union is entirely false and unsupported by the and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
of Accounts of native dealers in leather; legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner
2) That the supposed lack of leather materials as it may deem just and equitable." HOWEVER this
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it,
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the essential requirements of due process in trials and
Philippine Army. investigations of an administrative character. The
3) that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG primary rights which should be respected are as follows:
TIBAY is a company or employer union 1) The right to a hearing which includes the right
dominated by Teodoro, the existence and of the party interested or affected to present
functions of which are illegal; that the employer his own case and submit evidence in support
Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice thereof
2) the tribunal must consider the evidence such other evidence as may be relevant to the main
presented. issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is
3) The decision must have something to support new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
itself. involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
4) the evidence must be substantial.It means adversely affected by the result.
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere NAMIL V COMELEC
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not October 28, 2003
constitute substantial evidence. J. Callejo Sr.
Facts:
5) The decision must be rendered on the On May 14, 2001, the election for the members of the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least Sangguniang Bayan was held in Palimbang, Sultan
contained in the record and disclosed to the Kudarat.
parties affected. On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
6) The CIR (any tribunal) or any of its judges, Palimbang issued Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
therefore, must act on its or his own Proclamation (COCVP) No. 80311083 which contained,
independent consideration of the law and inter alia, the petitioners and the Sangguniang Bayan
facts of the controversy, and not simply winning candidates
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving The next day, May 21, 2001, the Municipal Board of
at a decision. Canvassers of Palimbang issued COCVP No. 8031109
7) The CIR (any board or body) should, in all which listed the private respondents as winners,
controversial questions, render its decision in Private respondent Kapina wrote the COMELEC
such a manner that the parties to the requesting that she and the others who were proclaimed
proceeding can know the various issues as winners on May 21, 2001 be recognized as the
involved, and the reasons for the decision winning candidates and the new members of the
rendered. Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang.
8) After receiving the comments and reports of the election
In the case at hand, except as to the alleged agreement officers involved in the incident, Commissioner Mehold
between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Sadain submitted his recommendation to the
Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy COMELEC that there was valid proclamation of private
the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, , a respondents and that there being such, adjudication on
conclusion of law. The interest of justice would be better the matter is no longer required. This recommendation
served if the movant is given opportunity to present at was adopted by the public respondent COMELEC in its
the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and Resolution 4615.
Thus, petitioners moved that Resolution No. 4615 be the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot
declared null and void for being issued without acquire a vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless,
according them due notice and hearing. The petitioners a protected right. The Court also cited the case of
allege that they were never accorded the chance to Farinas v COMELEC where it ruled that that the
present their side in connection with the investigation COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a
that was purportedly conducted by Commissioner proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation
Sadain and on the memoranda/report of the public without notice and hearing.
respondent’s officers and only learned about the
controversy only when they were notified of the assailed
resolution of the public respondent
VILLEGAS V HIU CHIONG
Issue: November 10, 1978
WON petitioners were deprived of due process J. Fernandez
City Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municpal
Held/Ratio: Board of Manila and signed by mayor Villegas on March
Yes, 27, 1968
While it is true that the COMELEC is vested with a Section 1 of said Ordinance prohibits aliens from being
broad power to enforce all election laws, the same is employed or to engage or participate in any position or
subject to the right of the parties to due process. occupation or business enumerated therein, whether
Procedural due process demands prior notice and permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing
hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also necessary that an employment permit from the Mayor and paying the
the tribunal show substantial evidence to support its permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the
ruling. In other words, due process requires that a party diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or
be given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to in the technical assistance programs of both the
support his side of the case and that the evidence Philippine Government and any foreign government,
should be considered in the adjudication of the case. and those working in their respective households, and
The facts show that COMELEC set aside the members of religious orders or congregations, sect or
proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind
prior notice and hearing and it rendered the
questioned order based solely on private Respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was
respondent’s allegations. employed in Manila, filed a petition before the CFI of
Citing Binan v COMELEC, the court held that petitioners Manila to issue a writ of preliminary injunction and
cannot be deprived of office without due process of law. restraining order to stop the enforcement of said
Although public office is not property under Section 1 of ordinance. He argues that said ordinance is
discriminatory and violates the rule of uniformity in standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses
taxation. He also states that as a police power measure, no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit,
it makes no distinctions between useful and non-useful enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and
occupations in the collection of the permit fee. He finally entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor
argues that it is oppressive and unreasonable being arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the
applicable only to aliens. issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid,
CFI issued the writ prayed for. Petitioner Mayor Villegas being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to
files this petition for certiorari with the SC. allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
Issue: TAN v DEL ROSARIO

WON Ordinance 6537 is null and void. Facts:
October 3, 1994
Held/Ratio: J. Vitug
Yes. The ordinance in question violates the due process This case is about two consolidated petitions, the first of
of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. which questions the constitutionality of RA 7496
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely Simplied Net Income Taxation Scheme(SNIT). The
tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is petitioners state that the said statute violates Art VI Sec
regulatory in nature has no merit. There is no logic or 28(1) which provides that the rule of taxation must be
justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have uniform and equitable and that the Congress should
been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the evolve a progressive system of taxation. The second
purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the petition question validity of Section 6, Revenue
guise of regulation. Regulations No. 2-93, promulgated by CIR in
Moreover, The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only accordance with RA 7496. The petitioners state that
because it is excessive but because it fails to consider CIR had exceeded its authority in applying SNIT to
valid substantial differences in situation among professional partnerships.
individual aliens who are required to pay it. The same Issue:
amount is being collected from every employed alien WON there was violation of the EPC
whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time Held/Ratio: No
or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal
executive . protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both
standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his in privileges and liabilities. It does not prohibit
discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a classification so long as it is germane to the purpose of
municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any the law and makes substantial distinctions. Such
classifications are valid so long as they are not arbitrary injunction and refusing to allow the demurrer and motion
and inappropriate. for the dismissal of the complaint
The income tax is imposed not on the professional Issue:
partnership, which is tax exempt, but on the partners WON it is within the power of the State to deport aliens
themselves in their individual capacity computed on and whether doing such would be a violation of equal
their distributive shares of partnership profits. The law protection and due process of law
did not intend to place in an unequal footing or in Held/Ratio:
significant variance the income tax treatment of Yes. every government has the inherent power to expel
professionals who practice their respective professions from its borders aliens whose presence has been found
individually and of those who do it through a general detrimental to the public interest. . The international
professional partnership. community, as Martens says, leaves States at liberty to
fix the conditions under which foreigners should be
Forbes v Chuoco Tiaco allowed to enter their territory. These conditions may be
July 30, 1910 more or less convenient to foreigners, but they are a
Johnson J.
Facts: legitimate manifestation of territorial power and not
contrary to law. the expulsion of foreigners is a political
On the 19th of August, 1909, under the orders of the measure and that the executive power may expel,
said W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the without appeal, any person whose presence tends to
Philippine Islands, defendant Chuoco Tiaco was disturb the public peace.
deported therefrom and sent to Amoy, China, The power to exclude or expel aliens being a power
Later he was able to return to the Islands but he feared, affecting international relations is vested in the political
as that he should be again deported by the said department of the Government. The power to exclude
defendants,. Thus he filed with a petition that a aliens and the power to expel them rest upon one
preliminary injunction should be issued against the foundation, are derived from one source, are supported
plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them from deporting the by the same reasons, and are, in truth, but the exercise
defendant. of one and the same power.
Thus, also, it has a right to send them elsewhere it if
This petition was granted. The defendants filed this has just cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners
present petition with the SC and they argue that since of the citizens; that they will create religious
the power to deport foreign subjects of the Chinese disturbances or occasion any other disorder contrary to
empire is a private one of the governor-general of these the public safety
islands, and the defendant A. S. Crossfield exceeded It has been repeatedly decided when a government
these authority by trying the case and issuing the is dealing with the political rights of aliens that it is
not governed by that "due process of law" which laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to
governs in dealing with the civil rights of aliens. For Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution.
instance, the courts of the United States have Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal
decided that in the deportation of an alien he is not protection clause in the 1978 Election Code and thus
entitled to right of trial by jury, the right of trial by invalid
jury being one of the steps in the "due process of Held/Ratio:
law" in dealing with civil rights No. the 1978 Election Code is valid.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
Peralta v COMELEC classifications. What is proscribes is a classification
March 11, 1978 which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by
J. Antonio
a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the
Facts: purpose of the law and applies equally to all those
Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 belonging to the same class. 14The equal protection
Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections. They were clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
assailing the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978 to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to applies alike to all persons within such class, and
28, of the 1978 Election Code, which grants the voter reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
the option to vote either for individual candidates by between those who fall within the class and those who
filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of do not. Exactness in division is impossible and never
candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the looked for in applying the legal test. All that is required
candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by is that there must be, in general, some reasonable basis
simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the on general lines for the division
name of the political party, group or aggrupation. Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will be able
Petitioners argue that the optional straight party voting to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate
scheme is violative of the equal protection clause. They will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted
argue that an independent candidate would be individually or as a candidate of a party group or
discriminated against because by merely writing on his aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual
ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation.
voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage The choice is his. No one can compel him to do
which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on
effect, it is contended that the candidate who is not a whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a
party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to
their discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and
of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the registered voters in the Cities of Cebu and Mandaue.
advantages under the law accruing to candidates of They assail Section 3 of BP. 51, which uses the annual
a political party or group. If he wishes to avail income of a given city as the basis for classification of
himself of such alleged advantages as an official whether or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city
candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a whose voters may not participate in the election of
political party group or aggrupation. In other words, provincial officials of the province where the city is
the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be geographically located and Republic Act No. 5519,
assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and otherwise known as the Charter of Mandaue City, which
considered the relative advantages and disadvantages went into effect without the benefit of ratification by the
of either alternative. So long as the application of the residents of Mandaue in a plebiscite or referendum
rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he They argue that said law is inherently and palpably
cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was unconstitutional in that such classification is not based
the victim of discrimination. on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of
Ceniza v COMELEC
the law which in effect provides for and regulates the
January 28, 1980 exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such
CONCEPCION JR., J.: unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal
Facts: protection. They also state that Section 3 of Batas Blg.
On December 22. 1979, the Interim Batasang 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu city as
Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51 providing for local highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its
elections on January 30, 1980. It was provided in said electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently
BP that Section 4(1) of the Constitution. any city now and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification
existing with an annual regular derived from is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the
infrastructure and general funds of not less than forty purpose of the law which in effect provides for and
million pesos (P40,000,000.00) at the time of the regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and
approval of this Act shall be classified as a highly therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a
urbanized city denial of equal protection.
To implement this Act, the Commission on Elections Issue:
(COMELEC, for short) adopted Resolution No. WON, there has been a violation of the Equal Protection
1421which enumerated the cities which are not entitled Clause.
to participate in the election of pro- provincial officials. Held/Ratio:
Included therein were Cebu City and Mandaue City. No.
The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest
autonomy of local government units and independence. In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973
Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a
loss of the right to participate in provincial affairs, more plebiscite for the people’s approval. The YES vote was
particularly the selection of elective provincial officials being advanced by KBL – Marcos’ Party while the NO
since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise vote was being advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity
any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469
city w/c basically provided that there be equal opportunity,
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities equal time and equal space on media use for
and component cities on the basis of their regular campaigns for both sides. On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos
annual income is based upon substantial distinction. campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from
The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is 9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by
capable of existence and development as a relatively 26 TV stations and 248 radio stations nationwide.
independent social, economic, and political unit. It would UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be
also show whether the city has sufficient economic or granted the same opportunity as Marcos has pursuant
industrial activity as to warrant its independence from to Res’ns 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand.
the province where it is geographically situated UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal
The practice of allowing voters in one component protection before the laws.
city to vote for provincial officials and denying the ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal
same privilege to voters in another component city protection by virtue of COMELEC’s denial of their
is a matter of legislative discretion which violates request.
neither the Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due
The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in process nor were they not afforded equal protection. It
the enjoyment of similar rights and privileges granted by is the considered view of the SC that when Marcos
law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of conducted his ‘pulong-pulong’ or consultation with the
the equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as
an individual or group of voters in the city from voting for President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as
provincial officials while granting it to another individual the head of any political party. Under the Constitution,
or groups of voters in the same city. the ‘Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible
. . . for the program of government and shall determine
the guidelines of national policy’. In instances where the
United Democratic Opposition v COMELEC head of state is at the same time the president of the
(equal protection;
104 SCRA scope
17, G.R. No. 56515of equality; political laws) political party that is in power, it does not necessarily
follow that he speaks with two voices when he
dialogues with the governed. The president is accorded HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The
certain privileges that the opposition may not have. continued incarceration after the twelve-year period
Further, the SC cannot compel TV stations and radio when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in
stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not accordance with the controlling doctrine, when others
party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with
these TV stations and radio stations at their own implications at war with equal protection. That is not to
expense. give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory.
Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical
Gumabon v Director of Prisons offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the
37 SCRA 420, G.R. No. L-30026 conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and
(same; same; political crimes) the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same
Gumabon et al were charged for rebellion punished crime would be made to suffer different penalties. If
under Art 134 of the RPC. Their offense was complexed Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment,
with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping. then this would be repugnant to equal protection, people
They were all sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their similarly situated were not similarly dealt with.
sentence had become final and executory when the What is required under this constitutional guarantee is
Hernandez Doctrine was promulgated by the SC. the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons
Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder cannot under similar circumstances would be accorded the
be complexed to rebellion as it is necessarily absorbed same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the
therein. Hence, the without such complexion the penalty liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
must be lower than reclusion perpetua. Gumabon Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed.
precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, For the principle is that equal protection and security
namely, the denial of equal protection. The petitioners shall be given to every person under circumstances,
were convicted by CFI for the very same rebellion for which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked
which Hernandez and others were convicted. The law upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within
under which they were convicted is the very same law a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
under which the latter were convicted. It had not and restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding
has not been changed. For the same crime, committed on the rest.
under the same law, how can the SC, in conscience,
allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others Nunez v Sandiganbayan
can suffer only prision mayor? Nuňez assails
111 SCRA theNo.
433, G.R. validity of the PD 1486 creating the
L-50581-50617
ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was
effects of the Hernandez Doctrine. accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily
committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all offensive to the equal protection clause of the
public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuňez Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth
that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due met the standard requiring that it “must be based on
process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not
proceedings violates Nuňez’s right to equal protection, be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
because – appeal as a matter of right became equally to each member of the class.” Further still,
minimized into a mere matter of discretion; – appeal decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a
likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that
excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and decisions therein are more conceivably carefully
there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by reached than other trial courts.
certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two
chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to
appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts
and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and
thereafter to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan Mirasol v DPWH
violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be G.R. No. 158793, 8 June 2006
concerned. (equal protection of laws; valid qualifications; substantial
HELD: The SC ruled against Nuňez. The 1973 qualifications)
Constitution had provided for the creation of a special On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of
court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases the Department of Public Works and Communications
involving public officials charged with graft and issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited
corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention motorcycles on limited access highways. Accordingly,
of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8,
precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of
which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances.
public service. It follows that those who may thereafter Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
back as January 17, 1973, when the present to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on
Constitution came into force, that a different procedure motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South
for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal
Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215. engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female, for overseas employment,
HELD: The Court found that it is neither warranted nor sought the nullification of D.O. No. 1 arguing, among
reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable other things, that the same is violative of the equal
classification among modes of transport is that of protection clause.
“motorized” against the “non-motorized.” Not all HELD: The Court agreed that there is no question that
motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. workers,"but it does not thereby make an undue
The first may be denied access to some roads where discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that
the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be "equality before the law" under the Constitutiondoes not
reasonably differentiated from newer models. The Court import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and
found that real and substantial differences exist women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1)
between a motorcycle and other forms of transport such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
sufficient to justify its classification among those they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they
prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a apply equally to all members of the same class. The
motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. Court said that it is a matter of judicial notice that female
The most obvious and troubling difference would be that domestics and similar workers are subjected to
a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily exploitative working conditions marked by physical and
overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle. personal abuse. On the other hand, there is no
evidence that male OCWs suffer from the same
predicament and that there is no showing that the
government should act in a similar manner with regard
to them. The Court here is not saying that there is a
Philippine Association of Service Exporters v Drilon superiority of men over women. All it is saying is that,
(equal protection;
163 SCRA substantial
386, G.R. No. 81958 distinctions; requisites) based on available evidence, there is a marked
Department of Labor Secretary Drilon issued distinction in their working conditions and predicaments.
Department Order No. 1, otherwise known as the (see also: Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v
“Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of POEA, 243 SCRA 666; JMM Promotion and
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Management v CA; Dumlao v COMELEC; Tolentino v
Workers,” imposing, among other things, a ban on the Secretary of Finance; Inchong v Hernandez)
deployment of female domestic helpers and other
female workers of similar skill. Petitioner, a firm
administrative investigation, not in criminal cases. What

is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of
preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of
ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and
PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the
11, Davao City, respondents.
Facts: Department" simply means that the provisions of the
G.R. No. 113811
Himagan, was October 7, 1994 that was implicated in the
a policeman Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and
KAPUNAN, J.:
killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted regulations are applicable to members of the
murder of Bernabe Machitar. The TC issued an Order Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions,
suspending petitioner until the termination of the case rules and regulations are not inconsistent withR.A.
on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known 6975.
as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which
1990, which provides: limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47
Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension
sufficient in form and substance against a member of where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years
the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed shall continue until the case is terminated.
by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the The reason why members of the PNP are treated
court shall immediately suspend the accused from differently from the other classes of persons charged
office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be criminally or administratively insofar as the application
subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law
(Emphasis ours). which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses
Himagan questions the order stating that an imposition against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to discussions.
the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a
constitutional right to equal protection of laws. serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is
ISSUE: WON Himagan’s right to equal protection has pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are
been violated? NO obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily
RATIO: cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
HImagan misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive
reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 ofR.A.
lifting of preventive suspension in pending
6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue 1988."
favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate The petitioners contest this, stating that the
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Ombudsman was doing indirectly what he could not do
Recognizing the existence of real differences among directly, i.e., compelling them (petitioners Almonte and
men, the equal protection clause does not demand Perez) to produce evidence against themselves.
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons ISSUE: WON it is within Ombudsman’s power to issue
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and the order of subpoena duces tecum? YES
conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. 14 RATIO:
Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely At common law a governmental privilege against
forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
the instant case. If the classification is based on real bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This
and substantial differences; 15is germane to the purpose privilege is based upon public interest of such
of the law; 16applies to all members of the sameclass; paramount importance as in and of itself transcending
17
and applies to current as well as future conditions, the individual interests of a private citizen, even though,
18
the classification may not be impugned as violating the as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce
Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction his legal rights. 1
based on real and reasonable considerations related to On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality
a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic
here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded. or other national security secrets but on a general public
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts
have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute
COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, privilege against a subpoena considered essential to the
NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA RIVERA, petitioners, vs. enforcement of criminal laws.
HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED
Facts: In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or
CITIZENS,
The Ombudsmanrespondents.
received an anonymous letter alleging diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995 records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Nor has
that funds representing
MENDOZA, J.: savings from unfilled positions in
the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. Because of this, our attention been called to any law or regulation which
the Ombudsman issued subpoena duces tecum to to considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified
the Chief of the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him information. EIIB's function is the gathering and
to bring "all documents relating to Personal Services evaluation of intelligence reports and information
regarding "illegal activities affecting the national Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held
economy, such as, but not limited to, economic that testimony given at a fact-finding investigation and
sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar charges made in a pleading in a case in court
salting."18Consequently, while in cases which involve constituted a sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to
state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the commence investigation, because a formal complaint
circumstances of the case that there is reasonable was really not necessary.
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose Rather than referring to the form of complaints,
military matters without compelling production, 19 no therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate case" in Art. XI,
similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on 12 of the Constitution means any case concerning
other considerations. official act or omission which is alleged to be "illegal,
Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal unjust, improper, or inefficient." The phrase "subject to
protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all such limitations as may be provided by law" refers to
forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can such limitations as may be provided by Congress or, in
only hale respondents via their verified complaints or the absence thereof, to such limitations as may be
sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," imposed by the courts. Such limitations may well
while in proceedings before the Office of the include a requirement that the investigation be
Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an concluded in camera, with the public excluded, as
investigation. exception to the general nature of the proceedings in
First, there can be no objection to this procedure the Office of the Ombudsman. A reconciliation is
because it is provided in the Constitution itself. Second, thereby made between the demands of national security
it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints and the requirement of accountability enshrined in the
"in any form and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution.
Constitution took into account the well-known reticence Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the
of the people which keep them from complaining subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' right
against official wrongdoings. The Office of the against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory documents required to be produced in this case are
and prosecutory agencies of the government because public records and those to whom the subpoena duces
those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, tecum is directed are government officials in whose
through official pressure and influence, can quash, possession or custody the documents are.
delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is
the other hand complainants are more often than not directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents
poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers. be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and
with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.
broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A

franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS things, to amended by Congress in accordance with
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC., the constitutional provision that "any such
petitioners, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS: franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to
.G.R. No. 132922
Petitioners, an April 21, 1998
organization of lawyers of radio and amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress
MENDOZA, J.
television broadcasting companies, challenge the when the common good so requires." 10
validity of BP Blg No. 881, which requires radio and tv to In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies,
give free broadcast to electoral candidates. They base which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves
their challenge on the ff. grounds: and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast
(1) that it takes property without due process of law and signals and images. They are merely given the
without just compensation; temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise
(2) that it denies radio and television broadcast is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may
companies the equal protection of the laws; and reasonably be burdened with the performance by
(3) that it is in excess of the power given to the the grantee of some form of public service.
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast
media of communication or information during the stations and thereafter supervising radio and television
period of election. stations, the state spends considerable public funds in
ISSUES: licensing and supervising such stations. 18It would be
WON it is violative of their due process and just strange if it cannot even require the licensees to render
compensation? NO public service by giving free air time.
WON it is violative of their right to equal protection? NO the COMELEC however, does not take over the
RATIO: operation of radio and television stations but only the
(1) allocation of air time to the candidates for the purpose of
SPetitioners contend that §92 of BP Blg. 881 violates ensuring, among other things, equal opportunity, time,
the due process clause 6 and the eminent domain and the right to reply as mandated by the Constitution. 23
provision 7 of the Constitution by taking air time from (2)
radio and television broadcasting stations without Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 singles out
payment of just compensation. radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, They contend that newspapers and magazines are not
whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by similarly required as, in fact, in Philippine Press Institute
the government. Airwave frequencies have to be v. COMELEC, 27 we upheld their right to the payment of
allocated as there are more individuals who want to
just compensation for the print space they may provide including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be
under § within reach of a blaring radio or television set. The
The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate.
fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to the same Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience
treatment under the free speech guarantee of the has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject
Constitution as the print media. There are important the utterance.
differences in the characteristics of the two media, Petitioners' assertion therefore that §92 of B.P. Blg. 881
however, which justify their differential treatment for free denies them the equal protection of the law has no
speech purposes. basis. In addition, their plea that §92 (free air time) and
(1) Because of the physical limitations of the broadcast §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 (ban on paid political ads)
spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate should be invalidated would pave the way for a return
broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them. to the old regime where moneyed candidates could
There is no similar justification for government allocation monopolize media advertising to the disadvantage
and regulation of the print media. of candidates with less resources. That is what
(2)
Government spends public funds for the allocation Congress tried to reform in 1987 with the enactment of
and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does R.A. No. 6646. We are not free to set aside the
not do in the case of the print media. To require the judgment of Congress, especially in light of the recent
radio and television broadcast industry to provide free failure of interested parties to have the law repealed or
air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for at least modified.
what the industry gets. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.
(3) The broadcast media have also established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs.THE EXECUTIVE
Newspapers and current books are found only in SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE
metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
municipalities accessible to fast and regular MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO
FACTS:
MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
transportation. Even here, there are low income masses respondent.
who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines The
ROMEO caseM.stems
ACOP ANDfromFRANCISCO
the chargeG. against petitioner
ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-
beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and Panfilo Lacson, and 11 others, for the murder of the
intervenors.
shelter perforce enjoy high priorities. Kuratong Baleleng
G.R. No. 128096 Gang.
January The case was first under the
20, 1999
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found MARTINEZ,ofJ.:
jurisdiction the Sandiganbayan.
everywhere. The television set is also becoming However, upon the contention of Lacson that the RTC
universal. Their message may be simultaneously has the proper jurisdiction to thresh the matter since RA
received by a national or regional audience of listeners 7975 limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to to
cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the
government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it.
higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly
Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher, it was discharged in the present case.
transferred to RTC-QC. A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249
the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reveals that to fall under the exclusive original
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following
with the Sandiganbayan. TWhile these motions for requisites must concur:
reconsideration were pending resolution, , House Bill (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019,
No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11 as well as Senate Bill No. as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
844 12 were introduced in Congress, defining expanding (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
said bills sought, among others, to amend the Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), 31
"principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or
Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.These complexed with other crimes;
bills were consolidated and later approved into law as (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b),
R.A. No. 8249 . (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4;
4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 which provides and
that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
court over which trial has not begun as to the approval Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are
hereof." being charged with murder which is a felony punishable
ISSUES: under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the
(1) WON it violates Lacson’s right to equal protection? governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph
NO a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249..
(2) WON it is an ex post facto law? NO Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7
RATIO: of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the
(1) law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve
nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the
entire Congress and signed into law by the highest "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng
officer of the co-equal executive department as cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover,
unconstitutional. those cases where trial had already begun are not
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not the new law.
violated by a legislation based on reasonable In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified,
classification. The classification is reasonable and not heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad
arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the
namely: Sandiganbayan. Petitioner further contends that the
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction; legislature is biased against him as he claims to have
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and
35
of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39
all of which are present in this case. On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed allegedly had against petitioner during the committe
to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient
reasonables of the questioned provisions. The justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their
classification between those pending cases involving presence and participation in the legislative hearings
the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter
commenced and whose cases could have been affected before the committee involves the graft court of which
by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a
under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to
substantial distinction that makes real invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to
differences.Evidence against them were not yet conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40
presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already (2)
submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of
and presented documents. penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. Penal laws
Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in provide dor their punishment.
In this case,.R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of as their representative in Congress. Having been re-
procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform
does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It the functions of a Congressman
does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not ISSUE: WON membership in Congress exempt an
come within the prohibition. 5Moreover, the law did not accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has incarcerated persons in general? NO
been ruled that adjective statutes may be made RATIO:
applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the The Constitution guarantees the equal protection of
time of their passage. 54 laws.This simply means that all persons similarly
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review responsibilities imposed.7 The organs of government
questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be
review to determine if he presumption of innocence has displayed.
been convincing overcome. 56 The performance of legitimate and even essential duties
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. Congress
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, continues to function well in the physical absence of one
FACTS:
vs.ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant. or a few of its members. Never has the call of a
The
G.R. accused-appellant,
No. 132875-76 Romeo
February F. Jaloslos is a full-
3, 2000 particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
pledged member of Congress who is now confined at classification from those others who are validly
the national penitentiary while his conviction for restrained by law. A strict scrutiny of classifications is
statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant discriminations are made in favor of or against groups
filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully or types of individuals.
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including The SC finds that election to the position of
attendance at legislative sessions and committee Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
instance of a non-bailable offense. the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
The primary argument of Jalosjos is the "mandate of from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law faculty members"4 of the School, contested the
and apply to all those belonging to the same class. difference in salary rates between foreign and local-
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power hires.
of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people ISSUE: WON the salary discrepancy is based on a
expects to achieve the continuity of government and the reasonable distinction? NO
perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from RATIO:
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent
by law. School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED. foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction
between the services rendered by foreign-hires and
local-hires. The practice of the School of according
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy
(ISAE), petitioner, vs.HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this
capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. Court.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting
Facts: While we recognize the need of the School to attract
Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an
The
in hisInternational
capacity as theSchool is a domestic
Superintendent educational
of International School-
institution
Manila; and established
INTERNATIONAL primarily
SCHOOL, forINC.,
dependents
respondents. of enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-
foreign
KAPUNAN, diplomatic
J.: personnel and other temporary hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and
residents. It hires both foreign and local teachers as they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter.
members of the faculty. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the
The foreign hires are granted certain benefits not given foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid
to local hire such as housing, transportation, shipping bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are
Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded
percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as
justifies the difference on two "significant economic housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home
disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: leave travel allowances.
(a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights
The discrepancy between the salary of local and foreign of workers and promote their welfare," to afford labor full
hires was brought up by the ISAE,, "a legitimate labor protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty
union and the collective bargaining representative of all to regulate the relations between labor and capital.
These relations are not merely contractual but are so designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary.
impressed with public interest that labor contracts, Nicolas’ last day of actual service was on 17 February
collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to 1985.
the common good. Should such contracts contain January 31, 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas’ application
stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will for retirement “effective 17 February 1984,” granting a
not hesitate to strike down these stipulations lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and
In the workplace, where the relations between capital a monthly annuity thereafter
and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality April 22 1992- Nicolas died. Milagros filed with GSIS a
and discrimination by the employer are all the more claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146.
reprehensible. June 8 1992, - GSIS denied the claim because under
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no
upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, There is no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more contracted the marriage with the pensioner within
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups three years before the pensioner qualified for the
have similar functions and responsibilities, which they pension. According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on
perform under similar working conditions. 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign- retirement on “17 February 1984.”
hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for
in salary rates without violating the principle of equal declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18
work for equal pay. of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship
pension.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City TC: rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
Branch, petitioner, vs. MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, survivorship pension.
respondent.
FACTS: CA: agreed with the trial court that the retirement
CARPIO,
July J.
10, 1983 - Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas benefits are onerous and conjugal because the pension
Montesclaros married Milagros Orbiso on 10 July 1983. came from the deceased pensioner’s salary
Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married deductions.
Milagros who was then 43 years old. ISSUES:
January 4, 1985 - Nicolas filed with the GSIS an (1) WON the prohibition is based on reasonable
application for retirement benefits effective 18 February classification? NO
1985 under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the (2)WON the prohibition under PD 1146 is a denial of
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 due process? YES,
(“PD 1146”). In his retirement application, Nicolas RATIO:
(1) (2)
A statute based on reasonable classification does not Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the
violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal government employee to pay monthly contributions. PD
protection of the law.The requirements for a valid and 1146 mandates the government to include in its annual
reasonable classification are: appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; contributions. It is compulsory on the government
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; employer to take off and withhold from the employees’
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and monthly salaries their contributions and to remit the
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same same to GSIS. The government employer must also
class. remit its corresponding share to GSIS. Considering the
Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class mandatory salary deductions from the government
differently from another class provided there are real employee, the government pensions do not constitute
and substantial differences to distinguish one class from mere gratuity but form part of compensation.
another. Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that
The proviso in question does not satisfy these marriages contracted within three years before
requirements. The proviso discriminates against the retirement or death of a member are sham marriages
dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present
pensioner within three years before the pensioner GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship
qualified for the pension.[31] Under the proviso, even if pension of the surviving spouse who contracted
the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than marriage to a GSIS member within three years before
three years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent the member’s retirement or death. The law
spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse
marriage took place within three years before the contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship
pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly
between the means employed and the purpose prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats
intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or the purpose for which Congress enacted the social
purpose for such a prohibition. The classification does legislation.
not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the In PD 1146, There is outright confiscation of benefits
classification lumps all those marriages contracted due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving
within three years before the pensioner qualified for spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso
pension as having been contracted primarily for undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure
financial convenience to avail of pension benefits. comprehensive and integrated social security and
insurance benefits to government employees and their accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of
dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, civilization and culture. The term ‘non-Christian tribes’
and retirement of the government employees. Where refers to a geographical area and more directly to
the employee retires and meets the eligibility natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization
requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
is protected by the due process clause. No law can communities. The distinction is reasonable for the Act
deprive such person of his pension rights without due was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in
process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to the non- Christian tribes”
be heard.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit. The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It
is designed to insure peace and order in and among the
non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness
People v. Cayat and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the
government
Ormoc Sugar v.to raise oftheir
Treasurer Ormoc standards
City of life and
Facts: “Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian civilization. This law is not limited in its application to
tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink, conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is
any intoxicating liquors of any kind.” The law, Act No. intended to apply for all times as long as those
1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or liquors conditions exists. The Act applies equally to all
which the members of such tribes have been members of the class. That it may be unfair in its
accustomed to take. operation against a certain number of non- Christians by
reason of their degree of culture is not an argument
Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection against the equality of its operation nor affect the
to one prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said reasonableness of the classification thus established.
law.
Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid

classification, one of which is that the classification Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed
under the law must rest on real or substantial Ordinance No. 4 imposing “on any and all productions
distinctions. of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent
The distinction is reasonable. The classification to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA and
between the members of the non- Christian and the other foreign countries.” Payments for said tax were
members of the Christian tribes is not based upon made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration
First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Commission and with certain other government offices.
Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue
Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it
being violative of the equal protection clause and the retains the same for the President & Vice-President of
rule of uniformity of taxation. The court rendered a the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of
decision that upheld the constitutionality of the Representatives, COMELEC, National Census &
ordinance. Hence, this appeal. Statistics Office and the general public. The
Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power respondents counter that there is no discrimination
of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and because the law is based on a valid classification in
rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed? accordance with the equal protection clause.
Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is
persons or things identically situated and does not bar a constitutional.
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in
and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based the concept of due process, as every unfair
upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a
only to present conditions, but also to future conditions separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the
substantially identical to those present; and 4) the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee
classification applies only to those who belong to the against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply
exclude any subsequently established sugar central for requires that all persons or things similarly situated
the coverage of the tax should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
Philippine Judges v. Prado responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared
Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar
No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354
withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA,
Manila and paid a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien,

employed in Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment
from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and void.
Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan
HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a
Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho flat rate of P500, it failed to consider substantial
Facts: On December 15, 1992, Baclaran Credit differences in situations among aliens and for that
Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member reason violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. It also
Roger de Leon, charged petitioner Parañaque Mayor lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and
Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by
Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance denies aliens due
a mayor's permit process and the equal protection of the laws
Held: Petitioner's suspected partiality may be gleaned

from the fact that he issued a permit in favor of the
unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by Facts: On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval
the mere expedient of an executive order, whereas so of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled “An
many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations
could be granted the same permit. Worse, petitioner Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases
failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI's right to Conversion and Development Authority for this
equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other
Baclaran-based vendors' associations were not similarly Purposes.” Section 12 thereof created the Subic
situated as to give at least a semblance of legality to the Special Economic Zone and granted thereto special
apparent haste with which said executive order was privileges.
issued. It would seem that if there was any interest
served by such executive order, it was that of herein then the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A
petitioner. (EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-
duty-free privilege was operative, viz.:w
“Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the
presently fenced-in
Tiu vs. Court of Appealsformer Subic Naval Base shall be
Facts: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the the only completely tax and duty-free area in the
employment of aliens in any occupation or business SSEFPZ [Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone].
unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and
foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such
import raw materials, capital goods, equipment, and objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend
consumer items tax and duty-free. Consumption items, economic incentives to attract and encourage investors,
however, must be consumed within the Secured Area. both local and foreign. Among such enticements
Removal of raw materials, capital goods, equipment and are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2)
consumer items out of the Secured Area for sale to non- tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income
SSEFPZ registered enterprises shall be subject to the tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no
usual taxes and duties, except as may be provided foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on
herein” banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident status
to certain investors and of working visas to certain
Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that foreign executives and workers.
the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) We believe it was reasonable for the President to have
the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area delimited the application of some incentives to the
formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, confines of the former Subic military base. It is this
EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area specific area which the government intends to transform
within which the special privileges granted to the entire and develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned
zone would apply to the present “fenced-in former Subic naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and
Naval Base” only. It has thereby excluded the residents commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local
of the first two components of the zone from enjoying investors to use as operational bases for their
the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively businesses and industries. Why the seeming bias for
discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid big investors? Undeniably, they are the ones who can
standards, in contravention of the equal protection pour huge investments to spur economic growth in the
guarantee. country and to generate employment opportunities for
the Filipinos, the ultimate goals of the government for
Held: We first determine the purpose of the law. From such conversion. The classification is, therefore,
the very title itself, it is clear that RA 7227 aims primarily germane to the purposes of the law. And as the legal
to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into maxim goes, “The intent of a statute is the law.”[
productive uses. Obviously, the “lands covered under Certainly, there are substantial differences between the
the 1947 Military Bases Agreement” are its object big investors who are being lured to establish and
operate their industries in the so-called “secured area”
From the above provisions of the law, it can easily be and the present business operators outside the
deduced that the real concern of RA 7227 is to convert area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso
the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases investments and thousands of new jobs. On the other
hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the contributing directly to the achievement of the end
economic impact will be national; in the second, only purpose of the law, are not categorized further. Instead,
local. Even more important, at this time the business they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted
activities outside the “secured area” are not likely to and in obligations required.
have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law,
which is to turn the former military base CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine GOVERNMENT
economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis Facts:
to extend to them the benefits and incentives accorded -Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as
in RA 7227. Additionally, as the Court of Appeals taxpayer, citizen and a former government
pointed out, it will be easier to manage and monitor the official) initiated this original action seeking (1) to
activities within the “secured area,” which is already prohibit and “enjoin respondents [PCGG and its
fenced off, to prevent “fraudulent importation of chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or
merchandise” or smuggling. executing any agreement with the heirs of the late
It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and
does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand
there are actual and material differences between Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad —
territories, there is no violation of the constitutional including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and (2) to
clause. And of course, anyone, including the “compel respondent[s] to make public all
petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital negotiations and agreement, be they
can always avail of the same benefits by channeling his ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to
or her resources or business operations into the fenced- or relating to such negotiations and
off free port zone. agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos
We believe that the classification set forth by the heirs."
executive issuance does not apply merely to existing -PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make
conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the objective is to public any and all negotiations and agreements
establish a “self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses'
financial and investment center” in the area. There will, ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
therefore, be a long-term difference between such compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth
investment center and the areas outside it. involves an issue of "paramount public
Lastly, the classification applies equally to all the interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the
resident individuals and businesses within the “secured country's economy" that would be greatly
area.” The residents, being in like circumstances or prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.
Hence, the people in general have a such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal
right to know the transactions or deals being contrived protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special
and effected by the government. grant of tax exemption in favor only of the Marcos heirs
-PETITIONER INVOKES Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the
the people to information on matters of public concern constitutional rule that “taxation shall be uniform and
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to equitable.
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, Moncado v. People’s Court
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations THE CASE IN IN SPANISH!! Sorry.
as may be provided by law.
Issue:Whether the compromise agreement entered into Stonehill v. Diokno

between PCGG and the Marcoses violate equal
protection? YES FACTS: Stonehill et al and the corporation they form
were alleged to have committed acts in “violation of
Ratio: Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” By the
Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued
commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties against their persons and their corporation. The warrant
to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear provides authority to search the persons above-named
violation of the Constitution. The power to tax and to and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to residences, and to seize and take possession of the
a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies.[58] following personal property to wit:
Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically “Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
provides: “No law granting any tax exemption shall be correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
Members of the Congress.” The PCGG has absolutely papers showing all business transactions including
no power to grant tax exemptions, even under the cover disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and
of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases. loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”
The documents, papers, and things seized under the
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
the Marcoses from paying taxes on their properties, split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
aforementioned corporations and determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
herein. describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar,
Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for: none of these are met. The warrant was issued from
(1) they do not describe with particularity the mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a
documents, books and things to be seized; “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
actually seized; Code.”
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against
the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
against them; said applications. The averments thereof with respect to
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal the offense committed were abstract. As a
manner; and consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were issued the warrants to have found the existence of
not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to probable cause, for the same presupposes the
be disposed of in accordance with law. introduction of competent proof that the party against
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were committed specific omissions, violating a given
cured by petitioners’ consent; and that, in any event, provision of our criminal laws.
the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case
because the government blunders. do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issue is petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest
valid. order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the
the validity of the search warrant issued against their aforementioned applications — without reference to any
corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence determinate provision of said laws or codes.
has no cause of action. It should be raised by the The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
officers or board members of the corporation. The application for the contested search warrants was
constitution protects the people’s right against compounded by the description therein made of the
unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
“Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, Lt. Jacaria had been informed that Malasugui had just
journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, redeemed 2 pairs of bracelets from some pawnshops
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or and was carrying money, and so when Malasugui was
papers showing all business transactions including brought to him, he asked the latter for the bracelets and
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit he then voluntarily gave them. After this, Lt. Jacaria
and loss statements.” asked him if he had anything else, he “tremblingly”
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and answered in the negative.
seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions He was later searched, without his opposition, and the
of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions following were found: Tan Why’s pocketbook, P92 in
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the bills, Tan Why’s ID, and a memorandum of amounts.
seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the Malasugui was charged with the crime of robbery with
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, homicide. He was convicted by the CFI-Cotabato.
thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Malasugui testified at trial that he was forced to produce
Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be the bracelet, pocketbook and money, and that the rest
particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its were all fabricated.
major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The ISSUE/HELD:
Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right W/N the articles taken are admissible in evidence –
of the accused against a defective search warrant is YES.
emphasized. RATIO:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to
PEOPLE VS. MALASUGUI (2007) have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded
from later complaining thereof.
FACTS: The right to be secure from unreasonable search may
March 5, 1935 – Tan Why, a merchant, was found with be waived, and such waiver MAY BE MADE expressly
several head wounds and a fractured skull on a path or impliedly.
leading to a barrio in Cotabato, and situated within the Also, Malasugui was legally arrested without a judicial
property of Yu Enching Sero. Tan Why merely warrant because there were facts personally known to
responded “Kagui” when he was asked who had Lt. Jacaria (p.226, middle part) which gave him reason
attacked him. Tan Why was brought to the hospital, but to believe or suspect that a crime had in fact been
he died shortly afterwards. committed and that Malasugui was responsible.
Lt. Jacaria of the Constabulary ordered the immediate When the search of the person detained or arrested and
arrest of Kagui Malasugui. the seizure of the effects found in his possession are
incidental to a lawful arrest, they cannot be considered Velasco.

unlawful or unreasonable.
The Constitution only prohibits those arrests, searches At about 3:00 p.m. of the said day, when the vessel was
and seizures without judicial warrant which are searched and after Captain Pantinople informed the
unreasonable. team that Velasco, the charterer of the vessel, had other
(OLD) Sec. 105 of General Orders, No. 58 reads: “A documents showing that vessel came from Indonesia
person charged with a crime may be searched for carrying smuggled copra and coffee, a combined team
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center
proof of the commission of the crime.” operatives headed by Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent
People v. Damaso of Davao, proceeded to the Velasco’s room at the
Facts: Accsused-appellant charged in an information of Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said document.
violation of PD 1866 in connection with the crime of Velasco was not inside the hotel room when they
subversion assailed the legality of a search and seizure entered the room. There are conficting claims whether
conducted at his house at night time when he was not the manicurist Teofila Ibañez or whether Velasco’s wife,
around, on the ground that it violated constitutional who was allegedly inside the room at that time,
rights against unreasonable search and seizure. voluntarily allowed the police officers to enter
Issue: Whether or not a search on a house of a person Held: Issue: Whether there was consent on the part of
without the owner’s presence is valid. the person who was the occupant of the hotel room then
rented by Velasco.
Held: No. The search in the dwelling of the accused- Held: There was an attempt on the part of Lopez and
appellant without his knowledge is a violation of the Velasco to counteract the force of the recital of the
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches written statement of Teofila Ibañez (allegedly wife of
and seizures. Tomas Velasco) by an affidavit of one Corazon Y.
Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs [GR L-27968, 3 Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of
December 1975] Velasco, and another by Velasco himself; reiterating
Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part that the person who was present at his hotel room was
Facts: M/V Jolo Lema had been under strict one Teofila Ibañez, “a manicurist by occupation.” If such
surveillance by the combined team of agents of the NBI, indeed were the case, then it is much more easily
PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao prior to its understandable why that person, Teofila Ibañez, who
apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak, Sasa, Davao could be aptly described as the wrong person at the
City. M/V [Jolo Lema] was skippered (sic) by Capt. wrong place and at the wrong time, would have signified
Aquilino Pantinople and chartered by Mr. Tomas her consent readily and immediately. Under the
circumstances, that was the most prudent course of - On appeal Marti alleges that the ganja
action. It would save her and even Velasco himself from confiscated should not be held as admissible
any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law evidence against him since the procurement of
be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There the same went against his right against
was a person inside who from all indications was ready unreasonable search and seizure.
to accede to their request. Even common courtesy W/N: the right against unreasonable search and seizure
alone would have precluded them from inquiring too may be invoked against private individuals.
closely as to why she was there. Under all the Held: No, both American and Philippine jurisprudence
circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded as well as the records of the code commission attest
that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with that the Bill of Rights can only be invoked against the
the need for a search warrant State and not against private entities. In the instant case
the search and seizure was effected by Job Reyes the
People v. Marti proprietor of the delivery service on his own initiative. As
Facts: such the authorities had no involvement and the right
- The appellant Andre Marti had a package against unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked to
delivered w/ Manila Packaging & Export render such evidence inadmissible. The bill of rights
Forwarders to a certain Walter Frierz in Zurich was established to regulate the disparate powers of the
Switzerland. State in administering justice in order to safeguard
- Upon final inspection by the proprietor of the individuals from abuses as such they were never
forwarder Job Reyes he notice a peculiar smell intended to be operative against private individuals.
emanating from the package and proceeded to Valmonte v. De Villa
investigate. Facts
- He then gave a sample to the NBI narcotics lab 1. The NCR District command was created to
and later brought along 3 NBI agents to his office conduct security operations within the Metro
to have them look at the packages: he personally Manila Area to maintain peace and order.
opens the packages and allows them to be However, petitioners aver that because of the
viewed by the officers. installation of checkpoints, residents of
- After Marti was located and invited for questioning Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of
the results of the tests came revealing that the their safety being placed at the arbitrary
sample of the content of the packages was disposition of the military. Cars and vehicles were
indeed ganja “the devil’s lettuce”. being subjected to regular searches and check-
- Thus Marti was charged and convicted for ups especially at night or at dawn without the
violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. benefit of a search warrant or court order.
2. The fear increased when one time at dawn, prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
Parpon, a supply officer of Valenzuela, was shot forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
to death after refusing to submit himself to the determined by any fixed formula but is to be
checkpoint and continuing to speed off despite resolved according to the facts of each case.
warning shots fired. 3. Where, for example, the officer merely draws
3. Petitioners further contend that the said aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
checkpoints give the respondents a blanket parked on the public fair grounds or simply looks
authority to make searches and/or seizures into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do
without search warrant or court order in violation not constitute unreasonable search.
of the Constitution; and, instances have occurred 4. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
where a citizen, while not killed, had been Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
harassed. considered as a security measure to enable the
4. Petitioner Valmonte said that he has been NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
stopped and searched without a warrant. effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public.
Issue: W/N there was a violation of the constitutional- Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures
protected right against unlawful search and seizures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in
NO the interest of public security
Ratio: 5. etween the inherent right of the state to protect its
1. The constitutional right against unreasonable existence and promote public welfare and an
searches and seizures is a personal right individual's right against a warrantless search
invocable only by those whose rights have been which is howeverreasonably conducted, the
infringed, or threatened to be infringed former should prevail.
2. Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the 6. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military
effect that he had been stopped and searched is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in
without a search warrant by the military manning the same manner that all governmental power is
the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
the details of the incidents which amount to a occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
violation of his right against unlawful search and irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to these abnormal times, when conducted within
determine whether there was a violation of reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
Valmonte's right against unlawful search and an orderly society and a peaceful community
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are
found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman

PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 was found with two naked boys inside his room. While
Van Den Elshout in the ―after Mission Report‖ read
that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his
care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime
2. SOME PROCEDURAL RULES now.
(Macri p. 112-113)
3. ONLY A JUDGE MAY VALIDLY ISSUE A WARRANT
Harvey v Santiago Seized during the petitioner‘s apprehension were rolls
of photo negatives and photos of suspected child
Aberrant case; upheld validity of arrest of pedophiles on prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys
order of the Immigration Commissioner Santiago and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other
because there was probably cause based on months of literature advertising the child prostitutes were also
surveillance. The requirement that probable cause is to found.
be determined by a judge does not extend to PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
deportation because it is not criminal but administrative.
The existence of photographs justified the arrest and
the seizure without warrant. Pedophilia, though not a
crime, was offense to public morals.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien

pedophiles. They were apprehended
17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of
Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens
Petitioners are the following: American nationals opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of
Andrew Harvey, 52 and John Sherman 72. Dutch evidence, another charged not for pedophile but
Citizen Adrian Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face
Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation
Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the proceedings were instituted against aliens for being
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to undesirable aliens under Sec.
apprehended petitioners at their residences. The 69 of Revised Administrative Code.
―Operation Report‖ read that Andrew Harvey was
are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules

on Criminal Procedure).
Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against
petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of
Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative
Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III The rule that search and seizures must be supported by
commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed a valid warrant of arrest is
11March 1988 but was not granted by the PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners
filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court
heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions
to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.)
Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in
Issues: plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the was incidental to the arrest.
power to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of existence of probable cause.
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a
and seizures by CID agents. (3) Whether or Not the writ waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and
of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners. estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore,
the deportation charges and the hearing presently
conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas
Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has
promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and become legal, although such confinement was illegal at
social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners the beginning.
was based on the probable cause determined after
close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of
probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of
articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner
as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69

of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the
provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient
upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and to undicue a cautious man to rely on them and act in
Deportation after a determination by the Board of pursuance thereof.
Commissioners of the existence of a ground for
deportation against them. Deportation
proceedings are administrative in character and
never construed as a punishment but a
preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be Facts: On June 3 1936, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas issued
proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a a search warrant on the basis of affidavit of Agent
specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested Mariano Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had
and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted no personal knowledge but through information from a
with assistance of a counsel if desired. reliable source. In other words, the applicant‘s
knowledge of facts is based on a mere hearsay. In the
affidavit presented to the judge, the description is as
follows:"That there are being kept is said premises
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the books documents, receipts, lists chits, and other papers
State and done under the authority of the sovereign used by him in connection with his activities as
power. It a police measure against the undesirable money lender, charging a usurious rate of interests,
aliens whose continued presence in the country is found in violation of the law."At 7 pm on June 4, by virtue of
to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the the warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board
people. entered the store and residence of Narciso Alvarez
seized some articles such as internal revenue license,
ledger, journals, cash bonds, check stubs,
memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories,
bill of lading, credit receipts, correspondence, receipt
4. REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT Alvarez vs. books, promissory notes and checks. On July 8, Alvarez
Court of First Instance of Tayabas filed a petition alleging that the search was illegal based
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 on the lack of personal knowledge, that it was made at
night and for non compliance in the particularity
description rule in issuing warrant. On September 10,
the Court of First Instance ruled against the Alvarez

and upheld the validity of the search warrant.
2) W/N a search warrant can be made at night.
Yes, the search can be made at night. Section 101 of

General Order‘s number 58 authorizes search made at
Issues: night when it is positively asserted that the property is
on the person or in the place ordered tube searched.
(1) W/N the search warrant is legal when the affidavit is However, since the search warrant is declared illegal
based on hearsay. (RULING 1), such search could not be legally made at
night.
No. The search warrant is ILLEGAL because the
affidavits based on mere hearsay. The general rule is
that when the affidavit of the applicant or complainant
contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that (3) W/N the search warrant satisfies the particularity of
there exists probable cause. But when the applicant's description as required by the law.
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of
one or more witnesses having personal knowledge of Yes, it satisfied the requirement of particularity of
facts is necessary. The Court held that the warrant is description. Article III of the Constitution and section
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 97 of General Orders Number 58 requires that the
affidavit must contain a particular description of the
placed to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized. But, where, by the nature of the goods to be
illegal because it is based on the affidavit of an agent seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
who had no personal knowledge of the facts. The true required that technical description be given, as this
test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant would mean that no warrant could issue. Based on the
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been description of the affidavit, and taking into consideration
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged the nature of the articles as described it is clear that no
thereon and affiant be held liable for damages other more adequate and detailed description could
caused. have been given, particularly because it is difficult to
give a particular description of the contents thereof. The
description so made substantially complies with the
legal provisions because the officer of the law who

executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to identify the articles in question, which Issues:
he did.
1) Was the warrant valid?
No. It violated the single warrant single offense rule

because it was a general warrant.
Asian Surety vs. Herrera
The constitution requires that a SW should be issued
Must refer to one specific offense. upon a probable cause in connection with one single
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 offense. In the case at bar, the SW was issued for four
separate and distinct offenses. Estafa, falsification,
tax evasion and insurance fraud. Therefore it is invalid
for it is a general warrant.
Facts: On October 1965, upon a sworn application of

NBI agent Celso Zoleta Jr. supported with the It also failed to particularly describe the objects to be
deposition of witness Manuel Cuaresma, the seized.
respondent Judge Jose Herrera, issued a search
warrant against the petitioner for criminal case of The constitution mandates that objects to be seized
Estafa, falsification, insurance fraud and tax evasion. By should be couched not on generic but specific terms.
virtue of the search warrant, NBI agents seized the Section 2 provides that a search warrant may be issued
place in the office of the petitioner in Republic Market for the search and seizure of the following personal
and carried away two car loads of documents, papers properties.
and receipt. The petitioners, then filed a suit assailing
the validity of the SW, contending that it does not follow a) Property subject to the offense
the Constitutional and statutory requirements of a valid
SW. b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or
fruits of the offense
c) Property used or intended to be used as the means from the time when the affidavit was made or the search
of committing the offense warrant issued but generally speaking, a lapse of time
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 of less than three weeks will be held not to invalidate
the search warrant, while the lapse of four weeks will be
held to be so.
In the case at bar, the respondent judge used all three

of the description in relation to the things to be seized in
the petitioner. Thus, they are all couched in generic
terms. The respondent judge did not bother to specify Thus, the nearer the time at which the observation of an
the things to be seized that would be admitted as offense is alleged to have been made, the more
evidence to the offense charged. reasonable the conclusion of establishment of a
probable cause. In the case at bar, the alleged
commission of the crime is from 1961 To
1964 and the application for search warrant was made
in 1965.
It also violated the rule that it should be served in the
day. In the case at bar, the
SW was conducted evening of Oct 27, 1 965 at 7:3 0
pm until morning.
Thus, there can be doubt as to the establishment of a
probable cause because of the remoteness of time.
Petition granted.
The gap between the offense and application for search

warrant was remote. The rules for affidavit are
1 ) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense
must be clear and definite and must not be toor emote 20th Century Fox v CA
from the time of the making of the affidavit and issuance PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
of the search warrant
2) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the

stated time of observation of the offense id too remote
In cases involving violation of PD 49, a basic

requirement for validity of the search warrant is the
presentation of the master tape of the copyrighted films
from which the pirated films are supposed to have been The petitioner maintains that the lower court issued the
copied. questioned search warrants after finding the existence
of a probable cause justifying their issuance. According
to the petitioner, the lower court arrived at this
conclusion on the basis of the depositions of applicant
NBI's two witnesses which were taken through
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint to conduct searches searching questions and answers by the lower court.
and seizures in connection with the NBI‘s anti-film
piracy campaign. NBI conducted surveillance and
subsequently filed three applications for search
warrants, eventually isused by the lower court. Private
respondents filed and were granted a motion to lift. The lower court held that the allegation that master
tapes were viewed by the NBI and were compared to
the purchased and seized video tapes from the
respondents' establishments was not persuasive. They
were never shown to the court. The case should be
Issue: WON the judge property lifted the search dismissed as the allegation was not supported by
warrants issued earlier on competent evidence and for that matter the probable
application of NBI on basis of petitioner‘s complaint cause hovers in that grey debatable twilight zone
between black and white resolvable in favor of
respondents herein.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Ruling: The main issue hinges on the meaning of

"probable cause" within the context of the
constitutional provision against illegal searches and
seizures (Section 3, Article IV, 1973 Constitution,
now, Section 2, Article Ill, 1987
Constitution. Placer v Villanueva
The issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial

function of the judge. He is not reliant on the findings of
the fiscal.. Held: Judge may rely upon the fiscal‘s certification for
the existence of probable cause and on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification
does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant.
The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial
Facts: Petitioners filed informations in the city court function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on
and they certified that Preliminary Investigation and the part of issuing magistrate. Under Section 6 Rule 112
Examination had been conducted and that prima facie of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of
cases have been found. Upon receipt of said the existence of probable cause before issuing a
informations, respondent judge set the hearing of the warrant of arrest. If on the face of the information, the
criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
warrants of arrest. After the hearing, respondent issued fiscal‘s certification and require submission of the
an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence in support of the informations to
aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of
the findings of probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the
petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel conclusion as to existence of probable cause.
respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They contended
that the fiscal‘s certification in the informations of the
existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient
justification for the judge to issue warrants of arrest. Petition dismissed.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent city judge may,

for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest, compel Soliven v Makasiar
the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits
and other documentary evidence presented during the It is not necessary that a judge personally examine
preliminary investigation. the complainant and his witness. It is sufficient the
judge personally determine probable cause.
from requiring all of the office-holder‘s time, also

demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the

Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
together with others was charged for libel by the only by the holder of the office; not by any other person
president. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a
complaint affidavit because this would defeat her
immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the
principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a in the President‘s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran
president would sue then the president would allow et al, in a criminal case in which the President is
herself to be placed under the court‘s jurisdiction and complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a
conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. defense to prevent the case from proceeding against
Also, considering the functions of a president, the such accused.
president may not be able to appear in court to be a
witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would

prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked so minded the President may shed the protection
by Beltran, a person other than the president. afforded by the privilege and submit to the court‘s
jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President‘s
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the
privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any
hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside Cruz v Judge Areola
FACTS: On November 26, 1998, the Evaluation and ISSUE:

Preliminary Investigation Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a Resolution recommending the Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring
filing of an Information for Estafa against Marilyn the implementations of the warrant of arrest
Carreon, an employee of the Land Transportation
Office, based on the complaint filed by herein
complainants. The Office of the City Prosecutor found
no cogent reason to reverse, modify, or alter the
resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and HELD:
recommended that the case be set for trial.
Complainants filed the instant complaint charging both NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of
respondent Judge and his Branch Clerk of Court with arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
ignorance of the law. Complainants take issue of the determined personally by the judge after examination
fact that although respondent Judge already issued a under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
warrant of arrest, he still deferred its implementation to witnesses he may produce. Preliminary investigation
giveaway to a reinvestigation of the case on motion of should be distinguished as to whether it is an
the accused. They believe that there is no longer any investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground
reason why the respondent Judge should withhold the for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for
issuance of a warrant of arrest considering that the the determination of a probable cause for the issuance
Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary
there exists probable cause to indict the accused. In investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the
their Joint Comment, respondent Judge manifests that prosecution‘s job. The second kind of preliminary
the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the
function of a judge as he is mandated to determine the judge. In making the required personal determination, a
existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant. judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence
Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand, earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of
claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part to release reliance depends on the circumstances of each case
duly signed orders, resolutions and decisions of the and is subject to the judge‘s sound discretion. It is not
presiding judge of her branch. obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of
the accused, even after having personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers. For the determination of
whether probable cause exists and whether it is preliminary examination (p.e. for brevity) found probable
necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate cause and issued a warrant of arrest. Also after
the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or conducting the preliminary investigation (p.i. for brevity),
discretion. It appears from the records that the he issued a resolution forwarding the case to the
challenged Orders issued by the respondent Judge prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner received a
were not at all baseless. The respondent Judge merely subpoena directing him to filehis counter affidavit,
exercised his sound discretion in not immediately affidavit of witnesses and other supportingdocuments.
issuing the warrant of arrest and in suspending further He did it the following day. While proceedings are
proceedings pending reinvestigation of the case. On her ongoing, he filed a petition for habeas corpus with
part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be the C.A alleging that: the warrant was null and void
faulted for performing a ministerial function, that is, because the judge who issued it was a relative by
releasing Orders duly signed by the respondent Judge. affinity of the private respondent and the p.e. and the
p.i. were illegal and irregular as the judge doesn‘t have
jurisdiction on the case. The C.A. granted the petition
holding that the judge was a relative by affinity by 3rd
degree to the private respondent and the p.i. he
Sales v Sandiganbayan conducted has 2 stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper.
The proceeding now consists only of one stage. He
Determination of probable cause is exclusive province conducted the requisite investigation prior to the
of the judge. issuance of warrant of arrest. Moreover he did not
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 complete it. He only examined the witness of
the complainant. But the prosecution instead of
conducting p.i. of his own forwarded the records to the
Ombudsman (OMB for brevity) for the latter to conduct
the same. The OMB directed the petitioner to submit his
counter affidavit, but he did not comply with it finding the
same superfluous. The graft investigator recommended
Facts: The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of the filing of information for murder which the OMB
Pagudpud Ilocos Norte, shot the former mayor and his approved. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution
political rival Atty. Benemerito. After the shooting, he but prevented seeking reconsideration thereof he filed
surrendered himself and hence the police inspector and a motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest
wife of the victim filed a criminal complaint for murder pending the determination of probable cause. The
against him. The judge after conducting the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. This is now a
petition for review on the decision of the without doing anything and threw everything to the
Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Thirdly, a person
under preliminary investigation by the OMB is entitled to
a motion for reconsideration, as maintained by the
Issues: Rules of Procedure by the OMB. The filing of the motion
(1) Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary
conducting preliminary investigation. investigation proper. The denial thereof is tantamount to
(2) Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an the denial of the right itself to a preliminary investigation.
opportunity to be heard and to This fact alone renders preliminary investigation
submit controverting conducted in this case incomplete. And lastly, it was
evidence. patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 on the OMB‘s certification of probable cause given the
prevailing facts of the case much more so in the face of
the latter‘s flawed report and
one side factual findings.
Held: The proper procedure in the conduct of The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayan‘s assertion
preliminary investigation was not followed because of of having found probable cause on its own, considering
the following reasons. Firstly, the preliminary the OMB‘s defective report and findings, which merely
investigation was conducted by 3 different investigators, relied on the testimonies of the witnesses for the
none of whom completed the preliminary investigation prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the
There was not one continuous proceeding but rather, defense.
cases of passing the buck, the last one being the OMB
throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the
charge of murder is a non bailable offense. The gravity
of the offense alone should have merited a deeper and Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the
more thorough preliminary investigation. The OMB did Sandiganbayan, ordering the Sandiganbayan to quash
nothing of the sort but followed the resolution of the the warrant of arrest and remanding the OMB for
graft investigator. He did a worse job than the judge, by completion of the preliminary investigation.
actually adopting the resolution of the graft investigator PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Held: Yes. But by itself, it does not bind judges to come

out with the warrant of arrest. Issuance of warrants calls
Lim v Felix for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of the
issuing judge. If the judge is satisfied from the
If the judge relied solely on the certification of the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the
prosecutor he cannot be said to have personally investigating officer than an offense complained of has
determined probable cause. been committed and that there is a reasonable grounds
to believe that the accused has committed it, he must
issue a warrant or order for an arrest. A judge is not
required to personally examine the complainants and
witnesses, what the constitution mandates in satisfying
Facts: The petitioners. Lim et al, was charged of the the existence of probable cause, the judge shall either;
crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder of 1. Personally evaluate the report and the supporting
Congressman Espinosa of Masbate among others. documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the
Private respondent, Alfane was designated to review existence of probable cause, and in basis thereof, issue
the case and was raffled to RTC Makati Br. 56 of the arrest warrant and 2. If there is no sufficient
respondent judge, Nemesio Felix. After transmittal of establishment of probable cause, he may disregard the
the case, the respondent Judge issued warrant of Arrest prosecutor‘s certification and require the submission of
against the accused by virtue of the prosecutor‘s the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
certification in each submitted information arriving at a conclusions to the existence of probable
recommending the existence of a probable cause. cause.
Issue: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of

arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecutions
certification and recommendation that a probable cause
exists. Moreover, the constitution pursuant to Sec 2 Art III also
mandates that ³x x x probable cause should be
personally determined by the judge x x´. This means
that
1. The determination of probable cause is a function of

the judge.2. Preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor Distinguished.
does not bind the judge
The former is executive in nature and part of a
3. Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the ROSECU TOR‘S JOB. While the latter aka preliminary
preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause examination is judicial in nature and is lodged to
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the the JUDGE.
preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or release.
In the case at bar, the only basis of the respondent
judge in issuing warrants of arrest is only the
certification of the prosecutor, without personally
examining the information (which still in Masbate, and
wherein the respondent denied the motion for
transmittal of such records of the cases in the ground Okabe v Judge Gutierrez
that certification id enough ground for the determination PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
of probable cause and issuance of warrant ).Thus, there
is no personal examination conducted by the judge to
establish the existence of probable cause, thereby, the
respondent committed abuse of discretion. The judge committed GAD in finding probable cause
because the investigating prosecutor submitted the only
the resolution of the preliminary investigation and the
complainant‘s affidavit. The witnesses and reply
affidavits were not presented.
Note:
Preliminary investigation for the determination of

sufficient ground for filing of information and
investigation for the determination of a probable cause FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe,
a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged,
that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000
with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner,
who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits
delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondent‘s
that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the
upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the
later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal. petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall
Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow
her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she
have 3 minor children residing
During the preliminary investigation, the complainant
submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other
documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. there relying on her for support. Petitioner also
Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable questioned the irregularity of the determination of
cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was probable cause during the preliminary investigation
subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of
court then issued a warrant of arrest with a bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the
recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a petitioner from questioning the same. Upon
personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/
the Philippines for Japan on June 17, leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA
2000 without the trial court‘s permission, and returned to a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure
the Philippines on June order however all the other motions were denied, hence
28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, this case.
and returned on July 12,
2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an
urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold
departure order. Trial court approved the same.
Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a
judicial determination of probable cause and to defer reversible error in determining existence of probable
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of
documents appended to the Information submitted by respondent Maruyama and the latter‘s documentary
the investigating prosecutor were respondent evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the
Maruyama‘s affidavit-complaint for estafa and the petitioner.
120 -
4cases
HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded D. PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Criminal Procedure which provides that:
SEC. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the

information or complaint. An information or complaint People v. Damaso 212 SCRA 547 (1992), Supra
filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and
counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, Philippine Constabulary officers and personnel were
together with the other supporting evidence and the sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in
resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby Barangay Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In
DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence said place, the group apprehended several people
of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based including Berlina Aritumba. When interrogated, the
on the complete records, as required under Section persons apprehended revealed that there was an
8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal underground safehouse in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
Procedure. After coordinating with the Station Commander of
Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in
Urdaneta were they found subversive documents, a
radio, and several firearms. After the raid, the group
proceeded to Bonuan, Dagupan City, and put under
surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie
C.Jian Aritumba, sister of Berlina Aritumba whom they earlier
- arrested. The group interviewed a certain Luzviminda
118 - 3 Morados, an alleged househelper of Bernie Mendoza,
cases who pointed the location of the house under
119 4 surveillance. When they reached the house, the group
cases saw Luz Tanciangco outside. They told her that they
already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the In reversing his conviction, the Court said that the law
area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of
she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon a valid search and seizure proceedings. The
entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches
Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled 'Ang Bayan', and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived
xerox copiers and a computer machine. The group by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded
requested the persons in the house to allow them to or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her
look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the behalf. In the case at bar, the records show that
rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, appellant was not in his house at that time Luz
one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper,
radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, allowed the authorities to enter it. The Court found no
Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados
confiscated the articles and brought them to their was indeed the appellant's helper, or if it was true that
headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought she was his helper, that the appellant had given her
the persons found in the house to the headquarters for authority to open his house in his absence. The
investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco
the lessee of the house and owned the items has such an authority. Without this evidence, the
confiscated therefrom Hence, Basilio Damaso (alias authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot
Bernie Mendoza), was charged and convicted in an be given any color of legality.
information filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the
1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
connection with the crime of subversion. Damaso enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
contends that the search conducted by the PC officers of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
were illegal. The Solicitor General counters that a sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
search may be validly conducted without a search principles of government. As a consequence, the search
warrant with if the search was conducted with the conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would
consent of the person searched and since the evidence have been different if the situation here demanded
seized was in plain view of the authorities. urgency which could have prompted the authorities to
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 dispense with a search warrant.
actions that may be filed against Tambasen. Petitioner

Tambasen v. People 246 SCRA 184 (1995) contends that the search warrant covered three
offenses: "(1) illegal possession of armalite rifle and .45
A police officer applied for the issuance of a search cal. pistol; (2) illegal possession of hand grenade and
warrant from the MTCC, alleging that he received dynamite sticks; and (3) illegal possession of subversive
information that petitioner had in his possession at his documents" in violation of Section 3 of Rule 126 of the
house in Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & Revised Rules of Court (now Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the
Ammos), Hand Grenades, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure).
.45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and
Subversive Documents,"
which articles were "used or intended to be used" for
illegal purposes. On the same day, the application was
granted by the MTCC with the issuance of a search In attributing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC, the
warrant, which allowed the seizure of the items Court said that, on its face, the search warrant violates
specified in the application. On another date, a police Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court,
team searched the house of petitioner and seized two which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for
envelopes containing P14,000.00 and various more than one specified offense. The caption of the
communication equipment. Hence, petitioner filed search warrant reflects the violation of two special laws:
before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms,
seizure be ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was
therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and
void.
declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned

to him. His motion was granted by the MTCC which
opined that any seizure should be limited to the specific
items covered by the warrant and that the money could Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in
not be considered as "subversive documents"; it was the search warrant, the police acted beyond the
neither stolen nor the effects of gambling. However, parameters of their authority under the search warrant.
the RTC reversed the MTCC decision, saying that the Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires
any illegality in the search involves matters of defense that a search warrant should particularly describe the
which should be properly raised at the criminal action or things to be seized. Clearly then, the money which was
not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions"
seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the having been propounded. Said motion was denied by
police team were doing their task of pursuing subversive the trial court.
is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The
presumption juris tantum of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail
against the constitutionally protected rights of an
individual. While the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 arrest of petitioners, it said that the warrant issued by
the trial court was in the nature of a general warrant,
one of a class of writs long proscribed as
unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally
Pangandaman v. Casar 159 SCRA 599 (1988) subversive of the liberty of the subject. The warrant in
question was issued against fifty (50) "John Does", not
A shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or
del Sur, which left at least five persons dead and two would identify. Clearly violative of the constitutional
others wounded. The relatives of the victims, filed a injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi describe the person or persons to be seized, the
City, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be
the incident. The letter adverted to the possibility of voided.
innocent persons being implicated by the parties
involved on both sides — none of whom was, however,
identified — and promised that supporting affidavits
would shortly be filed. Afterwards, a criminal complaint
for multiple murder was filed with respondent Judge Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of
Casar. Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint Appeals 262 SCRA 219 (1996), Supra
and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest" against
the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the An intelligence officer of the Videogram Regulatory
witnesses) and fifty (50) "John Does." The lawyer for the Board (VRB), received information that private
victims' relatives filed a motion for reconsideration respondent Jose B. Jinco had in his possession pirated
seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent videotapes, posters, advertising materials and other
holding of a "thorough investigation" on the ground that items used or intended to be
the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
desired to be seized have any direct relation to an

offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have
some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the
used for the purpose of sale, lease, distribution, said offense; and the articles, subject of search and
circulation or public exhibition of the said pirated seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen
videotapes. Said officer then filed a verified Application such evidence.
for Search Warrant with prayer for the seizure of
the properties described in the search warrant. After The Court said that search warrant authorized only the
the issuance of the warrant, this was served on private seizure of articles used or intended to be used in the
respondents which led to the seizure of the properties unlawful sale, lease and other acts in violation of Sec.
described in the warrant. Private respondent then filed 56 of P.D. 49. The search warrant ordered the seizure
an Urgent Motion To Lift the Search Warrant and For of the following properties:
the Return of the Seized Articles alleging that the
search warrant violates the constitutional requirements "(a) Pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion
of particularity of the description of the warrant, being a pictures/films the titles of which are mentioned in the
general warrant and thus, null and void. The RTC attached list;
granted the motion in which the Court of Appeals
affirmed. (b) Posters, advertising leaflets, brochures,
invoices, journals, ledgers, and books of accounts
bearing and/or mentioning the pirated films with titles
(as per attached list);
The Court found respondent‘s contention untenable.
The Court said that a search warrant may be said to
particularly describe the things to be seized 1) when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances (c) Television sets, video cassettes records,
will ordinarily allow; rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment
2) or when the description expresses a conclusion of and other machines and paraphernalia or material used
fact — not of law — by or intended to be used in the unlawful sale, lease,
which the warrant officer may be guided in making the distribution, or possession for purpose of sale, lease,
search and seizure; or when the things described are distribution, circulation or public exhibition of the above-
limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense mentioned pirated video tapes which he is keeping and
for which the warrant is being issued. If the articles concealing in the premises above-described."
Search Warrants contending that the subject search

warrants are general warrants prescribed by the
Constitution. According to them, the things to be seized
were not described and detailed out, i.e. the firearms
Clearly, the above items could not be any more specific listed were not classified as to size or make, etc.. The
as the circumstances will allow since they are all used MTC denied the motion, hence, this petition for
or intended to be used in the unlawful sale or lease of certiorari.
pirated tapes. Therefore, the finding of the appellate
court that the Search Warrant is a "general" warrant is
devoid of basis.
The Supreme Court affirmed the MTC decision. It ruled

that a description of the property to be seized need not
be technically accurate nor necessarily precise;
Kho v. Makalintal 306 SCRA 70 (1999), Supra PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
In this case, petitioners sought to restrain the

respondent National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) from
using the objects seized by virtue of such warrants in and its nature will necessarily vary according to whether
any case or cases filed or to be filed against them and the identity of the property, or its character, is the matter
to return immediately the said items, including firearms, of concern. Further the description is required to be
ammunition and explosives, radio communication specific only so far as the circumstances will ordinarily
equipment, handsets, transceivers, two units of allow.
vehicles and motorcycle. The search warrants were
applied for after teams of NBI agents had
conducted a personal surveillance and investigation in
the two houses of Kho on the basis of confidential
information they received that the said places were Records on hand indicate that the search warrants
being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms under scrutiny specifically describe the items to be
and "chop-chop" vehicles. Armed with search warrants, seized thus:
the NBI recovered various high-powered firearms and
thousands of rounds of ammunition from the two Search Warrant No. 90-11
houses. Then, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash
"Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

transmitters, transceivers, handsets, scanners,
monitoring device and the like."
Search Warrant No. 90-13 In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could
not have been in a position to know beforehand the
"Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as exact caliber or make of the firearms to be seized.
transmitters, transceivers, handsets, radio Although the surveillance they conducted did disclose
communications equipments, scanners, monitoring the presence of unlicensed firearms within the premises
devices and others." to be searched, they could not have known the
particular type of weapons involved before seeing such
Subject Search Warrant Nos. 90-12 and 90-15 refer to: weapons at close range, which was of course
impossible at the time of the filing of the applications for
"Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and subject search warrants.
ammunitions for the said firearms." Search Warrant No.
90-14 states:
"Chop-chop vehicles and other spare parts."
Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue 344 SCRA 36 (2000)
Based on a complaint filed by a certain Rodrigo Abos,

