FIGURACION vs LIBI The wisdom and intent of the City Council to recognize

the right of Isagani Figuracion to

GR no. 155688, Nov 28, 2007
repurchase the lot cannot be gainsaid. The City of Cebu
FACTS: The Ceby City government expropriated lot no. has the power and authority to sell the expropriated
899-D-2 and turned the same into a portion of N. property that is no longer needed for that purpose for
Escario Street. The said lot is owned by Figuracion and which it was intended.
Cebu City paid him for the expropriation.
The Spouses Libi not only lacked the legal personality
In Resolution No. 330, the Cebu City Sangguniang but also have no legal basis to challenge the
Panlungsod approved the reconveyance to Isagani reconveyance.
Figuracion, successor-in-interest of Galileo Figuracion, of
an unused portion of Lot No. 899-D-2. On the basis CITY OF OZAMIZ vs LUMAPAS
thereof, Cebu City Mayor executed in favor of Isagani
Figuracion a deed of sale over the subject lot. GR no. L-30727, July 15, 1975

It appearing that herein respondents had been using the FACTS: Lumapas is an operator of transportation buses
subject lot, and refused to vacate it despite demand, for passengers and cargoes, under the name of Romar
petitioners, as successors-in-interest of Isagani Line. The Municipal Board of Ozamiz City enacted an
Figuracion, filed against respondents a complaint for ordinance imposing parking fees for every motor vehicle
unlawful detainer. parked on any portion of the existing parking space in
the City of Ozamiz.
The MTC rendered a decision, declaring petitioners
entitled to possession of the subject lot and ordering After approval the City of Ozamiz began collecting the
respondents to remove the fence they had constructed. prescribed parking fees and collected from Lumapas,
who had paid under protest. 4 years later Lumapas filed
Respondents filed against petitioners a complaint for the a complaint against the City of Ozamiz for recovery of
annulment of Resolutions and the deed of sale in favor parking fees, alleging, among others, that said
of Isagani. Ordinance No. 466 is ultra vires.

RTC rendered the resolutions and deed of sale as null The court rendered judgment declaring that such
and void. parking fee is in the nature of toll fees for the use of
public road and made in violation of Section 59[b] of
ISSUE: Whether the action by the Spouses Libi to annul Land Transportation and Traffic Code, there being no
the reconveyance of the lot to FIguracion is proper prior approval therefor by the President of the
Philippines upon recommendation of the Secretary of
RULING: No. The Court ruled that the Spouses Libi Public Works and Communications.
were not the real-parties-in-interest to annul the TCT of
Figuracion, since they are not themselves claiming title Petitioner now contends that the lower court erred: (1)
to or possession of the lot. Libi alleged that they bought in declaring Ordinance No. 466, series of 1964, of
the adjacent lot in the belief that they had an outlet to Ozamiz City, null and void; (2) in considering parking
N. Escario Street through the lot owned by the Cebu City fees as road tolls under Section 59[b] of RA No. 4136;
government. Clearly, they have no interest in the title of (3) in declaring the parking area as a public street and
the lot. not the patrimonial property of the city; and (4) in
ordering the reimbursement of parking fees paid by
Reversion is a proceeding by which the State seeks the Lumapas.
return of lands of the public domain through the
cancellation of private title erroneously or fraudulently ISSUE: Whether the Municipal Board of the City of
issued over it. The action should be in the name of the Ozamiz had power to enact the ordinance
State. Thus, Spouses Libi cannot be considered the
proper parties therein. RULING: Yes. The rule is well-settled that municipal
corporations, being mere creatures of the law, have only
The Spouses’ sole interest is the use of the property as such powers as are expressly granted to them and those
access to N. Escaro Street. Such interest is tangential to which are necessarily implied or incidental to the
any issue regarding ownership or possession of the exercise thereof, and the power to tax is inherent upon
property. Hence, it is not sufficient to vest in them the the State and it can only be exercised by Congress,
legal standing to sue for reversion of the property. They unless delegated or conferred by it to a municipal
should have maintained the action for easement. corporation. As such, said corporation has only such
powers as the legislative department may have deemed Resolution no.215, amending no.132, by converting the
fit to grant. By reason of the limited powers of local portion of Lapu-Lapu st. from lot B of sketch plan,
governments and the nature thereof, said powers are to beginning at the portion’s intersection with Dagohoy st.,
be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or into an alley. Declaring for this purpose, that said lot B
ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said shall not be part of this alley.
powers must be construed against the municipality.
Favis then instituted a petition annulling the lease
The implied powers which a municipal corporation contract. The lower court ruled that the 2 resolution
possesses and can exercise are only those necessarily were valid.
incident to the powers expressly conferred. Inasmuch as
a city has no power, except by delegation from ISSUES:
Congress, in order to enable it to impose a tax or license
fee, the power must be expressly granted or be 1. Whether the closing of the street without an
necessarily implied in, or incident to, the powers ordinance is valid
expressly conferred upon the city.
2. Whether the City Council of Baguio has the power to
Under Sec. 15[y] of the Ozamiz City Charter, the close city streets
municipal board has the power “x x x to regulate the use
of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, RULING:
parks; cemeteries and other public places; x x x”, and
the authority “To enact all ordinances it may deem 1. YES. It has been held that “even where the
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the statute or municipal charter requires the
furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of the municipality to act by ordinance, if a resolution
morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and is passed in the manner and with the statutory
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such formality required in the enactment of an
others as may be necessary to carry into effect and ordinance, it will be binding and effective as an
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this ordinance." Such resolution may operate
Charter x x x.” By this express legislative grant of regardless of the name by which it is called.
authority, police power is delegated to the municipal
corporation to be exercised as a governmental function 2. Considering that “municipal corporations in the
for municipal purposes. Philippines are mere creatures of Congress; that,
as such, said corporations possessed, and may
FAVIS vs CITY OF BAGUIO exercise, only such power as Congress may
deem fit to grant thereto",9 a reference to the
GR no. L-29910, April 25, 1969 organic act of the City of Baguio appears to be
in order. In subsection (L) of Section 2553 of
FACTS: Favis bought a parcel of land from the Baguio Charter, the language of the grant of
Assumption Convent Inc. the lot is bounded by a authority runs thus— "(L) To provide for laying
proposed road lot, owned by Assumption. The proposed out, opening, extending-, widening,
road lot was donated by Assumption to the City of straightening, closing up, constructing, or
Baguio for road purposes. Favis uses this road as means regulating, in whole or in part, any public plaza,
of egress and ingress from his residence to a public square, street, sidewalk, trail, park, waterworks,
street called Lapu-Lapu st. or water mains, or any cemetery, sewer, sewer
connection or connections, either on, in, or upon
Resolution no.115 of the City Council of Baguio leased public or private property; x x x." Undoubtedly,
lot 25 to Shell for 10-year period renewable for another the City is explicitly empowered to close a city
10 years. Resolution no.132 authorized the Mayor to street.
lease to Shell lot 25 and the donated lot. Said office, in a
letter noted that lot B is for public use and may not be RUIZ vs GORDON
leased.
GR no. L-65695, Dec 19, 1983
Favis sent a letter-protest against the additional lease
made in favor of Shell. He claimed that it would diminish FACTS: The constitutional rights to free speech and free
the width of Lapu-Lapu st. and that it would destroy the assembly are invoked in this mandamus proceeding filed
symmetry of the said st. thus making it look ugly and against Gordon, City Mayor of Olongapo City. It was
the City was bereft of authority to lease any portion of alleged that petitioner personally delivered to the
public st. in favor of anyone. respondent a letter application requesting in behalf of
the Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National
Reconciliation, Justice for Aquino Justice for All (JAJA),
Concern (sic) Citizen for Justice and Peace (CCJP), his representative should be at the office of the public
Damdamin Bayan na Nagkakaisa (DAMBANA), United official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the
Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), for a decision reached, whether adverse or favorable, should
permit to hold a prayer-rally at the Rizal Triangle, be sent to the address of petitioner. In that way, there
Olongapo City. need not be waste of time and effort not only of the
litigants but likewise of a court from which redress is
The Court required the respondents to answer. sought in case of a denial or modification of a request
Respondents replied by stating the request for a prayer for a permit.
rally was received in the Office of the Mayor and that
respondent had repeatedly announced in his regular CABRERA vs. CA
program on Sunday over the radio (DWGO) and at the
Monday morning flag ceremony before hundreds of GR no. 78673, March 18, 1991
government employees that he would grant the request
of any group that would like to exercise their freedom of FACTS: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted
speech and assembly. Resolution No. 158 which provides the closing of the old
road leading to the new Capitol Building of the province
When interviewed on the matter by the Editor-in Chief of and to give the owners of the properties traversed by
the 'Guardian', he mentioned the fact that he had the new road equal area from the old road adjacent to
granted the permit of the petitioner, which interview the respective remaining portion of their properties.
appeared in the November 22-28, 1983 issue of the said Deeds of Exchange were executed by the Province of
newspaper. Catanduanes.

Given these, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of Upon learning about the resolution, the petitioner filed a
the petition. This was complied with. complaint for “Restoration of Public Road and/or
Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and
ISSUE: Can the petition be granted Documents with Damages.” He alleged that the land
fronting his house was a public road owned by the
RULING: No. Reyes decision as to the role of the Province of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity
judiciary in petitions for permits to hold peaceable and therefore beyond the commerce of man and that
assemblies may have to be supplemented. This is how the deed of exchange was invalid.
the J.B.L. Reyes opinion reads on this point: "The
applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should The CFI sustained the authority of the provincial board
inform the licensing authority of the date, the public to enact Resolution No. 158 under existing law. Pursuant
place where and the time when it will take place. If it to Republic Act No. 5185, municipal authorities can
were a private place, only the consent of the owner or close, subject to the approval or direction of the
the one entitled to its legal possession is required Such Provincial Board, thoroughfares under Section 2246 of
application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the Revised Administrative Code. Although in this case
the public official concerned to appraise whether there the road was not closed by the municipality of
may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to Catanduanes but by the provincial board of
its grant but at another public place. It is an Catanduanes, the closure, nevertheless, is valid since it
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification was ordered by the approving authority itself. However,
that the clear and present danger test be the standard while it could do so, the provincial government of
for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there Catanduanes could close the road only if the persons
is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive prejudiced thereby were indemnified, Section 2246 of
evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. the Revised Administrative Code being very explicit on
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, this.
must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper The petitioner insist that Sec. 2246 is not applicable
judicial authority. because the public road was owned by the province in
its governmental capacity and, without a prior order of
As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this closure, could not be the subject of a barter. Control
action for mandamus could have been obviated if only over public roads, he insists, is with Congress and not
petitioner took the trouble of verifying on November 23 with the provincial board. He also alleged the closure of
whether or not a permit had been issued. A party the road injured him and his family.
desirous of exercising the right to peaceable assembly
should be the one most interested in ascertaining the ISSUE: Whether or not the Provincial Board can validly
action taken on a request for a permit. Necessarily, after enact the resolution.
a reasonable time or, if the day and time was
designated for the decision on the request, such party or
RULING: YES. Resolution 158 clearly says that it is
“hereby resolved to close the old road.” The authority of HELD: NO
the provincial board to close that road and use or A public street is property for public use hence outside
convey it for other purposes is derived from the
the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of
following provisions of Republic Act No. 5185 in relation
to Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code. man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract
Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be
used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real The vested right of the public to use city streets for the
property belonging to the municipality might be lawfully purpose they were intended to serve such as for
used or conveyed. traveling

In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, the court held

Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the
that the City Council of Baguio City has the power to
close city streets and withdraw them from public use. nature of the public street because it is going to be
While it is true that the above case dealt with city contrary to the general law
councils and not the provincial board, there is no reason
for not applying the doctrine announced therein to the MACASIANO vs. DIOKNO
provincial board in connection with the closure of
provincial roads. The provincial board has, after all, the FACTS: On June 13, 1990, the municipality of
duty of maintaining such roads for the comfort and
Paranaque passed an ordinance authorizing the closure
convenience of the inhabitants of the province.
Moreover, this authority is inferable from the grant by of some streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro
the national legislature of the funds to the Province of Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon.
Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads. By virtue of this Paranaque Mayor Ferrer was authorized
to enter into a contract to any service cooperative for
the establishment, operation, maintenance and
DACANAY vs. ASISTIO, JR. management of flea market and/or vending areas.
Because of this purpose, respondent Palanyag entered
FACTS: This is a petition for mandamus to the non- into an agreement with the municipality of Paranaque
action of the city government of Caloocan in accordance with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury.
with the decision of the RTC to evict the occupants of a Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent
flea market located in the streets of Caloocan. Palanyag on the said streets.

