Precedent - What It Is and What It Isnt - When Do We Kiss It and W
Precedent - What It Is and What It Isnt - When Do We Kiss It and W
Precedent - What It Is and What It Isnt - When Do We Kiss It and W
4-15-1990
Recommended Citation
Ruggero J. Aldisert Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn't; When Do We Kiss It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 Pepp. L. Rev. 3 (1990)
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Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn't;
When Do We Kiss It and
When Do We Kill It?*
Ruggero J. Aldisert**
I.
3. See, e.g., R. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINK-
ING (1989) [hereinafter LOGIC FOR LAWYERS]; R. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1976); Aldisert, Philosophy, Jurisprudenceand JurisprudentialTemperament of Fed-
eral Judges, 20 IND. L. REV. 453 (1987); Aldisert, The House of the Law, 19 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 755 (1986); Aldisert, Rambling Through ContinentalLegal Systems, 43 U. PITT. L.
REV. 935 (1982) [hereinafter Continental Legal Systems]; Aldisert, The Nature of the
Judicial Process: Revisited, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1980); Aldisert, The Role of the
Courts in ContemporarySociety, 38 U. PITT. L. REV. 437 (1977).
4. Allegheny County Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969-70 (3d Cir. 1979)
(footnote omitted).
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5
pletely investigated.
Stare decisis is the policy of the courts to stand by precedent. 6 The
expression stare decisis is but an abbreviation of stare decisis et non
quieta movere (to stand by or adhere to decisions and not disturb that
which is settled). Consider these words. First, decisis. This word
means literally, and legally, the decision. The doctrine is not stare
dictis. It is not "to stand by or keep to what was said." The doctrine
is not stare rationibusdecidendi or "keep to the rationes decidendi
of past cases." Rather, a case is important only for what it decides:
for "the what," not for "the why," and not for "the how." It is impor-
tant only for the decision, for the detailed legal consequence follow-
ing a detailed set of facts. Thus, stare decisis means what the court
did, not what it said.
Strictly speaking, the later court is not bound by the statement of
reasons, or dictis, set forth in the rationale. We know this because a
decision may still be vital although the original reasons for support-
ing it may have changed drastically or been proved terribly fallacious.
In a large number of cases, both ancient and modern, one or more of
the reasons given for the decision can be proved to be wrong, but the
cases have retained vitality.
Priestly v. Fowlerj announcing the common law fellow-servant
rule, is one such case. The court based the holding on the alleged
consent of a servant to run the risk. Yet there was no evidence that
such consent was ever requested of, or given by, fellow servants. Of
this case, it has been said that Lord Abinger planted it, Baron Alder-
son watered it, and the devil gave it increase. 8 The concept, however,
was almost immediately adopted in the United States in Farwell v.
Boston & Worcester Railroad.9 Chief Justice Shaw reasoned that an
employee consented to assume the risk of negligence by a fellow ser-
vant upon accepting employment. Again, there were no facts to sup-
port the assertion that the employee actually consented to anything.
This was a concept built out of thin air. Yet, the fellow-servant rule
remained the law in the United States for many years.' 0
III.
Precedent can be discussed in the context of four common types of
opinions:
1. The textbook common-law model. Here the opinion discusses
only the adjudicative facts. Facts are carefully and meticulously set
forth so that the reader may quickly become acquainted with the ma-
terial facts that form the subject of the holding. The court does not
suggest how it would decide another case based on a change in the
material facts. The fabric is tightly woven. There is no room, there
is no give, to stretch the holding beyond the stated facts.13
2. A variation of this purist model exists when, in addition to the
adjudicative (or material) facts, the court also discusses narrow and
specific facts not in the record and gratuitously suggests how it would
decide a case based on those non-record facts. Such a discussion is
easily recognized as obiter dictum. Consider this example: Operating
his car at an improperly high rate of speed, the driver-defendant at-
tempts a turn and whips across the centerline and crashes into on-
coming traffic. The court d~cides the case in favor of the plaintiff
and says by way of dictum, "Of course, although the facts are not
present here, if the steering wheel suddenly becomes defective, we
would have a products liability case and the defendant would not
have been liable."