The Court held that the said warrants comply with former Operating Chief of Unifish Packing Corporation,
Constitutional and statutory requirements. The law does to the BIR that said company and Frank Uy were
not require that the things to be seized must be engaged in activities constituting evasion of tax
described in precise and minute detail as to leave no payments, the BIR applied for search warrants for the
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. search of the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation
Otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the which the RTC judge issued. The Court of Appeals
applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Since RTC judge in issuing the search warrants. Petitioners
the element of time is very crucial in criminal cases, the filed the instant petition for review assailing the validity
effort and time spent in researching on the details to be of the warrants issued, based on the following: there
embodied in the warrant would render the purpose of was no probable cause for the judge to issue the
the search nugatory.
warrants; and the warrants did not particularly describe and those items not particularly described may be cut
the things to be seized. off without destroying
the whole warrant.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that before issuing

the warrants, the respondent judge took the deposition People v. Salanguit 356 SCRA 683 (2001), Supra
of Abos, who had access to company records showing
the illegal activities and even showed the issuing judge Accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko was found
photocopies thereof. Most of the items listed in the guilty of violation of Section
warrants, however, failed to meet the test of 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and was
particularity, thus, items not particularly described were sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from six (6)
ordered to be returned to petitioners. However, the months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years
warrants authorizing the seizure of unregistered delivery and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
receipts and unregistered purchase and sales maximum, and of §8 of the same law and sentencing
invoices remain valid since no other more adequate him for such violation to suffer the penalty of
and detailed description could be given precisely reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00. In
because they are unregistered. his appeal before the Court, appellant contested his
conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of
the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as
evidence against him on the ground that the warrant
used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the
Furthermore, the general description of most of the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana allegedly
documents listed in the warrants does not render the seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain
entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize view" doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts

and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision
warrants remain valid. The search warrant is severable, of the trial court finding appellant guilty of possession of
marijuana under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6425. The Court

ruled that the seized marijuana brick is inadmissible in
evidence against appellant. First, the warrant
authorized only the seizure of shabu, and not marijuana.
Secondly, the seizure of the marijuana brick could not
be justified under the "plain view doctrine" because the
marijuana allegedly found in the possession of appellant Paper Industries Corp. of the Philippines v. Asuncion
was in the form of two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not 307 SCRA 253 (1999)
being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped
in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as
marijuana. The Court, however, affirmed the decision
of the trial court finding appellant guilty of possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as Police Chief Inspector Pascua applied for a search
"shabu" under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425. The Court warrant with the Regional Trial Court presided by the
held that with respect to the seizure of shabu from herein respondent, Hon. Asuncion, against the
appellant's residence, Search Warrant No. 160 was management, represented by petitioners, of Paper
properly issued, such warrant Industries Corporation, allegedly in possession of
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 several high-powered firearms, ammunitions and
explosives. Although it was supported by depositions of
two police officers "no license" certification from the
Firearms and Explosive Office of the PNP was however
being founded on probable cause personally attached. At the hearing for the issuance of search
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the warrant Inspector Pascua did not testify but merely
deposing witness and particularly describing the place introduced as witness Police Officer Bacolod who stated
to be searched and the things to be seized. With that, from information gathered from reliable sources, he
respect to appellant's claim that there was undue and "believed" that PICOP security guards had no license to
unnecessary force employed by the searching party in possess subject firearms. Thereafter, Search Warrant
effecting the warrant, the Court found no evidence to No. 799 (95) was issued. It identified only one place —
support the allegation. Appellant did not present any "Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines located
affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao
like the barangay officials or neighbors, to attest to the del Sur" as the place to be searched. However, PICOP
truth of his claim. has 200 office/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1
airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL
depots/quick service outlet and 800 miscellaneous personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to
structures spread over 155 hectares of land. Searches possess the subject firearms and the place to be
were made by the police who recovered several searched was not described with particularity.
armalites, grenade launcher, 38 caliber revolvers, 45
caliber pistols, hand grenades and ammunitions kept
inside the ammo dam and security headquarters or
office of PICOP. The PNP then filed with the
Department of Justice a complaint for illegal possession In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed
of firearms against petitioners who moved to quash the to describe the place with particularity. It simply
search warrant authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises,"
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 but it did not specify such premises. The warrant
identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at
PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao
on the ground of its illegality. The motion and a del Sur." The PICOP compound, however, is made up
subsequent motion were denied, hence, resort to this of "200 offices/ buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1
petition. airstrip, 3 pier/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL
depots/quick service outlets and some 800
miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out
over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." Obviously,
the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus
The requisites for a valid search warrant are: 1) illegal authority to search all the structures found inside
probable cause present; 2) such presence is the PICOP compound.
determined personally by the judge; 3) the complainant
and the witnesses he or she may produce are
personally examined by the judge, in writing and under
oath or affirmation; 4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on facts personally known to them; and 5) the Because the search warrant was procured in violation of
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms,
and the things to be seized. In the case at bar the explosives and other materials seized were
search warrant was issued based solely on affidavits. "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Since
The trial judge failed to personally examine the these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are
complainant and the witnesses, witness Bacolod had no
inadmissible, the complaint and the proceedings before

the State Prosecutor have no leg to stand on.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 The Supreme Court held that while their contention may
be conceded, the trouble is that the place described in
the search warrant, which is the only place that may be
legitimately searched in virtue thereof, was not that
which the police officers who applied for the search
warrant had in mind, with the result that what they
actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was
People v. Court of Appeals 291 SCRA 400 (1998) a place other than that stated in the search warrant. It
does not suffice for a search warrant to be deemed
A search warrant was served against Azfar Hussain valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally
which resulted in his arrest together with 3 other determined by the judge after examination under oath,
Pakistanis and in the seizure of their personal or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
belongings, papers and effects, i.e. dynamite sticks, may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly
plastic explosives, fragmentation grenade and high describe the place to be searched, the manifest
powered firearms and ammunitions. Charged in court, intention being that the search
they pleaded not guilty and submitted their "Extremely be confined strictly to the place so described.
Urgent Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Declare
Evidence Obtained Inadmissible" on the ground that the
place searched, in which the accused were then
residing, was Apartment No. 1, a place other than and
separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit People v. Tiu Won Chua 405 SCRA 280 (2003)
adjacent to, Abigail's Variety Store, the place stated in
the search warrant. The trial court granted the Motion to Appellants were convicted for violation of the
Quash which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA No.
special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General 7659. On appeal, they assailed the legality of the search
now seeks reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
alleging that the police officers had satisfactorily
established probable cause before the judge for the
issuance of a search warrant.
warrant and the search and arrest conducted pursuant 5. PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO SEIZURE Burgos v.
thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of Chief of Staff
conviction.
Facts:
- Judge Cruz-Pano issued 2 search warrants, by virtue

of which the premises of the
The Supreme Court held that a mistake in the name of ―Metropolitan Mail‖ and ―We Forum‖ newspapers
the person to be searched does not invalidate the were searched.
warrant, especially since in this case, the authorities - Police seized printing machines, equipment,
had personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in
the accused because of the test buy operation the printing, publication and distribution of the
conducted before obtaining the search warrant. In fact, newspapers as well as numerous papers, documents,
a "John Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so long books and other written literature alleged to be in the
as it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable possession of publisher-editor Jose Burgos, Jr.
the officer to identify the accused. It also held that a PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
mistake in the identification of the owner of the
place does not invalidate the warrant provided the
place to be searched is properly described. Thus, even
if the search warrant used by the police authorities did - Burgos filed for writ of mandamus and prohibition for
not contain the correct name of Tiu Won or the name of the return of the materials seized and to enjoin
Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it because the respondents from using said materials from being used
place to be searched was described properly. as evidence against him.
- One of Burgos‘ many arguments against the search
warrants is that although the warrants were directed
against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles belonging to his
co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and
However, the search conducted on the car parked the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
away from the building, however, was illegal because
it was not part of the place described to be searched
and it was not incidental to a lawful arrest. Issues: (topical only)
W/N it is necessary that property to be searched is
owned by the person against
whom the warrant is issued. and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no

consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession
of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles
Held: and property seized under the warrants.
NO, OWNERSHIP IS NOT NECESSARY, ONLY
POSSESSION
6. CONDUCT OF THE SEARCH
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

Under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, A search appellee, vs. YOLANDA GESMUNDO, accused-
warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the appellant.
following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;

PADILLA, J p:
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or
fruits of the offense; and Facts:
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means - After having allegedly witnessed accused sell
of committing an offense. marijuana outside her house, police
investigators procured a search warrant to search
The above rule does not require that the property to be accused‘s house for marijuana.
seized should be owned by the person against whom - Accused claims that while she was seated in the sala,
the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be Sgt. Yte, one of the officers conducting the search, was
owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the showing her something which the latter claimed to be a
above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may search warrant when someone uttered the following
be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen words "ito na" coming from the direction of the kitchen.
property must be owned by one other than the person in She, together with Sgt. Yte proceeded to the kitchen
whose possession it may be at the time of the search and saw PFC Luciano holding a plastic bag with four
other companions who entered the house through the

back door which was opened at that time.
- She claims that the marijuana supposedly seized by
the raiding police team in her possession, was planted
by the police officers.
As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National
Bureau of Investigation, et al. 20 a procedure, wherein
Issue: members of a raiding party can roam around the raided
W/N police complied with the proper procedure for premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only
conducting a search by virtue witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to
of a warrant. witness a search conducted by the other members of
the raiding party in another part of the house, is violative
of both the spirit and the letter of the law.
Held:
NO THEY DID NOT Furthermore, The police authorities in the case at bar
testified that they submitted an inventory to the court
The search of the accused-appellant's house was without the marijuana, the latter having been turned
conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Rules of Court which specifically provides that no Having made no return or inventory to the warrant-
search of a house, room or any other premise shall be issuing court, there is no proof that the police really
made except in the presence of the lawful occupant found marijuana in the house of the accused. It is also
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of required that the marijuana received be presented as
the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of evidence. The identity of the marijuana which
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same constitutes the corpus delicti must be established before
locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure the court.
regularity in the execution of the search warrant.
Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article Accused is acquitted.
130 of the Revised Penal Code. 19
Chinese currencies, typewriters, and even the Toyota

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENNY Corolla (good lord)
GO, appellant.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.: Issues:

W/N the manner of conducting the search and seizure
was proper.
Facts:
- A search warrant was issued by the RTC Pasay Held:

commanding a search of Go‘s
residence and to seize Shabu, weighing scales and NO, NOT AT ALL.
other drug paraphernalia.
- In order to gain entry into Go‘s house, they sideswept
(sinagi) Go‘s Toyota Corolla GLI which was parked
outside. Jack Go, accused‘s son and the only one
present at the house at the time, thereupon opened the A search warrant must conform strictly to the
door of the house and the policemen at once introduced requirements of the constitutional and statutory
themselves, informed him that they had a warrant for provisions under which it is issued. Otherwise, it is
the search of the premises, and promptly handcuffed void. An examination of the testimonies of the police
him to a chair. officers brings to light several irregularities in the
- Barangay Kagawads were later called to be manner by which the search of appellant‘s residence
witnesses to the search and to afterwards sign the was conducted.
inventory receipt and affidavit of orderly search.
In order to enter the premises to be searched, the police

- Police officers then seized a plastic bag containing a officers deliberately side- swiped appellant‘s car which
yellowish substance, a weighing scale, various was parked alongside the road, instead of following the
documents, bank books, money in Philippine and regular ―knock and announce‖ procedure as outlined
in Section 7, Rule 126. Since the police officers had not

yet notified the occupant of the residence of their Also, despite the warrant‘s limiting the search and
intention and authority to conduct a search and absent a seizure to shabu and drug paraphernalia, the police
showing that they had any reasonable cause to seized numerous other items, which are clearly
believe that prior notice of service of the warrant unrelated to illegal drugs or illegal drug paraphernalia.
would endanger its successful implementation, the
deliberate sideswiping of appellant‘s car was
unreasonable and unjustified.
Furthermore, the inventory made was not detailed, as

was required. Neither was the accused nor the
barangay officials issued an inventory receipt.
In explaining why they handcuffed jack to a chair while
they conducted their search, the police explained that
not only was he unfamiliar with Jack Go and unsure of
how the latter would react, but it was a standard
operating procedure. There is no showing, however, of The raiding team‘s departure from the procedure
any action or provocation by Jack Go when the mandated by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
policemen entered appellant‘s residence. Considering taken together with the numerous other irregularities
the degree of intimidation, attending the search of appellant‘s residence, tainted
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 the search with the vice of unreasonableness, thus
compelling this Court to apply the exclusionary rule and
declare the seized articles inadmissible in evidence.
alarm and fear produced in one suddenly confronted

under similar circumstances, the forcible restraint of
Jack Go all the more was unjustified as was his
continued restraint even after Barangay Kagawads Benny Go is ACQUITTED. Motion For Return of
Lazaro and Manalo had arrived to justify his forcible Personal Documents, Vehicle and Paraphernalia is
restraint. GRANTED IN PART, and the trial court is hereby
ordered to return to him those items seized from the
subject premises which belong to him as listed in said
Motion. The subject shabu is ORDERED forfeited in liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2
favor of the State. CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31
January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat,
7. WARRANTLESS ARREST or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the
CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as
and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a
NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners, consequence of this positive identification, Dural
vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who
BRIG. conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information
charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the
crime of ―Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of
Persons in Authority.‖ (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail
GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER recommended). On 15
AGUIRRE, respondents. February 1988, the information was amended to
include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the
filing of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of
On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva.
Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU- The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9
CAPCOM) received confidential information about a February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato
member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen.
being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on
verification, it was found that the wounded person, who 15 February 1988. On 26 February 1988, however, Umil
was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial
actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need
they were accordingly released. not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 offenses which requires the determination by a judge of
the existence of probable cause before the issuance of
a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the
offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing
any warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion. persons committing overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other milder acts but equally
in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or
capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the
situation that involves the very survival of society and its
Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested government and duly constituted authorities.
while in the act of shooting the 2 CAPCOM soldiers nor
was he arrested just after the commission of the said
offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting
incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is
unjustified. However, Dural was arrested for being a (http://mclairgarcia.wordpress.com/2011/04/01/umil-vs-
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed ramos/)
subversive organization. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit MIGUEL SINGSON, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), respondents.
direct assaults against the State and are in the nature PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved
in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements,
or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of
the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than
for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in
PUNO, J.:
YES, IT IS
Facts:
―Section 5, Rule 113. Arrest without warrant, when
- Patrolman Fulgencio was instructed by his station lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without
commander to monitor the activities of Sucro, following warrant, arrest a person:
information that Sucro was selling marijuana.
- Pat. Fulgencio hid himself under a house 2 meters (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
away from an adjacent chapel. From there, he observed and he has personal
Sucro enter the chapel, taking something which turned knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart arrested has committed it; ―
found inside the chapel, and then return to the street
where he handed the same to a buyer. This was done
three times, and every transaction was reported by An offense is committed in the presence or within the
Fulgencio to his superior. view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
- Police officers then intercepted the 3rd buyer, who authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer
threw a tea bag containing marijuana to the ground. The sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
buyer admitted that he purchased the bag from disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to
Sucro. the scene thereof.
- Police then arrested Sucro and recovered 19 sticks PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the
chapel.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw

Issue: Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw Sucro
W/N the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to
and consequently, W/N the them and exchange some things. These, Sucro did
evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible. three times during the time that he was being
monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going
transaction to his superiors.
Held:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Held:

vs. ARMANDO DE LARA Y GALARO, accused-
appellant. YES, THE ARREST IS LEGAL
―Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace

officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person;
QUIASON, J.:
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
Facts: has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense…‖
- A buy-bust operation was conducted outside De Lara‘s PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
house to entrap De Lara, a suspected drug dealer.
During the transaction, De Lara sensed the presence of
police officers and so ran into his house. He was later
subdued by the police. Appellant was caught red-handed in delivering two tin
- De Lara denied having sold marijuana to anyone and foils of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer.
claimed that the arresting officers merely planted the Applying the aforementioned provision of law,
marijuana on his person. He claims that as he was appellant's arrest was lawfully effected without need
returnig home after fetching his son, he was arrested by of a warrant of arrest. "Having caught the appellant in
police who then proceeded to dearch his house without flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the
a warrant. policemen were not only authorized but were also under
obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a
warrant of arrest".
Issue:
W/N De Lara‘s arrest was legal.
W/N the seizure of prohibited drugs from inside his

house was legal. We also find as valid the seizure of the plastic bag of
prohibited drugs found inside appellant's house. The
seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs
was the result of appellant's arrest inside his
house. A contemporaneous search may be conducted

upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate
vicinity where the arrest was made.
Issue:
W/N Bohol‘s arrest, and the search on his person are
However, the photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill, legal.
the Receipt of Property Seized, and the booking sheet
are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there
was no showing that appellant was then assisted by Held:
counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing.
YES
Be that as it may, the rejection of said evidence would
not affect the conviction of appellant in view of the The arrest of Bohol is legal. The Constitution proscribes
abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt. unreasonable arrests and provides in the Bill of Rights
that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without
a valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority.
However, it is a settled exception to the rule that an
arrest made after an entrapment operation does not
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is
RICARDO BOHOL, considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113,
accused-appellant. QUISUMBING, J.: Facts: Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal
- Acting on information that Bohol was engaged in the Procedure:
illegal drug trade, police officers conducted a buy-bust
operation to entrap him. ―Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.–A peace
- P02 Estrada handed Bohol a marked P100 bill and officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
Bohol, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet containing a person:
white crystalline granules which p02 Estrada suspected
to be shabu. Police officers then emerged from their When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
hiding places and arrested has committed, is actually
Bohol. committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;‖
Considering the legality of Bohol‘s warrantless arrest,

the subsequent warrantless search that resulted in the Facts:
seizure of the shabu found in his person is likewise
valid. In a legitimate warrantless arrest, the arresting - a woman informant went to the polce station and
police officers are authorized to search and seize from reported that a certain ―Bella‖ would be receiving a
the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the shipment of illegal drugs that day at a certain address.
things which may be used as proof of the commission of Acting on the information, police went to the address to
the offense. The constitutional proscription against conduct a buy-bust operation.
warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain - They knocked on the door of the accused and
exceptions. This Court has ruled that the following pretended to buy marijuana. After an exchange of
instances constitute valid warrantless searches and P1000 in marked bills and a brick (1 kilo) of marijuana
seizures: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) was made, police arrested the accused and searched
search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation their house where they found even more bricks of mary
of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain jane.
view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his - The accused, live-in partners, maintain that they could
right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) not have committed the crimes charged in the
stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency informations because they were sleeping at the time
circumstances. said crimes were allegedly perpetrated. Consequently,
the search conducted by the police officers was not
incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest. The
confiscated contraband was, therefore, inadmissible in
evidence against them.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ENRIQUE HINDOY
and BELLA B. NEGROSA, accused-appellants. Issue:
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 W/N the arrest and search were legal.
Held:
YES
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
reasonable doubt the elements necessary to offense.
successfully prosecute a case for the illegal sale of a
prohibited drug, namely, (a) identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the things sold and the payment therefor.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee vs. LI YIN
CHU alias ROBERT LI, appellant.
CARPIO, J.:
It is true that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, ―The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search Facts:
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the - A man showed up at the PNP station at Camp Crame
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the and reported that Robert Li was engaged in illegal drug
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and activity in Metro Manila. The police then planned to
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 conduct a buy bust operation on the basis of the report.
- the informer called up appellant and made
arrangement for the purchase of five to ten kilos of
shabu to be delivered between 4 to 5 p.m. that same
particularly describing the place to be searched and the day (July 4,
persons or things to be seized.‖ It is equally true that 1999) in front of Iceberg Food House along Banawe
any evidence obtained in violation of such right shall be Street, Quezon City.
inadmissible in evidence. This right, however, is not - Around 5 o‘clock in the afternoon, appellant arrived on
without exceptions, as in instances of searches board a blue Honda Civic
incidental to lawful arrests. Under paragraph (a), car with plate number WBY 852. He was approached by
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a peace the informer and both conversed in Chinese since
officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in appellant could not speak English or Tagalog. The
his presence the person to be arrested has committed, informer then called SPO1 delos Santos, who was just
about two meters away, to approach. The informer
introduced SPO1 delos Santos as "Mr. Nueva" to

appellant. The informer told appellant that Mr. Nueva Appellant contends that the arresting officers merely
wanted to buy shabu. After shaking hands with SPO1 framed him up. The Court is aware that in drug-related
delos Santos, appellant opened the left rear door of the cases, frame-up and "hulidap" are common and
car and showed the shabu to SPO1 delos Santos by standard line of defenses. However, like alibi, frame-up
pointing to the plastic bag on top of the back seat of the is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. For this defense
car. SPO1 delos Santos opened the plastic bag and to prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and
saw a transparent self-sealing plastic bag inside. He convincing.11 In this case, appellant has gravely failed
removed the seal and felt the substance inside the bag to substantiate his allegations of a frame-up. Appellant‘s
with his fingers. Convinced that the substance inside the claim that the police merely planted the shabu deserves
self-sealing bag was shabu, he gave a pre-arranged scant consideration. It is incredible that the police
signal to SPO1 Pastrana, who immediately rushed to officers would plant a very large quantity of shabu when
the scene. SPO1 Pastrana and SPO1 delos Santos a few sticks of marijuana could have been used, with
identified themselves as police officers and placed great ease, to frame-up appellant. Records also show
appellant under arrest. With the informer doing the that appellant and the police officers are strangers to
interpretation in Chinese language, appellant was each other. Nothing in the records explains why the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 prosecution witnesses would fabricate their
testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious
crime.
informed of his constitutional rights. The police officers Appellant then harps on the poseur-buyer‘s failure to
thereafter confiscated the shabu and the Honda Civic present to appellant the buy- bust money in exchange
car. for the shabu. No law or rule of evidence requires the
simultaneous exchange of the buy-bust money and the
shabu. The well-entrenched principle is that the
Issue: accused commits the crime of illegal sale drugs as soon
W/N Bohol‘s arrest, and the search on his person are as he consummates the sale transaction, whether
legal. payment precedes or follows delivery of the drug sold.
Held:
YES
True, Delos Santos, as poseur buyer, failed to show buyer did not immediately arrest the suspect but
appellant the buy-bust money. However, Delos Santos returned to the station to make a report. It was only in
satisfactorily explained that he was unable to give the evening of the same day that the police, without a
appellant the buy-bust money because he immediately warrant, arrested the accused.
signaled Pastrana, his backup, to arrest appellant so
as "to evade any commotion or any armed back-up."
Delos Santos also testified that the buy-bust money,
consisting of genuine and boodle money, existed and Issue:
was at the car which he and the other police operatives W/N the arrest was legal.
Held:
boarded en route to Banawe Street. Therefore, while NO

the payment for the shabu sold was not simultaneous
with the delivery of the shabu, there was definitely A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed
money, both genuine and boodle, to pay for the sale of by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in
the shabu. flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in
flagrante delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer
must be caught redhanded in the act of selling
marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting or
posing as a buyer.
DON RODRIGUEZA, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by
the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification.
Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the
alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana
Facts: Another buy-bust operation with facts of similar leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released appellant
import to those of the immediately preceding cases. Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his
Except in this case, the police officer acting as poseur
custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo and Molina as they were riding on a ―trisikad‖ and
that the supposed sale of demanded that they open the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 black bag they were carrying.
- The bag was revealed to contain dried marijuana
leaves. Mula and Molina were
thereafter handcuffed. (note: Paguidopon and the police
marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the did not know Mula‘s
natural course of things and inconsistent with the name until after they were arrested)
aforestated purpose of a buy-bust operation. It is rather
absurd on his part to let appellant escape without
having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. Issue:
It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of the law. W/N Bohol‘s arrest, and the search on his person are
legal.
Held:
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and YES
GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY",
accused-appellants. to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
Facts: commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
- SP01 Paguidopon received information that a drug PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
pusher was in Davao. As Mula was passing by on his
motorcycle,t he informant pointed Mula out as the
alleged drug pusher to SP01 Paguidopon.
- The following month, SP01 Paguidopon received In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no
information that Mula would be passing through NHA, outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
Ma- a, Davao City. Paguidopon then intercepted Mula holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants
could not be said to be committing, attempting to
commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that

accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible
we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to
open the bag. Such response which allegedly Accused are therefore acquitted.
reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers
that accused- appellants were committing a crime, is an
equivocal statement which standing alone will not
constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto
arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but
merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting
officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of People v Francisco Antinero Beriarmente
any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
25 September 2001
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants
waived their right against unreasonable searches and Ynares-Santiago, J.
seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
Facts: Sinarlo was the poseur-buyer while Francisco

Antinero was the target in a buy-bust operation.
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused- Together they rode in a tricycle to one Boy Bebelone‘s
appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by house followed by policemen. In front of Boy
the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person Bebelone's house, accused Beriarmente handed over to
was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized Randy Sinarlo a straw sack that Beriarmente had picked
by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence up from a house along Sawang Street. As soon as the
against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left policemen saw the sack change hands, they arrested
with no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants. accused Beriarmente. They examined the contents of
the sack and concluded that it contained marijuana
plants, prompting them to confiscate the same. They

then brought accused Beriarmente to the police station.
Issue:
W/N guilt of the accused sufficiently established.

The prosecution witnesses identified accused Francisco
Beriarmente in open court as the person who sold and
handed over the sack of marijuana plants to witness
Randy Sinarlo. The latter also identified the sack and its Held/Ratio: YES. There is no question that the buy-bust
contents, which SPO2 operation conducted by the police in the case at bar
Caballero had placed inside a plastic container, as was proper. There is no showing of irregularity in the
the very same sack and marijuana plants that the conduct of the same. Consequently, the arrest of
accused sold and gave to him. accused-appellant, though warrantless, falls squarely
under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court,
which provides that a peace officer or private person
may make an arrest, without a warrant, when the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
The version of the accused: he was instructed to get a committing, or
sack along Sawang Street and to deliver said sack to is attempting to commit an offense, in his presence. The
the NFA Milling. He and Randy Sinarlo then rode a accused-appellant was caught inflagrante delicto as a
tricycle and he fetched the sack from Rosita as result of a buy-bust operation conducted by the police
instructed. Without knowing the contents of the sack, he on the basis of information received from a police asset
gave the same to Randy Sinarlo. On the way to the NFA that the accused- appellant was looking for a buyer. His
area, they were intercepted by the police and he was arrest, therefore, was lawful and the sack of marijuana
arrested, while Randy Sinarlo was not apprehended. He plants confiscated from him were admissible in
was brought to the municipal building where the police evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
tried to interrogate him. However, since the lawyer they
assigned to him did not show up, the investigation did
not push through. Thereafter, he was incarcerated in the
municipal jail.
Accused: there was no trial buy-bust operation because:
(1) there was no trial buy- bust operation to validate the
suspicion that accused was really engaged in the sale

of illegal drugs; (2) the poseur-buyer used his own
money to purchase the marijuana plants, not marked There is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-
money; and (3) no marked money was presented as bust operations. It is of judicial notice that drug pushers
evidence in court. sell their wares to any prospective customer, stranger or
not, in both public or private places, with no regard for
time.
In the prosecution for the sale of illegal drugs, what is

important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the
goods from the accused-appellant and the same was People v Antonio Enrile
presented as evidence in court. Neither is there a rule of
law which requires that there must be a simultaneous Cruz, J. Facts:
exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug The buy-bust plan was made on the strength of a tip
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher. given by Renato Polines, a police informer, who was
himself to pose as the buyer.
There is also no rule that requires the police to use only

marked money in buy-bust operations. In fact, this Court Prosecution witnesses (2 policemen) allege that on the
has ruled that the failure to use marked money or to occasion they saw Polines hand over to accused
present it in evidence is not material since the sale Abugatal the marked money representing payment for
cannot be essentially disproved by the absence thereof. the mock transaction. Abugatal left with the money and
The non-presentation of the marked money does not returned ten minutes later with a wrapped object which
create he gave Polines. The two policemen then approached
a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as Abugatal and placed him under arrest, at the same time
the sale of the illegal drugs is confiscating the wrapped object. Subsequent laboratory
adequately established and the substance itself is examination revealed this to be marijuana with flowering
presented before the court. tops weighing 22 grams.
W/N Enrile’s guilt established beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution also showed that, upon providing
Abugatal led the policemen to a house at 20 De Vera
Street, also in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City,
where he called out for Antonio Enrile. Enrile came out
and met them at the gate. Abugatal pointed to Enrile as Held/Ratio: NO.
the source of the marijuana, whereupon the policemen Re credence of Abugatal’s sworn statement.
immediately arrested and frisked him. They found in the
right front pocket of his trousers the marked money It was made without compliance with the requisites of a
earlier delivered to Abugatal. custodial investigation, including the right to the
assistance of counsel. The confession was clearly
inadmissible. It was not enough then to inform the
suspect of his constitutional rights. The trial court had to
ascertain for itself that the accused clearly understood
At the police headquarters, Abugatal signed a sworn the import and consequences of his confession and had
confession affirming the above narration. Enrile refused the intelligence and mental capacity to do so. There is
to make any statement pending consultation with a no showing in the record that this was done, short of the
lawyer. statement in the decision that Abugatal had been
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 informed of his rights and had validly waived the
assistance of counsel.
In his defense, Enrile testified that the marked money

was "planted" on him by the police officers, who he said
simply barged into his house without a warrant and If the sworn statement of Abugatal was inadmissible
arrested him. He stoutly denied any knowledge of the against him, much less was it admissible against Enrile.
marijuana.
Re warrantless arrest
Issue:
Under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, a

peace officer or a private person may make a According to the policemen themselves, what happened
warrantless arrest only under any of the following was that they asked Abugatal who gave him the
circumstances : marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this
reason that they proceeded to Enrile's house and
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested immediately arrested him.
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;.
What the policemen should have done was secure a

search warrant on the basis of the information supplied
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, by Abugatal, and then, with such authority, proceeded
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest Enrile.
the person to be arrested has committed it; and. They had no right to simply force themselves into his
house on the bare (and subsequently disallowed)
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who allegations of Abugatal and bundle Enrile off to the
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where police station as if he had been caught in flagrante
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined delicto.
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
The discovery of the marked money on him did not

mean he was caught in the act of selling marijuana. The
Paragraphs (a) and (b) are clearly inapplicable. marked money was not prohibited per se. Even if it
Paragraph (b) is also not in point because the were, that fact alone would not retroactively validate the
policemen who later arrested Enrile at his house had no warrantless search and seizure.
personal knowledge that he was the source of
marijuana.
People v Joselito del Rosario

Belosillo, J.
Facts: Joselito del Rosario et al. were charged with the police station. The investigator took the statement
special complex crime of of the accused on May
Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia 14,1996, and was only subscribed on May 22,1996. All
Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 the while, he was detained in the police station as
in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 on May 16, 1996. He also executed a waiver of his
detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the
assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera
shot and killed her. Joselito was the alleged driver of the
getaway tricycle involved in the incident.
Joselito: contends that the lower court erred in: (1) Not
finding the presence of threat and irresistible force
employed upon him by his co-accused; (2) Not
Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, the considering his defense that he was not part of the
police proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the conspiracy among co-accused; (3) Not considering the
barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was violations on his constitutional rights as an accused;
summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and, (4) Not considering that there was no lawful
and was invited for interview. The driver was accused warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule
Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to name his 113, of the Rules of Court.
passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police
station, accused informed them of the bag and lunch
kit's location and the place where the holduppers may
be found and they reported these findings to their
officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they Issue: W/N Del Rosario’s arrest proper.
proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed
men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00
to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter,
they went inside the house where they found Marquez
dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these Held/Ratio:
were happening, accused del Rosario was at the back PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
of the school, after which they went back to
act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the

purview of the rule since he was arrested on the day
NO. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides: following the commission of the robbery with homicide.
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113,
has in fact been committed and he has personal necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense
arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to has just been committed; and (2) the person making the
be arrested arrest has personal
is a prisoner who has escaped from penal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
establishment or place where he is serving final arrested had committed
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is it. Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from between the time the offense was committed and the
one confinement to another. time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable
lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of
the crime, a warrant of
arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of
immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain
SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the place of facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody
"Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. The has committed the crime. Again, the arrest of del
SC has previously held that when a police officer sees Rosario does not comply with these requirements since,
the offense, although at a distance, or hears the as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the
disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to consummation of the crime and not immediately
the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just
warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, since committed" at the time the accused was arrested.
the offense is deemed committed in his presence or Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal
within his view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto arrested had committed the
or caught immediately after the consummation of the PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Prosecution: At about 3:30 in the morning the desk

officer of the Cavite City police station, received a
telephone call that a person had been shot near the
offense since they were not present and were not actual cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio,
eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of Cavite City. For this reason, a police team responded
his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only to the call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead
during the custodial investigation. on his tricycle which was then parked on the road. A
tricycle driver told the police that accused and the victim
However the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's were last seen together coming out of the Sting Café
arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court a quo about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene.
because even in instances not allowed by law, a Forthwith the police interviewed people at the café.
warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any They found out from a tricycle driver where he lived so
objection thereto is waived when the person arrested they proceeded there. The policemen knocked on the
submits to arraignment without any objection, as in this door for about three minutes before it was opened by a
case. man who answered the description given by the tricycle
driver and who turned out to be the accused. The police
operatives identified themselves and informed him that
he was being sought in connection with the shooting
near the cemetery.
People v Fidel Cubcubin PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Mendoza, J.
Facts: The accused, armed with an unlicensed Accused-appellant denied involvement in the
homemade (paltik) Smith and Wesson caliber .38 incident. The police asked permission to enter and
revolver, with no serial number shot Henry Piamonte, look around the house. He was brought to the Sting
hitting and inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in Cafe for purposes of identification. There, he was
the head which caused the latter‘s instantaneous death. positively identified as the victim‘s companion. The
police investigators asked accused-appellant where the
fatal gun was. But he refused to tell them so his
permission was sought to go back to his house to
conduct a further search. They later found the gun. The
accused was then taken to the police station, where he
was photographed along with the things seized from indicating that accused- appellant had committed the
him. crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from
which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant
was probably guilty was based entirely on what they
had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called
the PNP station; by an alleged witness who saw
Issue: accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the
Sting Cafe; by the waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said
W/N arrest proper. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
that the man last seen with the victim was lean,
Held/Ratio: NO. mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a
Under ROC113 §5(b), two conditions must concur for a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a
warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just tricycle driver who told them that the physical
committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace description given by the waitress fitted accused-
officer or private person has personal knowledge of appellant and who said he knew where accused-
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has appellant lived and accompanied them to accused-
committed it. It has been held that ―‗personal appellant‘s house. Thus, they merely relied on
knowledge of facts‘ in arrests without a warrant must be information given to them by others.
based upon probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.‖
Nor can it be argued that the arresting officers had

probable cause to believe accused-appellant to be guilty
In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was of the killing of the victim because they found a
effected shortly after the victim was killed. The bloodstained t-shirt, a .38 caliber revolver, and two
question, therefore, is whether there was ―probable spent .38 caliber shells in his house. At the time
cause‖ for the arresting officers to believe that accused- accused-appellant was arrested, he was not doing
appellant committed the crime. There was none. The anything overtly criminal. The alleged discovery
two did not have ―personal knowledge of facts‖ of the gun came after his arrest. Moreover, as
will presently be explained, the objects allegedly seized

from accused-appellant were illegally obtained without a
search warrant. The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant
who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of
the house and they introduced themselves as
policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and
found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried
People v Gabriel Gerente leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were
sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for
Grino-Aquino, J. 10 March 1993 examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be
marijuana.
Facts: Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police

Station received a report from the Palo Police Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended
Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy
Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was Echigoren, are still at large.
brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that
the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was
massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and
heavy object. Right away,
Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Issue:
Lima and Patrolman Alex
Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling W/N the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana
incident took place. There they found a piece of wood leaves as evidence in violation of his constitutional right
with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the
marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the
witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers.
and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three
men who killed Clarito.
Held/Ratio: to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes,

reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed
NO. The search of appellant's person and the seizure her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under
of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid those circumstances, since the policemen had personal
because they were incident to a lawful warrantless knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts
arrest. indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him,
they
ROC 113.5 provides: Arrest without warrant; when could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they
lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
without a warrant, arrest a person: warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, The search conducted on Gerente's person was
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .' valid arrest. ROC113.12 provides: Search incident to
lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant."
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3)
hours after Gerente and his companions had killed The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
they arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 who is about to be arrested may be armed and might
attack them unless he is first disarmed.
inspected the scene of the crime, they found the

instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete
hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him
waist. Burdeos promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua

and warned him not to move. He then frisked Cadua
Edwin Cadua v Court of Appeals and found in his possession a .38 caliber ―paltik‖
revolver. PO3
Quisumbing, J. 19 August 1999 Reynoso Bacnat then apprehended Cadua‘s
companion, who was later identified as
Joselito Aguilar. In Aguilar‘s possession was found a
fan knife.
Facts: The police were dispatched to where a mother

and daughter were allegedly held up and in need of
police assistance. At the address given, the police found
the complainants who stated that the alleged Issue:
holduppers had just fled. Then, the police officers
requested the complainants to board the patrol unit in W/N Cadua’s his right to be protected from any unlawful
order to facilitate the search. As they were patrolling warrantless arrest
around the area, complainants informed the police has been violated.
officers that one of the suspects was dressed in jeans
and a t-shirt while the other was dressed in a black top
and black pants. The police officers then noticed two
(2) men walking alongside the street and as the officers
slowed down the mobile Held/Ratio:
NO. Through police dispatch to the scene of a crime
report and in the presence of complainants, it was
ascertained that a robbery had just been committed,
unit to get a closer look, the complainants identified the and the arresting officers had personal knowledge that
men as the alleged holduppers, one of which is the petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect. As
petitioner in this case. The police officers slowed down explained by a respected authority on criminal
to a stop, alighted from the vehicle, and called out to the procedure:
suspects. As Burdeos was approaching the suspects,
he noticed that petitioner Cadua was about to pull
something which was tucked at the right side of his
apparent. Good people do not ordinarily lurk about the

―It has been ruled that ‗personal knowledge of facts‘, streets and uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens
in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable must be protected from annoyance and
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable crime. Prevention of crime is just as commendatory as
grounds of suspicion. . . . Peace officers may pursue the capture of
and arrest without warrant any person found in criminals. Surely the officer must not be forced to await
suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances the commission of robbery or other felony. The rule is
reasonably tending to show that such person has supported by the necessities of life.‖
committed, or is about to commit, any crime or breach
of the peace. Probable cause for an arrest without
warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing The incidental search and subsequent seizure of the
the accused to be guilty. Besides reasonable ground of unlicensed firearm in question is likewise lawful and
suspicion, action in good faith is another protective valid pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
bulwark for the officer. Under such conditions, even if Court, to wit:
the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the
peace officer is not liable. The cases hold that a peace
officer might arrest and detain in prison for examination
persons
walking in the street at night whom there is reasonable ―Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. - A person
ground to suspect of felony, lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.‖
although there is no proof of a felony having been

committed; but the arrest would be illegal if the person
so arrested was innocent and there were no reasonable Noteworthy, among the exceptions to the necessity for a
grounds of suspicion to mislead the officer. The reason search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an
of the rule is incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be
made either while a crime is actually being committed,
or soon after its
commission. The right to search includes in these

instances that of searching the person of one who is
arrested, in order to find and seize things connected Facts:The accused was arrested upon an informer‘s tip
with the crime as its fruits or as the means for its that appellant was one of
commission. the suspects in the killing of three persons some weeks
before in Quiapo, Manila.
When petitioner was searched contemporaneously with

the arrest, the ―paltik‖ was found in his possession, Responding to the information, Sub-station Commander
and seized. Such seizure cannot be considered Jaime Ortega, PO3
unlawful nor unreasonable. Moreover, at that moment Liquido Delgado, Mario Montes and SPO4 Oscar V.
of search and seizure, there was in the mind of the Clemente proceeded to the Muslim area where they
arresting officer more than a mere suspicion that saw several persons conversing at the corner of
petitioner was Elizondo St.. One of said persons had a suspicious
armed. Petitioner‘s movements clearly suggested the bulge in his stomach, and when frisked, a
presence of a weapon tucked at the side of his waist. .45 cal. pistol with an extended magazine and six (6)
The fact that Burdeos made an immediate draw for his live bullets was recovered
service revolver was an instinctive response to from the center front of his waist line. Major Ortega took
petitioner‘s actions which, under the gun and brought appellant to the sub-station. SPO4
the circumstances, indicated a high probability of an Redolfin Coloma notified SPO3 Jaime D. Mendoza of
offensive attack with a lethal weapon. the WPD Homicide Division to take custody of the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 appellant. That same day, SPO3 Mendoza received the
person of the accused and the subject firearm for
safekeeping.
People v Datukon Bansil

Issue:
10 March 1999 Quisumbing, J.

W/N the testimony of the prosecution’s witness was

sufficient.
While a police officer is not expected to remember every
single detail regarding the arrest, he is supposed to
remember the important details relating to the
commission of the crime, most especially when such
Held/Ratio: incident occurred in his presence and with his active
involvement. Further, no seizure receipt was issued by
NO. The testimony of SPO4 Clemente is full of the arresting team for the gun, if indeed it was taken
inconsistencies on material points, such as how the from the accused. Receipts for seized items are
arresting team was able to single out appellant as the mandatory on the part of apprehending and seizing
suspect, and among them who actually recovered the police officers.
firearm from appellant. Initially, SPO4
Clemente testified that they were able to identify
appellant because the informant told the desk officer the
attire of the accused, yet upon further questioning, he
could not even remember the supposed attire of the While the trial court found that appellant was lawfully
appellant used in identifying arrested without a warrant since he was actually
the latter at the time of arrest. Further, on direct committing a crime in the presence of a peace officer
examination, SPO4 Clemente initially testified that he under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
was the one who recovered the subject firearm from the Criminal Procedure based on the informant‘s tip and the
appellant; however, on cross-examination, he testified ―bulging waistline‖ of the appellant, we find that there
that it was actually another operative whose name he was no probable cause for the arrest of the appellant.
can no longer recall who recovered the firearm from the The arresting team was only armed with the knowledge
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 of the suspect‘s ―attire‖ which the prosecution witness
admitted during trial he cannot even remember. The
team did not have a physical description of the suspect
nor his name. They were not even given a specific place
appellant. Considering that there were only four within which to target their search of the suspect, only a
members of the arresting team, including himself, his vicinity of the Muslim
memory lapses renders his credibility suspect. Area in Quiapo, near the Muslim Mosque. Yet the
arresting team directly zeroed in on the accused and his
companions who were only eating halo-halo at a small
restaurant, surely not a crime in itself. While SPO4 Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the
Clemente claims that accused Sigma Rho Fraternity.
had a ―bulging waistline‖, this alone, in the light of the
availing circumstances, is insufficient to constitute
probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario

Torres-Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor,
counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that
Roger Posadas, et al. v Ombudsman the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them.
Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the
suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As a result of
their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested
by the NBI agents on that day. However, criminal
Mendoza, J. 29 September 2000 charges were filed later against the two student
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 suspects.
Facts: UP Diliman Chancellor Posadas asked the

assistance of the NBI I determining the persons Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special
responsible for the killing of Dennis Venturina in a frat Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu,
rumble in 1994. Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security
Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with
violation of P.D.
1829, which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the
apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.
The NBI, on the basis of the supposed positive
identification of two alleged eyewitnesses attempted to
arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as
suspects in the killing of Venturina. It appears that the Issue:
two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police
Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by

the NBI could be validly made without a warrant.
There is no question that this case does not fall under

paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this
Held/Ratio: case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who
had escaped from confinement. The question is whether
paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been
committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge
NO. In view of Art. III, §2 of the Constitution, the rule is of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan were
that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a probably guilty.
warrant issued by a judge after examining the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and
after finding probable cause to believe that the person
to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions
when an arrest may be made even without a warrant Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal
are provided ROC113.5: knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course of
their investigation indicating that the students sought to
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested be arrested were the perpetrators of the crime. The NBI
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and
to commit an offense; Taparan four days after the commission of the crime.
They had no personal knowledge of any fact which
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, might indicate that the two students were probably guilty
and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive
that the person to be arrested has committed it; identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is
insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who NBI.
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a

warrant under ROC113.5 must be based upon
"probable cause" which means an "actual belief or
reasonable grounds To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant
the courts. The determination of the existence of
probable cause that the persons to be arrested
committed the crime was for the judge to make. The law
of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on leave to the police officers the determination of whom to
actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties. This is
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of evident from a consideration of the requirements before
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable a judge can order the arrest of suspects.
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.
People v Peralta, et al. Panganiban, J. 30 March 2004

Facts: On November 4, 1992, Pedro Labita of Central
Bank of the Philippines (now BSP) went to the Theft and
Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these Robbery Section of Western Police District Command
agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime. (WPDC), and filed a complaint for Qualified Theft
When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to against Santiago
arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
committing a crime nor were they doing anything that
would create the suspicion that they were doing
anything illegal. On the contrary, Taparan and Narag,
under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr., Ulysses Garcia, Miguelito
part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence de Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola.
on the campus.
statements admitting his guilt and participation in the

crime charged. He also identified the other named
Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel, the accused as his cohorts and accomplices and narrated
investigating officer at WPDC, punctured currency notes the participation of each and everyone of them.
in P100.00 and P500.00 bills with a face value of
Php194,190.00. Said notes were allegedly recovered
by the BSP Cash Department during its cash counting
of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks
to the latter. The punctured bills were rejected by the On the basis of Garcia‘s sworn statements, the other
BSP money counter machine and were later submitted named accused were invited for questioning at the
to the investigation staff of the BSP Cash Department. police station and were subsequently charged with
As a result of the investigation, it was determined that qualified theft together with Garcia.
said rejected currency bills were actually punctured PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
notes already due for
shredding. These currency bills were punctured
because they were no longer intended for circulation.
Before these notes could be shredded, they were stolen Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated
from the BSP by the above-named accused. currency notes allegedly confiscated from Garcia after
his arrest were ―fruits of the poisonous tree‖ and,
hence, inadmissible in evidence.
On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita,

Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in front of Golden
Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City, while he was waiting The solicitor general evades the issue and argues,
for a passenger bus on his way to the BSP. Garcia was instead, that appellants waived the illegality of their
brought to the police station for investigation. arrest when they entered a plea. He further contends
that the exclusion from the evidence of the three
punctured currency bills would not alter the findings of
the trial court.
Issue: W/N illegality of arrest waived. Held/Ratio:
On November 4, 5 and 6, 1992, while in the custody of
the police officers, Garcia gave three separate YES.
circumstances: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest,

(2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) search of a
moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop and
frisk situations, and (6) consented search.
The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he
had merely been waiting for a passenger bus after
being pointed out by the Cash Department personnel of
the BSP. At the time of his arrest, he had not
committed, was not committing, and was not about to Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that
commit any crime. Neither was he acting in a manner the subsequent search was similarly illegal. Any
that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
that he was committing a crime. None of the provision is legally inadmissible in evidence under the
circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant exclusionary rule. In the present case, the perforated
under Section 5 of Rule P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of a
113 of the Rules of Court was present. search made without a warrant subsequent to an
unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in
evidence.
Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless,

not having raised the matter before entering his plea, he
is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Moreover, untenable is the solicitor general‘s argument
Note, however, that this waiver is limited to the arrest. It that Appellants De Leon, Flores and Loyola waived the
does not extend to the search made as an incident illegality of the arrest and seizure when, without raising
thereto or to the subsequent seizure of evidence objections thereto, they entered a plea of guilty. It was
allegedly found during the search. Garcia who was unlawfully arrested and searched, not
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 the aforementioned three appellants. The legality of an
arrest can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby. Objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal, and third parties
The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and cannot avail themselves of it.
seizures of whatever nature. Without a judicial warrant,
these are allowed only under the following exceptional
further reinvestigation of the cases. But the City Fiscal

did not. On the other hand the Fiscal appeared at the
Callanta v Villanueva proceedings to prosecute the petitioner, indicating that
he was in agreement with the complaint already filed
Fernando, J. 20 June 1977

After the issuance of the warrants of arrest with the bail
fixed in the amount of P600.00, petitioner posted such
required bail bonds, thus obtaining her provisional
liberty.
Facts: Judge Villanueva denied the motions to quash
the two complaints for grave oral defamation against
petitioner and thus issued the warrants of arrest. The
warrants are being contested on the ground that it
should have been the City Fiscal who should have Issue:
conducted the preliminary examination.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 May the petitioner question validity of arrest.
Petitioner: After conducting his preliminary examination

and after acquiring jurisdiction over the petitioner the Held/Ratio:
respondent Court referred the complaints to the City
Fiscal. So that on March 4, 1965, the arraignment and NO. [BUT take note of ROC114.26]
hearing of the cases were postponed because the City
Fiscal was investigating them. It may also be noted that
at the proceedings in said criminal cases on April 20,
1965, the Fiscal entered his appearance for the
government and manifested that he was ready for trial. With the express admission by petitioner that she had
If the Fiscal did not agree with the Judge in the latter's posted the required bail to obtain her provisional liberty,
investigation of the case, he would have asked for a it becomes futile to assail the validity of the issuance of
the warrants of arrest. Zacarias v Cruz: Posting of a bail

bond constitutes waiver of any irregularity attending the
arrest of a person, stop him from discussing the validity Puno, J.
of his arrest. Luna v Plaza: where petitioner has filed an
application for Facts: September- the police were to carry out the
bail and waived the preliminary investigation proper, he arrest of Larranaga (in connection with the Chiong
waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the sisters murder case) but his counsel remonstrated
preliminary examination conducted... prior to the against the warrantless arrest so the police were not
issuance of the warrant of arrest. able to arrest him. His counsel, Atty. Armovit, assured
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 that he would bring Larranaga for preliminary
investigation.
Atty. Armovit attended the preliminary investigation

At any rate, it cannot be denied that the City Fiscal of conducted by the Office of the City State Prosecutor of
Dagupan City had been quite active in the investigation Cebu. Forthwith, he moved that his client be given a
and thereafter in the prosecution of petitioner. The regular preliminary investigation. The motion was
matter was referred to his office. It was he who denied by the city prosecutor on the ground that
appeared at the hearing and Larranaga should be treated as a detention prisoner,
manifested his readiness to proceed with the trial. It hence entitled only to an inquest investigation. Atty.
would be then to pay an undue premium to Armovit was ordered to present Larranaga in person.
technicalities to assert that under such circumstances He was warned that his failure would be treated as
the procedural requisite, assuming that the contention of waiver of his client‘s right to a preliminary investigation
petitioner is correct, of such official conducting the and he would be proceeded against pursuant to section
preliminary examination was not in fact complied with. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Atty. Armovit‘s verbal
motion for reconsideration was denied by the city
prosecutor.
Francisco Juan Larranaga v CA, supra

Larranaga‘s effort to stop the filing of a criminal

information against him failed. It turned out that on
September 17, 1997 the said prosecutors had filed an Held/Ratio:
information with the RTC of Cebu charging Larranaga NO. The records do not show that petitioner was
with kidnapping and "lawfully arrested‖. For one, the
serious illegal detention. The prosecutors petitioner was not arrested on September 15, 1997, as
recommended no bail. his counsel persuaded the arresting officers that he
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 would instead be presented in the preliminary
investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on
September 17, 1997. For another,
the arresting officers had no legal authority to make a
warrantless arrest of the petitioner for a crime
committed some two (2) months before
On September 22, 1997, counsel filed a Supplemental

Petition with the CA impleading the RTC to prevent
petitioner‘s arrest. The move again proved fruitless as
Larranaga was arrested on the night of September 22, It then follows that the right of petitioner to a regular
1997 by virtue of a preliminary investigation pursuant to section 3 of Rule
warrant of arrest issued by the Executive Judge of the 112 cannot stand any
RTC of Cebu City. A second Supplemental Petition was diminution. Petitioner, a minor, is charged with a capital
filed by Larranaga‘s counsel in the Court of Appeals offense – kidnapping and
bringing to its attention the arrest of Larranaga. CA serious illegal detention. Its filing in court means his
denied petitions. arrest and incarceration as in all probability he would
not be allowed bail. His conviction will bring him face to
face with the death penalty. Thus, petitioner‘s counsel
was far from being unreasonable when he demanded
from the city prosecutors that he be furnished copies of
Issue: the affidavits supporting the complaint and that he be
given a non- extendible period of twenty (20) days to
W/N Larranaga was lawfully arrested. submit defense affidavit. As well pointed of his motion
―x x x prevented petitioner from preparing and
submitting the affidavits of some forty (40) classmates,
teachers, proctors and security guards who had G.

previously made known their willingness to testify. BJ
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 130 - last case; De
Garcia v Locsin
131 - 3
cases
Fairness dictates that the request of petitioner for a 132 - 2
chance to be heard in a capital offense case should cases
have been granted by the Cebu City prosecutor. Webb 133 -3
vs. de Leon: that ―attuned to the times, our Rules have cases
discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary 134 - 1 case ( Veroy v Layague)
investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-
judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by
one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. As this
Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals,
‗the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted MANALILI v. CA
before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense
and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some Facts: Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas
other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is were patrolling the vicinity of the Kalookan City
a substantive right.‘ A preliminary investigation should Cemetery due to reports of drug addicts roaming the
therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the area. They chanced upon a male (who turned out to be
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon) who seemed to be
be protected from any material damage.‖ ´highµ on drugs in front of the cemetery. He was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a
swaying manner. When Manalili tried to avoid the
policemen, the latter approached him and asked what
he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried to resist, but
the policemen were persistent until he yielded his wallet
which they examined and found to contain crushed
8. WARRANTLESS ARREST marijuana residue. Further examination by the Forensic
Chemistry Section of the NBI confirmed the
In the cited cases, the search and seizure may be made

only with probable cause as essential requirement.
findings. Trial court convicted Manalili of violation of Probable cause (in relation to search and seizure):
Section 8, Article II, of RA Existence of such facts and circumstances which could
6425. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
decision of the trial court.(In his defense, Manalili that an offense has been committed and that the item,
claimed that he was not walking; that he was riding a article, or object sought in connection with said offense
tricycle until the three policemen ordered the driver of or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the
the tricycle to stop because the driver and passenger place to be searched. A stop-and-frisk operation is
were allegedly under the influence of marijuana. He another exception to the general rule. In this case,
claimed that he was searched and his pants were probable cause was established with Manalili·s
turned inside-out but nothing was found. To some suspicious behaviour.
extent he implied that the marijuana sample found in his PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
entity was framed up by the policemen.)
Issue: W/N the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk

operation is admissible. Held: Yes
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be
validated by a previously secured judicial warrant.
However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been
contemplated by the law:
1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest PEOPLE v. SY CHUA
2. Search of moving vehicles
3. Seizure in plain view

Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged
4. Customs search with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as
amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of
5. Waiver by the accused themselves of their right Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two
against unreasonable search and seizure. separate Informations.
scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col.

Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito,
Angeles City.
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
their confidential informant that accused-appellant was
about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn
Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief
formed a team of operatives. The group positioned The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal
themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him for Illegal
Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this
their back up. appeal to the Court.
Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by Held:

accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near
the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant The arrest of accused-appellant was unlawful.
alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box,
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him The trial court confused the concepts of a ―stop-
and introduced themselves as police officers. As and-frisk‖ and of a search incidental to a lawful
accused- appellant pulled out his wallet, a small arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in
transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may
protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded
twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from
his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into
the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained
a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest- precedent arrest determines the validity of the
O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
bullets and the car used by accused- appellant. SPO2 questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as
Nulud and the other police operatives who arrived at the a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the
law requires that there first be arrest before a search of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes
can be made— the process cannot be reversed. of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute preservation which permit the police officer to take steps
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; not armed with a deadly weapon that could
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
the view of the arresting officer. officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police
case at bar. Accused- appellant did not act in a officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him,
suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also
was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has be emphasized that a search and seizure should
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The
to commit a crime. ―Reliable information‖ alone, foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested
in the presence and within the view of the arresting before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal
officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause items found in his possession. The apprehending police
that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 appellant‘s business in the vicinity or the contents of the
Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending
police officers only introduced themselves when they
already had custody of accused-appellant.
With regard to the concept of ―stop-and frisk‖: mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a ―stop-and-
frisk‖. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer‘s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a ―stop-and- ―stop and frisk‖ principles is applicable to justify the
frisk‖ serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation
made by the police operatives on accused-appellant. grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line.
Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,

apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber
revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were
MALACAT v. CA then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an
"X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter
gave it to his commander. The trial court then ruled that
the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental
to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily
Facts: In response to bomb threats reported seven days admitted such fact to the police investigator for the
earlier, Police officer Yu and company were on foot purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store,"
patrol (all of them in uniform) along Quezon concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 petitioner'sguilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: W/N there was a valid warrantless arrest. Held:

The arrest and search of petitioner were invalid.
Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store
at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the
Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of concepts of a "stop-and- frisk" and of a search
three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of
of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
These men were acting suspiciously with "their eyes. . . quantum of proof before they may be validly effected
moving very fast." Yu and his companions and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a
positioned themselves at strategic points and lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
police officers then approached one group of men, who is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave whether
chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Facts: Executive Judge Romulo Estrada of the Regional

Trial Court of Zambales issued a warrant for the
conduct of a search and seizure in the residence of
an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a appellant.
search. In this instance, the law requires that there first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made ³ the
process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a
valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person
of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may On their way to Purok Yakal, SPO1 Buloron saw
reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and appellant sitting on a rocking chair located about two (2)
seize any money or property found which was used in meters away from a hut owned by Narding Estella,
the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or brother of appellant, and being rented by appellant‘s
that which may be used as evidence, or which might live-in partner, named Eva. They approached appellant
furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or and introduced themselves as police officers. They
committing violence. Here, there could have been no showed appellant the search warrant and explained the
valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding contents to him. SPO1
the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on Buloron asked appellant if indeed he had in his
the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical possession prohibited drug and if
act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had so, to surrender the same so he would deserve a lesser
just been committed, was being committed or was going penalty.
to be committed.
While inside the hut, appellant surrendered to the team
two cans containing dried marijuana fruiting tops. One
can contained twenty (20) bricks of fruiting tops. The
team searched the hut in the presence of appellant and
his live-in partner.
PEOPLE v. ESTELLA
They found a plastic container under the kitchen table,

which contained four (4) big bricks of dried marijuana
leaves and a .38 caliber revolver with four live
ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited drug, the blue cloth. He then informed the officers of 2 other
revolver and ammunitions. The team seized and signed persons who would be making marijuana deliveries.
a receipt for the seized items and arrested appellant.
The police officers then proceeded to where Nuevas

Held: said his associates, Reynaldo Din and Fernando
Inocencio, could be located. Din was carrying a plastic
The Constitution bars the admission of evidence bag which contained marijuana packed in newspaper
gathered in violation of the right against unreasonable and wrapped therein. When the police officers
search and seizure. In the present case, the illegal drug introduced themselves, Din voluntarily handed the
was searched for and found in a hut that has not been plastic bag over to them. After the items were
proven to be owned, controlled, or used by appellant for confiscated, the police officers took the three men to the
residential or any other purpose. Hence, he cannot be police office.
held guilty of illegal possession of the illegal drug found PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
therein.
Police officer Fami then revealed that when the receipt

of the evidence was prepared, all 3 accused were not
represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed that he
was the one who escorted all the accused during their
physical examination. He also escorted all 3 to the
PEOPLE v. NUEVAS Fiscal‘s office where they were informed of the charges
against them.
Facts: Police officers Fami and Cabling, during a
stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug
trafficking in Olongapo City, came across Jesus
Nuevas, who they suspected to be carrying drugs. Upon
inquiry, Nuevas showed them a plastic bag which Issue: W/N Din and Inocencio waived their right against
contained marijuana leaves and bricks wrapped in a unreasonable searches and seizures.
illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to

show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the
contents of the bag and that he conspired with Din to
Held: possess the illegal items.
NO. The search conducted in Nuevas‘ case was made
with his consent. However, in Din‘s case, there was
none. There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed
willingly submitted the plastic bag with the incriminating
contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in his
desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any
criminal liability, he cooperated with the police, gave
them the plastic bag, and even revealed his associates,
offering himself as an informant. His actuations were
consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find PEOPLE v. MONTILLA
excuses, blame others, and save oneself even at the
cost of others‘ lives. Thus, the Court would have
affirmed Nuevas‘ conviction had he not withdrawn his
appeal. On the other hand, with respect to the search
conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no Facts: Police officers Talingting and Clarin were
such consent had actually been given. The police informed by an asset that a drug courier would be
officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies arriving from Baguio to Dasmariňas carrying an
regarding the manner by which they got hold of undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the
the plastic bag. Neither can Din‘s silence at the time be informant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was
construed as an implied acquiescence to the waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmariňas.
warrantless search. Thus, the prosecution failed to Montilla was then apprehended and he was caught in
clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right possession of a bag and a carton worth
against unreasonable searches. On the other hand, 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and
Inocencio‘s supposed possession of the dried marijuana he said he came to Cavite
leaves was sought to be shown through his act of from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects
looking into the plastic bag that Din was carrying. The with him at that time except for some pocket money. He
act attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the
illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was
no warrant and that he should have been given the there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay
opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the ―early
if the informant has given the cops the information about morning‖ of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the
his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, policemen were not pressed for time, this would be
the cops should have ample time to secure a search beside the point for, under these circumstances, the
warrant. information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed
enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted search warrant. While there is an indication that the
is legal. Held: informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal
The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal. Sec 2 that he knew him by name.
Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception, they are:
(1) customs searches;
(2) searches of moving vehicles, On such bare information, the police authorities could
not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consented they could readily have access to a judge or a court that
searches; was still open by the time they could make preparations
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence
presented by the defense. In determining the
opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the
intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; ambient circumstances should be considered,
especially in rural areas.
(6) ―stop and frisk‖ measures have been invariably
recognized as the traditional
exceptions.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above

contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police
officer with authority to validly search and seize from the
In the case at bar, it should be noted that the offender
information relayed by informant to the cops was that
(1) dangerous weapons, and vicinity, converged at the place, identified themselves
as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill used by
of an offense. Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la Cruz
together with two aluminum foils and containing
marijuana.
Issue: W/N the warrantless seizure incidental to the

PEOPLE v. DELA CRUZ buy-bust operation violates
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Beltran‘s constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Facts: After receiving a confidential report from Arnel,

their informant, a ―buy-
bust‖ operation was conducted. Held:
A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace

officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the
At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first peace officer neither instigates nor induces the accused
negotiated with on the purchase and when Arcoy told to commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment of
De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00 worth of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or
marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal
give one aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way
from his pants‘ pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission
ascertaining that the foil of suspected marijuana was of the offense. While it is conceded that in a buy-bust
really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to operation, there is seizure of evidence from one‘s
his teammates by scratching his head and his person without a search warrant, needless to state a
teammates who were strategically positioned in the search warrant is not necessary, the search being
incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without NARCOM agents. When Abello asked ―aling Rosa‖
a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to
person to be arrested has committed, is actually the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in
committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is a plastic bag marked
a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of ―cash katutak‖.
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a
operation, the malefactors were invariably caught red- demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search
handed. There being no violation of the constitutional and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused
right against unreasonable search and seizure, the claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre
confiscated articles are admissible in evidence where she watched a movie
―Balweg‖. While about to cross the road an old
woman asked her for help in
carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested
by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of
the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be
found. Also, no search warrant was presented.
PEOPLE v. ARUTA
The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the

dangerous drugs of 1972
Facts: P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that
a certain ―Aling Rosa‖ will be arriving from Baguio City
with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a
team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal
they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the Issue: W/N the police correctly searched and seized the
informer pointed out who ―Aling Rosa‖ was, the team drugs from the accused.
approached her and introduced themselves as PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
PEOPLE v MALMSTEDT
Facts: Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of

Held: the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at
Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to
be lawfully conducted. establish a checkpoint in the said area was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other
prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by
the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same
The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in
she was merely crossing the street and was not acting his possession prohibited drugs.
suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she
was committing a crime. There was no legal basis to
effect a warrantless arrest of the accused‘s bag, there
was no probable cause and the accused was not
lawfully arrested. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their
inspection from the front going towards the rear of the
The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus
warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was seated at the rear thereof.
was illegal and inadmissible evidence. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on

accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's
waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's
passport and other identification papers. When
accused failed to comply, the officer required him to effects of accused and the same were brought to the
bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and
when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the
officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to
open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects In the chemistry report, it was established that the
turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which
is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was
filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the
luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the Accused argues that the search of his personal effects
officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was illegal because it was made without a search
was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were
officer noticed that there were bulges inside the discovered during the illegal search are not admissible
same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was as evidence against him.
only after the officers had opened the bags that accused
finally presented his passport.
Held: It was a lawful arrest.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
further investigation. At the investigation room, the committed by the accused and he was caught in
officers opened the teddy bears and they were found flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
to also contain hashish. Representative samples were personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of
taken from the hashish found among the personal the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is
true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado‘s house.
search warrant when the search was made over the Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged
personal effects of accused, however, under the things three times. These activities are reported through
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then transacting with appellant and was
and there committing a crime. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area.
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept.
committed, and that the objects sought in connection Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the
accused has been declared by this Court as valid, ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from
because of existence of probable cause, where the Sucro in front of the chapel.
smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned
by the accused, or where the accused was acting The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the
suspiciously, and attempted to flee. corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19
sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the
chapel and another teabag from Macabante.
Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant

PEOPLE v. SUCRO of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person
Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado‘s house at lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the
(accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant

stems from the fact that their knowledge required from TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2
the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements of the RA 6425 or the
for its issuance. However, warantless search and Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE
existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of
the actual commission of the crime from the
surveillance of the activities of the accused. As
police officers were the ones conducting the Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due
surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in to lack of search warrant.
performance of their duties.
Held: No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer

People Vs. Tangliben or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a person
when in his presence the person to be arrested has
[184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990] committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were

conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory In the present case, the accused was found to have
Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a been committing possession of marijuana and can be
person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who therefore searched lawfully even without a search
acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency
bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found
accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for out that an informer pointed to the accused telling the
further investigations. The policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 The police officers had to act quickly and there was not
enough time to secure a search warrant.
following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in

that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning
of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus
People Vs. Malmstedt stop in Sagada.
[198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107; 19 Jun 1991]
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day

(11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding
Facts: In an information filed against the accused- Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM)
appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a
RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay,
Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order
amended. to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted
by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs.
Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his
the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of
tourist. He had visited the country sometime in seven (7) NARCOM officers, in
1982 and 1985. coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00
o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming
from the Cordillera Region.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection
City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the from the front going towards the rear of the bus.
Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was
seated at the rear thereof.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the

NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on further investigation. At the investigation room, the
accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to
waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's also contain hashish. Representative samples were
passport and other identification papers. When accused taken from the hashish found among the personal
failed to comply, the officer effects of accused and the same were brought to the
required him to bring out whatever it was that was PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be
a pouch bag and when accused opened the same
bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-
looking objects wrapped in
brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one In the chemistry report, it was established that the
of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which
to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for

questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the ACCUSED‘S DEFENSE
luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the
officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not
was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal
officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the
which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
officers had opened the bags that accused finally pouch bag and that the two
presented his passport.
(2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is
merely entrusted to him by an valid, and therefore the RTC
Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further ruling be reversed.
claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the
same bus with him but because there were no more
seats available in said bus, they decided to take the
next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags,
and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Held:The Constitution guarantees the right of the people
Station. to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful
arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A
lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael officer or a private person under the following
Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt. circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace

a person:
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court
finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues
that the search of his personal effects was illegal
because it was made without a search warrant and,
therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence committed is actually committing, or is attempting to
against him. commit an offense;
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and

he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
accused has been declared by this Court as valid,

