TALAGA

.R. No.
196804 October 9, 2012
MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RODERICK A. ALCALA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197015
PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BARBARA RUBY TALAGA and RODERICK A.
ALCALA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In focus in these consolidated special civil actions are the disqualification of a substitute who was
proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election; and the ascertainment of who should assume the
office following the substitute’s disqualification.
The consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul and set aside the En Banc Resolution issued
on May 20, 2011 in SPC No. 10-024 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the Second
Division;
2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of Roderick A. Alcala;
3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of respondent Barbara C. Talaga as mayor of

Lucena City and CANCELLING the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation issued therefor;
4. Ordering respondent Barbara Ruby Talaga to cease and desist from discharging the
functions of the Office of the Mayor;
5. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Lucena City, the
proclaimed Vice-Mayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor as provided under Section 44 of
the Local Government Code;
6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Resolution to
the Office of the President of the Philippines, the Department of Interior and Local
Government, the Department of Finance and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panglunsod
of Lucena City.
Let the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Regional Election Director of Region
IV of COMELEC implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED. 1
Antecedents
On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo
(Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena
City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections. 2
Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-Kampi-CMD, declared in his CoC that he was eligible for
3
the office he was seeking to be elected to.
Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated
as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon
Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of
Lucena, which was docketed as SPA 09-029 (DC). He alleged
4
therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive
terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010
national and local elections.
The pertinent portions of Castillo’s petition follow:
1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino, married, and a resident of Barangay Mayao Crossing,
Lucena City but may be served with summons and other processes of this Commission at
the address of his counsel at 624 Aurora Blvd., Lucena City 4301;
2. Respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is likewise of legal age, married, and a resident of
Barangay Ibabang Iyam, Lucena City and with postal address at the Office of the City Mayor,
City Hall, Lucena City, where he may be served with summons and other processes of this
Commission;
3. Petitioner, the incumbent city vice-mayor of Lucena having been elected during the 2007
local elections, is running for city mayor of Lucena under the Liberal party this coming 10
May 2010 local elections and has filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor of Lucena;
4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and 2007 local
elections based on the records of the Commission on Elections of Lucena City and had fully
served the aforesaid three (3) terms without any voluntary and involuntary interruption;
5. Except the preventive suspension imposed upon him from 13 October 2005 to 14
November 2005 and from 4 September 2009 to 30 October 2009 pursuant to
Sandiganbayan 4th Division Resolution in Criminal Case No. 27738 dated 3 October 2005,
the public service as city mayor of the respondent is continuous and uninterrupted under the
existing laws and jurisprudence;
6. There is no law nor jurisprudence to justify the filing of the certificate of candidacy of the
respondent, hence, such act is outrightly unconstitutional, illegal, and highly immoral;
7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected for and had fully served three (3)
consecutive terms as a city mayor of Lucena, he still filed his Certificate of Candidacy for City
Mayor of Lucena for this coming 10 May 2010 national and local elections;
8. Under the Constitution and existing Election Laws, New Local Government Code of the
Philippines, and jurisprudence the respondent is no longer entitled and is already disqualified
to be a city mayor for the fourth consecutive term;
9. The filing of the respondent for the position of city mayor is highly improper, unlawful and
is potentially injurious and prejudicial to taxpayers of the City of Lucena; and
10. It is most respectfully prayed by the petitioner that the respondent be declared
disqualified and no longer entitled to run in public office as city mayor of Lucena City based
on the existing law and jurisprudence. 5
The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed
by the respondent be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a
disqualified candidate under the existing Election Laws and by the provisions of the New Local
Government Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
6
Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during
his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to
the prevailing jurisprudence to the effect that an involuntary separation from office amounted to an
7
interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule.
In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity,
8
was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, on December 30,
2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking into account the
intervening ruling in Aldovino. Relevant portions of his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve are
quoted herein, viz:
4. When respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City, the
rule that ‘where the separation from office is caused by reasons beyond the control of the officer –
i.e. involuntary – the service of term is deemed interrupted’ has not yet been overturned by the new
ruling of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, the prevailing rule then of the Honorable
Commission in [sic] respect of the three (3)-term limitation was its decision in the case of Aldovino,
et al. vs. Asilo where it stated:
"Thus, even if respondent was elected during the 2004 elections, which was supposedly his third
and final term as city councilor, the same cannot be treated as a complete service or full term in
office since the same was interrupted when he was suspended by the Sandiganbayan Fourth
Division. And the respondent actually heeded the suspension order since he did not receive his
salary during the period October 16-31 and November 1-15 by reason of his actual suspension from
office. And this was further bolstered by the fact that the DILG issued a
Memorandum directing him, among others, to reassume his position." (Emphasis supplied.)
5. Clearly, there was no misrepresentation on the part of respondent as would constitute a ground
for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of respondent’s certificate of candidacy at the
time he filed the same. Petitioner’s ground for the denial of due course to and/or the cancellation of
respondent’s certificate of candidacy thus has no basis, in fact and in law, as there is no ground to
warrant such relief under the Omnibus Election Code and/or its implementing laws.
6. Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the Supreme Court in respect of the issue on the three
(3)-term limitation, respondent acknowledges that he is now DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City having served three (3) (albeit interrupted) terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior
to the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the 2010 elections.
7. In view of the foregoing premises and new jurisprudence on the matter, respondent respectfully
submits the present case for decision declaring him as DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City. 9
Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in the
May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his CoC.
Acting on Ramon’s Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution on April 19, 2010, disposing as follows:
10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, Ramon
Y. Talaga, Jr. is hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to run for Mayor of Lucena City for the 10 May
2010 National and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.
Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division. Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte
11
Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for Reconsideration. At 4:30 p.m. on the same
12
date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching
thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the
party that had nominated Ramon. 13
On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramon’s Ex parte Manifestation of Withdrawal,
declared the COMELEC First Division’s Resolution dated April 19, 2010 final and executory. 14
On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes
cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in
Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes. 15
Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the suspension of
Barbara Ruby’s proclamation. 16
It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation of its Law
Department, gave due course to Barbara Ruby’s CoC and CONA through Resolution No. 8917,
17
thereby including her in the certified list of candidates. Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara
18
Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena City. 19
On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the
COMELEC, docketed as SPC 10-024. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon
20
because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be
considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three days
after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.
In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation, Barbara Ruby maintained the
21
validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En Banc did not deny due course to or
cancel Ramon’s COC, despite a declaration of his disqualification, because there was no finding that
he had committed misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his
COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006 applied,
22
based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her favor.
On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to
intervene, positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s substitution
23
had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.
On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and Alcala’s
petition-in-intervention, holding:
24
In the present case, Castillo was notified of Resolution 8917 on May 13, 2010 as it was the basis for
the proclamation of Ruby on that date. He, however, failed to file any action within the prescribed
period either in the Commission or the Supreme Court assailing the said resolution. Thus, the said
resolution has become final and executory. It cannot anymore be altered or reversed.
xxxx
x x x. A close perusal of the petition filed by Castillo in SPA 10-029 (Dc) shows that it was actually
for the disqualification of Ramon for having served three consecutive terms, which is a ground for his
disqualification under the Constitution in relation to Section 4(b)3 of Resolution 8696. There was no
mention therein that Ramon has committed material representation that would be a ground for the
cancellation or denial of due course to the CoC of Ramon under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The First Division, in fact, treated the petition as one for disqualification as gleaned from the
body of the resolution and its dispositive portion quoted above. This treatment of the First Division of
the petition as one for disqualification only is affirmed by the fact that its members signed Resolution
No. 8917 where it was clearly stated that the First Division only disqualified Ramon.
Having been disqualified only, the doctrine laid down in Miranda v. Abaya is not applicable. Ramon
was rightly substituted by Ruby. As such, the votes for Ramon cannot be considered as stray votes
but should be counted in favor of Ruby since the substituted and the substitute carry the same
surname – Talaga, as provided in Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006.
xxxx
Moreover, there is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code or any election laws for that matter
which requires that the substitution and the Certificate of Candidacy of the substitute should be
approved and given due course first by the Commission or the Law Department before it can be
considered as effective. All that Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code as implemented by
Section 13 of Resolution No. 8678 requires is that it should be filed with the proper office. The
respondent is correct when she argued that in fact even the BEI can receive a CoC of a substitute
candidate in case the cause for the substitution happened between the day before the election and
mid-day of election day. Thus, even if the approval of the substitution was made after the election,
the substitution became effective on the date of the filing of the CoC with the Certificate of
Nomination and Acceptance.
There being no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon as candidate for mayor of Lucena
City, the counting of the votes of Ramon in favor of Ruby is proper. The proclamation, thus, of Ruby
as mayor elect of Lucena City is in order. Hence, we find no cogent reason to annul the proclamation
of respondent Barbara Ruby C. Talaga as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Lucena after the
elections conducted on May 10, 2010. 25
Acting on Castillo and Alcala’s respective motions for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc
issued the assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2011 reversing the COMELEC Second Division’s
ruling.
26
Pointing out that: (a) Resolution No. 8917 did not attain finality for being issued without a hearing as
a mere incident of the COMELEC’s ministerial duty to receive the COCs of substitute candidates; (b)
Resolution No. 8917 was based on the wrong facts; and (c) Ramon’s disqualification was resolved
with finality only on May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc concluded that Barbara Ruby could not
have properly substituted Ramon but had simply become an additional candidate who had filed her
COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor Alcala should succeed to the position pursuant to Section
44 of the Local Government Code (LGC). 27
Issues
The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position
of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.
Ancillary to the core issue is the determination of who among the contending parties should assume
the contested elective position.
Ruling
The petitions lack merit.
1.
Existence of a valid CoC is a condition

sine qua non for a valid substitution
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to
be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the
Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the contents of a COC, viz:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge. x x x
The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time limit for filing
them are, namely: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to the regular election, the
candidates from among whom they are to make the choice; and (b) to avoid confusion and
inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. If the law does not confine to the duly-registered
candidates the choice by the voters, there may be as many persons voted for as there are voters,
and votes may be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor
of a candidate for another office in the same election. Moreover, according to Sinaca v. Mula, the
28 29
CoC is:
x x x in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political creed or
lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he
announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of
the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all
election purposes being as well stated.
Accordingly, a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he
possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such
declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the person making the declaration a valid or official
candidate.
There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One is
through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy. The Court differentiated the two remedies in Fermin v. Commission on
Elections, thuswise:
30
x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a petition
to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a
person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the
person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. 31
Inasmuch as the grounds for disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e.,
prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact of a candidate’s permanent residency in another country
when that fact affects the residency requirement of a candidate) are separate and distinct from the
grounds for the cancellation of or denying due course to a COC (i.e., nuisance candidates under
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code; and material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code), the Court has recognized in Miranda v. Abaya that the following
32
circumstances may result from the granting of the petitions, to wit:
(1) A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a valid CoC;
(2) A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have filed a valid CoC;
and
(3) A candidate may be qualified but his CoC may be denied due course or cancelled.
In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or withdraws his CoC
before the elections, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the option of substitution, to
wit:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. — If after the last day for the
filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later
than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur
between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with
any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of
candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a

candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that only an official
candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid
33
substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too,
that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person
without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not
filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.34
Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus
Election Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a
substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. 35
2.
Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification

rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not
a valid candidate to be properly substituted
In the light of the foregoing rules on the CoC, the Court concurs with the conclusion of the
COMELEC En Banc that the Castillo petition in SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to
deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v. Commission on
Elections:36
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on
the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is
false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is
noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a
material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section
78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate.
Castillo’s petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a)
Ramon made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material
matter that would affect the substantive right of Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the
election for which he filed his certificate); and (c) Ramon made the false representation with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible. The petition expressly
37
challenged Ramon’s eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and
the Local Government Code against any person serving three consecutive terms, and specifically
prayed that "the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent Ramon be denied due course to or
cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate." 38
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not
only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is
false. A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC that is short of the
39
requirements will not be granted. In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, the Court stressed that there
40
must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, thus:
The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of
the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses
cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to
deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character
of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any
material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he
cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or confused with a
Section 68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are different, for they are based on
different grounds, and can result in different eventualities. A person who is disqualified under
41
Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied
due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a
person who has not filed a CoC. Miranda v. Abaya has clarified that a candidate who is disqualified
42 43
under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate
until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section
78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate. 1âwphi1
To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by the
Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code reiterates the constitutional three-term limit for all elective
local officials, to wit:
Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected. (Emphasis supplied.)
The objective of imposing the three-term limit rule was "to avoid the evil of a single person
accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay
in the same office." The Court underscored this objective in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, stating:
44
x x x The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the people’s freedom to
choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same
office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when
they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the
City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from
asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his
CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false
declaration of his eligibility to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation even
worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the nuisance candidate may remain eligible
despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of due course to the CoC pursuant to Section
69 of the Omnibus Election Code. 45
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to
Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid,
46
considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had
the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As Miranda v.
Abaya aptly put it:
Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept of a
substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the
place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The Court has no other choice but to rule
that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a
valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in
the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed
certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he
cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called
"substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing
thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
47
3.
Granting without any qualification of petition in
SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELEC’s intention to
declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his CoC
That the COMELEC made no express finding that Ramon committed any deliberate
misrepresentation in his CoC was of little consequence in the determination of whether his CoC
should be deemed cancelled or not.
In Miranda v. Abaya, the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given
48
due course and/or cancelled." The COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then
pronounced — in apparent contradiction — that Joel Pempe Miranda was "disqualified." The
Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel
Pempe Miranda and at the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Miranda’s CoC. The Court explained:
The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by
the Comelec in its May 5, 1998 resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due
course and cancelled.
The Court rules that it was.
Private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the
position of Mayor for the City of Santiago be not given due course and/or cancelled.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.
(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)
In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the Comelec
ruled favorably in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition.
Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of
mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.
SO ORDERED.
(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)
From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the Comelec resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No.
98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was
GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The disqualification was simply
ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy. x x x.
49
xxxx
x x x. There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019
is one to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda (Rollo,
pp. 26-31). There is likewise no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any
qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the Comelec granted any
further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition
was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda was denied due course
and cancelled. x x x.50
The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of
cancelling or denying due course to the CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to
any qualification.
Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although Castillo’s petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC) specifically
sought both the disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or cancellation of his CoC,
the COMELEC categorically stated in the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 that it was granting the
petition. Despite the COMELEC making no finding of material misrepresentation on the part of
Ramon, its granting of Castillo’s petition without express qualifications manifested that the
COMELEC had cancelled Ramon’s CoC based on his apparent ineligibility. The Resolution dated
April 19, 2010 became final and executory because Castillo did not move for its reconsideration, and
because Ramon later withdrew his motion for reconsideration filed in relation to it.
4.
Elected Vice Mayor must succeed