3. A third model occurs when the court suggests how it would de-
cide an entire series of cases based on a broad. array of facts not in
the record. So long as this discussion does not implicate the adjudica-
tive facts at bar, it also is recognized as obiter dictum. Consider the
same operative facts presented in our second model. This time the
court says, "If the manufacturer designed a defective brake, a stick-
ing accelerator, a poorly designed steering mechanism, the plaintiff
would have a valid cause of action against the car dealer and manu-
facturer." This is only dictum. The facts of the case do not discuss
defective steering.
4. A fourth model is an opinion in which the court's statement of
its conclusion is broad enough to cover not only record facts but also
additional facts not in the record. Here, the court's decision is not
obiter dictum. It is truly the decision of the case, arrived at in the
common-law tradition, but couched in a holding that is beyond a rule
of law in the narrow sense. 14 The decision takes the form of a gen-
eral principle instead of a narrow rule of law.
13. See, e.g., Strotman v. K.C. Summers Buick, Inc., 141 Ill. App. 3d 8, 11-12, 489
N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (1986) (upholding the dismissal of a complaint alleging strict prod-
ucts liability for a car accident, because the complaint lacked specificity as to what was
defective).
14. See, e.g., Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1980). Although the facts
before the court in Finberg were limited to Philadelphia County, and only that
county's procedural rules were interpreted, the court announced a decision governing
the entire State of Pennsylvania.
Each of the foregoing variations announce decisions of the court
and can be components of the doctrine of stare decisis. As prece-
dents, however, they are not currency of equal value. Clearly, the
first one, the classic common-law model, possesses the strongest bite
of precedent. As we go down the list of examples, numbers two and
three are not precedent, and yet they are authority that can be con-
sidered by a court in a subsequent decision. The fourth variation
meets the definition's technical niceties, but does not possess maxi-
mum strength, and therefore, does not achieve the reliability of a de-
cision limited to the record material facts. An able advocate may
convince a subsequent court that its original holding, although tech-
nically precedent, was only "a little bit precedent."
This fourth model causes the courts more trouble than any aspect
of adjudication. It occurs when a court does not announce a narrow
rule based solely on record facts, but embarks on an intellectual
frolic of its own. Two examples of the fourth variation, decided in
the same year, are illustrative.
In Webb v. Zern, 15 Charles Webb purchased a keg of beer from a
distributor, John Zern. Webb's son, Nelson, was injured when the
keg exploded. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was controlling and then
stated: "We hereby adopt the foregoing language as the law of
Pennsylvania." The court should have held: Nelson, the son, could
recover in tort from the brewer, beer distributor and keg manufac-
turer on the theory of strict products liability, for the reasons set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A. This hold-
ing would have met the strictures of the pure common-law model. In
holding as they did, the judges galloped out of the courtroom, up the
hill to the legislature, and proceeded to legislate. The decision was
not limited to the material facts, but rather announced a broad prin-
ciple of law that could be applied to cases with materially different
facts.
Another example of this type of judicial legislation can be seen in
Miranda v. Arizona.16 Miranda was decided in 1966 and promul-
gated a broad legal principle, the so-called "MirandaRule." For the
past twenty years, courts and police departments across the country
have been forced to decide what does and what does not implicate
Miranda. The common-law tradition requires starting with a narrow
holding and, then depending upon the collective experience of the ju-
diciary, either applying it or not applying it to subsequent facts. The
Court did the opposite in Miranda.
What the Supreme Court Did What the Common Law Tradition Demands
dMiranda
Because the usual model was inverted in this case, the Court has
spent the last twenty years chipping away at its holding.
Miranda says that a prisoner must be advised that he or she has a
right to remain silent, a right to have an attorney present during
questioning, and a right to the appointment of an attorney if the pris-
oner cannot afford one. In 1971, the Court said that Miranda's pro-
scription did not apply if the statement was used only to impeach a
witness.17 The Court subsequently held that although it was neces-
sary to cut off questioning in a robbery case when the defendant in-
voked his right to remain silent, it was permissible to question about
an unrelated murder if fresh warnings were given "after the passage
of a significant period of time.' I8 In Beckwith v. United States,19 the
Court held that the questioning of a person suspected of criminal tax
fraud by Internal Revenue agents did not give rise to Miranda. Later
the Court held that Miranda was not violated when a defendant who
initially invoked Miranda waived his rights before seeing an attor-
ney, even though his attorney attempted to see her client but was as-
sured that he would not be questioned until the following day.20 In
Duckworth v. Eagan,2 1 the Court held that informing a suspect that
an attorney would be appointed for him "if and when you go to
court" did not render the warnings inadequate.