When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has because of existence of probable cause, where the
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while by the accused, or where the accused was acting
his case is pending, or has escaped while being suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting hereby affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant.
prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
committed by the accused and he was caught in
flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of
the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a POSADAS v. CA
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is
true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a 188 SCRA 288
search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then
and there committing a crime. Facts: Members of the Integrated National Police
(INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the
Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat.
Umbra Umpar conducted surveillance along Magallanes
Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and MemorialColleges they spotted petitioner carrying a
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and
committed, and that the objects sought in connection identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an unsuccessful. They then checked the "buri"
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Section 12, Rule 136 of theRules of Court a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of
an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged
bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. lawful under the circumstances.
770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a
.38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two
(2) live ammunitions for a .22
caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is
police station for further investigation. In the course of reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis
the same, the petitioner was asked to show the of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when
necessary license or authority to possess firearms and the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
so. was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was
the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same.
He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and

the prohibited articles recovered from him were It is too much indeed to require the police officers
indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner
was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for
ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless,
futile and much too late.
Issue: Whether or Not the warantless

search is valid.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be
sustained under the exceptions heretofore discussed,
Held: In justifying the warrantless search of the buri and hence, the constitutional guarantee against
bag then carried by the petitioner, argues that under
unreasonable searches and seizures has not been identified themselves as police officers. After giving the
violated. prearranged signal to the backup operatives, he and
Cariaga entered the house then announced that they
were going to conduct a search. Under a table, they
found a bag made of abaca
containing twelve more bricks of marijuana. The
People v. Hindoy evidence was marked then turned over to Prianes, who
G.R. No. 132662 (May 10, 2001) transmitted the same to the NBI for chemical analysis.
FACTS: A woman informant came to the station and HELD: The identity of ENRIQUE and BELLA as the
reported that a certain "Bella" of 248 Sto. Rosario St., sellers and possessors of
Mandaluyong, would be receiving a shipment of illegal the seized marijuana cannot be doubted, for they were
drugs that day. On the strength of that information, caught in flagrante delicto in a standard police buy-bust
Antiojo organized a team that would conduct a buy-bust operation. Such positive identification prevails over
operation. At around 3 a.m., the team, headed by their feeble denial and declaration that the abaca bag
Antiojo himself and guided by the woman informant, which contained twelve blocks of marijuana was only
went to said address. Eugenio and Cariaga acted as left to their custody by a certain Marlyn.
poseur-buyers, while SPO4 Rolando Cruz, SPO3
Antonio Nato, and Prianes served as backup. They
knocked on the door and Moreover, under the circumstances, it was the duty of
BELLA's live-in partner ENRIQUE opened it. the police officers to
conduct a more thorough search of the premises after a
successful entrapment, then make the necessary arrest
Eugenio said, "May bagong dating, kukuha kami (If of the suspects and seizure of suspected contraband.
there's new stuff, we'll get some)," referring to The search, being incident to a lawful arrest, was valid
marijuana. ENRIQUE answered, "Meron" (Yes, there is) notwithstanding the absence of a
so Eugenio gave him one P500.00 and five P100.00 PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
marked bills. After counting the money, ENRIQUE
asked BELLA to get the stuff. She complied and brought
a brick of marijuana, with an estimated weight of one
kilogram, which was wrapped in newspaper. ENRIQUE, warrant. In fact, the warrantless search and seizure, as
in turn, handed it over to Eugenio. That was when they an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend
beyond the person of the one arrested to include the

premises or surrounding under his immediate control. In
the case at bar, upon consummation of the illicit sale,
PO3 Eugenio introduced himself and SPO1
Cariaga as police officers. ENRIQUE and BELLA were HELD: The arrest without warrant was illegal because
apprised of their constitutional rights. Thereafter, the the police officers did not have personal knowledge of
officers searched the room where BELLA supposedly facts indicating that the accused-appellant had
got the first block of marijuana. There, they found an committed the crime. Their knowledge of the
abaca bag under a folding table. Upon inspection, the circumstances was based entirely on what the
bag yielded twelve more blocks of witnesses had told them. The police officers did not
compressed marijuana inside a plastic bag. The trial have probable cause either because at the time of his
court, therefore, was correct in admitting all thirteen arrest, accused-appellant was not doing anything
blocks of marijuana in evidence. overtly criminal. However, accused-appellant cannot
question the validity of his arrest without warrant
because he pleaded not guilty when arraigned. He also
did not move to quash the information for lack of
People v. Cubcubin, Jr. jurisdiction due to the illegal arrest.
G.R. No. 136267. (July 10, 2001)
The bloodied shirt, shells, and firearm are inadmissible

as evidence for being the product of an illegal search.
FACTS: Witnesses identified Accused-Appellant as the The search was illegal because it was not proven that
last person to have been seen together with the the accused-appellant gave his consent to the search.
murdered victim. Policemen went to his house and Even assuming that the arrest was valid, the search
asked permission to search. They found a bloodied cannot be justified as incident to a lawful arrest because
white shirt and two .38 caliber shells. The policemen the items that were seized were not within the
asked him to go with them to the café where he was last immediate control of the accused. In fact, the
seen with the victim where the witness positively policemen seized the firearm only after going back
identified him. The Policemen asked for his permission to the house of accused-appellant. Neither can the
to go back to the house to search for the gun. They plain view doctrine apply in this case since the
found the weapon and arrested Accused-Appellant. policemen did not come upon the objects inadvertently.
Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their

agents from confiscating plaintiff‘s magazines or from
preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that
the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
PITA v. CA magazine which is not per se obscene, and that
the publication is protected by the Constitutional
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti- guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.
Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a
Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special temporary restraining order against
Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, indiscriminateseizure, confiscation and burning of
Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from
dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and
peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"Magazines, pending hearing
be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court
burned the seized materials in public at the University granted the temporary restraining order. The case was
belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that
of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.
of various student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later

burned, was "Pinoy Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the
Playboy"magazines published and co-edited by freedom of expression of the petitioner.
plaintiff Leo Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the state has the right to protect society from
Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals,
superintendent of Western Police District of the City of as indeed we have laws punishing the author,
publishers and sellers of obscene publications. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4

However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the
pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's
sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures
are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using
the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether
the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is 2. The judge must determine whether or not the same
to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a
such immoral influences and into whose hands a case-to-case basis and on the judge‘s sound discretion.
publication or other article charged as being obscene
may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately
"whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend
upon the circumstances of the case and that the HON. ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., and THE PHIL.
question is to be decided by the "judgment of the NAVY, vs. HON. FRANCISCO ARCA, and MORABE,
aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The DE GUZMAN & COMPANY
government authorities in the instant case have not
shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant
confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said
materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them FACTS: Respondent company filed a case against
to carry out a search andseizure, by way of a search Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing vessel Tony Lex
warrant. The court provides that the authorities must VI which had been seized and impounded by petitioner
apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, Fisheries Commissioner through the Philippine Navy.
if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and The CFI Manila granted it, thus respondent company
that; took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.
1. The authorities must convince the court that the

materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend
clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony Lex III, also respectively
to warrant State interference and action; called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged
violations of some provisions of the Fisheries Act. On

August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats were actually Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private
seized for illegal fishing with dynamite. individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a)
who has committed, is actually committing or is about to
commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is
reasonably believed to have committed an offense
which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a
ISSUE: WON the seizure of the vessel, its equipment prisoner who has escaped from confinement while
and dynamites therein was valid. serving a final judgment or from temporary detention
during the pendency of his case or while being
transferred
from one confinement to another. In the case at bar, the
members of the crew of the
HELD: YES. Search and seizure without search warrant two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with
of vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their
laws have been the traditional exception to the apprehension without a warrant of arrest while
constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure
the vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was
jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.
sought before such warrant could be secured; hence it
is not practicable to require a search warrant before
such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected.
The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing
vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually People Vs. Amminudin
equipped with powerful motors that enable them to
elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast [163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988]
Guard.
Facts:Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested

on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City.
The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit
because of a tip from one their informers simply he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as
looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later like and that his business was selling watches and
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his
found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during
as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the
injuries allegedly sustained.
An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act

was filed against him. Later, the information was Issue: Whether or not search of defendant‘s bag is
amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also legal.
been arrested with him that same evening and likewise
investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss
the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement
of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not
investigation." The motion was granted, and trial caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his
arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he
about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances,
he was like any of the other passengers innocently
proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana
eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against
disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the
bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts crime as charged.
and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
Headquarters at the Pier area. He willingly went with

People Vs. Saycon them.
[236 SCRA 325; G.R. No. 110995; 5 Sept 1994]
At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to

open his bag, and the latter willingly obliged. In it were
personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that
Facts: On or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the maong wallet, there was a Marlboro pack containing the
morning, the Coastguard personnel received suspected "shabu". When police officer Winifredo Noble
information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack containing the
a suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon merely bowed his
Saycon was on board the MV Doña Virginia, which was head. Then Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu"
arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon were brought to the NARCOM office
receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the
CPO Tolin, instructed them to intercept the suspect. A NARCOM agents did not have
combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine a warrant of arrest. The PNP's Forensic Analyst
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 declared in court that she had conducted an
examination of the specimens and found out that the
specimens weighed 4.2 grams in total, consisted of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more widely known
Coastguard personnel consisting of CPO Tolin, a as "shabu."
certain Miagme, and Senior Police Officers Ruben
Laddaran and Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted
themselves at the gate of Pier 1. The MV Doña Virginia
docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in
Dumaguete City. Alvaro Saycon alighted from the boat
carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint Issue: Whether or Not the warrantless search was
manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was valid.
identified by police officer Winifredo Noble of NARCOM.
Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard
Held: The warrantless search was valid, as the

accused was a passenger of a motor vehicle. There The policemen identified themselves and asked the
was probable cause to believe that the accused was woman to put out the contents of the sack. The sack
carrying prohibited drugs. Three weeks earlier, agents contains sweet potato with a bricklike substance packed
of the Narcotics Command bought methamine with a masking tape. In plain view of the policemen it
hydrochloride from him. An agent of the Narcotics was identified to be marijuana. She was arrested
Command reported that the accused would be arriving and was convicted in the trial court.
on board the vessel and carrying methamphetamine
hydrochloride with him. Drug couriers do not go about
their trade with some external sign indicating that they
are transporting prohibited drugs. This must be taken She argued that the marijuana is inadmissible since
into account in determining probable cause. the warrantless search is invalid, not having been
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 pursuant to lawful arrest.
People v. Ayangao
ISSUE: WON the arrest was lawful. YES
WON the warrantless search was permissible. YES

FACTS: Policemen received information that a woman
would be traveling with marijuana from
Mountain Province to Pampanga.
HELD: The Court finds that the arrest was lawful

as appellant was actually committing a crime when
The informant went with them in the place pointed and she was arrested — transporting marijuana, such is an
he personally identified the woman. They approached act prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made,
the woman. The policemen noticed protruding the resulting warrantless search on appellant was also
marijuana leaves from the sacks of sweet potatoes. valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized the
arresting police officers to validly search and seize from
the offender.
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and

political development of the National Capital Region
This Court has already ruled that tipped information is As part of its program to maintain peace and order, the
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search. NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Although the apprehending officers received the tip Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 residents are worried about their safety and about being
harassed especially when Parpon, a supply officer, was
gunned down allegedly by NCRDC officals.
two weeks prior to the arrest, they could not be faulted

for not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the Valmonte claims that he himself had been searched
exact date of appellant‘s arrival was not known by the without a warrant by the military manning the
informant. AFFIRMED. checkpoint.
ISSUE: W/N the checkpoints are valid as they are

VALMONTE v. DE VILLA considered reasonable searches
YES
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search
Facts and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
question, determinable from a consideration of the
the National Capital Region District Command circumstances involved
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP,
with the mission of conducting security operations
within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at
defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints
are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as
per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the RUDY CABALLES y TAIÑO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, APPEALS G.R. No. 136292 January 15, 2002
the military indeed committed specific violations of Caballes was charged with theft for stealing cable
petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or conductors belonging to
other rights NAPOCOR. These conductors were found in his jeep. It
was alleged that while he was driving his jeepney, two
officers flagged down his jeepney and searched the
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those insides without a warrant. The police officers claimed
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable that while they were on a routine patrol, they saw his
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but jeepney being unusually covered with kakawati leaves.
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the

curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was
fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a valid NO
light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable
search Section 2, Article III: ―no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge‖. Exceptions: (1)
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (2)
thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving
interest of public security. vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs
search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort
and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted within Search of a moving vehicle: One such form of search of
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an moving vehicles is the "stop-and-search" without
orderly society and a peaceful community. warrant at military or police checkpoints which has
been declared to be not illegal per se, for as long as it is
warranted by the exigencies of public order and
conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. A
checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it

may involve an extensive search. PEOPLE v. LIBNAO
G.R. No. 136860 January 20, 2003

Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an
individual's right against unreasonable search. The The intelligence operatives of the PNP stationed in
search which is normally permissible in this instance is Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on
limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and
which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal
looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without drugs once a month in big bulks They received a tip that
opening the car's doors; (4) where the occupants are the drug pushers would be transporting the drugs, riding
not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where a tricycle. Thus they set up a checkpoint. At about 1:00
the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual o‘clock in the morning of the following day, the police
search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two
check is conducted in a fixed area. female passengers seated inside, who were later
identified as Libnao and her co-accused Nunga. In front
of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the and the two‘s uneasy behavior when asked about its
case at bar. The police officers did not merely conduct a ownership and content, the officers invited them to
visual search or inspection of petitioner's vehicle. They Kabayan Center. They brought with them the black bag.
had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves The bag was opened as soon as the barangay captain
and look inside the sacks before they were able to see arrived in the presence of Libnao and Nunga. Inside
the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple were bricks of marijuana leaves.
routine check.
The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious doesn‘t ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was
constitute probable cause illegal NO
as to justify the search without warrant.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Libnao contends that at the time she was apprehended
by the police officers, she was not committing any
offense but was merely riding a tricycle
Peace officers are limited to routine checks where the who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage
examination of the bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila;
vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is The warrantless search in the case at bench is not
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such bereft of a probable cause. The Police Intelligence
would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers Division had been conducting surveillance operation for
made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the information that once a month, Libnao and Nunga
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October
contains as item, article or object which by law is 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will
subject to seizure and destruction be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely,
Jurisprudence: There‘s probable cause in the following the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a
instances: (some tricycle and carrying a suspicious- looking black bag,
examples) which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they
where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated were asked who owned it and what its content was,
from the plastic bag carried by the accused; both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 warrantless search and seizure of appellant‘s bag was
not illegal.
where an informer positively identified the accused who

was observed to be acting suspiciously; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. VICTOR
where the accused who were riding a jeepney were DIAZ VINECARIO [G.R. No. 141137. January 20,
stopped and searched by 2004]
policemen who had earlier received confidential reports 15 police officers were manning a checkpoint at Ulas,
that said accused would transport a quantity of Davao City pursuant to the COMELEC gun ban when a
marijuana; car sped by past them thus they were ordered to go
where Narcom agents had received information that a back to the checkpoint.
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession When asked by the law enforcers to produce an
prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents identification card, they could not offer any. The police
confronted the accused Caucasian because of a officers noticed that a big military backpack was slung
conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present over the right shoulder of Vinecario who was observed,
his passport and other identification papers where as were the others, to be afraid and acting suspicious.
police officers received an information that the accused, Suspecting a bomb might be
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 the place sought to be searched. The required probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure
is not detemined by any fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.
inside, they ordered Vinecario to open the bag which he Warrantless search of the personal effects of an
did. They notice a small package wrapped in paper and accused has been declared as valid, because of
asked him to take it out. One of the police officers tore existence of probable cause, where the smell of
the paper and the smell of marijuana then was marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
noticeable. They were then brought to the police station. accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously,
Vinecario and his companions were then charged and and attempted to flee
convicted for violating RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act In light then of appellants‘ speeding away after noticing
of 1972) for having possessed, transported and the checkpoint and even after having been flagged
delivered marijuana down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous
gestures when interrogated on the contents of the
backpack which they passed to one another, and the
reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was
valid YES (probable cause found) a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an
attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with
Although the general rule is that motorists and their their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a
vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that
checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine appellants were
inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
searched when there is probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that
either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of
the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack
offense were instruments of some offense.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that People v. BALINGAN
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
G.R. No. 105834 February 13, 1995 ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure on
board the bus was valid YES Witness Obrera clearly
the Narcotics Intelligence Division of the Baguio set forth the events that led to appellant's arrest,
City Police Station received a telephone call from an starting from the receipt by him of an informant's
unnamed male informant. He passed the information tip. He was able to establish that: appellant had
that Balingan was going to Manila with a bag filled with physical possession of the subject gray luggage bag
marijuana. Acting on the information, P/Lt. Manuel from the time she left her house at Brookside until she
Obrera formed a surveillance team monitor appellant's boarded and sat
movements. The team was deployed at different places PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
in Baguio City, including Balingan‘s house on Brookside
and bus stations
Garcia soon reported seeing Balingan move out from
her residence at Brookside and board a taxicab which on the third row behind the driver of Dangwa bus with
proceeded to the direction of Bonifacio Street. Balingan plate number NTU-
was wearing a pink dress and carrying a gray luggage 153 bound for Manila; conducted a search of the same
(like a "maleta") with orange or yellow belts. She then bus at the Kennon Road checkpoint, they found the
boarded the bus. subject gray bag on the overhead luggage compartment
When the bus passed by the checkpoint, Lt. Obrera corresponding to appellant's seat; upon inspection, the
announced a routinary bag was found to contain suspected marijuana
check-up identified himself as a policeman to Balingan flowering tops which even during preliminary tests
and asked her permission to check her luggage; she did yielded positive for the presence of THC, an active
not respond and just looked outside the window. He component of marijuana.
opened the luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and The search and seizure in the case at bench happened
above Balingan and found suspected marijuana in it. in a moving, public vehicle. The search was made
He pulled out the luggage and turned it over to Lt. pursuant to a tip received from an informant. Their
Obrera. Lt. Obrera tries to arrest Balingan but the latter surveillance operations revealed that appellant, whose
resisted and tried to bite his hand and furthermore held movements had been previously monitored by the
tightly onto the window pane. Narcotics Division boarded a Dangwa bus bound for
Balingan was then charged and convicted for having Manila carrying a suspicious looking gray luggage bag.
violated RA 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act) When the moving, public bus was stopped, her bag,
upon inspection, yielded marijuana
March 19, 1989, or two days later. During that period,

Bagalihog v Fernandez the private respondent had all the opportunity to apply
for a search warrant and establish probable cause in
G.R. No. 96356 June 27, 1991 accordance with the Bill of Rights and the Rules of
Court. He did not.‖
On March 17, 1989, Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to The mere mobility of the motorcycle did not make the
death shortly after disembarking at the Masbate Airport. search warrant redundant for it is not denied that the
Witnesses said one of the gunmen fled on a motorcycle. vehicle remained with the petitioner until it was forcibly
Two days later, Capt. Julito Roxas and his men from the taken from him. The fear that it would be dismantled or
Philippine Constabulary seized the petitioner's hidden was mere speculation that was not borne out by
motorcycle and took it to the PC headquarters in the facts. The necessity for the immediate seizure of the
Masbate. They had no search warrant. The motorcycle motorcycle without the first obtaining a warrant has not
was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the been established.
vehicles used by the killers. There was no waiver. The petitioner merely agreed to
cooperate with the investigators and to produce the
vehicle when needed, but he did not agree to have it
impounded. The record shows that he expressed
Issue: W/N the seizure WITHOUT A WARRANT and reservations when this was suggested and said he
eventual impounding of the motorcycle was valid needed the motorcycle for his official duties as a
NO. member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and in his
private business
SC: ―We do not find that the importance of the
motorcycle in the prosecution of the criminal cases
excused its seizure without a warrant. The authorities
had enough time to comply with the required procedure PEOPLE V MUSA
but they did not do so, preferring the unconstitutional
shortcut. The crime was committed on March 17, G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
1989, and the motorcycle was seized only on
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 T/Sgt. Belarga, leader of a NARCOM team instructed
Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on
a certain Mari Musa. Information received from civilian
informer was that Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in said place
Sgt Ani then went to the house Mari Musa and also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his
approached him when he brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father,
came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. who was living in another house about ten arms-length
Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari away.
Musa the P20 marked money. After receiving the
money, Musa went back to his house and came back
and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers
containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two W/N the search and seizure inside his house (the
wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that kitchen to be exact) was valid
the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards NO
his companions and raised his right hand.
The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the
inside the house and made the arrest. The agents person of the appellant after arresting him in his house
searched the appellant and unable to find the but found nothing. They then searched the entire house,
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in
a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspect's lawful
marked money, they asked him where it was. The arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one
appellant said that he gave it to his wife. They then arrested to include the premises or surroundings under
found drugs in the kitchen and confiscated them. his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an
Defense: While he was being manicured at one hand, officer who has the right to be in the position to have
his wife was inside the one room of their house, putting that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
their child to sleep. 3 NARCOM agents, who introduced as evidence.
themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to
clothes, got inside Musa's house whose door was open. launch unbridled
The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a
the house but simply announced that they were general exploratory search made solely to find evidence
NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually
Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a applied where a police officer is not searching for
search warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent. evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag inadvertently comes across an incriminating object
whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant
police officer in each of them had a prior justification for what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to
an intrusion in the course of which he came respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused.
PEOPLE V FIGUEROA
[G.R No. 134056. July 6, 2000]

The "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of
the object where the incriminating nature of the object is Accused was charged with violation of the Dangerous
not apparent from the "plain view" of the object. There Drug Act of 1927 for manufacturing, producing,
are 4 elements of valid seizure based on the plain view preparing or processing methamphetamine
doctrine: hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug amounting to a
Prior valid intrusion based on the warrantless arrest in 2.4 liters, directly by means of chemical synthesis
which the police are Special Investigtor Palencia testified that they received
LEGALLY present in the pursuit of their official duties a call from their informant, a woman, who reported that
The evidence was INADVERTENTLY discovered by the a certain Obet was allegedly engaged in large-scale
police who have the right to be where they are drug trafficking in Makati City. He then instructed
The evidence must be immediately apparent their informant to establish contact with Obet for a buy-
PLAIN VIEW justified the seizure of the evidence bust operation. After several hours, the informant
without further search. reported that Obet was already waiting for her,
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve
the marked money which they hoped to find, the
NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found
the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, with instructions for her to come alone as soon as she
therefore, not within their "plain view" when they was ready with P150,000. Palencia then caused the
arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The dusting of fluorescent powder over ten pieces of
NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the authentic P100 bills as buy-bust money and gave them
house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. to the informant
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic Palencia then saw the informant hand over the money
bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no to Obet. While counting the money, Obet sensed the
presence of other people in the area. Obet, who was in Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was
possession of a .45 caliber pistol, fired it twice toward valid NO
the direction of Palencia, while hurrying towards the
house. Obet then held hostage his mistress, Estrella a warrantless search and seizure is not unreasonable
Brilliantes, and her 2 children for the next 3 hours until and offensive to the
the arrival of one Major Roberto Reyes to whom Obet Constitution if consent is shown.
surrendered. Palencia then brought OBET, his firearm In case of consented searches or waiver of the
and the recovered buy-bust money to the WPD constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive searches, it
Headquarters. is fundamental that to constitute, a waiver, it must first
Obet then volunteered the information that his source appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
was Betty thus he, accompanied by Palencia went to involved had
her house. Betty denied being the source. Once inside PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
the house, Obet went to the kitchen and pointed to what
he termed as liquid shabu inside a white pail along with
other drug paraphernalia, such as a beaker spray. The
investigator then seized the items. Palencia said that knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
when he searched Betty‘s house, he didn‘t have a existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an
warrant but it was with Betty‘s consent but he never saw actual intention to relinquish the right.The third condition
Obet nor Betty manufacture the shabu. does not exist in the instant case. The fact is, Betty
DEFENSE: Obet said he was approached by a certain asked for a search warrant
Eva wanting to buy Neither can the search be appreciated as a search
drugs. He told her he wasn‘t selling. He noticed that incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of either Betty or
someone was peeping from the dark thus he got his OBET as intimated by the trial court. First, Betty's arrest
gun. While he was locking the door, he accidentally did not precede the search. Second, per the
fired it as he forgot it was cocked. He was then arrested. prosecution's evidence OBET was not arrested for
Eva, in front of the police insisted that they go to Betty‘s possession or sale of regulated or prohibited drugs as
(his former live-in-partner) house. They searched the a consequence of the buy-bust operation. He
place without Betty‘s consent and without a warrant surrendered after taking hostage Estrella and her two
and found drugs inside the kitchen. Betty denied they children, although he was thereafter held in custody for
were hers. further questioning on illegal drugs.
OBET was held in custody and investigated or
interrogated about the source
of the shabu, none of which was found during the buy-

bust operation. In short he was held in custody as a Nuevas with the officers proceeded to a certain place
consequence of the failed buy-bust operation and as a where Din and Inocencio, the 2 other male persons
follow-up to link him to the source and establish a would be making their delivery. They found Din, who
conspiracy in the illegal trade of shabu. was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din
disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then
took the bag and upon inspection found inside it
"marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein.
PEOPLE v NUEVAS Fami testified that the search was done with their
consent.
G.R. No. 170233 February 22, 2007 They were then found guilty of illegal possession of
marijuana.
PO3 Fami testified that while conducting a surveillance
and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, he received a
tip that a certain male person, more or less 5‘4" in
height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was
upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and valid NO
maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried
leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person The searches and seizures conducted do not fall under
who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later the first exception, warrantless searches incidental to
identified as Nuevas alight from a motor vehicle lawful arrests. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is
Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Recent jurisprudence
possession of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two holds that the arrest must precede the search; the
other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily process cannot be reversed as in this case where the
pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search
opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to
charges, Nuevas disclosed where the 2 other male make the arrest at the outset of the search.
persons would make the delivery of marijuana weighing In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not
more or less 5 kilos committing a crime in the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 presence of the police officers. The police officers did
not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that
the persons to be arrested had committed an offense.
The searches conducted on the plastic bag then bag to the police officers. It can be seen that in his
cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any
arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police,
justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule gave them the plastic bag and even revealed his
113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused ‗associates,‘ offering himself as an informant.
perform some overt act that would indicate that he
"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
neither could the searches be justified under the plain People v Salanguit
view doctrine. An
object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. [G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001]
Where the object seized was inside a closed package,
the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant to search the
be seized without a warrant. However, if the package residence of Robert Salanguit He presented as his
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive witness SPO1 Badua, who testified that as a poseur-
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu
obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salanguit‘s room,
view and may be seized. In other words, if the package and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by Salanguit
is such that an experienced observer could infer from its from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then granted
the article is deemed in plain view. It must be a group of 10 policemen, along with one civilian
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 informer, went to the residence of Salanguit to serve the
warrant. The police operatives knocked on accused-
appellant‘s door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The
immediately apparent to the police that the items that police operatives then forced the door open and entered
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband the house.
or otherwise subject to seizure. Records show that the After showing the search warrant to the occupants of
dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching
that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were not readily the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent
apparent or transparent to the police officers. plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a
However, in Nuevas‘s case, the Court is convinced paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating substance, and 2 bricks of dried leaves which appeared
to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint. Note that However, the fact that there was no probable cause to
marijuana wasn‘t indicated in the search warrant, only support the application for the seizure of drug
shabu. paraphernalia does not make the search warrant is void.
Defense: As they were about to leave their house, they This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia
heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their was in fact seized by the police. None was taken by
house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore,
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized
the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which
evidence was presented showing probable cause as to
attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate its existence.
and descended through an opening in the roof. The search warrant authorized the seizure of
When Salanguit demanded to be shown a search methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not
warrant, a piece of paper marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being
inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused- justified on the ground that the drug was seized within
appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper the
was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it. ―plain view‖ of the searching party
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the
warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is
reasonable to assume that the police found the packets
ISSUE: W/N the search and seizure was illegal despite of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search
the issuance of a warrant warrant has been executed, the ―plain view doctrine‖
YES can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other
items subsequently found.
w/n marijuana found inside the house is admissible in PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
evidence NO
The warrant authorized the seizure of ―undetermined

quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia.‖ Evidence What the ‗plain view‘ cases have in common is that the
was presented showing probable cause of the existence police officer in each of them had a prior justification for
of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. None was an intrusion in the course of which he came
shown showing the existence of drug paraphernalia. inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
Salanguti said the warrant was void. the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the
prior justification whether it be a warrant for another SPO2 Calip went to Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti-
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or jueteng operations. He urinated at a bushy bamboo
some other legitimate reason for being present fence behind the public school. About (5) meters away,
unconnected with a search directed against the accused he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There
and permits the warrantless seizure. were marijuana plants in between corn plants and
THE extension of the original justification is legitimate camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that to who owned the house with the garden. The
they have evidence before them; the storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag owned it
‗plain view‘ doctrine may not be used to extend a PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating
at last emerges. However, a search incident to a lawful
arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and He reported it back to the police station and they
the premises within his immediate control. The rationale assembled a team who went to the house of Pasudag.
for permitting such a search is to prevent the person When they went to his house, he asked Pasudag to
arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, bring him to the backyard.
or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the for a photographer, who took pictures of accused
marijuana was Pasudag standing besides one of the marijuana plants.
found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, They uprooted seven marijuana plants. The team
the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to
recovered on accused-appellant‘s person or in an area the police station
within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the
shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested
to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid. W/N the search and eventual confiscation of the
marijuana plants was valid NO
As a general rule, the procurement of a search warrant

People v Pasudag is required before a law enforcer may validly search or
seize the person, house, papers or effects of any
G.R. No. 128822 May 4, 2001 individual. The Constitution provides that "the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and Ernesto Isip and/or Shalimar Philippines and/or
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall Occupants, June 28, 1985
be inviolable, x x x." Any evidence obtained in violation
of this provision is inadmissible. Shalimar Building, No. 1571, Aragon St., Sta. Cruz,
In the case at bar, the police authorities had ample Manila-Respondents
opportunity to secure
from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip
inquired as to who owned the house. He was
acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately
recognized that some plants in the backyard of the FACTS:
house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the
essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were Rolando H. Besarra of the National Bureau of
three months old and there was no sufficient reason to Investigation filed for search warrant concerning the
believe that they would be uprooted on that same day. first two floors of Shalimar Building owned and operated
"The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was by Ernesto Isip and for seizure of UNILAB particularly
any, could not have been more that mere passive Revicon multi vitamins, Disudrin, sundry items that are
conformity given under intimidating or coercive unauthorized production/ manufacture of the said drugs
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all after surveillance of an asset of Armadillo Protective
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee." and Security Agency. After which the search warrant
Even if the confession or admission were "gospel was served on respondent building. The search and
truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and seizure was able to produce 792 bottles of Disudrin and
without a valid waiver of such assistance, the 30 boxes each containing
confession is inadmissible in evidence. 100 pieces of Inoflox. When the seized objects was to
be turned over to the Bureau of Food and Drugs,
respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the
Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence assailing that
United Laboratories, Inc. – Petitioner vs the searching team searched from first to fourth floors
G.R. No. 163858 and the building at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Cruz, Manila while what is indicated on the search
warrant is the first and second floors of Shalimar Bldg.
located at No. 1571, Aragon St. Sta. Cruz thus all those
that was seized were fruit of a poisonous tree thus
inadmissible for evidence. On March 11,
2004 the RTC granted the respondents motion

contending that ground used by respondents to quash The petition is denied for lack of merit.
the search warrant was not invoked and that the seizure
of the items was based on the ―plain view doctrine.‖ A search warrant is a legal process which has been
On the other hand the respondents assailed that it likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State to
should be the BFAD and not the petitioners who should procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of
apply the search warrant. BFAD submitted the result of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public
its examination on the seized materials and found it to prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon,
be substandard. On May 28, 2004 the RTC rendered its issued under the police power. A search warrant must
decision noting that the search warrant is only for the issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of
counterfeit products of Revicon and not the actual the Philippines.
products seized.
A search warrant, to be valid, must particularly describe
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The officers of the law are to seize only those things
particularly described in the search warrant. A search
ISSUES: warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a
raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize
Whether or not the bottles of Disudrin and boxes of and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
Inoflox are inadmissible as evidence against the relating to a crime. The search is limited in scope so as
respondents. not to be general or explanatory. Nothing is left to the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
The immediate requirement means that the executing

officer can, at the time of discovery of the object or the
Whether or not the seizure of the same counterfeit facts therein available to him, determine probable cause
drugs is justified and lawful under the plain view of the object‘s incriminating evidence. In other words, to
doctrine hence can be admitted as evidence. be immediate, probable cause must be the direct result
of the officer‘s instantaneous sensory perception of the
object. The object is apparent if the executing
officer had probable cause to connect the object to
criminal activity. The incriminating nature of the
HELD: evidence becomes apparent in the course of the search,
without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It ―60 ml,‖ appeared to describe the condition/quality of
must be apparent at the moment of seizure. the bottles inside (as it is
with genuine UNILAB box of the true medicine of the
Since the articles allegedly seized during the same brand). The petitioner pointed out that ―ABR‖ is
implementation of the search warrant the acronym for ―amber bottle round‖ describing the
– Disudrin and Inoflux products – were not included in bottles in which the true and original Disudrin (for
the search warrant, they were, therefore, not lawfully children) is contained.
seized by the raiding team; they are not illegal per se,
as it were, like an arms cache, subversive materials or Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant
shabu as to justify their seizure in the course of a lawful but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized
search, or being in plain view or some such. No need by him. However, the seizure by the officer of
whatever for some public assay. objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must
adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the confluence of the essential requirements for the
doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law
The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial
cannot tell without proper examination or assay that the intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which
Disudrin and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must
respondent‘s place were counterfeit. All the relevant discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c)
presumptions are in favor of legality. it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items they observe may be evidence of a crime,
The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
applicable in this case because the boxes were found
outside the door of the respondents‘ laboratory on the
garage floor. The boxes aroused the suspicion of the
members of the raiding team – precisely because these
were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logos. The PEOPLE V. GUZMAN
boxes in which the items were contained were
themselves so designated to replicate true and GR 117952-53; Feb.14,2001
original UNILAB boxes for the same medicine. Thus, on
the left hand corner of one side of some of the boxes
the letters ―ABR‖ under the words
The accused was found guilty by the trial court of

violating RA 6425 (Dangerous Facts: The incidents involved in this case took place at
Drugs Act of 1972). the height of the coup d‘état staged in December,
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 1989. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was
charged in two separate informations for illegal
possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance
of rebellion, and for attempted homicide. Appellant was
HELD: The accused is GUILTY. The accused was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in
caught in flagrante delicto, possessing an unlicensed furtherance of rebellion, but was acquitted of
firearm. The search conducted thereafter was valid. It attempted homicide. Surveillance was undertaken by
was within the immediate control of the arrested person. the military along EDSA because of intelligence reports
Likewise, the drugs and paraphernalia obtained where about a coup. Members of the team were engaged by
in plain view of the police when the accused was rebels in gunfire killing one member of the team. A
arrested. Quoting PEOPLE v. Khor, the elements of searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They
illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: 1) the were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16
accused is in possession of an item or object which is ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of
identified as a prohibited drug; 2) such possession is not different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of
authorized by law; and 3) the accused freely and the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano. De
consciously possessed the said drug. All elements Gracia was seen inside the office of Col. Matillano,
concurring, the accused is thus guilty. Lastly, the holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door.
accused failed to quash the information against him The team arrested appellant. They were then made to
before arraignment thus he is estopped from sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives
questioning the legality of his arrest. and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No
search warrant was secured by the raiding team.
Accused was found guilty of illegal possession of
firearms. That judgment of conviction is now challenged
before us in this appeal. Issue: Whether or not there
was a valid search and seizure in this case. Ruling: YES
It is admitted
PEOPLE v DE GRACIA
233 SCRA 716 (July 6, 1994)

that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-
Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained
that time. The raid was actually precipitated by also suffered mental and physical torture to extract
intelligence reports that said office was being used as confessions and tactical informations. The respondents
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents
surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the contends that the Constitution grants to government the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men power to seek and cripple subversive movements for
coming from the Eurocar building. the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial
target zoning were intended to flush out subversives
and criminal elements coddled by the communities
were the said drives were conducted. They said that
they have intelligently and carefully planned months
GUANZON v DE VILLA ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign
media joined the operation to witness and record such
181 SCRA 623 [GR No. 80508 (January 30, 1990) event.
Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the
"saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that
were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed
specifictarget house to be search and that there is no consisted of violation of human rights.
search warrant orwarrant of arrest served. Most of the
policemen are in their civilian clothes and without
nameplates or identification cards. The residentswere
rudely rouse from their sleep by banging Held: It is not the police action per se which should be
on the walls andwindows of their houses. The prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods
residents were at the point of high- powered guns which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on
and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have
to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo been no impediment to securing search warrants or
marks. The residentscomplained that they're homes warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or
were ransacked, tossing their belongings and individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no
destroying their valuables. Some of their money and showing that theobjectives sought to be attained by the
valuables had disappeared after the operation. The "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights
of the squatters and low income families are fully resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the
protected. However, the remedy should not be brought ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were
by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and taken of the complainant''s 2 witnesses in addition to the
not one violator is properly charged. In the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say, however,
circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring that the complainant himself was not subjected to a
soldier or policeman whom the court can order similar interrogation. By his own
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
relief can be given.
accounts, all that resp. judge did was question Capt.

In the meantime where there is showing that some Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to
abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the
the alleged violations which are shocking to the same," and only bec. "the application was not yet
senses. Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila. subscribed and sworn to." The suggestion is that he
would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit
had already been completed when it was submitted to
him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching
questions. He limited himself to the contents of the
ROAN v GONZALES affidavit. He did not take the applicant''s deposition in
writing and attach them to the record, together w/ the
145 SCRA 687 (1986) affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on properly determine the existence or non- existence of
5/10/84. The petitioner''s house was searched 2 days the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person
later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are
discovered. The officers conducting the search found 1 false. (Mata v. Bayona.) The applicant was asking for
colt Magnum revolver & the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay
18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are now the and not of info. personally known to him. His
bases of the charge against the petitioner. RULING: application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify
Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby the issuance of the warrant sought.
declared null and void and accordingly set aside. The
petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the
agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by

It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses the military authorities, who practically coerced the
themselves, by their own personal info., to establish the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guarantee.
applicant''s claims. Even assuming then that it would
have suffied to take the deposition only of the
witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is
still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. A E. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS VS. CA1
study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael
Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be
"intelligence informers," shows that they were in the G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
main a mere restatement of their allegations in their
affidavits, except that they were made in the form of Rule involved: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
answers to the questions put to them by the resp. judge. debemos. Where the law makes no distinctions, one
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. does not distinguish.
judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even
as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the
window, or whether it was on the first floor or second
floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the
acts related were really done openly, in the full view of Issue: Does the anti-wiretapping law, RA 4200, allow
the witnesses, considering that these acts were against parties to a conversation to tape it without the consent
the law. These would have been judicious questions but of all those involved?
they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration
of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant
sought was issued forthwith. SOL-GEN ARGUES
THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER
DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY What was construed:
SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED
HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. We do not The word ―any‖ in Sec. 1 of RA 4200: It shall be
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 unlawful for ANY person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to
tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph case that was dismissed because the instrument used
or detectaphone or walkie- talkie or tape recorder, or was not mentioned in the law).
however otherwise described.
The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a

Facts of the case: Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do
Ester Garcia inside Garcia‘s office. Ramirez taped the not constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals
conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for reversed it.
insulting and humiliating her, using as evidence the
transcript of the conversation, based on the tape
recording.
Ratio: First, the court noted that the provision makes it

clear that it is illegal for any person to secretly record a
conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved.
―The law makes no distinction as to whether the party

1 By Dana Batnag sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication.‖
Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for

violating the anti-wire tapping act, because it was done
without her knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed The congressional records also showed that the intent
that what the law forbids is for other parties, who are not was that permission must be sought from all parties in
part of the conversation, to record it using the the conversation. ―This is a complete ban on tape
instruments enumerated in the law (there was an earlier recorded conversations taken without the authorization
of all the parties,‖ Sen. Tanada said during the as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation
deliberations. of this or the preceeding section, shall inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS:
―The provision seeks to penalize even those privy to Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
the private communications. respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962,
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor
distinguish.‖ of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver
and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private respondents
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting
Decision: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
Costs against Ramirez. and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ZULUETA v CA
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other
materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from
unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court
253 SCRA 699 (1996) regarding marital separation and
disqualification from medical practice.
HELD:
The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the Indeed the documents and papers in question are
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction
declaring "the privacy of communication and in confidence by one from the other during the
correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself is freedom of communication; quite another is a
aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party compulsion for each one to share what one knows with
against whom the constitutional provision is to be the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the fidelity that each owes to the other.
constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or
which public safety or order require otherwise, as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding." WATEROUR DRUG CORPORATION v NLRC
GR No. 113271 (October 16, 1997)
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify Facts: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by
anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received
evidence of marital infedility. A person, by contracting a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-
marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to
to privacy as an individual and the constitutional dispense medicine toemployees chargeable to the
protection is ever available to him or to latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited
her. practice. On the same date, Co issued another
memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate
with suppliers of medicine without consulting the
The law insures absolute freedom of communication Purchasing Department, as this would impair the
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither company's control of purchases and, besides she was
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to
her responsibility but explained that her act was "due protect the interests of the company.
to negligence," since fellow employee Irene
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested

access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for
Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In
through misrepresentation when she claimed that she said letter she protested Saldaña's invasion of her
was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico privacy when Saldaña opened an envelope addressed
then asked the company to look into the fraudulent to Catolico.
activities of Soliven.
In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico,

In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989, through her counsel, explained that the check she
WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a
Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without "refund of overprice." She also averred that the
the proper documents." On 29 January 1990, preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang
WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary,
that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Irene Soliven.
Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda

Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 37 January Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her
1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the
hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair
asked for additional time to give her explanation, and labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension.
she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3 In his decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex
February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor
informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March practice against
With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being

rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional
petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of right invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls
Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as
alleged as complainant's dishonesty," and to show that a legal basis for complainant's dismissal.
any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal
was without just cause and due process. He thus
declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but
disallowed reinstatement. The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the
appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal
suspension as the same was already included in the
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and computation of the aggregate of the awards in the
urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor amount of P35,401.86.
Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due
process and that there was no just cause to terminate
her services.
Issue: Whether or Not the dismissal of the private
respondent is in violation of the
Constitution, under the Bill of Rights.
In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground
that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for
Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found
that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check
of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which
her co-employee saw when the latter opened the Held: As to the first and second grounds, petitioners
envelope. But, it declared that the check was insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions"
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 from YSP, or probably from other suppliers, and that the
and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. It concluded: check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the
first or the last. They also maintained that Catolico
occupied a confidential position and that Catolico's
receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her
to violate company rules," constituted breach of Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her
confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the
Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her issues were joined through said letters.
side of the controversy.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled

In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners' that the burden is on the employer to prove just and
evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. The valid cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure
check in issue was given to her, and she had no duty to to discharge that burden would result in a finding that
turn it over to her employer. Company rules do not the dismissal is unjustified. It clearly appears then that
prohibit an employee from accepting gifts from clients, Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information.
and there is no indication in the contentious check that it PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
was meant as a refund for overpriced medicines.
Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the
constitutional provision on the right to privacy and
communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it Catolico'sdismissal then was obviously grounded on
was inadmissible in evidence. mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid
causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination of employment; and even the dismissal of
Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due an employee for loss of trust and confidence must
process requires that an employee be apprised of the rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's
charge against him, given reasonable time to answer arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides,
the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee,
defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the to which class of employees the term "trust and
employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every confidence" is restricted.
kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his
defense, including legal representation. In the case
at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to As regards the constitutional violation upon which
explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in the NLRC anchored its decision, that the Bill of
Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
searches and seizures perpetrated by private communication and against unreasonable searches and
individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, seizures which is hereby set aside.
that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits,
such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil
liabilities.
March 12, 1987 Per Curiam
In re Wenceslao Laureta
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor
Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the
best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded
separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for
every year of service. In this case, however, Labor
Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half Facts: Almost identical letters were personally sent to
month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not Justices Narvasa, M. Herrera, and Cruz, and a fourth
oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice
the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Feliciano, all members of the First Division of the
Arbiter. Supreme Court, in a stance of threats to effect a change
of the Court‘s adverse resolution (in GR 68635: Eva
Maravilla Ilustre vs. IAC being dismissed),
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution
of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 30
September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in In said letter, it stated that petitioner intended to hold
NLRC-NCR CA No. responsible members of the First Division who
005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for participated in the promulgation of the three minute-
upholding the Labor resolutions in question.
Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence against private
respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained
Indeed,, Maravilla-Ilustre filed an Affidavit-Complaint against him for the statements, conduct, acts and
before the Tanodbayan, charging some Members of the charges against
Supreme Court with having knowingly and deliberately the Supreme Court and the official actions of the
rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in
Resolution anonymity behind his client‘s name, in an alleged quest
―making‖ her opponents the ―illegal owners‖ of vast for justice but with the manifest intent to bring the
estates; charging some Justices into disrepute and to subvert public confidence
Justices of the Court of Appeals with knowingly in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice.
rendering their ―unjust resolution‖ PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
―through manifest and evident bad faith‖; and charging
Solicitor General Sedfrey
A. Ordoñez and Justice Pedro Yap of the Supreme
Court with having used their power and influence in Issue: Whether the letters addressed to the Supreme
persuading and inducing the members of the First Court justices are matters covered by the constitutional
Division of the Court into promulgating their ―unjust right of freedom of speech and right to privacy.
extended Minute Resolution of 14
May 1986.‖
Atty. Laureta reportedly circulated copies of the

Complaint to the press, which was widely publicized in Held/Ratio:
almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any
copy furnished to the Supreme Court nor the No. Letters addressed to individual Justices, in
members.Thus, the SC in its resolution petitioner Eva connection with the performance of their judicial
Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, why she should not be functions become part of the judicial record and are a
held in contempt for her statements, conduct, acts and matter of concern for the entire Court. The
charges against the Supreme Court and/or official contumacious character of those letters constrained the
actions of the Justices concerned, which statements, First Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en
unless satisfactorily explained, transcend the consults and so that the Court en banc could pass upon
permissible bounds of propriety and undermine and the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the
degrade the administration of justice; and (2) Atty. exercise of forbearance by the Court that it refrained
Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show from issuing immediately a show cause order in the
cause, , why no disciplinary action should be taken expectancy that after having read the Resolution of the
Court en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would
realize the unjustness and unfairness of their

accusations. F. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The fact that said letters are not technically considered

pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after
the main petition had been finally resolved does not Nov 26 1970 J. Fernando
detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The Mutuc v COMELEC
constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to
privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous
acts against the Court. Also, Atty. Laureta has Facts: Petitioner Mutuc after setting forth his residency
committed acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for in Pampanga filed for candidacy as a member of the
his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to Constitutional Convention. His petition was granted y
the ―proper forum‖ to effect a change of the Court‘s COMELEC but he was prohibited from using taped
adverse Resolution; Atty. Laureta has committed acts jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems
unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of and loud speakers.
dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper
forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse He filed this petition for prohibition to assail said ruling
Resolution; and for authoring, or at the very least, of COMELEC as being violative of his constitutional
assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the right to freedom of speech.
contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious
charges of his client, respondent Ilustre, notwithstanding
his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with
them, which we find disputed by the facts and
circumstances of record as above stated; for totally Issue:WON the ruling of the COMELEC prohibiting
disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal petitioner from using taped jingles is a form of
considerations set forth in this Court's Resolutions of censorship and thus a violation of his freedom of
the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of last speech.
resort;

Held/Ratio: Yes. In unequivocal language, the
Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or
a free press. It has been a constant holding that this
preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
respect when what may be curtailed is the misrepresentation by the media shall be just cause for
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
the equally vital right of suffrage. What respondent licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies.
Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on
petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right
is directed. The constitutional guarantee is not to be
emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say,
but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape Thus this petition for certiorari was filed by Franks
or other Chavez alleging that such issuances by respondents
mechanical contrivances violated the freedom on expression and of the press,
and the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern,
February 15, 2008 CJ Puno

Chavez v Gonzales WON the regulations and issuances made by the NTC
were violations of the freedom of speech
The case involves the Garci tapes which on June 7, Held/Ratio:

2005 Atty Alan Paguia had released in the media. On
June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Yes. All speech are not treated the same. Some types
Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the
those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and State under its pervasive police power, in order that it
those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those
held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. On june 11, of the community or society. Thus the tests applicable to
2005, NTC issued a press release which stated that the each type also differ.
Garcia tapes were fraudulent and warned that the
The general tests are: a) the dangerous tendency

doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a In the case at bar what applies is the clear and present
rational connection has been established between the danger rule, as they questioned issuances were
speech restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when focused solely on but one object—a specific content—
courts need to balance conflicting social values and fixed as these were on the alleged taped conversations
individual interests, and requires a conscious and between the President and a COMELEC official.
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations
observable in a given situation of type of situation; and as to the time, place or manner of the dissemination of
(c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the speech or expression.
premise that speech may be restrained because there is
substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an
evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule
requires that the evil consequences sought to be
prevented must be substantive, ―extremely serious Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the
and the degree of imminence extremely high.‖ Philippines v
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 COMELEC
April 21 1988 J. Mendoza
To determine which test to apply, a distinction also has Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast
to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content- Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc (TELEBAP). is an
neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the organization of lawyers of radio and television
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens,
time, place or manner, and under well defined taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner is
standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or GMA Network Inc.
censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech. As regards the latter, They are challenging the validity of §92 on the ground
it is the clear and present danger rule which should be that:
applied.
it takes property without due process of law and without frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege
just compensation; subject, among other things, to amendment by
it denies radio and television broadcast companies the Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision
equal protection of the laws; and that ―any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be
it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
supervise or regulate Congress when the common good so requires. What
the operation of media of communication or information better measure can be conceived for the common good
during the period of election. than one for free air time for the benefit not only of
candidates but even more of the public, particularly the
voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in
an election? ―[I]t is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
Issue: WON Sec 92 of BP 881 is unconstitutional paramount.‖
As regards the argument that petitioners should be
compensated for the airtime, the court held that Under
§92 of B.P. Blg. 881, the COMELEC does not take over
the operation of radio and television stations but only
the allocation of air time to the candidates for the
purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal
Held/Ratio: opportunity, time, and the right to reply as mandated by
the Constitution.
No.
Finally, as regards the differential treatment between
Regulation of the use and ownership of print and broadcast media, the court held that there are
telecommunications systems is in the exercise of the important differences in the characteristics of the two
plenary police power of the State for the promotion of media, which justify their differential treatment for free
the general welfare. speech purposes. Because of the physical limitations of
the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave wishing to use them
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are
Held/Ratio: Yes. To compel print media companies to

Philippine Press Institute v COMELEC donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in
May 22, 1995 J. Feliciano Resolution No. 2772 amounts to "taking" of private
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 personal property for public use or purposes. The taking
of private property for public use is, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment
of "just compensation" There is nothing at all to prevent
newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily
giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes
contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of
Facts: PPI assails the constitutionality of Resolution Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a
2272 which grants free print space called ―COMELEC constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against
space‖ to be provided by at least one newspaper of their
general circulation in every province or city. PPI argues will, in the kind of factual context here present, to
that this violates the prohibition imposed by the provide free print space for
Constitution upon the government, and any of its Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid
agencies, against the taking of private property for exercise of the power of eminent domain.
public use without just compensation. Moreover, the
requirement that publishers give free "Comelec Space"
and at the same time process raw data to make it
camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary
servitude. Finally they argue that said resolution is a
violation of the freedom of speech, of the press and of
expression. March 31, 1992 J. Gutierrez
Adiong v COMELEC
Facts: COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347

Issue: WON Resolution 2272 is unconstitutional which provided for an enumeration of lawful forms of
proganda as well and Prohibited forms of propaganda
for the elections. It provides:
Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in

the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. — The following COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the
are lawful election propaganda: posting of
decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and
Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers, handwritten other moving vehicles.
or printed letters, or other written or printed materials
not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in width
and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That
decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Issue:
Section 21 hereof.
WON the prohibition provided in Resolution 2347 is
Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda. — unconstitutional
It is unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx

Held/Ratio:
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly
exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether Yes The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's
public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the
COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at Constitution. There is no clear public interest threatened
the campaign headquarters of the candidate or political by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the
party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's cherished citizen's right of free
own residential house or one of his residential houses, if PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
he has more than one: Provided, that such posters or
election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by
three (3) feet in size. (Emphasis supplied)
speech and expression. Under the clear and present
danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear
and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided
must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's Tolentino v Secretary of Finance

mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. October 30, 1995 J. Mendoza
Facts: These are motions seeking reconsideration of

our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases
When faced with border line situations where freedom for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No.
to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions Tax Law.
intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the
police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in
favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the
freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate Petitioners reiterate their previous claims that R.A. No.
are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of
elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the
to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed. Constitution. They complain that the Senate did not
pass it on second and third
The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
stickers not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches
in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place,
including mobile places whether public or private except
in areas designated by the COMELEC. Verily, the readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its
restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be own version (S. No. 1630)
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the which it approved on May 24, 1994.
citizen's private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle. The prohibition would not only
deprive the owner who consents to such posting of the
decals and stickers the use of his property but more
important, in the process, it would deprive the citizen of They also argue that said act discriminates against the
his right to free speech and information press and religion. PPI argued that by removing the
exemption of the press from the VAT while maintaining
those granted to others, the law discriminates against
the press.
Facts:
Gonzales v Katigbak
Issue: WON RA 7716 is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory against the press The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez,
President of the Malaya Films, a movie production outfit
duly registered as a single proprietorship with the
Bureau of Domestic Trade. The issue being raised is in
Held/Ratio: No. The Court held that as a general relation the classification of the film Kapit sa Patalim as
proposition, the press is not exempt from the taxing ―For Adults Only" by the Board of Review for Motion
power of the State and that what the constitutional Pictures and Television (BRMPT).
guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
out the press or target a group belonging to the press
for special treatment or which in any way
discriminate against the press on the basis of the
content of the publication. Initially, the sub-committee decision was to classify
Since what the law granted to the press was a privilege, said film as ―For Adults Only‖. It was only in the
the law could take back the motion for reconsideration that it was allowed to be
privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. shown without any deletions or cuts. However, BRMPT
The reason is that by granting exemptions, the State held that there remains deficiencies in the application so
does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign it will withhold the showing of the film until the
prerogative. In withdrawing the exemption, the law deficiencies were filled up. Thus this petition for
merely subjects the press to the certiorari.
same tax burden to which other businesses have long

ago been subject.
Issue:
WON there has been a grave abuse of discretion on

the part of BRMPT and whether or not said
July 22, 1985 CJ Fernando classification was valid
That there was an abuse of discretion by respondent

Board is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail
undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim was
classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion
Held/Ratio: or cut. Moreover its perception of what constitutes
obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive. This
Yes, there was an abuse of discretion, but it was not PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
grave
The court held that in order to avoid an unconstitutional

taint on its creation, the power of respondent Board is Court concluded that there was an abuse of discretion.
limited to the classification of films.This is not to deny Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain
that equally basic is the other important aspect of that such an abuse can be considered grave
freedom from liability. Nonetheless, for the purposes of
this litigation, the emphasis should rightly be on freedom
from censorship.
Viva Productions v CA and Hubert Webb

March 13, 1997 J. Melo
The test, to determine whether freedom of expression

may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil Facts: The case revolves around the film the Jessica
of a substantive character that the State has a right to Alfaro Story which depicts the life of Ms. Alfaro, part of
prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also which her involvement with the Vizconde Massacre.
present. There should be no doubt that what is feared Private respondent Hubert Webb sent a letter to Viva
may be traced to the expression complained of. The Productions warning them that the projected showing of
causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be said movie on the life story of Alfaro would violate the
reasonable apprehension about its imminence sub judice rule and his rights as
an accused.
Since said warning went unheeded, respondent filed a PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
petition for contempt complaining that the acts of
petitioner and Alfaro concerning movie were
contumacious, within the contemplation of Section 3,
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. specifically failed to lay down any factual basis
constituting a clear and present danger which will
justify prior restraint of the constitutionally protected
freedom of speech and expression save its plea for time
to hear and resolve the issues raised in the petition for
A cease and desist order was issued was RTC of contempt.
Paranaque. Respondnet also filed a petition for
injunction and damages with the RTC of Makati which MTRCB v ABS-CBN
granted injunction. The appeal by Viva Production to the
CA was denied. Thus this petition before the Supreme
Court. ABS-CBN aired ―Prosti-tuition,‖ an episode of the
television (TV) program ―The Inside Story‖ produced
and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female
students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to
pay for their tuition fees. Some of the students were
Issue: named by the segment as belonging Philippine
whether or not the the lower court erred in granting the Women‘s University and this caused a great uproar in
injunction sought for. the PWU.
Held/Ratio: Thus a petition was filed with the MTRCB alleging that
said episode besmirched the name of the PWU and
Yes. The court took note of the rather unreasonable resulted in the harassment of some of its female
period that had elapsed from the time of the issuance of students. MTRCB initiated a complaint in the MTRCB.
the restraining order by the Parañaque court up to the
writing of this decision. The Court also notes that the
order of the said court
Respondents‘s defense was that ―The Inside Story‖ is Held/Ratio:

a ―public affairs program, news documentary and
socio-political editorial,‖ the airing of which is protected Yes. Section 3 of P. D. No. 1986 provides the power of
by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression MTRCB. It states:
and of the press. Thus petitioner has no power,
authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior ―SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The BOARD
restraint upon respondents shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
x x x x x x
b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as

The MTRCB Investigating Committee ordered herein defined, television programs, including publicity
respondent to pay P20,000 for failing to ask for a materials such as advertisements, trailers and stills,
permit to show the episode of the said program. Said whether such motion pictures and publicity materials be
decision was affirmed on Appeal with the MTRCB. Thus for theatrical or non- theatrical distribution, for television
a petition for certiorari was filed with the RTC which broadcast or for general viewing, imported or produced
set aside said decision. Motion for Reconsideration in the Philippines, and in the latter case, whether
by MTRCB was denied. Thus this petition for certiorari. they be for local viewing or for export
The law gives the Board the power to screen,

review and examine all
‘television programs.’ By the clear terms of the law, the
Issue: Board has the power to
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 ‗approve, delete x x x and/or prohibit the x x x
exhibition and/or television
broadcast of x x x television programs x x x.‘
WON MTRCB had the power to review the program . Thus, when the law says ―all television programs,‖
―The Inside Story‖. the word ―all‖ covers all television programs, whether
religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc.
Respondents claim that the showing of ―The Inside
Story‖ is protected by the constitutional provision on
freedom of speech and of the press. However, there

has been no declaration at all by the framers of the ABSCBN v COMELEC
Constitution that freedom of expression and of the January 28, 2000 J. Panganiban
press has a preferred status.
An information was received by COMELEC from a

reliable source stated that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group)
The only exception to power of MTRCB to review are has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct
those exhibited the Philippine Government and its radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make [an] exit
departments/agencies and newsreels. Thus respondent survey of the vote during the elections for national
argues that said program is a newsreel and thus officials particularly for President and Vice President,
belongs to the exception. results of which shall be broadcast immediately." Thus it
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 issued a resolution which restrained ABSCBN from
conducting said survey. COMELEC argues that said
project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as
well as the unofficial quick count of the National
The MTRCB Rules and Regulations implementing Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). Comelec
P. D. No. 1986 define newsreels as ―straight news justifies its Resolution as having been issued pursuant
reporting, as distinguished from news analyses, to its constitutional mandate to ensure a free, orderly,
commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given honest, credible and peaceful election
issue are not considered newsreels.‖ Clearly, the ―The
Inside Story‖ cannot be considered a newsreel. It is ABSCBN filed for TRO before the court which was
more of a public affairs program which is described as a granted. This petition for certiorari was filed to assail the
variety of news treatment; a cross between pure resolution of COMELEC
television news and news-related commentaries,
analysis and/or exchange of opinions
Issue:
WON COMELEC has the power to ban ABSCBN from

holding and reporting exit polls.
In the case at hand, by the very nature of a survey, the

interviewees or participants are selected at random,
Held/Ratio: so that the results will as much as possible be
representative or reflective of the general sentiment or
No. view of the community or group polled. Moreover, the
survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the
by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in
purpose of determining the probable result of an general has probably voted for, based on the limited
election by confidentially asking randomly selected data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at
voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the
have officially cast their ballots. elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding and the
reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine
those of the elections, since the former is only part of
the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be
Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall indicative of the other.
be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
press. The Court has always ruled in favor of the
freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an
exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not
to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the
validity. To justify a restriction, the promotion of a more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is
substantial government interest must be clearly the dissemination of information meant to add meaning
shown. When faced with borderline situations in to the equally vital right of suffrage.
which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or
the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against
actions allegedly made to assure clean and free
elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom.
Social Weather Station v COMELEC G.R. No. 147571,

5 May 2001
Petitioners wanted to conduct an election survey Petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Elections
throughout the period of the elections and release to (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution
the media the results of such survey as well as publish No. 6520. He claims that said section in the nature of an
them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on ex post facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the
the publication of election survey results constitutes a assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech for an election offense for not removing such
without any clear and present danger to justify such advertisement, even if at the time the said
restraint. advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly
legal.
HELD: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid

because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a HELD: NO. Section 32, although not penal in nature,
category of expression even though such suppression is defines an offense and prescribes a penalty for said
only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental offense. Laws of this nature must operate
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by prospectively, except when they are favorable to the
means other than suppression of freedom of accused. It should be noted, however, that the offense
expression. It has been held that "[mere] legislative defined in the assailed provision is not the putting up of
preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public "propaganda materials such as posters, streamers,
convenience may well support regulation directed at stickers or paintings on walls and other materials
other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify showing the picture, image or name of a person, and all
such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the advertisements on print, in radio or on television
maintenance of democratic institutions.‖ showing the image or mentioning the name of a person,
who subsequent to the placement or display thereof
becomes a candidate for public office." Nor does it
prohibit or consider an offense the entering of contracts
for such propaganda materials by an individual who
Chavez vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 162777, 31 August subsequently becomes a candidate for public office.
2004 One definitely does not commit an offense by entering
into a contract with private parties to use his name and court suits their pasttime.‖ Upon such statement,
image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming petitioner was charged and convicted of libel.
a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non- removal
of the described propaganda materials three (3) days
after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If
the candidate for public office fails to remove such HELD: The Court acquitted the petitioner. It said that
propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be while the statements of Dr. Alonzo could indeed be
liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code considered defamatory, it nonetheless fell within the
for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it exceptions provided for by the first paragraph of Article
indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate 354. Consequently, the presumption of malice or malice
retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in in law was negated by the privileged character of the
this case. report. The privilege may only be lost by proof of malice
in fact. It is, nevertheless, settled that "[a] privileged
communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.
Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection
LIBEL which the law throws over privileged communications.
The ultimate test is that of bona fides."
Alonzo v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 110088, 1
February 1995
Petitioner, as Field Operations Officer of the Philippine

Medical Care Commission, filed a report with their head Baguio Midland Courier v Court of Appeals G.R. No.
office concerning the non-compliance of the Sto. Nino 107566, 25 November
Medical Clinic and the Our Lady of Fatima Medical 2004
Clinic. The report noted the several violations committed
by the clinics. In her closing statement, petitioner made Private respondent Labo was a mayoralty candidate for
mention that, ―This particular clinic should be closely Baguio during the 1984 elections. The Baguio Midland
monitored because, aside from the above mentioned Courier published election-related articles, several of
violations, the husband is a judge and it gives them a which cast respondent Labo in an unfavorable light (e.g.
certain amount of 'untouchability.' In fact, they make That he did not pay his debts, that he is illiterate, etc). A
charge of defamation of character was filed against
petitioner and one of its columnists, Afable. As a presumption. The burden of proving actual malice shall
defense, petitioners invoked public interest as a then rest on the plaintiff, private respondent herein. In
defense saying that the public has a right to know those addition, the Court ruled that petitioner Afable‘s article
running for public office. The CA denied this argument constitutes a fair comment on a matter of public interest
saying that the public interest and ―fair comment‖ as it dealt with the character of private respondent who
principles did not apply to the private respondent as he was running for the top elective post in Baguio City at
was, as yet, not a public officer and was thus a private the time. Considering that private respondent assured
citizen. his would-be constituents that he would be donating
millions of his own money, petitioner Afable‘s column
with respect to private respondent‘s indebtedness
provided the public with information as regards his
financial status which, in all probability, was still
HELD: Concededly, private respondent was not yet a unbeknownst to them at that time. Indeed, the
public official at the time the 10 January 1988 article information might have dissuaded some members of the
was published. Nevertheless, this fact does not remove electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but
said article from the mantle of protection guaranteed by such is the inevitable result of the application of the law.
the freedom of expression provision of the Constitution; The effect would have been adverse to the private
this Court had recognized the public‘s right to be respondent but public interest in this case far outweighs
informed on the mental, moral, and physical fitness of the interest of private respondent.
candidates for public office. Plainly, the rule only applies
to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair
comment being that which is true, or which if false,
expresses the real opinion of the author based upon
reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds. Fernando v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 159751, 6
While the law itself creates the presumption that December 2006
every defamatory imputation is malicious,
nevertheless, the privileged character of a Petitioners here were charged for the sale and
communication destroys said distribution of pornographic materials. Upon a valid
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 search warrant, the police searched the premises of the
store Music Fair where they found 25 VHS tapes and 10
different magazines which they deemed were
pornographic. At trial, the accused were convicted of the
crime charged.
Upon appeal, petitioners argue that the prosecution But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to
failed to prove that the materials confiscated from the conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled
store were indeed pornographic and insist that the discretion in determining what is ―patently offensive.‖
materials were covered by the freedom of speech for No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or
being expressions of artistry. exposure of obscene materials unless these materials
depict or describe patently offensive ―hard core‖
sexual conduct. What remains clear is that obscenity is
an issue proper for judicial determination and should be
treated on a case to case basis and on the judge‘s
HELD: As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the sound discretion. In this case, the trial court found the
State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals
mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from affirmed such findings. Findings of fact of the Court of
obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify Appeals affirming that of the trial court are accorded
the regulation or limitation. Necessarily, that the great respect, even by this Court, unless such findings
confiscated materials are obscene must be proved. are patently unsupported by the evidence on record or
There is no perfect definition of ―obscenity‖ but the the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of
latest word is that of Miller v. California which facts.
established basic guidelines, to wit:
OBSCENITY
(a) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a U.S. v Kottinger 45 Phil 352
whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
The accused Kottinger's camera store was raided.
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently Among the photos found were pictures that showed
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by native Filipino inhabitants in their native garb. He was
the applicable state law; and thus charged with violating Section 12 of Act 277, the
Philippine Libel Law. The photos were used as
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious postcards.
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
protected by the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of

the press.
HELD: Although Philippine laws do not define what

obscenity means, the Court defined the obscene or
obscenity as ―something offensive to chastity,
decency, or delicacy.‖ There are two tests to HELD: The Court dismissed. Newspaper publications
determine whether something is obscene: 1) whether it tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the
corrupts the minds of the viewer of such materials; 2) courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is
men as an indecency. In the case at bar, it only summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 otherwise after the cause is ended. It must, however,
clearly appear that such publications do impede,
interfere with, and embarrass the administration of
justice before the author of the publications should be
portrayed the inhabitants in their native attire. Moreover, held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded
there are foreign publications of a similar nature against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-
which are imported and circulated in the Philippines, important duty of the court to administer justice in the
such as a book about the Ifugaos. As such, the pictures decision of a pending case. There is no pending case to
were not considered obscene within the meaning of the speak of when and once the court has come upon a
law. decision and has lost control either to reconsider or
amend it. That, we believe, is the case at bar, for here
CRITICISMS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT People v we have a concession that the letter complained of was
Alarcon 69 Phil 265 published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
After the court handed down its decision in this main had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robbery in
case and while appeal was band, and after that decision had been appealed to the
then pending, one Luis M. Taruc caused the publication Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider
of a letter addressed to the President. The letter was a its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein
rebuke of the decision of the court and the magistrates was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the
who passed upon the case. Taruc was ordered to show important consideration is that it was then without power
cause why he should not be cited in contempt for what to reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered
he said. In response, Taruc argued for his absolution by upon the merits of the case, and could not have been
invoking, among others, that what he published was influenced by the questioned publication.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 this country, especially because the people have been
thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes
go scot-free‖ was publicized in leading newspapers.
HELD: There was no violation. The Court did not

Zaldivar v Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 79690-707 purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible
tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of
The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes
Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any
cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987 impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
Constitution, respondent‘s powers as Tanodbayan have justice."
been superseded by the creation of the Office of the
Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special
Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an
investigation and file cases only when so authorized by Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the
the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the
by the respondent wherein he included statements statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a
which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. nature and were made in such a manner and under
This include: (a) That he had been approached twice by such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible
a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the
slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That authority of the Supreme Court to confront and
he "was approached and asked to refrain from prevent a "substantive evil"
investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;"
and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair
cases against two Members of the Court." Statements hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of
of the respondent saying that the SC‘s order '"heightens the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system
the people's apprehension over the justice system in of a country and the destruction of the standards of
professional conduct required from members of the bar malicious attack on the proceedings of the Court as to
and officers of the courts, which has some implications cast doubt on the integrity of the Court. To be sure,
to the society respondent even stated that he abides by, and respects,
the decision of the Court, and was willing to go through
the usual remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration,
or simply to push anew for the third mode to amend the
Charter. His remarks about the Chief Justice eyeing a
Estrada v Evardone G.R. No. 175147. 6 December Senate seat were mere speculations/personal
2007 observations based on a precedent not derogatory or
contumacious enough to warrant sanction from the
Petitioners allege that respondent made derogatory Court.
remarks against the Supreme Court and then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban after the former handed out
its decision in the Lambino case. It was reported in the
PDI that Evardone asserted that the then Chief Justice We have held that the power to punish for contempt is
had intended to run for the Senate which precipitated inherent in all courts, as it is essential to their right of
junking of the initiative. Thus, petitioners allege that the self-preservation. Courts are universally acknowledged
Evardone meant to undermine the Court and show that to
its decision was tainted with partiality. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
be vested, by their very creation, with the power to

HELD: After a careful consideration of the parties' impose silence, respect and decorum in their presence,
arguments, we do not find respondent's statements and submission to their lawful mandates, and as
contemptuous. The Court finds sufficient and corollary to this proposition, to preserve themselves and
acceptable the explanation of respondent that he had their officers from the approach of insults and pollution.
no intention to undermine the integrity of the Chief Judges are enjoined to exercise such power judiciously
Justice, much less that of the Court so as to degrade and sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the
the administration of justice. There is nothing in his end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
statements that insinuate or suggest that the Court was preservation of the dignity of the Court and not for
susceptible to influence in Lambino. Neither is there retaliation or vindication. Thus, being a drastic and
anything in his statements that can be considered as a extraordinary remedy, the power of contempt should not
be exercised unless clearly necessary in the interest of restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to
justice. discipline its students and inculcate upon them good
values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free
speech in school is not always absolute. The court
upheld the right of students for the freedom of
expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of
Miriam College Foundation v Court of Appeals G.R. the school on the conduct of their students. Further,
No. 127830. 15 Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides
December 2000 that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely
on the basis of the articles they write
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
College Foundation‘s school paper were subjected to
disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline
Committee after letters of complaint were filed before
the Board following the publication of the school paper EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class
that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the
contents. The Committee found the defendants guilty rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power
and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to
Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the
preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee enforcement of rules and regulations and the
questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over maintenance of a safe and orderly educational
the defendants. environment conducive to learning. That power, like the
power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning
guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that
Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the
HELD: Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution cases filed against respondent students
guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes
the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free
from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some
Sam because it was done without trial thus violating their

155 - last right to due process of law.
two cases PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
156 - 4
cases
157 - 4
cases Issue: What is the role of the State, through the Courts,
on matters of religious intramurals?
Ray
158 -2
cases Held: The expulsion/excommunication of members of a
159 - 2 religious institution/organization is a matter best left to
cases the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons,
160 - 3 of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to
cases exercise control over church authorities in the
161 3 cases performance of their discretionary and official
functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church
regulations.
Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz (2005)
Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine

Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop ―Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a
de la Cruz declared petitioners religious organization except for the protection of civil or
expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine property rights. Those rights may be the subject of
Independent Church. Because of the order of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction
expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction possession of church property.‖
against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial
Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal 3. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE German vs. Barangan
(1985)
Facts: German et al went to JP Laurel St to pray and grounds from possible external attacks and
worship in St Luke Chapel. But they were barred by disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for
General Barangan and his underlings from entering the a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the
church because the same is within the vicinity of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and
Malacanang. And considering that German‘s group is imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public
expressively known as the August Twenty One morals, public health or any other legitimate public
Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench interest that the State has a right to prevent. The burden
fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to show the existence of grave and imminent danger
to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners.
ongoings within the Malacanang. Respondents were in full control and had the capability
to stop any untoward move. There was no clear and
present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the
security of Malacanang.
Issue: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to

worship and pray at St. Luke is a violation of their
freedom to worship and locomotion.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Estrada vs. Escritor (2003)
Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the

RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Held: No prohibition. Petitioners' intention was not really Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than
to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an twenty five years and had a son with him as well.
anti-government demonstration since they wore yellow Respondent‗s husband died a year before she entered
T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted anti- into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to
government slogans. While every citizen has the right to another woman. Complainant Estrada requested the
religious freedom, the exercise must be done in good Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According
faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was to complainant, respondent should not be allowed
designed to protect the lives of the President and to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the
his family, government officials and diplomatic and court allows such act. Respondent claims that their
foreign guests transacting business with conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the
Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to Jehovah‗s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
secure the executive offices within the Malacanang the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness‗ under the religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
effective when legal impediments render it impossible accommodation of morality based on religion,
for a couple to legalize their union. provided it does not offend compelling state
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed
Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
respondent for such conjugal arrangement. goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to
the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for

she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The
free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one Centeno vs. Villalon (1994)
of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As
Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of Facts: The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic
human rights. The State‗s interest in enforcing its organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of
order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and
concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is
her partner. Thus the State‗s interest only amounts to admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit
the symbolic preservation of an unenforced from the DSWD. As a consequence, an
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only
to public and secular morality. The Court further states
that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality information was filed against Centeno, for violation of
approach that gives room for accommodation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno
filed a motion to quash the information on the ground

that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an
offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers
solicitations made for charitable or public welfare
purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose Tolentino vs. Sec. Of Finance (1995)
such as the construction of a chapel.
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale,
barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as
on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to
widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and
Issue: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be enhance its administration by amending the National
construed in its broadest sense so as to include a Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits
religious purpose? challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.
Held: No and that legislative enactments specifically One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate
spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an exclusively in the House of
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," Constitution, because it is in
only goes to show that the framers of the law in PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
question never intended to include solicitations for
religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there
is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H.
Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to No. 11197 and S. No.
proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did
power. However, in the case at bar, considering that not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as
earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held
criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No.
Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
Constitution required by the Constitution because the second and
third readings were done on the same day. But this was
because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as
urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
exclusively in the House of Representatives as required the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a
by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on
analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue separate days and of printing and distribution can
bill which is required by the Constitution to originate be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist legislative practice.
that a revenue statute and not only the bill which PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law must substantially be the same as
the House bill would be to deny the Senate‘s power not H. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL Caunca vs.
only to concur with amendments but also to propose Salazar (1949)
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores
private bills and bills of local application must come who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment
from the House of Representatives on the theory Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members advanced payment has already been given to Estelita
of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid.
the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another
prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in residence, which was disallowed by the employment
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld restrained. The employment agency wanted that the
pending receipt of the House bill. advance payment, which was applied to her
transportation expense from the province should be
paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the Macros vs. Manglapus (1989)
right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave? Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and
prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel
documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the of the President's decision to bar their return to the
amount it may advance to a prospective employee or Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the
maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by
movement. The fact that no physical force has been the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair
not make less real the deprivation of her personal the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor
place to another, freedom to choose one‘s residence. the President impair their right to travel because no law
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, has authorized her to do so.
to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to
cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental
faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. They further assert that under international law, their
If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
the protection of courts of justice as much as the Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or Political Rights, which has been ratified by the
physical coercion. Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers However, right to enter one's country cannot be
granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones
Philippines. country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right

involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the
other countries or within the Philippines. These are what right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the
the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, right to return may be considered, as a generally
the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return accepted principle of International Law and under our
to one's country, a distinct right under international law, Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court
independent from although related to the right to travel. held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious
treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino
the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and has determined that the destabilization caused by the
the right to enter one's return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 achieved during the past few years after the Marcos
regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious
threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
country as separate and distinct rights. What the
Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each
state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his Manotoc vs. CA (1986)
residence and the right to be free to leave any country,
including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted
laws protecting the national security, public order, public bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a
health or morals or the separate rights of others. motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the
country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel
the United States, "relative to his business transactions has been violated
and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied
the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as necessary consequence of the nature and function of a
well as the communication-request of the Securities and bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel make himself available at all times whenever the court
abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to
Commissioner leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has
not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is
no indication that the business transactions cannot be
undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of I. RIGHT TO INFORMATION Chavez vs. PEA and
Appeals denied the petition. Amari (2002)
Facts: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates
Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on
PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal
Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition
a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new
bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. PEA
has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him asserts that in cases of on-going negotiations the right
from exercising his constitutional right to travel. to information is limited to "definite propositions of the
government." PEA maintains the right does not include
access to "intra-
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to

agency or inter-agency recommendations or promote transparency in policy- making and in the
communications during the stage when common operations of the government, as well as provide the
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or people sufficient information to exercise effectively other
are in the constitutional rights.
'exploratory stage'."
Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids

Issue: Are negotiations leading to a settlement with or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or
PIATCO within the scope of the constitutional guarantee review committee is not immediately accessible under
of access to information? the right to information. While the evaluation or review is
still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or
decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the
committee makes its official recommendation, there
arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the
Held: Yes. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution government.
explains the people's right to information on matters of
public concern: ―…Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, Garcia vs. BOI (1990)
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
limitations as may be provided by law." Further, The
State policy (Sec 28, Art II) of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest reinforces the
people's right to information on matters of public Facts: The case involved the application by a
concern. Taiwanese private corporation, the Bataan
Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), for registration as a
new producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. The
Philippine Board of Investments (BOI) approved the
application, giving various fiscal incentives owing to the mentioned Article 81 may be disclosed upon the
pioneering status of the investment. The application as consent of the applicant, or by order of a court of
approved specified the province of Bataan as the site competent jurisdiction.
for the proposed investment. However, news broke out
that the investor amended its application to change the
investment site from the province of Bataan to the
province of Batangas. The Congressman of Bataan (the
original site) who opposed the change in location of the The Court ordered that the petitioner could have access
investment, requested the BOI toprovide a copy of the to BOI‘s records on the original and amended
original application, the amended application, and the applications for registration excluding, however, papers
supporting documents to each. The BOI denied the containing trade secrets and other business and
request, stating that the investor (BPC) refused to give financial information.
consent to the release of the requested documents, PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
relying on Section 81 of the Omnibus Investments
Code, which states: ―Confidentiality of Applications.
All applications and their supporting documents filed
under this Code shall be confidential and shall not be The documents were used by the Congressman to
disclosed to any person, except with the consent of the support his opposition to the change of location of the
applicant or on orders of a court of competent proposed investment. Unfortunately, the court did not
jurisdiction.‖ articulate a test or definition of what is a commercial or
trade secret.
Decision
The Congressman filed a case before the Supreme

Court, which ruled that the requested copies of certain
documents may not be denied, as it is the constitutional 3.TEST OF VALID GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE
right of a citizen to have access to information on issues
of public interest under Article III, Section 7 of the 1987
Constitution. The confidentiality of the records on BPC's
applications is not absolute and based on above
GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L- the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the
27833; 18 APR 1969] substantive evil of elections, whether for national or
local officials, being debased and degraded by
unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and
undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
Facts: efficiency in government but of lives as well.
RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting
the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the
period of election campaign or partisan political activity Respondents contend that the act was based on the
was challenged on: police power of the state. Issue: Whether or Not RA
(1) constitutional grounds - the basic liberties of free 4880 is unconstitutional? NO, but only because they
speech and free press, freedom of assembly and were unable to get the required 2/3 vote.
freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act.
Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are
(2) the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for
period of election campaign are matters of political permissible restriction on freedom of speech.
expediency and convenience which only political parties
can regulate or curtail by and among themselves ―clear and present danger‖ rule - evil consequence of
through self-restraint or mutual understanding or the comment or utterance must be extremely serious
agreement and the degree of imminence extremely high before the
utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
(3) the regulation and limitation of these political matters against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented.
invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and It has the advantage of establishing according to the
present danger to the state, would render the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It
constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly
without effect. established.
Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as 'dangerous tendency' rule - ―If the words uttered
amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred to prevent, then such words are punishable.‖ It is not
rights of speech and press, of assembly and of necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
association. He did justify its enactment however under violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient
that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it

necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and an occasion for the imposition of such restrictions but
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the also that they be limited in scope.
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to
prevent. There are still constitutional questions of a serious
character then to be faced. The practices which the act
In this case, the clearand present danger rule was identifies with "election campaign" or "partisan
applied: political activity" must be such that they are free from
the taint of being violative of free speech, free press,
The term clear seems to point to a causal connection freedom of assembly, and freedom of association. What
with the danger of the substantially evil arising from the removes the sting from constitutional objection of
utterance questioned. vagueness is the enumeration of the acts deemed
included in the terms "election campaign" or "partisan
Present refers to the time element. It used to be political
identified with imminent and immediate danger. The activity."
danger must not only be probable but very likely
inevitable. They are: "(a) Forming organizations, associations,
clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the
In considering the constitutionality of the law, the Court purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
took into account that this was in response to a serious campaign or propaganda for or against a party or
substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses,
merely in danger of happening, but actually in conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
remedied undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against
a candidate or party;(c) making speeches,
This is not to say, that once such a situation is found to announcements or commentaries or holding interviews
exist there is no limit to the allowable limitations on such for or against the election or any party or candidate for
constitutional rights. The clear and present danger public office; (d) publishing or distributing campaign
doctrine rightly viewed requires that not only should literature or materials; (e) directly or indirectly soliciting
there be votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 for or against any party; (f) giving, soliciting, or receiving
contributions for election campaign purposes, either The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or
directly or indirectly." 45 As thus limited the objection commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against
that may be raised as to vagueness has been the election of any party or candidate for public office
minimized, if not totally set at rest. 46 and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of
campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation
However, the challenged statute could have been more of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking
narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional
requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and command.
present danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly
explained, such provisions were deemed by the .Unfortunately, the necessary two-third vote, however,
legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary not being obtained, there is no occasion for the power to
and appropriate response not merely to a clear and annul statutes to come into play.
present danger but to the actual existence of a grave
and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, Such being the case, it is the judgment of this Court that
dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of Republic Act No.
late has invariably marred election campaigns and 4880 cannot be declared unconstitutional.
partisan
political activities in this country. G.R. No. 123881 March 13, 1997
The very idea of a government, republican in form, VIVA PRODUCTIONS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet APPEALS AND HUBERT J.P.WEBB, respondents.
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs
and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case
of freedom of expression, this
right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
MELO, J.:
FACTS:
JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES

RTC-Paranaque restrained the exhibition of the movie, COALITION (ABC), petitioner,
the Jessica Alfaro Story. RTC-Makati also issued a writ vs.
of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner further RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of
proceeding, engaging, using or implementing the Manila, respondent.
promotional advertising and marketing programs for the
movie entitled "The Jessica Alfaro Story" and from
showing or causing the same to be shown or exhibited
in all theaters in the entire country UNTIL after the final
termination and logical conclusion of the trial in the FERNANDO, C.J.
criminal action now pending before the Paranaque
Regional Trial Court
ISSUE: WON both courts acted with grave abuse of FACTS:

discretion in restraining the exhibition of the film? YES
Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the
RATIO: Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City of
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October
26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting
from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the
United States Embassy,
The order of RTC-Paranaque specifically failed to lay
down any factual basis constituting a clear and present it was stated that after the delivery of two brief
danger which will justify prior restraint of the speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on
constitutionally protected freedom of speech and the last day by the International Conference for General
expression save its plea for time to hear and resolve the Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All
issues raised in the petition for contempt. (read the Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be
whole case, yun lang relevant for clear and present presented to a representative of the Embassy or any of
danger test :/) its personnel who may be there so that it may be
delivered to the United States Ambassador. The march
G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983 would be attended by the local and foreign participants
of such conference. There was likewise an assurance in
the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less
rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The
steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a
and rally." 4 rally or assembly. resort to force is ruled out and
outbreaks of violence to be avoided.For the.
The City of Manila however rejected their petition filing constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury
due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided,
against the advisability of issuing such permit at this
time and at the place applied for." 6 In this case, what is at issue are the places for the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 assembly. The applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will
take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of
The Mayor suggested, however, in accordance, that "a the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the required
Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the
safety of the participants themselves and the general . Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
public may be ensured." enable the public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit
ISSUE: WON the order of the mayor to refuse the or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
petition and to change the venue is constitutional? NO indispensable condition to such refusal or modification
that the clear and present danger test be the standard
Free speech, like free press, may be Identified with the for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
public concern without censorship or punishment. It is evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse,
respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
on a showing, as 's the case with freedom of Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the
expression, of a clear and present danger of a proper judicial authority
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. 18
In these cases:
There are of course limits to its exercise.What is
guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not
assurance that all steps for the safety of the rally were
(1) Luneta - There can be no legal objection, absent the to be made.
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the Wherefore the mandatory injunction to the petitioner is
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 granted.
peace rally would startWhenever the title of streets and

parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions. G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923
(2) US Embassy – THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-

appellee,
A novel aspect to this case is the fact that the vs.
Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.
Diplomatic Relations which states that ―. The
receiving State is under a special duty to take MALCOLM, J.:
appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission
against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any FACTS:
disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of
its dignity‖ Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon,
and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality,
However, they were unable to prove the presence of became engaged in a discussion regarding the
clear and present danger. To repeat, it is settled law administration of Governor-General Wood, which
that as to public places, especially so as to parks and resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The
streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off
dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, Wood's
whether an individual or a group. There was also PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous

comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in
head for having recommended a bad thing for the this instance, the attack on the Governor-General
Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." passes the furthest bounds of free speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words
He was thus charged and convicted in the lower court used, which could easily produce disaffection among
for a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a
do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
persons in authority obedient to the laws.
ISSUE: WON the conviction of Perez is valid? YES In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious
RATIO: words. He has made a statement and done an act
The provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet
so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of together for unlawful purposes.
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings
permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused of a
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and
effect be seditious.
But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, .G.R. No. 126183 March 25, 1999
the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and
press and of assembly and petition must yield to DE LA CRUZ v CA
punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution BELLOSILLO, J.:
and the laws, and the existence of the State.
FACTS:
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief
Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position,
like the Presidency of the United States and other high
offices, under a democratic form of government,
Petitioners are public school teachers from various

schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously The the teachers were penalized not because they
charged, preventively suspended, and eventually exercised their right to peaceably assemble but
dismissed in October 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. because of the manner by which such right was
Cariño of DECS. exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral
absences thus disrupting
The CSC ordered their automatic reinstatement without PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
backwages which petitioners questioned. In the CA,
their petitioners were dismissed for lack of merit.
Thus the present petition were petitioners contend they classes in various schools in Metro Manila which
were merely exercising their right to peaceably produced adverse effects upon the students for whose
assemble and should therefore be entitled to education the teachers were responsible.
backwages.
Petitioners contend that classes were not actually
ISSUE: WON petitioners‘ actions fall under peaceful disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately
assembly? NO RATIO: appointed by Secretary Cariño. Besides being a purely
As ruled in previous cases, the petitioners‘ actions factual assertion which this Court cannot take
"amounted to a strike in every sense of the term, cognizance of in a petition for review, the fact that the
constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized prompt remedial action taken by Secretary Cariño might
stoppage of or absence from work which it was said have partially deflected the adverse effects of the mass
teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out for protests did not erase the administrative liability of
essentially economic reasons — to protest and pressure petitioners for the intended consequences thereof which
the Government to correct their grievances, the strikers were the very reason why such prompt remedial action
perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation became necessary.
of
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED and the
the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
mass actions by the conventional term "strike" did not November 1995 and 24 April 1996 are AFFIRMED. No
erase the true nature of the mass actions as costs.
unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of which
was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers' SO ORDERED.
economic grievances.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, to reasonable discretion to
Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO [80 PHIL 71; L-1800; 27

JAN 1948]
determine or specify the streets or public places to be
Facts: used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping,
to secure convenient use of the streets and public
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal places by others, and to provide adequate and proper
of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court
public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of favored the second construction. First construction
grievances to the government. The reason alleged by tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use
the respondent in his defense of the streets. Under our democratic system of
for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable government no such unlimited power may be validly
ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and granted to any officer of the government, except
upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the perhaps in cases of national emergency.
losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar
speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the The Mayor‘s first defense is untenable. Fear of serious
faith and confidence of the people in their government, injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech
and in the duly constituted authorities, which might and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men
threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify
public order." suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
violated. believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is
1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with property is not enough to justify its suppression.
unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit
for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade,
or procession in the streets and other public places of
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.

2. Your organization will be responsible for any loss or
G.R. No. L-65695 December 19, 1983 damage to government property and for the cleanliness
of the Rizal Triangle;
HECTOR S. RUIZ, as coordinator of the Olongapo
Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, petitioner, 3. The parade/march shall proceed from the corner of
vs. Gordon Ave., and
RICHARD GORDON, as City Mayor of Olongapo Magsaysay Drive, to Rizal Ave., thence to the Rizal
City, respondent. Triangle
FERNANDO, CJ.: Even as there was no controversy to speak of, the SC

held it best to reiterate the following doctrine with regard
Petitionr Hector Ruiz, the Coordinator of Olongapo to freedom of assembly:
Citizen‘s Alliance for National Reconciliation wrote to
Respondent Richard Gordon for a permit to hold a "The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should
prayer- rally at the Rizal Triangle, Olongapo City on inform the licensing authority of the date, the public
December 4,1983 from 1:00 P.M. until it will be finished place where and the timewhen it will take place. If it
in the early evening. It was also requested that a were a private place, only the consent of the owner or
parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such
starting at 1:00 P.M will be held. application should be filed well ahead in time to enable
the public official concerned to appraise whether there
Due to misunderstandings and lack of initiative by may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
petitioner to check if his petition was granted, he filed a its grant but at another public place. It is an
petition with the SC in order for their rally to be indispensable condition to such refusal or modification
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
allowed. Unbeknownst to him, Gordon already granted applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his
the rally on the following conditions: decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmmitted to them at the earliest
1. The parade/march and rally will be peaceful and opportunity. Thus if so
orderly;
minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial

authority.
Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the

other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too FACTS:
strongly stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so
than on the other departments — rests the grave and Three sets of petitioners question the constitutionality of
delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and BP 880
deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula,
no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with They argue among
what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes others that (1) B.P. No. 880 requires a
'as the sovereign prerogative of judgment.' Nonetheless, permit before one can stage a public assembly
the presumption must be to incline the weight of the regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and
scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as present danger.
they do precedence and primacy.
(2) It curtails the choice of venue and is thus
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, this case is dismissed. repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 time and place of a public assembly form part of the
message for which the expression is sought.
(3) it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass

actions in support of the government.
ISSUE: WON BP 880 is

constitutional? YES
NC
RATIO:
G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably
BAYAN v ERMITA assemble and petition for redress of grievances is,
together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and
the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of manner of holding public
constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the assemblies.21
very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily
unprotected. shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies22
that would use public places. The reference to "lawful
. But it is a settled principle growing out of the cause" does not make it content-based because
nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 protection. Neither are the words "opinion,""protesting"
and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly
content based, since they can refer to any subject. The
words "petitioning the government for redress of
that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution,
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
the community or society. The power to regulate the tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is and is independent of the content of the expressions in
the rally.
A test has thus been laid down: There is no
previous restraint on the communication of views or Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for ground of clear and present danger to public order,
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt public safety, public convenience, public morals or
proceedings unless there be a "clear and present public health.
danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a
right to prevent." Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly.
The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march, parade,
In this case, BP 880 was made due to the Court‘s ruling procession or any other form of mass or concerted
in Reyes v Bagatsing It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. action held in a public place." So it does not cover any
No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but and all kinds of gatherings.
a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in
Osmeña v. Comelec,20 where the Court referred to it as
permit may be required for the exercise of such right in

Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until
the right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the that city or municipality shall have complied with Section
extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of 15 of the law. For without such alternative forum, to
the substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right.
Advance notices should, however, be given to the
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly
the speech is not relevant to the regulation.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED in part,
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law and respondents, more particularly the Secretary
provides a precise and sufficient standard – the clear of the Interior and Local Governments, are
and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
reference to "imminent and grave danger of a immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas
substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to designation of at least one suitable freedom park or
whether respondent Mayor has the same power plaza in every city and municipality of the country.
independently under Republic Act No. 716024 is thus
not necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was
not pursued by the parties in their arguments. SUBAYCO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (1996)
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of

the law provides for an alternative forum through the
creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is Facts: twenty (20) demonstrators were killed and
needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any time. twenty-four (24) others were seriously wounded by
gunshots during the Welga ng Bayan held on
The Court noted however that every city and September 20,
municipality MUST set aside a freedom park 1985 at Escalante, Negros Occidental. Twenty (20)
considering that the existence of such freedom parks is counts of Murder and twenty- four (24) counts of
an essential part of the law‘s system of regulation of the Frustrated Murder were filed with respondent
people‘s exercise of their right to peacefully assemble Sandiganbayan
and petition, the Court is constrained to rule that after against those allegedly responsible for the death
thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior and injuries of the victims. Charged were several
civilian government officials, personnel from the two of his men, Amar and Mercado. The tear gas
Philippine caused the demonstrators to lie face down on the
Constabulary and the Integrated National Police, and ground; they persisted in their places rather than
from the para-military group disperse. Then, a single shot rang out followed by
Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) successive gunfire from different directions. As one
witness had described it, it was like New Year‘s Eve.
The rally was without permit from the local authorities, This firing lasted for a few minutes.
although the plan was not kept secret from them.
Capt. Sanson had been heard by some of the witnesses
The Welga ng Bayan started as scheduled on to have shouted ―Stop firing‖ repeatedly and, after
September 18, 1985. some time, the firing had stopped, but not soon enough
for men and women from the rallyists‘ group who died
At around noontime on that day, there were speeches and others who were wounded as a result of the gunfire
delivered by speakers from among the demonstrators
using the public address system on an improvised HELD: The use of bullets to break up an assembly of
platform, addressing the crowd assembled in front of the people petitioning for redress of grievance cannot but
Rural Bank. The crowd also shouted anti-Marcos and be bewailed. It is bound to happen again for as long as
anti-Military slogans, among others. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
abuses in government abound. Precisely to help put a

After a last-ditch effort to peacefully disperse the crowd brake on official abuses, people empowerment was
by Ponseca through a letter to the demonstrators in codified in various provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It
front of the Rural Bank had failed, the dispersal is high time to remind our officials that under our
operation by Capt. Sanson began. Four firetrucks were Constitution power does not come from the barrel of a
dispatched to the crowd of demonstrators, two of them gun but from the ballots of the people. It is thus
— the Cadiz and Escalante firetrucks — towards the important to know the unexpurgated will of the people
demonstrators massed in front of the Rural Bank of for in a republican government, it is the people who
Escalante. These hosed the demonstrators with water should truly rule. Consequently, the right of the people
but even after the water from them had been exhausted, to assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of
the demonstrators stayed put. Capt. Sanson then grievance should not be abridged by officials
ordered the throwing of teargas to the demonstrators by momentarily holding the powers of government.
BANGALISAN vs. CA Held: As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, ―It is

not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional
Facts: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the
the 800 public school teachers who staged ―mass manner in which they exercised such right which
actions‖ on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of
grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure public service and classes in various public schools in
of the public authorities to implement in a just and Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient but non-
correct manner certain laws and measures intended for disruptive avenues, other
their material benefit. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the

Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to than the mass actions in question, whereby
comply with said order, hence they were charged by the petitioners could petition the
Secretary with ―grave misconduct; gross neglect of government for redress of grievances.‖
duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and
regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to
perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, It bears stressing that suspension of public services,
otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the
Philippines.‖ They were simultaneously placed under public, which is one of the reasons why the right to
preventive suspension. strike is denied government employees. It may be
conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and
Despite due notice, petitioners failed to submit their noble intentions in staging the ―mass actions,‖ but that
answer to the complaint. On October 30, 1990, the will not justify their absences to the prejudice of
DECS Secretary rendered a decision finding petitioners innocent school children. Their righteous indignation
guilty as charged and dismissing them from the service does not legalize an illegal work stoppage.
effective immediately.
management shall not lockout employees who are

members of the KMG during the term of this agreement.
GSIS Management shall also respect the rights of the
GSIS v. Kapisanan ng Manggagawa ng GSIS employees to air their sentiments through peaceful
concerted activities during allowable hours, subject to
Facts: Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October reasonable office rules ....‖
7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS personnel, PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
among them members of the herein respondent
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS ("KMG" or
the "Union"), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file
employees. Contingents from other government If the finger of blame, therefore, is to be pointed at
agencies joined causes with the GSIS group. The mass someone for non-exhaustion of less confrontational
action's target appeared to have been herein petitioner remedies, it should be at the respondent union
Garcia and his management style. While the Mayor of for spearheading a concerted mass action without
Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence resorting to available settlement mechanism.
of the participating GSIS employees was not covered by
a prior approved leave.
On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS

Investigating Unit issued a memorandum directing 131 MALABANAN VS RAMENTO
union and non-union members to show cause why they
should not be charged administratively for their FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme
participation in said rally. Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation. They were granted a permit to hold a
Held: The mass action was held to be invalid because meeting to protest the merger of two units of the
of a contract stipulation stating that: ―The GSIS university. On the scheduled date, the students
Management and the KMG have mutually agreed to continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time
promote the principle of shared responsibility … on all and held it in a different place from that indicated in
matters and decisions affecting the rights, benefits and the permit. They expressed in a vehement language
interests of all GSIS employees …. Accordingly, their opposition to the merger and as a result, classes
… the parties also mutually agree that the KMG shall and office work was disturbed. Petitioners were placed
not declare a strike nor stage any concerted action under preventive suspension. On appeal, they were
which will disrupt public service and the GSIS found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral
defamation. They were suspended for one academic

year. They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC.
HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and ISSUE: Whether or not a written contract between the
academic considering that the TRO issued by the SC school and its employees and students are valid only for
allowed the students to enroll. But there is a need to one semester.
pass squarely on the constitutional question. Respect
for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and HELD: The motion was denied. Furthermore, in
free speech calls for the setting aside of the order of conclusion, the court reiterates that while we value the
suspension. Suspending them for one year is out of rights of students to complete their in the school or
proportion considering that the vigorous presentation of university of their choice and while We fully respect their
views was expected. The excitement of the occasion, right to resort rallies and demonstrations for the redress
the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the of their grievances and as a part of their freedom of
exuberance of the youth should be taken into speech and their right to assemble, still such
consideration. rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always
be conducted peacefully, without resort to intimidation,
coercion, violence. Academic freedom in all forms,
demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise
would be subvert freedom into degenerate license.
ALCUAZ v. PSBA
FACTS: On May 2, 1988, the Second Division rendered

a decision in the instant case which prodded the
Intervener Union to file a motion for reconsideration, its AGLIPAY v. RUIZ
arguments hinges the pronouncement that: Likewise it
is provided in the Manual, that the written contact Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of
required for college teachers are for one semester. It is prohibition against respondent
thus evident that after the close of First Semester. The Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage
PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either stamps commemorative of the
with the students, or with the intervening teachers. Such 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner
being the case, the charge of denial of due process in contends that such act is a violation of the
untenable. Constitutional provision stating that no public funds
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any
church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result

of the principle of the separation of church and state, for chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the
the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words
will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to ―Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.‖ The
further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress
such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress.
providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for This was to ―to advertise the Philippines and attract
the production and issuance of postage stamps as more tourists,‖ the officials merely took advantage
would be advantageous to the government. of an event considered of international importance.
Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and
freedom to religion. NO propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim
violation or purpose of the Government.
Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious

freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however
not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion
and is not a denial of its influence in human EVERSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is Facts. The Petitioner in his status as a taxpayer filed
recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the suit challenging the ability of the Respondent to
purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt reimburse funds to parents of parochial school students
and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. for the transportation of their children to and from
4052 ―advantageous to the government‖ does not school. The Petitioner brought suit alleging that the New
authorize violation of the Jersey reimbursement statute respects the
Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not establishment of religion, by allowing the parents of
inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or parochial school students to benefit from the
religious denomination. They were not sold for the reimbursement scheme. The New Jersey Court of
benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage Appeals held that the statute did not violate the
stamps, instead of showing a Catholic Constitution and the Supreme Court of the United
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari to consider
the issue.
Issue. This case considers whether the parents of Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive
parochial school children can benefit from the same authority to issue halal certificates and perform other
services afforded to the parents of public school related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the
children. subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the
separation of Church and State and that it is
Held. Affirmed. unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies
and guidelines on the halal certification scheme
In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the because said scheme is a function only religious
Supreme Court found the statute was not organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly
unconstitutional because it was designed to provide a perform for the Muslims.
benefit to the parents of all school children, distinct from
any religious function in which the children engaged ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional
provision as to freedom of religion. YES
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, et al RULING: Without doubt, classifying a food product as
(2003) halal is a religious function because the standards used
are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving
FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as
under DSWD, is a nongovernmental organization that halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret
especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for
petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect
certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention
Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
Philippine Halal welfare of the community can justify the infringement
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion
is constitutionally unacceptable.
Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office

on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation.
vacancy, or in respect to the reformation of the

RAUL GONZALEZ v. ROMAN CATHOLIC certificate of registration so as to show the fiduciary
ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA. character of the title. Without deciding whether such
disposition of the surplus was proper or what should be
Facts: Gonzalez brought the suit against the archbishop its disposition in the future, that a son of the last
in the CFI of Manila and prayed for judgment declaring incumbent, who was properly refused appointment as
that he, the lawful heir to the chaplaincy and its income; chaplain because he had not the qualifications
establishing the right of the petitioner and his prescribed by the Canon Law, was not entitled, as the
successors to be appointed to and receive the income nearest relative, to the accrued surplus.
of the chaplaincy during their infancy whenever it may
be vacant and, pending such appointment, to receive
the income for their maintenance and support. The trial
court directed the archbishop to appoint Gonzalez as
chaplain; and ordered payment to him the sum being Austria vs. NLRC
the aggregate net income of the chaplaincy during
the vacancy, less the expense of having the Facts: Private Respondent Central Philippine Union
prescribed masses celebrated in each year. It reserved Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists
to the petitioner any legal right he may have to proceed (hereinafter referred to as the "SDA") is a religious
in the proper court for cancellation of the certificate of corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine
registration of the property in the name of the law and is represented in this case by the other private
archbishop. respondents, officers of the SDA)
Issue: Is the Gonzalez legally entitled to be appointed The records show that petitioner Pastor Dionisio V.
the chaplain? Austria worked with the SDA
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 for twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991.
Thereafter, on 16 October 1991, at around 7:30 a.m.,

petitioner went to the office of Pastor Buhat, the
Ruling: The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands president of the Negros Mission. During said call,
reversed the judgment and absolved the archbishop petitioner tried to persuade Pastor Buhat to convene the
from the complaint, 'without prejudice to the right of Executive Committee for the purpose of settling the
proper persons in interest to proceed for independent dispute between him and the private respondent, Pastor
relief,' in respect to the income accrued during the David Rodrigo. The dispute between Pastor Rodrigo
and petitioner arose from an incident in which petitioner members and relate to matters of faith, religious
assisted his friend, Danny Diamada, to collect from doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation.
Pastor Rodrigo the unpaid balance for the repair of the
latter's motor vehicle which he failed to pay to Diamada. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its
religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a
religious significance. Simply stated, what is involved
here is the relationship of the church as an
employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely
29 October 1991, petitioner received a letter of secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice
dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this
funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross case, petitioner was not excommunicated or expelled
and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an from the membership of the SDA but was terminated
offense against the person of employer's duly from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an
authorized representative, as grounds for the employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different
termination of his services. from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from
the religious congregation.
HELD: The case at bar does not concern an
ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the
State from taking cognizance of the same. An K. NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
ecclesiastical affair is
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 1. Scope
Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Assoc., Inc.

v. Sec. of DILG
"one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of 403 SCRA 558 (2003)
worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of needful Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of
laws and regulations for the government of the Sections 193 and 234 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise
membership, and the power of excluding from such known as the Local Government Code, for being
associations those deemed unworthy of membership. violative of the equal protection clause and non-
Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair impairment clause of the Constitution because of the
involves the relationship between the church and its withdrawal by the said Code of the tax exemptions
previously enjoyed by petitioners.
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no a change in the rights of the parties with reference to
violation of the equal protection clause. The equal each other and not with respect to non-parties.
protection clause under the Constitution means that no
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the Clemons v. Nolting
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other 42 Phil. 702 (1922)
persons or other classes in the same place in like
circumstances. The guaranty of the equal protection of Clemons, an American citizen, agreed to be
laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable employed as an electrical engineer for the government
classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) at the sum of $4,000 per annum. The government
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the promised to pay to the petitioner his salary in "dollars ;"
purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing the contract was made in the United States; the
conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of Government offered to pay the petitioner in "Philippine
the same class. The Court held that there is reasonable currency" at the rate of two to one which Clemons
classification under the Local Government Code to refused; at the time the payment in question was
justify the different tax treatment between electric offered, Philippine currency was at a discount; two
cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, pesos in Philippine currency was not equivalent to one
and electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. "dollar" and the petitioner insisted that his salary should
The Court likewise ruled that there was no be paid in "dollars" or their equivalent value.
violation of the non-impairment clause. The The issue in this case was whether the
constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the Government of the Philippine Islands, when it enters
obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change in into a contract with an officer or employee under a
existing laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change promise to pay his salary in "dollars," pay such salary in
must not only impair the obligation of the existing Philippine currency at the rate of two to one if the officer
contract, but the impairment must be substantial. What or employee insists that his salary should be paid in the
constitutes substantial impairment was explained by this terms (specie) of his contract. Respondent Auditor
Court in Clemons v. Nolting: A law which changes the General contends that under the laws in force in the
terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the Philippine Islands a debt of the Government, payable in
time or mode of performance, or imposes new "dollars," may be paid in Philippine currency at the rate
conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or of two to one even though the debt grew out of a special
authorizes for its satisfaction something different from contract which provided that the same should be paid in
that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the "dollars."
obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. The Court said that the right of the legislative
Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect department of the state to adopt legislation changing or
altering the obligation of contract has been answered in respondent filed an action to annul the foreclosure sale
the negative so many times that it scarcely merits the and breach of contract. While the case was yet pending
citation of authorities now in its support. A law which with the trial court, petitioner additionally received from
changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, the Land Bank of the Philippines cash and Land Bank
either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes Bonds in payment of the foreclosed parcels. The trial
new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or court ruled against respondent which the Court Appeals
authorizes for its satisfaction something different from reversed.
that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the The Court ruled that the parcels of land in dispute
obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. were clearly still subject to private respondent's right of
Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect redemption. It said that P.D. No. 27 had the effect of
a change in the rights of the parties with reference to impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage
each other and not with respect to non-parties. contracts affecting said lands. There is no question,
however, that the land reform program of the
2. Limitations government as accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and
a. Police Power mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12),
Philippine National Bank v. Remigio was undertaken in the exercise of the police power of
231 SCRA 362 (1994) the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the
Supreme Court that the Constitutional guaranty of non-
Respondent obtained a loan from PNB and impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the
mortgaged five parcels of land as security. Respondent exercise of the police power of the state. One limitation
defaulted on said loan; hence, PNB extra-judicially on the contract clause arises from the police power, the
foreclosed the properties in question. Respondent made reason being that public welfare is superior to private
partial payments to his indebtedness. Meanwhile, P.D. rights.
No 72 was enacted that mandated agrarian reform.
Under said law, lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not
be the object of the foreclosure proceedings after the Ilusorio v. Court of Agrarian Relations
promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972. 17 SCRA 25 (1966)
Pursuant thereto, an "Operation Land Transfer
Program" was launched; among the areas it covered Petitioners herein, Potenciano Ilusorio and
were the parcels of land. PNB offered to sell the land to Teresa Ilusorio, are co-owners of a parcel of land
respondent at a much higher price as to which he situated in the Barrio of Bantug, Municipality of San
refused since he reasoned that he had already paid Miguel, Province of Bulacan. The main respondents
more than double of his previous indebtedness. So, herein — i.e. the fifteen (15) winning tenants named in
the dispositive part above-quoted — have for years

worked on said land under the share tenancy system. Ganzon v. Inserto
Before the beginning of the agricultural year 1960-1961, 123 SCRA 713 (1983)
they gave notice to the petitioners, in conformity with the
provisions of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon initiated proceedings
amended, that they (respondents) wanted to change to extra-judicially foreclose a real estate mortgage
their tenancy contract from share tenancy system to executed by the private respondents in his favor. The
leasehold tenancy. Petitioners filed suit alleging that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed between
aforesaid section of said law is unconstitutional on the private respondents Randolph Tajanlangit and Esteban
ground that it violates the freedom of contract and Tajanlangit as mortgagors on one hand and Rodolfo
impairs property rights, as well the obligation of Ganzon as mortgagee on the other hand was to secure
contracts. the payment by the Tajanlangits of a promissory note
In upholding the constitutionality of the law, the amounting to P40,000.00 in favor of Ganzon. A day
Court said that the purpose of the law in question is to before the scheduled public auction, the private
maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and respondents filed a civil action for specific performance,
cultivation of the land or afford them protection against damages, and prohibition with preliminary injunction
unjustified dismissal from their landholdings. Republic against the petitioners with the respondent court. Then,
Act No. 1199 is unquestionably a remedial legislation private respondents filed a "Motion For Release Of Real
promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of Estate And For The Clerk Of Court To Accept Bond Or
the Constitution and in the exercise of the police power Cash In Lieu Thereof," which the trial court granted
of the State to promote the common weal. It is a statute notwithstanding the opposition of private respondents.
relating to public subjects within the domain of the The issue in this case is whether or not the trial
general legislative powers of the State and involving the court may order the cancellation of a mortgage lien
public rights and public welfare of the entire community annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the
affected by it. Republic Act No. 1199, like the previous payment of a promissory note and substitute such
tenancy laws enacted by our law-making body, was mortgage lien with a surety bond approved by the same
passed by Congress in compliance with the court to secure the payment of the promissory note.
constitutional mandate that 'the promotion of social The Court said that the questioned orders violate
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of the non-impairment of contracts clause guaranteed
all the people should be the concern of the State' (Art. under the Constitution. Substitution of the mortgage with
II, sec. 5) and that 'the State shall regulate the relations a surety bond to secure the payment of the P40,000.00
between landlord and tenant . . . in agriculture . . ..' (Art. note would in effect change the terms and conditions of
XIV, sec. 6)." the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very
issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the
efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition. exercise of the police power of the State in the interest
of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.
b. Eminent Domain
c. Taxation
Kabiling v. National Housing Authority
156 SCRA 623 (1987) La Insular v. Machuca Go-Tauco
39 Phil. 567 (1919)
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 1808, a law authorizing the expropriation of A contract was entered into between La Insular
properties in favor of qualified squatter families, on the and the two defendants, Manuel Nubla Co-Siong and
ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition Rafael Machuca Go-Tauco (as surety), whereby the
against impairment of the obligation of contracts. plaintiff became obliged to supply cigarettes daily to
The Court upheld the constitutionality of said Manuel Nubla Co-Siong in a quantity of not less than
decree. The stated objective of the decree, namely, to two nor more than five boxes of two thousand packages
resolve the land tenure problem in the Agno-Leveriza each at a fixed price of P172 per box. When the
area to allow the implementation of the comprehensive contract was executed, cigarettes were subject to a
development plans for this depressed community, specific tax of one peso for each thousand cigarettes
provides the justification for the exercise of the police which liability incurred to the manufacturer, plaintiff-
power of the State. The police power of the State has appellee La Insular. A new law was passed which
been described as "the most essential, insistent and increased the specific tax on cigarettes from P1 to
illimitable of powers." It is a power inherent in the State, P1.20 per thousand cigarettes. The monthly statements
plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, thereafter submitted to the purchaser by the plaintiff
rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state showed this increase. Defendant was not able to pay its
and imposing upon the government limitations to purchases to which La Insular filed suit for specific
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to performance. The trial court acted favorably to La
enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct Insular.
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measure The dispute is upon the point of liability for the
to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and increased tax imposed by Act No. 2432. Defendant Co-
welfare. Siong contends that said law increases from P172 to
The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No. P182 per box the price which he was obligated to pay
1808 impairs the obligations of contract is without merit.
for the cigarettes, which alteration in the contract has contracting parties is not thereby changed in the sense
the effect of releasing the surety. necessary to release the surety upon the obligation for
The Court held that that in order to effect a the purchase price of the goods.
release of the surety, the change in the contract must,
as a general rule, be made by the principal parties to 3. Franchises, privileges, licenses, etc., do not come
the contract. A recognized exception — more apparent within the context of the provision.
than real — is found in cases where sureties on official
bonds have been held to be released as a result of C & M Timber Corp. v. Alcala
changes effected by the Legislature in the duration of 273 SCRA 437 (1997), Supra
the official term or in the duties of the officer whose
fidelity is intended to be secured by the bond. C & M Timber Corporation seeks the nullification
In the case at bar the Government of the of the order of the Office of the President, declaring as
Philippine Islands was in no sense a party to the of no force and effect Timber License Agreement (TLA)
contract of July 15, 1913, between the plaintiff and the No. 106 issued to petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA No.
defendants; and it is readily seen that when the 106, with the expiry date June 30, 1997, covers 67,680
Legislature of these Islands increased the internal hectares of forest land in the municipalities of Dipaculao
revenue tax upon cigarettes, this was an act done by a and Dinalongan in the Province of Aurora and the
stranger to the contract, and not by any person in privity Municipality of Maddela in Quirino province. The
therewith. The consequence is that, properly speaking, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
the legislative fiat, placing the burden of the tax on the revoked said license on the grounds of gross violation of
purchaser, did not in any wise affect the obligation of its terms and conditions. It also did not reinstate their
the contract as between the parties. It was merely an TLA saying that it might negate efforts to enhance the
external factor which, supervening upon the situation conservation and protection of our forest resources. On
created by the contract, made it impossible for the appeal, petitioner points out that there is no total log ban
purchaser to realize the benefit which would have in the country; that Congress has yet to make a
accrued to him if the seller had been required to pay the pronouncement on the issue; that any notice to this
tax. Nearly all changes in taxation affect existing effect "must be stated in good form, not implied"; and
contracts in some way or other, but this does not that in any case, any new policy consideration should
necessarily change such contracts in a legal sense. be prospective in application and cannot affect
Hence, where an Act of the Legislature imposes a petitioner's vested rights in its TLA No. 106.
new or additional tax upon goods contracted to be sold The Court said that the cancellation of its license
and places the burden of paying said tax upon the does not constitute an impairment of the obligation of its
purchaser, the obligation of the contract between the contract. It cited the case of Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.
Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary: "while the and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
administration grapples with the complex and COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation media of communication or information during the
of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. . . . period of election.
More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a Radio and television broadcasting companies do
private logging company are pitted against that of the not own the airwaves and frequencies through which
public at large on the pressing public policy issue of they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses, permits and merely given the temporary privilege of using them or
license agreements are the principal instruments by franchise, the exercise of the which may reasonably be
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition burdened with the performance by the grantee of some
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is form of public service, such as providing print space or
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they air time to Comelec. Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 must
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to be deemed incorporated in R.A. No. 7252 granting GMA
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a Network, Inc. a franchise and does not constitute denial
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular of due process and that B.P. Blg. 881, §92 is not an
concession area and the forest products therein. They invalid amendment of petitioner's franchise but the
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national in accepting a public grant of privilege.
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed An administrative agency cannot, in the exercise
contracts within the purview of the due process of law of lawmaking, amend a statute of Congress. Therefore
clause." §2 of Resolution No. 2983-A of the Comelec providing
for payment of just compensation is invalid.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of B.P. Blg. 881, §92 does not single out radio and
the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections television stations in providing free air time. There are
289 SCRA 337, Supra important differences in the characteristics of the
broadcast media and the print media, which justify their
Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 prohibits the sale differential treatment for free speech purposes.
or donation of print space or air time for political ads, The freedom of television and radio broadcasting
except to the Commission on Elections. Petitioners is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded
challenge the validity thereof on the ground (1) that it to newspaper and print media.
takes property without due process of law and without What the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or
just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television regulate by Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, among
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; other things, is the use by media of information of their
franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print 3) Unless other fully effective means are devised to
space or air time for political ads. In other words, the inform accused person of the right to silence and to
object of supervision or regulation is different from the assure continuous opportunity to exercise it, person
object of the prohibition. must, before any questioning, be warned that he has
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
L. FREE ACCESS TO COURTS may be used as evidence against him, and that he has
Art. III, Sec. 11 right to presence of attorney, retained or appointed. 4)
Defendant may waive effectuation of right to counsel
M. MIRANDA DOCTINE and to remain silent, provided that waiver is made
Art. III, Sec. 12 voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 5) There can be
no questioning if defendant indicates in any manner and
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) at any stage of interrogation process that he wishes to
consult with attorney before speaking. 6) Police may not
The U.S. Supreme Court, through Mr. Chief question individual if he is alone and indicates in any
Justice Warren, held that statements obtained from manner that he does not wish to be interrogated. 7)
defendants during incommunicado interrogation in Mere fact that accused may have answered some
police-dominated atmosphere, without full warning of questions or volunteered some statements on his own
constitutional rights, were inadmissible as having been does not deprive him of right to refrain from answering
obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege any further inquiries until he has consulted with attorney
against self-incrimination. and thereafter consents to be questioned. 8) Coercion
can be mental as well as physical and blood of accused
It laid down procedural rules which the police and is not the only hallmark of unconstitutional inquisition. 9)
the prosecution should follow when a person is under Incommunicado interrogation of individuals in police-
custodial investigation. 1) Prosecution may not use dominated atmosphere, while not physical intimidation,
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, is equally destructive of human dignity, and current
stemming from custodial interrogation of defendant practice is at odds with principle that individual may not
unless it demonstrates use of procedural safeguards be compelled to incriminate himself.
effective to secure privilege against self-incrimination. 2)
“Custodial interrogation”, within rule limiting admissibility
of statements stemming from such interrogation, means People v. De la Cruz
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after 279 SCRA 245 (1997)
person has been taken into custody or otherwise
In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless same. While he admits having been at the residence of
bodies of Teodorico M. Laroya, Jr. and his children, 12- the victims on the night that they were murdered, he
year old Karen Verona D. Laroya and 10-year old John flatly denied having killed them as he left the trio well
Lester D. Laroya, were discovered in their residence by and alive that same night when he proceeded to his
their horrified neighbors. They were all bloodied brother's place in Fort Bonifacio. The trial court
consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of rendered judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse.
them had a knife still embedded in and protruding from The Supreme Court held that the accused under
their bodies when found. Karen Verona also bore custodial interrogation must continuously have a
external signs of sexual assault. None of their counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. Prior
neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome murders. to the commencement of the investigation, the accused
On June 27, 1992, the police authorities apprehended must be informed, on top of all his other rights
appellant. They interrogated appellant regarding the enumerated therein, that where he lacks a counsel of
crimes on the same day that he was arrested. The his choice because of indigence or other incapacitating
investigation commenced at around 9:00 A.M. at the cause, he shall be provided with one. Appellant's
police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal at the time when conviction must be set aside for his extrajudicial
appellant was still without counsel. confession obtained without assistance of counsel is
Appellant, who was afflicted with a problem in inadmissible in evidence against him; that the Bill of
expressing himself and with an impediment in his Rights treats of both "confessions" and "admissions" in
speech (ngo-ngo) and who only reached the fourth the same light. With the exception of appellant's
grade of elementary schooling, was charged with putative extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of
multiple murder. Appellant's defense was that he was his alleged guilt has been presented by the People.
not fully apprised of his constitutional rights prior to and
while undergoing custodial investigation. Appellant PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
testified that although he was conversant with Tagalog, JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-
he is unable to read and write, although he can sign his appellant.
name. He bluntly repudiated his extrajudicial confession BELLOSILLO, J
and insisted that he was never assisted by any counsel
of his choice, much less met said Atty. Lorenza Facts:
Bernardino-Villanueva, his supposed counsel. Record - Two men and a woman were seen grappling for
shows that his answers to the questions appearing in possession of a bag. After taking possession of the
his extrajudicial confession are in fluent, flawless and bag, the 2 armed men shot the woman in the head.
expressive Tagalog. Appellant further claimed that he They then boarded a tricycle driven by Del Rosario
was tortured by the police authorities into signing the
and sped away. Witnesses took note of the tricycle’s This concept of custodial investigation has been
plate number. broadened by RA 7438 42to include "the practice of
- The police then located Del Rosario and invited him issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in
for interview. Del Rosario then gave statements connection with an offense he is suspected to have
concerning the locations and identities of the committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides
gunmen. (He even went with them to the location of that —
the gunmen but one of the gunmen was found dead . . . . Any public officer or employee, or
after a shootout that had taken place earlier) He was anyone acting under his order or in his
thereafter detained in the police station as ordered by place, who arrests, detains or investigates
the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on a later any person for the commission of an
date. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His offense shall inform the latter, in a
Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance language known and understood by him, of
of Ex-Judge Talavera. He was later charged with his right to remain silent and to have
Robbery with Homicide. competent and independent counsel,
- Transcripts reveal that del Rosario was handcuffed by preferably of his own choice, who shall at
police because allegedly they had already gathered all times be allowed to confer privately with
enough evidence against him and they were afraid the person arrested, detained or under
that he might attempt to escape. custodial investigation. If such person
cannot afford the services of his own
Issues: counsel, he must be provided with a
W/N Del Rosario’s Miranda rights were violated. competent and independent counsel by the
investigating officer.
Held:
YES, THEY WERE From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police deprived of his rights during custodial investigation.
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular house of the baranggay captain, he was already under
suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a effective custodial investigation, but he was not
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating
incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it officers. The police already knew the name of the
encompasses any question initiated by law enforces tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since
deprive of his freedom of action in any significant way. 41 the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had
waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions

on his participation in the crime even before his actual Held:
arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same YES, THEY WERE
transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the The accused was under arrest for the rape and killing of
Bill of Rights. Juanita Antolin and any statement allegedly made by
His warrantless arrest was also illegal as it was not him pertaining to his possible complicity in the crime
among those permitted by Rule 113. without prior notification of his constitutional rights is
Dispositive inadmissible in evidence. The policeman's apparent
ACQUITTED and RELEASED attempt to circumvent the rule by insisting that the
admission was made during an "informal talk" prior to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. custodial investigation proper is not tenable. The
BENITO BRAVO, accused-appellant. appellant was not invited to the police station as part of
a general inquiry for any possible lead to the
perpetrators of the crime under investigation. At the time
FRANCISCO, J.: the alleged admission was made the appellant was in
Facts: custody and had been arrested as the prime suspect in
- Nine year old Len-len Antolin was found dead, an the rape and killing of Juanita Antolin. The exclusionary
apparent victim of rape with homicide. Bravo was seen rule presumes that the alleged admission was coerced,
talking to Len-len on the day of her disappearance, the very evil the rule stands to avoid. Supportive of such
inviting her to an alleged birthday party and to a treat presumption is the absence of a written extra-judicial
of balut and Coke. He was then seen to be leaving confession to that effect and the appellant's denial in
with Len-len. court of the alleged oral admission. The alleged
- The police found Bravo at his work place and invited admission should be struck down as inadmissible.
him for questioning after informing him that he was a
suspect for Len-len’s killing. At the police station,
Bravo admitted that he was with Len-len but he was Dispositive
too drunk on the night in question that he could not ACQUITTED and RELEASED
remember what he did to her. The police did not
inform Bravo of his Miranda rights because, according PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
to them, he was only being informally interviewed. vs. VALERIANO AMESTUZO y VIÑAS, FEDERICO
AMPATIN y SABUSAB, ALBINO BAGAS y
Issues: DALUHATAN and DIASCORO VIÑAS y ODAL,
W/N Bravo’s Miranda rights were violated. accused
KAPUNAN, J.:
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular

Facts: suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
- At 9:30 in the evening a group of eight armed men interrogation and propounds questions to the person to
wearing masks entered a house in Caloocan where elicit incriminating statements.iii[7] Police line-up is not
they robbed the premises and gang raped the owner’s part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to
niece and employee. counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
- Bagas, one of the accused, claims that police (with invoked at this stage.iv[8] This was settled in the case of
Ampatin, one of the accused) one day had barged into People vs. Lamsingv[9] and in the more recent case of
the handicrafts factory in Pasay where he was People vs. Salvatierra.vi[10] The right to be assisted by
employed as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and
for a certain “Mario” and searched the building. cannot be claimed by the accused during identification
Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial
back of his neck with a gun and uttered, “Niloloko lang investigation process. This is because during a police
yata tayo ng taong ito” and “Magturo ka ng tao kahit line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
sino.” It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to investigatory to the accusatoryvii[11] and it is usually the
Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who
look upon. gives a statement in the course of the line-up.viii[12]
- Bagas was then brought to the police station where he
faced the victims of the crime face to face. He was Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke
asked if he knew the co-accused and replied in the his right to counsel when he was presented for
negative. The policemen then told the told the identification by the complainants because the same
complainants that accused-appellant was one of the was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover,
suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional there was no showing that during his identification by
frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped the complainants, the police investigators sought to
when one of the policemen intervened. elicit any admission or confession from accused-
appellant. In fact, records show that the police did not
at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented
Held: before the complainants. The alleged infringement of
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 the constitutional rights of the accused while under
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
invoked only by a person while he is under custodial cases in which an extra-judicial admission or confession
investigation.ii[6] Custodial investigation starts when the extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
conviction.ix[13] In the present case, there is no such detention cell to be presented to them for identification,
confession or extra-judicial admission. the police made an announcement that he was one of
the suspects in the crime and that he was the one
As regards the manner of identification, there is no law pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of culprits.
requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification.x[14] The fact that he was brought out of Also, Bagas had a credible alibi. He was locked in his
the detention cell alone and was made to stand before place of employment in Pasay during the night in
the accused by himself and unaccompanied by any question.
other suspects or persons does not detract from the
validity of the identification process. Dispositive
BAGAS ACQUITTED.
However, we agree that complainants’ out-of-court
identification of accused-appellant was seriously flawed THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
as to preclude its admissibility. In resolving the
admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, vs. ANTHONY ESCORDIAL, accused-appellant.
we have applied the totality of circumstances test
enunciated in the case of People vs. Teehankeexi[15]
which lists the following factors: MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
xxx (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at - Escordial was charged with robbery with rape after
the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of allegedly breaking into a ladies’ boarding house one
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior evening, robbing the inhabitants of their money and
description given by the witness; (4) the level of raping on of them.
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the - Escordail, while watching a basketball game, was
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime invited to the police station where he was asked to
and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the take off his shirt. The rape victim positively identified
identification process. him through a rough projection, or a keloid, on the
back of his neck and his voice.
The out-of-court identification of herein accused- - The other inhabitants of the boarding house identified
appellant by complainants in the police station appears him through a police line up.
to have been improperly suggestive. Even before
complainants had the opportunity to view accused-
appellant face-to-face when he was brought our of the Held:
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused.
deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to This is because the results of these pre-trial
remain silent and to have competent and independent proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and
counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." 44 We have
custodial interrogation, the police obtained any thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled
statement from him – whether inculpatory or exculpatory accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for
- which was used in evidence against him. The records that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation
do not show that he had given one or that, in finding him is inadmissible as evidence against him.45
guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle
accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when Darunda in a show-up on January 3, 1997 and by Erma
subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark
committing the crime with which he was charged. In Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his
other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant did
from accused-appellant which should have been not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court
excluded as evidence against him. identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him.
As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses
counsel in a police line-up considering that such is regarding these identifications should have been held
usually not a part of the custodial inquest. 42 However, inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal
the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused- lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary]
appellant, having been the focus of attention by the illegality.'"46
police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object
as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already immediately when these witnesses were presented by
under custodial investigation when these out-of-court the prosecution or when specific questions regarding
identifications were conducted by the police. this matter were asked of them, as required by Rule
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be 132, §36 of the Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant
made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone must be deemed to have waived his right to object to
is brought face to face with the witness for identification, the admissibility of these testimonies.47
while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court
witness from a group of persons gathered for that identifications does not render the in-court identification
purpose.43 During custodial investigation, these types of of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the "fruits of
identification have been recognized as "critical the poisonous tree."48 This in-court identification was
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" which what formed the basis of the trial court's conviction of
accused-appellant. As it was not derived or drawn from can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer
the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a contemplated in the above rule.
consequence thereof,49 it is admissible as evidence
against him. However, whether or not such prosecution PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond AUGUSTO MANZANO y REYES, respondent.
reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.
ERNESTO NAVALLO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE QUISUMBING, J.:
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and Facts:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. - Manzano was arrested following a buy-bust operation
where he was caught selling 4 tea-bag sized plastic
PUNO, J.: bags filled with marijuana.
Facts: - Manzano claims he has been "investigated,
- An audit examination revealed that Navallo, Collecting interrogated and made to sign an accomplished
and Disbursing Officer of Numancia National booking sheet and arrest report without the benefit of
Vocational School, had a shortage of P16,483.62. counsel."
- Navallo claims he was deprived of his rights according
to II, 12 of the Constitution when he was “pressured” Held:
to sign the examination report. This Court has already emphasized that "(w)hen an
arrested person signs a booking sheet and arrest report
Held: at a police station, he does not (thereby) admit the
Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his commission of an offense nor confess to any
constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the incriminating circumstance." 2 The booking sheet is no
1987 Constitution. 3Well-settled is the rule that such more than a record of arrest and a statement on how
rights are invocable only when the accused is under the arrest is made. It is simply a police report, and it has
"custodial investigation," or is "in custody no probative value as an extrajudicial statement of the
investigation,"4which we have since defined as any person being detained. 3The signing by the accused of
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a the booking sheet and arrest report is not a part of the
person has been taken into custody or otherwise custodial investigation which would otherwise require
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant the presence of counsel to ensure the protection of the
way."5A person under a normal audit examination is not accused's constitutional rights.
under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN
alias TOTO, accused. GERRY GALGARIN alias custodial investigation as it was not given to police
TOTO, accused-appellant. officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit
Bellosillo, J.: sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if
he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could
Facts: have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all
- Endino and Galgarin stabbed and shot Dennis Aquino likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him.
in front of his girlfriend in Puerto Princesa City. Aquino
then died. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of
- Galgarin was arrested in Antipolo and was set to be television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the
transported to Palawan to stand trial. On the way to recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases,14 it is
the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme
station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by caution must be taken in further admitting similar
reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the
showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may
his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. His attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions
interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having
program TV Patrol. an accused admit an offense on television. Such a
- Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights
made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice
by the threats of the arresting police officers. He system.
asserted that the videotaped confession was
constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERIC
Constitution. GUILLERMO y GARCIA, appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Held: Facts:
Apropos the court a quo's admission of accused- - Guillermo, an employee of Keyser plastics,
appellant's videotaped confession, we find such approached the company guard and calmly told him
admission proper. The interview was recorded on video that he killed Victor Keyser and requested for help in
and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt carrying the body to the garbage dump so that he may
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of burn it.
newsmen. Such confession does not form part of
- Once police arrived at the premises, a half-naked The confession appellant made while he was under
Guillermo told them” Sir, hindi ako lalaban, susuko investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of
ako, haharapin ko ito.” They then found Keyser’s Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the
dismembered limbs and chopped torso. Keyser’s head protective standards laid down by the Constitution.
was found in a cement bag. Under Article III of the Constitution, 3[43] a confession to
- When the police asked how he did it, according to the be admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a)
prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he bashed the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession
the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after must be made with the assistance of competent and
Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a independent counsel; (c) the confession must be
carpenter’s saw. He then mopped up the blood on the express; and (d) the confession must be in writing.
floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to Even if the admission or confession of an accused is
the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of
coconut lumber and a carpenter’s saw. When asked counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
Keyser had been maltreating him and his co- given.
employees.2[17] He expressed no regret whatsoever
about his actions. Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the
- The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP appellant’s confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo
Station for further investigation, which was conducted PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to
without apprising the appellant about his constitutional his acquittal. The facts in this case clearly show that
rights and without providing him with the services of appellant admitted the commission of the crime not just
counsel. to the police but also to private individuals.
- Guillermo, who was in police custody, was Appellant’s spontaneous statements made to a private
subsequently interviewed by Gus Abelgas of ABSCBN security guard, not an agent of the State or a law
and Kara David of GMA 7 where he admitted enforcer, are not covered by the Miranda principles and,
committing the crime and expressed no remorse. He as res gestate, admissible in evidence against him.
described how he committed the killings as well as his Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the
motive (he was treated like an animal, being made to media, appellant not only agreed to be interviewed by
work for years without being paid and was improperly the news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his
fed). guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the
commission of the crime
Held:
2 3
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, and that any confession or admission obtained in
vs. LINDES PAYNOR, accused-appellant. violation of his rights shall be inadmissible in evidence
Regalado, J.: against him. As held in People vs. Gamboa, this
Facts: constitutional right applies only against testimonial
- Aquinaldo, a middle-aged teacher was stabbed and compulsion and not when the body of the accused is
killed inside her classroom. Witnesses saw a man in proposed to be examined. In fact, an accused may
blue maong pants, and white T-shirt printed in front, validly be compelled to be photographed or measured,
using slippers and a brown hat, and with a green towel or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to
wrapped around his neck. move his body to enable the foregoing things to be
- When police went to Aguinaldo’s family to inquire for done, without running afoul of the proscription against
possible suspects, they pointed to appellant, the “jilted testimonial compulsion
boyfriend” of the victim’s sister, as a possible suspect. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
- Policemen went to Paynor’s workplace and found him USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.
wearing maong pants, white T-shirt with markings in Sarmiento, J.:
front, with a yellow towel wrapped around his neck Facts:
and a brown hat on his head. He was brought to the - Usman Hassan, an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart
station where he was positively identified by cargador, was accused of murder for stabbing to
witnesses. death Ramon Pichel solely on the basis of one
- Appellant then asseverates that there was a violation witness’s testimony, which was taken only 2 days after
of his rights while under custodial investigation, in light the incident and sworn to 4 days after the killing and
of the Miranda doctrine, when allegedly the police was practically forced out by the police. Witness said
investigators unceremoniously stripped him of his victim was stabbed only once, which was disputed by
clothing and personal items, and the same were later the medico-legal report which found the victim tabbed
introduced as evidence during the trial. 6 times.
- Hassan was also “presented” alone to the witness by
Held: the police and the relatives of the victim in the Funeral
The Court is not persuaded. The protection of the Parlor.
accused under custodial investigation, which is invoked
by appellant, refers to testimonial compulsion. Section Held:
12, Article III of the Constitution provides that such The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to
accused shall have the right to be informed of his right confront and Identify the accused alone at the funeral
to remain silent, the right to counsel, and the right to parlor, without being placed in the police line-up, was
waive the right to counsel in the presence of counsel,
"pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence where De Leon Jr, J.:

there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all Facts:
told, subserted his reliability as eyewitness. This - Continente et al were charged with the crimes of
unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of murder and frustrated murder in connection with the
Identification, which revolts against the accepted ambush of US Col. James Rowe’s (JUSMAG
principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the Commander) car in the corner of Tomas Morato and
esteem of every just man, and commands neither our Timog, which led to his death.
respect nor acceptance."20 - Central Intelligence Service (CIS) agents established
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police through a confidential intelligence information the
investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness involvement of Continente, an employee of the U.P.
and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to Collegian in U.P. Diliman.
counsel in all stages of the investigation into the - Continente was taken into custody where he admitted
commission of a crime especially at its most crucial to his participation in the ambush as a member of the
stage — the Identification of the accused. surveillance unit under the Political Assassination
Team of the CPP-NPA. Documents were confiscated,
As it turned out, the method of Identification became including a letter which had the acronyms "STR
just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive PATRC" which allegedly mean "Sa Tagumpay ng
moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against Rebolusyon" and "Political Assassination Team,
the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The Regional Command".
police procedure adopted in this case in which only the - Itaas was likewise arrested following intelligence
accused was presented to witness Samson, in the information. He likewise admitted his participation in
funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving the ambush as member of the NPA’s Sparrow unit.
relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled - Continente and Itaas insisted on making extrajudicial
confession and thus falls within the same ambit of the confessions to the police despite the absence of
constitutionally entrenched protection. For this counsel. They were nevertheless provided with
infringement alone, the accused-appellant should be counsel by the police, who assisted them.
acquitted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Held:
vs. DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. Appellants Continente and Itaas may not validly
ITAAS, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, JAMES DOE, PAUL repudiate the counsels who rendered them legal
DOE and SEVERAL OTHER DOES (at large), assistance during their respective investigations as
accused, DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. biased and incompetent. It must be emphasized that
ITAAS, accused-appellants. both appellants never signified their desire to have
lawyers of their own choice. In any case, it has been Faustino Algarme and 3 friends were walking down
ruled that while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases the street when Hatton allegedly stabbed Faustino.
where a person under custodial investigation cannot Hatton and his companion fled while Algarme was
afford the services of the lawyer is naturally lodged in rushed to the hospital where he died.
the police investigators, the accused really has the final One of Algarme’s companions reported the incident
choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and to the police headquarters. Three policemen, one of
ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the whom was identified as Titing Varela, accompanied him
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where to the scene of the crime where they beamed their
he never raised any objection against the former's flashlights towards the house of Nonong Hatton where
appointment during the course of the investigation and he believed the tall man and his companion entered.
the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his According to Algarme’s companion, the day after the
statement before the swearing officer.xii[57] incident when he went to the Police station to shed light
If Atty. Manansala and Atty. Corpuz decided against on the incident, he narrated to the police officers what
advising the appellants notto give their statements really transpired. He told them that the features of the
involving the ambush, the said lawyers were merely assailant was still in his memory and that if they can
complying with their oaths to abide by the truth. The show or present a person who will fit his description, he
counsel should never prevent an accused from freely can identify him. He waited at the police station but the
and voluntarily telling the truth.xiii[58] Whether it is an police failed to present any person to him. On the
extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the second day after the incident, he was picked-up from
purpose is always the ascertainment of truth. xiv[59] What his office and made to identify their suspect who turned
is sought to be protected with the constitutional right to out to be the accused-appellant. The latter was sitting
counsel is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating on a bench in the police station and a policeman
facts. The right is guaranteed merely to preclude the pointed to him as their suspect.
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit Hatton interposed the defense of alibi. He testified
something false, not to provide him with the best that on that same night, from 6:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m.,
defense. he was in the house of his friend to celebrate the
baptism of a friend’s child. During the entire period, he
People v Hatton got up only twice to go to the comfort room.
16 June 1992 Issue:

Medialdea, J. 1. W/N Hatton was properly identified in a police
line-up.
Facts:
2. W/N he was deprived of his right to be This argument raised by appellant has no merit. The
represented by counsel. doctrine enunciated in the case of U.S. v Wade is that
the presence of counsel is indispensable in a post-
Held/Ratio: indictment line-up. In this case, the accused had already
1. NO. been arrested and a lawyer already appointed to
The prosecution through its witness, made it appear represent him. It was fifteen days after his arrest and
that the latter identified the accused-appellant in a the appointment of a lawyer to represent him when he
police line-up. The details however, showed otherwise. was presented in a police line-up to be identified by the
From his testimony, it is clear that he did not positively prosecution witness.
identify the accused-appellant. At the time of the In the instant case, Hatton was brought to the police
incident he made a very fleeting glance on the person station only to be identified by a witness to the killing of
who stabbed the victim. At that moment, he had the Algarme. Technically, he was not yet under custodial
impression that the assailant was a mestizo. During the investigation.
proceedings in the police station where he was The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
supposed to identify the assailant, he identified the investigation. i.e., when the investigating officer starts to
accused-appellant as allegedly the person who stabbed ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
the deceased, not because he was certain that the admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point
accused-appellant was really the assailant but because or stage. the person being interrogated must be
he was the only mestizo in the station and because he assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
was pointed to the policemen as their suspect. The fact extorting false or coerced admission or confessions
is that the accused-appellant was not identified in a from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for
police line-up. He was pointed to by the police as their the commission of an offense.
suspect. He being the only mestizo in the station, the
witness pointed to him as "the man." From all
indications, the identification of accused-appellant by People v De Guzman
Ongue was suggested by the police and this is
objectionable. Melo, J.
30 June 1993
2. NO.
Hatton argued that when he was presented in a line- Facts:
up of sorts he was not represented by a counsel. This De Guzman et al fired at a family in a jeepney hitting
allegedly violates his constitutional right to counsel the passengers and killing the father. They later
during custodial investigation. hijacked another jeepney and rode away.
The accused were identified from a group of 15 People v Ordono and Medina
persons who were presented to 3 of the victims.
During the joint trial of the cases, they were again Per Curiam
positively identified the as the perpetrators of the 29 June 2000
crimes. Particularly, Lorna Carteciano further testified
that Victor Nuñez was the gunman who shot her Facts:
husband, Major Carteciano, in the head. The decomposing body of a young girl was found in
(Topical) It is alleged that the accused-appellant was the bushes. She was identified as Shirley Victore, who
deprived of his constitutional right to counsel when he was reported missing 3 days before. The NBI
was subjected to a paraffin test without the assistance examination revealed that she was raped and strangled
of counsel. to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to the accused who
Issue: were invited by the police for questioning. However, for
W/N accused was deprived of his constitutional lack of evidence linking them to the crime, they were
right to counsel. allowed to go home.
They returned a few days later and acknowledged
Held/Ratio: having committed the crime. Acting on their admission,
NO. the police immediately conducted an investigation and
He was not then under custodial investigation. The put their confessions in writing. The investigators
right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an however could not at once get the services of a lawyer
investigation, that is, when the investigating officer to assist them in the course of the investigation because
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of
confessions or admissions from the accused. At such Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. Be
point or stage, the person being interrogated must be that as it may, the statements of the two accused where
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions were apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation the right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent
right is likewise not violated where during a police line- counsel of their choice. Upon their acquiescence and
up where the accused was identified by the victim, assurance that they understood their rights and did not
because he was not, at that moment, under custodial require the services of counsel, the investigation was
investigation. conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor,
the Chief of Police and other police officers of Santol, La
Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving During arraignment, they retracted their statements and
of their voluntary statements. pled not guilty.
They were thereafter detained. A local radio host
visited them to interview them. A few days later, they Issue:
were brought to the PAO for assistance and counseling. W/N their right to counsel was violated.
The PAO lawyer, Atty. Corpuz, apprised each of the
accused of his constitutional rights and, even though Held/Ratio:
their confessions were already written in their dialect, YES.
explained to them each of the questions and answers Custodial investigation began when the accused
taken during the investigation. He likewise advised them Ordoño and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police
to ponder the consequences of their confessions, Station to confess and the investigating officer started
leading them to defer the affixing of their second asking questions to elicit information and/or confession
signature/ thumbmark thereon. from them. At such point, the right of the accused to
After a week or so, the two separately went back to counsel automatically attached to them. Concededly,
Atty. Corpuz and informed him of their willingness to after informing the accused of their rights the police
affix their signatures and thumbmarks for the second sought to provide them with counsel. However, none
time in their respective confessions. Once again Atty. could be furnished them due to the non-availability of
Corpuz apprised them of their constitutional rights, practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the
explained the contents of their respective statements, remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of
and finally, accompanied them to Judge Fabian M. Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers could be
Bautista, MTC judge who further apprised them of their found. At that stage, the police should have already
constitutional rights and asked them if they had been desisted from continuing with the interrogation but they
coerced into signing their confessions. They assured persisted and gained the consent of the accused to
Judge Bautista that their statements had been given proceed with the investigation. To the credit of the
freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they police, they requested the presence of the Parish Priest
had not been coerced into giving and signing their and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the
confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked the accused relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of
Ordoño and Medina to affix their signatures/ coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution by the
thumbmarks on their respective confessions, and to accused of their statements before the police.
subscribe the same before him. Atty. Corpuz then Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence
signed their statements as their assisting counsel, of a lawyer during the investigation.
followed by a few members of the MTC staff who In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial
witnessed the signing. confession the accused's parents, older brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal time to deliberate upon them, this aid and valuable
judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of advice given by counsel still came several days too late.
the gospel as chosen by the accused may be present, It could have no palliative effect. It could not cure the
RA 7438 does not propose that they appear in the absence of counsel during the custodial investigation
alternative or as a substitute for counsel without any when the extrajudicial statements were being taken.
condition or clause. It is explicitly stated therein that The second affixation of the signatures/ thumbmarks
before the above-mentioned persons can appear two of the accused on their confessions a few days after
(2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the accused their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the
must be absent, and, (b) a valid waiver must be presence and with the signing of the MTC judge, the
executed. RA 7438 does not therefore unconditionally PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not make
and unreservedly eliminate the necessity of counsel but their admissions an informed one. Admissions obtained
underscores its importance by requiring that a during custodial investigation without the benefit of
substitution of counsel with the above-mentioned counsel although reduced into writing and later signed
persons be made with caution and with the essential in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
safeguards. Constitution. If the lawyer's role is diminished to being
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared
Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the document albeit an indication therein that there was
relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused,
police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12,
of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two par. (1), are not met. The standards utilized by police
(2) accused in continuing with the investigation was of authorities to assure the constitutional rights of the
no moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in accused in the instant case therefore fell short of the
writing and with the assistance of counsel. standards demanded by the Constitution and the law.
Consequently, any admission obtained from the two (2)
accused emanating from such uncounselled
interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any People v Bagnate
proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to Per Curiam
eight (8) days later does not remedy this omission 20 May 2004
either. Although there was a showing that the PAO
lawyer made a thorough explanation of the rights of the Facts:
accused, enlightened them on the possible The accused was turned over to the police for
repercussions of their admissions, and even gave them custodial investigation. Without asking the name of
appellant, the police officer informed him in the Bicol The next day, the accused was brought before
dialect of his right to remain silent, to be assisted by Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of
counsel, that whatever he says may be used against or Tabaco, Albay. Judge Base requested the presence of
in his favor, and that he cannot be tortured or molested. Atty. Brotamonte and subsequently examined the
Asked if he is willing to cooperate, the accused voluntariness and veracity of the confession as well as
assented and gave his name as Amado Magnate. It was the authenticity of the signatures of the accused and
later learned that appellant’s real name is Amado Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained to the accused the
Bagnate. When appellant told the police of his consequences of his confession to the crimes charged
willingness to confess, he was again informed of his and asked him if he was coerced into admitting them.
rights, and was asked if he wanted to be assisted by Judge Base inspected his body and asked him if he was
counsel but appellant said that his counsel was in forced or coerced. Judge Base then asked him if he was
Manila. The police offered the services of Atty. Paterno still willing to sign it again and he answered in the
Brotamonte, which appellant accepted. Before affirmative saying that his conscience bothered him.
proceeding with the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte Judge Base asked him to sign the confession again in
asked the policemen to leave the investigation room the presence of Atty. Brotamonte, after which the
and conferred with appellant. He introduced himself to accused affixed his signature.
appellant and informed him of his rights. He also asked There were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the
and examined appellant to see if he was physically extra-judicial confession of appellant showed how the
harmed by the policemen and found none although Atty. crimes were committed by him.
Brotamonte noticed that appellant’s left hand was Later on, the accused repudiated his extra-judicial
handcuffed to the table. Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte confession before the trial court and assailed its
that he is willing to give a statement. The investigation admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation of
was then conducted in the Bicol dialect, with the police his constitutional rights, particularly his right to a
asking the questions. It was translated thereafter into competent and independent counsel of his own choice;
English with the help of Atty. Brotamonte, for the and that he was not fully apprised of the consequences
purpose of putting it into writing. After typing the first of his confession.
page of the confession, Atty. Brotamonte translated and
explained the contents thereof to appellant, then Atty. Issue:
Brotamonte and appellant signed thereon. W/N his right to counsel was violated.
After appellant’s confession was typed and signed,
Atty. Brotamonte left the police station and went back to Held/Ratio:
his office. As far as he could recall, the entire process NO. To be considered competent and independent
took more than an hour. for the purpose of assisting an accused during a
custodial investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant
be “willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of of the imposable penalty of the crimes he was to admit
the accused, as distinguished from one who would is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellant’s
merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution regards
recital of the individual’s constitutional rights. In People as inadmissible in evidence is confession given by an
v. Basay, the Court stressed that an accused’s right to accused without having been informed of his right to
be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel remain silent, or, without having been given competent
contemplates the transmission of meaningful and independent counsel, preferably his own choice, or
information rather than just the ceremonial and if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in
principle." writing and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he
The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by
accused from saying anything which might incriminate violence or any other means that vitiated his free will.
him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty for
accused to admit something false. The counsel, the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption
however, should never prevent an accused from freely arise that the counsel is incompetent or not independent
and voluntarily telling the truth. In the present case, the just because he failed to apprise the accused that the
assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more than imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit
perfunctory. Before the onset of the investigation, Atty. is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally
Brotamonte privately conferred with appellant to immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt
ascertain the voluntariness of his confession and to in the commission of a crime.
make sure that no force or duress was employed by the
police authorities on the latter to make him admit the
crimes charged. He informed appellant of his
constitutional rights and was clear in explaining to him People v Lucero
the questions propounded by the police. Also, it was
shown that he signed the confession with the assistance
of a competent and independent counsel, Atty.
Brotamonte, and it was also sworn to by him before Puno
Judge Base, who, before administering the oath to 29 May 1995
appellant, conferred with him and informed him of his
rights and the consequences of his confession. Facts:
Lucero et al were charged with the crime of robbery attend the wake of his friend. He gave word that in case
with homicide. They ambushed the complainant and of need, he could be reached at his residence.
took with them cash and jewelry. Killed in the incident The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two
was the driver of the complainant. CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial
Lucero and the Echavez brothers were apprehended statement of was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was
by the Special Operations Group of the Central already signed by Lucero. In the presence of the two
Intelligence Service (CIS) and brought to their CIS agents, Atty. Peralta examined the document and
headquarters. Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to explained to Lucero its legal implications. He asked
conduct the investigation of the suspects. He declared Lucero whether he gave the statements voluntarily.
that even before the investigation started, Lucero Lucero replied in the affirmative. Atty. Peralta then
verbally admitted his participation in the crime and that signed the statement.
he was the one who shot the driver. In any event, Pfc.
Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He Issue:
informed Lucero of his constitutional rights to remain W/N Lucero was denied the right to counsel.
silent and to counsel. When Lucero told him that he had
no lawyer, Pursal informed that CIS Legal Department Held/Ratio:
about Lucero's need for a lawyer. In due time, Atty. YES.
Diosdado Peralta appeared at the investigator's office at There was no "substantial" compliance with the
around 9:00 p.m. He identified himself as the lawyer requirements of right to counsel. This is far from the
who was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about intent of the Constitution. The records show that Atty.
the latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to where Peralta's, who was not the counsel of choice of
Lucero was. appellant, arrived at the CIS Office an the second night
Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised of appellant's detention. More exactly, he arrived at the
Lucero of his constitutional rights. He explained to CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and talked with appellant
Lucero that he has the right to remain silent, that he is about his rights. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he
not obliged to give any statement to the investigators, received no reaction from appellant although his
and that even if he has already given a statement, he impression was that appellant understood him. Worse,
may refuse to sign it. He observed no reaction from Atty. Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS
Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the agents when his real interrogation started. He said he
impression that Lucero understood his advice. had to attend the wake of a friend. His attitude did not
Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down speak well of the importance he gave to his role as
Lucero's statement. When the investigator started counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the
asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to commission of a very serious offense. It was during his
absence that appellant gave an uncounselled custodial investigation and were duly represented by
confession. They tried to cure his uncounselled counsel (Atty. Ruben Zerna)."
confession for the next day, appellant was brought by On appeal, appellant Bandula argues that the
two CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the presence extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao
of these agents, Atty. Peralta asked appellant if he executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence,
understood the statements he gave and if he signed it inadmissible in evidence considering that they were
voluntarily. However, the Constitution requires the right extracted under duress and intimidation, and were
to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney
but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances in who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an
the case at bench clearly demonstrate that appellant independent counsel nor counsel of their choice.
received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the
prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to convict
People v Bandula him of the crime charged.
From the records, it was shown that when accused-
Bellosillo appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were
27 May 1994 investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no
counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day
Facts: after the custodial investigation with respect to accused
The accused were found guilty for robbery with Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant
homicide after killing a lawyer and ransacking his Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both
house. accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney
Among the evidence admitted were the alleged of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that
extrajudicial confessions of accused Bandula and violence was used against the accused.
Dionanao that they were merely forced to participate in
the commission of the crime by "Boy Tall" and "Boy Issue:
Short.""These extrajudicial confessions made by W/N there was a violation of the rights of the
accused Teofilo Dionanao and Aurelio Bandula accused.
extracted during custodial investigation," the trial court
ruled, "have all the qualities and have complied with all Held/Ratio:
the requirements of an admissible confession, it YES. The Constitution requires that counsel be
appearing from the confession itself that accused were independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special
informed of their rights under the law regarding counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the
police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure
Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions, whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence
considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an People v Hernandez
independent counsel. As a legal officer of the
municipality, he provides legal assistance and support Puno
to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the 4 December 1997
delivery of basic services to the people, including the
maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously Facts:
doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of Hernandez et al were arrested, one by one, as suspects
interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who in the kidnapping of Sharleen Tan. The first to be
cannot represent the accused during custodial apprehended was accused Hernandez. He was
investigations. arrested on February 5, 1992 by the Central Police
(Morales v Enrile) At the time a person is arrested, it District (CPD) in connection with another crime. When
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the CPD learned that Hernandez was a suspect in the
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the Tan kidnapping case, he was turned over to the CIS for
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his investigation.
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used In the CIS, Hernandez waived his rights to remain
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to silent and to counsel in the presence of one Atty.
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he Solomon Villanueva and voluntarily admitted his
chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone participation in the crime. In his extrajudicial
if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the confession, Hernandez confirmed that in January 1992,
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this his friend, accused Lorenzo, asked him to join his group
is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be to kidnap Sharleen Tan. He revealed their individual
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel participation. He stated that accused Bolante
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his and Jacob were the ones who abducted
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of Sharleen. Accused Mansuer drove the taxi carrying
the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The Bolante, Jacob and Sharleen. They dropped off
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not Sharleen at a house in John Kennedy Street, Project 8,
be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Quezon City. It was Jacob who got in touch with
Sharleen's family to demand for ransom. Mansuer and 2.(MAIN) W/N Atty. Villanueva not an independent
Jacob were the ones who picked up the ransom. After and competent counsel. ( They insist that Atty.
three days, Jacob gave Hernandez P15,000 as his Solomon Villanueva who was provided by the CIS
share of the ransom money. The confession of operatives to assist them in the waiver of their rights to
Hernandez led to the apprehension of the other silence and to counsel is neither an independent nor a
accused. competent lawyer. They argue that since Atty.
When arrested, accused Lorenzo and Tumaneng Villanueva was once a member of the Judge Advocate's
waived their right to counsel and agreed to execute Office, his sympathies are suspect. They also assail the
extrajudicial confessions in the presence of Atty. competence of Atty. Villanueva to assist them during the
Villanueva. Accused Jacob also executed an custodial investigation. Allegedly, at no instance did
extrajudicial confession and waived his right to counsel Atty. Villanueva prevent appellants from incriminating
in the presence of Atty. Solomon Villanueva and his themselves.)
common-law wife Margarita Albiso. Meantime,
accused Famodulan, was invited by the CIS operatives
to shed light on the kidnapping of Sharleen Tan. He
executed a sworn statement where he waived his rights
to remain silent and to counsel in the presence of Atty.
Solomon Villanueva. Held/Ratio:
For their defense, appellants simply denied
complicity in the kidnapping of Sharleen. Appellants 1. YES.
Lorenzo and Tumaneng claimed that their extrajudicial
confessions were elicited under duress. Appellant Extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary
Famodulan maintained that he merely picked up the for no sane person would confess to a crime unless he
money as directed by accused Hernandez. has committed it. Thus, the burden is on the accused to
prove the involuntariness of his confession. In the case
at bar, appellants did not satisfactorily discharge this
burden.
Issue:
Their accusation lacks proof and is belied by the
1. W/N the extrajudicial confessions are admissible records. No medical certificate was presented to prove
in evidence. their maltreatment. Neither did they exhibit any physical
marks of violence. The records reveal that appellants
did not file an administrative or criminal complaint
against their alleged torturers. During the preliminary
investigation, appellants even subscribed their from truthfully answering the questions propounded by

confession before Fiscal Reynaldo Lugtu who certified the investigators. For allowing the free flow of truth,
that he personally examined appellants and was fully Atty. Villanueva cannot be deemed as an incompetent
convinced that they voluntarily executed and counsel. A lawyer's oath binds him to prevent
understood their extrajudicial confessions. Hence, the falsehood and not to suppress truth.
trial court rightly rejected appellants' allegation of
maltreatment.
People v Barasina
2. ATTY. VILLANUEVA IS AN INDEPENDENT AND
COMPETENT LEGAL COUNSEL. Melo
21 January 1994
The fact that Atty. Villanueva is a retired member of
the Judge Advocate's Office should not cast doubt on Facts:
his impartiality in assisting appellants during their The accused shot and killed Fiscal Mayo. He was
custodial investigation. There is no concrete evidence apprehended while trying to escape.
of bias on the part of Atty. Villanueva. Appellants' (Relevant to topic) On appeal, the accused-appellant
charge is specious and speculative. (People v Aquino) makes reference to the manner the extrajudicial
The right to counsel is designed to preclude the confession and waiver were extracted from him in the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit absence of a lawyer of his own choice. He maintains
something which is false. It ought to follow that a lawyer that he procured the services of Atty. Romeo Mendoza
should never prevent an accused from freely and in the course of the custodial investigation but it was
voluntarily telling the truth whether in an extrajudicial turned out that it was Atty. Abelardo Torres who
statement or testimony in open court. While our assisted during the interrogation upon the directive of
litigation is adversarial in nature, its purpose is always to P.Lt. Surapa. Accused-appellant concludes that the
ascertain the truth for justice is not justice unless extrajudicial statement can not thus be utilized against
predicated on truth. The accused under investigation is him for want of competent, independent counsel of his
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of own choice.
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from them. Issue:
In the case at bar, appellants waived their rights to W/N his right to counsel as provided in the
remain silent and to counsel in the presence and with constitution was violated.
the assistance of Atty. Villanueva. Atty. Villanueva
cannot be faulted when he did not prevent appellants
Held/Ratio: Romero
NO.
Quoting the CA, the SC held that the claim of the 29 January 1998
appellant that he was assisted by counsel, not of his
own choice, is belied by records. During the custodial
investigation, he failed to indicate in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with Facts:
an attorney of his own preference before speaking or
giving any statement. Indeed, there is no showing that The accused were charged with the crime of robbery
he manifested any resistance when he was assisted by with double homicide.
Atty. Torres. The hiring of Atty. Romeo Mendoza as
counsel by the appellant after the custodial investigation Police Major Roberto Rosales of the Camarines
is an afterthought. Norte Integrated National Police testified that upon
Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12[1], appellant’s arrest, the latter was apprised of his
Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the constitutional rights. In the presence of Atty. Augusto
message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under Schneider, an investigation conducted by the police
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally ensued and statements therein were reduced to writing,
competent and independent attorneys from handling his signed and sworn to before Jose Panganiban Municipal
defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a Mayor Arnie Arenal, who likewise inquired whether or
custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the not appellant understood the consequences of his
accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of confession.
the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one Appellant, on the other hand, proffered alibi as his
reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. defense and that the extra-judicial confession was
This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated allegedly obtained through the use of physical violence,
by the framers of the charter. coercion and intimidation.
Appellant assails the lower court for giving weight
and credence to the extra-judicial statement, stating that
at the time of the taking thereof, he was assisted by an
ineffectual counsel who could not safeguard his
constitutional rights and interests.
People v Jerez
Issue:
W/N he was assisted by an ineffectual counsel While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where
rendering his extrajudicial confession inadmissible. a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the
services of a lawyer or (where the preferred lawyer is
unavailable as in the case at bar) is naturally lodged in
the police investigators, the accused has the final
Held/Ratio: choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and
ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
NO. EJ admissible. investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where
he never raised any objection against the former’s
When appellant executed the extrajudicial appointment during the course of the investigation and
confession, it was done in the presence of his counsel, the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
Atty. Schneider, and sworn to before Mayor Arenal. If statement before the swearing officer. Thus, “once the
indeed his confession were obtained as a result of prosecution has shown that there was compliance with
coercion and intimidation by policemen at the police the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation
station, he could have informed the Mayor of the advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary
maltreatment he suffered. Having failed to convince the and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his
authorities, the extra-judicial confession voluntarily confession is involuntary and untrue. The burden is on
made by Jerez is admissible in evidence. “The the accused to destroy this presumption. A confession
presumption, therefore, of spontaneity and is admissible until the accused successfully proves that
voluntariness stands unless the defense proves it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat
otherwise. or promise of reward or leniency.
Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it Although appellant thereafter claimed that the
denied his right to have an independent counsel of his confession he gave was made under duress, there is,
own choice. The records show that at the time the however, no evidence on record to support the
extrajudicial confession was executed, appellant same. In People v. Villanueva, the Court declared that
disclosed to the police officers that his counsel of choice “voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its
was Atty. Freddie Venida but that the latter would not be language such that if upon its face the confession
available as he is due to depart for Manila on the same exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to
day. Subsequently, Major Rosales suggested that Atty. cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details,
Schneider, supposedly the only lawyer available, which could possibly be supplied only by the accused,
appear as the counsel of appellant during investigation reflecting spontaniety and coherence which
and the latter answered in the affirmative. psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to
which violence and torture have been applied, it may be
considered voluntary.” A scrutiny of the sworn statement

discloses in detail relevant facts surrounding the Issue:
commission of the offense charged which the accused 1. w/n batocan’s extrajudicial confession as
himself could only have known. admissible evidence against him? No
2. w/n extrajudicial confessions of the Suelas as
People vs. Niero Suela (2002) admissible against them? No
Facts: Held:
3 armed men (Niero Suela, Edgar S. and Edgardo 1. With respect to Batocan, he did not finish first
Batocan) rob the house of Rosas. They took tv, cash, year high school. He was interviewed before he
jewelries etc amounting to P657K and stabbed & killed gave his confession for around five minutes. After
Gabilo. Edgar Suela contacted Rosas’ secretary, telling this initial interview with Atty. Rous, counsel just
her that if Rosas will agree, he will relay information as listened nonchalantly to the
to the identity and whereabouts of those responsible for questions propounded by the police and to the
Gabilo’s death for P200K. An entrapment ensued and answers given by Batocan. Atty. Rous’ attention
this effected his arrest. While under detention, the even seemed divided for while hewas attending
Suelas expressed their desire to give an extrajudicial the custodial investigation, he was also looking
confession. Hence, they were brought to the IBP for the over another paperwork on his desk. In view of
taking down of their confessions. In the extra judicial these, the court is not convinced that Batocan’s
confession of the Suelas they also impleaded Edgardo extrajudicial confession was obtained without
Batocan who also participated in the crime. A warrant of violating his constitutional rights.
arrest was issued against Batocan, during his custody
he also expressed his desire to give an extrajudicial 2. As to the Suelas, Atty. Sansano did not
confession. The trial court held that the appellants understand the exact nature of appellants’ rights
had been assisted by competent and independent to counsel and to remain silent during their
counsel during the execution of their extrajudicial custodial investigations. He viewed a refusal to
confessions. The letter of Nerio Suela addressed to answer as an obstruction in the
Director Rosas asking him for forgiveness as well as the investigation. Moreover, when he interviewed
discovery of the stolen TV set and knife in the former’s appellants, he did not even bother to find out the
house, further convinced his guilt. Finding the presence gist of their proposed statements in order to
of one aggravating circumstance (disguise) with no apprise them of the nature and consequences of
mitigating circumstance, the trial court sentenced them their extrajudicial confessions. Clearly and sadly,
to death. Hence, this automatic review of the Decision. appellants were not accorded competent and
independent counsel whom they could rely on them to a pawnshop in Tondo to have it tested. She was
to look after their interests. As to the admissibility told that it was genuine. However, she told the three
of the wristwatch, it is of limited probative value that she had no money.
as it was taken without a search warrant and not Regardless, petitioner and Garganta went back to the
as an incident of a valid arrest. It is clearly a fruit house of respondent the following day. The two
of a poisonous tree and as such, could not be convinced her to go with them to Angeles City,
admitted and appreciated against the accused. Pampanga to meet Arnold and see the gold bar. Arnold
informed her that it was worth PhP 60,000. After
a. As to Nerio Suelas’ letter to Director Rosas, respondent informed them again she had no money,
this was written while Nerio was no longer petitioner continued to press her that buying the gold
under custodial investigation. In open court, bar would be good investment. Due to their insistence
he admitted having written it. The fact that Paiste bought the gold bar for Php 50,000. Paiste had
he was not assisted by counsel when he the gold tested but it turned out to be fake; Paiste then
wrote it will not make the letter inadmissible proceeded to petitioner's house to inform the latter that
in evidence. Even excluding the wristwatch the gold bar was fake. Petitioner replied that they had to
and the written extrajudicial confessions, see Garganta, and that she had nothing to do with the
there is still material evidence on transaction.
record which prove beyond reasonable Paiste brought petitioner to NBI in the presence of a
doubt the commission of robbery with certain Atty. Tolentino where petitioner amicably
homicide. While under the new rules, promised respondent they would locate Garganta, and
an aggravating circumstance that is NOT the document they both signed would be disregarded
alleged in the information CANNOT be should they locate Garganta. Subsequently, Paiste filed
appreciated in determining the criminal charges against Aquino for Estafa. RTC held petitioner,
liability of the accused, the rules do not Garganta et. al. guilty as charged, CA affirmed.
prevent its appreciation for the purpose of
determining civil liability.
Issue: w/n the amicable settlement executed in the NBI
Aquino vs. Paiste is admissible as evidence? YES
Aquino, Garganta, and Adeling went to the house of Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated
Paiste to convince her respondent to buy a gold bar by law enforcement officers after a person has been
owned by a certain Arnold, an Igorot. After Paiste was taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
shown a sample of the gold bar, she agreed to go with of action in any significant way. It is only after the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the presence of
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular Atty. Uy safeguarded petitioner's rights even if the
suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the custodial investigation did not push through and
police carries out a process of interrogations that lend precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, that the rule intimidation.
begins to operate.
In CAB, petitioner was brought by respondent before
the NBI to be investigated, she was already under People vs. Judge Ayson (2009)
custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the
for her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It
she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the
one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed. sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him
However, it can be gleaned from the amicable of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation
agreement, as aptly pointed out by the CA, that the was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining
the crime was either aborted or did not push through as Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines
the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos
amicably settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his
waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The
both parties affixing their signatures on it in the findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he
presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino. refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating
that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He
It is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in proffered a compromise however this did not ensue.
the person of Atty. Uy, which was not objected to . Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against
Verily, she was provided with an independent counsel Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the
and such "right to counsel is intended to preclude the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit statement, to which defendants argued that the
something false. The lawyer, however, should never confession was taken without the accused being
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not
the truth."An amicable settlement is not and does not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of
partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
admission but is a contract between the parties within counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the
the parameters of their mutually recognized and prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law

excuses no one. The right against self-incrimination is
Issue: 1. w/n respondent Judge correct in making not self- executing or automatically operational. It must
inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness,
of accused? No the protection does not come into play. It follows that
the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a
Held: It should at once be apparent that there are two failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
(2) rights
1) right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in 2) Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also
accorded to every person who gives evidence, treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights.
whether voluntarily or under compulsion of These rights apply to persons "under investigation for
subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under
proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled investigation by police authorities; and this is what
to be a witness against himself" makes these rights different from that embodied in the
It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person
inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular administrative.
incriminatory question. However, the right can be This provision granting explicit rights to persons under
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in investigation for an offense was not in the 1935
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of
claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, "
right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under
before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to investigation for the commission of an offense"--
testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena 1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to
must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be counsel, and to be informed of such right, 21
sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular 2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
question is addressed to him, the answer to which may means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to him;
answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty. 3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these
It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.
accordance with the well known axiom that every one is
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this
procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police Court ruled that such a statement was admissible,
custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as compliance with the constitutional procedure on
the commencement of an adversary proceeding against custodial interrogation not being exigible under the
the suspect.24 circumstances.
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right and subsequently charged with its commission in court,
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to producing evidence, to wit:
any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with
those rights must be afforded to him throughout the the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, after having been taken into custody or otherwise
such opportunity afforded him, the individual may deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to
to answer or make a statement. But unless and until remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat,
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free
of interrogation can be used against him. will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado rights rejected; and
interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated 2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement a) to refuse to be a witness;
without full warnings of constitutional rights." b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by
such refusal;
Not every statement made to the police by a person c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-
involved in some crime is within the scope of the examination by the prosecution;
constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific
interrogation," or "under investigation for the question which tends to incriminate him for some crime
commission of an offense," the statement is not other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to It should by now be abundantly apparent that
a police precinct and before any sort of investigation respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and
could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20,
up for the killing of an old woman because she was Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them
as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one *case did not discuss the facts of the case, it focused on
with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be a discourse of the history of the Right Against Self
sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by Incrimination. (Lifted relevant text from case)*
arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis
was however so far divorced from the actual and correct No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
state of the constitutional and legal principles involved himself. Any person under investigation for the
as to make application of said thesis to the case before commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.
capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
as they are hereby, annulled and set aside. him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
In CAB Ramos was not in any sense under custodial shall be inadmissible in evidence, and specifically, the
interrogation, as the term should be properly portion thereof which declares inadmissible a
understood, prior to and during the administrative confession obtained from a person under investigation
inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in for the commission of an offense who has not been
which he appeared to have had a hand. It is also clear, informed of his right (to remain silent and) to counsel.
too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions
posed to him on the first day of the administrative We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the mandate has and should be given a prospective and not
proceedings should be recorded, the record having a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession
thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal obtained from a person under investigation for the
action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just commission of an offense, who has not been informed
as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in
that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the evidence if the same had been obtained after the
day before the investigation, offering to compromise his effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973.
liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence
spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded against the accused, if the same had been
on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution,
not been accorded to Ramos. even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he
had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no
Magtoto vs. Manguera (1975) law gave the accused the right to be so informed before
that date.
The Constitutional Convention at the time it deliberated the law on the matter. But it is only now that it had come
on Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution was under Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
aware of the Escobedo and Miranda rule which had That is all that our duty and power ordain Us to
been rejected in the case of Jose. That is the reason proclaim; We cannot properly do more.
why the Miranda-Escobedo rule was expressly included
as a new right granted to a detained person in the People v Tunday (1988)
present provision of Section 20, Article IV of the New
Constitution. Facts:
When Delegate de Guzman (A) submitted the draft of Jarolan Lawre, who was convicted of qualified theft and
this Section 20, Article IV to the October 26, 1972 sentenced to reclusion perpetua on the basis mainly of
meeting of the 17-man committee of the Steering his extrajudicial confession. Lawre and 2 others illegally
Council, Delegate Leviste (O) expressly made of record took an Isuzu truck loaded with 14 rolls of iron rod while
that "we are adopting here the rulings of US Supreme it was parked in the corner of Tondo. En route the truck
Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases." And We cannot collided with a jeep and Lawre's companions fled,
agree with the insinuation in the dissenting opinion of leaving him alone at the wheel. Sulit who was directing
Justice Castro that the Delegates did not know of the traffic, approached Lawre and asked him why he did not
existence of the second paragraph of Art. 125 of the stop at the timely traffic signal but all the latter did was
Revised Penal Code. scratch his head. Then he suddenly ran away. Abad,
Hence, We repeat, this historical background of Section the owner of the truck, reported the incident to the
20, Article IV of the New Constitution, in Our considered police which, on the basis of the Identification furnished
opinion, clearly shows that the new right granted therein by Sulit, arrested Lawre and his co-accused Alfredo
to a detained person to counsel and to be informed of Tunday. Lawre gave a statement in which he admitted
such right under pain of his confession being declared stealing the truck with its contents, but Tunday refused
inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a to submit to any interrogation. Tunday was eventually
prospective and not a retroactive effect. It did not exist acquitted for insufficient evidence, but Lawre was found
before its incorporation in our New Constitution, as We guilty despite his defense of alibi and his allegation that
held in the Jose and Paras cases, supra. the extrajudicial confession was illegally obtained.
The authors of the dissenting opinions ignore the
historical fact that the constitutional and legal Issue: w/n the extrajudicial admission of Tunday is
guarantees as well as the legal precedents that insure admissible? No, not admissible.
that the confession be voluntary, underwent a slow and
tedious development. The constitutional guarantee in Held:
question might indeed have come late in the progress of
Examination of the extrajudicial confession shows the same in the corner of Rodriguez and Patria streets
it is lacking with details that according to the trial court when the period of the truck ban began. When the truck
bespeak the guilt of the accused as no one but the collided with the jeep, it was already in the comer of
actual perpetrator of the offense could have described it Lopez and Rodriguez streets, and the person at the
with such particularity. As convincing as it appears to wheel was the accused-appellant. He was caught red-
be, however, it must still be rejected for violation of the handed. When questioned, he simply scratched his
Constitution. head, and the next instant he had already bolted. The
“In Galit, we held that a confession must be made with accused-appellant was positively Identified as the
the assistance of counsel unless the right to counsel is person in possession — of and actually driving — the
waived with the assistance of counsel. Under Article III, stolen truck. But all he pleaded in his defense was his
Section 12 of the new Constitution, it is not only feeble alibi.
provided that the right to the assistance of counsel, to
be validly waived, must be made in writing but that it Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan263 SCRA 222 (1996)
must also be done in the presence of counsel. These
requirements have not been met." Facts: Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police
Apart from this, it is clear from the said sworn investigator of the Western Police District inMetro
statement that the accused-appellant was not properly Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected
informed of his constitutional rights. Typically, the criminals. A recipient of various awards and
interrogation began with the standard sacramental commendations attesting to his competence and
recital of such rights, but without any effort to explain performance as a police officer, he could not therefore
them, and ended with the mechanical question of imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other
whether he understood the notification, followed by the side of the investigation table as the suspected
usual docile "Opo" from the suspect. There is now a mastermind of the armed hijacking of apostal delivery
long list of cases that have outlawed this unfeeling van. Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and
procedure as not sufficient to satisfy the imperative pointed to three other soldiers, namely,
requisites laid down by the Bill of Rights for the Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles
protection of the person under custodial (who turned out to be a discharged soldier), as his
investigation. The confession having been obtained in confederates. In May 1982, petitioner executed a sworn
violation of the Bill of Rights, it is not admissible in statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos
evidence against the accused-appellant. and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero. Peitioner however sought
Still and all, the conviction can be sustained, but later that his confession be inadmissible evidence,
on another basis. The evidence shows conclusively that saying that the law should favour him as an accused.
the authorized driver of the truck Cabilto, who parked
Issue: “(1) Any person under investigation for the

w/n A A3.12 1987 Constitution shall be given a commission of an offense shall have the right to be
retroactive effect and petitioner’s extrajudicial informed of his right to remain silent and to have
confession be held as in admissible evidence? No competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
Held: of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
Petitioner contends that respondent Court erred in
presence of counsel.
admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding
uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
he was made to sign the same through torture,
any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
intimidation and without the presence and assistance of
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
counsel. He also claims that in executing the
are prohibited.
extrajudicial confession, he was denied the right to
counsel in the same way that his waiver of the said right (3) Any confession or admission obtained in
was likewise without the benefit of counsel. violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the inadmissible in evidence against him.
1973 Constitution reads as follows:
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil
“No person shall be compelled to be a witness sanctions for violations of this section as well as
against himself. Any person under investigation for compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
the commission of an offense shall have the right to torture or similar practices and their families.”
remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of
such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, In Magtoto case itheld that the provisions of the
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall 1973 Constitution (which were not included in the 1935
be used against him. Any confession obtained in Charter) must be prospectively applied. By parity of
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987
evidence.” Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his
In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused right to counsel during custodial investigation must be
under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied
are, inter alia, as follows: retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial
confession was made prior to the effectivity of said
Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to provides that “(p)enal laws shall have a retroactive
counsel during custodial investigation without the effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony
benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 who is not a habitual criminal,” what is being construed
Constitution should, by such argumentation, be here is a constitutional provision specifically contained
admissible. in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal
statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration
Definitive ruling in Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile issued the
of the individual rights and privileges which the
guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during
Constitution is designed to protect against violations by
custodial investigation. The court specifically ruled that
the government, or by individuals or groups of
“(t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
individual. It is a charter of liberties for the individual
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
and a limitation upon the power of the state. Penal laws,
counsel.” Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino, “x x
on the other hand, strictly and properly are those
x. The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right
imposing punishment for an offense committed against
to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a
the state which the executive of the state has the power
judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April
to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes
1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March
punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a
1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x.
crime or offense against its law.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part
of Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine People v. Jara (1986)
affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the
requirements and restrictions outlined Facts:
in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide fo
not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date r the killing and robbery of Ampara on June 9, 1978. In
of promulgation ofMorales.”Pursuant to the above another case, two of the appellants were found guilty of
doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of homicide for the killing on the same date of Luisa Jara
the Morales and Galit rulings because he executed his while Felicisimo Jara, the husband of the
extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two of the
counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983. appellants, Raymundo Vergara and
Bernardo Bernadas, made extrajudicial confessions
Petitioner’s contention that Article III, Section 12 of implicating Jara as the mastermind. The confessions
the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect were taken while the two were held incommunicado in
for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be the presence of five policemen and after two weeks of
sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
detention.
Issue: w/n court erred in convicting the accused merely
Issue: there was a valid waiver of right to counsel on ground of circumstantial evidence and not beyond
during extrajudicial confession? No reasonable ground? No
w/n his rights to lawful custodial investigation was
Held: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights violated?
appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions
which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a Held:
legal form or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and The court held that absence of direct proof does not
artificial style does not create an impression of necessarily absolve him from any liability because
voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the under the Rules on evidence and pursuant to settled
accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial
unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. Whenever evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2). the facts
person entitled to that protection, the presumption is from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
always against the waiver. Consequently, the (3). the combination of all the circumstances is such as
prosecution must prove with strong, convincing to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The
evidence that indeed the accused willingly and circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support
voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and conviction must be consistent with each other which
deliberately manifested that he was not interested in were proven in the case. The extrajudicial confession
having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that taken from the accused was within the requirement of
confession and such proof was absent here. Miranda rights and within lawful means where his
confession was taken in the presence of his lawyer.
People vs. Mahinay(1999)
Miranda Rights include:
Facts: Accused was convicted for rape and homicide of 1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under
a 12 year old girl. He assailed the court decisions custodial investigation must be informed in a
contending that his conviction was based on language known to and understood by him of the
circumstantial evidence that fails to prove his guilt reason for the arrest and he must be shown the
beyond reasonable doubt and that an extrajudicial warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings,
confession was taken from him in violation of his information or communication must be in a
constitutional rights on custodial interrogation. language known to and understood by said
person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure
silent and that any statement he makes may be that he understood the same;
used as evidence against him; 8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be
assisted at all times and have the presence of an done in writing AND in the presence of counsel,
independent and competent lawyer, preferably of otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is
his own choice; void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or to speak;
cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be 9. That the person arrested must be informed that
provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be he may indicate in any manner at any time or
engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be stage of the process that he does not wish to be
appointed by the court upon petition of the person questioned with warning that once he makes such
arrested or one acting in his behalf; indication, the police may not interrogate him if
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a the same had not yet commenced, or the
lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
investigation in any form shall be conducted 10. The person arrested must be informed that
except in the presence of his counsel or after a his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the
valid waiver has been made; right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at him from invoking it at any time during the
any time, he has the right to communicate or process, regardless of whether he may have
confer by the most expedient means - telephone, answered some questions or volunteered some
radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either statements;
retained or appointed), any member of his 11. He must also be informed that any
immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or statement or evidence, as the case may be,
minister chosen by him or by any one from his obtained in violation of any of the foregoing,
immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in
by/confer with duly accredited national or part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
international non-government organization. It
shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure
that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to
waive any of said rights provided it is made People vs. Fabro (1997)

Facts: Nicomedes Fabro, and four others were charged itself. It starts off with a Pasubali wherein appellant was
with murder of a certain Dionisio Joaquin. RTC found informed of his constitutional rights and a Pagpapatunay
them guilty. In Fabros’ appeal, he contends that his which confirmed that he understood said rights. Both
defense of alibi should be considered and that parts also serve as a written proof of appellant’s waiver
his extrajudicial confession must be deemed in fulfilment of the requirements of the Constitution.
inadmissible for the following reasons: (1) appellant’s Confession - It is a declaration made voluntarily and
confession was extracted under threat and intimidation; without compulsion or inducement by a person
(2) the lawyer's (Atty. Jungco’s participation was only as acknowledging that he has committed or participated
a witness during the signing of the prepared confession in the commission of a crime. Confession or admission
and not during the investigation or interrogation itself; obtained in violation of SEC. 12 and SEC. 17 ART. III
and (3) appellant was made to sign the confession shall be inadmissible in evidence, because a confession
without having read it and without the presence of guilt constitutes formidable evidence against the
of counsel. accused, on the principle that no one will knowingly,
freely and deliberately admit authorship of a
Issue: w/n the appellant’s confession admissible? YES crime unless prompted by truth and conscience,
particularly where the facts given could have been
Held: known only by accused.
A confession is defined in jurisprudence as a
declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or
inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging that People vs. Alicando
he has committed or participated in the commission of a Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape
crime. In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four
in evidence unless it is given: 1. Freely and voluntarily, years of age, choking her with his right hand. The
without compulsion, inducement or trickery 2. Knowingly incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A
based on an effective communication to the individual neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victim’s body
under custodial investigation of his constitutional rights; and the parents and police were informed. Appellant
and 3. Intelligently with full appreciation of its was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length
importance and comprehension of its consequences. from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and
When all these requirements are met and the interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed
confession is admitted in evidence, the burden of proof his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis
that it was obtained by undue pressure, threat or of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up
intimidation rests upon the accused. This adherence to interrogations, the police came to know and recovered
the Constitution is further confirmed by the confession from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a
pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to
stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The
assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical
Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when
Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he
penalty. was interrogated, whether he was medically examined
before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its
Issue: w/n death penalty proper? No efforts trying to discover late body marks of
maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical
Held: The records do not reveal that the Information abuse alone.
against the appellant was read in the language or
dialect known to him. The Information against the Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie
appellant is written in the English language. It is was raped. These consists of a pillow with bloodstains
unknown whether the appellant knows the English in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused
language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. These
by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the physical evidence are evidence of the highest order.
Information couched in English was translated to the They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa
appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The Rebada that the victim was raped.These are
RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3
implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the
against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional crime without the benefit of counsel.
right to due process of law. It is urged that we must
presume that the arraignment of the appellant was People vs de Lara (1994)
regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot Facts:
lean on this rebuttable presumption. There could be no After a surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation
presumption. The court must be sure. was conducted by the police, as a consequence of
which, accused was arrested. The accused already
The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it pocketed the marked money and handed two foils to the
accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section police when he sensed the presence of police
requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry operatives. He tried to retrieve the two foils but he was
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the prevented from doing so. He tried to escape by running
inside his house. The police pursued him and were able policemen’s entry into the house of the accused
to subdue him. The accused admitted that he kept without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a
prohibited drugs in his house. He even showed the person caught committing an offense in flagrante.
arresting officers a blue plastic bag containing The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid.
prohibited drugs. The team, together with the accused, The seizure of the plastic bag was the result of
proceeded to WPD headquarters for investigation. the accused’s arrest inside the house. A
During the investigation, accused was apprised of his contemporaneous search may be conducted
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the upon the person of the arrestee and the
assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked to immediate vicinity where the arrest was made.
give a written statement, he refused to do so pending 2. There was no showing that accused was then
arrival of his lawyer. Accused contends that his arrest assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into
and the seizure of the bag containing prohibited drugs writing. (The rejection of these evidence would
was null and void. He also contends that he was not not affect the conviction of the accused in view of
assisted by counsel during custodial investigation, the abundance of other evidence establishing his
where he was forced to sign the photocopy of the guilt.)
marked money, the Receipt of Property Seized, and the
Booking and Information Sheet. PEOPLE V LINSANGAN
Issue: Facts:
1. w/n the arrest of the accused and the seizure of The accused appealed to this Court alleging that the
the plastic bag were valid? Yes lower court erred in not holding that when the policemen
2. w/n the documents (photocopy of the marked required him to initial the P10-bills, they violated his
twenty-peso bill, Receipt of Property Seized, and constitutional right to counsel, to remain silent, and not
the Booking and Information Sheet) signed by to incriminate himself while under custodial
the accused during the investigation were investigation.
admissible in evidence? No Held:
The court's assessment of the credibility of the
Held: prosecution's witnesses is entitled to great respect
1. The accused was caught in flagrante as a result unless and until they are clearly shown to be arbitrary,
of a buy-bust operation. There was no need for a which the defense failed to do. The appellant was not
warrant. The policemen were not only authorized denied due process during the custodial investigation.
but were also under obligation to apprehend the Although he was not assisted by counsel when he
drug pusher even without a warrant. The initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in his
waist, his right against self-incrimination was not confess to any incriminating circumstance. The Booking
violated for his possession of the marked bills did not Sheet is merely a statement of the accused's being
constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of
his act of selling marijuana cigarettes. His conviction an arrest. It is a police report and maybe useful in
was not based on the presence of his initials on the charges of arbitrary detention against the police
P10-bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed the themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and
testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction".
he was actually engaged in selling marijuana cigarettes However, we sustain appellant's contention that his
to a member of the arresting party. The trial court gave signature on the Receipt of Property Seized is
more credence to their categorical declarations than to inadmissible as evidence, as it was given without the
the appellant's denials. That is as it should be for as law assistance of counsel. In People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA
enforcers, they are presumed to have performed their 732 (1992), we stated that appellant's signature on this
official duties in a regular manner. Their task of document is a declaration against his interest and a tacit
apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug trade admission of the crime charged. Any admission taken
is difficult enough without legal and procedural from appellant, as a result of a violation of his
technicalities to make it doubly so. constitutional right, is inadmissible in evidence against
him. But even disregarding this exhibit, the remaining
evidence on record is sufficient to sustain appellant's
PEOPLE V MORICO conviction.
Facts:
Appellant claims that his signatures on the Receipt of
Property Seized from him, the Booking Sheet and Arrest PEOPLE V LUVENDINO
Report and the Facts:
"PansamantalangPagtalikodsamgaKarapatansaArtikulo Luvendino contends that the "demonstration" or re-
125” were obtained in violation of his constitutional right enactment and his extrajudicial confession were
to counsel during custodial investigation. effected and secured in the absence of a valid waiver by
him of his constitutional rights and that the re-enactment
Held: and the confession should be held inadmissible in
With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, evidence because they had been involuntarily made.
[t]he Court reiterates its ruling in People v. Rualo, 152
SCRA 635, that when an arrested person signs a Held:
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police station, he Luvendino validly waived his right to counsel so far as
does not admit the commission of an offense nor his extrajudicial confession was concerned, although he
was not assisted by counsel when he initially signed his In view of the documentary evidence on record the
confession at the police headquarters (disregarding for defense lost its credibility before the court. An oral
present purposes only, the subsequent events in the confession made by the accused to the officer and
office of the Provincial Fiscal). At the time the telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to
extrajudicial confession and waiver were first executed surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence
(i.e., 10 February 1983), there was no rule of doctrine against him. This is because such confession was made
prescribing that waiver of the right to counsel may be unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was
validly made only with the assistance of counsel. It is not under investigation when he made the oral
scarcely necessary to add that we are here referring confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke
only to extrajudicial confessions and waivers which compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial
were made voluntarily and intelligently. investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES
GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the
confession is competent to satisfy the substance of
PEOPLE v. DY what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral
Facts: confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a
Accused is the owner of Benny’s Bar at Boracay Island case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral
and was sentenced with murder before the trial court for confession made by the accused outside the ambit of
shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused custodial investigation can be admissible in court and
contends the court erred in admitting the presentation of was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the
the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police accused being guilty of the crime.
officer and made a confession on the crime and
informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a
statement the accused denied to have done. They PEOPLE V SAMUS
assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that Facts:
such statement was not made in writing and is in Appellant claims that his alleged confession to the
violation of the due process required in custodial media while in police custody cannot be admitted in
investigation. evidence. He further contends that the pair of earrings,
the turnover receipt, as well as the testimonies of
Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the Pontaños and Bitos, relative thereto should be excluded
prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the for being “fruits of the poisonous tree.”
accused.
Held:
Held:
While it is true that the confessions of appellant were care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is
made without benefit of counsel, they are still not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for
admissible in evidence because of appellant’s failure to courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick.
make timely objections before the trial court. If only the There may also be an existing proposition for the
defense had proffered them on time, the prosecution "selective decarceration of older prisoners" based on
could have been warned of the need to present findings that recidivism rates decrease as age
additional evidence to support its case. To disregard a increases. But, in this particular case, the CA made no
major portion of the prosecution’s case at a late stage specific finding that respondent suffers from an ailment
during an appeal goes against the norms of of such gravity that his continued confinement during
fundamental fairness. Indeed, justice is dispensed not trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in
only for the accused, but also for the prosecution. Be danger. It merely declared respondent not in the best of
that as it may, and even if we now affirm appellant’s health even when the only evidence on record as to the
conviction for murder, we do not, however agree with latter's state of health is an unverified medical certificate
the trial court’s imposition of the death sentence, stating thatrespondent's condition required him to "xxx
because the proven aggravating circumstance of be confined in a more sterile area xxx." That medical
dwelling was not alleged in the Information. recommendation was even rebuffed by the CA itself
when, in its Resolution, it held that the physical
N. RIGHT TO BAIL condition of respondent does not prevent him from
seeking medical attention while confined in prison.
PEOPLE V FITZGERALD
Facts:
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting ENRILE V SALAZAR
respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite the fact Facts:
that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by In February 1990, SenEnrile was arrested. He was
reclusion perpetua(rape of a 13 year old girl) and the charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan
evidence of his guilt is strong. for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their
Held: failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp
It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging
other than those stated in the Motion filed by that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent.
respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere That he was charged with a criminal offense in an
claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an information for which no complaint was initially filed or
ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was
denied due process; denied his right to bail; and

arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant
issued without the judge who issued it first having LAVIDES V CA
personally determined the existence of probable cause. Facts:
ManoletLavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child
ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm the abuse under R.A. No. 7610. His arrest was made
Hernandez ruling. without a warrant as a result of an entrapment
conducted by the police.
HELD: Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against
Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied him and asked the trial court to suspend the
bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would arraignment scheduled.
entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged Trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner’s
against him however is complexed with murder and motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations,
multiple frustrated murders – the intention of the and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was
prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the
form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum. charges against him and then ordered him released
The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion upon posting bail bonds.
with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile
et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion Held:
because other crimes such as murder or all those that In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted
may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the
however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there
the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step would then be no need for the arraignment of the
that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a accused. In the second place, the trial court could
petition to be admitted for bail. He should have ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment
exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at
corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment.
crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal
absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the
need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever
essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is being so required by the court or these Rules," while under
used by a lot of opportunists to attempt to grab power.
Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the accused at the A reading of the April 2, 1987 order convinces us that
arraignment is required. the court below was remiss in its duty as enunciated in
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an People vs. San Diego. Without summarizing the factual
accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a the number of prosecution witnesses but not their
motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence
because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing strong" to deny bail to Escaño. On this point alone, the
of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at order granting bail to Escaño should be invalidated.
once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon COMMENDADOR V DE VILLA
valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him Facts:
with a crime and his right to bail. In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on
June 5, 1990, but the application was denied. He filed
with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus
CARPIO V MAGLALANG with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
Facts: preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the
An information for murder was filed against Escaño and provisional liberty. However he was not released
ten other unindentified persons by the provincial fiscal in immediately. The RTC now declared that even military
the Regional Trial Court of Bataan at Balanga. Four men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right
days later, the Acting Executive Judge of said court to bail.
issued an order of arrest against Escaño recommending
no bail for his provisional liberty. Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the
In opposing said application, the public prosecutor accused right to bail.
averred that the accused was charged with a capital
offense for which no bail may be availed of, that the Held:
reasons advanced in said application would be The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has
overcome by strong and sufficient evidence; and that traditionally not been recognized and is not available in
during the custodial investigation, he was represented the military, as an exception to the general rule
by counsel. embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial
is given more emphasis in the military where the right to
Held: bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after considering that the motion for bail was filed on a
more than one year from their arrest, there was Saturday and the hearing was immediately conducted
substantial compliance with the requirements of due on Monday thereby depriving the prosecution to make
process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule
Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre- embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a
charge investigation only after one year because well established rule of law that bail is not a matter of
hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men right and requires a hearing where the accused is
were involved in the failed coup. charged with an offense which is punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Respondent
judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of
BAYLON V SISON petition for bail before making an outright grant of this
Facts: motion.
Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:
granting bail to the accused charged with double . . The prosecution must first be accorded an
murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3 opportunity to present evidence because by the very
days before the scheduled hearing for bail in violation of nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis
Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed
petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from against in determining whether the guilt of the accused
the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised
also assails that they were not given the chance to regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural
present evidence that strongly prove the guilt of the due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence
accused. Respondent judge justifies not having submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the
committed grave abuse of discretion since the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial
prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
and the lack of previous notice was cured with the filing arbitrariness.
of motion for reconsideration.
BASCO vs. RAPATALO
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge exercised 269 SCRA 220
abuse in discretion in the grant of bail to the accused.
Held: FACTS: An information for murder was filed against

The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the Morente. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail.
discretion of the judge in granting bail to the accused The hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995
by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent approve it or not. He further declared that when he
Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the
but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more
1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary
materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor was
trial was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard not around at the time the public prosecutor
on said date as the prosecution’s witnesses in recommended bail. Respondent Judge stated that in
connection with said petition were not notified. Another any case, the bailbond posted by accused was
attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995. cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was issued on
account of complainant’s motion for reconsideration.
Complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently
Union on July 3, 1995 and later learned that the conformed to and approved the motion for
accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition reconsideration.Accused is confined at the La Union
had not been heard at all. Upon investigation, Provincial Jail. On August 14 1995, in a sworn letter-
complainant discovered that bail had been granted and complaint, complainant Basco charged respondent
a release order dated June 29, 1995was issued on the Judge Leo M. Rapatalo with gross ignorance or willful
basis of a marginal notedated June 22, 1995, at the disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to
bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Oliva an accused in a murder case without receiving evidence
which stated: “No objection: P80,000.00,” signed and and conducting a hearing.
approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by
respondent Judge. Note that there was already a ISSUE: CAN A JUDGE SET BAIL EVEN W/O
release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the CONDUCTING A HEARING OR RECEIVING
marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June EVIDENCE? NO.
22, 1995 when the hearing of the bail petition was
aborted and instead arraignment took place) when HELD: If the denial of bail is authorized in capital
another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995. offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong,
the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity,
Respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the
based on the prosecutor’s option not to oppose the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should
petition as well as the latter’s recommendation setting be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability of
the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred evasion of the prosecution.In practice, bail has also
that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the been used to prevent the release of an accused who
petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to
might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the by its very nature involves the exercise of the judge’s
judges might not want to release. individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while
bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of
person is charged with a capital offense punishable by his own individual views, prevent them from getting out
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article of control.
114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
states, “No person” charged with a capital offense, or an Consequently, in the application for bail of a person
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life charged with a capital offense punishable by death,
imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing,
be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
criminal action.” court, must actually be conducted to determine whether
or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the strong. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
However, the determination of whether or not the the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered
discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only discretion of the court which may confine itself to
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be examination and cross examination. If a party is denied
weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the the opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation
court,it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial of procedural due process.
discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of Since the determination of whether or not the evidence
cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of
rebuttal. judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses
To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, “is not to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to
absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and the discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required
exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion,
if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. 94.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for The absence of objection from the prosecution is never
bail is required, as can be gleaned from the Tucay v. a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is the court’s
Domagas, is for the court to take into consideration the determination after a hearing that the guilt of the
guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting
of Court in fixing the amount of bail. This Court, in a bail. Respondent Judge should not have relied solely on
number of cases held that even if the prosecution fails the recommendation made by the prosecutor but should
to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for have ascertained personally whether the evidence of
bail of an accused, the court may still require that it guilt is strong. After all, the judge is not bound by the
answer questions in order to ascertain not only the prosecutor’s recommendation.
strength of the state’ s evidence but also the adequacy
of the amount of bail. In the light of the applicable rules on bail and the
jurisprudential principles , SC reiterated the duties of the
After hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution. On the basis thereof, the judge should then (1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
formulate his own conclusion as to whether the application for bail or require him to submit his
evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of
the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting Court as amended);
or denying the application for bail may be invalidated (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
because the summary of evidence for the prosecution regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
which contains the judge’s evaluation of the evidence present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
may be considered as an aspect of procedural due strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise
process for both the prosecution and the defense. its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, supra);
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused
An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
that respondent Judge granted bail to the accused prosecution (Baylon v. Sison);
without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
of the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the accused upon the approval of the bailbond. (Section 19,
offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied.
procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules
The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
room for doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of the law.” The
of bail applications. People filed the appeal on the ground that while the
judge had discretion on the grant of bail, he had abused
PEOPLE v CABRAL this discretion.
303 SCRA 361
ROMERO; February 18, 1999 ISSUE
- WON the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse
despite a showing by the prosecutor that there is strong
FACTS evidence proving respondent’s guilt for the crime
- Roderick Odiamar was charged with the rape of 15 charged.
year old Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary
liberty, the accused filed a motion for bail which was HELD
opposed by the petitioner. YES
- The SC held that the CA and the lower court failed to
- The lower court grated the motion on the ground that mention and include some facts which are significant
despite the crime alleged to have been committed is factors and circumstances which are strong, clear, and
punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence thus far convincing. Consideration of the said factors and
presented is not strong enough to warrant denial of the circumstances would have resulted in the denial of bail.
bail. The judge in concluding thus cited the fact that the Reasoning
girl went with the offender voluntarily and did not resist - Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides:
during the commission of the rape. In addition, the judge “All persons, except those charged with offenses
quoted the medico legal report as not conclusion that punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
rape was in fact committed consideration that the of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be
lacerations on the victim may have been weeks or bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
months old when the medical examination was recognizance as may be provided by law. the right
performed six days after the offense occurred. to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
- The CA affirmed the decision saying that there was no suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”
abuse of discretion in this case. “There is grave abuse
of discretion where the power is exercised in an - Section 7 Rule 4 of the Rules of court provides:
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, “No person charged with a capital offense, or an
prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, when the evidence of guilt is strong, 1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of application for bail or require him to submit his
criminal prosecution.” recommendation;
2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
- In the case at bar, bail is discretionary and not a regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
matter of right considering that the punishment for the present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
offense is reclusion perpetua. the grant of the bail is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise
dependent on the evidence of the guilt which should its discretion
which should be strong to justify denial. this 3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused
determination is a matter of judicial discretion. is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution
- By judicial discretion, the law mandates the 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge
determination of whether proof is evident or the the accused upon the approval of the bail bond.
presumption of guilt is strong. Proof evident or evident Otherwise the petition should be denied.
proof is this connection, has been held to mean clear, - Based on the duties, the court’s order granting or
strong evidence which leads a well guarded denying bail must contain a summary of the evidence
dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that an for the prosecution. A summary is defined as a
offense has been committed as charged, that the comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a
accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be test or statement. HENCE, THE SUMMARY SHOULD
punished capitally if the law is administered. NECESSARILY BE A COMPLETE COMPILATION OR
Presumption great exists when the circumstances RESTATEMENT OF ALL THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE
testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally PRESENTED DURING THE HEARING PROPER. The
to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to Lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to
an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable what pieces of evidence should be included in the
probability of any other conclusion. summary. Otherwise, the same will be considered
defective in form and substance which cannot be
In other words, the test is not whether the evidence sustained or be given a semblance of validity.
establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather
whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of SEPARATE OPINION
guilt.
VITUG [dissenting]
- In the case of an application for bail, the duties of the - The extraordinary remedies under Rule 65 of the rules
judge are as follows: of Court are not open when the question is whether the
trial judge has erred in the exercise of sound discretion. conjunction with the evidence extant on the record
These special reliefs are available only when the judge approved the recommendation of Prosecutor Apolinar
has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to Carrao.
lack or excess of jurisdiction in his decision or order
such as by arbitrarily ignoring the evidence or A duplicate copy of trial prosecutor Apolinar
completely acting on bias and whim. Carrao‚ letter dated September 3, 1996 addressed to
the provincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was
presented by the respondent to disprove the accusation
CORTES VS CATRAL that he granted bail to the accused without conducting
279 SCRA 1 any hearing.
(1997)
2. Catral allegedly reduced bailbond for an illegal
FACTS: Cortes filed a complaint against Judge Catral possession of firearms case from 180K (recommended
for granting bail without hearing. by prosecutor) to 30K without hearing. Catral says that
bailbond recommended was 180K. Accused filed for
1. Catral allegedly granted bail in two murder cases, a reduction and there was no opposition from prosecutor.
crime that is supposedly not bailable without hearing.
Catral says that in one of them, the case was frustrated 3. Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide
homicide, and the prosecutor recommended bail of case was granted with a bailbond of P14,800.00 by
200K, plus the circumstantial evidence were weak. In Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is too low. It is
the case of People v. Rodrigo Bumanglag, for murder, because this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio
the inquest judge issued a warrant of arrest for the Bong Decierto. Catral averred that he was acting on the
accused with no bail recommended. recommendation of the OIC provincial prosecutor and
mindful of the guidelines in fixing a reasonable amount
When the case was elevated to the Regional Trial Court of bailbond coupled by the fact that the evidence on
upon information filed by the provincial prosecutor, the record is merely circumstantial and there was no
information made no mention of a bailbond. In the eyewitness to the commission of crime granted bailbond
hearing of the petition to determine whether or not the in the sum of P14,800.00.
evidence of guilt is strong, the fiscal opted not to
introduce evidence and recommended bail in the sum of 4. Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio Bong
P200,000.00 instead. Respondent judge ‚acting on the Dicierto was sued for concubinage and convicted by
said recommendation and again guided by the provision Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy Siriban
of Section 9, Administrative Circular 12-94 in appealed and it was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the
sala of Judge Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo Catral Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an
acquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in Aparri spread that accused charged with murder, without having
the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siriban conducted any hearing as to whether the evidence of
house to get an envelope. guilt against the accused is strong.
ISSUE: WON the allegations of the complainant would The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in
warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a
respondent judge. YES. comment or leave the application of bail to the sound
discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if
HELD: Bail should be fixed according to the the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in
circumstances of each case. The amount fixed should opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The
be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a
the trial yet reasonable enough to comply with the few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the
constitutional provision that bail should not be prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to
excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still
of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask
be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must searching questions from which it may infer the strength
be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the
amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account accused.
a number of factors such as the applicant‚ character and
reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the
fugitive from justice. determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial
When the accused is charged with an offense discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after the
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since
imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and
hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly
discretion of the court, not only to take into account the exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that
guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the
of Court, but primarily to determine the existence of evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner
strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the having the right of cross examination and to introduce
accused. evidence in his own rebuttal.
The procedural lapse of respondent judge is aggravated Whether or not valid classification between
by the fact that even though the accused in Criminal petitioner and Jalosjos exists
Case No. 07-874, People v. Ahmed Duerme, have yet
to be arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum RULING:
of P200,000.00. Respondent evidently knew that the
accused were still at large as he even had to direct their The petition is bereft of merit.
arrest in the same order where he simultaneously
granted them bail. At this juncture, there is a need to In attempting to strike a distinction between his case
reiterate the basic principle that the right to bail can only and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that
be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already
otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal,
premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for when he filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus
bail for some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention
prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and
Trillanes IV v. Pimentel political rights since the presumption of innocence is still
G.R. No. 179817, in his favor.
June 27, 2008
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged
with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of
FACTS: statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness,
whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in as a "political offense."
relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the 2007
elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the
term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate
now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all grievances against the rampant and institutionalized
official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still
pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, xxx
there was already conviction.
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise,
ISSUE: however.
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to charged.
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement as the functions and duties of the In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from application for bail and for release on recognizance was
the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is
restricted in liberty of movement. strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial court's
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an
is taken into custody for purposes of the administration accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
of justice. No less than the Constitution provides: liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of
the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage
All persons, except those charged with offenses of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas xxx
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. (Underscoring supplied) Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who
attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he
The Rules also state that no person charged with a voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion such can be proven by the numerous times he was
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail allowed to travel outside his place of detention.
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
of the criminal action. Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The
assailed Orders augured well when on November 29,
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some
d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh
perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed
covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, this time as the "Manila Pen Incident," proves that
there is clearly no distinction as to the political petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk that he
would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in Issue: Whether or Not the accused’s right to bail
fact, the cause for foreboding became real. violated.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight

find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the
amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the
bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before
controlling is the determination of whether the evidence conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion.
of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
discretion. perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua
PEOPLE VS. FORTES bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if
223 SCRA 619 the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
25 JUN 1993 limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong. But once it is determined that the evidence of
guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. If
an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by
Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and
Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon, sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a
accompanied his 13-year old daughter, Merelyn, to the matter of right on the part of the accused nor of
police station of the said municipality to report a rape discretion on the part of the court.
committed against the latter by the accused. Following
this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A
bond of P25000 was granted for accused’s provisional DE LA CAMARA V. ENAGE
release. The MCTC found him guilty. An appeal to RTC 41 SCRA 1
was filed, the request for the fixing of bond was denied.
Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that FACTS:
the same amounted to an undue denial of his Ricardo de la Camara, Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis
constitutional right to bail. Oriental, was arrested and detained in Agusan, for his
alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the
wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador
Logging Co., at Agusan del Sur. Thereafter, the
Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed a case for multiple weak, would make himself scarce and frustrate the
frustrated murder and another for multiple murder hearing of his case. Thus, a bail is a "mode short of
against petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo. confinement which would, with reasonable certainty,
Then came an application for bail filed by petitioner with insure the attendance of the accused" for the
the lower court, premised on the assertion that there subsequent trial.
was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident. At
the time of the filing ofthe petition, the defense had not Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered
presented its evidence. nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. If the
Constitution did not prohibit this, the right to bail
Respondent Judge issued an order granting de la becomes meaningless. The sole permissible function of
Camara's application for bail, admitting failure on the money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial,
part of the prosecution to prove that de la Camara and declared that bail set at a higher figure than an
would flee even if he had the opportunity,but fixed the amount reasonably calculated to fulfill thus purpose is
amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of "excessive",
P1,195,200.00 ( P840,000.00 for the multiple murder
and P355,200.00 for multiple frustrated murder). Therefore, that fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as
Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being the bail is clearly violative of the Constitution. Under the
informed sent a telegram to Judge stating that the bond circumstances, there being only two offenses charged,
required "is excessive" and suggesting that a the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed
P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
reasonable. P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated
murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the
ISSUE: W/N the amount of for bail is reasonable? Department of Justice did recomend the total sum of
P40,000.00 for the two offenses.
HELD: YES.
Guidelines in the fixing of bail:
Before conviction, every person is bailable except (1) ability of the accused to give bail
if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of (2) nature of the offense
guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption (3) penalty for the offense charged
of innocence in favor of every accused unless his guilt (4) character and reputation of the accused
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless,it is (5) health of the accused
not beyond the realm of probability that a person (6) character and strength of the evidence
charged with a crime, especially where his defense is (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial
(8) forfeiture of other bonds submitted a required Memorandum, which sought an

(9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue,
arrested he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for
hearing and the court directing the issuance of a
Discretion is with the court to rule upon the warrant for his arrest and fixed bail for his temporary
question of bail. We must stress, however, that where liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail surrendered his passport and posted the required cash
would amount to a refusal and render nugatory the bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.
constitutional right to bail, SC will not hesitate to
exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required Issue:
remedy. There is grim irony in an accused being told WON Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional
that he has a right to bail but at the same time being liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending.
required to post such an exorbitant sum.
Held:
However, because petitoner escaped from jail, no As suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
ruling can be had on his plea to nullify the Judges order. constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Government of the US vs. Judge Puruganan Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
GR No 148571 proceedings, because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Facts:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the
United States Government, through diplomatic channels presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
requested the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
known as Mario Batacan Crespo. A Petition for thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
Extradition was filed with the RTC, but before the court guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that
could act, Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,” which prayed that case like extradition, where the presumption of
petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for innocence is not at issue.
hearing. This was granted. After the hearing, Jimenez
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be in extradition cases and that private respondent is a
extradited are bailable in the United States is not an high “flight risk.” Muñoz filed an MR questioning the
argument to grant him one in the present case. To Order denying his application for bail. This was granted
stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct by subsequent respondent Judge Olalia in an Order
from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent
He should apply for bail before the courts trying the to post bail (P750K).
criminal cases against him, not before the extradition
court. On December 21, 2001, petitioner government filed an
urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge.
GOV’T. OF HONG KONG V. OLALIA & JUAN MUNOZ
(April 19, 2007) Issue:
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez W/N trial court committed GAD amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to
Facts: Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong bail for there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory
Court with 3 counts of the offense of “accepting an law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
advantage as agent,” in violation of Section 9 (1a) of the bail, the right being limited solely to criminal
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. He also faced 7 proceedings?
counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud,
penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On Ratio:
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of Private respondent maintained that the right to bail
arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faced a guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh
charge process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s
liberty.
As early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of The US v. Purganan ruling (bail granted only to crim
Manila a petition for the extradition of private proceedings) applies squarely to private respondent’s
respondent. For his part, private respondent filed, in case. However, the SC cannot ignore the following
the same case a petition for bail which was opposed by trends in international law
petitioner. After hearing on October 8, 2001, Judge
Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for The modern trend in public international law is the
bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail primacy placed on the worth of the individual
person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the administrative proceedings, such as deportation
recognition that the individual person may properly be a and quarantine,have likewise been detained.
subject of international law is now taking root.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to
On December 10, 1948, the UN General Assembly close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to
which the right to life, liberty and all the other bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has
fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal
While not a treaty, the principles contained in the proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
said Declaration are now recognized as customarily jurisdiction to persons in detention during the
binding upon the members of the international pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, the cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under
SC, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held international conventions to uphold human rights.
that under the Constitution,the principles set forth
in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no
1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the justification why it should not also be allowed in
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the UDHR
which the Philippines signed and ratified. applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why
it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
The Philippine authorities are under obligation to both are administrative proceedings where the
make available to every person under detention innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for
admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the
the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
however, in light of the various international treaties respect for the promotion and protection of human
giving recognition and protection to human rights, rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in
particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see
of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order. to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to
deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced satisfactorily met.
to transfer to the demanding state following the
proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be a In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
length of time of the detention should be reasonable. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
Records show that Munoz had been detained for over court to determine whether private respondent may be
two (2) years without having been convicted of any granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing
crime. By any standard, such an extended period of evidence.”
detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental
right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation
of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant
him bail. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO
198 SCRA 130
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant 5 JUN 1991
of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were
to due process under the Constitution. charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts
committed before and after February 1986. Private
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that:
demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the
the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c)
Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has
and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it been extinguished. This was denied.
does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail
so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC.
which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order
No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article

135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the
amendatory decrees. right to bail.
Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at

P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It
to the court once every two months within the first ten is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense,
days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence.
supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly It is only when it is a capital offense that the right
asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the
evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K
probability that the accused will not comply with this without hearing the prosecution.
main condition of his bail. It was contended that:
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990,
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of
years and was an escapee from detention when rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not
arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA) favorable to him.
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no
known address; Accused validly waived his right to bail in another
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were
Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's made therein: accused to remain under custody,
License to substantiate his false identity; whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," Concepcion will be released immediately, with a
turned out to be also a false address; condition that they will submit themselves in the
5. He and his companions were on board a private jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was
vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and dismissed.
address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We
for his arrest. hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
This however was denied. Hence the appeal. which is personal to the accused and whose waiver
would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person

with a right recognized by law. - October 18, 1991 – TC ordered the case ARCHIVED
for failure to locate the two accused
PEOPLE v MANES
303 SCRA 231 - June 24, 1992 - Sergon and Ramil Manes were
PARDO; February 17, 1999 ARRESTED in Romblon, Romblon
- September 17, 1992 - Upon ARRAIGNMENT, both

FACTS accused pleaded NOT GUILTY to the information
- July 12, 1991, Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo Province
filed with RTC Iloilo City, an INFORMATION charging - August 25, 1992 - accused filed a PETITION FOR
the accused with MURDER: BAIL which was opposed by the prosecution. TC did not
hear the petition for bail. Neither did the accused invoke
"That on or about the 23rd of June, 1991, in the the right to bail at any stage of the trial.
Municipality of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable - January 13, 1995 - TC convicted the accused of
court, the above-named accused, conspiring, murder
confederating and mutually helping one another to
better realize their purpose armed with a knife and a .38 - February 10, 1995 - both accused appealed to SC
caliber revolver respectively, with treachery and/or where accused questioned TC’s failure
evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, stab and shot (a) to hear the petition for bail
Nicanor Tamorite with the knife and .38 caliber revolver (b) to consider defense of relative in favor of Ramil
with which they were then provided, inflicting upon the Manes and
said Nicanor Tamorite stab wounds and gun shot (c) to take note that Sergon Manes was a mere victim of
wounds on the different parts of his body which caused Tamorite's unlawful aggression
his death immediately thereafter."
According to the prosecution
- prosecution recommended NO BAIL for the provisional > June 23, 1991 – 5 in the afternoon, ALAN Catequista
liberty of the accused. with NICANOR Tamorite and JOSE Cubita, went to see
a basketball game at the barangay plaza. When the
- July 22, 1991 - TC issued a WARRANT OF ARREST game was over, Alan approached and invited Nicanor to
against the accused go home; at that time, he was still seated. Accused
RAMIL Manes approached Nicanor and pointed a 38 saw his younger brother Sergon lying on the concrete
caliber revolver at him, saying "It is a bad luck you did pavement and several persons were ganging up on him,
not kill me during the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. three of whom he identified as Nicanor, Alan and Jose.
Now I will be the one to kill you." Nicanor ran to Alan They kept on boxing and kicking his brother prompting
and used him as a shield from Ramil. At that point, Alan him to come to the latter's aid. On his way out, he saw a
heard a thud and as he looked back, he saw accused gun on top of the table and brought it with him to the
SERGON Manes with a gory knife and he also saw basketball court.
Nicanor running away, with blood on his back.
> While on his way to the basketball court, Ramil fired a
Ramil Manes pursued Nicanor and shot him hitting him warning shot to prevent Nicanor from stabbing his
at the back, just above the waistline. Both accused brother Sergon. Nicanor persisted in the pursuit of
continued to chase Nicanor who ran towards the Sergon, with a knife in his hand. Sergon was about
premises of the house of ADING Ablado. Ramil Manes three meters ahead of Nicanor who was about ten
fired two more shots. It could not be determined meters ahead of the pursuing Ramil. Ramil fired another
whether those shots hit Nicanor as he and the accused shot that hit Nicanor who fell to the ground. Meanwhile,
were already inside the premises of the fence of Ading. Sergon managed to flee. Ramil also fled to the direction
Jose who was near Nicanor when the two accused of the sugarcane field as soon as he fired the second
chased him did not render assistance to him. After Alan shot because he saw the group of Alan approaching
heard the two shots, he and Jose ran home. Alan told armed with guns .12 Ramil and his brother Sergon went
his father and uncle that Sergon stabbed Nicanor and into hiding and only surfaced a year later when they
that Ramil shot him. Alan, his father, uncle, Jose and were arrested in Romblon.
the mother of Nicanor then went to where the body of - prosecution’s set of facts was favored by the court
Nicanor was in the downhill portion of the premises of
the house of Ading. Nicanor was lying on his back, with ISSUE
2 wounds on the breast, 1 gunshot wound and 1 stab WON petitioner has a right to bail
wound.
HELD
According to the accused(Ramil) NO
> June 23, 1991 – in the afternoon, he was at home Ratio When an accused is charged with a capital
cooking. At around 5:00 to 5:30, he heard shouts offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua,
coming from the direction of the barangay basketball or life imprisonment or death, and evidence of guilt is
court, which was about ten (10) meters away from his strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of
house. He went to the window to check what it was. He right nor of discretion
Reasoning - even though prosecution failed to show evident