and assume the position of Mayor
due to a permanent vacancy in the office
On the issue of who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City, Castillo submits that the
doctrine on the rejection of the second-placer espoused in Labo, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections should not apply to him because Ramon’s disqualification became final prior to the
51
elections. Instead, he cites Cayat v. Commission on Elections, where the Court said:
52 53
x x x In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment
declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before
the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the candidate had not
become final before the elections. This essential condition does not exist in the present case.
Thus, in Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after the 11
May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case,
Cayat was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day,
Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor of Buguias,
Benguet was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot
be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension
of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis
added)
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the
disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first
sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections,
which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the
first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be
voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became
final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in
Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng’s
proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none. 54
Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that he was entitled to assume the position
of Mayor of Lucena City for having obtained the highest number of votes among the remaining
qualified candidates.
It would seem, then, that the date of the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Ramon
disqualified is decisive. According to Section 10, Rule 19 of the COMELEC’s Resolution No. 8804, a 55
decision or resolution of a Division becomes final and executory after the lapse of five days following
its promulgation unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. Under Section 8, Rule 20 of
Resolution No. 8804, the decision of the COMELEC En Banc becomes final and executory five days
after its promulgation and receipt of notice by the parties.
The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its Resolution dated April 19,
2010, the copy of which Ramon received on the same date. Ramon filed a motion for
56
reconsideration on April 21, 2010 in accordance with Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No.
57
8696, but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010, ostensibly to allow his substitution by Barbara
58 59
Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any motion for reconsideration. Such circumstances indicated
that there was no more pending matter that could have effectively suspended the finality of the ruling
in due course. Hence, the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have attained finality
upon the lapse of five days from its promulgation and receipt of it by the parties. This happened
probably on April 24, 2010. Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc continued to act on the
withdrawal by Ramon of his motion for reconsideration through the May 5, 2010 Resolution declaring
the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division final and executory.
Yet, we cannot agree with Castillo’s assertion that with Ramon’s disqualification becoming final prior
to the May 10, 2010 elections, the ruling in Cayat was applicable in his favor. Barbara Ruby’s filing of
her CoC in substitution of Ramon significantly differentiated this case from the factual circumstances
obtaining in Cayat. Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April 17,
2004, and his disqualification became final before the May 10, 2004 elections. Considering that no
substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his rival, remained the only candidate for
the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May
10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a bona
fide candidate. To the electorate, she became a contender for the same position vied for by Castillo,
such that she stood on the same footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillo’s
claim of being the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being consequently
entitled to assume the office of Mayor.
Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. Labo, Jr. should be
1âwphi1
applied. There, the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest number of
votes for the contested office could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first
placer because the second placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will." Surely, the Court
60
explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not be deemed elected to the office. There was to
61
be no question that the second placer lost in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and
could not assume the vacated position. No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena
62
City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative.

63
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is
when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s
disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast
the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Under this sole exception, the electorate
64
may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest
number of votes may be deemed elected. But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply
65
because the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of
the fact of Barbara Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the
Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the decisions.
On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the
position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute
due to Ramon’s ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in
accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was not an additional
candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was
beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate. 66
A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should
be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit: 67
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions in these consolidated cases; AFFIRMS the
Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 by the COMELEC En Banc; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, 1 certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
Rollo (G.R. No. 196804), pp. 50-51.

1
Id. at 94, 96.

2
Id. at 221.
3
Id. at 88.
4
Id. at 88-91.
5
Id. at 91.
6
Montebon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180444, April 9, 2008, 551 SCRA 50, 56.;
7
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602,
613; Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998, 295
SCRA 157.
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 234, 263-264.
8
Rollo (G.R. No. 196804), pp. 99-100.

9
10
Id. at 102-105.
11
Id. at 106-125.
12
Id. at 126-129.
13
Id. at 130-131.
14
Id. at 133-134.
15
Id. at 140
16
Id. at 135-139.
17
Id. at 179.
18
Id. at 142-144
19
Id. at 145
20
Id. at 185-217.
21
Id. at 283-298.
Section 12. Substitution of candidates. – In case of valid substitutions after the official
22
ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted candidates shall be considered
votes for the substitutes.
23
Rollo (G.R. No. 196804), pp. 305-320.
24
Id. at 79.
25
Id. at 75-78.
26
Id. at 50-51.
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
27
and Vice-Mayor. - If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x
28
Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617, 625.
29
G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999, 315 SCRA 266, 276.
30
G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782.
31
Id. at 794-796.
32
Supra note 28, at 627.
Bautista v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998, 298 SCRA
33
480, 493.
34
Miranda v. Abaya, supra note 28, at 626-627.
35
Luna v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 107, 115.
36
Supra note 30, at 792-794 (bold emphases and underscoring are part of the original text).
Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447,
37
455.
38
Rollo (G.R. No. 196804), p. 91.
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified
39
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
40
G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
41
Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra note 30, at 794.
42
Id. at 796.
43
Supra note 8, at 258; citing Latasa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154829,
44
December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601.
Section 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified
45
petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in
mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names
of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that
the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of
candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate
46
Rollo (G.R. No. 196804), pp. 98-101.
47
48
Id.
49
Id. at 628.
50
Id. at 632.
51
G.R. No. 105111 & 105384, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297.
52
Rollo (G.R. No. 197015), pp. 18-19.
53
G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23.
54
Id. at 44-45.
In Re: COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election System in

55
Connection with the May 10, 2010 Elections (Promulgated on March 22, 2010).
56
Rollo (G.R. No. 196804), p. 106.
57
Id.
Section 7. Motion for reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a Decision, Resolution,

58
Order or Ruling of a Division shall be filed within three (3) days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the
Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling. x x x
59
Rollo (G.R. No. 196804), pp. 126-129.
60
61
Id. at 312.
62
Id. at 309-310; citing Abella v. Commission on Elections, 201 SCRA 253.
Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 761,
63
802; citing Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617, 635.
64
Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481, 501.
65
Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, supra note 51, at 312.
66
Gador v. Commission on Elections, L-52365, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 431.
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
67
and Vice-Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In view of the opinions submitted, it is my view that there was no valid substitution of candidates for
the mayoralty position in Lucena City between Ramon Talaga and his wife, Ruby Talaga. I likewise
opine that considering the judgments on the disqualification of Ruben Talaga and on the validity of
the substitution became final only after the May 10, 2010 elections, the laws of succession in case of
permanent vacancies under Section 44 of the Local Government Code should apply.
First, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code1 is clear that before a substitution of candidates for
an elective position could be validity done, the official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party should die, withdraw or must be qualified for any cause. In the present case, the records will
show that at the time Ruby C. Talaga filed her Certificate of Candidacy, or May 4, 2010, there was
still no ground for substitute since the judgment on Ramon Talaga’s disqualification had not yet
attained finality.
Although the Decision of the Comelec was promulgated on April 19, 2010, the five-day period for its
execution or implementation was suspended when Ramon Talaga filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on April 21, 2010. This is clear under Section 2 of Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, which
provides:
Section 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not proforma, suspends the execution or implementation of the decision,
resolution, order or ruling. (Emphasis supplied)
It also appears that on the morning of May 4, 2012, or before Ruby Talaga filed her Certificate of
Candidacy, Ramon Talaga filed a manifestation to withdraw his Motion for Reconsideration.
However, this manifestation does not have any effect in determining the finality of an action for
disqualification of a candidate. It is significant to note that under the Comelec Rules of Procedure, an
action for disqualification of candidate is a Special Case or Special Action.2 In relation thereto,
Section 13 of Rule 18 of same rules provide that the finality of a judgment in a Special Action is
based on the date of promulgation, to wit:
Section 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. –
(a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs a
decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after
thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolutions of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a

Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special actions
and Special cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its
promulgation. (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, the finality of the judgment of the Comelec is reckoned from the date of the promulgation
and not from the date of receipt of the resolution, decision or order – which is the standard rule in
non-election related cases. To my mind, the rationale for such requirement would manifest by
relating the aforementioned provision with Section 5 of Rule 18 of the same Rules, which provides:
Section 5. Promulgation. - The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the Commission or a

Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon
the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that because of the requirements of ‘advance notice’ and a ‘scheduled date’ of
promulgation, there is an assurance that the parties to an election case would be present on the
date of promulgation. Hence, the actual promulgation of a Comelec decision, order or resolution
constitutes an actual notice to the parties.
In the present case, the five-day period in attaining finality judgment could have been reckoned from
May 5, 2010 or the day when the Comelec En Banc issued an order dismissing the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Ramon Talaga. However, the records will show that the parties were not
notified of the promulgation of the said May 5, 2010 Decision. In here, the notice of the May 5, 2010
Order of the Comelec En Banc was made only on the next day, or May 6, 2010 and was received by
the parties or their counsels only on May 7, 2012 and May 13, 2010.3 Therefore, when the parties
were not notified of the promulgation of the May 5, 2010 Order of the Comelec En Banc as required
by the Comelec Rules, the judgment on Ramon Talaga’s disqualification could not be considered as
final and executory as to them. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo the May 6, 2010 Notice was
valid, the judgment would attain finality only after five-days from receipt thereof. Nevertheless,
whether it was received on May 7 or May 13, the judgment on Ramon Talaga’s disqualification
became final and executory after the May 10, 2010 Elections.
Considering further that Ramon Talaga’s disqualification became final after the May 10, 2010
Elections, it was only during that time that office of the Mayor of Lucena City became vacant. Since
there is no question that Ramon’s disqualification to serve as City Mayor is permanent in character,
the incumbent Vice-Mayor should serve as Mayor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government
Code, which provides:
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor.
xxxx
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher
vacant office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the foregoing, I concur with the ponencia of Justice Lucas P. Bersamin that it is the
incumbent Vice-Mayor, Roderick Alcatala, who should be the Mayor of Lucena City.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, Section 77, Candidates in case of death, disqualification
or withdrawal of another. – If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an
official candidates of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political
party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. x x x
2
Part V, Title B, Rule 23 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE.
3
Rollo, p. 132.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I concur with the ponencia in dismissing Mayor Barbara Ruby Talaga's petition against the assailed
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc Resolution of May 20, 2011 in SPC No. 10-024; but I
dissent with the ponencia's reasoning that the cause of invalidity or Ruby's substitution of Ramon
Talaga is the cancellation of Ramon's certificate of candidacy (CoC). I dissent, too, with the
ponencia's ruling that it is the Vice-Mayor who should be seated as Mayor, applying the rules of
succession under the Local Government Code (LGC).
Ramon and Philip Castillo were the original candidates for the mayoralty post in Lucena City for the
May l 0, 20 I 0 elections.1 Soon after they filed their CoCs, Castillo filed a petition to ''deny due
course to or to cancel the certificate of candidacy" of Ralllon o11 the ground that he had served for
three consecutive terms as mayor.2
Ramon defended himself by citing the then COMELEC ruling that his preventive suspension in the
course of his three terms as mayor prevented him from serving continuously.3 On December 23,
2009, however, the Supreme Court issued a contrary ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections4 and held that preventive suspension is only a temporary incapacity that does not interrupt
a local official’s term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
In light of this development, Ramon manifested before the COMELEC that he made no
misrepresentation in his CoC because of the prevailing COMELEC ruling; he acknowledged that he
was disqualified to run for mayor, and he prayed for a ruling declaring him disqu`alified.5
The requested ruling came on April 19, 2010, through the grant of Castillo’s petition by the
COMELEC First Division.6 Ramon responded to the ruling by filing a motion for reconsideration,7 but
he withdrew his motion on May 4, 2010 through an ex parte manifestation of withdrawal.8 Later, on
the same day, Ruby – Ramon’s wife – filed her CoC, attaching thereto the required Certificate of
Nomination by Ramon’s party.9
The COMELEC en banc’s action on Ramon’s manifestation of withdrawal did not come until the next
day – May 5, 2010. The en banc, in its Order, considered the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division final and executory.10
On election day, May 10, 2010, Ramon’s name remained in the printed ballot, but votes for him were
counted in Ruby’s favor as votes for the substitute candidate.11
Castillo sought to suspend the proclamation of Ramon or Ruby who had garnered 44,099 votes as
against Castillo’s 39,615.12 On May 13, 2010, the COMELEC gave due course to Ruby’s CoC as
substitute candidate.13 The Board of Canvassers, on the other hand, did not suspend the
proclamation as Castillo had requested, and instead proclaimed Ruby as winner and elected Mayor
of Lucena City on that same day.14
Castillo sought to annul Ruby’s proclamation through another petition15 while the elected Vice Mayor,
Roderick Alcala, moved to intervene in Castillo’s petition.16 On January 11, 2011, the COMELEC
Second Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and denied Alcala’s motion. The COMELEC Second
Division reasoned out that the substitution became final and executory when Castillo failed to act
after receiving a copy of the COMELEC resolution giving due course to Ruby’s substitution.17
Both parties went to the COMELEC en banc for the reconsideration of the COMELEC Second
Division’s ruling. The COMELEC en banc reversed the January 11, 2011 ruling of the COMELEC
Second Division on due process consideration and on the ground that the filing of Ruby’s CoC was
not a proper substitution for being premature and for being filed out of
time.18 Against this COMELEC en banc ruling, both parties went to the Court.
The issues raised by the parties before the Court can be condensed as follows:
a. Whether Ruby validly substituted for Ramon as candidate for mayor of Lucena City;
b. In the negative, whether the cause of the invalidity of the substitution is Ramon’s
disqualification or the cancellation of his CoC;
c. Who between Castillo and Alcala should assume the position of mayor of Lucena City?
The ponencia dismissed Ruby’s petition (G.R. No. 196804) and Castillo’s petition (G.R. No. 197015)
for lack of merit; and upheld the COMELEC en banc’s resolution of May 20, 2011 in SPC No. 10-
024.
I agree with the ponencia’s conclusion that Ruby never validly substituted Ramon, and, therefore,
she never became a candidate who can be validly voted for in the May 2010 elections. The ponencia
considers Ruby’s substitution as invalid because Ramon’s CoC contains an "incurable defect
consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run"19 for a fourth consecutive term. The
ponencia adds that despite the absence of an express finding of material misrepresentation by the
COMELEC, the fact that it granted Castillo’s petition "without express qualifications"20 manifested
that the COMELEC had cancelled Ramon’s CoC. In short, the ponencia considers the CoC of a
three-term candidate as invalid, warranting its cancellation.
I dissent with the reasoning of the ponencia. I base my position of dissent on the following grounds –
the same grounds which would later support my position that it is Castillo who should be seated as
Mayor -
a. the violation of the three-term limit rule is a unique but proper ground for disqualification
and not for the cancellation of a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC);
b. the petition filed by Castillo against Ramon was based on the three-term limit rule and,
hence, was a petition for disqualification, but no effective disqualification ever took place
since Ramon never qualified to serve for a fourth term; and
c. since Ruby did not validly substitute Ramon and Ramon opted to exit out of the election
race (although through an erroneous mode of asking for a ruling disqualifying him), neither of
the two can be considered candidates and the votes cast in their favor should be considered
stray; thus, Castillo should be proclaimed as Mayor of Lucena City.
Hidden behind but not erased by this simplistic recital of the issues, rulings and dissent is the legal
reality that these cases pose issues way beyond the question of substitution that appears on the
surface. They require a look into the nature of a CoC; distinctions between eligibility, or lack of it, and
disqualification; the effects of cancellation and disqualification; the applicable remedies; and the
unique nature and the effect of the constitutional three-term limit for local elective officials.
The CoC and the Qualifications for its Filing.
A basic rule and one that cannot be repeated often enough is that the CoC is the document that
creates the status of a candidate. In Sinaca v. Mula,21 the Court described the nature of a CoC as
follows –
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the
candidate's political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a
public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is
eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and
his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.
Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions left to Congress the task of providing the qualifications of local
elective officials. Congress undertook this task by enacting Batas Pambasa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 337
(LGC), the OEC and, later, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC
1991).22
Under Section 79 of the OEC, a political aspirant legally becomes a "candidate" only upon the due
filing of his sworn CoC.23 In fact, Section 73 of the OEC makes the filing of the CoC a condition sine
qua non for a person to "be eligible for any elective public office"24 – i.e., to be validly voted for in the
elections. Section 76 of the OEC makes it a "ministerial duty" for a COMELEC official "to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy"25 filed.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides what a CoC must contain or state:26
Section 2. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall be under oath and
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office and constituency stated
therein; that he is eligible for said office, his age, sex, civil status, place and date of birth, his
citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized; the registered political party to which he belongs; if
married, the full name of the spouse; his legal residence, giving the exact address, the precinct
number, barangay, city or municipality and province where he is registered voter; his post office
address for election purposes; his profession or occupation or employment; that he is not a
permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that
he will obey the laws, legal orders, decrees, resolution, rules and regulations promulgated and
issued by the duly-constituted authorities; that he assumes the foregoing obligations voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate are true
and correct to the best of his own knowledge. [italics supplied]
From the point of view of the common citizen who wants to run for a local elective office, the above
recital contains all the requirements that he must satisfy; it contains the basic and essential
requirements applicable to all citizens to qualify for candidacy for a local elective office. These are
their formal terms of entry to local politics. A citizen must not only possess all these requirements; he
must positively represent in his CoC application that he possesses them. Any falsity on these
requirements constitutes a material misrepresentation that can lead to the cancellation of the CoC.
On this point, Section 78 of the OEC provides:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. [italics, emphases and underscores ours]
A necessarily related provision is Section 39 of LGC 1991 which states:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. – (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxxx
(c) Candidates for the position of Mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component
cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. [italics ours]
Notably, Section 74 of the OEC does not require any negative qualification except only as expressly
required therein. A specific negative requirement refers to the representation that the would-be
candidate is not a permanent resident nor an immigrant in another country. This requirement,
however, is in fact simply part of the positive requirement of residency in the locality for which the
CoC is filed and, in this sense, it is not strictly a negative requirement. Neither does Section 74
require any statement that the would-be candidate does not possess any ground for disqualification
specifically enumerated by law, as disqualification is a matter that the OEC and LGC 1991
separately deal with, as discussed below. Notably, Section 74 does not require a would-be
candidate to state that he has not served for three consecutive terms in the same elective position
immediately prior to the present elections.
With the accomplishment of the CoC and its filing, a political aspirant officially acquires the status of
a candidate and, at the very least, the prospect of holding public office; he, too, formally opens
himself up to the complex political environment and processes. The Court cannot be more emphatic
in holding "that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the
electoral process."27
Pertinent laws28 provide the specific periods when a CoC may be filed; when a petition for its
cancellation may be brought; and the effect of its filing. These measures, among others, are in line
with the State policy or objective of ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public
service,"29 bearing in mind that the limitations on the privilege to seek public office are within the
plenary power of Congress to provide.30
The Concept of Disqualification and
its Effects.
To disqualify, in its simplest sense, is (1) to deprive a person of a power, right or privilege; or (2) to
make him or her ineligible for further competition because of violation of the rules.31 It is in these
senses that the term is understood in our election laws.
Thus, anyone who may qualify or may have qualified under the general rules of eligibility applicable
to all citizens may be deprived of the right to be a candidate or may lose the right to be a candidate
(if he has filed his CoC) because of a trait or characteristic that applies to him or an act that can be
imputed to him as an individual, separately from the general qualifications that must exist for a
citizen to run for a local public office. Notably, the breach of the three-term limit is a trait or condition
that can possibly apply only to those who have previously served for three consecutive terms in the
same position sought immediately prior to the present elections.
In a disqualification situation, the grounds are the individual traits or conditions of, or the individual
acts of disqualification committed by, a candidate as provided under Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC
and Section 40 of LGC 1991, and which generally have nothing to do with the eligibility requirements
for the filing of a CoC.32
Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC (together with Section 40 of LGC 1991, outlined below) cover the
following as traits, characteristics or acts of disqualification: (i) corrupting voters or election officials;
(ii) committing acts of terrorism to enhance candidacy; (iii) overspending; (iv) soliciting, receiving or
making prohibited contributions; (v) campaigning outside the campaign period; (vi) removal,
destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda; (vii) committing prohibited forms of election
propaganda; (viii) violating rules and regulations on election propaganda through mass media; (ix)
coercion of subordinates; (x) threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms
of coercion; (xi) unlawful electioneering; (xii) release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds;
(xiii) solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of the election; (xiv) declaration
as an insane; and (xv) committing subversion, insurrection, rebellion or any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude.
Section 40 of LGC 1991, on the other hand, essentially repeats those already in the OEC under the
following disqualifications:
a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
b. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
c. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
d. Those with dual citizenship;
e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
g. The insane or feeble-minded.
Together, these provisions embody the disqualifications that, by statute, can be imputed against a
candidate or a local elected official to deny him of the chance to run for office or of the chance to
serve if he has been elected.
A unique feature of "disqualification" is that under Section 68 of the OEC, it refers only to a
"candidate," not to one who is not yet a candidate. Thus, the grounds for disqualification do not apply
to a would-be candidate who is still at the point of filing his CoC. This is the reason why no
representation is required in the CoC that the would-be candidate does not possess any ground for
disqualification. The time to hold a person accountable for the grounds for disqualification is after
attaining the status of a candidate, with the filing of the CoC.
To sum up and reiterate the essential differences between the eligibility requirements and
disqualifications, the former are the requirements that apply to, and must be complied by, all citizens
who wish to run for local elective office; these must be positively asserted in the CoC. The latter refer
to individual traits, conditions or acts that serve as grounds against one who has qualified as a
candidate to lose this status or privilege; essentially, they have nothing to do with a candidate’s CoC.
When the law allows the cancellation of a candidate’s CoC, the law considers the cancellation from
the point of view of the requirements that every citizen who wishes to run for office must commonly
satisfy. Since the elements of "eligibility" are common, the vice of ineligibility attaches to and affects
both the candidate and his CoC. In contrast, when the law allows the disqualification of a candidate,
the law looks only at the disqualifying trait or condition specific to the individual; if the "eligibility"
requirements have been satisfied, the disqualification applies only to the person of the candidate,
leaving the CoC valid. A previous conviction of subversion is the best example as it applies not to
the citizenry at large, but only to the convicted individuals; a convict may have a valid CoC upon
satisfying the eligibility requirements under Section 74 of the OEC, but shall nevertheless be
disqualified.
Distinctions among (i) denying due course to or cancellation of a CoC, (ii) disqualification, and (iii)
quo warranto
The nature of the eligibility requirements for a local elective office and the disqualifications that may
apply to candidates necessarily create distinctions on the remedies available, on the effects of lack
of eligibility and on the application of disqualification. The remedies available are essentially: the
cancellation of a CoC, disqualification from candidacy or from holding office, and quo warranto,
which are distinct remedies with varying applicability and effects. For ease of presentation and
understanding, their availability, grounds and effects are topically discussed below.
As to the grounds:
In the denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC, the ground is essentially lack of eligibility
under the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public
office;33 the governing provisions are Sections 78 and 69 of the OEC.34
In a disqualification case, as mentioned above, the grounds are traits, characteristics or acts of
disqualification,35 individually applicable to a candidate, as provided under Sections 68 and 12 of the
OEC; Section 40 of LGC 1991; and, as discussed below, Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. As
previously discussed, the grounds for disqualification are different from, and have nothing to do with,
a candidate’s CoC although they may result in disqualification from candidacy whose immediate
effect upon finality before the elections is the same as a cancellation. If they are cited in a petition
filed before the elections, they remain as disqualification grounds and carry effects that are distinctly
peculiar to disqualification.
In a quo warranto petition, the grounds to oust an elected official from his office are ineligibility and
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This is provided under Section 253 of the OEC and
governed by the Rules of Court as to the procedures. While quo warranto and cancellation share the
same ineligibility grounds, they differ as to the time these grounds are cited. A cancellation case is
brought before the elections, while a quo warranto is filed after and may still be filed even if a CoC
cancellation case was not filed before elections, viz.:
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications for
elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be
initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought
on the basis of two grounds - (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and
must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results. Under section 253, a
candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any
of the qualifications for elective office.36
Note that the question of what would constitute acts of disqualification – under Sections 68 and 12 of
the OEC and Section 40 of LGC 1991 – is best resolved by directly referring to the provisions
involved. On the other hand, what constitutes a violation of the three-term limit rule under the
Constitution has been clarified in our case law.37 The approach is not as straight forward in a petition
to deny due course to or cancel a CoC and also to a quo warranto petition, which similarly covers
the ineligibility of a candidate/elected official. In Salcedo II v. COMELEC,38 we ruled that –
In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that
the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by
this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right to run for the elective
post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be
considered as a "material representation," the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions
applying Section 78 of the Code.
xxxx
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of