January 5, 1979 – Metropolitan Manila Commission On September 30, 1990, Brig. Gen Macasiano, PNP
enacted an ordinance allowing the use of streets for the Superintendent of Metropolitan Traffic Command
purpose of flea markets subject to several conditions. ordered the destruction and confiscation of the stalls.
1987 – Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea These stalls were later returned to Palanyag. Petitioner
markets and the stallowners filed a case against such then sent a letter to Palanyag giving the latter 10 days
action. to discontinue the flea market otherwise the market
stalls shall be dismantled. Hence, respondents filed with
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in the court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus
questions (Heros del '96, Gozon and Gonzales) are of with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to
public dominion, hence outside the commerce of man. which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The
After the decision came out, there was a change in the court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin
city administration and current mayor (Asistio) did not petitioner from enforcing his letter pending the hearing
pursue the action of the previous mayor and left the flea on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.
markets in the streets as is.
Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a ISSUE: Whether an ordinance issued by the
petition for mandamus to remove the stalls in their municipality of Paranaque authorizing the lease and use
street of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea market
is valid?
ISSUE: May public streets be leased or licensed to
market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or HELD:
resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission?
Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties demanded by public necessity and in the exercise of
of public domain devoted to public use and made police power.
available to the public in general are outside the Petitioner’s counter-argument: It has never agreed on
commerce of man and cannot be disposed or leased by the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets. By virtue of its
the local government unit to private persons. Aside from ownership of the streets, it should not be deprived
the requirement of due process, the closure of the road without due process of law and without just
should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road compensation.
or other public property from public use when
circumstances show that such property is no longer ISSUES
intended or necessary for public use or public service. 1. Whether the Mayor of Makati could have validly
When it is already withdrawn from public use, the opened Jupiter and Orbit streets? – YES
property becomes patrimonial property of the local 2. If yes, what is the nature of the state power being
government unit concerned. It is only then that invoked by the Mayor? – POLICE POWER
respondent municipality can use or convey them for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the HELD:
local unit concerned might lawfully used or conveyed. 1. BAVA cannot rightfully complain that the Mayor of
Those roads and streets which are available to the public Makati, in opening up Jupiter and Orbit streets, had
in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are acted arbitrarily.
still considered public property devoted to public use. In Citing Sangalang v. IAC, the Court held that Jupiter
such case, the local government has no power to use it street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and
for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private Ayala Corporation’s commercial section. Being
persons. Hence the ordinance is null and void. considered as merely a boundary – and hence not part
of Ayala’s real estate development projects – it cannot
be said to have been for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air
SANGALANG vs. IAC (1989) Village residents.
The very Deed of Donation executed by Ayala Corp.
Before the Court are six consolidated petitions, docketed covering Jupiter and Orbit Streets, amongst others,
as G.R. nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, 82281 and effectively required both passageways open to the
60727. The first five petitions for a motion for general public.
reconsideration raise the issue of whether Jupiter Street “…the property will be used as a street for the use of the
is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air Village residents. members of the DONEE (BAVA), their families,
Meanwhile, the last petition (G.R. 60727) raises the lone personnel, guests, domestic help and under certain
issue of whether or not the Mayor of Makati could have reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general
validly opened Jupiter and Orbit Streets to vehicular public…”
traffic. * As the Court asserted in Sangalang, the opening of
Jupiter and Orbit streets was warranted by the demands
FACTS: Ayala Corporation (original owner of the of the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion
property subsequently subdivided as Bel-Air Village) and public convenience.
executed a Deed of Donation covering Jupiter and Orbit 2. The act of the Mayor now challenged is in the concept
streets to Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA). of police power.
Respondents allege that upon instructions of the Mayor The demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter streets
of Makati, studies were made by the on the feasibility of does not amount to deprivation of property without due
opening streets in Bel-Air Village calculated to alleviate process of law or expropriation without just
traffic congestions along the public streets adjacent to compensation – there is no taking of property involved.
Bel-Air Village. Police power as the “state authority to enact legislation
Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by the that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
Municipality of Makati in the interest of the general order to promote the general welfare.”
public to open to traffic several village streets including Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not
Jupiter and Orbit streets. unrestricted license to act accordingly to one’s will. It is
Respondent’s claim: BAVA had agreed to the opening of subject to the far more overriding demands and
Bel-Air Village streets and that the opening was requirements of the greater number.
Public welfare when clashing with the individual right to Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the
property should not be made to prevail through the practice of law for three (3) monthseffective from
state’s exercise of its police power. receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P
The exercise of police power, however, may not be done 500.00
arbitrarily or unreasonably. But the burden of showing
that it is unjustified lies on the aggrieved party.
In the case at bar, BAVA has failed to show that the CEBU OXYGEN vs. BERCILLES
opening up of Orbit and Jupiter streets was unjustified
or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. FACTS: In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu
The fact that the opening has led to the loss of privacy was excluded in the city’s development plan hence the
of BAVA residents is no argument against the council declared it as abandoned and was subsequently
Municipality’s effort to ease vehicular traffic in Makati. opened for public bidding. Cebu Oxygen was the highest
The duty of local executive is to take care of the needs bidder at P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen applied for the
of the greater number, in many cases at the expense, of land’s registration before CFI Cebu but the provincial
the minority fiscal denied it, so did the court later, alleging that the
road is part of the public domain hence beyond the
commerce of man.
SANGALANG vs. IAC (177 SCRA 87)
ISSUE:Whether Cebu Oxygen can validly own said land.
FACTS: Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the
petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang, HELD: Yes. Under Cebu’s Charter (RA 3857), the city
allegedly used intemperate and accusatory language in council “may close any city road, street or alley,
his motion for reconsideration.The Court finds Atty. boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus
Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
particularly, “. . .The Court not only put to serious conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
question its own integrity and competence but also belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.”
jeopardized its own campaign against graft and Since that
corruption undeniably pervading the judiciary . . .” portion of the city street subject of Cebu Oxygen’s
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for. application for registration of title was withdrawn from
public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion
ISSUE: DI KO ALAM BAKIT SINAMA NI SIR TO SA LIST becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of
an ordinary contract. Article 422 of the Civil Code
HELD: expressly provides that “Property of public dominion,
His suggestions that the Court might have been guilty of when no longer intended for public use or for public
graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
only unbecoming, but comes, as well, as an open assault State.
upon the Court’s honor and integrity.

Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a CRUZ v. CA

license to insult the Court with GR L-44178 AUGUST 21, 1987
derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad
hominem. In that event, it is the Court’s duty "to act to FACTS: The private respondents instituted a class suit
preserve the honor and dignity .. and to safeguard the before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
morals and ethics of the legal profession." VIII in behalf of the vendors and regular stall holders in
We sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, Padre Rada Market for annulment with preliminary
for resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect injunction against the then Manila Mayor Antonio J.
toward the Court within the meaning of Section 1, of Villegas, petitioner Cruz, and other persons whose
Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act names were unknown to them after the decision of the
also constitutes malpractice as the term isdefined by City Mayor to withdraw Padre Rada Market as a public
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. market.
ISSUE: WON the Mayor of Manila can withdraw Padre camino vecinal, said reference was but a mere proposal
Rada Market from government supervision. of its existence to the Sangguniang Bayan of Liloan.
The Colomidas, on the other hand, relied on old-
HELD: NO. timers as witnesses – witnesses such as Florentino
By the very nature of a market, its location, opening, Pepito, who attested to the existence of the Camino
operations, and closure must be regulated by vecinal and its availability to the general public since
government. It is not a question of the petitioner's right practically time immemorial.
to run his market as he pleases but what agency or The trial court ruled in favor of the Colomidas
office should supervise its operations. We agree with the because the zoning map used as evidence by the Pilapil
Court of Appeals that the Mayor had no legal authority did not specifically indicate that the amino vecinal was
to, by himself, allow the petitioner to withdraw the indeed merely “proposed” since other roads and streets
major portion of Padre Rada Market from its use as a were classified as such. The CA upheld that trial court,
public market, thereby also withdrawing it from the city's basically because it said that findings of facts by the trial
constant supervision. The establishment and court, as a general rule, should be undisturbed.
maintenance of public markets is by law among the
legislative powers of the City of Manila. Since the ISSUE: WON the zoning plan must give way to the
operation of Padre Rada Market was authorized by a claims of the adversaries?
municipal board resolution and approved by the City
Mayor, as provided by law, it follows that a withdrawal HELD: NO
of the whole or any portion from use as a public market In its infinite wisdom, the SC said that it didn’t
must be subject to the same joint action of the Board matter what opinion the Colomidas or the engineer gave
and the Mayor. The Mayor of Manila, by himself, cannot regarding the existence of the camino vecinal. What
provide for the opening, operations, and closure of a really mattered is the zoning plan (the Urban Land Use
public market. There is no question that the Padre Rada Plan) as finally approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Market is a public market as it was authorized to operate the Municipality of Liloan. The zoning plan showed that
and it operates as such. The Padre Rada Market is, the camino vecinal was declared closed. And it’s beyond
therefore, a public market which happens to be dispute that the abandonment, closure or establishment
privately-owned and privately operated. The Padre Rada of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the
Market is a public market and as such should be subject Municipality of Liloan under the LGU of 1983. The SC
to the local government's supervision and control. It’s rebuked the parties for not having resorted to a pre-trial
conversion into a private market or its closure must conference which would have prevented the dragging of
follow the procedures laid down by law. a trivial case for six years.