The end result is that the broad legal principle announced in Mi-
randa v. Arizona has been consistently chipped away in the 23 years
since the decision was filed. Perhaps the same results would have
been forthcoming if the traditional application of precedent had been
IV.
Obiter dictum is where the precedential dragon often reposes.
Gratuitous statements in an opinion which do not implicate the adju-
dicative facts of the case's specific holding are neither stare decisis
nor precedent. They bind neither coordinate nor inferior courts in
the judicial hierarchy. They are classic obiter dicta: "statement[s] of
law in the opinion which could not logically be a major premiss of
2
the selected facts of the decision." 2
I do not accept the cynic's wail that dictum is merely a label pasted
on a case that a subsequent court simply does not want to follow. I
suggest two ways to identify dicta:
* First, dictum is the express or implied description of a factual
scenario that does not appear in the case record.
* Second, dictum is any statement of facts that does not appear
in the minor premise of the court's syllogistic reasoning.
For example, using the familiar categorical syllogism in deductive
logic as used in the law:
Major Premise: All men are mortal.
Minor Premise: Socrates is a man.
Conclusion: Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
This syllogism is legitimate only to the extent that Socrates appears
in the record and legitimately belongs both in the minor premise and
also the conclusion. We cannot properly say that RoboCop is also a
man, is qualified to be in the minor premise, and is therefore, mortal.
The fact of RoboCop's mortality is simply not a matter of record.
Dictum is the antithesis of precedent.
V.
Precedent then, is a doctrine with two jurisprudential concepts in
tension:
* The notion that the reasoning supporting the past decision
may be wrong, but the decision itself, may be right. We have
mentioned this concept before. The logic of the argument,
22. R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 80 (2d ed. 1968) (citing E. PATTERSON,
JURISPRUDENCE: MAN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 313 (1953)).
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VI.
Yet another view of precedent is the perception of the doctrine as a
method of classification. In this view, precedent covers the fact situa-
tion of the instant case and at least one other. It decides one case and
classifies another.
Any classification is an abstraction. The art of legal advocacy is to
expand or contract an abstraction to the extent it is either desirable
or undesirable. If contracted, the original case retains only the
highly constrictive confines of a legal rule. If expanded, the precept
develops from a narrow rule of law into a full-fledged legal principle.
The precepts may form the basis of what Herman Oliphant once
called "a mounting and widening structure, each proposition includ-
ing all that has gone before and becoming more general by embracing
24
new states of fact."
When we expand, we indulge in the process of classification. We
have two fact situations. The first has a definite legal result. We see
one or two elements common to the two fact situations. We then put
the two fact situations in one class, and, using the combined elements
as one enlarged antecedent fact situation, we apply the legal conse-
quence of the first case. Such a class may include multitudes of fact
situations so long as a single common attribute exists.
These classes of fact situations give us a parallel series of corre-
sponding propositions of law, each more and more generalized as we
recede farther and farther from the original state of facts and include
more and more fact situations in the successive classes. It becomes a
Where do we
draw the line?
Additional Facts
Precedent:
c ase facts
VII.
How do we determine where to draw the line? Is there some gui-
31. The phrase translated means, "They shall not pass!" It has been attributed to
Petain but actually was uttered by General Nivelle at Verdun on January 23, 1916.
32. Oliphant, supra note 24, at 73.
33. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 23, at 56-69.
34. Id. at 66-67.
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dance to know when the precedential force of one case must stop?
Or is it purely personal intuition? At what level in the model classi-
fication do we say that the rule must stop? Cardozo raised the same
sort of question 75 years ago:
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of information do I
appeal for guidance? In what proportions do I permit them to contribute to
the result? In what proportions ought they to contribute? If a precedent is
applicable, when do I refuse to follow it? If no precedent is applicable, how do
35
I reach the rule that will make a precedent for the future?