the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the
consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from
serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of
the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public
office upon just any innocuous mistake. [emphases ours, citation omitted]
Thus, in addition to the failure to satisfy or comply with the eligibility requirements, a material
misrepresentation must be present in a cancellation of CoC situation. The law apparently does not
allow material divergence from the listed requirements to qualify for candidacy and enforces its edict
by requiring positive representation of compliance under oath. Significantly, where disqualification is
involved, the mere existence of a ground appears sufficient and a material representation assumes
no relevance.
As to the period for filing:
The period to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC depends on the provision of law
invoked. If the petition is filed under Section 78 of the OEC, the petition must be filed within twenty-
five (25) days from the filing of the CoC.39 However, if the petition is brought under
Section 69 of the same law, the petition must be filed within five (5) days from the last day of filing
the CoC.40
On the other hand, the period to file a disqualification case is at any time before the proclamation of
a winning candidate, as provided in COMELEC Resolution No. 8696.41 The three-term limit
disqualification, because of its unique characteristics, does not strictly follow this time limitation and
is discussed at length below. At the very least, it should follow the temporal limitations of a quo
warranto petition which must be filed within ten (10) days from proclamation.42 The constitutional
nature of the violation, however, argues against the application of this time requirement; the rationale
for the rule and the role of the Constitution in the country’s legal order dictate that a petition should
be allowed while a consecutive fourth-termer is in office.
As to the effects of a successful suit:
A candidate whose CoC was denied due course or cancelled is not considered a candidate at all.
Note that the law fixes the period within which a CoC may be filed.43 After this period, generally no
other person may join the election contest. A notable exception to this general rule is the rule on
substitution: when an official candidate of a registered political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause after the last day for filing a CoC, the law allows the substitution of the dead,
withdrawing or disqualified candidate, provided that he or she had a valid and subsisting CoC at the
time of death, withdrawal or substitution. This proviso is necessary since the entry of a new
candidate after the regular period for filing the CoC is exceptional. Unavoidably, a "candidate" whose
CoC has been cancelled or denied due course cannot be substituted for lack of a CoC, to all intents
and purposes.44 Similarly, a successful quo warranto suit results in the ouster of an already elected
official from office; substitution, for obvious reasons, can no longer apply.
On the other hand, a candidate who was simply disqualified is merely prohibited from continuing as
a candidate or from assuming or continuing to assume the functions of the office;45 substitution can
thus take place before election under the terms of Section 77 of the OEC.46 However, a three-term
candidate with a valid and subsisting CoC cannot be substituted if the basis of the substitution is his
disqualification on account of his three-term limitation. Disqualification that is based on a breach of
the three-term limit rule cannot be invoked as this disqualification can only take place after election
where the three-term official emerged as winner. As in a quo warranto, any substitution is too late at
this point.
As to the effects of a successful suit on the right of the second placer in the elections:
In any of these three remedies, the doctrine of rejection of the second placer applies for the simple
reason that –
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He
lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the
results under such circumstances.47
With the disqualification of the winning candidate and the application of the doctrine of rejection of
the second placer, the rules on succession under the law accordingly apply.
As an exceptional situation, however, the candidate with the second highest number of votes
(second placer) may be validly proclaimed as the winner in the elections should the winning
candidate be disqualified by final judgment before the elections, as clearly provided in Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646.48 The same effect obtains when the electorate is fully aware, in fact and in law and
within the realm of notoriety, of the disqualification, yet they still voted for the disqualified candidate.
In this situation, the electorate that cast the plurality of votes in favor of the notoriously disqualified
candidate is simply deemed to have waived their right to vote.49
In a CoC cancellation proceeding, the law is silent on the legal effect of a judgment cancelling the
CoC and does not also provide any temporal distinction. Given, however, the formal initiatory role a
CoC plays and the standing it gives to a political aspirant, the cancellation of the CoC based on a
finding of its invalidity effectively results in a vote for an inexistent "candidate" or for one who is
deemed not to be in the ballot. Although legally a misnomer, the "second placer" should be
proclaimed the winner as the candidate with the highest number of votes for the contested position.
This same consequence should result if the cancellation case becomes final after elections, as the
cancellation signifies non-candidacy from the very start, i.e., from before the elections.
Violation of the three-term limit rule
a. The Three-Term Limit Rule.
The three-term limit rule is a creation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision fixes
the maximum limit an elective local official can consecutively serve in office, and at the same time
gives the command, in no uncertain terms, that no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Thus, a three-term local official is barred from serving a fourth and subsequent
consecutive terms.
This bar, as a constitutional provision, must necessarily be read into and interpreted as a component
part of the OEC under the legal reality that neither this Code nor the LGC provides for the three-term
limit rule’s operational details; it is not referred to as a ground for the cancellation of a CoC nor for
the disqualification of a candidate, much less are its effects provided for. Thus, the need to fully
consider, reconcile and harmonize the terms and effects of this rule on elections in general and, in
particular, on the circumstances of the present case.
b. Is the Rule an Eligibility Requirement or a Disqualification?

In practical terms, the question of whether the three-term limit rule is a matter of "eligibility" that must
be considered in the filing of a CoC translates to the need to state in a would-be candidate’s CoC
application that he is eligible for candidacy because he has not served for three consecutive
terms immediately before filing his application.
The wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, however, does not justify this requirement as
Section 8 simply sets a limit on the number of consecutive terms an official can serve. It does not
refer to elections, much less does it bar a three-termer’s candidacy. As previously discussed,
Section 74 of the OEC does not expressly require a candidate to assert the non-possession of any
disqualifying trait or condition, much less of a candidate’s observance of the three-term limit rule. In
fact, the assertion of a would-be candidate’s eligibility, as required by the
OEC, could not have contemplated making a three-term candidate ineligible for candidacy since that
disqualifying trait began to exist only later under the 1987 Constitution.
What Section 8, Article X of the Constitution indisputably mandates is solely a bar against serving for
a fourth consecutive term, not a bar against candidacy. Of course, between the filing of a CoC (that
gives an applicant the status of a candidate) and assumption to office as an election winner is a wide
expanse of election activities whose various stages our election laws treat in various different ways.
Thus, if candidacy will be aborted from the very start (i.e., at the initial CoC-filing stage), what
effectively takes place – granting that the third-termer possesses all the eligibility elements required
by law – is a shortcut that is undertaken on the theory that the candidate cannot serve in any way if
he wins a fourth term.
I submit that while simple and efficient, essential legal considerations should dissuade the Court
from using this approach. To make this shortcut is to incorporate into the law, by judicial fiat, a
requirement that is not expressly there. In other words, such shortcut may go beyond allowable
interpretation that the Court can undertake, and cross over into prohibited judicial legislation. Not to
so hold, on the other hand, does not violate the three-term limit rule even in spirit, since its clear and
undisputed mandate is to disallow serving for a fourth consecutive term; this objective is achieved
when the local official does not win and can always be attained by the direct application of the law if
he does win.
Another reason, and an equally weighty one, is that a shortcut would run counter to the concept of
commonality that characterizes the eligibility requirements; it would allow the introduction of an
element that does not apply to all citizens as an entry qualification. Viewed from the prism of the
general distinctions between eligibility and disqualification discussed above, the three-term limit is
unavoidably a restriction that applies only to local officials who have served for three consecutive
terms, not to all would-be candidates at large; it applies only to specific individuals who may have
otherwise been eligible were it not for the three-term limit rule and is thus a defect that attaches only
to the candidate and not to his CoC. In this sense, it cannot but be a disqualification and at that, a
very specific one.
That the prohibited fourth consecutive term can only take place after a three-term local official wins
his fourth term signifies too that the prohibition (and the resulting disqualification) only takes place
after elections. This circumstance, to my mind, supports the view that the three-term limit rule does
not at all involve itself with the matter of candidacy; it only regulates service beyond the limits the
Constitution has set. Indeed, it is a big extrapolative leap for a prohibition that applies after election,
to hark back and affect the initial election process for the filing of CoCs.
Thus, on the whole, I submit that the legally sound view is not to bar a three-termer’s candidacy for a
fourth term if the three-term limit rule is the only reason for the bar. In these lights, the three-term
limit rule – as a bar against a fourth consecutive term – is effectively a disqualification against such
service rather than an eligibility requirement.50
c. Filing of Petition and Effects.
As a disqualification that can only be triggered after the elections, it is not one that can be
implemented or given effect before such time. The reason is obvious; before that time, the gateway
to the 4th consecutive term has not been opened because the four-term re-electionist has not won.
This reality brings into sharp focus the timing of the filing of a petition for disqualification for breach of
the three-term limit rule. Should a petition under the three-term limit rule be allowed only after the
four-term official has won on the theory that it is at that point that the Constitution demands a bar?
The timing of the filing of the petition for disqualification is a matter of procedure that primarily rests
with the COMELEC. Of course, a petition for disqualification cannot be filed against one who is not
yet a candidate as only candidates (and winners) can be disqualified. Hence, the filing should be
done after the filing of the CoC. On the backend limitation of its filing, I believe that the petition does
not need to be hobbled by the terms of COMELEC Resolution No. 869651 because of the special
nature and characteristics of the three-term limit rule – i.e., the constitutional breach involved; the
fact that it can be effective only after a candidate has won the election; and the lack of specific
provision of the election laws covering it.
To be sure, a constitutional breach cannot be allowed to remain unattended because of the

procedures laid down by administrative bodies. While Salcedo considers the remedy of quo warranto
as almost the same as the remedy of cancellation on the question of eligibility, the fact that the
remedies can be availed of only at particular periods of the election process signifies more than
temporal distinction.
From the point of view of eligibility, one who merely seeks to hold public office through a valid
candidacy cannot wholly be treated in the same manner as one who has won and is at the point of
assuming or serving the office to which he has been elected; the requirements to be eligible as a
candidate are defined by the election laws and by the local government code, but beyond these are
constitutional restrictions on eligibility to serve. The three-term limit rule serves as the best example
of this fine distinction; a local official who is allowed to be a candidate under our statutes but who is
effectively in his fourth term should be considered ineligible to serve if the Court were to give life to
the constitutional provision, couched in a strong prohibitory language, that "no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms."
A possible legal stumbling block in allowing the filing of the petition before the election is the lack of
a cause of action or prematurity at that point. If disqualification is triggered only after a three-termer
1âwphi1
has won, then it may be argued with some strength that a petition, filed against a respondent three-
term local official before he has won a fourth time, has not violated any law and does not give the
petitioner the right to file a petition for lack of cause of action or prematurity.52
I take the view, however, that the petition does not need to be immediately acted upon and can
merely be docketed as a cautionary petition reserved for future action if and when the three-term
local official wins a fourth consecutive term. If the parties proceed to litigate without raising the
prematurity or lack of cause of action as objection, a ruling can be deferred until after the cause of
action accrues; if a ruling is entered, then any decreed disqualification cannot be given effect and
implemented until a violation of the three-term limit rule occurs.
As a last point on the matter of substitution, a candidate with a valid and subsisting CoC can only be
validly substituted on the basis of a withdrawal before the elections, or by reason of death.
Disqualification that is based on a breach of the three-term limit rule cannot be invoked as this
disqualification can only take place after election. As in a quo warranto situation, any substitution is
too late at this point.
I shall consider the case on the basis of these positions.