PILAPIL v. CA ALBON v. FERNANDO

G.R. No. 97619 November 26, 1992 G.R. No. 148357 June 30, 2006Corona, J.

FACTS: Spouses Pilapil own a parcel of land in Bahak, FACTS:

Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu. Spouses Colomida, on the other In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public
hand, bought a parcel of land located also in Bahak. works project to widen, clear and repair the existing
Now this land owned by the Colomidas has for its sidewalks of Marikina Green heights Subdivision. It was
ingress and egress to the National Road a camino undertaken by the city government pursuant to
vecinal (barrio road). However, this camino vecinal Ordinance No. 59. Subsequently, petitioner Albon filed a
transverses the property of the Pilapil, which was the taxpayer’s suit for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
root of all their problems. with damages against respondents City Engineer Alfonso
The Pilapil denied the existence of the camino Espirito, Assistant City Engineer Anaki Maderal and City
vecinal. Socrates Pilapil, the husband, presented himself Treasurer Natividad Cabalquinto. According to the
as witness (which was lousy) as well as Engineer petitioner it was unconstitutional and unlawful for
Epifanio Jordan, Municipal Planning and Development respondents to use government equipment and
Coordinator of Liloan. The engineer said that while that property, and to disburse public funds, of the City of
zoning map of Poblacion, Liloan made reference to a Marikina for the grading, widening, clearing, repair and
maintenance of the existing sidewalks of Marikina New Sun Valley v. Sangguniang Barangay,
Greenheights Subdivision. He alleged that the sidewalks G.R. No. 156686, July 27, 2011
were private property because Marikina Greenheights
Subdivision was owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc. Hence, the FACTS:
city government could not use public resources on them. The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley
In undertaking the project, therefore, respondents issued a Resolution directing the New Sun Valley
allegedly violated the constitutional proscription against Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster
the use of public funds for private purposes as well as Streets to vehicular and pedestrian traffic. NSV
Sections 335 and 336 of RA 7160 and the Anti-Graft and residents, contended that when they bought their
Corrupt Practices Act. The trial court ruled in favor of the residential properties, they also paid proportionately for
respondents. Ordinance No. 59 is a valid enactment. The the roads and the park in then subdivision. They have
court recognized the inherent police power of the therefore an existing equity on these roads. To open the
municipality and with this it is allowed to carry out the roads to public use is a violation of the rights and
contested works. The Court of Appeals sustained the interests to a secure, peaceful and healthful
decision of the trial court stating that sidewalks of environment. Further, they claimed that a "Barangay
Marikina Greenheights Subdivision were public in nature Resolution" cannot validly cause the opening of the
and ownership thereof belonged to the City of Marikina subject roads because under the law, an "ordinance" is
or the Republic of the Philippines following the 1991 required to effect such an act.
White Plains Association decision. Thus, the
improvement and widening of the sidewalks pursuant to ISSUE: WON the claim of NSV that a "Barangay
Ordinance No. 59 of 1993 was well within the LGU¶s Resolution" cannot validly cause the opening of the
powers. subject roads because under the law, an "ordinance" is
required to effect such an act, is correct.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 59 HELD: No. NSV is incorrect. The requirement under Sec.
21 of the passage of an ordinance by a local government
HELD: NO. Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is unit to effect the opening of a local road, can have no
empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes set applicability to the instant case since the subdivision
forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160). It is road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic in the
expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs area - namely Rosemallow and Aster Streets – have
under the general welfare clause of RA 7160. With this already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to,
power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to and the titles thereto already issued in the name of, the
protect the lives, health, and property of their City Government of Parañaque since the year 1964.
constituents and maintain peace and order within their Having been already donated or turned over to the City
respective territorial jurisdictions. Also, in the exercise of Government of Parañaque, the road lots in question
their inherent police power the cities and municipalities have since then taken the nature of public roads which
have the power to exercise such powers and discharge are withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence
such functions and responsibilities as may be necessary, placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein
appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective Appellant. Accordingly, NSV was not in the lawful
provisions of the basic services and facilities, including exercise of its predicated rights when it built obstructing
infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular
needs of their residents and which are financed by their traffic for the use of the general Public. Consequently,
own funds. These infrastructure facilities include defendant’s act of passing the disputed barangay
municipal or city roads and bridges and similar facilities. resolution, the implementation of which is sought to be
Regarding the nature of ownership of the sidewalks in restrained by Appellant, had for its purpose not the
question, there is also no hindrance in declaring that the opening of a private road but may be considered merely
sidewalks are of public dominion. PD 957, as amended as a directive or reminder to the Appellant to cause the
by PD1216, mandates subdivision owners to set aside opening of a public road which should rightfully be open
open spaces which shall be devoted exclusively for the for use to the general public.
use of the general public.
 is that the province, city or municipality have either
City of Manila V. Teotico “control or supervision” over said street or road.