We judges seek answers to these questions throughout our judicial
careers. I do not purport to give you answers; however, I make bold
to suggest a method to find those answers. I emphasize that I will be
talking about methods, not answers. The methods are found in the
canons of logic. And here I draw freely upon passages of my most
recent book, Logic for Lawyers: A Guide to C7ear Legal Thinking
(1989).
Whether to extend or restrict precedent is inextricably wrapped up
in the concept of inductive reasoning. This means reasoning from a
particular to another particular, or from an assembly of particulars to
an inductive generalization. Let us start with generalizations.
36. But see K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIEN-
TIFIC KNOWLEDGE vii (1962). Popper states the following:
The way in which knowledge progresses, and especially our scientific knowl-
edge, is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by tenta-
tive solutions to our problems, by conjectures. These conjectures are
controlled by criticism; that is, by attempted refutations, which include se-
verely critical tests. They may survive these tests; but they can never be posi-
tively justified: they can neither be established as certainly true nor even as
'probable' . ...
Id. (emphasis in original).
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0 0
From one particular to
another we analogize.
Doctrine
37. Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., 1970 App. Cas. 1004, 1058 (Lord Diplock); see
also LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 3, at 113-22.
38. See J. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 98-142 (8th ed.
1916).
620
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44. See Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161
(1930).
45. See Lloyd, Reason and Logic in the Common Law, 64 L.Q. REV. 468, 482 (1948).
46. Id.
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Ix.
When do we overrule? We start with Roscoe Pound's warning that
the law must be stable, yet it cannot stand still.60 No black letter
guidelines determine when to follow precedent. Weighty considera-
61. Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; Or Hard Cases Can Make Good
Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 231 (1962).
62. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 541 (1975) (citing J. SwiFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS
(1726)).
63. Traynor, supra note 61, at 231.
64. Traynor, supra note 56, at 745.
65. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2370 (1989) (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888)).
66. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
67. See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967)); Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (overruling International Union v. Wisconsin Em-
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ployment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949)); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (overruling Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948)); Andrews v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972) (overruling Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312
U.S. 630 (1941)); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970) (overruling Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962)); Peyton v.
Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (overruling McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934)); see also Bur-
net v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-13 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases overruled by the Court prior to 1931).
68. B. CARDOZO, supra note 35, at 150. See generally Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2370.
cided and that subsequent events have undermined its continuing validity
69. Boy's Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 255 (1970)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Henslee v. Union Planters Bank,
335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)).
70. McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 178 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted).
71. Andrews v. Styrap, 26 L.T.R. (N.S.) 704, 706 (Ex. 1872).
72. Schaefer, supra note 52, at 7.
73. Rumsey v. New York & N.E.R.R., 133 N.Y. 79, 85, 30 N.E. 654, 655 (1892).
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of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges are bound to follow that
decision so long as it stands unreversed, unless it can be7 4shown that the law
was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case.
X.
As explained, all precedents do not have the same bite. Some are
less powerful than others. Notable commentators have addressed
certain aspects of this phenomenon. For example, Henry Campbell
Black observed:
A decision is not authority as to any questions of law which were not raised or
presented to the court, and were not considered and decided by it, even
though they were logically present in the case and might have been argued,
and even though such questions, if 75
considered by the court, would have caused
a different judgment to be given.
Black has highlighted the importance of examining carefully the
opinion, if not the briefs, in the prior case. 76 Were the issues
presented, considered and decided? If not, even though they could
have been, the prior decision should not be considered a binding pre-
cedent on unaddressed points. If so, the prior decision is to be consid-
ered binding precedent.
To be sure, issues raised in a case stem from the facts presented.
Facts, therefore, are of controlling importance, as explained by Pro-
fessor Brumbaugh:
Decisions are not primarily made that they may serve the future in the form
of precedents, but rather to settle issues between litigants.
Their use in after cases is an incidental aftermath. A decision, therefore,
draws its peculiar quality of justice, soundness and profoundness from the
particular facts and conditions of the case which it has presumed to adjudi-
cate. In order, therefore, that this quality may be rendered with the highest
measure of accuracy, it sometimes becomes necessary to expressly limit its ap-
77
plication to the peculiar set of circumstances out of which it springs.