Castillo’s Petition is Properly a
Petition for Disqualification against
Ramon for Possessing some Grounds
for Disqualification
On the basis of my views on the effect of the three-term limit rule, I disagree with the ponencia’s
conclusion that Castillo’s petition is one for the cancellation or denial of due course of Ramon’s CoC.
I likewise so conclude after examining Castillo’s petition, its allegations and the grounds it invoked.
As a rule, the nature of the action is determined by the allegations in the complaint or petition. The
cause of action is not what the title or designation of the petition states; the acts defined or described
in the body of the petition control. The designation or caption and even the prayer, while they may
assist and contribute their persuasive effect, cannot also be determinative of the nature or cause of
action for they are not even indispensable parts of the petition.53
In this sense, any question on the nature of Castillo’s petition against Ramon cannot ignore the
pertinent allegations of the petition, and they state:
4. Respondent was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and 2007 local
elections based on the records of the Commission on Elections of Lucena City and had fully served
the aforesaid three (3) terms without any voluntary and involuntary interruption.
xxxx
7. Respondent, knowing well that he was elected for and had fully served three (3) consecutive
terms as a city mayor of Lucena, he still filed his Certificate of Candidacy for City Mayor of Lucena
for this coming 10 May 2010 national and local elections;
xxxx
8. Under the Constitution and existing Election laws, New Local Government Code of the
Philippines, and jurisprudence the respondent is no longer entitled and is already disqualified to be a
city mayor for the fourth consecutive term. [emphasis supplied]
These allegations, on their face, did not raise any of the specified grounds for cancellation or denial
of due course of a CoC under Sections 69 and 78 of the OEC. Specifically, Castillo’s petition did not
allege that Ramon was a nuisance candidate or that he had committed a misrepresentation on a
material fact in his CoC; the petition failed to allege any deliberate attempt, through material
misrepresentation, to mislead, misinform or deceive the electorate of Lucena City as to Ramon’s
qualifications for the position of Mayor. More importantly, and as previously discussed, the non-
possession of any disqualifying ground, much less of a potential breach of the three-term limit rule, is
not among the matters of qualification or eligibility that a candidate is required to assert in his CoC.
Castillo’s allegations simply articulate the fact that Ramon had served for three consecutive terms
and the legal conclusion that the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and LGC 1991
disqualifies him from running for a fourth consecutive term. Under these allegations, Castillo’s
petition cannot come within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC; Ramon’s status as a three-term
candidate is a ground to disqualify him (as precautionary measure before elections) for possessing a
ground for disqualification under the Constitution and the LGC, specifically, for running for the same
office after having served for three continuous terms.
From the given facts and from the standards of strict legality based on my discussions above, I
conclude that the COMELEC was substantially correct in treating the case as one for disqualification
– that is, without cancelling his CoC - in its April 19, 2010 Resolution and in ruling for disqualification,
subject to my reservation about prematurity and the existence of a ripe cause of action. This
reservation gathers strength in my mind as I consider that most of the developments in the case took
place before the May 10, 2010 elections under the standards of Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. Brought to its logical end, this consideration leads me to conclude that while the
COMELEC might have declared Ramon’s disqualification to be final, its declaration was ineffectual
as no disqualification actually ever took effect. None could have taken place as the case it ruled
upon was not ripe for a finding of disqualification; Ramon, although a three-term local official, had
not won a fourth consecutive term and, in fact, could not have won because he gave way to his wife
in a manner not amounting to a withdrawal.
Ruby’s Substitution of Ramon is

Invalid not because Ramon’s CoC
was cancelled but because of its non-
conformity with the Conditions
Required by Section 77 of the OEC
As a rule, a CoC must be filed only within the timelines specified by law. This temporal limitation is a
mandatory requirement to qualify as a candidate in a national or local election.54 It is only when a
candidate with a valid and subsisting CoC is disqualified, dies or withdraws his or her CoC before
the elections that the remedy of substitution under Section 77 of the OEC is allowed. Section 77
states:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who
died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with
the Commission. [italics supplied, emphasis and underscoring ours]
In the present case, the grounds that would give rise to the substitution had to be present for Ruby’s
substitution to be valid. Specifically, she had to show that either Ramon had died, had withdrawn his
valid and subsisting CoC, or had been disqualified for any cause. All these are best determined by
considering the antecedents of the present case. To recall:
1. On April 19, 2010, the Comelec First Division disqualified Ramon in SPA No. 09-929 (DC).
The Resolution did not contain any order to deny due course or to cancel Ramon’s CoC;
2. On April 21, 2010, Ramon filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration seeking a reversal of
the April 19, 2010 Resolution;
3. On May 4, 2010, at exactly 9:00 a.m., Ramon filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation of the
Pending Motion for Reconsideration dated May 3, 2010 praying that the COMELEC issue an
"Order to NOTE the instant Manifestation and DEEM the Resolution promulgated on April
19, 2010 as final and executory";
4. On the same day at 4:30, Ruby filed her CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of
her husband, Ramon;
5. In an Order dated May 5, 2010, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order in response to
Ramon’s Manifestation which stated: "(a) To NOTE this instant Manifestation; and (b) To
consider the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the Commission First Division final and executory";
6. On the May 10, 2010 elections, Ramon garnered the highest number of votes with 44,099
votes, while Castillo garnered only 39, 615 votes;
7. Three days after the elections or on May 13, 2010, the COMELEC en banc issued
Resolution No. 8917 that gave due course to Ruby’s CoC. This Resolution was premised on
the Memorandum of the Law Department dated May 8, 2010 which erroneously stated that
Ruby filed her CoC on May 5 not May
4, 2010; and
8. On the basis of Resolution No. 8917, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Ruby as
the duly elected mayor of Lucena City.55
All these, of course, will have to be viewed from the prism of the three-term limit rule.
Substitution refers to an exceptional situation in an election scenario where the law leans backwards
to allow a registered party to put in place a replacement candidate when the death, withdrawal or
disqualification of its original candidate occurs. The question that arises under the bare provisions of
Section 77 of the OEC is how the COMELEC should handle the law’s given conditions and
appreciate the validity of a substitution. The approaches to be made may vary on a case-to-case
basis depending on the attendant facts, but a failsafe method in an election situation is to give
premium consideration not to the candidates or their parties, but to the electorate’s process of choice
and the integrity of the elections. In other words, in a legal or factual equipoise situation, the
conclusion must lean towards the integrity of the electoral process.
Death as basis for substitution obviously does not need to be considered, thus leaving withdrawal
and disqualification as grounds for the validity of Ruby’s substitution.
On the matter of withdrawal, two significant developments could possibly serve as indicators of
withdrawal and should be examined for their legal effects.
The first development relates to the aftermath of the Court’s ruling in Aldovino regarding the
interruption of service for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Although the Aldovino ruling still had
to lapse to finality, Ramon almost immediately manifested before the COMELEC First Division his
recognition that he was disqualified and asked for a ruling. The requested ruling, of course, was on
the case that Castillo had filed. This ruling did not come until April 19, 2010 when the COMELEC
First Division granted Castillo’s petition, to which Ramon responded with a verified motion for
reconsideration.
A significant aspect (although a negative one) of this development is that Ramon never indicated his
clear intention to withdraw his CoC. Despite the Aldovino ruling, he only manifested his recognition
that he was disqualified and had asked for a ruling on Castillo’s petition. To be sure, he could have
made a unilateral withdrawal with or without any intervention from the COMELEC First Division. The
reality, however, was that he did not; he did not withdraw either from his disqualification case nor his
CoC, pursuant to Section 73 of the OEC; he opted and continued to act within the confines of the
pending case.
A question that may possibly be asked is whether Ramon’s Manifestation recognizing his
disqualification can be considered a withdrawal. The short answer, in my view, is that it cannot be so
considered. Withdrawal and disqualification are separate grounds for substitution under Section 77
of the OEC and one should not be confused with the other. Recognition of disqualification, too,
without more, cannot be considered a withdrawal. Disqualification results from compulsion of law
while withdrawal is largely an act that springs from the candidate’s own volition. Ramon’s obvious
submission to the COMELEC First Division, by asking for a ruling, cannot in any sense be
considered a withdrawal.
The second occasion was in early May 2010 when he withdrew, through a Manifestation, his motion
for reconsideration of the First Division’s ruling finding him disqualified for violation of the three-term
limit rule. To recall, he made his ex parte manifestation of withdrawal in the morning of May 4, 2010,
while his wife filed her CoC in substitution in the afternoon of the same day, on the apparent theory
that his acceptance of the First Division disqualification ruling qualified her for substitution under
Section 77 of the OEC.
I cannot view these moves as indicative of withdrawal because the parties’ main basis, as shown by
their moves, was to take advantage of a final ruling decreeing disqualification as basis for Ruby’s
substitution. Plainly, no withdrawal of the CoC was ever made and no withdrawal was also ever
intended as they focused purely on the effects of Ramon’s disqualification. This intent is evident from
their frantic efforts to secure a final ruling by the COMELEC en banc on Ramon’s disqualification.
But neither can I recognize that there was an effective disqualification that could have been the basis
for a Section 77 substitution. As repeatedly discussed above, the constitutional prohibition and the
disqualification can only set in after election, when a three-term local official has won for himself a
fourth term. Quite obviously, Ramon – without realizing the exact implications of the three–term limit
rule – opted for a disqualification as his mode of exit from the political scene. This is an unfortunate
choice as he could not have been disqualified (or strictly, his disqualification could not have taken
effect) until after he had won as Mayor in the May 2010 elections – too late in time if the intention
was to secure a substitution for Ruby. Additionally, there was no way that Ramon could have won as
he had opted out of the race, through his acceptance of an ineffectual disqualification ruling, in favor
of his wife, Ruby. I hark back, too, to the reason I have given on why the constitutional three-term
limit rule cannot affect, and does not look back to, the candidate’s CoC which should remain valid if
all the elements of eligibility are otherwise satisfied.
Whatever twists and turns the case underwent through the series of moves that Ramon and his wife
made after the First Division’s April 19, 2010 ruling cannot erase the legal reality that, at these
various points, no disqualification had ripened and became effective. To repeat, the cause for
disqualification is the election of the disqualified candidate to a fourth term – a development that
never took place. Without a disqualified candidate that Ruby was replacing, no substitution pursuant
to Section 77 of the OEC could have taken place.56 This reality removes the last ground that would
have given Ruby the valid opportunity to be her husband’s substitute. To note an obvious point, the
CoC that Ruby filed a week before the May 10, 2010 elections could not have served her at all as
her filing was way past the deadline that the COMELEC set.
To return to the immediate issue at hand and as previously discussed, a substitution under Section
73 of the OEC speaks of an exceptional, not a regular, situation in an election and should be strictly
interpreted according to its terms. In the clearest and simplest terms, without a dead, withdrawing or
disqualified candidate of a registered party, there can be no occasion for substitution. This
requirement is both temporal and substantive. In the context of this case and in the absence of a
valid substitution of Ramon by Ruby, votes for Ramon appearing in the ballots on election day could
not have been counted in Ruby’s favor.57
With a fatally flawed substitution,

Ruby was not a candidate.
In view of the invalidity of Ruby’s substitution, her candidacy was fatally flawed and could not have
been given effect. Her CoC, standing by itself, was filed late and cannot be given recognition.
Without a valid CoC, either by substitution or by independent filing, she could not have been voted
for, for the position of Mayor of Lucena City. Thus, the election took place with only one valid
candidate standing – Castillo – who should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor.
The ponencia justifies the Vice-Mayor’s succession to the office of the Mayor in this wise:
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is
when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s
disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast
the plurality of votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. xxx But the exception did not apply in favor
of Castillo simply because the second element was absent. xxx
On the other hand, Barbara Ruby was properly disqualified by the COMELEC En Banc from
assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. She was not a substitute candidate because
Ramon’s disqualification was confirmed only after the elections.
The ponencia’s reasoning would have been sound had Ruby been a candidate, who for one reason
or another simply cannot assume office. The harsh legal reality however is that she never was and
never became a candidate - a status which must be present before the doctrine of rejection of
second placer may apply - either through the ordinary method of filing within the period allowed by
law or through the extraordinary method of substitution. Ruby’s status is comparable to (or even
worse than) a candidate whose CoC was cancelled after the elections. As previously discussed, the
cancellation of a CoC signifies non-candidacy from the very start, i.e., before the elections, which
entitles the "second placer" to assume office. The same result should obtain in this case.
From the perspective of Vice Mayor Alcala’s intervention, Ruby did not validly assume the mayoralty
post and could not have done so as she was never a candidate with a valid CoC. To recall my earlier
discussions, it is only the CoC that gives a person the status of being a candidate. No person who is
not a candidate can win. Thus, Ruby despite being seated – never won. In the absence of any
permanent vacancy occurring in the Office of the Mayor of Lucena City, no occasion arises for the
application of the law on succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code58 and
established jurisprudence.59 Thus, I dissent as the petition of Vice-Mayor Roderick Alcala should
have failed.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo (G.R. No. 196804), p. 42.
2
Id. at 88-92.
3
Id. at 229.
4
5
Rollo (G.R. No. 196804), pp. 98-101.
6
Id. at 102-105.
7
Id. at 106-124.
8
Id. at 126-129.
9
Id. at 130-131.
10
Id. at 133-134.
11
Id. at 136.
12
Id. at 135-138.
13
Id. at 142-144.
14
Id. at 145.
15
Id. at 185-214.
16
Id. at 305-318.
17
Id. at 361-375.
18
Id. at 42-52.
19
Decision, p. 17.
20
Id. at 20.
21
373 Phil. 896, 908 (1999).
Prior to these laws, the applicable laws were the Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
22
R.A. No. 2264 (An Act Amending the Laws Governing Local Governments by Increasing
Their Autonomy and Reorganizing Provincial Governments); and B.P. Blg. 52 (An Act
Governing the Election of Local Government Officials).
See, however, Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended. Penera v. Commission on