- In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life premeditation, trial court correctly considered treachery
imprisonment or death, the accused has no right to bail as qualifying the killing of the victim to murder.
when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a
petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of Dispositive we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial
guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the court convicting accused-appellants Sergon Manes
accused. While the accused can apply for bail and and Ramil Manes of murder and sentencing each of
have the court hear his application summarily and them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
promptly, such right may be waived expressly or with the accessory penalties of the law and to
impliedly. In this case, the trial court proceeded to try indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicanor
the case without resolving the petition for bail that Tamorite in the amount of P50,000.00, plus
appellants filed. P21,250.00, as actual damages.
However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial
court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only PEOPLE v HOLGADO
in the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure GR No. L-2809 (March 22, 1950)
to bring to the attention of the trial Court at the earliest Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the
opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal
their right to bail. detention because according to the information, being a
private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable
- the defense of relative FAILED TO PROSPER motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the
because: house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby
depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty.
1) unlawful aggression, the essential element to He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he
defense of relative is absent because if it were true that was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence
Sergon was being attacked, he would have suffered was presented to indict the latter.
injuries.
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the
2) if indeed he acted in defense of his younger brother proceedings in the trial court.
Sergon who was then under attack, he would not harbor
any fear in presenting himself to the proper authorities. Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : “If the
defendant appears without attorney, he must be
informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney
being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the PEOPLE v SANTOCILDES

aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney GR No. 109149 (December 21, 1999)
de oficio todefend him. A reasonable time must be Facts: On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged
allowed for procuring attorney.” This was violated. with the crime of rape of a girl less than 9 years old.
Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no Appellant contends that he was represented
person shall be held to answer for a during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong,
criminaloffense without due process of law", and that all who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and even conducted the direct examination and cross-
and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however,
hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty.
be heard by counsel. Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C.
Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Appellant
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to
the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the
whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was crime charged.
real and whether it had reference tothe commission of
the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand,
investigation was opened by the court on this matter in maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellant's
the presence of the accused and there is now no way of counsel during trial was not a member of the bar,
determining whether the supposed instruction is a good appellant was afforded due process since he has been
defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal
confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with that said person "presented the evidence for the
the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. defense with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and in
Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with general handled the case of appellant in a professional
this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the and skillful manner."
simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was
not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the Issue: Whether or not the accused was deprived,
accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it though no fault of his own, to be defended by a person
that the accused be assisted by counsel especially authorized to practice law amounting to denial of
because of the qualified plea given by him and the due process.
seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the
court. Held: The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in
Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987
Constitution. Such right is guaranteed to minimize the to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the
imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused case back for a new trial.
is pitted against the awesome prosecutorymachinery of
the State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to
principle of due process which basically means that a disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
person must be heard before being condemned. The accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to
due process requirement is a part of a person's basic reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court
rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed must be presumed to have complied with the procedure
with or performed perfunctorily. prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and
that such a presumption can only be overcome by an
Hence, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been
conviction and ordered the remand of the case to held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or
the trial court for new trial. that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to
inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be
The Supreme Court also directed the IBP to investigate presumed that the accused was informed by the court of
Ompong's unauthorized practice of law. such right.
PEOPLE v AGBAYANI Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides

GR No. 122770 (January 16, 1998) that after a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to
Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14- two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good
year old daughter and was found guilty of the crime of cause grants him further time. It must be pointed out
rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when
by the new counsel of the accused assailing the so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible
irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may
accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case,
accused of his right to choose his own counsel and the appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence,
violation of the appellants right for a 2 day preparation he effectively waived such right. It is untenable to
for trial. believe that the counsel whorepresented the appellant
was not prepared during the trial as records showed he
Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to was able to cross-examine the complainant and there
disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the was no ground to claim he is incompetent to represent
accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the
decision of the lower court.
PEOPLE v MAGSI
GR No. L-32888 (August 12, 1983) Held: YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of
Facts: Soon after appellant was apprehended on cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic
August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55
the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. SCRA 243-244): the trial courts
The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) shouldexercise solicitous care before sentencing the
times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses
date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario by first insuring that the accused fully understands the
Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing gravity of the offense, the severity of the consequences
was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty. attached thereto as well as the meaning and
Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent
accused desire to be represented by a de parte and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take
counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to testimony, to assure the court that the accused has not
withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty.
acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who
second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused,
de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of
second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory
next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador queries addressed to the accused whether he
Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty,
hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio are not sufficient compliance.
counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed
that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes PEOPLE v MALUNSING
only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty GR No. L-29015 (April 29, 1975)
butqualified it with the allegation that he committed the Facts: It was the failure of the lower court to respect the
crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the constitutional right to counsel, so it is alleged, that is
other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of murder the basis for seeking the reversal of a conviction for
and made to suffer the death penalty. murder of appellant Manuel Villegas. The appellant is a
very old man, ignorant and unlettered; during the entire
proceeding in the case, the appellant while present did
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights not know what was going on; the trial court never
of the accused. apprised the appellant of his fundamental right to be
assisted by a lawyer; the trial court did not even bother number of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to manifest
inquiring why the appellant Manuel Villegas did not take respect for this right if the counsel de oficio thus named,
the witness stand. Attorney Geronimo Pajarito explicitly instead of conferring with the accused, would just
manifested in the opening of the trial that appellant blithely inform the judge that he was already fully
intimated to him that he had his own lawyer. There was prepared for his exacting responsibility. It was
an admission that he did appear for him in the unintended but the result could not rightly be
preliminary investigation but only because there was no distinguished from pure travesty. Appellant could then
other counsel. Parenthetically, it may be observed that rightfully invoke this constitutional guarantee of right to
while in the original complaint there were two other counsel.
accused with the same surname as the lawyer,
Geronimo Pajarito and Samuel Pajarito, after such PEOPLE v CUIZON
preliminary investigation, no doubt due to the efforts of GR No. 109287 (April 18, 1996)
Atty. Geronimo Pajarito, possibly a kinsman, they were FACTS: Cuizon, Pua, and Paul Lee are found guilty of
both discharged for lack of probable cause, the court transporting, without legal authority, methamphetamine
ask the appellant if he has a lawyer; after answering in hydrochloride, also known as shabu.
the negative, the Court then appointed Atty. Pajarito as
counsel de oficio for the defendant. After marking it of However, Appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or
record that he was appointed as counsel de oficio, the understand a word of English or Filipino and only knows
Attorney was ask whether he wanted to confer with the Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to take the witness
appellant. This was answered with: “I think I know the stand for lack of an interpreter who would translate his
case.” The Court then immediately proceeded with the testimony to English. In the hearing set on October 28,
hearing. In the decision itself, there is this meaningful 1992, the last trial date allotted to the defense for the
admission by the court: “No evidence was presented for reception of Lee’s testimony, his counsel, although
and in behalf of appellant Manuel Villegas.” notified of the proceedings, did not appear. Thus, the
trial court deemed him and Pua to have waived their
Issue: Whether or not the appointed counsel de oficio right to present additional evidence, and the case was
Atty. Geronimo Pajarito lacks candor in the exercise of considered submitted for decision after the filing of
his profession. memoranda. The counsel for Pua and Lee did not ask
for the reconsideration of such ruling; neither did he
Held: It is not enough that a counsel de oficio was submit any memorandum. Only accused Cuizon, who
appointed, were the accused has indicated that he was assisted by another counsel, was able to submit his
wanted a lawyer of his own choice, a decision prompted memorandum.
moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the
ISSUE: WON the trial court violated Paul Lee's armslength ahead of his wife, was attacked by accused
constitutional right to due process. Mario Serzo from behind. Accused stabbed Alfredo at
his back forcing the latter to scamper for his dear life
RULING: YES. The SolGen was right in saying that the and was declared dead on arrival in the hospital.
trial judge did not exert sufficient effort to make Appellant was charged with murder filed by Rizal
available compulsory process and to see to it that Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Filipinas Z. Aguilar-Ata.
accused appellant Lee was given his day in court. It is Thereafter, pre-trial was waived and the case
clear that appellant Lee was effectively denied his right proceeded to trial on the merits. After arraignment and
to counsel, for although he was provided with one, he trial, accused was found guilty of the crime charged.
could not understand and communicate with him The accused contends that he was denied his right to
concerning his defense such that, among other things, counsel, a narration of the proceedings before the trial
no memorandum was filed on his behalf; further, he was court, arraignment was set by the trial court during
denied his right to have compulsory process to which appellant appeared without counsel.
guarantee the availability of witnesses and the Consequently, the trial court appointed Atty. Wilfredo
production of evidence on his behalf, including the Lina-ac as counsel de oficio for the arraignment only.
services of a qualified and competent interpreter to The presentation of evidence for the defense was reset
enable him to present his testimony. In sum, he was as appellant was not ready to testify and he manifested
denied due process. For this reason, we hold that the his intention to secure the services of a counsel de
case as against Lee must be remanded to the court of parte hence Atty. Lina-ac was relieved as counsel de
origin for a re-trial. oficio as a consequence Appellant appeared without
counsel, forcing the trial court to appoint another
PEOPLE v SERZO counsel de oficio, respectively Bella Antonano and Atty.
GR No. 118435 (June 20, 1997) Bonifacia Garcia. The trial court convicted the accused
FACTS:Alfredo (victim) together with his wife Adelaida of the crime of murder. Hence, appealed was made to
Alcantara were staying inside their house comfortably the SC.
watching television when Susana Serzo mother of the
accused and one Epifania Bentilacion came knocking at ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in not giving the
their doorsteps and pleading for help to bring out her defendant-appellant time to engage counsel of his own
grandchildren who were being held inside their house choice.
by her son (Mario Serzo Jr) the accused in this case.
The spouses were able to rescue the grandchildren and RULING:
to bring them to a safer place. When returning to their NO, SC affirmed the decision of the trial court.
house, Alfredo Alcantara who was walking just The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the
Constitution. The right covers the period beginning from Therefore, it do not constitute a deprivation of
custodial investigation, well into the rendition of appellant's constitutional right to counsel because he
judgment and even on appeal however right to counsel was adequately represented by three court-appointed
de parte is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano and Atty. Garcia.
the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the Courts are not required to await indefinitely the pleasure
states's and the offended party's equally important right and convenience of the accused as they are also
to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may mandated to promote the speedy and orderly
restrict the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte administration of justice. Nor should they countenance
if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or such an obvious trifling with the rules. Indeed, public
the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the policy requires that the trial continue as scheduled,
attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid considering that appellant was adequately represented
reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like. by counsels who were not shown to be negligent,
In this case, appellant had been given ample time incompetent or otherwise unable to represent him.
to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his
subsequent appearances in court without such counsel AMION v JUDGE CHIONGSON
and his act of allowing this situation to continue until the AM No. RTJ-97-1371 (January 22, 1999)
presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of intention FACTS: The allegations against respondent judge are
to do so. It even appears that he was merely delaying premised on his appointment of a counsel de oficio for
his own presentation of evidence on purpose to the accused-complainant despite the latter’s objection
prejudice of the offended party, the trial court and the thereto on the ground that he had his own retained
orderly administration of justice. Furthermore, appellant counsel in the person of Atty. Depasucat.
did not demonstrate in what way the services of his
counsels de oficio were unsatisfactory. He did not cite Accused-complainant explains that respondent judge
any instance substantiating his claim that he was not appointed another lawyer in the person of Atty. Ong of
effectively represented. In short, he was afforded a the Free Legal Aid to act as counsel de oficio for the
chance to be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by scheduled hearing of the criminal case. He further avers
his own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such that his retained counsel was ready for hearing but on
right. It taxes the mind to think that, almost two years the day before the scheduled hearing, he was informed
since appellant first invoked his right to be represented that Atty. Depasucat was ill.
by counsel de parte, he still could not find one who
would suit his needs and desires. Neither did he It was for this reason that accused-complainant was not
cooperate with his court-named lawyers. represented by his defense lawyer in the scheduled
hearing which prompted respondent judge to appoint
Free Legal Aid lawyer Atty. Ong. Notwithstanding

complainant-accused’s vehement opposition, Moreover, there is no denial of the right to counsel
respondent judge proceeded with the trial with Atty. Ong where a counsel de oficio was appointed during the
representing the complainant-accused as counsel de absence of the accused’s counsel de parte pursuant to
oficio. He also claims that Atty. Ong did not have the court’s desire to finish the case as early as
sufficient knowledge of the case and that no prior practicable under the continuous trial system.
conference was held between said counsel de oficio
and himself. ANDRADA v PEOPLE
GR No. 135222 (March 4, 2005)
ISSUE: WON there is a violation of the accused Facts:- On September 24, 1986 at about 1:15 am, Sgt
constitutional rights. Sumabong, Sgt Gaces and Cpl Aresinio Ugerio were
eating at the Marlow’s Restaurant in Baguio City. When
RULING: NO. An examination of related provisions in Cpl Ugerio talked to a woman who passed by their
the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will table, petitioner Peter Andrada, approached him and
show that the “preference in the choice of counsel” scolded him. Sgt. Sumabong advised Andrada to pay
pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under his bills and go home as he was apparently drunk.
investigation rather than one who is the accused in - As Sumabong was paying the bills, he heard
criminal prosecution. Ugerio moan in pain. He then saw Andrada hacking
Ugerio with a bolo. Sumabong approached them but
Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of Andrada ran away. Andrada was then arrested in a
his substantive and constitutional right to due process waiting shed at the corner of Camdas Road and
as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be Magsaysay Ave.
heard and to present evidence to substantiate his - Andrada invoked self defense claiming that
defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in Ugerio and Sumabong slapped his face and pointed
court together with his counsel at the scheduled their guns to his head. He also said that he ran away to
hearings. his house in Camdas Subd. He checked to see if his
mother was around to accompany him to surrender, but
Accused-complainant had more than sufficient time and nobody was home. On his way to surrender, he say his
every available opportunity to present his side which mother with a policeman. They proceeded to the police
would have led to the expeditious termination of the station in Magsaysay Ave where Andrada surrenderd.
case. A party cannot feign denial of due process when The RTC however ruled against Andrada.
he had the opportunity to present his side.
Issue: WON the mitigating circumstance of voluntary He also proved that on said dates, the victim, Elvie, was
surrender can be invoked by Andrada no longer living with them in Mabitac, Laguna. She
already transferred to Minayutan, Famy, Laguna where
Held: No she was in Grade 2.
Ratio: - Evidences showed that Andrada, after attacking The accused was convicted for two counts of rape
the victim, ran away. However, he was apprehended by committed on August 15 and 16, 1993 when the
the policemen who were in the waiting shed. informations filed against him alleged August 15 and 16,
- For voluntary surrender to be accepted as a 1994 as the dates when the crimes were committed. He
mitigating circumstance, it should be spontaneous and it contends that he was denied due process to defend
must show that Andrada has the real interest to himself. His whole defense of alibi centered around
surrender unconditionally to the police authorities. August 15 and 16, 1994, the alleged dates of the rape
- In this case however, surrender was not incidents.
spontaneous.
ISSUE: WON the accused was denied of his right to be
PEOPLE v VALDESANCHO informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
GR No. 137051-52 (May 30, 2001) him.
FACTS: Two counts of the crime of rape was charged
against Vicente Valdesancho. It was alleged that the RULING. YES. Article III, Section 14 of the 1987
rape was committed against Elvie Basco on August 15 Constitution mandates that no person shall be held
and 16 1994, respectively. All evidence of the liable for a criminal offense without due process of law.
prosecution tried to prove that the victim was raped by It further provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
the accused on these dates. accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him and shall enjoy the right to be
The accused interposed the defense of alibi. He heard by himself and counsel. Similarly, the Revised
contends that Elvie together with her mother, Leonida, Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which took
filed the instant cases against them because of the effect on December 1, 2000, provides that in all criminal
serious quarrel between Erlinda (wife of the accused prosecutions, it is the right of the accused to be
and the older sister of the victim) and Leonida because informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
of the latter's relationship with a lesbian. He also said against him. To convict an accused for an offense not
that he had no misunderstanding or quarrel with Elvie. alleged in the complaint or information violates such
He proved that on these dates he was in the town of right.
Sta. Maria helping Ka Usting prepare for the town fiesta.
proceeded without any evidence being presented on his

The rationale behind informing the accused in writing of part. Finally, without the services of an expert in sign
the charges against him was explained by this Court as language ever being utilized at any stage of the
early as 1904 in U.S. v. Karelsen,[27] viz: proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and
"First. To furnish the accused with such a description of sentenced to die by electrocution. Executive clemency
the charge against him as will enable him to make his was recommended, however, in view of the accused's
defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction infirmity and his nearly ten-year detention as a suspect.
or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution ISSUE:
for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the Whether or not the accused was given due
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are process of law and the insufficiency of the purely
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be circumstantial evidence presented to overcome the
had (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In constitutional presumption of innocence be in his favor.
order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must HELD:
be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made The Supreme Court held that the absence of an
up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed
the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense
place, names (plaintiff and defendant),and with which he was charged and who could also have
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a communicated the accused's own version of the
specific allegation of every fact and circumstances circumstances which led to his implication in the crime,
necessary to constitute the crime charged." deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the
PEOPLE v CRISOLOGO accused's final plea of not guilty can excuse these
GR No. 74145 (June 17, 1987) inherently unjust circumstances.
FACTS: The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign
Zosimo Crisologo alias “Amang”, a deaf-mute, language and of any other means, whether in writing or
was charged for robbery and homicide committed on 1 otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against
May 1976 in Calamagoy, Poblacion Magsaysay, Davao him denied the accused his fundamental right to due
del Sur. Accused was allegedly informed of the charged process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual
against him through sign language but apparently no process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused
sign language expert or representative was available. was determined was not safeguarded. The accused
The accused through a counsel de oficio waived the could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard
reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. Trial by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him in the - The RTC found Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong
proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake. and Emilio Senoto guilty of murder for the killing of
The Constitution of this state expressly provides that an Jonathan Calpito. Accused-appellants, shortly after the
accused has a right to be heard by himself and counsel, filing of the information, submitted a motion for
also, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; reinvestigation alleging that “it was a certain Jesus
against him, and, further to be confronted by the Mendoza who stabbed the victim. The trial court acted
witnesses, who are to testify against him. In favorably on the motion. The City Prosecutor filed a
constructing this constitutional provision it needs no motion to admit an amended information on the basis of
discussion in deciding that all this must be done in a affidavits. The information, as amended, included
manner by which the accused can know, the nature and Jesus Mendoza among the named accused. But unlike
the cause of the accusation he is called upon to answer, accused-appellants who were immediately arrested
and all necessary means must be provided, and the law after the commission of the crime, Jesus Mendoza
so contemplates, that the accused must not only be remained at large. At their arraignment, the detained
confronted by the witnesses against him, but he must accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
be accorded all necessary means to know and - On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his
understand the testimony given by said witnesses, and evaluation of the respective submissions of the
must be placed in a condition where he can make his prosecution and the defense, including their rebuttal and
plea rebut such testimony, and give his own version of sur-rebuttal evidence, rendered its now assailed
the transaction upon which the accusation is based. decision.
PEOPLE v QUITLONG ISSUES

GR No. 121502 (July 10, 1998) 1. WON the RTC abused its discretion and/or acted
FACTS in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding that there
- Calpito was a student from Baguio city. One time, he was conspiracy between and among the accused-
wanted some fishballs so he and Gosil bought some appellants
fishballs worth P15. When Calpito counted his change, 2. WON the RTC gravely abused its discretion
he found out that he only received P35 for his P100. and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in
Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, the fishball vendor finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of
would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito. The Murder instead of Homicide
3 men kept arguing. Moments later, Soriano saw eight
men rushing towards Gosil and Calpito. Calpito got HELD
stabbed and fell to the ground. 1. YES, Quitlong is guilty of murder while the other 2 are
only accomplices.
2. NO, the crime was qualified The crime committed DISPOSITION appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty
was qualified by abuse of superiority. While superiority of the crime of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito.
in number would not per se mean superiority in Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr.,
strength, enough proof was adduced, however, to show are found guilty as accomplices in the commission of
that the attackers had cooperated in such a way as to the crime.
secure advantage of their superiority in strength
certainly out of proportion to the means of defense People v Marcelo
available to the person attacked. March 22, 1999
- Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in J. Vitug
particular, mandates that no person shall be held
answerable for a criminal offense without due process Facts:
of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused Carmelita lives with her two daughters Josefina and
shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the Jaezel. Not far from their residence is the store owned
accusation against him. The right to be informed of any by accused Ernesto Marcelo. The children grew fond of
such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. Ernesto because he usually gives them candies and in
- object of informing an accused in writing of the time Carmelita felt at ease with him and would leave the
charges against him: First. To furnish the accused with children under his care when she is away.
such a description of the charge against him as will On March 8, 1993, Josefina would complain to her
enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail mother about a pain in her vagina and Carmelita would
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection even notice her daughter inserting her hand in her panty
against a further prosecution for the same cause; and to prevent it from touching her vagina. When this
third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it strange behavior recurred, she confronted her daughter
may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support who admitted that accused, would insert his finger, and
a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. then later on his penis into his vagina. An information for
Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542). In order that this requirement rape was then filed against Ernesto. RTC convicted him.
may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions Ernesto argues that the information averred to have
of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and taken place on 11 March 1993 and 06 March 1993,
intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with pointing out that the trial court convicted him in Criminal
reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff Case No. Q-93-51492 despite its opinion that rape had
and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the been committed not on 06 March 1993 but in the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every morning of 08 March before Carmelita arrived to fetch
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime her children. He thus argues that the allegation in the
charged information, not being sufficiently definite on the date of
the commission of the crime, has violated the Melenia Hernandez, the victim, was a grade three
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the student at the time of the alleged rape. She was the
nature and cause of accusation against him so as to daughter of the common law wife of the accused
give him the full opportunity to prepare for his defense. Ambray. On March 13, 1996, she said that at around
Issue: 2am, the accused woke her up and brought her to bed
WON the right of the accused to be informed of the and inserted his penis on her vagina and sexually
nature and cause of accusations against him was abused her. She was not able to see her mother
violated when the information failed to state the exact immediately, thus she revealed the incident to her aunt
date the rape was committed. which led to the filing the information against accused.
Held/ Ratio: RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
No. Section 6, Rule 110, of the Rules on Criminal Issue:
Procedure, in relation to Section 11 thereof, provides WON the penalty imposed against the accused should
that the complaint or information would be sufficient if it have been reduced
states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained Held/Ratio:
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the Yes. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 which
offense, and the place wherein the offense was amended Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code to which
committed. With respect particularly to the time of the the accused is charged provides for attendant
commission of the offense, it “is not necessary to state circumstances for which the imposable penalty is death.
in the complaint or information the precise time at which The first circumstances provides: “1. When the victim is
the offense was committed except when time is a under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
alleged to have been committed at any time as near to consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the actual date at which the offense was committed as the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.”
the information or complaint will permit.”
Although it was shown that the accused is the common-
law spouse of the victim’s mother, the first special
People v Ambray qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the
February 25, 1999 indictment on which he was arraigned. The failure to
J. Gonzaga-Reyes allege the fact of relationship between the accused and
the victim in the information for rape is fatal and
Facts: consequently bars conviction of its qualified form which
is punishable with death. Qualifying circumstances therefore. The Constitution is clear that an accused has
must be properly pleaded in the indictment in order not the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
to violate the constitutional right of the accused to be accusation against him. Hence, a person cannot be
properly informed of the nature and cause of the convicted of a crime for which he has not been charged,
accusation against him otherwise, he would be denied the due process of law
People v Paglinawan People v De Vera

January 31, 2000 June 9, 1999
J. Mendoza J. Vitug
Facts: Facts:
The Senados were sleeping in their household when
suddenly they heard a gunshot which hit their light At around midnight of December 31, 1993, while they
which thus causing the room to be covered in total were playing with fireworks, Neil saw accused go under
darkness. Afterwards, four bursts of gunfire were a mango tree. After a short while, he heard a gun shot,
subsequently heard. When the firing ceased, she saw which was followed by the falling body of his brother
accused Paglinawan holding an M16 rifle looking at Gerardo. When he looked around, he saw the accused,
their house which was lighter because of a bulb. He whom he clearly recognized, holding a long-barreled
found and his wife and children injured, and another gun, about one meter long, also locally known as
child, Jerry, dead. An information was filed against "sumpak." Just as he started to assist his brother, he
appellant accusing him of murder. RTC convicted only heard shouts, about 40 to 50 meters away, that her
convicted him for murder qualified with treachery. sister Perlita was also dead. He speculated that that the
Issue: shooting was an offshoot of the land dispute between
WON, accused can also be found guilty for the injuries his father and the accused. Three informations were
suffered by the wife and children filed against the accused, one for the murder of Gerardo
Held/Ratio: Valdez, the second for homicide for the death of Perlita
No. the information filed in this case is only for the Ferrer, and the third for illegal possession of firearms.
murder of Jerry Senados, the seven-year old child of RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
Segundino and Millianita Senados. Though the complex crime of Murder with Homicide and of the
prosecution established in the testimony of its witnesses crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
that Millianita Senados and Junior Senados were and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death
injured, the court cannot hold accused-appellant liable
for said injuries since he was not properly charged Issue:
WON accused can be tried and held liable or convicted a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is
for two or more criminal cases at the same time owned by Pres. Marcos.
Petitioner claims that the phrase “to intervene directly or
Held/Ratio: indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or
application with the Government” is vague and violates
No. while the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the
more criminal cases and can render a consolidated accusation against him. He further complains that the
decision, it cannot convict the accused of a complex provision does not specify what acts are punishable
crime consisting of the various crimes alleged on the under the term intervene, and thus transgresses his
two informations. Thus appellant cannot be held liable right to be presumed innocent
for the complex crime of murder with homicide but Issue:
should be held liable separately for these crimes. To do WON Section 5 of RA 30194 was unconstitutional for
so would deprive the accused of their constitutional right being void for vagueness.
to be informed of the nature and cause of the Held/Ratio:
accusation against them. It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth and
the vagueness doctrines have special application only
Romualdez v Sandiganbayan to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for
July 29, 2004 testing the validity of penal statutes.
J. Panganiban
Nonetheless, the term intervene should be understood
Facts: in its ordinary acceptation, which is to “to come
The People of the Philippines through the PCGG filed between.” Criminally liable is anyone covered in the
an information before [the anti-graft court] charging the enumeration of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- any person who
accused, Alfredo Romualdez with violation of Section 5, intervenes in any manner in any business, transaction,
Republic Act No. 3019. The information provided that
4 “Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the
the accused, being the brother-in-law of President spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of
Ferdinand E. Marcos, and therefore, related to him by the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the
Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or
affinity within the third civil degree, for the purpose of indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government:
promoting his self-interests and/or that of others, Provided, That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of
office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with
intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the the Government along the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office,
government-owned and controlled corporation and the nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part
of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites
Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully
performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.”
contract or application with the government. It is can not hold hostage the court by their refusal to the
impossible for the law to provide in advance details of reading of the complaint or information.
how such acts of intervention could be performed. But
the courts may pass upon those details once trial is Abalos v People
concluded. Thus, the alleged vagueness of intervene is September 17, 2002
not a ground to quash the information prior to the J. Quisumbing
commencement of the trial.
Facts:
People v Bryan Ferdinand Dy On November 11, 1994, an Information for Falsification
January 16, 2003 of Private Documents was filed against the accused–
J. Ynares-Santiago appellant Braulio Abalos in the MTC of Dagupan City.
On December 12, 1994, another Information for
Facts: Falsification of Private Document was filed against the
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by accused Dy accused-appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of
for the decision finding him guilty of rape and acts of Lingayen, Pangasinan.
lasciviousness. One of their main contentions is that the On June 5, 1995, during his arraignment before the
right to be arraigned is not among the rights that are Dagupan Municipal Trial Court, the accused-appellant
susceptible to waiver or estoppel, thus the lack of entered a plea of not guilty. On August 7, 1995, he filed
arraignment cannot be deemed cured by their a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Municipal Trial
participation in the trial; Court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Issue: Initially, the motion to quash was granted, but this was
WON there has been a violation of the rights of the later reversed in a motion for certiorari filed in the RTC.
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the On the MTC Lingayen, he also filed a motion to quash
accusations against them. but this was also denied. He appealed in both cases,
Held/Ratio: which was consolidated by the CA who later decided to
NO. Indeed, the right to be informed of the nature and dismiss his appeals, Thus the petition on certiorari.
cause of the accusation may not be waived and indeed, Primarily, petitioner assails the assumption of
the defense may waive their right to enter a plea and let jurisdiction over the criminal cases for falsification by the
the court enter a plea of “not guilty” in their behalf. MTCC-Dagupan and the MTC- Lingayen. He argues
However, it becomes altogether a different matter if the that both courts could not have simultaneous jurisdiction
accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature over his case. He avers that only one crime was
and cause of the accusation against them. The defense committed pursuant to the unified and indivisible nature
of the criminal intent proved
Issue: insomnia, accused entered the kitchen and forcibly

raped her. An information was filed against him for rape
WON the informations filed in Lingayen as well as in through force and intimidation. RTC found him guilty
Dagupan, MTCC, were dismissible for multiplicity of beyond reasonable doubt and imposed upon him the
offenses merged in one information. penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus the appeal to the
SC.
Held/Ratio:
Issue:
No. there was a waiver of his right.
WON an information lacking certain material allegations
The Rules of Court, particularly Rule 110, Section 13, may still sustain a conviction.
indeed frowns upon multiple offenses being charged in
a single information. However, petitioner failed to Held/Ratio:
raise this issue during arraignment, in Lingayen as
well as in Dagupan. His failure to do so amounts to Yes, the accused-appellant failed to interpose any
a waiver and his objection on this point can no objection to the presentation by the prosecution of
longer be raised on appeal. In his Motion to Quash evidence which tended to prove that he committed the
filed in Dagupan City, petitioner alleged lack of rape by force and intimidation. While generally an
jurisdiction. On the other hand, in his Motion to Quash accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not
filed in Lingayen, petitioner alleged forum-shopping, clearly charged in the complaint or information, this rule
double jeopardy, lack of jurisdiction, and that the facts is not without exception. The right to assail the
do not constitute an offense. He only raised the issue of sufficiency of the information or the admission of
“multifariousness of offenses alleged” in his petition evidence may be waived by the accused-appellant. In
before this Court. By this time, his objection is belated, People v. Lopez, we held that an information which
and obviously to no avail. lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a
conviction when the accused fails to object to its
People v Palarca sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured
May 29, 2002 by competent evidence presented therein. Thus -
J. Ynares-Santiago
Failure to object was thus a waiver of the constitutional
Private complainant, a 70 year widow was tending to right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
her sari-sari store, while accused, who was a frequent accusation. It is competent for a person to waive a right
buyer in the store, was finishing his two bottles of beer.
While complainant was drinking her pills for her
guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation
which would be invalid if taken against his will. or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation
and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he
Acebedo v Sarmiento may interpose.The remedy in the event of a non-
December 16, 1970 observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the
J. Fernando accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the
Facts: case
In the case at hand, Petitioner not once but twice did
On August 3, 1959, a criminal information for damage to seek to have the prosecution for damage to property
property through reckless imprudence against petitioner against him terminated as the matter was pending for at
and a certain Chi Chan Tan with the CFI Pampanga. As least six years, the first time he sought to put an end to
there were no further proceedings, petitioner on May 19, it. When at last, the trial stage was reached, the
1965 moved to dismiss the criminal charge. Respondent complaining witness testified on direct examination but
Judge denied this on July 10, 1965. After two more made no appearance when his cross-examination was
years, came the trial with the complainant having to be continued. A clear case of a denial of the right to a
testified on direct examination but not having as yet speedy trial was thus made out. There was an order of
been fully cross-examined. At the continuation of the dismissal that amounted to an acquittal. No
trial set for June 7, 1967 such witness did not show up. reconsideration could therefore be had without
The provincial fiscal moved for postponement. Counsel offending the provision on double jeopardy.
for petitioner, however, not only objected but sought the
dismissal of the case based on the right of the accused People v Ginez
to speedy trial. May 27, 1991
Initially, respondent judge granted the dismissal, but he J. Paras
later reversed himself and proceeded with the trial.
Issue: Facts:
WON the right of the accused to a speedy trial was An information for libel was filed on January 27, 1987
violated. before the RTC of San Fernando, La Union against
Held/Ratio: Ramon Labo, Jr., Francis Floresca and Perfecto
Yes. The right to a speedy trial means one free from Manaois as editor/publisher of the "People's Bagong
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary Taliba" in connection with the publication of the article
objective being to assure that an innocent person may
captioned "Inihablang Ex-Justice" in its August 3, 1986

issue. Issue:
On April 13, 1987, private complainant filed a motion for WON the rights of the accused to a speedy trial had
joint hearing and at the same time asked the court to been violated.
defer the hearing already scheduled for April 20 and 21,
1987, on the ground that the other accused, Manaois, Held/Ratio”
had lately been arrested and filed bond for his No. the court held that said right has not been violated
provisional liberty. The motion was granted and the and held that the dismissal of the case as regards
court reset the case for the arraignment and pre-trial of private respondents Labo and Floresca is premature
the case with respect to the accused Manaois for May and erroneous. "The right of an accused to a speedy
18, 1987. trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the
On June 11, 1987, private complainant filed a motion for same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a
postponement on the ground that he has a serious eye reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It
ailment (cataract in both eyes) that needs immediate secures rights to a defendant but it does not preclude
medical attention. In an order dated June 16, 1987, the the rights of public justice."
Court granted the said motion and reset the hearing of Private complainant's absences at the hearings of the
the case to July 30, 1987. This was also postponed case were in good faith and that he had justifiable and
when counsel for the accused failed to appear during meritorious reasons therefore. Said absences are
the hearings. When the RTC on September 16, 1987 evidently not capricious, oppressive, nor vexatious
reset the hearing to October 15, 1987 private to the two accused who had waived their
complainant was in Manila recuperating from a second appearance at the trial of the case. It should be
eye operation. remembered that the right to a speedy trial is
On September 25, 1987 private complainant filed with relative, subject to reasonable delays and
the Fiscal's Office a complaint for libel against private postponements arising from illness, medical
complainant Esquivel, the person identified by Manaois attention, body operations, as in the instant case
as the editor of the August 3, 1986 issue of the People's where it was satisfactorily proven that private
Bagong Taliba, for his possible inclusion as one of the complainant had to undergo eye operations,
accused hospitalization and a medical check-up abroad.
On October 15, 1987, the respondent court issued an The subject case for libel was dismissed on October 15,
Order dismissing the case as against respondents Labo 1987, some eight and a half months after the
and Floresca for failure of private complainant Justice information was filed. This period is not such an
Guerrero to appear. The motion for reconsideration was extended, prolonged or lengthy duration as to cause
denied and thus this instant petition. capricious and vexatious delay. While accused
persons do have rights, many of them choose to demonstrated that the delay was capricious, oppressive,
forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights unreasonable, and vexatious; or it must be due top
unjustifiable causes; delay due to the ordinary course of
UY v ADRIANO justice is not a violation); (c) assertion of the right (the
G.R. No. 159098. 27 October 2006. accused must assert the right at the soonest possible
(right to speedy trial; purpose; factors) instance); (d) prejudice to the accused (the accused
must specifically allege how their rights as enumerated
Petitioners were charged for the violation of Article 188 above had been violated).
of the Revised Penal Code for manufacturing and
selling soy sauce using the name and trademark of DACANAY v PEOPLE
“Marca Pina Soy Sauce,” passing off their product as G.R. No. 101302. 25 January 1995
the genuine article. For various reasons, the (right to speedy trial; right to separate trial)
prosecution of the case stalled (delay in the
presentation of witnesses, a statutory change in the The government levied a charge of economic sabotage
court with jurisdiction over cases with the same subject against the principal officers of the National Sugar
matter, petitioners filed motions instead of responsive Trading Corporation through smuggling with regard to
pleadings, etc.) and the proceedings lasted for six the importation of raw sugar in 1986. The case
years. Thus the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the remained pending until 1991 herein petitioner filed a
information (at the RTC) claiming that their right to Motion for Immediate and Separate Trial invoking his
speedy trial had been violated by the lackadaisical right to speedy trial.
attitude of the public attorney in prosecuting the case.
HELD: The Court ruled for petitioner. A separate trial is
HELD: The Court ruled against the petitioners. It ruled in consonance with the right of an accused to a speedy
that the right to speedy disposition of cases was for the trial as guaranteed to him by the 1987 Constitution. As
benefit and protection of the accused in criminal cases defined in the case of Flores v. People, 61 SCRA 331
in order that: (1) oppressive pre-trial incarceration would (1974), a speedy trial is one “conducted according to
be prevented; (2) the anxiety and concern of the the law of criminal procedure and the rules and
accused would be minimized; and (3) the possibility of regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and
the defense being impaired would be limited. As such, oppressive delays.” The primordial purpose of this
the factors to be examined in disposing claims of constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of an
speedy trial are the following: (a) length of delay (not accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an
really indicative of a violation, it is merely a trigger for indefinite period of time. Likewise, it is intended to
the analysis); (b) reason for the delay (it must be prevent delays in the administration of justice by
requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with reasonable questioned and interrogated the accused and defence
dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions. The main witnesses in a very disrespectful and mocking manner
objection of respondent People of the Philippines to he going so far as to comment on the infidelity of one of the
separate trial asked by Petitioner is that such a accused’s mother and to insinuate that Opida is
procedure would entail a repetitive presentation of mentally ill.
evidence but such inconvenience and expense on the
part of the Government cannot be given preference over HELD: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and
the right to speedy trial and the protection to a person’s ordered their release. It said that it was not enough for
life, liberty or property accorded by the Constitution. judges to be impartial, they must moreover appear
This is particularly true in the case of petitioner where impartial. The Court said that the judge in this case
the prosecutors’ opposition to the request for separate failed miserably. Given the obvious hostility of the judge
trial was based on the ground that the principal accused toward the defense, it was inevitable that all the
in the case, the former President of NASUTRA, was protestations of the accused in this respect would be, as
abroad and was not yet arrested. If an accused cannot they in fact were, dismissed. The accused are
be placed under arrest because he remains outside the admittedly notorious criminals who were probably even
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, with more proud of their membership in the Commando gang even
reason should his co-accused, who are under arrest, be as they flaunted their tattoos as a badge of
entitled to a separate trial. notoriety. Nevertheless, they were entitled to be
presumed innocent until the contrary was proved and
PEOPLE v OPIDA had a right not to be held to answer for a criminal
G.R. No. L-46272. 13 June 1986 offense without due process of law. The judge
(right of the accused; impartial judge; appearance of disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too
impartiality) eager to convict the accused, who had manifestly
earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion of
This is a criminal case on automatic review by the the trial, "You want me to dictate the decision now?" he
Supreme Court of the imposition of the death penalty was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and
upon the two accused. The case stems from the killing obviously waiting only to be formalized. Considering the
of one Fabian Gaban. Allegedly, the accused and way they were tried, we now declare that they should
several others ganged up on him, hitting him with beer not be detained in jail a minute longer. While this is not
bottles and fist blows until one among them, Mario del to say that the accused are not guilty, it does mean that,
Mundo, took out a knife and killed the victim. Del Mundo because their constitutional rights have been violated,
is still at large, however the two defendants herein were their guilt, if it exists, has not been established beyond
charged as co-conspirators. During trial, the judge reasonable doubt and so cannot be pronounced. Due
process has stayed the uneven hand of the quick the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by
condemnor and must set the defendants free. such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions
PEOPLE v CASTILLO propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such
G.R. No. 120282. 20 April 1998 questions and the answers thereto were eliminated,
(right of the accused; impartiality of the judge; appellant would still be convicted.
clarificatory questions)
As correctly observed by the solicitor general, “there
Defendant was accused of the killing of Tony Dometita.
was no showing that the judge had an interest, personal
During trial, the judge of the trial court propounded upon
or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar. He
the defendant several clarificatory questions. The trial
is therefore presumed to have acted regularly and in the
court convicted. Upon automatic appeal to the SC,
manner [that] preserve[s] the ideal of the ‘cold neutrality
defendants charge the trial judge with impartiality
of an impartial judge’ implicit in the guarantee of due
alleging that he took over the work of the prosecution by
process (Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18).” That the
asking questions which were well-within the
trial judge believed the evidence of the prosecution
responsibility of the prosecution. Specifically, defendant
more than that of the defense, does not indicate that he
alleges that the judge took over from the prosecution
was biased. He simply accorded greater credibility to
and asked questions in a leading manner, interrupted
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to that
the cross-examination when the answer would be
of the accused.
beneficial to the prosecution, asked questions alluding
to the character of the defendant which the defense
could not object to. PEOPLE v SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 121038-45. 25 January 1999.
(impartial trial; media publicity)
HELD: No merit. The allegation of bias and prejudice is
not well-taken. It is a judge’s prerogative and duty to
This is the rape-slay case of Allan Gomez and Eileen
ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth.
Sarmenta for which former Mayor Antonio Sanchez of
Questions which merely clear up dubious points and
Calauan, Laguna was convicted. Defense claims that
bring out additional relevant evidence are within judicial
they were denied the right to an impartial trial because
prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that
of the pervasive media coverage of the case which
allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be
characterized the defendants as being guilty of the
received with caution, especially when the queries by
crime.
the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety
of a judge’s queries is determined not necessarily by
their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by
HELD: Denied. Citing the case of People v Teehankee, (rights of the accused; public trial)
the Court said that, “Pervasive publicity is not per
se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The For the convenience of the parties, the respondent
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to- judge held hearings in the comfort of his airconditioned
day, gavel-to-gavel coverages does not by itself prove chambers instead of in the courtroom. No objection was
that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial made by anyone by this arrangement. After judgment
judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is was rendered against the accused, counsel for the
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench defense sought to invalidate the proceedings as being
from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational violative of the accused’s right to public trial.
criminal cases. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch
with the world. Our judges are learned in the law and HELD: Denied. The Constitution guarantees an
trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera accused the right to a public trial. It possesses that
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere character when anyone interest in observing the
exposure to publications and publicity stunts does manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his
not per se fatally infect their impartiality. courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such
attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no
“At best, appellant can only conjure possibility or moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown.
prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation that thereby the accused is afforded further protection,
and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejsndro, et that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and
al., we rejected this standard of possibility of not tainted with any impropriety. Here, it was undeniable
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice that even if the hearings were not held in its usual place
as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial (i.e. the courtroom), the same was still open to the
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that public and whoever wished to observed the proceedings
the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply were free to do so.
that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.” The
Court also said that in fact, media enhances the rights PEOPLE v MONJE G.R. No. 146689. 27 September
of the accused as it brings to the public’s eye possible 2002
violation of such rights. (rights of the accused; right to meet witnesses face to
face; cross-examination; purpose)
GARCIA v DOMINGO
52 SCRA 143 (1973)
Accused herein were charged and convicted of the rape leading and searching inquiry of the witness for further
and murder of a 15-year-old girl. The prosecution’s case disclosure touching the particular matters detailed by
was woven completely upon the testimony of one him in his direct examination, and it serves to sift,
Michael Cordero who testified that he saw the accused modify, or explain what has been said, in order to
with the victim and three others walking to the ricefield develop new or old facts in a view favorable to the
where the victim’s body was later found. During trial, cross-examiner. The object of cross-examination
however, and after a short initial cross-examination, therefore is to weaken or disprove the case of one’s
Cordero refused to return to court so that he may be adversary, and break down his testimony in chief, test
questioned by the defense witness more fully. the recollection, veracity, accuracy, honesty and bias or
Notwithstanding this repeated refusal and despite the prejudice of the witness, his source of information, his
court warning that his testimony would be stricken from motives, interest and memory, and exhibit the
the record, the court nonetheless convicted the accuse improbabilities of his testimony. In other words, the
based mostly on such testimony. ultimate purpose of cross-examination is to test the
truth or falsity of the statements of a witness during
HELD: The Court reversed the conviction and ordered direct examination. Unfortunately, for the accused,
the immediate release of the accused. It bears stressing these objectives of cross-examination were never
that the cross-examination of a witness is an absolute attained in this case because of the continued failure
right, not a mere privilege, of the party against whom he and refusal of witness Cordero to appear for his cross-
is called. With regard to the accused, it is a right examination.
guaranteed by the fundamental law as part of due
process. Article III, Sec. 14, par. (2), of the 1987 CAAMIC v GALAPON
Constitution specifically mandates that "the accused A.M. No. MTJ-93-887. 7 October 1994
shall enjoy the right to meet the witnesses face to face," (subpoena; nature; purpose)
and Rule 115, Sec. 1, par. (f), of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure enjoins that in all criminal In a letter addressed to the Court Administrator,
prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to confront petitioner sent complaint charges for grave coercion
and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the against respondent judge. She alleged that she
trial. Cross-examination serves as a safeguard to received a subpoena from the respondent ordering her
combat unreliable testimony, providing means for to appear in court. When she did, she claims that she
discrediting a witness' testimony, and is in the nature of was threatened, berated, and coerced by respondent
an attack on the truth and accuracy of his testimony. into giving him P8,000.00 to the judge which
The purpose of cross-examination, however, is not represented the amount that she received as death
limited to bringing out a falsehood, since it is also a benefit resulting from the death of her common-law
husband. Respondent filed a comment materially absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or
denying the allegations in the complain saying that the remotely related to his official functions and duties,
subpoena was issued upon the request of one accommodating the request and using his official
Generosa Sandagan who, as it turns out, is the mother functions and office in connection therewith was, by any
of petitioner’s common-law-husband and who was yardstick, improper. The public trust character of his
merely seeking the recovery of the proceeds of the office would have been enough reason for him to
death benefits of her son. decline the request. And, there being no case in his sala
in connection with which complainant could be
HELD: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and subpoenaed, respondent then had absolutely no power
fined the judge with further admonition. Asubpoena "is a or authority to issue one to the complainant. He thus
process directed to a person requiring him to attend and exhibited his ignorance of the elementary rule on
to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any issuance of subpoenas.
investigation conducted under the laws of the There is something more, however, in this case. In
Philippines, or for taking of his deposition." Although the using the subpoena form for criminal cases, which was
subpoena he caused to be issued purports to be in a never explained by respondent, nothing could have
form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not, been intended but to sow fear in the mind of the
in fact, issued in connection with a criminal case or for complainant and compel her attendance, for her failure
any other pending case in his court nor for any to do so would have subjected her to "the penalty of
investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant to law." There was, therefore, some element of
law or by direction of this Court. It was designated for a intimidation, oppression or abuse of authority, which
specific purpose, viz.,administrative conference. That aggravates his apparent ignorance of the law on
purpose was, in no way connected with or related to issuance of subpoenas. Considering that it was done
some of his administrative duties because he knew from upon request of a party which has no case before his
the beginning that it was for a confrontation with the court, he invited legitimate criticism against his office as
complainant as solicited by Generosa Sandagan for the an instrument of oppression.
latter to get a share in the death benefits of Edgardo
Sandagan which was received by the complainant. GIMENEZ v NAZARENO
Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's court 160 SCRA 1
for her claim; neither is there any case in respondent's (rights of the accused; trial in absentia; requisites)
court concerning such death benefits. What Generosa
wanted was for respondent to act as mediator or Respondent de la Vega, along with five others, was
conciliator to arrive at a possible compromise with the charged with murder. He was arraigned and pleaded
complainant, which was, obviously, non-official and not guilty. Before the scheduled date of the first
hearing, he escaped from detention. Prosecutors file a arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged,
motion to proceed with the hearing in absentia, invoking jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and
Sec 19, Art IV of the 1973 Constitution: this continues until the termination of the case,
notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, ISSUE 2: WON an accused who has been tried in
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself absentia retains his right to present evidence and cross
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and examine witnesses
cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the HELD 2: NO. The requisites for a trial in absentia are:
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the
process to secure the attendance of witnesses accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to
and the production of evidence in his appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. The right
behalf. However, after arraignment trial may to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses is a
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the personal right and can be waived. Failure to appear
accused provided that he has been duly notified during trial, after due notice, constitutes a waiver of
and his failure to appear is unjustified. these rights. Thus, rendering judgment for a trial in
absentia is not a violation of the right to be presumed
The lower court proceeded with the trial. The case was innocent. The accused is still presumed to be innocent,
dismissed against the five accused, while proceedings and his conviction must be based on evidence showing
against de la Vega were held in abeyance. The guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
defendant sought reconsideration of the abeyance but
was denied. PEOPLE v MACARAEG
CONCEPCION; January 14, 1986
ISSUE 1: WON court loses jurisdiction over an accused
who escapes from detention after arraignment FACTS
Private Respondent Vasco Valdez was charged with
HELD 1: NO. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the Homicide before the CFI of Pangasinan for the death f
person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for one Severs Paulo and posted bail for
voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary h i s provisional release. Attached to the bail bond was
appearance is accomplished by appearing for awaiver stipulating that the trial may proceed in
arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in hisabsence.- When the case was called for trial, the
this case. Where the accused appears at the prosecutionpresented Welino Paulo, as its 1st witness,
who when asked if he could identify the accused, WON the accused, despite having waived
answered in the affirmative. h i s presence at the trial, may still be compelled
to bepresent in the same trial when he is to be
Since the accused was not present in court, the identified
prosecution asked the court to order the
presence of the accused so that he HELD
c o u l d b e identified. Counsel for accused YES. Stare Decisis.
o b j e c t e d t o t h e motion by invoking the waiver in Reasoning-
the bail bond and contended that the absence of the The rule adopted by the Court in the case of Aquinovs.
accused is part of his defense. R e s p o n d e n t J u d g e Military Commission No. 2 (supra) is that while the
D a n i e l M a c a r a e g o f t h e C F I , invoking the case accused may waive his presence at the trial of the
of Aquino v Military CommissionNo.2 denied the case, his presence may be compelled when he is to be
motion: identified.
“The issue at bar was one of those squarely raised in The Court said: “Since only 6 Justices are of the view
the Aquino case where six out of ten Justices that petitioner may waive his right to be present at all
voted that the accused may not be compelled to stages of the proceedings while Justices are in
be present during the trial when he is to agreement that he may so waive such right,
b e identified by the witnesses of the except when he is to he identified, the result is
prosecution w h i l e f o u r v o t e d t h a t t h e that the respondent Commission's Order
a c c u s e d m a y b e compelled in this instance. requiring his presence at all times
The reason of the m a j o r i t y i s t h a t t h e d u r i n g t h e proceedings before it should be
a c c u s e d m u s t n o t b e compelled to assist the m o d i f i e d , i n t h e sense that petitioners presence
prosecution in proving its case.” shall be requiredonly in the instance just indicated.
The prosecution moved for reconsideration but Petition GRANTED, orders of respondent Judge
respondent Judge denied the motion. Prosecution ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Judge is ordered
then filed this petition with prayer for a TRO. The SC toi s s u e the necessary process to
granted the petition and issued a TRO, c o m p e l t h e attendance of the accused at
restraining the respondent Court from further the hearing of thec r i m i n a l case for
proceeding with the criminal case. p u r p o s e s o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Temporary TRO
lifted and set aside
ISSUE
appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction

of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15)
G.R. No. 92415 May 14, 1991 days from the notice of the judgment against him. While
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- at large, he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is
appellee, vs. OMAR MAPALAO and REX deemed to have waived the same and he has no
MAGUMNANG, defendants-appellants. standing in court.
GANCAYCO, J.:p By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of
Rex Magumnang was charged with highway robbery an information, is at large and has not been
with homicide along with the other accused. However apprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself to
After arraignment and during the trial, he escaped from the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be
confinement and had not been apprehended since then. granted any other relief by the courts until he submits
The trial court found him guilty. He therefore seeks to himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested.
appeal the conviction. The jurisdiction of the court once acquires, is not lost
ISSUE: WON he may appeal his conviction? NO upon the instance of parties but continues until the case
. Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of is terminated. Where the accused appears at the
Criminal Procedure, the Court, may "upon motion of the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged,
appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and
appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps this continues until the termination of the case,
bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.
the appeal." In this case, appellant Magumnang A trial in absentia will thus occur when the following
remained at large even as his appeal was pending. requisites are present:
Hence, by analogy his appeal must be dismissed.
The reason for this rule is because once an accused (1) that there has been an arraignment;
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or (2) that the accused has been notified; and
flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is
and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction unjustified.
of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has
seek relief from the court. the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court.
Thus when as in this case he escaped from To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to
confinement during the trial on the merits and after his render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in
arraignment, and so the trial in absentia proceeded and absentia.
the judgment against him was promulgated evenas he ON PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: He is still
remained at large, he should not be afforded the right to presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still
be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such discovered that the entire records appear to have been
evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable destroyed due to a fire.
doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process He filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
since the accused was given the opportunity to be Corpusdue to his continued detention without any valid
heard judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so to due process.
hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in ISSUE: WON Petitioner should be released under writ
absentia waives his right to present evidence on his of habeas corpus? NO
own behalf and to confront and cross-examine RATIO: was devised and exists as a speedy and
witnesses who testified against him. effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
P. HABEAS CORPUS personal freedom.13 It secures to a prisoner the right to
have the cause of his detention examined and
G.R. No. 122954 February 15, 2000 determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue
NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs.THE ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful
COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU authority.
OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as
(IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA a consequence of a judicial proceeding,
CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE resulting in the restraint of a person,
CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, respondents. (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence,
QUISUMBING, J.: or
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
detention since May 21, 1981, up to present 1 by reason sentence is void as to such excess.15
of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint
He was requesting transfer from Manila City Jail to the by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, 2 but the Jail such restraint.The petition does not make out a case.
Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding The Director of Prisons is holding the prisoner under
Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a
cannot be effected without the submission of the lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits
requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or the legality of his detention. The mere loss or
Mittimus, Decision, and Information.3 It was then destruction of the record of the case does not invalidate
the judgment or the commitment, or authorize the advance payment it gave?

prisoner's release.
Also, in order that a judgment may be subject to
collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount
lack of jurisdiction.The proper remedy in this case is for it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has
either petitioner or public respondents to initiate the absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of
reconstitution of the judgment of the case movement. The fact that no physical force has been
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does
and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. not make less real the deprivation of her personal
SO ORDERED. freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence.
JJ., concur. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion,
to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to
[82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949] cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
(Sorry couldn’t find the original case!) psychological element that may curtail the mental
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.
Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place
who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to
Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An the protection of courts of justice as much as the
advanced payment has already been given to Estelita individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or
by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. physical coercion.
However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another
residence, which was disallowed by the employment RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, vs. HON. FLORITO
agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was S. MACALINO, RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, BUREAU OF
restrained. The employment agency wanted that the IMMIGRATION, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,
advance payment, which was applied to her
transportation expense from the province should be
paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave. Rodolfo M. Villaceran of the Philippine National Police
filed an application with RTC-Pampanga for the
issuance of a search warrant against petitioner
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the Raymond M. Jackson, an American citizen, a.k.a. Allen
right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the Miller, and Jaime C. Bueta for the search of the articles
The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of
Court on June 28, 1999 against the Commissioner of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
the CID and John Doe and Jane Doe; and on the same application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if
date, the Court issued a resolution (a) directing the the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the reason of same supervening events such as the
respondents to make a return of the writ on or before instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no
July 2, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.; After the return of the longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
respondents, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing application. Any such supervening events are the
the petition of Jackson and denied his plea for a writ issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge
of habeas corpus.[22] of the detained person
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal
restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who
ISSUE: WON petition for habeas corpus should be attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth
granted? NO process where on its face shows good ground for the
detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to
allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the
RATIO: apparent effects of such process.
In this case, based on the return of the writ by the
respondents, the petitioner was arrested and detained
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as at the CID detention center at Bicutan, Parañaque City,
amended, provides that “except as otherwise expressly under a Mission Order. Records show that the U.S.
provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend passports which were confiscated from the him when he
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which was arrested by PNP and purportedly issued to
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the have been determined to have been tampered. As a
person entitled thereto.” The ultimate purpose of the consequence, said passports were cancelled by the
writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from U.S. Embassy.
unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is
granted to test the right under which he is detained. It has been ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the
passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening passport to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain
events may bar his release or discharge from in the country.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is against the injustice to him as Governor. A petition for
DISMISSED. habeas corpus was filed by the wife of Paredes, alleging
that the warrant for her husband’s arrest was void
because the preliminary investigation was void, and,
Paredes v. Sandiganbayan that the crime charged in the information against him
G.R. No. 89989, January 28, 1991 had already prescribed.
Facts:
In January 1976, Paredes, provincial attorney of Agusan ISSUE: WON a writ of habeas corpus is proper?NO
del Sur was granted land through free patent. Eight
years later, Paredes was charged with perjury by the RATIO:
provincial fiscal requested by the Sangguniang The absence of a preliminary investigation does not
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur. affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor impair
A former Mayor of Agusan filed a criminal complaint the validity of the information or otherwise render it
charging Attorney Paredes with having violated section defective
3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. The petitioner alleges that the information against
3019) because he allegedly used his office as Provincial Governor Paredes is invalid because the preliminary
Attorney to influence, persuade, and induce Armando investigation was invalid and the offense charged has
Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office in already prescribed. Those circumstances do not
Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent constitute valid grounds for the issuance of a writ of
application. habeas corpus
Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the preliminary The remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the
examination of the complainant and his witnesses attention of the court to the lack of a preliminary
without the presence of accused because the summon investigation and demand, as a matter of right, that one
was erroneously served. Fiscal found a prima facie case be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the
against Paredes. information, should merely suspend the trial and order
His motion for reconsideration was denied, assailing the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation
validity of the preliminary investigation that it was
conducted without his notice. In the meantime, Paredes
was elected Governor of Agusan del Sur and the free MANALO v PNP CHIEF CALDERON
patent was reverted back to public domain. (Reyes, J/2007)
Information was filed and warrant of arrest was issued
against Paredes. He refused to post bail in protest FACTS:
obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement, to

A fire broke out in a polling area in an elementary liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient
school due to five malefactors bearing firearms who cause and to deliver them from unlawful custody.[21]
poured gasoline over a ballot box and set it ablaze,
causing the death of two people and injuriesto nine Only if the Court is satisfied that a person is
others. unlawfully restrained of his liberty will a petition
for habeas corpus be granted and the person detained
In the investigation that ensued, several eye-witnesses released from confinement.[22] If respondents are not
identified some of petitioners as the perpetrators of the detaining nor restraining the applicants or the person in
school burning.[3] The investigation also yielded that all whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus is filed, the
six petitioners, who are all members of petition should perforce be dismissed.[23]
the PNP Regional Special Operations Group (PNP-
RSOG), failed to timely respond to the incident at
the Pinagbayanan Elementary School.[4] In this case, no illegal deprivation of liberty is shown
to exist:
A PNP memorandum was thus passed, that required (1) the assailed memoranda decreeing the
the monitoring of the petitioners in their camp base as monitoring of their movements cannot be
well as escorts when they leave the premises. considered as a form of curtailment of their
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging freedom guaranteed under our Constitution.
that the monitoring was an illegal deprivation of their
liberty. It is evident that petitioners are not actually detained or
restrained of their liberties. What was ordered by
ISSUE: WON a writ of habeas corpus should be the PNP is that their movements, inside and outside
issued? NO camp be monitored. Even petitioners themselves
admit they are not actually detained or imprisoned.
[30]
RATIO:
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was (2) the “restrictive custody” complained of by
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to petitioners is, at best, nominal restraint which is
relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither
and efficient defense of personal freedom. actual nor effective restraint that would call for the

The main thrust of the special proceeding of habeas grant of the remedy prayed for.
corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's (3) petitioners’ reliance on Moncup ] is misplaced. In
detention. More specifically, its vital purpose is to said case, petitioner was ordered released by
respondent but his release was saddled with obey a chain of command under civilian officials.
[35]
restrictions. There, petitioner was required to
secure prior approval for:
(a) any travel outside Metro Manila; and
(b) a change in residence. His freedom of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE
speech was likewise muffled by a COURSE and DISMISSED.
prohibition on granting interviews to local or
foreign media. He was likewise ordered to
report regularly to respondent] G.R. No. L-59118 March 3, 1988
In the case at bench, no restrictions in the nature JUAN DIZON AND SOLEDAD RAMOS, petitioners, vs.
of those imposed in Moncupa exist. To reiterate, BRIG. GEN. VICENTE EDUARDO AND COL. TEDDY
petitioners are merely held to account for their CARIAN, respondents.
movements inside and outside the camp’s TEEHANKEE, C. J.:
premises. They are not required to secure prior FACTS:
approval before they can move out of the camp, A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the parents of
only that each of them be accompanied by an two young persons, Eduardo Dizon and Isabel Ramos
escort and their time of departure and arrival who werevarrested with others by the military, detained
noted. in the military camp, and then claimed by the military to
(4) members of the police force are subject to the have been released after nine days. But they were not
administrative disciplinary machinery of released to their parents, who had been visiting them,
the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law nor to any other responsible person — and were never
enumerates the disciplinary actions, including seen or heard from by anyone since then.
restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly Alleging that the signatures of the desaparecidos on
designated supervisors and equivalent officers of their release papers were falsified and thus, they were
the PNP as a matter of internal discipline, never released by the military said release being a
(5) although the PNP is civilian in character, its scheme of the respondents to prolong their detention,
members are subject to the disciplinary authority torture and interrogation, the petitioners-parents filed
of the Chief, Philippine National Police, under the the petition at bar on December 17,1981.
National Police Commission. Courts cannot, by ISSUE: WON habeas corpus may be issued? NO
injunction, review, overrule or otherwise interfere RATIO:
with valid acts of police officials. The police The release of a detained person renders the petition
organization must observe self-discipline and for habeas corpus moot and academic.. Where,
however, there are grounds for grave doubts about the
alleged release of the detainees, which we share, such investigation of the grave charges at bar as well as
particularly, where the standard and prescribed of the whereabouts and fate of the desaparecidos.
procedure in effecting the release has not been ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to refer this case
followed, then the burden of proving by clear and to the Commission on Human Rights for investigation
convincing evidence the alleged release is shifted to the and appropriate action as may be warranted by its
respondents. Release is an affirmative defense and findings, and to furnish the Court with a report of the
"each party must prove his own affirmative outcome of its investigation and action taken thereon.
allegations," 13 just as the burden of proof of self- This Resolution is immediately executory.
defense in a killing rests on the accused .
In this case, respondents were unable to prove that the
alleged release occurred. January 4, 1995
(1) The signatures of the detainees on their release G.R. No. 117568
papers were falsified. ROLANDO ANGELES y BOMBITA, petitioner, vs.
(2) Respondents did not follow the prescribed standard DIRECTOR OF NEW BILIBID PRISON, respondent.
procedure for releasing detainees: Vitug, J.:
(3) The inherent implausibility of respondent Carian's
reason for supposedly releasing the detainees — that Rolando Angeles y Bombita was charged and
they had agreed to act as spies. sentenced to life imprisonment for the illegal possession
(4( What is likewise difficult of comprehension is that of shabu. He has now lodged a petition for habeas
according to the affidavits of Major Cabauatan and Lt. corpus, invoking
Maranon, elements of their command after encountering (a) Republic Act No. 7659, which has reduced the
a group of "heavily armed men" captured the detainees penalties prescribed under the original provisions of the
with other alleged Comminist Terrorists; with one Dangerous Drugs Act, and
casualty on the latter's side, yet all of them except the (b) the recent ruling of this Court in People vs. Martin
two detainees "were released on or before September Simon y Sunga, 3 which has confirmed the retroactive
23, 1981, having been found out that no sufficient application of the above-numbered amendatory law.
evidence would be established to warrant their further
detention" ISSUE: WON the petition of habeas corpus may
However, the Court regrets that it cannot grant the relief prosper? NO
sought by petitioners. It is not the repository of all
remedies for every grievance.. It is not a trier of facts, RATIO:
nor does it have the means and facilities to conduct All courts of competent jurisdiction mat entertain
petitions for habeas corpus to consider the release of
prisoners convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.:

Act who have served the maximum of the applicable FACTS:
penalties newly prescribed by Republic Act No. 7659. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the wife and
children of Wilfredo Torres. A conditional pardon was at
In this regard, the formalities required for petitions first granted to Torres but the Board of Pardons and
for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally, and such Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
petitions, although deficient in form (e.g. in letter-petition cancellation of the conditional pardon granted because
forms), may be entertained so long as they are sufficient he had been charged with twenty counts of estafa
in substance. In the negative, the courts to which the before, and convicted of sedition.
petitions are filed may refer the matter to the
Commission on Human Rights or to the Public Thus, the Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the
Attorney’s Office for possible assistance to the prisoners President" an Order of Arrest and
7
concerned Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to
The foregoing notwithstanding, Angeles’ petition serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
for habeas corpus cannot be granted. Petitioner, it ISSUE: WON the petition for habeas corpus is valid?
appears, has only served the minimum of his NO
sentence; however, he may, if qualified, be released RATIO:
on parole pursuant to Section 5 of the Indeterminate Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a
Sentence Law which reads: person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus, Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the
being still premature, is DISMISSED. grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked
because of a breach thereof, the determination of which
G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995 is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS final sentence for his first conviction until November 2,
CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES, 2000.
(LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in
Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA the first place was the exclusive author of the
R. TORRES and MARIA CECILIA R. conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary
TORRES), petitioners, vs.THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own
OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the
MUNTINLUPA, MM., respondents. subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the
same. Courts have no authority to interefer with the Petitioners, in their reply to the separate amended
grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted returns, stated that the subject persons were never
criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final released on September 13,1978 or on any day
judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is thereafter as shown by the affidavits of one Diosdado
not a requirement for the President to determine Camora and one Diomedes Bono.
whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of
a conditional pardon HELD: The Sandiganbayan decision, lenient as it was,
proves beyond per adventure the falsity of the incredible
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is claim by res respondents in their returns and amended
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No returns in the case at bar that they released the three
pronouncement as to cost detainees-victims on the very same night of their arrest
on September 13,1978. They thereby flaunted the
CONTADO v. TAN authority of this Court; brazenly perjured themselves in
swearing to their false returns; failed to give respect due
FACTS: This petition for habeas corpus was flied on to justice and truth and created and placed obstacles to
November 20, 1978 by Nora Contado, Adelina Razon the administration of justice and prevented the
and Nena Tizon in behalf of their spouses Crispo resolution of this case with the promptness which its
Contado, Cesar Razon and Jimmy Tizon. The very nature required, involving as it did, the liberty and
respondents are Rufilo L. Tan, the then Municipal Mayor lives of the three victims.
of Llorente, Eastern Samar
It is beyond doubt the bounden duty of respondents
Petitioners alleged that on September 13,1978, their having custody of a detained person to respect and
spouses were arrested by members of the Integrated obey a writ of habeas corpus issued by a court or judge
National Police of Llorente, Eastern Samar, having jurisdiction in the premises and properly served
upon them, and every person who unlawfully disobeys
In their separate amended returns, respondents denied the Court's commands or unlawfully resists or counsels'
the material allegations of the petition stating that they resistance to its execution is in contempt of court and
(respondents) merely invited the three missing persons may be summarily punished therefor. Disobedience to
for questioning and reiterated that they had been the writ may take the form of neglecting or refusing to
released on the same day on September 13, 1978 at produce the person whose presence is sought by the
8:00 p.m. Respondents prayed that the petition be writ, of failing to make a return, of making a false or
dismissed for being moot and academic. evasive return, or of refusing to obey the final order or
judgment entered in the proceedings.
The Court herein exercises this power on a corrective HELD: It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy
and not a retaliatory or vindictive principle (though it disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in
could impose a heavier penalty and order respondents" criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
imprisonment for a substantial period of time) and cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all
therefore finds respondents guilty of contempt of court proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
and sentences each of them to pay a fine of One hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a
Thousand Pesos (P l,000.00) as hereinbelow ordered. case may demand expeditious action on all officials who
But the respondents must face criminal charges for their are tasked with the administration of justice.
perjured returns to the writ, as set forth hereinabove. However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153
SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy disposition of cases" is a
relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of
Q. SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES "speedy trial" accorded to the accused in all criminal
proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible
CADALIN v. POEA ADMINISTRATOR concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution
FACTS: On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their delays which render rights nugatory.
own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient
contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing definiteness and clarity of some facts, the claimants
an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas were ordered to comply with the motion of AIBC for a
Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims bill of particulars. When claimants filed their
arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment "Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike
by BRII, a foreign corporation engaged in construction. out the complaint from the records for failure of
claimants to submit a proper bill of particulars. While the
The claimants say that they were deprived by NLRC POEA Administrator denied the motion to strike out the
and the POEA of their right to a speedy disposition of complaint, he ordered the claimants "to correct the
their cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of deficiencies" pointed out by AIBC.
the 1987 Constitution. The POEA Administrator allowed Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response
private respondents to file their answers in two years to the complaint, the records of employment of the more
(on June 19, 1987) after the filing of the original than 1,700 claimants had to be retrieved from various
complaint (on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total countries in the Middle East. Some of the records dated
disregard of its own rules as far back as 1975.
SAMBANG v. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL petitioner's criminal case. The respondent general
court-martial then scheduled the dates for the
Facts: Petitioner, then a constable 2nd class (C2C) in continuation of the hearing of petitioner's case.
the Philippine Constabulary (PC), and his brother On September 29, 1999 hearing, petitioner moved for
Vicente Sumbang, a civilian, were accused with the the dismissal of the case alleging among others that
killing of Joemarie Bedia and Joey Panes committed on there was inordinate delay in the trial of his case which
May 29, 1988 in Bo. Obrero, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City. is in violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial
and disposition of his case
Upon his arraignment on November 20, 1989, petitioner
entered a plea of "not guilty". The prosecution started HELD:"It must be here emphasized that the right to a
presenting its witnesses on January 21, 22, and 23, speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy
1991. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss or Demurrer trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
to Evidence on February 27, 1991. On the other hand, attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
Vicente Sumbang was convicted of Homicide by the delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City on March 27, 1991. are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
On January 14, 1992, Republic Act No. 6975 otherwise justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
known as the "Philippine National Police (PNP) Law" elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally
took effect. The PNP law provides among others for the applicable is the balancing test used to determine
integration of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
National Police (PC-INP) into the PNP including its speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that
functions, officers and other enlisted personnel and also matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
provides for the continuation of court-martial the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length
proceedings against PC-INP criminal offenders already of delay, reason for the delay, defendant's assertion or
arraigned prior to its effectivity. The composition of the non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
general court-martial RECOM 6 was also subjected to defendant resulting from the delay, are considered."
changes and petitioner's criminal case remained
pending and unresolved. Although it is unfortunate that it took about eight years
from 1991 before the trial of this case was resumed, in
On February 17, 1999 and August 4, 1999, respectively, 1999, we do not find such delay as amounting to a
Letter Order Nos. 80 and 436 of the National violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial considering
Headquarters, Philippine National Police (NHQ-PNP) that such delay could not be attributable to the
were issued by the PNP Director General constituting prosecution. The cases cited by petitioner upholding
general court-martial PRO 6, Iloilo City which took over the right of the accused to a speedy trial are not in point
since the delay therein complained of was due to the HELD: On June 20, 1990, Criminal Case No. 6672 was
vacillation and procrastination of the prosecuting officers deemed submitted for the decision of the
and their lack of conscientiousness in the discharge of Sandiganbayan. Since then, no action has been taken
their duties, which circumstances do not obtain in the by the anti-graft court. On March 23, 2000, petitioner
case at bar. The prosecution in the instant case had filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, grounded on the
already presented its four witnesses, all of whom, violation of his right to a speedy
except for the fourth witness, were cross-examined by disposition. Unfortunately, even this Motion has not
petitioner's counsel on January 21, 22, and 23, 1991, been ruled upon by public respondent.
respectively.
Under Section 6 of PD 1606 amending PD 1486, the
Sandiganbayan has only 90 days to decide a case from
LICAROS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
the time it is deemed submitted for
decision. Considering that the subject criminal case
Facts: On 5 June 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the
was submitted for decision as early as June 20, 1990, it
Central Bank was robbed and divested of cash in the
is obvious that respondent court has failed to decide the
amount of P19,731,320.00.
case within the period prescribed by law. Even if we
In the evening of June 6, 1982, Modesto Licaros (no were to consider the period provided under Section
relation to herein petitioner), one of the principal 15(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which is 12
accused, together with four companions, delivered in months from the submission of the case for decision,
sacks a substantial portion of the stolen money to the the Sandiganbayan would still have miserably failed to
Concepcion Building in Intramuros, Manila where Home perform its mandated duty to render a decision on the
Savings Bank had its offices, of which herein petitioner case within the period prescribed by law. Clearly then,
was then Vice Chairman and Treasurer. The delivery the decision in this case is long overdue, and the period
was made on representation by Modesto Licaros to to decide the case under the law has long expired
former Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, Sr.,
As earlier discussed, more than ten years has lapsed
then Chairman of the Bank and father of herein
since the subject case has been deemed submitted for
petitioner, that the money to be deposited came from
decision. The delay cannot at all be attributed to
some Chinese businessmen from Iloilo who wanted the
petitioner, who has neither utilized dilatory tactics nor
deposit kept secret;
undertaken any procedural device to prolong the
proceedings. As a matter of fact, he has been
As of this writing, and more than ten (10) years after the
continuously pushing for the resolution of his case even
case submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not
during the early stages of the prosecution. Moreover, it
rendered the Decision.
is undeniable that such delay has caused much
prejudice, distress and anxiety to herein petitioner, Tilendo of diverting and misusing the funds allocated for
whose career as bank executive and businessman has the construction of the CCSPC Agriculture Building.
suffered the stigma of being shackled to an unresolved The Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao endorsed the
criminal prosecution, virtually hanging like a Damocles’ anonymous complaint to the National Bureau of
sword over his head for more than a decade. We need Investigation (NBI), Region XII for the conduct of a fact-
not stress the consequences and problems inherent in finding investigation.
this pending litigation and/or criminal prosecution which NBI conducted investigations pertaining to the case.
include the prospects of unrealized business Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao received the NBI report
transactions, stagnant professional growth, hampered charging accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA
travel opportunities and a besmirched 3019, and Articles 217, 218, and 219 of the RPC.
reputation. Furthermore, it is worth noting that petitioner OMB found probable cause and ordered filing of
has been charged merely as an accessory after the fact information.
due to his being a senior executive of the bank where Tilendo opposed raising right to speedy disposition of
the principal accused tried to deposit the stolen cases, the case having dragged for years.
money. Clearly then, the dismissal sought by herein
petitioner is justified under the circumstances and in HELD: In this case, there was no unreasonable delay
accordance with the guidelines set forth in the above- to speak of because the preliminary investigation stage
cited case. officially began when the NBI filed before the
Ombudsman a complaint against Tilendo for violation of
TILENDO vs. OMBUDSMAN the relevant provisions of RA 3019 and the
G.R. No. 165975 RPC. Contrary to Tilendo’s view, the preliminary
Facts: investigation did not automatically commence upon the
Tilendo is President of the Cotabato City State filing of the anonymous letters in the Ombudsman
Polytechnic College (CCSPC).
CCSPC had an appropriation of P6 million for the Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 7), as amended, or
construction of its Agriculture Building and Science the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
Academic Building. outlines the procedure applicable to all criminal and
Concerned Faculty Members of the CCSPC filed before administrative complaints cognizable
the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against Tilendo for by the Ombudsman. Section 2, Rule II of AO 7 clearly
violation of RA 3019. Complaint basically alleged that states that “upon evaluating the complaint, the
Tilendo enriched himself and his family while he was investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:
President of the CCSPC, using government funds for (a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; (b)
personal purposes. The complaint likewise accused referred to respondent for comment; (c) endorsed to the
proper government office or agency which has Ombudsman-Mindanao found the complaints proper for
jurisdiction over the case; (d) forwarded to the a preliminary investigation. The case involving petitioner
appropriate office or official for fact-finding Mabanglo was docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0201 while
investigation; that involving petitioner Roque was docketed as OMB-
MIN-91-0203
Even assuming there was delay in the termination of
the preliminary investigation, Tilendo is deemed to have On August 14, 1997, petitioners instituted the instant
slept on his right to a speedy disposition of petition for mandamus premised on the allegation that
cases. From 22 October 1999, when he submitted to ‘[a]fter the initial Orders finding the cases proper for
the NBI his counter-affidavit, after asking for several preliminary investigation were issued on June[,] 1991
extensions of time, Tilendo did nothing until December and the subsequent submission of their counter-
2002. It seems that Tilendo was insensitive to the affidavits, until the present[,] or more than six (6) years,
implications and contingencies of the projected criminal no resolution has been issued by the Public
prosecution posed against him. He did not take any Respondent [and no] case [has] been filed with the
step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the appropriate court against the herein Petitioner
matter. Tilendo’s inaction gives the impression that he
did not object to the supervening delay, and hence it HELD: We find the long delay in the termination of the
was impliedly with his acquiescence preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of
ROQUE v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to
the requirements of the law governing the conduct of
Facts: On January 14, 1991, Laura S. Soriano and preliminary investigation, including substantial
Carmencita Eden T. Enriquez of the COA, by virtue of compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law
COA Regional Office Assignment Order No. 91-174 for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
dated January 8, 1991, conducted an audit on the P9.36 of the procedural due process constitutionally
million allotment released by the DECS Regional Office guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the
No. XI to its division offices broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the
constitutional guarantee of ‘speedy disposition’ of cases
As a result of the audit, auditors Soriano and Enriquez as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in
found some major deficiencies and violation of the Anti- the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) delay is violative of the petitioner’s constitutional
rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be
In an Order dated June 11, 1991, the Office of the deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. We are not accomplishment reports. This enabled them to claim on
impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to their progress billings, resulting in an overpayment by
sanitize the long delay by indulging in the speculative the government of P4,164,000.00, and concealed the
assumption that ‘delay may be due to a painstaking and negative slippage incurred by said contractors. It also
grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the discovered that mobilizations fees advanced to
evidence presented during the preliminary investigation contractors amounting to P15,798,675.00 remained
merited prosecution of a former high-ranking unrecouped, when these were supposed to be deducted
government official.’ In the first place, such a statement from contractors’ progress billings.
suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
On December 8, 1992, the Office of the President,
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five
through then Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante,
charges against the petitioner were for his alleged
asked the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary
failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities
investigation. Thus, the Commission on Audit,
required by Republc Act 3019, which certainly did not
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, instituted a
involve complicated legal and factual issues
complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
necessitating such ‘painstaking and grueling scrutiny’ as
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) against regional
would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating
officials of Cotabato City and DPWH-ARMM. The
the preliminary investigation.
complaint was docketed as Case No. OMB-0-92-2771.
GUIANI v. SANDIGANBAYAN
On July 31, 1998, Graft Investigation Officer II Gay
Maggie F. Balajadia-Violan recommended the
FACTS: After the creation of the Autonomous Region
indictment of petitioners, among others, for various
for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the regional Department
violations of RA 3019. The recommendation was
of Public Works and Highways (DPWH-ARMM) began
approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao
the implementation of regional, provincial and district
Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. on October 8, 1998, and by
impact projects to be funded from the infrastructure
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on October 16, 1998.
seed money of P615 Million from the Office of the [1]
Immediately thereafter, 21 criminal informations were
Regional Governor of ARMM.
filed against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan as
On October 15, 1992, the Commission on Audit- Criminal Cases Nos. 24963-24983
Special Audit Office (COA-SAO) conducted a physical
Petitioenrs say that the DELAY OF ALMOST SIX (6)
inspection of the impact projects and found several
YEARS TO RESOLVE THE PRELIMINARY
irregularities therein. More specifically, the COA-SAO
INVESTIGATION DISREGARDED THE
found that in relation to the concreting of the Cotabato-
OMBUDSMAN’S DUTY, AS MANDATED BY THE
Lanao Road, the contractors bloated the
CONSTITUTION AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770
violated their constitutional rights. not that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and balanced are: the length of delay, the
HELD: As meticulously detailed by the Ombudsman reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert
above, the period of time that elapsed during the such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by
conduct of the preliminary investigation in this case was the delay
warranted by the sequence of events. Because of the
The records of this case show that petitioners raised
complexity of the transactions complained of which
their objections to the perceived delay in the resolution
were contained in a two-page report from the COA, the
Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) sought further of the complaints against them only on September 27,
substantiation of the allegations therein and requested 1999, when they filed their Omnibus Motion with the
for the complete report of the COA Special Audit Sandiganbayan. It would appear, therefore, that
Office. The authenticated SAO Report No. 93-04 was petitioners impliedly acquiesced in the delay in the
received by the GIO on November 16, 1994. It was only proceedings.
then that the GIO required all forty-one respondents to
file their counter-affidavits. ABADIA v. COURT OF APPEALS
Most of the respondents, including some of
Facts: Private respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan
petitioners herein, moved for extensions of time. All the
was arrested on April 27, 1990 in connection with the
counter-affidavits were received in August 1995, owing
December 1989 coup attempt. He was brought to the
to the number of respondents. Thereafter, the COA
ISG Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio, Makati where
filed reply-affidavits on February 24, 1996 and May 29,
1996. It was only after the submission of the last he was detained for nine months without charges. On
pleading, i.e., the reply-affidavits, that the preliminary January 30, 1991, a charge sheet was filed against
investigation can be said to have been concluded. The private respondent by the office of the Judge Advocate
time to resolve the cases commences from this date. General alleging violations of the 67th, 94th and 97th
Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct
In the application of the constitutional guaranty of Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman, respectively.
the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances HELD: In the context of the constitutional protection
peculiar to each case. Well-settled is the rule that the
guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused individuals
right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a
particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial, we cannot
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
accept petitioners’ submission that the absence of any
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
specific provision limiting the time within which records
oppressive delay. In the determination of whether or
of general courts martial should be forwarded to the
appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing Respondent court, therefore, did not commit an abuse
authority to decide on the case would deny private of discretion in ordering the petitioners to act with
respondent – or any military personnel facing charges dispatch in dealing with the private respondent’s case.
before the General Courts Martial, for that matter – a Over three years have elapsed since the respondent’s
judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to a arrest. To this day, there is no indication – and it has not
speedy trial. What petitioners suggest is untenable. In been alleged – that records of the case have been
the case at bench, the records of the case may forwarded to the appropriate military appellate authority.
indefinitely remain with the General Court Martial, and This case does not even involve complex issues of fact
our courts, because of a procedural gap in the rules, and law. The central issue which the appropriate military
cannot be called upon to ascertain whether certain appellate authority will have to review is whether or not
substantive rights have been or are being denied in the the General Court Martial was correct in dismissing the
meantime. That is not the spirit ordained by inclusion of case on grounds of prescription under Article 38 of the
the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Articles of War.
Constitution which mandates the “duty of the Courts of
Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to DIMAYACYAC v. JUDGE ROXAS
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction Facts: An information for falsification of public
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the documents docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037
government at the RTC of Quezon City was filed against petitioner
along with some others.
As admitted by counsel for respondents, there is no
Before his arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the
time frame within which to transmit the records of the
information on two (2) grounds. First, that the officer
case to the reviewing authority as well as time limitation
who filed the information had no legal authority to do so,
within which the Chief of Staff must act on the
and second, that more than one offense was charged in
recommendation of dismissal However, it must be
the information.
stressed that the absence of a rule does not give to the
Chief of Staff indefinite time within which to act at the RTC granted motion to quash
expense of the constitutional right of a citizen to enjoy
liberty and to be protected from illegal or arbitrary More than two (2) years after the quashal of the
detention. information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 or on
October 19, 1993, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed
against the same accused including petitioner two (2) disposition of his case, and only when the case was
informations for falsification of public documents brought to the appellate court on certiorari. Even in this
docketed at the Quezon City RTC as Criminal Case petition before us, petitioner did not raise the issue of
Nos. Q-93-49988 and 49989 his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
The SOolicitor General then invoked the right to speedy

disposition of cases for the accused R. SELF-INCRIMINATION
HELD: As to the length of delay, it is established that Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners
the prosecution did not take any action on petitioner’s Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for
case for two years. From the time that Criminal Case prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It
No. Q-91-18037 was dismissed on August 23, 1991, the was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
prosecution failed to effect the very simple remedy of administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for
filing two separate informations against petitioner until complainants announced that he would present as his
October of 1993. Indeed, there was a delay in the first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner,
refiling of the proper informations. However, the through counsel, made of record his objection, relying
prosecution was never given the opportunity to explain on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a
the circumstances that may have caused such delay witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to
precisely because petitioner never raised the issue of compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of
the length of time it took the prosecution to revive the Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse
case. There is nothing on record to show what of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right
happened during the two-year lull before the filing of the against self-incrimination.
proper informations. Hence, it could not be ascertained
that peculiar situations existed to prove that the delay The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the
was vexatious, capricious and oppressive, and facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness
therefore, a violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to stand and interrogate him, the right against self-
speedy disposition of cases. incrimination being available only when a question
What the records clearly show is that petitioner never calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness.
asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case. They likewise alleged that the right against self-
The only ground he raised in assailing the subsequent incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative
filing of the two informations is that he will be subjected hearing.
to double jeopardy. It was only the OSG that brought to
light the issue on petitioner’s right to a speedy Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea
that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that
the complainants, he being the party proceeded against while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth
in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not
appeal by respondent Board. be accomplished according to means or methods
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the
human personality. More and more in line with the
Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual
first witness of the complainants violates the Self- even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is
Incrimination Clause. given due weight. The constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a government ...
must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.
Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative
hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners
cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, People v. Rondero (Scope of Right Against Self-
compel the person proceeded against to take the Incrimination)
witness stand without his consent. The Court found for The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice
the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9
principle that "the accused in a criminal case may year old victim was later found dead and half naked with
refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was
also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be convicted of homicide only.
compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not
the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his Held: Guilty of the special complex crime of rape with
license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional homicide. The absence of sperm does not negate the
guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The commission of rape since the mere touching of the
accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his pudenda by the male organ is already considered as
silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It consummated rape. The presence of physical injuries
is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to on the victim strongly indicates the employment of force
remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness on her person. Contusions were found on Mylene’s
stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own face, arms and thighs. Hence, death is the appropriate
free genuine will." penalty.
The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with

People v. Gallarde(Scope of Right Against Self- compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary
Incrimination) to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the
FACTS: Accused was charged with the crime of rape body of the accused is permissible.
with homicide. The trial court convicted him of murder Page 218
only. The trial court rejected the photographs taken of
the accused immediately after the incident on the Regala v. Sandiganbayan (Scope of Right Against
ground that the same were taken when the accused Self-Incrimination)
was already under the mercy of the police. Facts: Clients consulted the petitioners, in their capacity
as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
HELD: The taking of pictures of an accused, even structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in
without the assistance of counsel, being purely a question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional
mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional advice in the form of, among others, the deeds of
rights against self-incrimination. assignment covering their client's shareholdings.
Villaflor v. Summers(Scope of Right Against Self- Petitioners fear that identifying their clients would
Incrimination) implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice
Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-
adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations.
herself into physical examination to test whether or not
she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of 1. July 31, 1987 – complaint before the Sandiganbayan
adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused of PCGG vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., (principal
to such physical examination interposing the defense defendant) et al. for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth,
that such examination was a violation of her i. e., shares of stocks in named corporations in PCGG
constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "R. P. v.
Cojuangco, et al."
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a 2. Defendants named in the case are herein petitioners
violation of the petitioner’s constitutional rights against (plus private respondent Raul S. Roco) - then partners
self-incrimination. of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and
Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law Firm).
Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights.
The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person 3. ACCRA Law Firm – acquired info on assets of
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness clients, personal and business circumstances; assisted
against himself, is limited to a prohibition against in organization and acquisition ofbusiness associations
and/or organizations (companies listed in CivilCase 7. Edgardo J. Angara - holding approximately 3,744
0033), where its members acted as incorporators, or shares as of February, 1984 of UCPB
simply, asstockholders etc; delivered documents which
substantiate the client'sequity holdings, i.e., (1) stock 8. Expanded Amended Complaint of ACCRA – said that
certificates endorsed in blankrepresenting the shares is only in legitimate lawyering; became holders of
registered in the client's name, and (2) ablank deed of shares of stock in the corporations listed but do not
trust or assignment covering said shares; acted claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of
asnominees-stockholders of the said corporations stock; said Avelino V. Cruz an incorporator in 1976 of
involved insequestration proceedings (as office practice) Mermaid Marketing Corporation but for legitimate
business purposes and already transferred shares
4. August 20, 1991 - respondent PCGG’s "Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended 9. Petitioner Paraja Hayudini - denied being onvolved in
Complaint" excluded private respondent Raul Roco the alleged ill-gotten wealth
from complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 because of his
undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the 10. "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in 8, 1991 with Counter-Motion of ACCRA – moving that
the companies involved in respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to
PCGG Case No. 33. them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded
Roco.
5. Third Amended Complaint – said defendants
conspired in helping set up, through the use of the 11. Conditions precedent for the exclusion of
coconut levy funds, UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, petitioners, namely (PCGG’s Comment): (a) the
COCOMARK, CIC, and more than 20 other coconut disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) documents
levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c)
San Miguel Corporation shares deeds of assignments petitioners executed for clients
covering shares
6. ACCRA Investments Corporation - became the
holder of approximately 15 million shares (roughly 12. PCGG’s supposed proof to substantiate compliance
3.3%) of total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of by Roco: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of his the
31 March 1987; 44 among the top 100 biggest counsel reiterating previous request for reinvestigation;
stockholders of UCPB (about 1,400,000 shareholders); (b) Affidavit as Attachment; (c) Letter of the Roco,
a wholly-owned investment arm Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices originally requesting
the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence of the facts of the instant case clearly fall withinrecognized
PCGG against Roco exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not
privileged information. Sandiganbayan resolution
13. Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he annulled and set
did actually not reveal identity of the client, nor aside. Petitioners excluded from complaint.
undertook to reveal the identity of the client for whom he 1. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
acted as nominee-stockholder. divulge the name or identity of this client. Reasons:
1. Court has a right to know that the client whose
14. March 18, 1992 - respondent Sandiganbayan privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh
promulgated Resolution herein questioned, denying the and blood.
exclusion of petitioners for their refusal to comply with 2. Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-
the conditions by PCGG client relationship has been established. The attorney-
client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
15. Hence, petition for certiorari, grounds: strict 3. Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of
application of the law of agency; absolutely no evidence the relationship.
that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to 4. Due process considerations require that the
reveal, disclosure not constitute a substantial distinction opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
or equal protection clause, favoritism and undue adversary.
preference; not holding that, under the facts of this
case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners 2. BUT (Exceptions/Racio Decidendi): When the
ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their client's name itself has an independent significance,
client(s) and the other information requested by the such that disclosure would then reveal client
PCGG; unreasonable or unjust confidences
1. A strong probability exists that revealing the client's
ISSUE: Privileged Information name would implicate that client in the very activity for
Whether or not the lawyer’s fiduciary duty (uberrimei which he sought the lawyer's advice. (Baird exception
fidei) may be asserted in refusing to disclose the identity for freedom of consultation)
of clients [name of petitioners' client(s)] under the facts 2. Disclosure would open the client to civil liability.
and circumstances obtaining in the instant case (case at bar)
3. Government's lawyers have no case against an
HELD: The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name,
to reveal the identityof their clients under pain of the the said name would furnish the only link that would
breach of fiduciary duty owing to theirclients, because form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime. (case at bar – BAIRD that he gained by the contract to the person who
EXCEPTION) requested him.
4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem
on which the client seeks legal assistance (case at 6. OTHERS: Privileged Communication Laws
bar) Applicable
5. Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been a. Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
previously disclosed and it is the identity which is Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383
intended to be confidential "forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal
any communication made by the client to him or his
3. Petitioners were impleaded by PCGG as co- advice given thereon in the course of professional
defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their employment."
clients, after the "bigger fish" as they say in street
parlance — the names of their clients in exchange for b. Rules of Court Sec. 24: “Disqualification by reason of
exclusion from the complaint. (Primavera Farms, Inc., et privileged communication. — The following persons
al. vs. PCGG Mario Ongkiko) - "so called client is Mr. cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
Eduardo Cojuangco" (leverage to nail clients) following cases: “An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to any
4. No valid cause of action. It would seem that communication made by the client to him, or his advice
petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as given thereon in the course of…”
defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being
prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services c. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states, Sec. 20: “duty
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence,
and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of
5. The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised his client, and to accept no compensation in connection
on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio with his client's business except from him or with his
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one knowledge and approval.”
person lets his services and another hires them without
reference to the object of which the services are to be d. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
performed. Their services may be compensated by “A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be him.”
placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all
e. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: The defendants, the petitioners herein, from the Third
lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033.
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and 2. Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
ability," discretion in not acting favorably on the petitioners'
prayer to exclude them. The prerogative to determine
7. Equal protection clause - a guarantee which provides who shall be made defendants in a civil case is initially
a wall of protection against uneven application of status vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in this case.
and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee
operates against uneven application of legal norms so 3. If Roco's revelation violated the confidentiality of a
that all persons under similar circumstances would be lawyer-client relationship, he would be solely
accorded the same treatment. answerable therefor to his principals/clients and,
probably, to this Court in an appropriate disciplinary
8. Violates the equal protection guarantee and the right action if warranted.
against self-incrimination and subverts the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege. 4. They have no right to make such a demand for until
they shall have complied with the conditions imposed
SEPARATE OPINIONS (THREE OTHER JUSTICES: for their exclusion, they cannot be excluded except by
VITUG, DAVIDE AND PUNO) way of a motion to dismiss. The rule ofconfidentiality
VITUG, J., concurring: under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause
toexclude a party. It is merely a ground for
1. Confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship - disqualification of a witness.
allows the lawyer and the client to institutionalize a
unique relationship based on full trust and confidence 5. The revelation is entirely optional, discretionary, on
their part. The attorney-client privilege is not therefor
2. A situation of what it could elicit from a counsel applicable. The lawyer-client privilege provides the
against his client, unreasonable and with thinly petitioners no refuge. They are sued as principal
disguised threat of incrimination. defendants for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth.
DAVIDE, JR., J.: dissenting 6. Wrong use of American jurisprudence in ponencia:

1. Court must confine itself to the key issue, issue 1. Issue of privilege contested therein arose in grand
burried: whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with jury proceedings on different States.
grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the
2. In the cases cited by the majority, the lawyers continuing illegality, as where the legal representation
concerned were merely advocating the cause of their itself is part of a larger conspiracy. [like this case]
clients but were not indicted for the charges against
their said clients. Here, the counsel themselves are co- 4. Atypical of the usual case where the hinge issue
defendants duly charged in court as co-conspirators. involves the applicability of attorney-client privilege:
petitioners included as defendants and conspirators.
7. Lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the
commission of a crime or against the prosecution of the 5. The issue of attorney-client privilege arose when
lawyer therefor. PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the complaint
on condition they reveal the identity of their client.
8. As a general rule, the identity of a defendant in a
criminal prosecution is a matter of public record and, 6. The issue poses a trilemma: need for courts to
thus, not covered by the attorney-client privilege. discover the truth, need to protect adversary system of
Identity of a client is not within the lawyer-client privilege justice, need to keep inviolate the constitutional right
in this manner because every litigant is in justice entitled against self-incrimination and effective counsel in
to know the identity of his opponents. criminal litigations.
PUNO, J., dissenting: 7. Attorney-client privilege can never be used as a

1. MAIN POINT OF PUNO: Sandiganbayan committed shield to commit a crime or a fraud.
grave abuse of discretion when it misdelineated the
metes and bounds of the attorney-client privilege by 8. PCGG relented on its original stance as spelled out in
failing to recognize the exceptions. But petitioners need its Complaint that petitioners are co-conspirators in
to prove that prove they fall within the exceptions to the crimes and cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege.
general rule. Needs factual basis.
2. REASON: Attorney-client privilege is not a magic FRANCISCO BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. FELIX

mantra whose invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and
drape he who invokes it with its protection. Plainly put, it FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of
is not enough to assert the privilege. Isabela, respondents.
(Scope of Right Against Self-Incrimination)
3. Legal advice exception may be defeated through a
prima facie: in furtherance of present or intended Facts: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein
the petitioner complains that the respondent judge
ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to does not exist, and which may identify him as the
take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. falsifier.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the It cannot be contended in the present case that if
purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's
determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
documents supposed to be falsified. unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the
petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit
ISSUE: Whether or not the order violates the A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to
petitioner's right against self-incrimination. obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But
even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or
HELD: Yes. The constitutional inhibition is directed not specimens without resorting to the means complained
merely in giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal
the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that
of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the
accused has a right to hold secret. hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do
not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the constitutional privilege exists for the protection of
hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical innocent persons.
act, because it requires the application of intelligence
and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that Note: Measuring or photographing the party is not within
the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine the privilege. Nor is the removal or replacement of his
whether or not he is the falsifier. garments or shoes.
For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is p. 218

a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a Galman v. Pamaran (Immunity)
document, and one who is compelled to furnish a Facts: In order to determine the facts and
specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a
witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all
The present case is more serious than that of aspects of the killing of Sen Aquino at MIA, PD 1886
compelling the production of documents or chattels, was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board
because here the witness is compelled to write and aka the Agrava Board. The board conducted public
create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and
testified and/or produced documentary and other

evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in In the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned
response to an invitation issued by the board. Among to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also
those who testified and produced evidence before the those suspected as authors and co-participants in the
board are the respondents in this petition. tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and
called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is
Respondents contend that their individual testimonies one where the person testifying or producing evidence
before said board should not be admitted in evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an
and prayed that the same be rejected as evidence for offense and not merely in order to shed light on the
the prosecution. However, said prayer was denied by facts and surrounding circumstances of the
the Sandiganbayan contending that their testimonies assassination, but more importantly, to determine the
could not be excluded because the immunity was not character and extent of his participation therein.
available to them because of their failure to invoke their
right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886
Finding Board. denied them the right to remain silent. They were
compelled to testify or be witnesses against themselves.
Issue: 1. WON the testimonies given by the 8 Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They
respondents who did not invoke their rights against self- have to take the witness stand, testify or produce
incrimination before the Agrava Board is admissible in evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or
evidence. refused to do so. The jeopardy of being placed behind
prison bars even before conviction dangled before their
Held: 1. NO. The Board is in truth and in fact, and to all very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to
legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only be a witness against themselves, both of which are
with the function of determining the facts and sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our
circumstances surrounding the killing, but more fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to
importantly, the determination of the person or persons remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness
criminally responsible therefore so that they may be against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by
brought before the bar of justice. P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced
evidence as ordered, they were not immune from
The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them.
similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment
and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their
consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction.
Issue: 2. WON the right against self incrimination 2. One which grants “Transactional Immunity” - grants
extends to testimonies given before the Agrava board immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense
and not to an investigating officer to which his compelled testimony relates.
Held: YES. The privilege has consistently been held to It is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first
extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all type of immunity statutes (Use Immunity). It grants
cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon merely immunity from use of any statement given before
a witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere forfeiture the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason
case where only property rights were involved, "the right or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or
not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is producing evidence do not render the witness immuned
secured in favor of the defendant, then with more from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the
reason it cannot be denied to a person facing right against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from
investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life the use against him of such statement and nothing
and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being
him, hang on the balance. prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self-
incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the
The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes hallmark of due process, demands that private
no other import except to make said provision also respondents should have been informed of their rights
applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, to remain silent and warned that any and all statements
the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" to be given by them may be used against them. This,
applies to the herein private respondents they were denied, under the pretense that they are not
notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so
Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. inform them.
Immunity Statutes: The provision on self incrimination renders inadmissible

any confession obtained in violation thereof. As herein
1. One which grants “Use Immunity” - prohibits use of earlier discussed, this exclusionary rule applies not only
witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by
manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a
the witness. criminal proceeding or any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense.
Summary:
As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right respondent herein. An advanced payment has already
renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion, been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for
meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to
UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by
IMMUNITY is offered. Hence, under the oppressive the employment agency. Further she was detained and
compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be her liberty was restrained. The employment
offered to the witness before he can be required to agency wanted that the advance payment, which was
answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional applied to her transportation expense from the province
right. But in this case, the compulsion has already should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed
produced its desired results — the private respondents to leave.
had all testified without offer of immunity. Their
constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the
way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact advance payment it gave?
been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the
potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount
answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has
testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of
under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the movement. The fact that no physical force has been
immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does
depend on a claim of the privilege against self- not make less real the deprivation of her personal
incrimination which the same law practically strips away freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one
from the witness. place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence.
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion,
S. NON-DETENTION BY REASON OF POLITICAL to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
BELIEFS OR ASPIRATIONS existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to
cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
T. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE psychological element that may curtail the mental
Caunca v. Salazar (Involuntary servitude) faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place
Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to
Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far the protection of courts of justice as much as the
Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar,
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or

physical coercion. In this instance, the validity of the National Defense
Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is
People v Lagman and Zosa, et. Al, 66 Phil. 13 impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
(Service in defense of the State)
Facts: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and
45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Held: The Court held that The National Defense Law, in
Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does
60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of
being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty the Government to defend the State cannot be
years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register performed except through an army. To leave the
in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of organization of an army to the will of the citizens would
said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been be to make this duty of the Government excusable
required to do so. The evidence shows that these two should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to
appellants were duly notified by the corresponding enlist therein.
authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in
order to register for military service in accordance with The right of the Government to require compulsory
law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these military service is a consequence of its duty to defend
notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the
information. life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct.
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the
in defense that they have not registered in the military Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if
service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests,
a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and and even against his religious or political convictions, to
Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no take his place in the ranks of the army of this country,
military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In
the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Feb., 233), it
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of was also said that this is not deprivation of property
First Instance to one month and one day of without due process of law, because, in its just sense,
imprisonment, with the costs. there is no right of property to an office or employment.
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws
enacted by reason of the actual existence of war does public morals or private reputation; the right of the
not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the people to keep and bear arms (article 2) is not
last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service infringed by law prohibiting the carrying of
is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in concealed weapons; the provision that no person
preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. shall be twice put in jeopardy (art. 5) does not
prevent a second trial, if upon the first trial the jury
The circumstance that the appellants have dependent failed to agree, or the verdict was set aside upon
families to support does not excuse them from their duty the defendant's motion. . . .
to present themselves before the Acceptance Board
because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for In 1897, state laws which barred individuals from
deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, carrying concealed weapons were common, and usually
they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to upheld by state supreme courts; the laws did not forbid
attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 state militias from carrying concealed weapons. The
of Commonwealth Act No. 1). prohibitions on concealed carry are the exceptions that
prove the rule. Only if the Second Amendment is an
Robertson v. Baldwin (1897) (Naval enlistment) individual right does the Court's invocation of a
The Court refused to apply the 13th Amendment to concealed carry exception make any sense.
merchant seamen who had jumped ship, been caught,
and been impressed back into maritime service without Kapisanan ng Manggagawa v. Gotamco Saw Mill
due process. The Court explained that 13th (GR No. L-1573, 29 March 1948)
Amendment's ban on involuntary servitude, even (Return to work order in industries affected with public
though absolute on its face, contained various implicit interest)
exceptions. In support of the finding of an exception to
the 13th Amendment, the Court argued that the Bill of Facts: The Kaisahan ng Manggagawa ng Kahoy sa
Rights also contained unstated exceptions: Pilipinas declared a strike against Gotamco Saw Mill
because the latter did not accede to the former’s
The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten request of a salary increase. While the case was being
Amendments to the constitution . . . [are] subject heard by the Court of Industrial Relations, the parties
to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from reached a temporary wage arrangement and the
the necessities of the case. . . . Thus, the freedom workers were ordered to go back to work while the saw
of speech and of the press (article 1) does not mill was ordered to increase the salaries of the workers
permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or by P2.00, let them take home small pieces of lumber to
indecent articles, or other publications injurious to be utilized as firewood, and was enjoined from laying-
off, suspending, or dismissing any laborer affiliated with promulgated which grants to labor what it grants to
the petitioning union. Conversely, the workers were capital and denies to labor what it denies to capital.
enjoined from staging walk-outs or strikes during the Among other things, Section 19 lays down the “implied
pendency of the hearing. condition that when any dispute between the employer
or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has
Gotamco Saw Mill subsequently filed an urgent motion been submitted to the CIR for settlement or arbitration,
asking that the petitioning union be held in contempt of pursuant to the provisions of the Act, and pending
court for having staged a strike during the pendency of award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer
the main case, for picketing on the premises of the saw shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so
mill, and for grave threats which prevented the joined by the court after hearing and when public
remaining laborers from working. The union alleged that interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that
one of its representatives conferred with the he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court,
management of the saw mill, but instead of entertaining which shall be issued only after hearing when public
their grievances, the saw mill ordered the stoppage of interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its
the work and employed four new Chinese laborers opinion, be promptly decided or settled.” Thus, the
without express authority of the court and in violation of voluntariness of the employee’s entering into such a
Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The CIR contract of employment—he has a free choice between
ruled that there was a violation of the previous order of entering into it or not—with such an implied condition,
the CIR by the union, which warranted the negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude
commencement of contempt proceedings and that the ensuing.
saw mill did not violate Section 19 of CA 103.
Issue: W/N the previous order of the CIR, which ordered
Issue: W/N Section 19 of CA 103 is unconstitutional for the union laborers to go back to work, is unconstitutional
being in violation of the organic proscription of for being in violation of the organic proscription of
involuntary servitude. involuntary servitude.
Ruling: NO. Section 19 of CA 103 does not offend Ruling: NO. The order of the court was for the
against the constitutional inhibition proscribing striking workers to return to their work. That order was
involuntary servitude. The provisions of CA 103 were made after hearing, and Section 19 of CA 103
inspired by the constitutional injunction making it the authorizes such order when the dispute cannot in its
concern of the State to promote social justice to insure opinion be promptly decided or settled. The very
the well-being and economic security of all the people. impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of the
In order to attain this object, Section 19 was dispute confers upon the CIR the power to issue the
order for the reason that the public has an interest in “The Social Scourge of Gambling must be stamped out.
preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the The laws against gambling must be enforced to the
wheels of industry. limit.” (Peo v. Gorostiza, 77 Phil 88)
 Several laws promulgated which apparently
infringe the human rights of individuals were DEL ROSARIO VS BENGZON (PROHIBITED
“subjected to regulation by the State basically in PUNISHMENTS)
the exercise of its paramount police power.” Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act
 From Justice Perfecto’s concurring and dissenting 6675 was published in two newspapers of general
opinion: If the laborers should feel that they are circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30
compelled against their will to perform something March 1989, 15 days after its publication, as provided in
which is repugnant to their conscience or dignity, Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative
they need not resort to any court action to seek Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76
judicial settlement of the controversy, as they can dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990
resign from their work and there is no power that the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for
can compel them to continue therein. violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of
the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the
U. PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTS Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical
Association, the national organization of medical
People v. Dionisio or not the penalty applied to his
ISSUE: Whether doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional
offense infringes the Constitutional provision that brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class
“Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and suit requesting the Court to declare some provisions
unusual punishment inflicted.” (Art III Sec. 1 clause 19, (specifically penal) of the Generics Act of 1988 and the
of the Constitution of the Phils) implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant
thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The
RULING: Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in petition was captioned as an action for declaratory
themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for the relief, over which the Court does not exercise
Constitutional structure has been interpreted as jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest
referring to penalties that are inhumane and barbarous, involved, the Court decided to treat it as a petition for
or shocking to the conscience and fines or prohibition instead.
imprisonment are definitely not in this category. Nor
does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual Petitioners have assailed Section 12, paragraphs b, c
punishment. and d, of the Generics Act prescribing graduated
penalties (ranging from a reprimand to a fine of not less
that P10,000 and the suspension of the physician's Issue:

license to practice his profession for one [1]) year or W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative
longer, at the discretion of the court) for violations of its power and is valid.
provisions.
Held:
Held: Petitioners' allegation that these penalties violate NOT VALID. The duration of penalty for the period of
the constitutional guarantee against excessive fines and imprisonment was left for the courts to determine as if
cruel and degrading punishment, has no merit. Penal the judicial department was a legislative dep’t. The
sanctions are indispensable if the law is to be obeyed. exercise of judicial power not an attempt to use
They are the "teeth" of the law. Without them, the law legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is
would be toothless, not worth the paper it is printed on, an instance of the admin. of justice and the app. of
for physicians, dentists and veterinarians may freely existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said
ignore its prescriptions and prohibitions. The penalty of section violates the rules on separation of powers and
suspension or cancellation of the physician's license is non-delegability of legislative powers.
neither cruel, inhuman,or degrading. It is no different
from the penalty of suspension or disbarment that this Harden v. Director of Prisons(Prohibited
Court inflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or punishments)
violate the laws and the Codes of Professional and On various dates in 1946, Fred M. Harden transferred to
Judicial Conduct. the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and
the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, both
in Hongkong, over P1, 000,000 in cash. Mrs.
People v Dacuycuy(Prohibited punishments) Harden filed to the court a motion to order Mr. Harden to
Facts: Private respondents were charged with violation return all the amounts mentioned to re deposit them
of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. with the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of India,
They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (…be Australia and China with respect to their conjugal
punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more than partnership. Mr. Harden failed to comply, wherein, he
P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the was committed to jail for an indeterminate period of time
court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes a cruel until he complies with the court’s orders.
and unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. Judge Dacuycuy ruled Contention of the State: The petition for Writ of Habeas
that the said section is a matter of statutory construction Corpus by the petitioner was denied based on the
and not an undue of delegation of legislative power. following arguments. The term of imprisonment by the
petitioner in this case in indefinite and might last through
life, but the terms of the sentence is left open for him to
avoid more years by just complying with the courts
orders. His imprisonment for more than six months is
not excessive or unjust since he was given the right to
comply with said orders. The imprisonment is but a pure
remedial measure to coerce the petitioner to act and
perform the orders.
Contention of the Accused:Mr. Harden contends that he

has no means to comply with the court’s orders since he
was committed to jail.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in committing

the petitioner in jail for an indeterminate period of time
until complying with the court’s orders for a mere reason
of disobedience.
Ruling: The penalty complained of is neither cruel,

unjust nor excessive since it is the outcome of the act of
the petitioner. The petitioner was given the choice to
prevent his more time of detention in jail by just
complying with the said orders, but he did nothing. The
court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the
party who is charged, its judgment, order or decree is
not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.
Whether the act charged has been committed or can
still be performed is already determined by the order or
judgment of the trial court wherein the petitioner for
habeas corpus is adjudged in contempt. The petition is
denied.
U. Prohibited Punishments no substantial arguments on the said motion that can

disturb the verdict.
Art. III, Sec. 19 On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the
defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the
services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the
People of the Philippines v. Leo Echegaray y Pilo Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines. (FLAG)
The SC upheld the validity of the Death Penalty law A supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by
against the challenge that there are no compelling the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant aiming for the
reasons for the enactment of the same. The Court also reversal of the death sentence.
rejected the contention that the death penalty is cruel, In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
degrading, or inhuman punishment, and said that the raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal
US Supreme Court in Furman v Georgia did not matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2)
categorically rule on such issue; what was in use was alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former
the arbitrariness pervading the procedure by which the counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
death penalty was imposed. constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
Issue/s: WON the death penalty law (RA no. 7659) is
Per Curiam unconstitutional
Held: No.
Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration &
Facts: The SC rendered a decision in the instant case supplemental motion for reconsideration are denied for
affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the lack of merit.
crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime  Accused-appellant first claims that the death
having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during
penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman
which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly
known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.)
accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. To state,
supreme penalty of death. however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in
The accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty
Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is
the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of misleading and inaccurate.
the alleged false accusation of rape against the
accused. The motion was dismissed as the SC found
o The issue in Furman was not so much punishment for the crime of rape mainly because
death penalty itself but the arbitrariness the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the
pervading the procedures by which the taking of life.
death penalty was imposed on the accused
o In support of his contention, accused-
by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense
appellant largely relies on the ruling of the
theory in Furman centered not so much on
U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia::
the nature of the death penalty as a
"Rape is without doubt deserving of serious
criminal sanction but on the discrimination
punishment; but in terms of moral depravity
against the black accused who is meted out
and of the injury to the person and to the
the death penalty by a white jury that is
public, it does not compare with murder,
given the unconditional discretion to
which does involve the unjustified taking of
determine whether or not to impose the
human life. Although it may be
death penalty.
accompanied by another crime, rape by
o Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death definition does not include the death of or
penalty because it was cruel and unusual even the serious injury to another person.
per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more
nullified all discretionary death penalty than that, does not. Life is over for the
statutes in Furman, it did so because the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim,
discretion which these statutes vested in life may not be nearly so happy as it was,
the trial judges and sentencing juries was but it is not over and normally is not beyond
uncontrolled and without any parameters, repair. We have the abiding conviction that
guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, the death penalty, which 'is unique in its
if not altogether eliminate, the intervention severity and irrevocability' x x x is an
of personal biases, prejudices and excessive penalty for the rapist who, as
discriminatory acts on the part of the trial such, does not take human life"
judges and sentencing juries.
 The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing
 Accused-appellant maintains that the death ruling on two grounds:
penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading
1) That the public has manifested its rejection of  Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the
the death penalty as a proper punishment for penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence
the crime of rape through the willful omission with the enemy during times of war, qualified
by the state legislatures to include rape in their piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping,
new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of rape with homicide or with the use of deadly
Furman; weapon or by two or more persons resulting in
insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson
Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see
resulting in death.
how this could have any bearing on the
Philippine experience and in the context of our  The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took
own culture.
2) That rape, while concededly a dastardly the form of a constitutional question of whether or
contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive
integrity, physical privacy, and psychological or unusual punishment in violation of the
balance, does not involve the taking of life. constitutional proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment.
Phil. SC: We disagree with the court's
predicate that the gauge of whether or not a o Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty
crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
attendance of the circumstance of death on excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S.,
the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact 436, the United States Supreme Court said
an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive that 'punishments are cruel when they
justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
involve torture or a lingering death, but the
tooth".
 The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally punishment of death is not cruel, within the
promulgated, provided for the death penalty in meaning of that word as used in the
specified crimes under specific circumstances. constitution. It implies there something
As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had inhuman and barbarous, something more
entered our legal system through the old Penal than the mere extinguishment of life.
Code, which was a modified version of the o People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a
Spanish Penal Code of 1870. number of people who honestly believe that
the supreme penalty is either morally wrong o Heinous crime is an act or series of acts
or unwise or ineffective. However, as long which, by the flagrantly violent manner in
as that penalty remains in the statute which the same was committed or by the
books, and as long as our criminal law reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a
provides for its imposition in certain cases, patent disregard and mockery of the law,
it is the duty of judicial officers to respect public peace and order, or public morals. It
and apply the law regardless of their private is an offense whose essential and inherent
opinions," viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and
outrageous to a civilized society and hence,
 Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution
shock the moral self of a people.
simply states that congress, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose  The right of a person is not only to live but to live
the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision a quality life, and this means that the rest of
imposes a requirement that for a death penalty society is obligated to respect his or her individual
bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or
of a higher incidence of crime should first be her own physical body, and the value he or she
perceived and statistically proven following the puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological,
suspension of the death penalty. Neither does material and social preferences and needs.
the said provision require that the death penalty
be resorted to as a last recourse when all other o Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
society ransom resulting in the death of the victim
or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected
o What R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
Congress, in the interest of justice, public resulting in death, and drug offenses
order and rule of law, and the need to involving minors or resulting in the death of
rationalize and harmonize the penal the victim in the case of other crimes; as
sanctions for heinous crimes, finds well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
compelling reasons to impose the death kidnapping and serious illegal detention
penalty for said crimes. where the victim is detained for more than
three days or serious physical injuries were  People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation
inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does
were made or the victim is a minor, robbery injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds
with homicide, rape or intentional the respect, freedom, and physical and moral
mutilation, destructive arson, and integrity to which every person has a right. It
carnapping where the owner, driver or causes grave damage that can mark the victim for
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an
or raped, which are penalized by reclusion outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by only the victim but the society itself.
their very nature.
Francis v Resweber
 SC: The death penalty is imposed in heinous Where a mechanical failure in the electric chair
crimes because: prevented the execution of the convict and another
execution date was scheduled by the warden, the US
o The perpetrators thereof have committed Supreme Court denied the plea of the convict that he
unforgivably execrable acts that have so was being subjected to a cruel and unusual punishment
– as there is no intent to inflict unnecessary pain or any
deeply dehumanized a person or criminal
unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution.
acts with severely destructive effects on the The situation of the victim is just as through he has
national efforts to lift the masses from suffered the anguish in any other occurrence, such as a
abject poverty through organized fire in the cellblock.
governmental strategies based on a January 13, 1947
disciplined and honest citizenry Facts: Francis was convicted of murder and was
sentenced to electrocution. The electric chair sent out a
o They have so caused irreparable and current but failed to cause his death because of some
substantial injury to both their victim and mechanical difficulty. He was removed from the chair
and returned to prison. A new death warrant was
the society and a repetition of their acts
issued.
would pose actual threat to the safety of Francis argued that a new execution would constitute
individuals and the survival of government, double jeopardy (5th Amendment) and cruel and unusual
they must be permanently prevented from punishment (8th Amendment).
doing so
Issue: Was an order for re-execution tantamount to reduced, as nearly as possible, to no more than that of
cruel and unusual punishment? death itself. Electrocution has been approved only in a
No. There is no cruel and unusual punishment. The fact form that eliminates suffering.
that Francis has already been subjected to a current of
electricity does not make his subsequent execution any Echegaray v Secretary of Justice
more cruel in the constitutional sense than any other The SC said that the suspension of the execution of the
execution. The cruelty against which the Constitution death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the power, as an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It is not a
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve,
involved in any method employed to extinguish human although its effect is the same; the temporary
life humanely. The fact that an unforeseeable accident suspension of the execution of the death convict. It
prevented consummation does not add an element of cannot be denied however that Congress can amend
cruelty to a subsequent execution. RA 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a imprisonment. The effect is a commutation of sentence.
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO
within the meaning of that word as used in the staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and scheduled on that same day. The public respondent
barbarous, something more than the mere Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
extinguishment of life. arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the
Dispositve: Petition denied. Re-execution is ordered. rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the
Dissent (Burton, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge): power of the executive to grant reprieve.
Subjecting Francis to the electric chair again is a cruel
and unusual punishment. In determining whether the
proposed procedure is unconstitutional, we must Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the
measure it against a lawful electrocution. The contrast is case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction
that between instantaneous death and death by over the case
installments -- caused by electric shocks administered
after one or more intervening periods of complete
consciousness of the victim. Electrocution, when Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the
instantaneous, can be inflicted by a state in conformity SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of
with due process of law. The all-important consideration the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to
is that the execution shall be so instantaneous and amend, modify or alter the same. Even after
substantially painless that the punishment shall be the judgment has become final, the SC retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death
to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment
The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise
is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot
subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution be considered as a violation of the power of the
vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in President to commute final sentences of conviction. The
such lower courts as may be established by law. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
the process of execution of decisions where exclude each other for the simple reason that there is
supervening events may change the circumstance of no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only
the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused
the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-
because of these unforeseen, supervening equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of
contingencies that courts have been conceded the the government.
inherent and necessary power of control of Pagdayawon v Secretary of Justice
its processes and orders to make them conform to law The mere pendency in the two houses of Congress of a
and justice. bill seeking the repeal of RA 7659 should not per se
warrant the outright issuance of a temporary restraining
The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention order to stay the execution of a death sentence that has
that by granting the TRO, the Court has in become final. In fact, being speculative, it is not and
effect granted reprieve which is an executive function should not be considered as a ground for the stay of a
under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an death sentence.
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still Facts: Thirty death row inmates sought to enjoin the
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be execution of their death sentences in view of a possible
claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death repeal of laws authorizing the imposition of death
convict who becomes insane after his penalty.
final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of The SC has the power to control the enforcement of its
insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is decisions, including the issuance of a TRO to stay the
indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a execution of a death sentence which is already final.
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though Issue: Can a TRO be issued for the death sentences?
its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of No. The mere pendency of a bill in either or both houses
the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it of Congress should not per se warrant outright issuance
cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend of a temporary restraining order to stay the execution of
a death sentence that has become final. In fact, being - Betty Sia Ang asserts that P.D. 115 is unconstitutional
speculative, it is not and should not be considered as a as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
ground for a stay of a death sentence. While newspaper imprisonment for non-payment of a debt. She argues
reports indicate the supposed acquiescence of a that where no malice exists in a breach of a purely
number of senators and congressmen to the abolition of commercial undertaking, P.D. 115 imputes it.
the death penalty, such is by no means an assurance
that these same legislators will eventually vote for the Held:
modification or repeal of the law. PD 115’s penal clause is valid
A trust receipt arrangement does not involve a simple
V. Non-imprisonment for Debt loan transaction between a creditor and debtor-importer.
Apart from a loan feature, the trust receipt arrangement
Art. III, Sec. 20 has a security feature that is covered by the trust receipt
itself.That second feature is what provides the much
People v. Nitafan needed financial assistance to our traders in the
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: importation or purchase of goods or merchandise
Facts: through the use of those goods or merchandise as
- Betty Sia Ang received in trust from Allied Banking collateral for the advancements made by a bank. The
Corp “Gordon Plastics, plastic sheeting and Hook title of the bank to the security is the one sought to be
Chromed, in the total amount of P398,000.00, protected and not the loan which is a separate and
specified in a trust receipt”, under the obligation on her distinct agreement.
part to sell the same and account for the proceeds of The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and
the sale or return the same to Allied Bank if unsold. abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods
- However, she later paid only P283,115. Allied Bank to the prejudice of another regardless of whether the
thus charged Betty Sia Ang with estafa. latter is the owner or not. The law does not seek to
- On motion, Judge Nitafan quashed the information on enforce payment of the loan. Thus, there can be no
the ground that a trust receipt transaction is an violation of a right against imprisonment for non-
evidence of a loan being secured so that there is, as payment of a debt.The misuse of trust receipts therefore
between the parties to it, a creditor-debtor relationship. should be deterred to prevent any possible havoc in
The penal clause of PD 115 (Trust Receipts Law) is trade circles and the banking community .
inoperative because it does not actually punish an The offense is punished as a malum
offense mala prohibita. The law only refers to the prohibitum regardless of the existence of intent or
relevant estafa provision in the Revised Penal Code. malice. A mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the
sale or the goods if not sold, constitutes a criminal
offense that causes prejudice not only to another, but - In 1987, Romana Magbago filed an administrative
more to the public interest. complaint with the Supreme court against MTC Judge
Icasiano for grave abuse of authority, manifest
partiality and incompetence for issuing orders of
The enactment of P.D. 115 is a valid exercise of the detention against Magbago for contempt of court. The
police power of the State and is, thus, constitutional. complaint was dismissed for lack of merit in 1988.
- Magbago, had apparently filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman, also in 1987, a complaint charging
Judge Icasiano with a violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft
W. Double Jeopardy and Corrupt Practices Act). This was likewise
dismissed during the preliminary investigation stage.
Art. III, Sec. 21 - A similar complaint, however, appeared to have been
filed with the office of the Tanodbayan which was
transferred to the (then) newly-created Office of the
Ombudsman. The Special Prosecutor working on the
1. Requisites case was not aware of the previous complaint and
dismissal thereof, and thus filed an information against
Judge Icasiano with the Sandiganbayan.
- Judge Icasiano asserts that the information should be
a. Valid complaint or information
quashed because he would be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense.
b. Filed before a competent court Held:

To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is
fundamental that the following requisites must have
obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid
c. To which the defendant has pleaded complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) a
valid arraignment; (d) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or
Icasiano v Sandiganbayan otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Facts:
Double jeopardy does not apply in the present

controversy because: Held:
1. the Supreme Court case was administrative in NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
character while the Sandiganbayan case also against The present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside
said petitioner is criminal in nature. the void decision of the trial court does not place
Parulan in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will
2. the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an
complaint with the Ombudsman cannot bar the present adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon
prosecution because it was dismissed in the preliminary Respondent Judge's erroneous conclusion that his
investigation stage. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases.
al. vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a
Philippines, a preliminary investigation is not a trial to decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a
which double jeopardy attaches. subsequent case based on the same offense.
People v Grospe The dismissal being null and void (as it was erroneous),
Facts: the proceedings before the Trial Court may not be said
- Manuel Parulan was charged with B.P. 22 involving a to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no
check with the amount of P86K and with estafa for a second proceeding which would subject the accused to
check with an amount of P11k. The two cases were double jeopardy.
tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and
defense being the same for the two suits. Gonzales v Court of Appeals
- The trial court dismissed the two cases on the ground Facts:
of lack of jurisdiction, saying that the two essential - Gonzales was charged with qualified seduction with
elements that make up the offenses involving the MTC, to which he pleaded “not guilty”. The
dishonored checks, did not occur within the territorial prosecution had already concluded the presentation of
jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but rather in its evidence and the defense was about to finish theirs
Bulacan where false assurances were given. when the prosecution filed a motion to charge
- The People filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Gonzales with rape since the evidence submitted
dismissal as being issued with grave abuse of indicated that the crime evidently committed was rape
discretion. and not qualified seduction.
- Parulan argues that the order of dismissal was, in - The trial court thus dismissed the case for qualified
effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and seduction and the prosecution filed 6 informations for
that to set the order aside after plea and trial on the rape with the RTC. Gonzales entered a plea of not
merits, would subject him to double jeopardy. guilty to the charges.
charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be

Held: convicted of the offense charged, or of any other
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall
The requisites for double jeopardy: not be discharged, if there appears to be good cause to
(1) The previous complaint or information or other detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the
formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss
sustain a conviction; the original case upon the filing of the proper
(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case; information.)
(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to
the charge; and
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is
dismissed without his express consent.
When all the above elements concur, a second
prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt
to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the Joan Flores v Hon. Francisco Joven, RTC-Surigao
said offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily del Sur, Emmanuel Navarro
includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense
charged, can be rightly barred.
There is no question that the Municipal Trial Court did
not have the requisite jurisdiction to try the offense of Austria-Martinez
rape, a crime that lies instead within the province of the
Regional Trial Court. 27 December 2002
Moreover, the dismissal of Criminal Case for qualified
seduction by the Municipal Trial Court not only was
provisional but likewise with the express consent of the Facts:
accused.
(Note: Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Flores caused the filing of a criminal against Navarro
Court provides: and 9 other persons for rape. Before the accused were
arraigned, Navarro filed a motion to dismiss on the
Sec. 11. When mistake has been made in charging the ground that the complaint did not sufficiently describe
proper offense. — When it becomes manifest at any the crime of rape and in any of its forms. The trial court
time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in
re-set the arraignment as the prosecution intended to YES. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the
file several other cases of rape against the accused. records of this case adequately show that respondent
Navarro was identified as one of those who sexually
An amended information for rape was later filed abused petitioner. In the Flores’ sworn statement, she
against Navarro, as the principal accused. He filed a stated that she knew the perpetrators by face and
motion to quash the amended information. RTC granted further declared under oath that she was able to identify
the motion finding that Navarro was not one of those them later at the police station during line-up
identified by petitioner to have abused her, and that the
Information failed to show his particular participation in The offended party has the right to appeal an order
the crime. Navarro, however, was not released from of the trial court which deprives them of due process,
detention as there were still pending cases against him. subject to the limitation that they cannot appeal any
MR was denied. Hence this case for certiorari. adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in
double jeopardy. However, in this case, double
Meanwhile, Navarro’s other co-accused were jeopardy does not apply. The requisites that must be
arraigned and pleaded “not guilty” to the charges present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid
against them. Trial commenced as regards their complaint or information; (b) a court of competent
respective cases. Later, Navarro escaped from jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge;
detention and has remained at large. and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or
the case dismissed or terminated without the express
Before presentation of evidence, it dropped the consent of the accused. The third requisite is not
infromations against the other 6 principal accused for present in the instant case. Private respondent Navarro
insufficiency of evidence which was granted by the trial has not been arraigned
court
Issue:
W/N the RTC erred in quashing the information.

People v Aurelio Balisacan
Held/Ratio:
Bengzon
31 August 1966 defendant was only allowed to testify in order to

establish mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of
fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not
be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt
Facts: or innocence of the accused. In deciding the case upon
the merits without the requisite trial, the court a quo not
Balisacan was charged with homicide. To this charge only erred in procedure but deprived the prosecution of
the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of its day in court and right to be heard.
guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by counsel. At
his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was
allowed to present evidence to prove mitigating 2. NO. It is settled that the existence of a plea is an
circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the essential requisite to double jeopardy. In the present
effect that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense case, it is true, the accused had first entered a plea of
because the latter was strangling him. And he further guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the
stated that after the incident he surrendered himself course of being allowed to prove mitigating
voluntarily to the police authorities. RTC acquitted him. circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense.
Said testimony, therefore — as the court a
quo recognized in its decision — had the effect of
vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should
Issue:1. W/N the RTC was correct in acquitting the have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at
accused despite his plea of guilty when arraigned. least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for
him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there
2.W/N the appeal placed the accused in having been no standing plea at the time the court a
double jeopardy. quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no
double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a
quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the
Held/Ratio:
prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or
even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing
1. YES. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of
so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for
guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses
lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is
the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves
perforce null and void.
the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty
fixed by law under the circumstances. In this case, the
d. Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted, or entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his terminated without the express consent of the accused.
express consent. Where there is no former conviction, acquittal, dismissal
or termination of a former case for the same offense, no
People v Hon. Gregorio Pineda, CFI Rizal and jeopardy attaches.
Consolacion Naval
People v Hon. Martin Villarama, and Jaime Manuel
Melo
16 February 1993 Medialdea
23 June 1992
Facts:
Consolacion Naval was accused of having committed Facts:
the crime of estafa before the CFI of Rizal, Branches 19 Jaime Manuel was charged with violation of Section
and 21. She moved for the quashal of the second 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having in
charge on the supposition that she was in danger of his possession 0.08 grams of shabu. During the
being convicted for the same felony. Judge Pineda of arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
Branch 21 found in her favor. Thereafter, trial ensued after which the prosecution
rested its case. Counsel for Manuel verbally manifested
Issue: W/N the court was correct in granting the in open court that private respondent was willing to
motion to quash. change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to
the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No.
Held/Ratio: 6425, as amended. That same day, the respondent
NO. The mere filing of two informations charging the Judge issued an order directing Manuel to secure the
same offense is not an appropriate basis for the consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set
invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy the promulgation of the decision. The prosecutor filed
has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a
termination of the case without the consent of the Lesser Offense on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution
accused. Moreover, it appears that private respondent already rested its case; (2) the possibility of conviction
herein had not yet been arraigned in the previous case of private respondent of the crime originally charged
for estafa. Thus, there is that other missing link, so to was high because of the strong evidence of the
speak, in the case at bar. Legal jeopardy attaches only prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court
(a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent and the prosecutor had expended would be put to
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been waste. Manuel filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave
of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on
therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the
Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against
accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. the said motion, it behooves the trial court to
Subsequently, respondent Judge rendered a decision assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as
granting the accused's motion. MR of prosecution was all the circumstances upon which the accused made his
denied. change of plea to the end that the interests of justice
and of the public will be served. A reading of the
Issue: disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the
W/N it was proper for the RTC to grant the request strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.
to plead to a guilty to a lesser offense without the Apparently, the judgment under review dwelt solely on
prosecutor’s and the offended party’s consent. only one of the three objections (i.e. waste of valuable
time already spent by the court and prosecution)
Held/Ratio: interposed by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive.
YES. Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process It must be recalled that the other two grounds of
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a objection were that the prosecution had already rested
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to its case and that the possibility of conviction of the
court approval. It usually involves the defendant's private respondent of the crime originally charged was
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution.
some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in
for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private
Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.
stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still The counsel for the private respondent argues that
permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his only the consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes
plea thereafter. involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because
However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty there is no offended party to speak Of and that even the
to a lesser offense under Rule 116.2 is not demandable latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before
by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is the trial court could allow the accused to change his
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial plea.
court. However, the provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is
In the case at bar, Manuel moved to plead guilty to a clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended
lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to
its case. The trial court need not wait for a guideline a lesser offense. The reason for this is obvious. The
Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal. Such supposition has no basis. The right against
Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both
evidence in his hands can only sustain the former. the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private
It would not also be correct to state that there is no respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the
offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as amended. situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this
While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable
themselves, they are made so by law because they provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which
infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by states: Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double
drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society jeopardy. xxx However, the conviction of the accused
is malevolent and incessant. Such pernicious effect is shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their which necessarily includes the offense charged in the
families. As a result, society's survival is endangered former complaint or information under any of the
because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim following instances: c) the plea of guilty to the lesser
of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and
offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of of the offended party…Under this rule, the private
the people, the government files the criminal action in respondent could still be prosecuted under the original
the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as
who represents the government is duty bound to defend amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal
the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point who also represents the offended party,i.e., the state.
that it is as though he were the person directly injured More importantly, the trial court's approval of his change
by the offense. Viewed in this light, the consent of the of plea was irregular and improper.
offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured
from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government. Gorion vs. RTC of Cebu (1992)
No Double Jeopardy Facts:

Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent Petitioner was charged with the crime of Estafa
maintains that the private respondent's change of plea involving the amount of P50, 000. Upon his
and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty and the
Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open court set the pre-trial and trial of the case on Apr 17,
to review otherwise his constitutional right against 1990. The pleadings of the parties do not reveal what
double jeopardy will be violated. transpired on Apr 17, 1990. However, it appears that
hearing was again scheduled for Sept 27 and
28 1990. When the case was called for hearing on Sept 1. w/n an order dismissing a criminal case after

27, neither the petitioner nor his counsel was present. accused had been arraigned, issued in open
Not wanting to take advantage of their absence, and court through inadvertence or mistake during a
considering that there were other cases to be heard, the hearing that had already been cancelled, be set
prosecutor moved for the cancellation of the hearing on aside by the court and the case tried without
that date as well as the hearing to be held on the placing the accused in double jeopardy? No
following day, which the court granted. The hearing was Double Jeopardy yet.
reset, unfortunately the case was still included in the The erroneous dismissal order of Sept 28 1990
trial calendars of the court for Sept 28. When the case was then issued capriciously and arbitrarily; it
was called for the hearing on that date, only the fiscal unquestionably deprived the State of a fair opportunity
appeared for prosecution. The court then issued an to present and proved its case. Thus, its right to
order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. On due process was violated. The said order is null and
Jul 2, 1991, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging void and hence, cannot be pleaded by the petitioner to
therein that the dismissal of the case by the bar the
court on Sept 28 1990 without his consent amounted to subsequent annulment of the dismissal order or a re-
his acquittal; hence, he would be placed in opening of the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
double jeopardy if the case were to be reopened or cont The dismissal of Sept 28 1990, being null and
inue. The trial court set aside the dismissal order of void because the trial court lost its jurisdiction to issue
Sept 28 1990 in its Order of Aug 9 1991 on the ground the same and violated the right of the prosecution to
that the court was only misled in issuing the same due due process. The three requisites of double jeopardy
to the stenographers’ failure to transcribe the order are: 1.) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
given in open court issued the previous day, hence, it second 2.) The first jeopardy must have been validly
was issued without due process. Also on the same day, terminated and 3.) A second jeopardy must be for the
the court denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss on same offense as that in the first.
the ground that the order of dismissal of 28 September Legal jeopardy attaches only; a. upon a valid
1990was set aside in the aforesaid order. Petitioner filed indictment b. Before a competent court c.
a motion to reconsider the other denying his motion to after arraignment d. when valid plea has been entered
dismiss, alleging that he cannot be blamed or faulted for e. when the case was dismissed or otherwise
a.) the failure of the stenographer b.) any error in the terminated without the express consent of the accused.
dismissal of the case c.) the inclusion of the case in the It having been shown that in this case, the requisites of
calendar of Sept 28 1990. a valid termination of the first jeopardy are not present,
the petitioner cannot hide behind the protective mantle
Issue/held/ratio: of double jeopardy. The petition is dismissed
The accused, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside

Cuison vs. CA (1998) Promulgation.
Facts: Issue/Held/Ratio:
RTC found Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double 1. w/n petitioner’s right against double jeopardy
homicide, sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 6 was violated? NO
years and 1 day to 12 years and 1 day. He was also
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Sapigao P30,000.00 To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the
and heirs of Castro P30,000.00. CA affirmed RTC’s following must be proven:
decision with the modification that civil indemnity was “ x x x (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
increased to P50,000.00 In a petition for review in SC it the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
was remanded to RTC for promulgation of decision. validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for
However, respondent Judge promulgated [on April 4, the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals] only with necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a
did not commit the accused to jail to commence service frustration thereof (citations omitted).
of his sentence. And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid
OSG filed for motion for clarification of the indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
aforementioned decision, On Aug 17, 1995, CA arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been
rendered a Resolution which states in pertinent portions entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
thereof: ‘In the dispositive portion of this Court’s terminated without the express consent of the accused.”
decision, We simply modified the appealed decision of Petitioner contends that “the promulgation by Judge
the court a quo in one respect only - the increase of the Ramos on Apr 4, 1995 of the Respondent Court’s
indemnity to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of the decision of Jun 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive
victims from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 as ruled in portion has effectively terminated the criminal cases
various cases including that cited in Our decision…” against the petitioner x x x.”
SC, acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil
declared that this Court had affirmed the decision of the action for the recovery of indemnity.Hence, a decision in
court a quo with regard to the penalty of imprisonment such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the
imposed in the said trial court’s decision.’ civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court
Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not
decision anew. the criminal.
As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Bermoy were acquitted. Upon appeal to the CA, the
Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the ruling was affirmed. It held that even assuming that the
promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no
void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for
rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused
April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April against double jeopardy.
12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of
discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial Issue/held/ratio:
court void. Since the criminal cases have not yet been 1. w/n double jeopardy has attached in the case?
terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet NO
attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a
defense. For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 of Rule 117 of
We must stress that Respondent Court’s questioned the 1985 Rules on Crim Pro requires the following
Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991 elements in the first criminal case:
Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the (a) The complaint or information or other formal charge
judgment of conviction and the full execution of the was sufficient in form and substance to sustain
penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner. a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
PS Bank vs. Spouses Bermoy (2005) (c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
and
Facts: (d) He was convicted oracquitted or the case was
Petitioner charged spouses Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy dismissed without his express consent.
with estafa through falsification of a public document.
Upon arraignment, the spouses pleaded not guilty to the On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the
charge. Upon hearing, private prosecutor and defense express consent or upon motion of the accused
counsel admitted the jurisdiction of the Court and the does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is
identities of the accused. Initial hearing was set. During subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is
the hearings, the prosecution presented its witnesses based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of
and rested its case after the presentation of the the right to speedy trial. A dismissal upon demurrer to
testimonies. However, instead of presenting evidence, evidence falls under the first exception. Since such
the defense filed a demurrer to evidence on the ground dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to
that the prosecution failed to identify the spouses as the an acquittal. All the elements were present in the
accused. The case was dismissed and the spouses criminal case. Thus, the Information for estafa through
falsification of a public document against respondent Thereafter, petitioners filed for “certiorari, prohibition,
spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the
a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the issuance of a TRO” (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed
case and the persons of respondent for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and
spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this
which they entered “not guilty” pleas. Finally, the case instant petition.
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became Issue/held/ratio:
vested on respondent spouses. 1. w/n dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of
acquittal? NO
Dismissal of action 2. w/n the judge ignored petitioner’s right against
double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207? NO
Paulin vs. Gimenez (1993)
For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case
Facts: must be without the express consent of the accused.
Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with
were smothered with dust when they were overtaken by the express assent of the accused, he has deemed to
the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In
Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the latter entered the the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion
gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.
security guard for the identity of the owner of the Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an
vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that shows
petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not
immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police guilty. While the former, in the case at bar, terminated
and block road to prevent the petitioners’ escape. Upon the proceedings because no finding was made as to the
the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down guilt or innocence of the petitioners.
and were immediately apprehended. The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside
the order of dismissal for the reception of further
A complaint “grave threats” was filed against the evidence by the prosecution because it merely
petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and
by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the
Mabuyo filed a MFR thus the dismissal was reversed.
right to complete the presentation of its evidence. The law, the allegations in the Information, and the evidence
rule on summary procedure was correctly applied. adduced plus a more circumspect and reflective
exercise of judgment, would have prevented a failure of
When the ground for the motion to dismiss is justice in the instant case.
insufficiency of evidence When the proceedings have been unreasonably
prolonged as to violate the rights of the accused to
PEOPLE v. CITY COURT OF SILAY speedy trial
Facts: ESMENA v. POGOY
Respondents were charged with "falsification by private Facts:
individuals and use of falsified document." Esmeña and Alba were charged with grave coercion in
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas
rested its case, private respondents moved to dismiss Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from
the charge against them on the ground that the the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a
evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. pleaded “Not Guilty”. No trial came in after the
Acting on this motion, respondent court dismissed the arraignment due to the priest’s request to move it on
case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an
the acts committed by the accused as narrated above order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal
do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged. informed the court that it received a telegram stating
Held: that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked
It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed
against the private respondents was erroneous. the case because the trial was already dragging the
It is true that the criminal case of falsification was accused and that the priest’s telegram did not have a
dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this was medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to
a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, recognize the complainant’s reason to be valid in order
calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the
its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the
doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused. priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979,
We cannot but express Our strong disapproval of the accused Esmeña and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the
precipitate action taken by Judge Alon in dismissing the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
criminal case against the private respondents at that Held:
stage of the trial. A thorough and searching study of the
The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for
their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal reconsideration, claiming that his absence was because
was not ready because his witness was not in court. such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of the
Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The
dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly motion was denied by respondent judge.
manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Issue: Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of
Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy. the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their
Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a cases.
speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, Held:
therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place In determining the right of an accused to speedy
them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" disposition of their case, courts should do more than a
would not change the legal effect of the dismissal. If the mathematical computation of the number of
defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy
the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial
postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above,
the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his there was no showing that there was an unjust delay
evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent judge
defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to
shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an prosecute its case.
acquittal of the defendant. The private respondents cannot invoke their right
PEOPLE v. TAMPAL against double jeopardy. In several cases it was held
Facts: that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is
Tampal et al were charged of robbery with homicide and equivalent to an acquittal that would bar another
multiple serious physical injuries. The case was set for prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this
hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial does not apply, considering that the rights of the
Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for postponement accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State.
due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and the
case was reset without any objection from the defense case is remanded to the court of origin for further
counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991 proceedings.
but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent Revival of the criminal cases provisionally dismissed
judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as PEOPLE v. LACSON
unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to Facts:
Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal Facts:

laws should also cover procedures, and that these According to witnesses, Ramil Maquiling boxed the
should be applied only to the sole benefit of the deceased Pacasum who was compelled to box back.
accused. Petitioner asserts that Sec 8 was meant to When Ramil fell, appellant, elder brother of Ramil
reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line helped him and tried to pacify. They ran out of the disco
with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy but when the deceased and his companions followed
trial. outside, Ramil Maquiling and his companions were
Held: waiting and another fist fight ensued.
Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though During the fight, appellant went to his car and got a
procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should pistol. He fired a warning shot and then shot deceased
not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve twice on the left thigh. Appellant then fired another shot
intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be and hit the deceased on the chest. He died due to the
construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and gun shot wounds. Another person, Jojo Villarimo
the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would suffered gunshot wounds on his upper right leg which
be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge required medical attendance.
dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New On June 13, 1988, Iligan City Fiscal Ulysses V. Lagcao
rule took effect on Dec1,2000, it would only in effect charged Respondent Casan Maquiling with homicide
give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 and frustrated homicide. Acting on the petition of the
years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said private complainants, the Department of Justice
rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. subsequently directed the upgrading of the charge of
“Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; homicide to murder.
justice is not to be dispensed for the accused
alone.”The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for To both charges, Respondent Maquiling, assisted by
the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should Counsel de Parte Moises Dalisay Jr., entered a plea of
not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate not guilty upon his arraignment on June 5, 1989. Trial
retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided ensued. The trial court rendered its Decision convicting
merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an private respondent of homicide and serious physical
injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect injuries.
the administration of justice.
Appeal by the prosecution
People v. Maquiling The CA reversed and accepted the claim of self-
Doctrine: The rule against double jeopardy proscribes defense. When the accused-appellant tried to pacify
as appeal from a judgment of acquittal. and stop Frederick from inflicting further harm on his
brother, he was instead boxed on the right cheek by
Frederick. Hence accused had opted to leave the disco "Sec. 2. Who may appeal. -- Any party may appeal
but was followed to his car by Frederick with a shotgun from a final judgment or order, except if the accused
[i]n hand.The deceased Frederick not only aimed the would be placed thereby in double jeopardy."
shotgun [at] him but actually fired at the accused. And This rule stems from the constitutional mandate stating
the accused shot at the deceased only after he was that “no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the
himself injured by the deceased who fired a shotgun at same offense.
him. He likewise shot at Olegario ‘Jojo’ Villaremo to
disarm him as he likewise took possession of the U.S. v. Kepner: the United States Supreme Court,
shotgun. reviewing a Philippine Supreme Court decision,
declared that an appeal by the prosecution from a
judgment of acquittal would place the defendant in
ISSUE: double jeopardy.
WON the appeal is proper. NO
Elements of Double Jeopardy:
The petition is not meritorious.  the accused individuals are charged under a
Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is complaint or an information sufficient in form and
to appeal the trial court's judgment to the Court of substance to sustain their conviction;
Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme Court in a  the court has jurisdiction;
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.  the accused have been arraigned and have
In such cases, this tribunal is limited to the pleaded; and
determination of whether the lower court committed
reversible errors or, in other words, mistakes of  they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is
judgment. A direct review by the Supreme Court is the dismissed without their express consent.
normal recourse of the accused, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. In the case at bar, there are no questions as regards the
existence of the first, third and fourth elements.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, prohibits the
state from appealing or filing a petition for review of To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the
a judgment of acquittal that was based on the agency exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions, the
merits of the case. Thus, Section 2, Rule 122 of the remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
Rules of Court reads: 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases
must clearly show that the public respondent acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion ignoring material facts which if considered would lead to
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. a finding of guilt. Petitioner posits that the Double
An examination of the 65-page Decision rendered by Jeopardy Clause does permit a review of acquittals
the Court of Appeals shows no patent and gross error decreed by trial magistrates where, as in this case, no
amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Neither does it retrial will be required even if the judgment should be
show an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power arising overturned. It thus argues that appealing the acquittal
from passion or hostility. of private respondent would not be violative of the
constitutional right of the accused against double
PETITION is DENIED. jeopardy.
Issue: W/n the decision of the respondent court
People v. Hon. Perlita Tirona acquitting Muyot can be reviewed on a petition for
[G.R. No. 130106. July 15, 2005] review on certiorari?
Facts: Ratio:
Petitioner for review on certiorari seeking annulment of In PP v. Velasco, the Court ruled that as mandated by
decision of Judge Tirona acquitting accused private the Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence, an acquittal
respondent Chief Inspector Renato A. Muyot. is final and unappealable on the ground of double
jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or
The NBI, w/ 2 search warrants, conducted a search of before the Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that
Muyot’s house. They allegedly found 498.1094 grams a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal
of shabu which led to the filing of an information brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot
charging private respondent with Violation of Section be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. Only when
16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,as amended by there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of
Rep. Act No. 7659. double jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as
The case was raffled to the sala of public respondent -- represented by the prosecution, were denied due
Branch 102 of the QC RTC process.
Accused pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear in this
Tirona acquitted private respondent on grounds of jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is
reasonable doubt. immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground
of double jeopardy. The only exception where double
Petitioner now contends that public respondent, in jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding
acquitting private respondent, committed GAOD in of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process.
The fact that the petition was given due course does not acquitting Catuday of both charges for lack of proof
necessarily mean we have to look into the sufficiency of of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
the evidence since the issue to be resolved is the Notably, the decision also stated that "these (light threat
appealability of an acquittal. We have categorically case and frustrated theft case) were tried jointly."
ruled in People v. Velasco that, except when there is a
finding of mistrial, no appeal will lie in case of an
acquittal. There being no mistrial in the case before us, The provincial fiscal, together with the private
we find no need to reexamine the evidence, because if prosecutor, filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
we do so, we will be allowing an appeal to be made on proving that respondent Judge's decision be annulled
an acquittal which would clearly be in violation of the for lack of due process insofar as the light threat case
accused’s right against double jeopardy. was concerned. On April 17, 1974, the Court (Second
People v. Navarro Division) issued a resolution to the effect that
G.R. No. L-38453-54 March 25, 1975 "considering the allegations contained, the issues raised
and the arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari,
FACTS: the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for lack of
merit."
Catuday was charged before Municipal Court of Makati ISSUE:
with crime of light threat allegedly committed against
WON this case is proper. YES.
Henry Dioquino. While the case was pending, he was
also charged with frustrated theft. This petition for certiorari is granted.
Respondents here have not pointed to any court order
The CFI of Rizal acquitted Jaime Catuday. for joint trial, as indeed there is none. Joint trial is not
called for in the two criminal cases. It is true that the
In the hearings after March 25, 1970, it was always the accused in the two cases is only one person, but there
theft case which was heard. Sometime in December are two different complainants: Henry Dioquino, in the
1972, upon retirement of Judge Flores of Branch XI, threat charge, and Commonwealth Foods, Inc., in the
respondent District Judge Pedro C. Navarro took over in theft case. The threat was supposed to have been
the two cases. The theft case was then in the rebuttal made on March 5, 1968; the theft was allegedly
stage. On March 20, 1973, rebuttal evidence closed, committed on January 31, 1969, almost a year
and upon order of the court, the parties filed their thereafter. Also, the charges are different. They do not
respective "offer and submission of exhibits", and even belong to the same class of crimes. Light threat is
submitted the theft case for decision. On July 20, 1973, a crime against personal liberty and security; frustrated
respondent Judge rendered one decision,
theft is a crime against property. So, We cannot say the always accorded this right to the prosecution, and
charges are for offenses founded on the same facts or where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled
form or are part of a series of offenses of the same or the offending court action. We have heretofore held that
similar character. Consequently, the court had no power a purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives
to try them jointly. the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it
Going to the matter of the captions in the pleadings, denies the prosecution its day in court.
subpoenas, court orders, transcript of stenographic
notes, etc., it has been argued that since most of the For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal)
captions include both Criminal Case No. 20145 (light without due process, and, therefore, null and void. Such
threat) and Criminal Case No. 20146 (frustrated theft), dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental
there was joint trial of the cases, and the court properly prerequisite, that is, due process, and,
consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for
treated the hearing as joint and acted accordingly with the claim of double jeopardy.We have likewise held
respect to the two cases. It has been held, however, that a trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and
that a mistake in the caption of an indictment in well-founded motion of the prosecution for
designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal and
that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set
defect, for it is the sufficiency of the averments of the aside to give the State its day in court and an
charging part that is the gist of the accusation. opportunity to prove the offense charged against the
accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice,
Evidently, the State had been deprived of due especially when no substantial right of the accused
process, which act was an abuse of discretion on would be prejudiced thereby.
the part of the herein respondent Judge, tantamount
to excess or lack of jurisdiction, rendering the In the present case, the respondent Judge, in rendering
judgment of acquittal of the accused Jaime his judgment of acquittal of private respondent JAIME
Catuday, in Criminal Case No. 20145 for light threat, CATUDAY in Criminal Case No. 20145 for Light Threat
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. which was never tried in the respondent Judge's court
nor in Branch XI of the CFI of Rizal, acted with abuse of
discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases,
that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its
evidence in support of the charge. The Court has PEOPLE V TAC-AN
CALLEJO; February 27, 2003
YES
FACTS - Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any
- Mario Austria is the Officer-in-Charge Provincial witness for the prosecution listed in the Information,
Warden of the Batangas Provincial Jail. whether or not said witness is the offended party or the
- He falsified a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the
Semi-Expendable and Non-Expendable Property, , a dismissal of a criminal case. Although under the law,
public/official document, by stating that certain firearms pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of
are a property of the provincial; government of the private complainant or the complaining witness is
Batangas and issued it to Mr. Alberto Tesoro, a civilian however not required. Even the presence of the
agent, for his own use in connection with the accused is not required unless directed by the trial
performance of his official duties and functions court. It is enough that the accused is represented by
- Out of the 11 witnesses listed in the information, only 3 his counsel. Indeed, even if none of the witnesses
were notified. When the case was called for pre-trial, listed in the information for the State appeared for the
the 3 did not appear and the RTC dismissed the case. pre-trial, the same can and should proceed. After all,
- The public prosecutor filed a motion for the public prosecutor appeared for the State. The trial
reconsideration of said order, contending that the trial court thus acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed
court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it the case merely because none of the witnesses notified
dismissed the case simply because three of its by the trial court appeared for the pre-trial.
witnesses who were notified failed to appear at the - The State, like the accused is also entitled to due
initial pre-trial. process in criminal cases. The order of the trial court
- CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition on the dismissing the criminal case deprived the State of its
ground that the errors committed by the trial court were right to prosecute and prove its case. Said order is,
mere errors of judgment which are not correctible by a therefore, void for lack of jurisdiction, and is of no effect.
writ of certiorari. - The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that the
- Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present petition for the reinstatement of the case does not place the private
reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. respondent in double jeopardy.
ISSUE Ratio The cardinal precept is that where there is a
WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it of their jurisdiction.
dismissed the case simply because three witnesses of - to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three
its eleven witnesses failed to appear at the initial prerequisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must
trial of the case have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
HELD must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the 5. On 2 July 1991, Gorion filed a Motion to Dismiss
first. alleging therein that the dismissal of the case by
- Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid the court on 28 September 1990 without his
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after consent amounted to his acquittal; hence, he
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and would be placed in double jeopardy
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused Issue: W/N there is double jeopardy involved in this
Petition GRANTED case NO
Gorion v RTC of Cebu 1992 1. It is obvious to this Court that the trial court was,
1. an information against Gorion was filed in Court on 28 September 1990, divested of jurisdiction,
for Estafa. However, on the hearing date for Sept pro hac vice, to issue any order, much leas one of
27, Gorion wasn’t there thus the prosecutor dismissal, in Criminal Case No. CBU-16727 for
suggested that it be moved to another date for the the simple reason that said case was already
accused to be able to defend himself. Thus the effectively removed from its trial calendar for that
Judge approved the resetting of the Sept 27 date in view of the previous day's order cancelling
hearing as well as the Sept 28 hearing to October the hearing of the case on 27 and 28 September
4. 1990
2. But on the 28th, the case was still called for 2. The Judge, Clerk of Court and the prosecution
hearing as it was included in the calendar. But should shoulder the blame because unless
without any witnesses or evidence presented by amnesia suddenly struck all of them
the prosecutor, the case was dismissed. simultaneously, it cannot be imagined that in a
3. Counsel for Gorion, Atty. Bilocura, received a brief span of about twenty-four hours, they had all
copy of this order on 4 October 1990. However, forgotten about the order dictated in open court
he received a copy of the 27 September 1990 cancelling the hearing for 27 and 28 September
Order only on 15 June 1992. 1990.
4. The pleadings of the parties do not reveal what 3. The erroneous dismissal order of 28 September
actually transpired on 4 October 1990. In any 1990 was then issued capriciously and arbitrarily;
event, the case was called again on 31 May it unquestionably deprived the State of a fair
1991, but the Court reset the hearing to 18, 22, opportunity to present and prove its case.
23 and 25 July 1991 on the ground that it had not 4. Thus, its right to due process was violated. The
yet received from the Chief Justice of this Court a said order is null and void and hence, cannot be
reply to the Presiding Judge's request for an pleaded by Gorion to bar the subsequent
extension of the trial dates.
annulment of the dismissal order or a re-opening the arraignment which the accused refused to
of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. enter a plea. Feeling aggrieved, Summerville
immediately filed a motion for reconsideration of
Summerville General Merchandise v Eugenio the Secretary’s ruling.
August 7, 2007 6. the prosecution filed with the trial court a Motion
1. The president and general manager of to Withdraw Informationon the basis of the
Summerville accused several persons Resolution issued by Secretary Perez. The next
(incorporators of AROTECH Corp) of day, the RTC issued the order dismissing the
unauthorized manufacturing, distribution and sale case. MR filed by Summerville.
and unfair competition of Royal brand playing 7. trial court issued an Orderholding in abeyance all
cards, the design and mark of which are claimed pending incidents to await the final resolution of
to have been duly patented/copyrighted and the motion filed before the DOJ. Respondents
registered. filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that
2. After due investigation, the City Prosecutor’s the trial court has all the facts necessary to
Office of Manila recommended the prosecution of resolve the pending incidents and also filed a
respondents for unfair competition. Thus an Motion to Dismiss on the ground of double
information for unfair competition was filed jeopardy.
3. Arraignment was scheduled for July 13, 2000;
however, on June 22 of the same year, private ISSUE: w/n double jeopardy already attached in this
respondents filed a petition for review with the case NO
Department of Justice assailing the May 31, 2000 1. First, in Santos v Orda: The trial court is not
Resolution of the City Prosecutor’s Office bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
4. Undersecretary Puno affirmed the resolution of Justice since it is mandated to independently
the Prosecutor however DOJ Secretary Perez evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it
issued his Resolution which recalled and set may either agree or disagree with the
aside the Resolution of Undersecretary Puno, but recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
without however issuing a ruling on the propriety Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary
of the complaint and merely indicated that the of Justice would be an abdication of the trial
case would be further reviewed and the court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima
corresponding resolution would be issued. facie case
5. DOJ then issued a Resolution dismissing both the 2. In this case, it can be readily seen from the Order
complaint filed by petitioner and the counterclaim of Judge Eugenio, granting the withdrawal of the
filed by private respondents. This was done after Information, that the trial court glaringly failed to
conduct its own determination of a prima facie Gerardo Pepito, pending assumption of duty of
case, and simply adopted the Resolution issued Judge Yuzon's successor. (Yuzon retired earlier)
by the Secretary of Justice. 1. In the meantime, Martinez filed a petition with the
3. This failure of Judge Eugenio to independently DOJ seeking review of the resolution of the City
evaluate and assess the merits of the case Prosecutor finding a prima facie case of libel
against the accused violates the complainant’s against him. Accordingly, 3rd Asst. City
right to due process and constitutes grave abuse Prosecutor Tabanag filed before the trial court on
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. a motion to suspend proceedings pending
4. Thus, it is only but proper for this Court to remand resolution by the DOJ of Martinez' petition for
the case to the trial court to rule on the merits of review, which was granted by Judge Pepito
the case to determine if a prima facie case exists 2. then Acting Justice Secretary Bello declaredthat
and consequently resolve the Motion to Withdraw while the language used in the article may be
Information anew. unsavory and unpleasant to complainant, the
5. Since the order granting the withdrawal of the same was not actionable as libel, as if embodied
Information was committed with grave abuse of merely an opinion protected as a privileged
discretion, then the accused was not acquitted communication under Article 354 of the Revised
nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or Penal Code. The appealed resolution was
termination of the case. Ergo, the fourth requisite therefore set aside and the City Prosecutor was
(that the accused has been convicted, acquitted, directed to cause the dismissal of the information
or the case has been dismissed or terminated filed against Martinez. Thus a MTD was then
without the express consent of the accused) was filed.
not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in 3. At the hearing, upon manifestation of Laurel’s
counsel, as private prosecutor, that he had
Martinez v Court of Appeals received no copy of the motion to dismiss, the
1. Martinez was accused by VP Laurel for libel trial court directed the case prosecutor to furnish
arising from the allegedly derogatory and said counsel the desired copy, giving the latter
scurrilous imputations and insinuations against ten days to respond.
Laurel contained in Martinez' article entitled "The 4. The prosecutor didn’t comply with the trial court's
Sorrows of Laurel" published on January 8, 1990 order; this notwithstanding, said court, through
in his Manila Times column Narrow Gate Presiding Judge Roberto A. Barrios, issued an
2. Laurel filed a motion to set the case for order dismissing the case. (note: no arraignment
arraignment and pre-trial. Action on the motion was held)
was held in abeyance by the pairing judge, Hon.
5. Laurel appealed arguing that the order of 4. The dismissal order having been issued in
dismissal was void because it was only based on violation of private complainant's right to due
the Secretary’s Opinion. CA granted the appeal process as well as upon an erroneous exercise of
thus it remanded the case to TC for arraignment. judicial discretion, the Court of Appeals did not err
6. Martinez went up to the SC contending that his in setting aside said dismissal order.
right against double jeopardy has been violated
Discharge of co-accused
Issue: W/N double jeopardy attaches in this case NO Bogo-Medellin Milling v Son
1. Appeal against the order of dismissal was not 1. Hermosa, Tuñacaowere accused by Bogo-
foreclosed by the rule of double jeopardy, said Medellin of qualified theft. Information was then
order having issued before arraignment. Legal filed in court. However, Bogo-Medellin filed on 14
jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid April 1986 a manifestation informing the trial court
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after of petitioner Hermosa's desire and willingness to
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, act as state witness and to testify against his co-
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise accused, private respondent Tuñacao who,
terminated without the express consent of the Hermosa claimed, was the most guilty.
accused 2. Initially, Judge Tomol denied the application of
2. Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Bogo-Medellin for discharge of Hermosa. On
Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a Bogo-Medellin's motion for reconsideration,
final judgment or order in a criminal case is however, Judge Tomol issued an order reversing
granted to "any party", except when the accused himself and discharging Hermosa from the
is placed thereby in double jeopardy. information for qualified theft.
3. As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor 3. On the initial scheduled date of hearing, Hermosa
General, in failing to make an independent finding failed to appear before the trial court. The hearing
of the merits of the case and merely anchoring was then rescheduled, first to 20 January and
the dismissal on the revised position of the later to 3 March. By the latter date, respondent
prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the Judge Son had become Presiding Judge of
discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
effect, it was the prosecution, through the 4. On the 3 March hearing, counsel for Tuñacao
Department of Justice which decided what to do manifested to the court that he would be moving
and not the court which was reduced to a mere for reconsideration of the order of Judge Tomol
rubber stamp discharging petitioner Hermosa from the qualified
theft information.
5. Bogo-Medellin opposed the motion for determination of whether a second and prohibited
reconsideration upon the ground that jeopardy would attach upon reinstatement of
reinstatement of Hermosa as co-accused in Hermosa as a co-accused in the qualified theft
would place him in double jeopardy, considering information.
that the order of Judge Tomol discharging 3. The general rule is that the discharge of an
Hermosa had resulted in his acquittal of the crime accused in order that he may turn state witness,
of qualified theft. is expressly left to the discretion of the trial court.
4. The effect of the discharge of a defendant is
Issue: W/N there would be double jeopardy if Hermosa specified in Section 10 of Rule 119 in the
would be reinstated YES following manner: The order indicated in the
1. Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Rules of preceding section, shall amount to an acquittal of
Court, the following are the requisites for the the accused discharged and shall be a bar to
defense of double jeopardy: future prosecution for the same offense, unless
a. There must be a complaint or information the accused fails or refuses to testify against his
or other formal charge sufficient in form and co-accused in accordance with his sworn
substance to sustain a conviction; statement constituting the basis for his discharge.
b. Filed before a court of competent 5. Once the discharge of an accused from the
jurisdiction; information is effected, the legal consequence of
c. After the accused had been arraigned and acquittal follows and persists unless the accused
pleaded to the charge; so discharged fails or refuses to testify against his
d. Than the accused was convicted or co-defendant, in which case the defense of
acquitted or the case against him was double jeopardy is withdrawn from him and
dismissed or otherwise terminated without becomes unavailable to him. Until it is shown that
his express consent; the discharged accused has in fact failed or
e. The second offense charged is the same refused to testify against his co-defendant,
as the first offense charged, or for an subsequent proof showing that any or all of the
attempt to commit the same or a frustration conditions listed in section 9 of Rule 119 of the
thereof; or Rules of Court had not been actually fulfilled,
f. The second offense necessarily includes or would not affect the legal consequence of the
is necessarily included in the first offense discharge, i.e., would not wipe away the resulting
charged. acquittal.
2. the discharge of Hermosa must be considered as 6. In the case at bar, there is no evidence of record
valid for present purposes, that is, for to show that petitioner Hermosa failed or refused
to testify against his co-accused, i.e., that he and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or
reneged on his covenant with the prosecution. incorrectness.
7. All the record shows is that petitioner Hermosa 2. In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is
failed to attend two scheduled hearings, which immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot
does not necessarily show that he had violated be recalled for correction or amendment except in
his undertaking to testify against his co-accused the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by
"in accordance with his sworn statement another order reconsidering the dismissal of the
constituting the basis for his discharge." He has case since the inherent power of a court to modify
still YET to testify. its order or decision does not extend to a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.
3. she could no longer "revise" her decision of
acquittal without violating not only an elementary
Argel v Judge Pascua August 20, 2006 rule of procedure but also the constitutional
proscription against double jeopardy
1. Argel complained against Judge Pascua that he 4. The fact that respondent never had any intention
was already acquitted in an earlier decision but of having complainant incarcerated on the basis
then she amended her decision and instead of the second decision but only to make him
convicted him answer for the civil liabilities arising from the
2. Judge said that she erroneously thought that crime, as respondent explained, cannot exculpate
there was no witness who positively identified him her from administrative liability.
because of the fact that the testimony of the
eyewitness was not attached to the records at the 2. Crimes Covered
time she wrote her decision
P/CPL. GUILLERMO SARABIA, PNP, petitioner,
Issue: W/N the amended decision is null and void YES
vs.
1. Too elementary is the rule that a decision once
final is no longer susceptible to amendment or THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
alteration except to correct errors which are G.R. No. 142024
clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused
by an omission or mistake in the dispositive July 20, 2001
portion, or to rectify a travesty of justice brought MENDOZA, J.:
about by a moro-moro or mock trial. A final
Nature: petition for review of the decision of Court of
decision is the law of the case and is immutable
Appeals
1. June 23, 1991 - Petitioner Sarabia, then a member of violence against or intimidation of person wherein he
the city police force with intimidation, pointed his gun at was convicted, and which is now on appeal with the
complainant Josephine Picos-Mapalad and her then Court of Appeals.
boyfriend, complainant Anastacio Mapalad and forced
them to perform sexual acts against their will.
W there is double jeopardy - NO.
2. Three criminal informations against petitioner for

grave coercion were filed in the Municipal Trial Court of To raise the defense of double or second jeopardy, the
Tagbilaran City, which resulted in the filing of Criminal following elements must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
Case Nos. 4399, 4400, and 4401 in that court. Court must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
found him guilty in all three cases. jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the
first.
3. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, the
three criminal cases were raffled to two salas of the
court. Branch 1 of the RTC of Bohol affirmed the With respect to the third element, under Rule 117, ß7 of
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case the Rules of Court, the test is whether one offense is
Nos. 4399 and 4400. Branch 47 of the RTC of Bohol identical with the other or whether it is an attempt or
ordered the transfer of the records of Criminal Case No. frustration of the other or whether one offense
9730 to Branch I of the same court to be consolidated necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
with Criminal Case No. 9729 and 9731. The three cases other. On the other hand, Rule 120, ß5 provides:
were finally raffled off to Branch 48 of the RTC.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
4. Branch 48 of the RTC of Bohol affirmed in toto the another. ñ An offense charged necessarily includes that
decision of the Municipal Trial Court. The Court of which is proved, when some of the essential elements
Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed in or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
toto the decision of the lower court. complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an
offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
5. Petitioner raises the plea of double jeopardy. He constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
contends the incident which gave rise to this case is
also the subject of a criminal case for robbery with
The third requisite, identity of offenses, is absent in this the petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of
case. The crime for which petitioner now stands one's victim as defined and penalized under paragraph
charged is not the same as the crime of robbery with 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner
violence against or intimidation of person for which he appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court
was convicted. Neither is the former an attempt to of Pasig.
commit the latter or a frustration thereof. And the former
crime does not necessarily include, and is not
necessarily included in, the first crime charged. 4. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was
arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before Branch 68
ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. He entered a plea
vs. of not guilty.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. 5. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989, petitioner was
G.R. No. 93475 June 5, 1991 arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before Branch 68
DAVIDE, JR., J.:p of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig.
1. 14 March 1985 - an owner-type jeep, then driven by W there could be a valid charge for alleged
petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of the Revised
driven by Ernesto Reyes resulting in damage to the Penal Code which provides as basis for prosecution. "2.
tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Anyone who shall fail to help another whom he has
Gonzal. accidentally wounded or injured" when, he was
previously charged with "reckless imprudence resulting
2. (2) informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an in damage to property with multiple physical injuries"
Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage under Article 265 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code -
to property with multiple physical injuries under Article YES.
365 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) an Information
for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised
Penal Code on Abandonment of one's victim. 1. The petitioner is actually invoking his right against
double jeopardy. He, however, failed to directly and
categorically state it in his petition or deliberately
3. 29 June 1987 - the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig obscured it behind a suggestion of possible resultant
rendered its decision in Criminal Case No. 2793 finding absurdity of the two informations. The reason seems
obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that issue in the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal
three courts below. In any case, to do so would have of the information under one does not bar prosecution
been a futile exercise. under the other.
2. When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in the 4. Since the informations were for separate offenses ó
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. the first against a person and the second against public
2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. peace and order ó one cannot be pleaded as a bar to
64294 before the Regional Trial Court. As stated above, the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
the judgment of conviction in the former was rendered
on 29 June 1987, while his arraignment in the latter took
place only on 27 April 1989. Among the conditions for The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly
double jeopardy to attach is that the accused must have for separate offenses. Quasi offenses under Article 365
been arraigned in the previous case. are committed by means of culpa. Crimes against
Security are committed by means of dolo. Moreover, in
Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither
Legal jeopardy attaches only an offense by itself nor an element of the offense
(a) upon a valid indictment, therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the
penalty by one degree. Upon the other hand, failure to
(b) before a competent court, help or render assistance to another whom one has
(c) after arraignment, accidentally wounded or injured is an offense under
paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same code.
(d) a valid plea having been entered, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity
without the express consent of the accused. as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL
3. Moreover, he is charged for two separate offenses OPULENCIA, respondents.
under the Revised Penal Code. It is a cardinal rule that G.R. No. L-45129
the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked March 6, 1987
only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple
act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision FELICIANO, J.:
requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
Nature: petition for certiorari and mandamus, the of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against
People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power
the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph
Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 (1), of the Revised Penal Code.
1. 1 February 1975 - members of the Batangas City 7. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel
Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976,
Light System, equipped with a search warrant searched alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the
and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena offense charged in the second information and that the
Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right
private respondent Manuel Opulencia. against double jeopardy. Judge granted the accused's
2. They discovered that electric wiring, devices and motion to quash.
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary 8. Petitioner argues that the constitutional protection
authority from the city government, and "architecturally against double jeopardy is protection against a second
concealed inside the walls of the building" or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The
3. 24 November 1975 - Assistant City Fiscal of petitioner stresses that the first information filed before
Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or
City an information against Manuel Opulencia for unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices,
violation of Ordinance No. 1. acts which were in violation of an ordinance of the City
Government of Batangas.
4. 2 February 1976 - Manuel Opulencia filed motion to
dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft
there charged had already prescribed and that the civil under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code filed
indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the before the Court of First Instance of Batangas in
jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different essential
elements.
5. Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on
the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense Whether there is double jeopardy - Yes. :|
charged was a light felony which prescribes two months 1. The first sentence of Article IV (22) 1973 Constitution
from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection
further that the information was filed by the fiscal more against double jeopardy is not available where the
than nine months after discovery of the offense. second prosecution is for an offense that is different
6. 14 days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance although both the first and second offenses may be
based upon the same act or set of acts. The second written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a
general proposition: the constitutional protection, bar to another prosecution for the same act under a
against double jeopardy is available although the prior national statute. An offense penalized by municipal
offense charged under an ordinance be different from ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense
the offense charged subsequently under a national under a statute. The two offenses would never
statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that constitute the same offense having been promulgated
both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. by different rule-making authorities — though one be
2. Where the offenses charged are penalized either by subordinate to the other — and the plea of double
different sections of the same statute or by different jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the
statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the
offenses charge: the constitutional protection against second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose
double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is of extending the constitutional protection against double
shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be
offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is covered by the first sentence. 13
charged under a municipal ordinance while the 4. The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses
other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is is addressed by examining the essential elements of
to the identity of the actswhich the accused is said to each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are
have committed and which are alleged to have given set out in the respective legislative definitions of the
rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts
against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under
which constitute or have given rise to the first offense a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be
under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which addressed, in the first instance, by examining the
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged location of such acts in time and space. When the acts
under a statute. of the accused as set out in the two informations are so
3. The question may be raised why one rule should related to each other in time and space as to be
exist where two offenses under two different sections of reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same
the same statute or under different statutes are occasion and where those acts have been moved by
charged, and another rule for the situation where one one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary
offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately
another offense under a national statute. If the second characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise
sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been to penal liability simultaneously under different legal
enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national
statute). technical elements.

5. In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within 7. By the same token, acts of a person which physically
the same time frame: from November 1974 to February occur on the same occasion and are infused by a
1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia common intent or design or negligence and therefore
installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced,
and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the as it were, to produce as many different acts as there
necessary permit or authorization from the municipal are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that
authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or an enterprising prosecutor can find.
permitted such unauthorized installation for the very 8. It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's
purpose of reducing electric power bill. This corrupt petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case. It is
intent was thus present from the very moment that such difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who
unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the
effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape
flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without criminal punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by
the corresponding recording thereof in his electric inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information
meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current for an offense which he should have known had already
was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the
wiring and devices. fundamental law to hold the protection of the right
6. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not against double jeopardy available even to the private
be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may respondent in this case.
be regarded as the "same offense" where the second 3. Act punished by a law or ordinance, conviction or
offense necessarily includes the first offense or is acquittal shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
necessarily included in such first offense or where the for the same act.
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of 4. Doctrine of Supervening Event
double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HON.
elements constituting the first offense need be present MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME MANUEL,
in the technical definition of the second offense. The law respondents.
here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused
person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which G.R. No. 99287
though different from one another are nonetheless each June 23, 1992
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of MEDIALDEA, J.:
Nature: petition for certiorari seeking to reverse RTC matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion
decision of the trial court.
1. Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of 3. In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused)
Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425 for possession of moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the
0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu) prosecution had already rested its case. In such
2. During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and
of not guilty. On January 9, 1991, counsel for private the Office of the Prosecutor with yardstick within which
respondent verbally manifested in open court that their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in
private respondent was willing to change his former plea People v. Kayanan, We held that the rules allow such a
of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
violation of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425. Judge found the evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged.
accused guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of 4. As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not
violation of Section 17, Article III, Republic Act No. wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor
6425, as amended. before it could act on the accused's motion to change
W Respondent Judge erred in granting accused's plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment
request to plead guilty to a lesser offense - YES. whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the
trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
1. Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a the accused made his change of plea to the end that the
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to interests of justice and of the public will be served.
court approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979,
p. 1037). It usually involves the defendant's pleading 5. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in
guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private
counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.
sentence than that for the graver charge (ibid). 6. The counsel for the private respondent argues that
Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial only the consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes
stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because
permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his there is no offended party to speak Of and that even the
plea thereafter. latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before
2. However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to the trial court could allow the accused to change his
a lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not plea. We do not agree. The provision of Section 2, Rule
demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the
offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
guilty to a lesser offense. It would not also be correct to SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) AND
state that there is no offended party in crimes under RA PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
6425 as amended. While the acts constituting the G.R. No. L-61776
crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so
by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. March 23, 1984
relevant: 1. Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several
persons accused in more than one hundred (100)
7. Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents
maintains that the private respondent's change of plea before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed
and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of from his alleged involvement, as a government auditor
Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open of the Commission on Audit assigned to the Ministry of
to review otherwise his constitutional right against Education and Culture, together with some
double jeopardy will be violated. uch supposition has no officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of
basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the Treasury and the Teachers’ Camp in Baguio City, in the
accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks
applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended for non-existent obligations of the Teachers’ Camp
party consent to the private respondent's change of resulting in damage to the government of several million
plea. pesos.
Under Rule 117, Sec. 7: the private respondent could 2. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25,
still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation 1976.
of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the
lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the 3. In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of
offended party, i.e., the state. municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in the local
elections held in January 1980. He was elected.
X. Ex post facto law and Bill of Attainder
4. On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Art. III, Sec. 22 decision convicting herein petitioner and some of his co-
1. Ex post facto law accused in all but one of the thirty-two (32) cases filed
a. Kinds against them. Whereupon, appeals were taken to this
Court and the cases are now pending review in G. R.
b. Characteristics Nos. L-54645-76.
c. Some cases 5. However; on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg.
REYNALDO R. BAYOT, PETITIONER, VS. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13
of Republic Act No. 3019. crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith
6. Thereafter, in other cases pending before the with suspension from office pending action in court, is a
respondent court in which herein petitioner is one of the penal provision which violates the constitutional
accused, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law.
the accused-public officers pendente lite from their 2. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code
respective offices or any other public office which they clearly states that suspension from the employment or
may be occupying pending trial of their cases. public office during the trial or in order to institute
7. On July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not
directing the suspension of all the accused including a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of
herein petitioner “from their public positions or from any judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
other public office that they may be holding x x x ” concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
8. Herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration suspension.
alleging that “to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195 to the herein accused would be violative of the 3. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of
constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before
facto law”. The motion was denied by respondent court final judgment. Not being a penal provision, therefore,
in a resolution dated September 6, 1982. Hence, this the suspension from office, pending trial of the public
petition for certiorari. officer charged with crimes mentioned in the
amendatory provision committed before its effectivity
9. Petitioner submits that respondent court acted does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction amounting facto law.
to lack of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending petitioner from office as Mayor of Amadeo, 4. Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be
Cavite, pendente lite because in the supposition that suspended because he is presently occupying a
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 is to be applied retroactively, position different from that under which he is charged is
its application would violate the Constitutional provision untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that
against enactment of ex post facto law; any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under Republic
W BP 195 is an ex post facto law - NO. Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the
1. We find no merit in petitioner’s contention that government or public funds or property whether as a
Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage
Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
thru Falsification of Public Document as among the court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the use
of the word “office” the same applies to any office which 1. Whether or not petitioner could qualify to apply for
the officer charged may be holding, and not only the probation under PD No. 986 since he had
particular office under which he was charged. appealed from his conviction in 1988, after PD
1990 amending PD 986 become effective in
FAJARDO v COURT OF APPEALS
1986.
GR No. 128508 (February 1, 1999)
2. Whether or not PD 1990 is an ex post facto law
Petitioner: Daniel G. Fajardo hence, invalid.
Respondent (s): Court of Appeals, Hon. Florentino P.
Pedronio (in his capacity as presiding Judge, RTC Br HELD:
31, Iloilo City, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and 1. NO. PD 1990 provides, “no application for
Station Commander of Iloilo City probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the
FACTS: judgment of conviction”. At the time of the
On May 26, 1988, the RTC Br 31 of Iloilo City convicted commission of the offense in 1981, petitioner
petitioner of violation of BP Blg 22 and sentenced him to could have appealed if convicted and still availed
suffer the penalty of 8 months imprisonment and pay himself of probation but he was convicted on May
the costs. The petitioner appealed to the Court of 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time, PD 1990
Appeals. By decision promulgated on February 27, was then in full effect. He could no longer apply
1990, the CA affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed a for probation since he had appealed.
petition for review on certiorari of the conviction before 2. NO. PD 1990 is valid. It is not an ex post facto
the SC but latter also denied said petition. law in its application and neither is it considered
as such. The law applies only to accused
On June 2, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for probation convicted after its effectivity. An ex post facto law
before the trial court contending that he was eligible for is one that punishes an act as a crime which was
probation because at the time he committed the offense innocent at the time of its commission. PD 1990 is
in 1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction not penal in character just like the Probation Law
was still qualified to apply for probation and that the law that it amends.
that barred an application for probation of an accused
who had interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its 2. Bill of Attainder
application and hence, not applicable to him. Trial court a. Definition.
denied petitioner’s motion for probation and so did CA. b. Characteristics
ISSUES:
IV. CITIZENSHIP appeal from a judgment of CFI of Cebu, who likewise

remanded the appellant to the Collector of Customs.
A. General Principles
ISSUE:
1. Definition Whether or not appellant is a citizen of the Philippine
Islands?
a. Distinguished from nationality
HELD:
2. Usual modes of acquiring citizenship YES. The mother before she married was a Spanish
subject and entitled to all the rights, privileges and
3. Modes (by birth) applied in the Philippines: immunities pertaining thereto. Upon the death of her
husband, which occurred after the Philippine Islands
a. Before adoption of the 1935 Constitution were ceded to the United States, she, under the rule
prevailing in the United States, ipso facto reacquired the
i. Jus Sanguinis nationality of the Philippine Islands, being that of her
native country. If it may be said that during the lifetime
ii. Jus Soli of the father minor children follow his nationality, it
logically follows, by the widow placing herself and her
ROA v COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS children within the jurisdiction of the United States on
GR No. L-7011 (October 30, 1912) his death, whereby she herself reacquires her former
FACTS: nationality, and she being the natural guardian of such
On July 6, 1889, appellant Tranquilino Roa was born in children, that they should follow her nationality, with the
lawful wedlock in the Philippines to a Chinese father proviso that on becoming of age they may elect for
and a Filipina mother. His father went to China in 1985 themselves. The nationality of the appellant having
and died there about 1900. On 1901, while still a minor, followed that of his mother, he was therefore a citizen of
appellant was sent to China by his mother to study. the Philippine Islands on July 1, 1902, and never having
When he returned to the Philippine Islands on 1910, he expatriated himself, he still remains a citizen of this
was denied admission by the Board of Special Inquiry country.
for the reason that he takes the nationality of his father
and thus becomes a subject of the Emperor of China b. After adoption of the 1935 Constitution
and not a citizen of the Philippines, to which the Insular 4. Natural-born citizens
Collector of Customs affirmed. Appellant filed the 5. Marriage by Filipino to an alien
6. Policy against dual-allegiances
Yet, by being born to Filipino parents, Manzano natural

MERCADO v MANZANO born Filipino citizen, by operation of the 1935 Philippine
GR No. 135083 (May 26, 1999) Constitution and laws under principle jus sanguinis (the
NATURE: This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set right of blood).
aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to Although he is registered as an alien with the Philippine
declare Manzano disqualified to hold the office of vice- Bureau of Immigration and holds and American
mayor of Makati City. Important details on Edu passport, he has not lost his Filipino citizenship since he
Manzano: born September 4, 1955 in San Francisco, has not renounced it and has not taken an oath of
California, USA to Filipino parents. allegiance to the USA.
Manzano, after the age of majority, registered himself
FACTS: On the May 11, 1998 elections for vice- as a voter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998
mayoralty of Makati City, 3 candidates competed for the Philippine elections which effectively renounced his US
post: Eduardo B. Manzano, Ernesto S. Mercado, and citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law,
Gabriel V. Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his he no longer had US citizenship.
proclamation was suspended due to a pending petition
for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril Private respondent Manzano was then proclaimed as
alleging that Manzano was an American citizen. On May vice-mayor of Makati City.
7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC
cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Manzano on the ISSUES:
grounds of his dual-citizenship, which disqualifies him 1. WON petitioner Mercado has personality to bring
according to Sec.40(d) of the Local Government Code. this suit considering that he was not an original
Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Mercado party in the case for disqualification filed by
sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Ernesto Mamaril nor was his motion for leave to
Manzano opposed the motion to intervene. The motion intervene granted. YES.
was unresolved. But on August 31, 1998, the
COMELEC en banc (with 1 commissioner abstaining) 2. WON respondent Manzano is a dual citizen and if
reversed the Second Division’s ruling on the so, WON he is disqualified from being a
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and directing candidate for vice-mayor in Makati City. NO.
the proclamation of Manzano as winner, saying:
REASONS: Manzano argues that Mercado has neither
Manzano, being born in the USA, obtained US legal interest in the matter of litigation nor an interest to
citizenship by operation of the US constitution and laws protect because he is “a defeated candidate for the
under principle of jus soli (basis is place of birth). vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual
private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and allegiance to hold elective office.”
executory judgment.”
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual
This assumes that at the time intervention was sought, citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of circumstances
there had already been a proclamation of the election of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be
results for the vice-mayoralty elections when in fact, a national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a
there has not been such a proclamation. Certainly, the result of a person’s volition; it is a situation wherein a
petitioner had, and still has an interest in ousting private person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
respondent from the race when he sought to intervene. loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is an
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC only applies when the issue because a person who has this raises a question
election of the respondent is contested, and the of which state’s law must apply to him/her, therefore
question is WON the second placer may be declared posting a threat to a country’s sovereignty. In Sec.5
winner. If Mamaril was competent to bring action, so Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship, the concern
was Mercado, being a rival candidate. was not with dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized
citizens who maintain allegiance to their countries of
Petitioner has right to intervene even if he filed the origin even after naturalization. Hence, “dual citizenship”
motion on May 20, 1998, when it was shown that the in the aforementioned disqualification clause must mean
private respondent had the most votes. Electoral “dual allegiance”. Therefore, persons with mere dual
Reforms Law of 1987 provides that intervention may citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has been no final judgment It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for
rendered. Failure of COMELEC en banc to resolve candidacy, such persons with dual citizenships have
petitioner’s motion for intervention was tantamount elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their
to denial of the motion, justifying this petition for dual citizenship. In private respondent’s certificate of
certiorari. candidacy, he made these statements under oath on
March 27, 1998: “I am a Filipino citizen…Natural-
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner born”. “I am not a permanent resident of , or
contends that through Sec.40(d) of the Local immigrant to , a foreign country.” “I am eligible for
Government Code (which declares as “disqualified from the office I seek to be elected. I will support and
running for elective local position… Those with dual- defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
citizenship”), Congress has “command[ed] in explicit maintain true faith and allegiance thereto…”The
filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
renounce his American citizenship, effectively Philippine elections, leaves no doubt of his election of
removing any disqualification he might have as a Philippine citizenship.
dual-citizen. In Frivaldo v. COMELEC, it was held that
“By laws of the United States… Frivaldo lost his DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari,
American citizenship when he took his oath of DISMISSED. *Ineligibility refers to lack of qualifications
allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for prescribed.
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every
certificate of candidacy contains an oath of VALLES v COMELEC
allegiance to the Philippine Government.” Therefore, GR No. 137000 (August 9, 2000)
petitioner Mercado’s contention that the oath of FACTS: Petitioner questions the qualification of private
allegiance contained in private respondent’s certificate respondent RosalindYbasco Lopez to run for governor
of candidacy is insufficient to constitute his renunciation of Davao Oriental on citizenship grounds. Respondent
of his American citizenship. Also, equally without merit was born in 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an
is his contention that, to be effective, such renunciation Australian mother. In 1998, she applied for an Alien
should have been made upon reaching the age of Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
majority since no law requires the election of Philippine Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an
citizenship to be made upon majority age. Australian passport.
Plus, the fact that Manzano admitted that he was ISSUE: WON respondent is a Filipino; and if she is,
registered as an American citizen with the Philippine WON she renounced her citizenship by applying for
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
holds an American passport which he used for his last
travel to the US dated April 22, 1997should not be such RULING: Respondent is a Filipino. In 1934, the
a big deal. At the time of said travel, the use of an controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine
American passport was simply an assertion of his Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
American nationality before the termination of his August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts,
American citizenship. Admitting that he was a registered all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
alien does not mean that he is not still a Filipino (Aznar subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein, including
v. COMELEC). their children, are considered Philippine citizens.
Respondentâ€™s father was therefore a Filipino, and
Manzano’s oath of allegiance, together with the fact he consequently, her.
has spent his life here, received his education here, and
practiced his profession here, and has taken part in past
Respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation

of citizenship must be express. Applying for ACR, ICR, AASJS - CALILUNG v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
and Australian passport are not enough to renounce DATUMANONG
citizenship. They are merely acts of assertion of her GR No. 160869 (May 11, 2007)
Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced Facts:
the same. Petitioner filed this petition to prevent Justice Secretary
Datumanong from implementing R. A. 9225 arguing that
Dual citizenship in the LGC, Sec 40, meansdual R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Sec. 5, Article
allegiance VI of the Constitution which states that dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to national interest and shall be
JACOT v DAL AND COMELEC dealt with by law.
GR No. 179848 (November 27, 2008)
Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of Issue:
COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional and whether the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual
May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground allegiance.
that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US
citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Held:
Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US R.A. 9225 is constitutional and that the Court has no
on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his jurisdiction yet to pass upon the issue of dual
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. allegiance. The court held that that the intent of the
legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away
ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which
citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor? takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born
Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
allegiance is a general requirement for all those who citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
who seek elective public posts, considering their special renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section
circumstance of having more than one citizenship. 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of
dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the the ground that he is not a natural born citizen, nor was
issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the he a resident of the second district. One of petitioner’s
concerned foreign country. What happens to the other argument was that respondent's father was not, validly,
citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of
9225. the oath of citizenship.
The HRE ruled for private respondent Ong. Petitioner’s
Moreover, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a motion for reconsideration was also denied. Thus the
declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing petition on certiorari with the SC.
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on Issue:
dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. WON the issue on the citizenship of respondent Ong
9225, the framers were not concerned with dual can extend to a collateral attack on the citizenship of his
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized father.
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries Held/Ratio:
of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific No. The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his
Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial death just so we can go after the respondent. The
department, including this Court, to rule on issues petitioners questioning of the citizenship of the father
pertaining to dual allegiance. through a collateral approach cannot done. In our
jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only
7. Attack on one's citizenship may be made only be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask the
through a direct, not a collateral proceeding. Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to
Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the
Co v HRET
principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already
been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity
July 30, 1991
to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak
J. Gutierrez Jr.
8. Res judicata in cases involving citizenship
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, congressional election for the second B. Citizens of the Philippines
district of Northern Samar transpired. Among the 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
candidates were petitioner Balinquit and private of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution
respondent Ong. Ong was proclaimed the winner. a. Re: 1935 Constitution
However, an election protests was filed against him on
Valles v COMELEC Yes. Lopez was born a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what
August 9, 2000 served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the
J. Purisima principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country which were the Philippine Bill of
Facts: July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law. Under both organic
acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, with a their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Filipino father and Australian father. In 1949, at the age
of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Lopez’s father, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet,
Philippines. Camarines Norte, thus under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the Jones Law he is deemed a Filipino citizen. By
In 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino virtue of the same laws, herein private respondent
citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
then, she has continuously participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. Tecson v COMELEC
In 1992, she ran for was elected as governor of Davao
Oriental. This was contested by her opponent Gil Taojo March 3, 2004
in a petition of quo warranto on the ground of her J. Vitug
Australian Citizenship.COMELEC dismissed the
petition. Facts:
When she ran in 1995, she again won against Rabat
which was also contested. Said petition was also On December 31, 2003, Roland Allan Kelly Poe (FPJ)
dismissed. Thus this petition for certiorari. filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
In her reelection in 1998, her citizenship was again President of the Republic of the Philippines. Petitioner
contested by now petitioner Valles. COMELEC again Victorino Fornier filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to
dismissed the case. Petitioner’s motion for deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
reconsideration was denied, thus this petition for upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
certiorari. misrepresentation by claiming to be a natural-born
Issue: Filipino citizen when in truth, his parents were
WON Lopez was a Filipino citizen. foreigners. Even on the assumption that his father
Lorenzo Pou was a Filipino citizen, such could not have
been transmitted to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
child of an alien mother. legitimate or illegitimate.
COMELEC dismissed the case. The motiton for Chiongbian v De Leon
rconsideration filed by petitioner was also dismissed.
Thus this petition for certiorari. January 31, 1949
Issue: CJ Moran
WON FPJ was a Filipino citizen
Held/Ratio: Facts:
Yes. The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" This a petition filed by William CHiongbian seeking to
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, permanently prohibit respondent Customs Officials from
also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act cancelling the registration certificates of his vessels, and
of 1902 which provided that: respondent Philippine Shipping Administration from
“...that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands rescinding the sale of three vessels to him.
continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects The entire case hinges on whether or not petitioner
on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said William Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, Issue:
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the WON petitioner is a Filipino citizen
Philippine Islands …” Held/Ratio:
The only conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Yes. The Article IV of the 1935 Constitution provides
Lorenzo Pou that could be drawn from the presumption that:
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines:
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San …
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
could have well been his place of residence before had been elected to public office in the Philippine
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited Islands.
from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), …
if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, father of the herein petitioner, was elected to and held
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, the office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Occidental Misamis. Thus his father became a Filipino
citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of stated that he was born of a Chinese father and a
the Constitution. William Chiongbian, the herein Filipina mother. He is married to a Filipina with who he
petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino has four children. He also stated that he had already
citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the renounce all allegiance to the Republic of China; that he
Constitution, his father having become a Filipino citizen recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the
upon the adoption of said Constitution. Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
The argument that subsection 2 is is strictly personal and allegiance thereto; and that he will obey, support
and does not extend to the children of the grantee . The and defend the Constitution and laws of the Philippines
framers adopted said provision fully cognizant of the The Commissioner of Immigration referred the matter to
transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in the DOJ Sec who opined that hat the alleged Philippine
subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the citizenship of petitioner's mother had not been
transmission of citizenship in such a particular case, sufficiently established, that said election of Philippine
they would have so clearly stated. citizenship by petitioner herein was legally ineffectual
b. Re: 1973 Constitution and that he did not thereby become a Filipino citizen
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Petitioner sough rehearing and reconsideration and
Philippines. argued that the delay in electing citizenship was due to
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, who elected the belief that he was a citizen of the Philippines. When
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. it was referred back to DOJ sec, petition was denied.
a. Procedure for election
b. When to elect Petitioner then instituted in the CFI of Manila this action
for mandamus against the Secretary of Justice and the
Cuenco v Secretary of Justice Commissioner of Immigration, to compel them to
recognize as valid said election of Philippine citizenship
May 26, 1962 by petitioner and to cancel his alien's certificate of
J. Concepcion registration.
Facts: Issue:
Counsel for petitioner Alfonso DyCuenco wrote to the
Commissioner of Immigration a letter requesting the WON delay to elect citizenship was justified in
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration, upon petitioner’s circumstance
the ground that he had exercised the right to elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Article IV, section I(4) Held/Ratio:
of the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625. He
NO. Petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He said delay or to warrant extension of the period to
became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of elect Philippine citizenship.
citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was
over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) In re: Ching.
years after he had reached the age of majority. It is Bar Matter No. 914, 01 October 1999
clear that said election has not been made "upon (citizenship; perfection of Filipino citizenship; age of
reaching the age of majority." majority; reasonable time)
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a Petitioner Ching, an applicant for admission to the
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority, and Philippine Bar, was born to a Chinese father and a
that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution. As such,
years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine his citizenship followed that of his father’s. The 1973
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to and 1987 Constitutions allowed individuals to elect to
above, which period may be extended under certain perfect their Filipino citizenship for which CA 625
circumstances, as when the person concerned has provided the procedure. In all cases, perfection of one’s
always considered himself a Filipino. For this reason, citizenship had to be done “upon reaching the age of
petitioner introduced evidence to the effect that he is majority” which has been taken to mean that it must be
referred to as a Filipino in his birth certificate, in his done “within reasonable time” from reaching such age.
marriage contract and in the birth certificates of his In turn, “within reasonable time” has been taken to
children; that he married a Filipina; and that he enlisted mean three (3) years although the Court in Cuenco
in the Philippine guerrilla forces in December, v Justice Secretary said that the three year rule was
1942.1äwphï1.ñët not inflexible but warned against over-extending the
time period.
However, he stated that he joined a unit In this case, Ching only elected to become a
of Chinese volunteers and that he registered himself in Filipino citizen at the age of thirty-five (35) years old
the Bureau of Immigration as a Chinese. Moreover, it when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
appears that, as early, at least, as 1947, petitioner knew 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after
that he had to make a formal election, if he wanted to be he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
a citizen of the Philippines, and yet he did not do so until interpretation of the phrase “upon reaching the age of
four (4) years later, or in May 1951. The reasons given majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by
by him for such delay were his alleged financial any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period
difficulties and the illness of members of his family. within which to exercise the privilege. It should be
These reasons are patently insufficient to excuse stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous because he never was a Filipino citizen and could not
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a have reacquired such citizenship. While his Chinese
certified public accountant, a registered voter and a father lived, Delfin was not a Filipino. His mother was
former elected public official, cannot vest in him not a Filipina; she was Chinese. After the death of such
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down father, Villahermosa continued to be a Chinese, until
the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in April, 1947.
by election. After that reacquisition Delfin could claim that his
mother was a Filipina within the meaning of paragraph
Villahermosa v Commissioner of Immigration 4, section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution; but,
80 Phil 541, 31 March 1948 according to that same Organic Act, he had to elect
(citizenship; jus sanguinis; subsequent acquisition of Philippine citizenship upon attaining his majority. Until
citizenship by parent) he becomes of age and makes the election, he is the
Chinese citizen that he was at the time of his father's
This is a petition for a Writ of Habea Corpus; the demise. This petition is moreover to be denied on the
petitioner is the mother of Delfin Co, an 18-year-old strength of precedents heretofore established, because
Chinese national who was apprehended with a party of Delfin was a Chinese when he arrived here; and any
his compatriots who entered the Philippines illegally. posterior change of status can not affect the legality of
Delfin and company was adjudged as illegal aliens and his detention for purposes of deportation.
ordered deported back to China. Petitioner, who had Republic v Chule Lim
lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to Delfin’s G.R. No. 153883, 13 January 2004
father, filed an Oath of Allegiance with the Civil Registry
of Tarlac for which reason, under CA No. 63, she thus Chule Y. Lim, respondent, was an illegitimate child of a
resumed her Philippine citizenship. Chinese father and a Filipino mother. She filed a petition
Petitioner thus came to court arguing that since to the court for correction of four erroneous entries in
she is once again a Philippine citizen and since the her birth certificate, among which was her citizenship
citizenship of a minor follows that of his mother, Delfin which was listed as Chinese when she claims to be a
Co is, for all intents and purposes, a Filipino citizen and Filipino. The petition was granted. However, petitioner
cannot be deported to China. herein filed an appeal specifically on the correction of
her citizenship (from Chinese to Filipino) not having
HELD: Petition denied. Commonwealth Act No. 63 does complied with the legal requirements for election of
not provide that upon repatriation of a Filipina her citizenship in that the respondent never elected her
children acquire Philippine citizenship. It would be Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority as
illogical to consider Delfin as repatriated like his mother,
provided for in Article IV, Sec 1(3) of the 1935 date of initial hearing, 27 April 1995, the OSG entered
Constitution and Sec 1, CA No. 625. its appearance and manifested its objection on the
ground that as per Section 10 of CA 473, the initial
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent needs to elect hearings of petition for naturalization are proscribed
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the ageof majority? within 30 days preceding the next election (which, in this
case was 08 May 1995). The hearing of the case was
HELD: Petition denied; judgment upheld. The reset to 09 June 1995 at which time the OSG again filed
constitutional and statutory requirements of electing a Motion to Dismiss as no publication of this subsequent
Filipino citizenship applyonly to legitimate children; the hearing was made. As such, the court did not obtain
case at bar clearly states that respondent is an jurisdiction over the case.
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and alien father. By
being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, HELD: The Court disagreed with the Republic. A plain
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. reading of Section 9 of CA 473 shows that for there to
be a valid publication, the following requisites must
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. concur: (1) the petition and notice of hearing must be
C. Naturalization published; (2) the publication must be once a week for
1. Modes of Naturalization three (3) consecutive weeks; and, (3) the publication
a. Direct must be in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
b. Derivative general circulation in the province where the applicant
2. Doctrine of indelible allegiance. resides. The said provision also requires that copies of
3. Direct naturalization under Philippine laws. the petition and notice of hearing must be posted in the
4. Naturalization under C.A. 473 office of the clerk of court or in the building where the
a. Qualifications office is located. Further, the petition shall not be heard
b. Disqualifications within six (6) months from the date of last publication of
c. Procedure the notice. The fact that, in this case, the initial hearing
was originally set during the prohibited period in Section
Republic v Hamilton Tan Keh 10, but well beyond the six (6) months prohibited period
G.R. No. 144742, 11 November 2004 in Section 9, did not render the publication of the notice
(petition for naturalization; publication requirements) and the petition invalid. Respondent Tan Keh had
strictly complied with all the requirements under Section
Respondent filed a petition for naturalization pursuant to 9. His petition and the notice of hearing were duly
RA 530 and caused the publication of the Notice of published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
Initial Hearing in the manner prescribed by law. On the the Official Gazette during the month of September
1994 and in a newspaper of general circulation in July him.

1994. Moreover, the original date of hearing, April 27,
1995, was not within six (6) months from the last Subsequently, or on May 10, 1962, the Solicitor General
publication of the notice thereof. There are two filed a petition praying that said decision and certificate
prohibited periods that must be reckoned with under of naturalization be respectively annulled and cancelled,
Sections 9 and 10 of CA 473. Section 9 provides that upon the ground that the notice of the filing of said
the notice must set forth, inter alia, "the date of the petition and of the hearing thereof had been
hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held published in the Official Gazette only once, instead
within six months from the date of last publication of the of once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in
notice." Section 10, on the other hand, provides that "no violation of Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization
petition shall be heard within thirty days preceding any Law. After due hearing said court issued on October 15,
election." The hearing on June 9, 1995 on respondent 1962, the order complained of granting relief sought by
Tan Keh’s petition was not within any of these two the Solicitor General. Hence the present appeal.
prohibited periods.
ISSUE: WON publication is necessary to make his
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF GAN naturalization valid? YES
TSITUNG TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES. GAN TSITUNG, , -versus-REPUBLIC RATIO:
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
The SC decided the case based on the ruling on Ong
G.R. No. L-20819 November 29, 1965 Son Cui Republic which explicitly held that "there being
only one publication of said notice hearing in this
CONCEPCION case in the Official Gazette, the same is clearly
incomplete and, therefore, insufficient to confer
FACTS: jurisdiction to the court a quo to try the case and
grant the petition."
On December 24, 1954, CFI- Manila rendered a
decision granting the petition for naturalization as citizen This doctrine was reiterated in Celestino Co y Quing
of the Philippines, filed on November 14, 1953, by Reyes vs. Republicupon the ground that non-
appellant Gan Tsitung. On the latter's motion, he was, compliance with the provisions of Section 9 of the
on December 26, 1956, allowed to and did take his oath Revised Naturalization Act, relative to the
of allegiance as citizen of the Philippines and the publication of the aforesaid notice once a week for
corresponding certificate of naturalization was issued to three (3) consecutive weeks — affects the
jurisdiction of the court. It constitutes a fatal defect, between the applicant and the Solicitor General but a
for it impairs the very root or foundation of the matter impressed with the highest public interest,
authority to decide the case, regardless of whether involving as it does an inquiry as to when an alien
the one to blame is the clerk of court or the should be allowed to enjoy the coveted boon of Filipino
petitioner or his counsel citizenship. It is for this reason that the burden of proof
is upon the applicant to show full and complete
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby compliance with requirements of the law. The
affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so government can at all stages of the proceeding raise the
ordered. issue of such non-compliance even without filing a
formal opposition to the petition.
Sy v Republic
The requirement by Section 9 of Commonwealth Act
MAKASIAR, J. No. 473, as amended, that the copy of the petition to be
posted and published should be a textual or verbatim
Facts: restatement of the petition as filed, is jurisdictional. Non-
compliance therewith, as in the instant case, nullifies the
Juanita Sy filed a petition for naturalization in CFI- proceedings including the decision rendered therein in
Manila, however, the notice of the petition as Published favor of the applicant (
in the Daily Mirror, a newspaper of general circulation,
and as posted on the Court bulletin board, did not WHEREFORE, THE DECISION DATED DECEMBER
restate verbatim the petition, but merely summarized 11, 1961 AND THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 23,
some of the averments therein. Thus the Solicitor 1965, ARE HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE,
General argues that since she was unable to comply WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLEE.
with the requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
she should not be afforded citizenship. ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ISSUE: WON publication of naturalization is necessary? respondents.
YES
MENDOZA, J.:
RATIO: FACTS:
WE have ruled with undeviating uniformity "that a Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China.
naturalization proceeding is not simply a private contest
In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of sufficient to grant him citizenship? NO
Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he
has stayed in the Philippines where he found It is settled, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
employment and eventually started his own business, enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by
July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition the State, C.A. No. 473, clearly provides that the
to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law. his present and former places of residence. 23This
provision and the rule of strict application of the law
The TC granted his petition for naturalization. However in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument
this was reversed by the CA after the OSG noted of "substantial compliance" with the requirement
several infirmities in his petition: under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this
ground alone, the instant petition ought to be
(1) failed to state all his former placer of residence denied.
in violation of C.A. No. 473 (pertinent defect)
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
(2) failed to conduct himself in a proper and AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of §2; SO ORDERED.
(3) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his Republic vs. Dela Rosa
previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, (sorry couldn’t find case online; only found a digest)
also in contravention of §2; and Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
(4) failed to support his petition with the appropriate Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and
documentary evidence.4 Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of
the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision of the Regional
Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, which re-admitted
in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully Revised Naturalization Law and
published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private
such publication constitutes substantial compliance respondent on February 27, 1992.
ISSUE: Won substantial compliance with the law is

On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final
naturalization captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of and executory.
the Philippines. The respondent Judge set the petition The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the
for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the following irregularities:
publication of the said order and petition in the Official (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the
three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition
should be at least six months before the said date of itself;
hearing. (2) the petition was heard within six months from the
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion last publication of the petition;
to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule, that it shall be done (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance
on January instead of having it on March, " where he before the finality of the judgment; and
manifested his intention to run for public office in the (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without
May 1992 elections. The motion was granted and the observing the two-year waiting period
hearing was moved on February. Six days later, on
February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed d. Effects of naturalization
Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO,
is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, GR L-21289, 4 October 1971
all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino Facts:
citizen On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
directly with the Supreme Court. Philippines. She was permitted to come into the
Issue: WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted o his Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her
citizenship as Filipino. arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
Held:No. P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau
The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines
declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore on or before the expiration of her authorized period of
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as stay in this country or within the period as in his
GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. discretion the Commissioner of Immigration.
He is ordered to VACATE his office and to After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in
SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao Whatever the corresponding court or administrative
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have
the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
action for injunction with preliminary injunction. marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto
The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962
for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen e. Denaturalization
Yeung appealed. 5. Naturalization by direct legislative action
Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a 6. Administrative Naturalization [R.A. No. 9139]
Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. a. Special Committee on Naturalization
Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an b. Qualifications
alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or c. Disqualifications
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided d. Procedure
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the e. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. f. Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine D. Loss and Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his (C.A. 63)
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not 1. Loss of Citizenship
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said a. By naturalization in a foreign country
Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the b. By express renunciation of citizenship
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel
provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during (Aug. 1, 1989)
the proceedings, is not required to go through a Ponente: Cruz, J.
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as
a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of FACTS:
a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.  Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the
Every time the citizenship of a person is material or Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for
being bigamous. regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to

 Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue is
Australian passport, and obtained an Alien also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen
Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for holding public office in the Philippines), and in the
a change in status from immigrant to returning interest of the speedy administration of justice.
Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation denied his application 1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire
for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not into Labo's citizenship?
applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. 2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen?
 According to the records of the Australian Embassy 3. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines?
(as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still 4. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can
an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace
no direct evidence was presented to prove that he him?
took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian
citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any HELD/RATIO:
person over the age of 16 years who is granted 1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo
Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not
The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC
of all other allegiance. had at first considered the petition as a pre-
 Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the proclamation proceeding, which does not require the
local elections held on January 18, 1988. The payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC
second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the
quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-
holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such
asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on
annulled. significant issues, such as the one being decided in this
case.
ISSUES:
*The original issue raised before the Supreme Court 2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his
concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the
Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2)
for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence the express renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing
COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice
Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods Mayor shall replace Labo.
prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of
Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation. *Separate concurring opinion (Gutierrez Jr., J.):
- Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia Although no decision has been rendered by the
did not confer him with dual citizenship. The COMELEC and elevated to the SC for review, it is
Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is undeniable that a foreigner cannot be allowed to hold
inimical to national interest. public office in the Philippines. It is regrettable, however,
- The contention that his marriage to an Australian that Labo should be disqualified on the basis of his
national did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship because he has already achieved a lot while
citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo serving as Mayor during the pendency of the case.
had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of YU VS DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
that marriage. Also, his Filipino citizenship has not been G.R. No. 83882. January 24, 1989
automatically restored upon the annulment of his
Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared THE CASE Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus
void on the grounds of bigamy. (right to due process) with a prayer to be released from
- The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held arbitrary detention as he claims that his continued
in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is
totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been FACTS
politically motivated. The latter can be reversed  Petitioner- a Portuguese National acquired a
because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to Philippine citizenship by naturalization on Feb.
questions of citizenship. 10, 1978.
 Despite naturalization, on 21 July 1981, petitioner
3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the applied for and was issued a renewed
Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410
was elected. by the Consular Section of the Portuguese
Embassy in Tokyo. SaidConsular Office certifies
4. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July
Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor 1986.
because he has not been duly elected by the people of  Petitioner though a naturalized Filipino signed
Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not commercial documents stating his citizenship as
Portuguese without the authentication of an as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
appropriate Philippine Consul Portuguese passport and represented himself as such
 Petitioner was detained by the CID for obtaining a in official documents even after he had become a
Foreign passport while (at the same time) holding naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
a Filipino citizenship as well reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
 Respondents argue that the petitioner was in full inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
knowledge and legal capacity when he applied for citizenship
A Philippine citizenship through naturalization he
consequently recognizes, identifies and agrees to While still a citizen of the Philippines who had
the oath taken which states to renounce renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and
‘absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
to any foreign prince, potentate, state or potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to
sovereignty” and pledged to “maintain true faith "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the
and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese
Philippines,". Hence, petitioner then knows the in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the
limitations or restrictions once solemnizing said Companies registry of Tai Shun EstateLtd. filed in
oath and it succeeding consequences should they Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
be violated.
How Philippine Citizenship obtained/reacquired:
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner Mr. Willie Yu’s acts constitute 1.) By direct act of Congress
a renunciation of his Philippine Citizenship? YES 2.) By naturalization- take the oath of allegiance to
the Republic Act 9225
HELD 3.) By administrative repatriation—take the oath of
Petitioner’s motion for release from detention is Allegiance to the Republic and register the same
DENIED (along with other motions filed). in the local civil registry or in the place where the
person resides/last resided; original citizenship is
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation acquired
that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left
to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full c. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced d. By rendering service to or accepting commission in
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a the armed forces of a foreign country
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status e. By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization
f. By having been declared by competent authority a

deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed
2. Reacquisition of Citizenship governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January
a. Taking an oath of allegiance 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October
b. Naturalization 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon
c. Repatriation Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was
also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
ANGAT V. REPUBLIC COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo;
14 SEPT.1999 election and proclamation on the ground that he was not
a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
Facts: Angat was a natural born citizen who lost his States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May
citizenship by naturalization in the US. On March 11, 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in
1996, he filed a petition with the RTC to regain his the United States as alleged but pleaded the special
status as a citizen of the Philippines. The court and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
thereafter repatriated him. citizenship only to protect himself against President
Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over upon himself as a means of survival against the
repatriation cases unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's
agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the
Held: No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the
the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the
the RTC which has no jurisdiction thereover. The court’s private respondents reiterated their assertion that
order was thereby null and void. The Special Committee Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not
on Naturalization was reactivated on June 8, 1995, reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the
hence, when Angat filed his petition on March 11, 1996, election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not
the Committee constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also
under PD No. 725 (a Decree providing for repatriation of argued that their petition in the Commission on
Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section
by marriage to aliens and of natural born Filipinos) was 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate
in place. purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as
governor, his candidacy and election being null and void
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the
[174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO. 87193; 23 JUN 1989] public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the
contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his Constitution.
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he
was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19,
election did not cure this defect because the electorate 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born"
of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any
Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows,
also joined in the privaterespondent's argument that however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not United States in 1983 per the following certification from
applicable because what the League and Estuye were the United States District Court, Northern District of
seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado
and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as Francisco, California, U.S.A.
governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the
petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a consequence thereof he was coerced
citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on into embracing American citizenship. His feeble
January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of
his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in
Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting
public officials and employeesowe the State and the as provincial governor in this country while owing
Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse
Code that a candidate for local elective office must be this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter office and employment only to the citizens of this
of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the
voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed,
as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. fundamental law then applicable was the
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the 1935Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however,
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine
serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for underCommonwealth Act No. 63, section
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and among other, "rendering service to or
our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be acceptingcommission in the armed forces of a foreign
treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is country.” He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March
surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No.
difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative
possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson
children. The returning renegade must show, by an III, who was then running for reelection.
express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty
and love. Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional
Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is requirement that "no person shall be a Member of
hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born
and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of citizen.”
the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to
vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the
elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this Philippines. Asdistinguished from the lengthy process of
decision becomes final and executory. naturalization, repatriationsimply consists of the taking
BENGZON VS. HRET of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine
[357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840; 7 May 2001] and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last
Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his provided in §13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born
status as a natural-born Filipino. citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative
naturalization when he was seven years old due to the
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA V. COURT OF naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968. 21
APPEALS
POSTED IN UNCATEGORIZED BY ADMIN ON 27 FEB Held: RA 8171, “An Act Providing for the Repatriation of
2010 Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine
G.R. No. 125793 (August 29, 2006) Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born
Filipinos,” was enacted on 23 October 1995. It provides
Facts: Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons,
citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was viz.:
seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a
naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine
naturalization,20petitioner also acquired American citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-
citizenship. born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship, including their minor children, on
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on 3 August 1995 account of political or economic necessity, may
and was admitted as abalikbayan for one year. reacquire Philippine citizenship through
Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained in repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4
Baybay, Malay, Aklan by agent Wilson Soluren of the of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended:
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on 23 May 1996 Provided, That the applicant is not one of those
(pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72). disqualified, as enumerated in the law:
Subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention 1.1 Person opposed to organized
Center in Manila. Petitioner was, eventually, ordered government or affiliated with any
deported to his country of origin. association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing
Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for organized government;
Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or 2. Person defending or teaching the necessity or
Temporary Restraining Order on 29 May 1996. Tabasa propriety of violence, personal assault, or
alleged, among others, that he is entitled to admission association for the predominance of their ideas;
or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota 3. Person convicted of crimes involving moral
immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as turpitude; or
4. Person suffering from mental alienation or

incurable contagious diseases.
Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino

who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of
political or economic necessity under RA 8171? He
does not.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of

repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-
born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity, and to the minor
children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that,
if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship
due to political or economic reasons later decides to
repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also
benefit his minor children according to the law. This
includes a situation where a former Filipino,
subsequently, had children while he was a naturalized
citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the
former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship
on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship. To
claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children
must be of minor age at the time the petition for
repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a
child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil
life much less the capacity to undertake a political act
like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor
children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization
separately from their parents.
d. Direct act of Congress
i
ii
iii
iv
v
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viii
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Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 1

- a sovereign person with the people composing it, FACTS:

seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the

Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired

THIRD ISSUE: He petitioned for habeas corpus on the theory that a

FOURTH ISSUE: ISSUE:

PARAS, J., DISSENTING OPINION HELD/RATIO:

mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that

Relations (BLR) reversed the Med-Arbiter’s decision organizations, which determination has been

Sanders, as director of the special services department

wary in accepting "possessory information documents,

ISSUE/HELD: P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of

 A compliant for damages against, Third Party

FACTS: The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government

duties and taxes. Thereafter, the customs appraiser

the defendants herein cannot he sued under the first

tort committed by him when he acted without or in

ISSUES There is no question, therefore, that the

Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 constitution provides that state 2. No.

P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual

ISSUE: WON the suit against the DA is a suit against FACTS:

expropriation proceedings were initiated before

ISSUE: WON the respondent’s decision is valid FROILAN V. PAN ORIENTAL

Alien Property Administrator, so the decision of the

CASE#1: Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa

services through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw.

ISSUE: W Amigable may properly sue the government FACTS:

 The City appropriated funds for her unpaid back RATIO:

which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents

moneys sought to be garnished, as long as it HELD:

Fontanilla v Maliaman Petition granted.

FACTS: CHAPTER IV:

conviction thereof the permit to operate and

ISSUE: WON RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police LUTZ v ARANETA

great industries of our nation, o 2 – a petition by landowners and sugar

o The interests of the public generally, as

 Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted xhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the

coordinative functions, and in the process

G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995

not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise

HELD: the decision was filed the judgment became final and

RATIO: o Must be general and consistent with public policy

port facilities, electric transmission, railroads and other 2 December 1998

 After the lease contract expired, negotiations began

The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is

Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna filed 2 complaints

FACTS:  1985- NPC filed MTD of the second expropriation

Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of

whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be

The bone of contention in the instant controversy

HELD: When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the

acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279

Held: Bardillon v Masili

city wanted that 3m of land as a place of discharging

as it deprives defendants of ordinary use of their ISSUE:

 Eminent domain is an inherent power of

contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture

through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation

HELD: yes determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.