Facts: At about 8:00 in the evening, private respondent

Genaro Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and BERNARDINO JIMENEZ, petitioner, vs. CITY OF
P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a loading and MANILA and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
unloading zone, waiting for a jeepney when one came respondents
along to stop. As he stepped down from the curb to
board the jeepney and took a few steps, he fell inside an FACTS: In the morning of August 15, 1974 the plaintiff
uncovered and unlighted manhole. The fall caused went to STA. Ana public market to buy bagoong. He
Teotico’s head to hit the rim and break his eyeglasses attained injuries after stepping on an uncovered opening
and the broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. which could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater,
Respondent was then brought to PGH to be treated of causing a dirty and rusty four-inch nail, stuck inside the
his injuries. Respondent suffered contusions in various uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of plaintiff-
parts of his body and allergic eruptions caused by the petitioner penetrating to a depth of about one and a half
anti-tetanus injections administered to him required inches.the injury caused him confinement and failure to
further medical treatment and payment of these attend into the operation of school bus thus, engaging
charges. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for damages the services of another person for compensation.
against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the
health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The trial Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whose
court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the City of administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had been
Manila was sentenced to pay the damages. placed by virtue of a Management and Operating
Contract.
Issue: Whether or not the City of Manila is liable for The lower court decided in favor of respondents. On
damages. appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court held the Asiatic
Integrated Corporation liable for damages but absolved
Ruling: YES. Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a respondent City of Manila.
particular prescription making “provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or ISSUE: Whether or not the Intermediate Appellate
injury suffered by any person by reason” — specifically Court erred in not ruling that respondent City of Manila
— “of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, should be jointly and severally liable with Asiatic
public buildings, and other-public works under their Integrated Corporation for the injuries petitioner
control or supervision.” In other words, Article 2189 suffered.
governs liability due to “defective streets,” in particular.
Since the present action is based upon the alleged RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION
defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be
decisive thereon. held liable for the injuries sustained by the petitioner
In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in because under the Management and Operating Contract,
turn, alleged that “the streets aforementioned were and Asiatic Integrated. Corporation assumed all responsibility
have been constantly kept in good condition and for damages which may be suffered by third persons for
regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes any cause attributable to it.
thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers It has also been argued that the City of Manila cannot
concerned” who “have been ever vigilant and zealous in be held liable under Article I, Section 4 of Republic Act
the performance of their respective functions and duties No. 409 as amended (Revised Charter of Manila) which
as imposed upon them by law.” Thus, the City had, in provides:
effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under 'The City shall not be liable or held for damages or
its control and supervision. At any rate, under Article injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of
2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other City
therein established to attach that the defective roads or Officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any
streets belong to the province, city or municipality from other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said
which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires
Mayor, Municipal Board, or any other officers while particular market, more specifically, to check the safety
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." of the place for the public.
The contention of respondent City of Manila that
RULING: petitioner should not have ventured to go to Sta. Ana
The petition is impressed with merit. Public Market during a stormy weather is indeed
The Supreme Court squarely ruled that Republic Act untenable. As observed by respondent Court of Appeals,
No. 409 establishes a general rule regulating the it is an error for the trial court to attribute the
liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to negligence to herein petitioner
persons or property arising from the failure of city There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of
officers" to enforce the provisions of said Act, "or any Manila to exercise reasonable care to keep the public
other law or ordinance or from negligence" of the City market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place
"Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while for their marketing needs. While it may be conceded
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." that the fulfillment of such duties is extremely difficult
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines during storms and floods, it must however, be admitted
which provides that: "Provinces, cities and municipalities that ordinary precautions could have been taken during
shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries good weather to minimize the dangers to life and limb
suffered by any person by reason of defective conditions under those difficult circumstances.
of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other
public works under their control or supervision." QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer
constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, RAMIR J. TIAMZON, petitioners, vs. FULGENCIO
cities and municipalities x x x liable for damages for the DACARA,** respondent.
death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason"—
specifically—"of the defective condition of roads, streets, FACTS: Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara,
their control or supervision." Sr. and owner of ’87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan with
Art. 1, sec. 4, R.A. No. 409 refers to liability Plate No. 877 (sic), while driving the said vehicle,
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at
the object, thereof, while Article 2189 of the Civil Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being
Code governs liability due to "defective streets, repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result,
public buildings and other public works" in Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and
particular and is therefore decisive on this the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned
specific case. turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
In the same suit, the Supreme Court clarified Indemnification was sought from the city government
further that under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, (Record, p. 22), which however, yielded negative
it is not necessary for the. liability therein results. Fulgencio Dacara in behalf of his minor child
established to attach, that the defective public filed for damages against the Quezon City and Engr.
works belong to the province, city or municipality Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants, before the Regional Trial
from which responsibility is exacted. What said Court.
article requires is that the province, city or The defendants claimed that they exercised due care by
municipality has either "control or supervision" providing the area of the diggings all necessary
over the public building in question. measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why
In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely
Public Market, despite the Management and Operating because of the latter’s negligence and failure to exercise
Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated due care.
Corporation remained under the control of the former. The Regional Trial Court ruled against the QC
The fact of supervision and control of the City over Government. The CA agreed with the RTC’s finding that
subject public market was admitted by Mayor Ramon petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the
Bagatsing in his letter to Secretary of Finance Cesar damage suffered by respondent
Virata. In fact, the City of Manila employed a market
master for the Sta. Ana Public Market whose primary
duty is to take direct supervision and control of that
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE QC GOVERNMENT MAY actually experienced emotional and mental
BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE INJURIES OF THE sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they
RESPONDENTS must be substantiated by clear and convincing
proof
RULING:
The Petition is partly meritorious. Exemplary Damages
Negligence Petitioners argue that exemplary damages and
That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate attorney’s fees are not recoverable. Article 2229 of the
cause of the accident was aptly discussed in the lower Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
court’s finding. imposed by way of example or correction for the public
Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio, Jr. was good. The award of these damages is meant to be a
driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) deterrent to socially deleterious actions.
when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly well It must be emphasized that local governments and their
above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on “city employees should be responsible not only for the
streets with light traffic, when not designated ‘through maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety
streets,’ ” as provided under the Land Transportation of the public. Thus, they must secure construction areas
and Traffic Code. Thus, making the respondents with adequate precautionary measures.
negligent. It is too late in the day for them to raise this
new issue. It is well-settled that points of law, theories
or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO
cannot be considered on review or appeal. MANILA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, LAURA BIGLANG-AWA, METROPOLITAN
Moral Damages WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS),
Petitioners argue that moral damages are recoverable and KWOK CHEUNG, respondents.
only in the instances specified in Article 221926 of the
Civil Code. FACTS: Under a “Contract For Water Service
To award moral damages, a court must be Connections”2 entered into by and between the
satisfied with proof of the following requisites: Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)
(1) an injury—whether physical, mental, or and Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of K.C. Waterworks
psychological—clearly sustained by the claimant; System Construction (KC, for short), the former engaged
(2) a culpable act or omission factually the services of the latter to install water service
established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of the connections.
defendant as the proximate cause of the injury On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the
sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of South Sector Office of MWSS to conduct and effect
damages predicated on any of the cases stated in excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and Santolan
Article 2219. Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a national road, for the
Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages laying of water pipes and tapping of water to the
to be recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that respective houses of water concessionaires. Then, they
the act or omission caused physical injuries proceeded with the excavation.
It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the Priscilla Chan together with Assistant City Prosecutor
appellate courts, however, that no other evidence (such Laura Biglang-awa were driving along te area where the
as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) excavation was taking place. Suddenly, the left front
was presented to prove Fulgencio, Jr.’s bare assertion of wheel of the car fell on a manhole where the workers of
physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the
would justify an award of moral damages based on humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa
Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the was fractured.
Decisions are conspicuously silent with respect to the Consequent to the foregoing incident, Biglang-awa filed
claim of respondent that his moral sufferings were due before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila a
to the negligence of petitioners. complaint for damages against MWSS, the Municipality
The award of moral damages must be solidly of San Juan and a number of San Juan municipal
anchored on a definite showing that respondent
officials. Thereafter, she amended the complaint and the drilling or excavation is made on a national or
included KC as one of the defendants. municipal road, for as long as the same is within
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment its territorial jurisdiction.
in favor of Biglang-awa. Unable to accept the judgment, It must be borne in mind that the obligation of
both Biglang-awa and the Municipality of San Juan went the [petitioner] to maintain the safe condition of
to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the the road within its territory is a continuing one
decision of the trial court with modification. which is not suspended while a street is being
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION repaired. It is the duty of the municipal
Petitioner maintains that under Section 149, [1][z] of the authorities to exercise an active vigilance over
Local Government Code,6 it is obliged to provide for the the streets; to see that they are kept in a
construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of reasonably safe condition for public travel.
only municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, Nor can petitioner seek shelter on Section 8 of
bridges, parks and other public places. Ergo, since Ordinance 82-01 of the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
Santolan Road is concededly a national and not a Concededly, Section 8 of the Ordinance makes the
municipal road, it cannot be held liable for the injuries permittee/excavator liable for death, injury
suffered by Biglang-awa on account of the accident that and/or damages caused by the non-completion of
occurred on said road. Moreover, the petitioner works and/or failure of the one undertaking the
contended that only the Project Engineer of KC and works to adopt the required precautionary
MWSS can be held liable for the same accident. measures for the protection of the general public.
Significantly, however, nowhere can it be found in said
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR Ordinance any provision exempting municipalities in
THE INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE RESPONDENT Metro Manila from liabilities caused by their own
negligent acts.
RULING:
The petition must have to be denied.
Petitioner failed to take note of the other provisions of SAMUEL DUMLAO, petitioner, vs. TE ONORABLE
Section 149 of the same Code, more particularly the COURT OF APPEALS, FLORANTE, PACIFICO, LEO,
following: ANELES, CRISTOPER, EAN, LAURA, ANNIBAL and
Section 149. Powers and Duties.—(1) The sangguniang ROMULUS, minors and all surnamed CERVANTES
bayan shall: (bb) Regulate the drilling and excavation of ELIALDE, respondents.
the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and
other pipes; the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, FACTS: On February 28, 1964, about 1130 in the night,
drains and other similar structures; erecting of poles and Isauro Elialde, accompanied by his wife anidena Elialde,
the use of crosswalks, curbs and gutters therein, and while driving his Jeep southwards from Davao City, thru
adopt measures to ensure public safety against open Talomo Bridge, suddenly and unepectedly came upon a
canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to hole on the south end of said bridge right on his way. To
life and property, and provide just compensation or relief avoid it he swerved his jeep abruptly to the left side of
for persons suffering from them; the road where he was confronted by a steep
Clear it is from the above that the Municipality of San embankment. e swerved his eep back to the right to get
Juan can “regulate” the drilling and excavation of the into his lane after passing the boulders and the
ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other destroyed portion of the road. but he collided with the
pipes within its territorial jurisdiction. Doubtless, the truck of defendant ermanos de ap driven by Dulcesimo
term “regulate” found in the aforequoted provision of Dacoy who came from the opposite direction. As a result
Section 149 can only mean that petitioner municipality of the collision, Isauro Elialde died on the spot in his eep
exercises the power of control, or, at the very least, while his wife who was found on the road, severely
supervision over all excavations for the laying of gas, inured but was still alive, died soon after in the hospital
water, sewer and other pipes within its territory. the plaintiffs as heirs of both deceased sued the
the municipality’s liability for injuries caused by hermanos de yap but the suit was dismissed for failure
its failure to regulate the drilling and excavation of plaintiffs to prosecute. however, same plaintiffs filed
of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, the present complaint on May 16, 1966, which, aside
and other pipes, attaches regardless of whether
from the original defendant, now includes the City of excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the
Davao and City Engineer Samuel Dumlao. installation of its underground conduit system. The
Petitioner seeks to be relieved from liability citing the complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban
provision of Article 2189 of the Civil Code as properly failed to notice the open trench which was left
serving the basis of the liability of the City of Davao, uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the
which does not include that of any of city officials. lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITIONER, BEING A PUBLIC accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained
OFFICIAL BE SUED IN HIS PRIVATE CAPACITY injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent
scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband
RULING: suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep
it is a well settled principle of law that a public was shattered.
official may be liable in his personal private PLDT, in its answer, contended that the injuries
capacity for whatever damage he may have sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their
caused by his act done with malice and in bad own negligence and that the entity which should be held
faith,4 or beyond the scope of his authority or responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte,
Jurisdiction. for short), an independent contractor which undertook
Examining the allegations of the complaint and the construction of the manhole and the conduit system.
reviewing the evidence it would indeed be correct Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of
to say that petitioner was sued in his official the accident involving respondent spouses and that it
capacity, and that the most that was imputed to had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by
him is act of culpable neglect, inefficiency and installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs
gross indifference in the performance of his in the vicinity of the work site.
official duties. Verily, this is not imputation of bad the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private
faith or malice, and what is more was not respondents. The appellate court reversed the decision
convincingly proven. of the lower court and dismissing the complaint of
We are, therefore, constrained to hold that from the respondent spouses stating that the respondent spouses
complaint itself, no sufficient cause of action was were negligent. On their second motion for
alleged, and the evidence utterly fails to provide a basis reconsideration, the court of appeals affirmed the
for imposing on petitioner the liability as has been decision of the trial court.
declared against him ointly with his codefendants, the
City of Davao and ermanos de ap, by the trial court. ISSUE: WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS LIABLE FOR
in the case of defendant City Engineer Samuel Dumlao, THE INJURIES OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
his inclusion in the complaint, as shown in paragraph 3
thereof is in his private capacity and conforms with the RULING: The accident which befell private respondents
provision of Section 5 of Act 4354. This very patent was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio
inconsistency may well be said to reflect how infirm the Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on
appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is insofar as the part of petitioner PLDT. The perils of the road were
petitioner, who incidentally has long retired, is known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private
concerned. The petition is hereby granted, and the respondents. By exercising reasonable care and
decision appealed from is reversed insofar as prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have
petitioner Samuel Dumlao is concerned, who is avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even
accordingly declared without liability for damages assuming arguendo that there was some alleged
negligence on the part of petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of
INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and said signs was to inform and warn the public of the
SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA presence of excavations on the site. The private
ESTEBAN, respondents respondents already knew of the presence of said
excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these
FACTS: The respondents while on their jeep ran over a excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall
mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an into the excavation but the unexplained sudden
swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the FACTS: The municipality of Malasiqui, Pangasinan
accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the passed Resolution No. 159 whereby it resolved to
omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta. Another
warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes Resolution was passed creating the Executive Committee
the proximate cause only when the doing of the said for such event. The Municipal Council appropriated
omitted act would have prevented the injury. P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages for the zarzuela
It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT and cancionan, The zarzuela to be performed was
for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due donated by an association of Malasiqui employees where
and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a Vicente Fontanilla was a member. During the
societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a performance, the stage collapsed, pinning Fontanilla
reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. causing his death. The heirs of Fontanilla filed claims for
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last damages against the Municipality.
clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident,
notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner ISSUE: W/N the Municipality can be held liable
PLDT.
As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street HELD: Yes. The celebration of a town fiesta by the
almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental
and location of the excavations there. It was his function. The legal consequence thereof is that the
negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary
hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of private corporation with the municipal council acting as
his imprudence. its board of directors. It is an elementary principle
A person claiming damages for the negligence of that a corporation has a personality, separate and
another has the burden of proving the existence of such distinct from its officers, directors, or persons
fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively responsible in an action for damages for tort or
established by competent evidence negligence culpa aquilla committed by the
corporation's employees or agents unless there is
PALAFOX VS PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton
negligence on their part. Further, under the
FACTS: Sabas Torralba was employed as a truck driver doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-
of the provincial govt. of Ilocos Norte. One day while on municipality is liable for damages for the death of
duty, he ran over Proceto Palafox, killing him then. Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was
Torralba was prosecuted for homicide through reckless attributable to the negligence of the
imprudence to which he pleaded guilty. The heirs of municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
Palafox instituted a civil case against him and the The municipality acting through its municipal council
municipality. appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee
on entertainment and in charge of the construction of
ISSUE: W/N the municipality of Ilocos Norte can be the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent
held liable of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent
superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or
HELD: NO. Local govt. Units are not liable for liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his
negligent acts of its employees while they are assigned tasks.
performing governmental functions or duties. In
this case, Torralba was involved in the construction or
maintenance of roads which was a government duty at MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS FIRME
the time of the accident. Thus, the municipality cannot
be held liable for death of Palafox. FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck, and a dump
truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union
collided. Several passengers died, including Laureano
TORIO VS FONTANILLA Banina, Sr. His heirs filed a complaint for damages
against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who in
turnn, filed a third party complaint against the
Municipality and its dump truck driver Alfredo Bislig. The ISSUE: Whether or not prior approval by the
Municipality raised the defense of non-suability of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is required before Gov.Garcia
State. could have validly entered into the questioned contracts.