23
Elections, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 574, 581-586, citing Lanot v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 114.
24
Section 73 of OEC reads:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the
same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he
files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of
them.
However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the
person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the
office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other
office or offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. [italics supplied]
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, however, adds that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts
or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon that start of the aforesaid
campaign period[.]" (italics supplied)
25
See Cipriano v. Commission on Elections, 479 Phil. 677, 689 (2004).
26
The statutory basis is Section 74 of OEC which provides:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is
eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the
political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding, a
certificate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, or
if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the
local civil registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the
case of a Muslim, his Hadji name after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage:
Provided, That when there are two or more candidates for an office with the same name and
surname, each candidate, upon being made aware of such fact, shall state his paternal and
maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to use the name and surname
stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also include one
nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport
size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not
exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642, 658 (1999). See also Bautista v. Commission on
27
Elections, 359 Phil. 1 (1998).
28
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 and Section 78 of OEC.
29
1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 26.
See Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA
30
96, 100-103.
31
Merriam-Webster’s 11th Collegiate Dictionary, p. 655.
32
If at all, only two grounds for disqualification under the Local Government Code may as
well be considered for the cancellation of a CoC, viz.: those with dual citizenship and
permanent residence in a foreign country, or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after January 1, 1992. It may be argued that
these two disqualifying grounds likewise go into the eligibility requirement of a candidate, as
stated under oath by a candidate in his CoC.
Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 179695 and 182369, December 18, 2008,
33
574 SCRA 782, 792-794.
34
See Section 7 of R.A. No. 6646.
35
Sections 68 and 12 of OEC cover these acts: (i) corrupting voters or election officials; (ii)
committing acts of terrorism to enhance candidacy; (iii) over spending; (iv) soliciting,
receiving or making prohibited contributions; (v) campaigning outside the campaign period;
(vi) removal, destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda; (vii) committing
prohibited forms of election propaganda; (viii) violating rules and regulations on election
propaganda through mass media; (ix) coercion of subordinates; (x) threats, intimidation,
terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion; (xi) unlawful electioneering;
(xii) release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds; (xiii) solicitation of votes or
undertaking any propaganda on the day of the election; (xiv) declaration as an insane; and
(xv) committing subversion, insurrection, rebellion or any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 387 (1999), citing Aznar v. Commission on
36
Elections, 185 SCRA 703 (1990).
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, 311 SCRA 602 [1999]; Borja v. Commission on

37
Elections 295 SCRA 157 (1998); Socrates v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154512,
November 12, 2002; Latasa v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 154829, December 10,
2003, 417 SCRA 601; Montebon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180444, April 9,
2008, 551 SCRA 50; Aldovino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 184836 December 23,
2009.
38
Supra note 36, at 386-389.
Loong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 93986, December 22, 1992, 216 SCRA 760,
39
765-766.
40
Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 6646.
41
Section 4(B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 reads:
SEC. 4. Procedure in filing petitions. - For purposes of the preceding sections, the following
procedure shall be observed:
xxxx
B. PETITION TO DISOUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68 OF THE

OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISOUALIFY FOR LACK OF
OUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SOME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
1. A verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC and the
verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some
grounds for disqualification may be filed on any day after the last day for filing of certificates
of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
42
Section 253 of OEC.
43
Section 15 of R.A. No. 9369.
44
Miranda v. Abaya, supra note 27, at 658-660.
45
See: Section 72, OEC; Section 6, R.A. No. 6646.
Section 77 of OEC expressly allows substitution of a candidate who is "disqualified for any
46
cause."
Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA
47
400, 424.
Cayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 163776 and 165736, April 24, 2007, 522
48
SCRA 23, 43-47; Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.

49
Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481, 501.
Separate from these considerations is the possibility that the candidacy of a third-termer
50
may be considered a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Nuisance candidacy, by itself, is a special situation that has merited its own independent
provision that calls for the denial or cancellation of the CoC if the bases required by law are
proven; thus, it shares the same remedy of cancellation for material misrepresentation on the
eligibility requirements. The possibility of being a nuisance candidate is not discussed as it is
not in issue in the case.
51
Supra note 41.
See comments at footnote 49 on the possibility of using the nuisance candidate provision
52
under Section 69 of the OEC.
See Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372, 385-
53
386.
54
Section 73 of the OEC states:
Section 73. Certificate of Candidacy – No person shall be eligible for any elective public
office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed…. [italics
supplied]
55
Rollo (G.R. No. 196804), pp. 56-59.
See the analogous ruling of Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642 (1999) on the principles of
56
valid substitution.
See the related case of Cayat v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007, 523 SCRA
57
23.
58
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Oj}ices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor
and Vice-Mayor. - (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor,
the vice-governor or vice-mayor shall become the governor or mayor.
xxxx
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official tills
a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to quality, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of
his office.
59
See Gonzales V. Comelec (G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 761, 800) where
the Court held that "the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. The votes intended
for the disqualified candidate should not be considered null and void, as it would amount to
disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. The second place is just that, a
second placer - he lost in the elections and was repudiated by either the majority or plurality
of voters."
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
MENDOZA, J.:
The subject consolidated petitions for certiorari seek to annul and set aside the En Banc Resolution
of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in SPC No. 10-024, dated May 20, 2011, which, among
others, ordered the respondent Vice-Mayor to succeed as Mayor of Lucena City, pursuant to Section
44 of the Local Government Code.
From the records, it appears that:
1] On December 1, 2009, Ramon Y. Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) filed
their respective Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) before the Commission on Elections
(Comelec.).
2] On December 5, 20U9, Castillo tiled the initiatory pleading, a petition, docketed as SPA
No. 09-029 (DC) and entitled, "In the Matter of the Petition To Deny Due Course or to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor For Having Already Served Three
(3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena," praying as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of

Candidacy filed by the respondent he denied due course to or cancel the same and
that he be declared as a disqualified candidate under the existing Election Laws and
by the provisions of the New Local Government Code." [Emphasis supplied]
3] On December 30, 2009, Ramon filed a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve SPA No. 09-
029 (DC) wherein he insisted that there was no misrepresentation on his part constituting a
ground for a denial of due course to his CoC or cancellation thereof, but in view of the ruling
in Aldovino,1 he acknowledged that he was indeed not eligible and disqualified to run as
Mayor of Lucena City, praying that
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the instant petition be SUBMITTED

for decision and that he be declared as DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of
Mayor of Lucena City in view of the new ruling laid down by the Supreme Court.
[Emphasis supplied]
4] On April 19, 2010, the Comelec First Division promulgated its resolution disqualifying
Ramon from running as Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 local elections, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, Ramon S. Talaga, Jr. is hereby DISQUALIFIED to run for Mayor of
Lucena City for the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections. [Emphases supplied]
5] On April 21, 2010, Ramon filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration in SPA No.
09-029.
6] On May 4, 2010, at 9:00 o’clock in the morning, Ramon filed an Ex Parte Manifestation of
Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for Reconsideration.
7] On the same day, May 4, 2010, at 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon, the wife of Ramon,
Barbara Ruby C. Talaga (Barbara Ruby), filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Lucena City, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued
by the Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had nominated Ramon.
8] On May 5, 2010, the Comelec En Banc, in SPC No. 10-024, issued an Order declaring the
April 19, 2010 Resolution disqualifying Ramon as having become final and executory, the
decretal portion of which reads:
... the Commission hereby orders as follows:
1] To NOTE the instant Manifestation; and
2] To consider the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the Commission First Division final
and executory.
SO ORDERED.
9] On May 10, 2010, the National and Local Elections were successfully conducted. The
name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted
in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate.
10] On May 11, 2010, Castillo filed before the Board of Canvassers of Lucena City a Petition
to Suspend Proclamation praying for the suspension of the proclamation of Ramon or
Barbara Ruby as the winning candidate.
11] On May 12, 2010, at around 5:17 o’clock in the afternoon, per City/Municipal Certificate
of Canvass, Barbara Ruby was credited with 44,099 votes while Castillo garnered 39,615
votes.
12] On May 13, 2010, the Comelec, in Resolution No. 8917, gave due course to the CoC of
Barbara Ruby as substitute candidate.
13] On the same day, May 13, 2010, the Board of Canvassers of Lucena City did not act on
Castillo’s Petition to Suspend Proclamation and proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the winning
candidate and elected Mayor of Lucena City.
14] Aggrieved, on May 20, 2010, Castillo filed his Petition (For Annulment of Proclamation of
Barbara Ruby C. Talaga as the Winning Candidate for Mayor of Lucena City, Quezon) with
the Comelec, which was docketed as SPC No. 10-024, arguing 1] that Barbara Ruby could
not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and 2]
that Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the Comelec En Banc had
approved her substitution three days after the elections. Hence, the votes cast for Ramon
should be considered stray.
15] On June 18, 2010, Barbara Ruby filed her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of
Proclamation contending that the substitution was valid on the ground that the Comelec En
Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramon’s CoC, despite a declaration of
disqualification as there was no finding of misrepresentation.
16] On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention and a Petition in Intervention,
asserting that he should assume the position of Mayor because Barbara Ruby’s substitution
was invalid and Castillo lost in the elections.
17] On January 11, 2011, the Comelec Second Division dismissed the petition of Castillo and
the motion to intervene of Alcala. It reasoned out, among others, that Resolution No. 8917
(allowing the substitution) became final and executory when Castillo failed to act after
receiving a copy thereof.
18] Not in conformity, both Castillo and Alcala filed their respective motions for
reconsideration of the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the Comelec Second Division for
being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Castillo argued 1] that the determination of the candidacy of a person could not be made after the
elections and then given retroactive effect; and 2] that the CoC of Ramon was in reality cancelled
and denied due course which consequently barred him from being substituted as a candidate.
Accordingly, he prayed that the votes cast in favor of both Ramon and Barbara Ruby be considered
stray and that he be proclaimed winner, being the qualified candidate with the highest number of
votes.
Alcala, in advocacy of his position, argued that 1] Resolution 8917 was based on erroneous set of
facts; and 2] there was no valid reason for the substitution as there was no withdrawal,
disqualification or death of another candidate.
Barbara Ruby, in her defense, countered that the ruling of the Comelec Second Division was in
accord with law and jurisprudence and that doubts as to the validity of the substitution should be
resolved in her favor as she received the mandate of the people of Lucena City.
19] On May 20, 2011, acting on the motions for reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc reversed the
January 11, 2011 Resolution of the Comelec Second Division reasoning out that 1] Resolution 8917
was issued without any adversarial proceedings as the interested parties were not given the
opportunity to be heard; 2] Resolution 8917 was based on erroneous set of facts because Barbara
Ruby filed her Certificate of Candidacy on May 4, 2010 at 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon, before the
Comelec acted on Ramon’s withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration on May 5, 2010, and so
premature; and 3 Barbara Ruby’s Certificate of Candidacy was filed out of time because she was
just another candidate, not a substitute.
It also ruled that Barbara Ruby being disqualified, the law on succession under Section 44 of the
Local Government Code should apply.
Accordingly, the Comelec En Banc decreed:

1. REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the Second
Division;
2. GRANTING the petition-in-intervention of Roderick Alcala;

Lucena City and CANCELLING the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation issued therefor;
the Local Government Code;
6. DIRECTING the Clerk of Court of the Commission to furnish copies of this Resolution to
the Office of the President of the Philippines, the Department of Interior and Local
Government, the Department of Finance and the Secretary of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Lucena City.
Let the Department of Interior and Local

Government and the Regional Election Director
of Region IV of COMELEC implement this
resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, these consolidated petitions of Castillo and Barbara Ruby.
In their respective petitions, both Barbara Ruby and Castillo pray, among others, that she or he be
declared as the winning candidate in the May 10, 2010 mayoralty election in Lucena City.
II – Nature of Petition under Section 78
As the records indicate, the controversy stemmed from the initiatory pleading filed by Castillo in SPA
No. 09-029 (DC) entitled, "In the Matter of the Petition To Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate
of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor For Having Already Served Three (3)
Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena," a petition filed under Section 78 of the the Omnibus
Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) which reads:
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
A certificate of candidacy is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office.2 Section 73 of the