As emphasized, the use of the precedent's authority depends upon,
and is limited to "the particular facts and conditions of the case
which it has presumed to adjudicate. 7 8s We should not apply prece-
dents blindly. The putative precedent must be analyzed carefully to
ascertain the actual holding of the court to determine whether a sim-
ilarity of facts and issues exists. It must be studied to determine
whether the precept emerging therefrom is the case's true holding or
merely dictum.
2. Plurality Opinions
79. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) (plurality opinion).
80. Id. at 90-91, 337 A.2d at 900 (plurality opinion).
81, 535 F.2d 249, 250 (3d Cir. 1976).
82. 432 Pa. 256, 248 A.2d 32 (1968).
sylvania State Supreme Court declined to follow a prior opinion rep-
resenting the views of only two of its justices, the court being of the
view that an opinion "joined by only one other member of this Court,
has no binding precedential value."83
The United States Supreme Court recently agreed to review Hor-
ton v. California.84 At issue is the scope, or continued vitality of the
high court's 1971 ruling in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,8 5 which al-
lowed the use of evidence found in plain view only if discovered inad-
vertently. A California appeals court said the 1971 Supreme Court
holding is not binding precedent because it was reached by only four,
86
not five, justices.
Because a plurality opinion is not an opinion of the court, all appel-
late courts should adopt the United States Supreme Court's practice
of labeling a plurality opinion as an "Opinion Announcing the Judg-
ment of the Court," rather than simply "Opinion" or "Opinion of the
Court." A few years ago we asked West Publishing Company to note
this in its headnotes when only a plurality opinion is forthcoming. In
such cases West usually now states in the headnotes, for example,
"Opinion by Heffernan, C.J., with two others concurring." This is
most helpful in determining the precedential value of a case..
Although the Court seemed bound by law to hear all "appeals" from
the state courts (presenting an appropriate constitutional law chal-
lenge), because of the vast number of cases, it devised a concept of
dismissing appeals "for lack of jurisdiction," ostensibly for the reason
that no substantial federal question had been raised. Although re-
corded case law is scant, if in fact non-existent, many astute lawyers
in the criminal law field believed that where a direct appeal from a
state court decision in a criminal case had been denied by the
Supreme Court, the appellant was then precluded from seeking relief
to the federal court under federal habeas corpus,8 9 because the Court
had rendered a final decision that no substantial federal question was
presented. In other words, this decision was considered to be a bind-
ing precedent. Lacking a federal question, federal habeas corpus re-
lief was, therefore, foreclosed.
Congress eliminated this trap for the unwary who mistakenly
would take an appeal rather than file a petition for certiorari in such
cases. In 1988, it amended section 1257 of title 28 to abolish "appeal"
and now provides that final judgment "rendered by the highest court
of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari." 90 To be sure, the amendment
was not designed solely to protect defendants in criminal cases;
rather, its purpose was to give the Court almost total discretion to ac-
cept cases for review. However, its effect has been to allow the alter-
native relief of federal habeas corpus review for the unwary
counselor who may previously have been bound by a final determina-
tion on appeal.
XI.
Well, there it is. I do not know whether I have helped or made a
confusing subject even more so. I have tried to suggest guidelines to
help you decide whether to kiss or kill the precedential dragon. In
either event you must go back to its very definition. In so doing, you
recognize that a case holding in the common-law tradition is fact spe-
cific. When you compare a putative precedent with the case at bar,
you compare facts and not the reasons stated. Yet, I freely admit
that my emphasis on facts for definitional purposes is not shared by
those who seem to say that the reasons given in the holding are also
91.See Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161
(1930).Professor Goodhart's method is summarized in G. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE
921-44(1973); R. CROSS, supra note 22, at 67-76; see also id. at 35-40, 104-05.
92.M. WEBER, Value Judgments in Social Science, in MAX WEBER SELECTIONS IN
TRANSLATION 69 (W. Runciman ed. 1987).
93. Id.
94. Schaefer, supra note 52, at 23.
95. A. LANG, The Lady Dragonissa,in A CAVALCADE OF DRAGONS (R. Green ed.
1970).