ISSUE: W/N the Municipality is liable for the tort HELD: Yes. The fact that the Province of Cebu operated
committed by its employee who was then engaged in under a reenacted budget in 2004 lent a complexion to
the discharge of governmental functions this case which the trial court did not apprehend. Sec.
323 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that in case of a
HELD: Generally, municipal corporations are not reenacted budget, "only the annual appropriations for
liable for the torts committed by them or by their salaries and wages of... existing positions, statutory and
employees or agents in the discharge of official contractual obligations, and essential operating
governmental functions and can be answerable expenses authorized in the annual and supplemental
only if it can be shown that they were acting in a budgets for the preceding year shall be deemed
proprietary capacity/ function. reenacted and disbursement of funds shall be in
In this case, the driver of the dump truck insists that he accordance therewith."
was on his was to get a load of sand and gravel for the It should be observed that, as indicated by the
repair of the San Fernando’s municipal streets at the word "only" preceding the above enumeration in
time the accident occured. In the absence of evidence to Sec. 323, the items for which disbursements may
the contrary, the regularity of performance is presumed. be made under a reenacted budget are exclusive.
Hence, the driver is presumed to be performing official Clearly, contractual obligations which were not
functions at the time of the accident. In line with this, included in the previous year's annual and
the Municipality cannot be held liable. supplemental budgets cannot be disbursed by the
local government unit. It follows, too, that new
contracts entered into by the local chief executive
QUISUMBING VS GARCIA require the prior approval of the Sanggunian.
And so, to give life to the obvious intention of the law
FACTS: The subject COA report stated "Several and to avoid a construction which would render Sec.
contracts in the total amount of P102,092,841.47 were 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160 meaningless, disbursement, as
not supported with a Sangguniang Panlalawigan used in Sec. 346, should be understood to pertain to
resolution payments for statutory and contractual obligations which
authorizing the Provincial Governor to enter into a the Sanggunian has already authorized thru ordinances
contract, as required under Section 22of R.A. No. 7160." enacting the annual budget and are therefore already
Gov. Garcia sought for reconsideration from COA but subsisting obligations of the local government unit.
without waiting for its resolution, she instituted an action Contracts, as used in Sec. 22(c) on the other
for Declaratory Relief where she alleged that the hand, are those which bind the local government
infrastructure contracts complied with R.A. No. 9184 unit to new obligations, with their corresponding
bidding procedures and were entered into pursuant to terms and conditions, for which the local chief
the general and/or supplemental appropriation executive needs prior authority from the
ordinances passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sanggunian. This confirms the indispensability of the
hence a separate authority to enter into such contracts sanggunian's authorization in the execution of contracts
was no longer necessary. which bind the local government unit to new obligations.
The trial court declared that Gov. Garcia need not secure
prior authorization from the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. City of Manila v. IAC
It further declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
does not have juridical personality nor is it vested by FACTS:
R.A. No. 7160 with authority to sue and be sued. It also Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died on June 4,1971 and was
ruled that it is only when the contract involves buried on June 6,1971 in Lot No. 159, Block No. 194 of
obligations which are not backed by prior ordinances the North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to
that the prior authority of the sanggunian concerned is Irene Sto. Domingo, from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021.
required. Full payment of the rental therefor amounts to P50.00
and no other document was executed to embody such patrimonial property of the City of Manila which
lease. The burial record for Block No. 194 of Manila was created by resolution of the Municipal Board
North Cemetery does not reflect the term of duration of of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904. The
the lease in favor of the Sto. Domingos. administration and government of the cemetery are
Administrative Order No. 5 of the City Mayor of Manila under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the
prescribes uniform procedure and guidelines in the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the
processing of documents pertaining to and for the use exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same
and disposition of burial lots and plots. Subject lot was are under the charge and responsibility of the
leased to the bereaved family for 5 years only. superintendent of the cemetery. The City of Manila
On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for
North Cemetery authorized the exhumation and removal the use and dispositions of burial lots and plots within
of the remains, placing the bones and skull in sack and the North Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5,
kept the same in the depository of the cemetery. s. 1975. With the acts of dominion, there is, therefore
Thereafter, the lot in question was rented out to another no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of
lessee. property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary
The plaintiffs went to the cemetery on All Souls Day and or private character. Furthermore, there is no
found out that the resting place of their dear departed dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of
did not anymore bear the stone marker which they the private respondents. Hence, obligations
placed on the tomb. arising from contracts have the force of law
Hence, this case. between the contracting parties. Thus a lease
The trial court rendered its decision ordering the contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as
defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of the law between them.Therefore, a breach of
another single lot within the North Cemetery for a period contractual provision entitles the other party to
of 43 years 4 months and 11 days; to search for the damages even if no penalty for such breach is
remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and prescribed in the contract.
thereafter, to bury the same in the substitute lot.
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals
which modified the trial court’s decision. Ceferino Inciong v. Hon. Eufemio Domingo

ISSUE: Are the operations and functions of a public FACTS: Philippine Sugar Commission failed to pay real
cemetery a proprietary function? estate taxes due on its sugar refinery situated at Brgy.
Caloocan, Balayan, Batangas. The Provincial Treasurer
HELD: Yes. The operations and functions of a public of Batangas scheduled the sale of said refinery at public
cemetery are proprietary function. Under Philippine laws, auction. To restrain the sale, PHILSUCOM filed a petition
the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as for prohibition in the Court of Appeals against the
such endowed with the faculties of municipal Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Assessor of Balayan,
corporations to be exercised by and through its city Batangas.
government in conformity with law, and in its proper Meanwhile, Barangay Caloocan thru petitioner Atty.
corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract Ceferino Inciong filed a Motion for Intervention alleging
and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in that Barangay Caloocan is an indispensable party in the
character-public, governmental or political on the one case as it has a 10% share of the property tax sought to
hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the be collected from PHILSUCOM.
other. Governmental powers are those exercised in PHILSUCOM and the Municipal Treasurer of Balayan,
administering the powers of the state and promoting the Batangas entered into an Amnesty Compromise
public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, Agreement pursuant to Executive Order No. 42. The
public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand agreement was submitted to the Court of Appeals and
are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the case was accordingly dismissed.
the community and include those which are ministerial, PHILSUCOM paid the amount of P7,199,887.51 to the
private and corporate. Municipal Treasurer. Out of this amount, the Municipal
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence Treasurer allocated to Barangay Caloocan as its share
of a special law, the North Cemetery is a 10% or a total of P719,988.75.
Consequently, Atty. Ceferino Inciong filed a case for Province of Cebu v. Hon. IAC
payment of attorney's fees against the Province of
Batangas, Municipality of Balayan and Barangay FACTS: Incumbent Governor Rene Espina was on
Caloocan. official business in Manila. Vice-Governor Priscillano
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of Almendras and 3 members of the Provincial Board
Atty. Ceferino Inciong. enacted Resolution No. 188, donating to the City of
Hence, the instant petition. Cebu 210 province. The deed of donation was
immediately executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu
ISSUE: May Atty. Inciong be awarded the Atty’s fees at by Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted in behalf of
10% ? the City of Cebu by Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. The
document was prepared and notarized by a private
HELD: Yes. Atty Inciong may be awarded the atty’s fees lawyer, and was later approved by the Office of the
at 10%. As correctly stated by the Office of the Solicitor President through Executive Secretary Juan Cancio.
General, the position of respondent Chairman of the Accordingly the lots donated were to be sold by the City
COA disallowing payment of attorney's fees to petitioner of Cebu to raise funds that would be used to finance its
Atty. Ceferino Inciong is not proper in the light of the public improvement projects. 1 year period was given
following considerations. within which to dispose the donated lots.
(1) The employment by Barangay Caloocan of petitioner Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina
as its counsel, even if allegedly unauthorized by the denounced as Legal and immoral the action of his
Sangguniang Barangay, is binding on Barangay Caloocan colleagues in donating practically all the patrimonial
as it took no prompt measure to repudiate petitioner's property of the province of Cebu, considering that the
employment (Province of Cebu v. Intermediate Appellate latter's income was less than one. fourth (1/4) of that of
Court, 147 SCRA 447). the City of Cebu.
(2) The Decision dated August 9, 1989 of Branch XI, Some taxpayers and Atty. Garcia filed a suit to declare
Regional Trial Court, Balayan, Batangas in Civil Case No. the donation illegal, null and void.
1878, directing Barangay Caloocan to pay attorney's Garcia filed the complaint for the annulment of the deed
fees to petitioner, has become final and executory and is of donation with an application for the issuance of a writ
binding upon Barangay Caloocan (Mercado v. Court of of preliminary injunction.
Appeals, 162 SCRA 75). For services rendered in Civil Case no. 238-BC, CFI of
(3) COA Circular No. 86-255 cannot diminish the Cebu, respondent Pablo P. Garcia filed a Notice of
substantive right of petitioner to recover attorney's fees Attorney's Lien.
under the final and executory Decision dated August 9, Petitioner Province of Cebu opposed stating that the
1989 of the Regional Trial Court. payment of attorney's fees and reimbursement of
In its Comment, the respondent, thru the COA Legal incidental expenses are not allowed by law and settled
Office states that PHILSUCOM paid the amount of jurisprudence to be paid by the Province.
P7,199,887.51 to the Municipal Treasurer under the
Amnesty Compromise Agreement. Out of this amount, ISSUE:
the Municipal Treasurer allocated to Barangay Caloocan Whether Atty. Garcia is entitled to attorney’s fees.
as its share the amount of P719,988.75. This allocation
is erroneous because pursuant to Republic Act No. HELD: Yes. Atty. Garcia is entitled to attorney’s fees.
5447, Barangay Caloocan should only share from Until the contrary is clearly shown an attorney is
the basic tax which is 50% of what PHILSUCOM presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant
paid because the other half should go to the whom he purports to represent (Azotes v. Blanco, 78
Special Education Fund. Under the said Republic Phil. 739) His authority to appear for and represent
Act No. 5447, the rightful share of Barangay petitioner in litigation, not having been questioned in the
Caloocan should be P359,994.38 only. lower court, it will be presumed on appeal that counsel
Thus, payment of attorney's fees to petitioner Atty. was properly authorized to file the complaint and appear
Ceferino Inciong must be in an amount equivalent to for his client. (Republic v. Philippine Resources
10% of P359,994.38. Development Corporation, 102 Phil. 960) Even where an
attorney is employed by an unauthorized person to
represent a client, the latter will be bound where it has
knowledge of the fact that it is being represented by an
attorney in a particular litigation and takes no prompt Petitioner questioned the failure of the Sanguniang
measure to repudiate the assumed authority. Such Bayan to appropriate an amount for the payment of his
acquiescence in the employment of an attorney as salary. The proper provincial and national officials
occurred in this case is tantamount to ratification (Tan endorsed compliance with Circular 9-A of the Joint
Lua v. O' Brien, 55 Phil. 53). The act of the successor Commission on Local Government and Personnel
provincial board and provincial officials in allowing Administration in giving the revised rate of salary for
respondent Atty. Pablo P. Garcia to continue as counsel petitioner.
and in joining him in the suit led the counsel to believe
his services were still necessary. The Sanguniang Bayan enacted a resolution
We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: appropriating the amount of P500.00 per month as the
"that a municipality may become obligated upon salary of the petitioner. Thereafter, it was increased to
an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of P774.00 per month.
the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to
which it has the general power to contract. The Another resolution appropriating the amount of
doctrine of implied municipal liability has been P15,144.00 as payment of the unpaid salaries of the
said to apply to all cases where money or other petitioner was enacted. The resolution was vetoed by
property of a party is received under such the respondent mayor resulting into the filing by the
circumstances that the general law, independent petitioner of a petition for a writ of mandamus.
of express contract implies an obligation upon the
municipality to do justice with respect to the ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to payment of
same." (38 Am Jur. Sec. 515, p. 193): damages.
The obligation of a municipal corporation upon the
doctrine of an implied contract does not connote an HELD: Yes. Petitioner is entitled to payment of
enforceable obligation. Some specific principle or damages. We find and rule that petitioner is entitled to
situation of which equity takes cognizance must be the damages and attorney’s fees because the facts show
foundation of the claim. The principle of liability rests that petitioner was forced to litigate in order to claim his
upon the theory that the obligation implied by law to pay lawful salary which was unduly denied him for three (3)
does not originate in the unlawful contract, but arises years and that the Mayor acted in gross and evident bad
from considerations outside it. The measure of recovery faith in refusing to satisfy petitioner’s plainly valid, just
is the benefit received by the municipal corporation. The and demandable claim. (Article 2208, (2) and (5), New
amount of the loan, the value of the property or Civil Code).
services, or the compensation specified in the contract,
is not the measure. If the price named in the invalid That respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone
contract is shown to be entirely fair and reasonable not should be held liable and responsible for the miserable
only in view of the labor done, but also in reference to plight of the petitioner is clear. Respondent Mayor
the benefits conferred, it may be taken as the true vetoed without just cause on October 26, 1982 the
measure of recovery. Resolution of the Sanguniang Bayan appropriating the
salary of the petitioner. While "to veto or not to veto
involves the exercise of discretion" as contended by
Pilar v. Sangguniang Bayan ng Dansol, respondents, respondent Mayor, however,
Pangasinan exceeded his authority in an arbitrary manner
when he vetoed the resolution since there exists
FACTS: Petitioner Expedito Pilar was elected vice mayor sufficient municipal funds from which the salary
of Dasol, Pangasinan. The Sanguniang Bayan adopted of the petitioner could be paid. Respondent Mayor’s
Resolution No. 1 which increased the salaries of the refusal, neglect or omission in complying with the
mayor and municipal treasurer to P18,636.00 and directives of the Provincial Budget Officer and the
P16,044.00 per annum respectively. The said resolution Director of the Bureau of Local Government that the
did not provide for an increase in salary of the vice salary of the petitioner be provided for and paid the
mayor despite the fact that such position is entitled to prescribed salary rate, is reckless and oppressive, hence,
an annual salary of P16,044.00. by way of example or correction for the public good,
respondent Mayor is liable personally to the petitioner It has been held that upon the issuance of an
for exemplary or corrective damages. appointment and the appointee’s assumption of
the position in the civil service, "he acquires a
legal right which cannot be taken away either by
Rama v. CA revocation of the appointment or by removal
except for cause and with previous notice and
FACTS: Petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter to hearing" Moreover, it is well-settled that the person
the Civil Service Commission seeking the recall of the assuming a position in the civil service under a
appointments of 14 municipal employees on the completed appointment acquires a legal, not just an
allegation that the appointments of the said employees equitable, right to the position. This right is protected
were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma. not only by statute, but by the Constitution as well,
Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section which right cannot be taken away by either revocation
15 of the 1987 Constitution. of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid
cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice
While the matter was pending before the CSC, and hearing.
employees: Elsa Marino, Morell Ayala, and Flordeliza
Oriazel, filed with the CSC a claim for payment of their
salaries alleging that petitioner withheld the payment of LAGANAPAN v. ASEDILLO
their salaries and benefits. aw 1ibrary
FACTS: The petitioner Solano Laganapan was appointed
The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the chief of police of the municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna
appointments of the 14 employees, for lack of merit. It on 4 January 1960, with a compensation of P660.00 per
upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground annum, by the respondent Mayor Asedillo. On 1 July
that they had already been approved by the Head of the 1960, his salary was increased, and he was extended an
CSC Field Office in Lucena City. appointment which was approved as provisional under
Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260 by the
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of the 14 employees Commissioner of Civil Service.
were valid.
On 1 April 1962, the petitioner was given another
HELD: Yes. The appointment of the 14 employees were increase in salary and a corresponding appointment was
valid. The records reveal that when the petitioner made which the Commissioner of Civil Service "approved
brought the matter of recalling the appointments of the under Sec. 24(c) of Republic Act No. 2260, to continue
fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the until replaced by an eligible but not beyond thirty (30)
only reason he cited to justify his action was that these days from receipt of certification of eligibles by the
were "midnight appointments" that are forbidden under Provincial Treasurer of Laguna."
Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the
CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition However, on 16 February 1967, the petitioner was
applies only to presidential appointments. In summarily dismissed from his position by respondent
truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, on the ground that his
local elective officials from making appointments appointment was provisional and that he has no civil
during the last days of his or her tenure. Petitioner service eligibility. The petitioner was told to surrender
certainly did not raise the issue of fraud on the part of his firearm and other office equipment to the Municipal
the outgoing mayor who made the appointments. Treasurer of Kalayaan, Laguna who was also informed of
Neither did he allege that the said appointments were petitioner's dismissal on the same day.
tainted by irregularities or anomalies that breached laws
and regulations governing appointments. His solitary Subsequently, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan, Laguna
reason for recalling these appointments was that they abolished the appropriation for the salary of the chief of
were, to his personal belief, "midnight appointments" police of Kalayaan, Laguna.
which the outgoing mayor had no authority to make.
Hence, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus, quo
warranto with preliminary mandatory injunction against
respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo, the Municipality of instituted against Mayor Asedillo, not personally,
Kalayaan, Laguna, and Epifanio Ragotero, seeking his but in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of
reinstatement to the position of chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, and he appeared and defended
Kalayaan, Laguna, with back salaries and damages. the action in such capacity.