Omnibus Election Code provides that no person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless
he files a sworn certificate of candicacy within the period fixed therein. Section 74 thereof provides
that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that he is eligible for the office he seeks
to run, and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of his knowledge. In the case of Sinaca v.
Mula,3 the Court had an occasion to elaborate on the nature of a CoC in this wise:
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the
candidate’s political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a
public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is
eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and
his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.
Thus, when Ramon filed his CoC before the COMELEC, he pronounced before the electorate his
intention to run for the mayoralty post and declared that he was "eligible" for the said office.
A petition filed under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is one of two remedies by which the
candidacy of a person can be questioned. The other is a petition under Section 68.4 In Mitra v.
Comelec,5 the nature of a petition under Section 78 was further explained as follows:
Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) governs the cancellation
of, and grant or denial of due course to, COCs. The combined application of these sections requires
that the candidate’s stated facts in the COC be true, under pain of the COC’s denial or cancellation if
any false representation of a material fact is made. To quote these provisions:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
the best of his knowledge.
xxxx
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing
not later than fifteen days before the election.
The false representation that these provisions mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact.
The critical material facts are those that refer to a candidate’s qualifications for elective office, such
as his or her citizenship and residence. The candidate’s status as a registered voter in the political
unit where he or she is a candidate similarly falls under this classification as it is a requirement that,
by law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious:
the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the political unit where he or she ran as a
candidate.
The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of
the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses
cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to
deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character
of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any
material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he
cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. [Emphases
supplied]
A- A Petition to Deny Due Course or

to Cancel a CoC under Section 78
is different from a Disqualification
Case and a Quo Warranto Case
In Fermin v. Comelec,6 it was stressed that "a ‘Section 78’ petition ought not to be interchanged or
confused with a ‘Section 68’ petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and
resulting in different eventualities." In the said case, it was written:
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68
of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is
false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is
merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all.
In Fermin, a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy was also
distinguished from a petition for quo warranto as follows:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on
the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is
false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is
noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a
material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section
78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the wining candidate. [Emphases in the original]
Also as can be gleaned from the foregoing, it was clearly stressed in Fermin that the denial of due
course to, or the cancellation of, the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding
that the candidate made a material representation that was false.
When it was stated in Fermin that the false material representation "may relate to the qualifications
required of the public office he/she is running for," it simply meant that it could cover one’s
qualifications. It was not, however, restricted to qualifications only. When word "may" was used, it
meant that it could relate to, or cover, any other material misrepresentation as to eligibility. Certainly,
when one speaks of eligibility, it is understood that a candidate must have all the constitutional and
statutory qualifications7 and none of the disqualifications.8 "Eligible x x relates to the capacity of
holding as well as that of being elected to an office."9 "Ineligibility" has been defined as a
"disqualification or legal incapacity to be elected to an office or appointed to a particular position."10
B - A person whose certificate is cancelled

or denied due course under Section 78
cannot be treated as a candidate at all
A cancelled certificate of candidacy cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid
votes.11 Much in the same manner as a person who filed no certificate of candidacy at all and a
person who filed it out of time, a person whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due
course is no candidate at all.12 The Court has been consistent on this. In Fermin, in comparing a
petition under Section 78 with a petition under Section 68, it was written: "While a person who is
disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all."
Thus, whether or not his CoC was cancelled before or after the election is immaterial, his votes
would still be considered stray as his certificate was void from the beginning.
C - A candidate disqualified by final judgment

before an election cannot be voted for,
and votes cast for him shall not be counted.
Granting arguendo that the petition is considered as one for disqualification, still, he cannot be voted
for and the votes for him cannot be counted if he was disqualified by final judgment before an
election. In Section 6 of R.A No. 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, it is clearly provided
that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast
for him shall not be counted. This provision of law was applied in the case of Cayat v.
Comelec,13 where it was written:
The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot
be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the
disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first
sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections,
which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the
first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be
voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became
final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in
Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng’s
proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none.
D - A candidate whose CoC has been cancelled
or denied due course cannot be substituted.
Section 7714 of the Omnibus Election Code enumerates the instances wherein substitution may be
allowed: They are death, disqualification and withdrawal of another. A candidate whose CoC has
been cancelled or denied due course cannot be substituted. This was the clear ruling in Miranda v.
Abaya,15 where it was written:
It is at once evident that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of
the electoral process. It cannot be taken lightly, lest there be anarchy and chaos. Verily, this explains
why the law provides for grounds for the cancellation and denial of due course to certificates of
candidacy.
After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood
why in Bautista we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this
principle to the case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that
only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably
cannot be any possible substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled
and denied due course. [Emphases supplied]
III – An assiduous assessment of the

factual situation leads to the conclusion
that Petitioner Castillo should have been
proclaimed mayor-elect of Lucena City
I concur with the majority that Ramon, having served as mayor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms, was ineligible to run again for the same position in the May 10, 2012 election as his
candidacy was proscribed by no less than the Constitution. Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
In line therewith, Section 43 of the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
x x x.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections,16 the Court held that the two conditions for the application
of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms. In Aldovino v. Comelec,17 the Court stressed that "preventive suspension, by its
nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to
avoid the three-term limitation."
Contending that Ramon was ineligible and must be disqualified to run again as Mayor, Castillo filed
before the Comelec a petition entitled, "In the Matter of the Petition To Deny Due Course or to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor For Having Already Served Three
(3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena," praying "that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by
the respondent be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a
Government Code."
Evidently, the petition filed was pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. On December
30, 2009, Ramon filed a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve SPA No. 09-029 (DC) wherein he
acknowledged that he was indeed not eligible and disqualified to run as Mayor of Lucena City. On
April 19, 2010, the Comelec First Division promulgated its Resolution "granting the petition of Castillo
and disqualifying Ramon to run for Mayor of Lucena City for the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections."
Specious, if not ludicrous, is the argument that there was nothing in the resolution from which it can
be deduced that the Comelec First Division cancelled, or denied due course to, Ramon’s CoC. Such
argument strains or tasks one’s credulity too much. Common sense dictates that when the Comelec
First Division granted the petition of Castillo, it, in effect, granted his prayer which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed
by the respondent be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a
Government Code." [Emphasis supplied]
Needless to state, the Comelec considered Ramon as having made material misrepresentation as
he was manifestly not eligible, having served as mayor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms. It
could not have been otherwise. A candidate who states in his CoC that he is "eligible," despite
having served the constitutional limit of three consecutive terms, is clearly committing a material
misrepresentation, warranting not only a cancellation of his CoC but also a proscription against
substitution.
As held in Bautista,18 Miranda,19 Gador,20 and Fermin,21 a person whose certificate is cancelled or

denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all and his votes will be
considered as stray as his certificate was void from the beginning. Also in Cayat,22 assuming that this
is a disqualification case, the rule is that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted.
Accordingly, when his CoC was denied due course or cancelled, Ramon was never considered a
candidate at all from the beginning.
Indeed, on April 21, 2010, Ramon filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, but on May 4, 2010, at
9:00 o’clock in the morning, he filed an Ex Parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion
for Reconsideration. His motion, in effect, rendered the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the Comelec
First Division as final and executory pursuant to Section 13, Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, which reads:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. - (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies and special reliefs; a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall
become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases, a decision or resolution of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a

Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special actions
and Special cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its
promulgation.
The reason is that a motion for reconsideration once withdrawn has the effect of cancelling such
motion as if it was never filed. In Rodriguez v. Aguilar,23 it was written:
Upon the withdrawal by respondent of his Motion for Reconsideration, it was as if no motion had
been filed. Hence, the Order of the trial court under question became final and executory 15 days
from notice by the party concerned.
In the same manner that the withdrawal of an appeal has the effect of rendering the appealed
decision final and executory, the withdrawal of the Motion for Reconsideration in the present case
had the effect of rendering the dismissal Order final and executory. By then, there was no more
complaint that could be amended, even for the first time as a matter of right.
Although the April 19, 2010 Resolution became final and executory on April 24, 2010, it has no effect
on Ramon’s candidacy or his purported substitute because his certificate was void from the
beginning. The date of the finality of the denial of due course or cancellation of a CoC has no
controlling significance because, as consistently ruled in Bautista,24 Miranda,25 Gador,26 and
Fermin,27 "the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
treated as a candidate at all."
No substitution in case of cancellation

or denial of due course of a CoC
As Ramon was never a candidate at all, his substitution by Barbara Ruby was legally ineffectual.
This was the clear ruling in the case of Miranda v. Abaya,28 where it was ruled that "considering that
Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution of a
person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course."
There being no valid substitution,

the candidate with the highest number
of votes should be proclaimed as the
duly elected mayor
As there was no valid substitution, Castillo, the candidate with the highest number of votes is entitled
to be, and should have been, proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. The reason is that he is the
winner, not the loser. He was the one who garnered the highest number of votes among the
recognized legal candidates who had valid CoCs. Castillo was not the second placer. He was the
first placer.
On this score, I have to digress from the line of reasoning of the majority and register my dissent.
The ruling in Cayat is applicable because, although the petition therein was for disqualification, the
CoC of Cayat was cancelled. At any rate, even granting that it is not exactly at all fours, the
undisputed fact is that Castillo’s petition is one under Section 78. That being the case, the applicable
rule is that enunciated in in Bautista,29 Miranda,30 Gador,31 and Fermin32 - "the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all."
The votes cast for him and those for his purported substitute could only be considered as stray and
could not be counted.
The Second Placer Doctrine
The second placer doctrine applies only in case of a vacancy caused by a disqualification under
Section 12 and Section 68 of the OEC and Section 40 of the LGC or quo warranto petition under
Section 253. When a winning candidate is disqualified under Section 12 and Section 68 of the
OEC and Section 40 of the LGC or unseated under Section 253, a vacancy is created and
succession under Section 44 of the the Local Government Code33 becomes operable. Section 44
provides:
CHAPTER II
Vacancies and Succession
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. - If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the
offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall
become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according
to their ranking as defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking
sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest
ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by
the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily
resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in the Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.
As stated therein, one of the causes for a vacancy is when a winning candidate fails to qualify or is
disqualified. The vacancy is created when a first placer is disqualified after the elections. This is very
clear because before an election, there is no first placer to speak of.
As the CoC of Ramon was cancelled, he was not a candidate at all. As he was not a candidate, he
could not be considered a first placer. The first placer was the bona fide candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes among the legally recognized candidates – Castillo.
As Ramon was not a candidate, his purported substitute, Barbara Ruby, was not a bona fide
candidate. There is, therefore, no vacancy, the only situation which could start the ball rolling for the
operation of the rule of succession under Rule 44 of the Local Government Code.
Granting arguendo that Castillo was