In answer, respondents Mayor Elpidio Asedillo and Furthermore, it is of record that, after the
Epifanio Ragotero claimed that the appointment of the summary dismissal of the petitioner by
petitioner, being merely temporary in character, and the respondent Mayor Asedillo on 16 February 1967,
petitioner having no civil service eligibility, his services the Municipal Council of Kalayaan instead of
could be terminated with or without cause, at the opposing or at least protesting the petitioner's
pleasure of the appointing power; and that the summary dismissal from his position, even
petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. abolished the appropriation for the salary of the
Chief of Police of Kalayaan, Laguna, We consider
The respondent Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna, for its this act of the Municipal Council of Kalayaan as an
part, alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action approval or confirmation of the act of respondent
against it; and that, if the acts of the respondent mayor Mayor in summarily dismissing the petitioner. as
are patently irregular, the said mayor should be held to make said municipality equally liable, as held
solely liable therefor. by the trial court, as respondent Mayor for the
reinstatement of petitioner and for the payment
After due hearing, judgement was rendered in favor of of his back salaries.
petitioner.
A number of cases decided by the Court where the
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents should be held municipal mayor alone was held liable for back salaries
liable for the illegal dismissal of petitioner of, or damages to dismissed municipal employees, to the
exclusion of the municipality, are NOT applicable in this
HELD: Yes. instance.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that, in
terminating the services of the appellee, the appellant In Salcedo vs. Court of Appeals, for instance, the
Mayor Elpidio Asedillo acted summarily without any municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of
semblance of compliance or even an attempt to comply the Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because
with the elementary rules of due process. No charges the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor
were filed; nor was a hearing conducted in order to give refused to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the
the appellee an opportunity to defend himself, despite Commissioner of Civil Service to reinstate.
the provisions of Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 4864,
otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966, which took In Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, the municipal mayor was held
effect on 8 September 1966, that "Members of the local personally liable for dismissing a police corporal who
police agency shall not be suspended or removed except possessed the necessary civil service eligibility, the
upon written complaint filed under oath with the Board dismissal being done without justifiable cause and
of Investigators herein provided for misconduct or without any administrative investigation.
incompetence, dishonesty, disloyalty to the Government,
serious irregularities in the performance of their duties, In Rama vs. Court of Appeals, the governor, vice-
and violation of law." Following the rule, there was no governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
need for exhaustion of administrative remedies before provincial auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial
appellee could come to court for the protection of his engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in
rights. their individual and personal capacity damages to some
200 employees of the province of Cebu who were eased
We, likewise, find no merit in the contention of out from their positions because of their party
the respondent Municipality of Kalayaan, Laguna affiliations.
that Mayor Elpidio Asedillo alone should be held MADERAZO v. PEOPLE
liable for the back salaries of the petitioner,
because the records show that the action was
FACTS: Medaria Verutiao testified that she had been the petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant
lessee of a stall in the Biliran public market. She was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when
averred that Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners.
provides that, to facilitate the development of the public
market, in the absence of adequate government finance, Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners
construction by private parties of buildings and other evicted Verutiao from her stall and prevented her from
structures for commercial purposes may be allowed and selling therein, hence, losing income from the business.
the expenses thereof shall be reimbursed to the builder Verutiao was deprived of her possession of the stall from
by applying 50% to monthly rentals when January 21, 1997. Petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo
occupied for business. and Sangguniang Bayan member Victor Maderazo, Jr.,
She spent P24,267.00 for the construction of the had no right, without judicial intervention, to oust
market stall. She was not, however, reimbursed by Verutiao from the stall, and had her merchandise
the Municipality of her expenses. The Municipality transported to the police station, thereby preventing her
partially paid her P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the from doing business therein and selling her
construction of the market stall. However, considering merchandize. Petitioner Mayor Maderazo had no right to
that she had not been fully reimbursed for her take the law into his own hands and deprive Verutiao of
expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not her possession of the stall and her means of livelihood.
pay her rent.
Petitioner had to file an action for unlawful detainer
She went to the Municipal Treasurer to request for the against Verutiao to recover possession of her stall and
reimbursement. She was told by then Treasurer Lee and cause her eviction from said premises. Verutiao insisted
his successor, Lorenzo Dadizon, that the Municipality on her right to remain as lessee of her stall and to do
had no money and she had to wait for another budget business thereat. Such action is designed to prevent
hearing. Thus, Verutiao closed her stall and breaches of the peace and criminal disorder and prevent
proceeded to Mindanao where she spent the those believing themselves entitled to the possession of
Christmas holidays. She and her husband received a the property resort to force to gain possession rather
letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo, directing her than to secure appropriate action in the court to assert
to vacate the stall within 24hrs because of her failure to their claims. It was incumbent upon petitioner Mayor to
pay the rentals for the stall. institute an action for the eviction of Verutiao. He cannot
be permitted to invade the property and oust the lessee
Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises. who is entitled to the actual possession and to place the
The locks were opened on the authority of the Mayor on burden upon the latter of instituting an action to try the
January 27, 1997. The contents of the market stall were property right. An action for forcible entry and unlawful
inventoried by Victor Maderazo and taken to the police detainer are summary proceedings established for the
station for safekeeping. purpose of providing expeditious means of protecting
actual possession, which is presumed to be lawful until
An information was filed before the Sandiganbayan the contrary is proven.
charging the defendants with grave coercion. Ordinances.
Sandiganbayan rendered judgment convicting the
accused of the crime of unjust vexation. Undeniably, petitioner Mayor is tasked to enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
ISSUE: Whether or not the People adduced proof Municipality and to implement all approved programs,
beyond reasonable doubt of petitioners’ guilt for unjust projects, services and activities of the Municipality and
vexation to ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the
Municipality are collected. He is obliged to institute
HELD: Yes. Although Verutiao was not at her stall when or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial
it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from proceedings for the recovery of funds and
the stall and brought to the police station, the crime of property. However, in the performance of his
unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the duties, petitioner Mayor should act within the
crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party confines of the law and not resort to the
be present when the crime was committed by said commission of a felony. A public officer is
proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the was not a mere passenger, but instead one who had
enforcement of laws and ordinances. He must direct control and supervision over Lozano during the
exercise his power and perform his duties in time of the accident.
accordance with law, with strict observance of
the rights of the people, and never whimsically, It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a
arbitrarily and despotically. driver by the municipality. That he was
subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during
the time of the accident is of no moment. The
JAYME v. APOSTOL Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s
employer notwithstanding Lozano’s assignment
FACTS: On February 5, 1989, Mayor Fernando Q. to Mayor Miguel. Even assuming arguendo that
Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or
Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee directions to Lozano, he still cannot be held liable.
of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme
registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was Court ruled that mere giving of directions to the
then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano driver does not establish that the passenger has
borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring control over the vehicle. Neither does it render
Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch one the employer of the driver.
his Manila flight.
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a vehicle’s registered owner. There existed no causal
minor, who was then crossing the National Highway in relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used
South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent that will make him accountable for Marvin’s death.
Marvin some 50 meters away from the point of impact, a Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the
clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high accident.
speed at the time of the accident. Marvin sustained
severe head injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin (2) The CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of
expired six (6) days after the accident. Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at
the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano
Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he
the parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for damages was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the
with the RTC against respondents. RTC ruled in favor of time of the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on
sps Jayme stating that: “the defendant Municipality of several occasions, held that an employer-employee
Koronadal cannot be held liable for the damages relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned
incurred by other defendant being an agency of the by the employer to another person or entity because
State performing a governmental functions.” However, control over the employee subsists. In the case under
defendants Lozano, Apostol, and Mayor Miguel were review, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be
ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff. Lozano’s employer notwithstanding Lozano’s assignment
to Mayor Miguel.
CA reversed and stated that Mayor Miguel should not be
liable as he was not the employer of Lozano. Unfortunately, the municipality may not be sued
because it is an agency of the State engaged in
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a municipal mayor can be governmental functions and, hence, immune from
held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San
assigned to him; and Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held that
(2) Whether or not an LGU may be held liable for the municipal corporations are suable because their charters
tortious act of a govt employee grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
HELD: committed by them in the discharge of governmental
(1) Spouses Jayme contend, inter alia, that vicarious functions and can only be held answerable only if it can
liability attaches to Mayor Miguel. According to them, he be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity.
In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following
gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant resolution stating that the authority to detach plate/tow
was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor
was committed or that the case comes under the vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant in Metro Manila by the MMA appears to be in conflict
cannot recover. with the decision of the Court in the case
abovementioned where it was held that the license
Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except
driver and his direct employer. Settled is the rule that only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43.
the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally
liable with the driver for damages incurred by MMA defended the said ordinance on the ground that it
passengers and third persons as a consequence of was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it
injuries or death sustained in the operation of said by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting
vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility
vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the among others of:
operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third (1) Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic
persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible services requiring coordination or consolidation for the
for the consequences incident to its operation. Authority; and
(2) Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances
of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of
SOLICITOR GENERAL v. MMA basic services requiring coordination, and exercise of its
rulemaking powers.
FACTS: On July 13, 1990, the Court held that the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for MMA argued that there was no conflict between the
traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could decision and the ordinance because the latter was
be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It
1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation
down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law
obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was
that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic enacted. MMA sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of
violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor 1991, under the specific authority conferred upon it by
was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the EO 392, and while Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is
Commission. No motion for reconsideration of that justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause
decision was submitted. embodied in the Local Government Code.

In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance
complained to the Court that when he was stopped for was null and void because it represented an invalid
an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the
confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD
Quezon City. Likewise, several letter-complaints were 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits,
received regarding removal of front license plate by E. the removal of license plates and the confiscation of
Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Operations Center and the confiscation of his driver's Manila.
license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the Metropolitan Police
Command-Western Police District. On May 1990, the ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 11, Series of
Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, 1991 is valid
Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license
plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ HELD: No. The Court holds that there is a valid
abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." measures, it appearing that the requisites of such
delegation are present. These requisites are. (1) the
completeness of the statute making the delegation; and local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree,
(2) the presence of a sufficient standard. Under the first which has the force and effect of a statute.
requirement, the statute must leave the legislature
complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree
delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and
implement it. As a second requirement, the enforcement now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such
may be effected only in accordance with a sufficient sanctions. In fact, the above provisions prohibit the
standard, the function of which is to map out the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The
boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise
the delegation from running riot." The measures in discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and
question are enactments of local governments acting under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is,
only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license
the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed
will of their principal. by it to be imposed by the Commission.

To test the validity of such acts in the specific Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in
case now before us, we apply the particular case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be
requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the
accepted principles governing municipal Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political
corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including
ordinance, to be valid: (1) must not contravene the Municipality of Mandaluyong. It is for Congress to
the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect
regulate trade; (5) must not be unreasonable; to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without
and (6) must be general and consistent with such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues
public policy. prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor
vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in
that the measures under consideration do not Metropolitan Manila.
pass the first criterion because they do not
conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD
1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal ROBLE ARRASTRE, INC. v. VILLAFLOR
of license plates or the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations committed in FACTS: Roble Arrastre, Inc. is a cargo handling service
Metropolitan Manila. operator, authorized by the Philippine Ports Authority.
For the years 1992 and 1993, petitioner was granted
The requirement that the municipal enactment Business Permits No. 349 and No. 276, respectively, by
must not violate existing law explains itself. Local respondent Altagracia Villaflor as Municipal Mayor of
political subdivisions are able to legislate only by Hilongos, Leyte. PPA issued a 90-day hold-over authority
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power to petitioner. Stated therein was the proviso that
from the national legislature (except only that notwithstanding the 90-day period aforementioned, the
the power to create their own sources of revenue authority shall be deemed ipso facto revoked if an earlier
and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution permit/contract for cargo handling services is granted or
itself). They are mere agents vested with what is sooner withdrawn or cancelled for cause pursuant to
called the power of subordinate legislation. As PPA Administrative Order No. 10-81.
delegates of the Congress, the local government
unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times On 27 January 1994, while the 90-day hold-over
the will of their principal. In the case before us, authority was in effect, petitioner filed with respondent
the enactments in question, which are merely mayor an application for the renewal of its Business
Permit No. 276. However, the same was denied.
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioner filed with the RTC, a petitioner with all documentary requirements and
Petition for Mandamus with Preliminary Mandatory payment of all the fees.
Injunction.
While we agree with petitioner that there is no
Petitioner stated that the source of the power of the ordinance conferring upon the respondent mayor the
municipal mayor to issue licenses is Section 444 Local power to refuse the issuance of the permit for the
Government Code of 1991, which is merely for the operation of an arrastre service, we are, as yet,
purpose of revenue generation and not regulation, unprepared to declare that the power of the municipal
hence, the municipal mayor has no discretion to refuse mayor as enunciated under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) is
the issuance of a business license following the ministerial. What can be deduced from the aforesaid
applicant’s payment or satisfaction of the proper license section is that the limits in the exercise of the power of a
fees. Respondent mayor averred, inter alia, that the municipal mayor to issue licenses, and permits and
remedy of mandamus does not lie as the issuance of the suspend or revoke the same can be contained in a law
permit sought is not a ministerial function, but one that or an ordinance. Otherwise stated, a law or an ordinance
requires the exercise of sound judgment and discretion. can provide the conditions upon which the power of the
municipal mayor under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) can be
The RTC opined that the PPA has the sole authority to exercised. Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local
grant permits in the operation of cargo handling services Government Code of 1991 takes its cue from Section 16
in all Philippine ports, whether public or private. CA thereof, which is largely an exercise of delegated police
reversed, stating that the pursuit of the duty of power.
respondent mayor under Section 444 of the Local
Government Code necessarily entails the exercise of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of
official discretion. Hence, it held that mandamus will not 1991, whereby the power of the respondent mayor to
lie to control or review the exercise of her discretion. issue license and permits is circumscribed, is a
manifestation of the delegated police power of a
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA validly interpreted municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof
Section 444, (3) (iv), R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the cannot be deemed ministerial.
Local Government Code of 1991 (as a grant of police
power and full discretion to the respondent mayor to It may be true, as argued by petitioner, that Resolution
refuse the issuance of the permit despite due No. 93-27, which was enacted by the Sangguniang
compliance of all documentary requirements and full Bayan of Hilongos, is not an ordinance but merely a
payment of the required permit fees by the petitioner) resolution. A municipal ordinance is different from
a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
HELD: Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, resolution is merely a declaration of the
encapsulates the delegated police power to local sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a
governments. Local government units exercise police specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general
power through their respective legislative bodies. and permanent character, but a resolution is
Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are
unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to enacted differently—a third reading is necessary
issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
same for any violation of the conditions upon which said decided otherwise by a majority of all the
licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or Sanggunian members.
ordinance. On this matter, petitioner maintains that
under the Local Government Code of 1991, a suspension However, the fact that Resolution No. 93-27 is a “mere”
or revocation of permits shall be premised on a finding resolution can do nil to support petitioner’s cause. Thus:
of violation of the conditions upon which the permits “Discretion,” when applied to public functionaries, means
were issued pursuant to a law or ordinance, which is a power or right conferred upon them by law or acting
independent of the Code itself. Petitioner asseverates officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by
further that there was no law or ordinance that the judgment or conscience of others. A purely
conferred upon the respondent mayor the power to ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a discretional
refuse the issuance of the permit despite compliance of act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a
given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in actually present when the irrevocable letter of
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without resignation of Board Member Sotto was noted, and the
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the motions to declare the entire province of Compostela
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law Valley under a state of calamity and to authorize the
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the Governor to enter into the Contract with the Allado
right to decide how or when the duty shall be Company were approved
performed, such duty is discretionary and not • Petitioner furthermore challenged the validity of
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the the special session of February 8, 2001 for lack of
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of quorum, there being only seven members of the
official discretion or judgment. Sanggunian in attendance, and for lack of written notice
sent to all members at least 24 hours before the holding
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or of the special session in accordance with Section 52 (d)
tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, 17 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
in a prescribed manner and without regard to the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or ISSUE: WON the resolutions issued by the Sanggunian
impropriety of the act done. A discretionary act, on the during its sessions held on February 8 and 26, 2001
other hand, is a faculty conferred upon a court or official were valid
by which he may decide the question either way and still
be right. RULING: NO.
• The determination of the existence of a quorum
depends on the total number of members of the
MEANING OF QUORUM Sanggunian without regard to the filing of a leave of
absence by Board member Sotto.
ZAMORA VS. CABALLERO • “Quorum” is defined as that number of
members of a body which, when legally
FACTS: assembled in their proper places, will enable the
• Petitioner Manuel Zamora, a member of the body to transact its proper business or that
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley (the number which makes a lawful body and gives it
Sanggunian), seeks to invalidate all acts executed and power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any
resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its sessions valid act.
held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum. • “Majority,” when required to constitute a
• On February 26, 2001, the Sanggunian held its quorum, means the number greater than half or
4th regular session during which it issued Resolution No. more than half of any total.
05 declaring the entire province of Compostela Valley • In fine, the entire membership must be taken
under a state of calamity and Resolution No. 07 into account in computing the quorum of the
authorizing the Governor to, on behalf of the province, sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the constitution
enter into a construction contract (Contract) with Allado merely states that “majority of each House shall
Construction Company, Inc. (the Allado Company) for constitute a quorum,” Section 53 of the LGC is more
the completion of Phase II of the construction of the exacting as it requires that the “majority of all members
capitol building. During the same session, the of the sanggunian. . . elected and qualified” shall
Sanggunian accepted the letter of irrevocable constitute a quorum.
resignation submitted by Board Member Gemma • The Journal of the Sanggunian is far from clear
Theresa M. Sotto. and explicit as to the presence of a quorum when the
• Petitioner thus filed a petition 8 before the questioned acts were taken. It does not indicate how
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nabunturan, Compostela many members were actually present when the body
Valley against the Governor, et al., challenging the voted on the motions leading to the adoption of
validity of the acts of the Sanggunian on February 26, Resolution Nos. 05 and 07. While the Journal and the
2001, alleging that while the Journal and Resolutions Resolutions show that 13 members attended the
indicated the presence of 13 members, the Sanggunian session, the Journal shows that only six members were
nonetheless “conducted official business without a called by the presiding officer to vote on the motions.
quorum” as only seven of its fourteen members were
• The motion to grant the Governor authority to • Respondent moved to quash on the following
enter into the construction contract is also deemed not grounds:
approved in accordance with the law even if it received o The power to investigate, and to order the
seven affirmative votes, which is already the majority of improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to
thirteen, due to the defect in the seventh vote. conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the
• For a resolution authorizing the governor to National Electrification Administration;
enter into a construction contract to be valid, the vote of o and Neither the Charter of the City of
the majority of all members of the Sanggunian, and not Dumaguete nor the Local Government Code grants (the
only of those present during the session, is required in Sangguniang Panlungsod) any specific power to
accordance with Section 468 of the LGC in relation to investigate alleged inefficient power lines of NORECO II.
Article 107 of its Implementing Rules
• Applying Section 468 of the LGC and Article 107 ISSUE: WON The Local Government may exercise the
of its Implementing Rules, there being fourteen power of contempt
members in the Sanggunian, the approval of eight
members is required to authorize the governor to enter RULING: NO
into the Contract with the Allado Company since it • The exercise by the legislature of the contempt
involves the creation of liability for payment on the part power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of
of the local government unit the government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority
and punishes contempts thereof.
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD HAS NO • The contempt power of the legislature is,
CONTEMPT POWERS therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies
cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, reasons that the national legislature does. The
INC. VS. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF power attaches not to the discharge of legislative
DUMAGUETE functions per se but to the character of the
legislature as one of the three independent and
FACTS: coordinate branches of government. The same
• Assailed is the validity of a subpoena dated thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies
October 25, 1985 sent by the respondent Committee to which are creations of law.
the petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac, • To begin with, there is no express provision
Chairman of the Board of Directors and the General either in the 1973 Constitution or in the Local
Manager, respectively, of petitioner Negros Oriental II Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337)
Electric Cooperative (NORECO II), requiring their granting local legislative bodies, the power to
attendance and testimony at the Committee’s subpoena witnesses and the power to punish
investigation on October 29, 1985 nonmembers for contempt. Absent a constitutional
• Similarly under fire is the Order issued by the or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the
same Committee on the latter date, directing said only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena
petitioners to show cause why they should not be and for the punishment of non-members for
punished for legislative contempt due to their failure to contumacious behaviour would be for said power to be
appear at said investigation deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated
• The investigation to be conducted by legislative power. To allow local legislative bodies or
respondent Committee was “in connection with pending administrative agencies to exercise these powers without
legislation related to the operations of public utilities” express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine
(Id.) in the City of Dumaguete where petitioner NORECO of separation of powers.
II, an electric cooperative, had its principal place of • There being no provision in the Local
business. Government Code explicitly granting local legislative
• Specifically, the inquiry was to focus on the bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the
alleged installation and use by the petitioner NORECO II power to punish for contempt, the Sanggunian
of inefficient power lines in that city. Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish
the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.
• The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. DMC appealed
may, therefore, enact ordinances to regulate the from said decision.
installation and maintenance of electric power lines, e.g. • Ruling of the CA
prohibit the use of inefficient power lines, in order to • Granting respondent’s appeal, the Court of
protect the city residents from the hazards these may Appeals ruled that the court of origin had jurisdiction
pose. In aid of this ordinance making power, said body over the Complaint for Forcible Entry.
or any of its committees may conduct investigations - The CA gave greater weight to the testimony of
similar to, but not the same as, the legislative respondent’s real property manager, Bienamer Garcia,
investigations conducted by the national legislature. As that Habagat Grill had been built on December 1, 1993.
already discussed, the difference lies in the lack of — Testimony was credible, because he (Garcia)
subpoena power and of the power to punish for had personal knowledge of the facts he had testified to
contempt on the part of the local legislative bodies. -- it was his task to know such matters.
They may only invite resource persons who are
willing to supply information which may be - The CA faulted petitioner for not presenting any
relevant to the proposed ordinance. other documentary evidence to establish the date of
• Clearly, then, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Habagat Grill’s construction.
Dumaguete cannot look into any suspected failure of — Court of origin had improperly adjudged the
NORECO II to comply with the standards of electric subject property as part of the public domain.
service prescribed by law and in its franchise. The — Lower court could take cognizance of a
proper recourse is to file a complaint with the NEA Presidential Proclamation, but not of the situational
(National Electrification Administration) against NORECO relation between the property covered by the
II if there be sufficient basis therefor. Proclamation and the land in question.
— CA further criticized petitioner for not presenting
any evidence to show the basis of the latter’s alleged
OTHER ILLUSTRATIVE CASES: authority to build Habagat Grill on the property
• Hence, this petition.
HABAGAT GRILL VS. DMC-URBAN PROPERTY
DEVELOPER, INC. ISSUE: Whether the MTC can take judicial notice

FACTS: RULING: NO.

• Consunji Inc. acquired and became the owner of • Petition has no merit; CA was correct.
a residential lot situated in Matina Davao City. On June • “Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts
13,1981, David Consunji Inc transferred said lot to its which judges may properly take and act on without
sister company, the DMC Urban Property Developers, proof because they already know them.” Its object is to
Inc(DMC) in whose favor a TCT was issued. save time, labor and expense in securing and
• Alleging that Louie Biraogo forcibly entered said introducing evidence on matters that are not ordinarily
lot and built the Habagat Grill in December 1993, DMC capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and
filed[1994] a Complaint for Forcible Entry against the tenor of which can safely be assumed from the
Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo. tribunal’s general knowledge or from a slight search on
• The Complaint alleged that as owner, DMC its part. Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial
possessed the lot in question from June 11, 1981 until notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the
December 1,1993, that on that day, December 1, 1993, municipality in which they sit. Such notice, however, is
Louie Biraogo, by means of strategy and stealth, limited to what the law is and what it states
unlawfully entered into the lot in question and • The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved
constructed the Habagat Grill thereon, thus illegally by merely taking judicial notice of Presidential
depriving DMC of the possession of said lot since then Proclamation No. 20; such location is precisely at the
up to the present, that the reasonable rental value of core of the dispute in this case. Moreover, considering
said lot is P10,000 a month. Louie Biraogo in his Answer respondent’s allegation that the supposed lot covered by
denied illegally entering the lot in question. the Ordinance has been lost due to inundation by the
• After necessary proceedings, the Municipal Trial sea, we cannot fathom how the trial court could have
Court in Cities dismissed the case on the ground of lack
known of the actual location of the metes and bounds of
the subject lot. RULING: NO
• Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial The resolution is an enactment of an LGU acting only as
notice under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, agent of the national legislature.
because the exact boundaries of the lot covered by that There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs
law are not a matter of public knowledge capable of to grant franchises to operate CATV system.
unquestionable demonstration. Neither may these be Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had
known to judges because of their judicial functions. been withdrawn when President Marcos issued P.D. No.
Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings of 1512 “terminating all franchises, permits or certificates
the trial courts, because they had erred in taking judicial for the operation of CATV system previously granted by
notice of the exact metes and bounds of the property. local governments.”
The appellate court aptly relied on the Report submitted Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, “only
by the survey team that had been constituted by the persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or
trial court, precisely for the purpose of determining the cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or
location of Habagat Grill in relation to respondent’s lot. Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate
and maintain a cable television system or render cable
television service within a service area.”
BATANGAS CATV, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or
legislative authorization, municipalities have no
FACTS: power to grant franchises. Consequently, the
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod protection of the constitutional provision as to
enacted Resolution No. 210 7 granting petitioner a impairment of the obligation of a contract does
permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system not extend to privileges, franchises and grants
in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or
that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the ultra vires.
maximum rates specified therein, “provided, however, Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe
that any increase of rates shall be subject to the regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause.
approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.” This is primarily because the CATV system commits the
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public
subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical
a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter 9 realities of constructing CATV system—the use of public
threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and
approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, the parceling of large regions—allow an LGU a certain
pursuant to Resolution No. 210. degree of regulation over CATV operators. This is the
Respondent argues that Resolution was enacted same regulation that it exercises over all private
pursuant to Sec. 177 (c) and (d) of BP 337 (LGC of enterprises within its territory.
1983) which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses and But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the
is in the nature of a contract between Petitioner and general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No.
Respondent 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas the well- recognized limits of its power. The flaws in
City, a petition for injunction. It alleged that respondent Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of
Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation
the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because policy over the CATV industry.
under Executive Order No. 205, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole
authority to regulate the CATV operation in the
Philippines.

ISSUE: WON a local government unit (LGU) can

regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators
within its territorial jurisdiction