the second placer, the doctrine would
still not apply
Granting arguendo that Castillo was a second placer, the rejection of the second placer doctrine, first
enunciated in Labo v. Comelec,34 would still not apply in this situation. In Labo and similarly situated
cases, it was ruled that "the subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to
be declared the winner." The Labo ruling, however, is not applicable in the situation at bench for two
reasons: First, Ramon was not a candidate as he was disqualified by final judgment before the
elections; and Second, the situation at bench constitutes a clear exception to the rule as stated in
Labo v. Comelec,35 Cayat v. Comelec36 and Grego v. Comelec.37
On the first ground, in Cayat, it was ruled that Labo is applicable only when there is "no final
judgment of disqualification before the elections." Specifically, Cayat reads:
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, does
not apply to the present case because in Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before
the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of
other cases because the judgment declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other
cases had not become final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the
doctrine on the rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition — the
disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential condition
does not exist in the present case. [Emphases supplied]
In this case, the cancellation of Ramon’s CoC because of his disqualification became final before the
May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.
The only other instance that a second placer is allowed to be proclaimed instead of the first placer is
when the exception laid down in Labo v. Comelec, Cayat v. Comelec and Grego v. Comelec is
applicable. In Grego, it was held that "the exception is predicated on the concurrence of two
assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2)
the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate."
In this case, the two assumptions have been satisfied: 1] the cancellation of Ramon’s CoC became
final before the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections and 2] the electorate was conscious of
the circumstances surrounding Ramon’s candidacy and subsequent disqualification. The fact that
Ramon was a renowned political figure in Lucena City, owing to his three (3) consecutive terms as
mayor therein, cannot be denied. Verily, the people of Lucena City were fully aware of the
circumstances of his candidacy, but still voted for Ramon despite his notorious ineligibility for the
post.
The gratuitous presumption that the votes for Ramon were cast in the sincere belief that he was a
qualified candidate is negated by the electorate’s awareness that Ramon had long-served as mayor
of the city for almost a decade. This cannot be classified as an innocuous mistake because the
proscription was prescribed by the Constitution itself. Indeed, voting for a person widely known as
having reached the maximum term of office set by law was a risk which the people complacently
took. Unfortunately, they misapplied their franchise and squandered their votes when they supported
the purported substitute, Barbara Ruby. Thus, the said votes could only be treated as stray, void, or
meaningless.
In view of all the foregoing, I vote that the petition of Barbara Ruby be DENIED and the petition of
Castillo be GRANTED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Aldovino , Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, 609
SCRA 235, where it was ruled that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary
incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the three-term limit rule.
Bellosillo, Marquez and Mapili, Effective Litigation & Adjudication of Election Contests, 2012
2
Ed., p. 47.
3
G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999, 315 SCRA 266, 276.
4
Gonzales v. Comelec, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 761.
5
G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
6
7
Section 39 and 6 of Article VI and Sections 2 and 3 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 39 of the LGC.
8
Sections 12 and 68 of the OEC and Section 40 of the LGC.
9
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Vol. I, Eighth ed., p. 1002.
Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., p. 698; and Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Vol. I, Eighth ed., p.
10
1552.
11
Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998, 298 SCRA 480.
12
Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642 (1999). See also Gador v. Comelec, 184 Phil 395 (1980).
13
G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23.
14
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after
the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate
nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the
election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates
to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
15
370 Phil. 642 (1999).
16
370 Phil. 625 (1999).
17
18
Supra note 11.
19
Supra note 12.
20
Supra note 12.
21
Supra note 6.
22
G.R. No. 163776, April 24 2007, 522 SCRA 23.
23
G.R. No. 159482, 505 Phil. 468 (2005).
24
Supra note 11.
25
Supra note 12.
26
Supra note 12.
27
Supra note 6.
28
Supra note 9.
29
Supra note 11.
30
Supra note 12.
31
Supra note 12.
32
Supra note 6.
33
Republic Act No. 7160; An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991.
34
257 Phil. 1 (1989).
35
Id.
36
G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23.
37
G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481, 501.
DISSENTING OPINION
ABAD, J.:
I must disagree with the majority opinion penned by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin.
The Facts and the Case
On December I, 2009 Ramon Talaga and Philip Castillo filed their respective certificates of
candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor of Lucena City in the scheduled May 10, 2010
elections.1 Four days later on December 5, 2009 Castillo filed a petition2 before the Commission of
Elections (COMELEC) for denial or cancellation of Ramon Talaga's COC, alleging that the latter had
already served three consecutive terms as mayor and was, consequently, disqualified to run for
another term.3
Ramon countered that the three-term limit rule did not apply to him since the Sandiganbayan
preventively suspended him from office during his second and third terms4 in connection with
Criminal Case 27738. In support of his contention, Ramon cited the COMELEC resolution in
Aldovino v. Asilo5 which held that the terms during which an elected official was preventively
suspended should not be counted for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. Parenthetically,
the cited COMELEC resolution was still pending consideration by the Supreme Court in G.R.
184836, entitled "Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections."6
Eventually, on December 23, 2009 the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the COMELEC
resolution in Aldovino that Ramon invoked.7 The Court held that preventive suspension does not
constitute interruption of a term or loss of office. Such suspension amounts to a mere temporary
incapacity of an elected official to perform the service demanded by his office. Thus, preventive
suspension is not a valid ground for avoiding the three-term limit rule.
In view of the Supreme Court decision in Aldovino, on December 30, 2009 Ramon filed with the
COMELEC a manifestation with motion to resolve,8 conceding the fact of his disqualification for a
fourth term. Acting on his motion, on April 19, 2010 the COMELEC First Division issued a resolution,
granting Castillo’s petition and disqualifying Ramon.9
Ramon filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division’s April 19, 2010
resolution10 but, before the COMELEC En Banc could act on his motion, he filed at 9:00 a.m. on May
4, 2010 an ex parte manifestation withdrawing the motion.11 At 4:30 p.m. on the same date, Barbara
Ruby Talaga (Ruby) filed a COC for mayor of Lucena City in substitution of her husband Ramon.
She attached a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) from Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the
party that nominated Ramon.12
Meanwhile, acting on Ramon’s ex parte manifestation, the COMELEC En Banc issued an order on
May 5, 2010, declaring the Division’s April 19, 2010 resolution that disqualified him final and
executory.13 Three days later or on May 8, 2010, the COMELEC Law Department wrote a
memorandum to the COMELEC En Banc, recommending that Ruby’s COC be given due course.14
In the meantime, the automated elections took place two days later on May 10, 2010. Inevitably,
although it was Ramon’s name that was on the pre-printed ballot, the votes cast for that name were
counted for Ruby, his substitute candidate. She got 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes.
Castillo promptly filed a petition before the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) asking for the
suspension of Ruby’s proclamation on the ground that the issue of her substitution of her husband
was still pending before the COMELEC.15 As it happened, acting on the COMELEC Law
Department’s memorandum, on May 13, 2010 the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution
8917, giving due course to Ruby’s COC and CONA and directing her inclusion in the certified list of
candidates. In view of this, the CBOC proclaimed Ruby winner in the mayoralty race.16
On May 20, 2010 Castillo filed with the COMELEC’s Second Division a petition for annulment of
Ruby’s proclamation in SPC 10-024, alleging that she could not substitute Ramon, whose COC had
been cancelled and denied due course. Citing Miranda v. Abaya,17 Castillo pointed out the denial or
cancellation of Ramon’s COC made it impossible for Ruby to substitute him since, to begin with, he
did not have a valid candidacy. And Ruby could not be considered a candidate since the COMELEC
approved her substitution three days after the elections. Castillo concluded that the votes for Ramon
should be considered stray.18
In her comment on the petition before the COMELEC,19 Ruby insisted that she validly substituted her
husband since the COMELEC En Banc in fact approved through Resolution 8917 its Law
Department’s finding that Ramon was disqualified. The En Banc had no occasion to deny due
course to or cancel Ramon’s COC. Notably, Castillo failed to appeal Resolution 8917. Further, the
COMELEC First Division’s April 19, 2010 resolution merely declared Ramon disqualified from
running for a fourth term. It made no finding that he committed misrepresentation, the ground for
denial or cancellation of his COC.
Ruby also insisted that the COMELEC did not have to approve her substitution of Ramon since the
law even allowed a substitute to file his COC before the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) if the
cause for substitution occurs immediately prior to election day. Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.)
9006 is also explicit that, in case of valid substitution, the rule considering votes cast for a
substituted candidate as stray votes shall not apply if the substitute candidate has the same family
name as the one he replaces. Thus, votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her favor.
On July 26, 2010 respondent Roderick A. Alcala (Alcala), the elected vice-mayor of Lucena City,
sought to intervene in the case. He claimed that, since Ruby’s substitution was invalid and Castillo
clearly lost the elections, he should assume the post of mayor under the rules of electoral
succession.20
In a resolution dated January 11, 2011,21 the COMELEC’s Second Division dismissed Castillo’s
petition and Alcala’s petition-in-intervention. It held, first, that COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution 8917,
which had become final and executory, already settled the issue of Ruby’s substitution; second, that
the Miranda v. Abaya22 ruling did not apply since Castillo’s petition cited no material
misrepresentation that could be ground for cancellation of Ramon’s COC; and, third, the Omnibus
Election Code does not require the COMELEC to first approve a substitution before it can take
effect.
Upon Castillo and Alcala’s motion for reconsideration, however, on May 20, 2011 the COMELEC En
Banc issued a resolution,23 reversing the Second Division’s ruling. The En Banc held a) that
Resolution 8917 could not attain finality since the COMELEC issued it merely as an incident of its
ministerial duty to receive COCs of substitute candidates; and b) that COMELEC issued Resolution
8917 without hearing the interested parties on the issue of substitution.
Further, the COMELEC En Banc found that Resolution 8917 was based on the wrong facts. Ruby
filed her COC at 4:30 p.m. on May 4, 2010, not on May 5 as the resolution stated. The COMELEC
resolved to disqualify Ramon with finality only on May 5. Consequently, Ruby could not have
properly substituted Ramon; she simply became an additional candidate who filed her COC out of
time. Thus, said the En Banc, Vice-Mayor Alcala should succeed to the position pursuant to Section
44 of the Local Government Code. Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. dissented from the majority.
Ruby and Castillo assailed the COMELEC En Banc’s resolution via these consolidated petitions for
certiorari and prohibition. On June 21, 2011 the Court issued a status quo ante order in G.R.
196804.24
Issues Presented
Was Ramon merely disqualified from running for mayor or was his COC in fact cancelled or denied
due course?
Did Ruby validly substitute Ramon as candidate for mayor of Lucena City?
Discussion
There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an election: a petition for
disqualification, and a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC. The majority holds that, in
resolving the case before it, the COMELEC had in fact denied due course to and cancelled
Ramon’s COC.
I disagree. Although Castillo denominated his petition as one for cancellation or denial of due course
to Ramon’s COC and sought the same relief, it did not raise any of the specified grounds for such
action under Sections 69 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code that read:
Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. – The Commission may motu proprio or upon verified petition of an
interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that
said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause
confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run
for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate.
xxxx
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 69 refers to nuisance candidates. Section 78, on the other hand, treats of material
misrepresentation in the COC. Castillo’s petition made no claim that Ramon was a nuisance
candidate or that he made some material misrepresentation in his COC. All that the petition raised
against Ramon’s candidacy is the fact that he had already served three consecutive terms as mayor.
Castillo of course points out that by filing a COC for mayor after he had already served three
consecutive terms, Ramon actually misrepresented the fact of his eligibility for that office, knowing
that it was not the case. But this argument is unavailing because at the time Ramon filed his COC
the COMELEC’s official stand, supported by this Court’s decision in Borja, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,25 was that the terms during which an elected official was preventively suspended should
not be counted for purposes of applying the three-term limit. It was only on December 23, 2009,
nearly a month after Ramon filed his COC, that the Supreme Court reversed in Aldovino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections the election body’s official stand.
Thus, it cannot be said that Ramon knowingly misrepresented his eligibility when he filed his COC.
While Castillo denominated his petition as one to deny due course to or cancel Ramon’s COC, and
prayed for such remedies, the basic rule is that the nature of an action is governed by the allegations
in the petition, not by its caption or prayer. We cannot rely simply on the fact that the COMELEC
resolution granted the petition without making any qualifications. A closer reading of the resolution
will show that Ramon was merely being disqualified for having served three consecutive terms. It
made no mention of Ramon’s COC as having been cancelled or denied due course, and indeed
gave no grounds which would justify such a result. The ponencia cites
Miranda v. Abaya26 to justify its stand, but fails to note that in Miranda the Court found that there was
blatant misrepresentation, which is in clear contrast to this case.
On the issue of substitution, the law specifically provides that a candidate who has been disqualified
for any cause may be substituted by another. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa 881) states:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. – If after the last day for the
filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Castillo cites Miranda v. Abaya27 as justification for rejecting the substitution of Ramon by Ruby. But
the substitution that the Court did not allow in Miranda is the substitution of a candidate whose COC
has been ordered cancelled on the grounds enumerated in Sections 69 and 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. The reasoning is that it is not possible to substitute such a person since he cannot be
considered a candidate at all. Substitution presupposes the existence of a candidate to be
substituted.
Miranda recognized that it is possible for a disqualified candidate to have a valid COC since the
grounds for disqualification are distinct from the grounds for canceling or denying due course to a
COC under Sections 69 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, it does not follow that a
disqualified candidate necessarily filed an invalid COC. A disqualified candidate whose COC was
neither canceled nor denied due course may be substituted under the proper circumstances
provided by law.
Going to another point, it will be recalled that the COMELEC First Division disqualified Ramon from
running for mayor on April 19, 2010 upon Castillo’s petition. Ramon filed a motion for reconsideration
which went up to the COMELEC En Banc but at 9:00 a.m. on May 4, 2010 he filed an ex parte
manifestation withdrawing his motion for reconsideration. In the afternoon of the same day, Ruby
filed her COC, admittedly before the COMELEC En Banc could act on Ramon’s withdrawal of his
motion for reconsideration. Only on the following day, May 5, did the COMELEC En Banc
acknowledge the withdrawal and considered the First Division’s April 19, 2010 resolution final and
executory.28
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) joined Alcala and Castillo in claiming that Ruby did not
validly substitute Ramon because at the time that she filed her COC, the COMELEC had not yet
disqualified Ramon by final judgment as required by Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.
But Ramon’s withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration in the morning of May 4, 2010 rendered
the COMELEC First Division’s April 19, 2010 resolution final and executory, even without the En
Banc’s formal action. The Court held in Rodriguez, Jr. v. Aguilar, Sr.29 that a motion for
reconsideration, once withdrawn, has the effect of canceling such motion as if it were never filed.
The consequence of this is that the decision subject of the withdrawn motion for reconsideration ipso
facto lapses into finality upon the expiration of period for appeal. Thus, in accordance with
COMELEC Rules, the April 19, 2010 resolution became final and executory five days from its
promulgation or on April 24, 2010.30
The May 5, 2010 COMELEC En Banc resolution merely confirmed the final and executory nature of
the First Division’s April 19, 2010 resolution. As correctly observed by Chairman Brillantes in his
dissent, the withdrawal’s effectivity cannot be made to depend on COMELEC approval because, if
such were the case, substitution of candidates may be frustrated by either the commission’s delay or
inaction.
Castillo claims that, for the substitution of a candidate to be effective, the COMELEC must approve
the same on or before election day.31 Here, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution 8917 which
approved Ruby’s COC on May 13, 2010 or three days after the elections.
But no law makes the effectivity of a substitution hinge on prior COMELEC approval. Indeed, it
would be illogical to require such prior approval since the law allows a substitute candidate to file his
COC even up to mid-day of election day with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate. Surely, this rules out the possibility of securing prior COMELEC
approval of the substitution.
COMELEC Resolution 8917, which gave due course to Ruby’s COC and directed her inclusion in
the certified list of candidates, amounted to a mere formality since the substitution took effect when
she filed her COC and the required CONA.
Finally, I would like to voice my concern regarding Justice Arturo D.Brion’s view on the applicability
of the three-term limit rule as a ground for disqualification. In his separate opinion, Justice Brion
opines that a candidate who has already served three consecutive terms can only be disqualified
after he has been proclaimed as the winner for fourth term. His theory is that the Constitution merely
prohibits an official from serving more than three consecutive terms; it does not prohibit him from
running for a fourth term.
Such an interpretation, however, would cause confusion in the polls and make a mockery of the
election process. It robs qualified candidates of the opportunity of being elected in a fair contest
among qualified candidates. The candidacy of one who has already served three consecutive terms
is worse than that of a nuisance candidate. Election laws should be interpreted in such a way as to
best determine the will of the electorate, not to defeat it. The Supreme Court has on occasion upheld
the disqualification of candidates who have already served three consecutive terms from running for
another. Indeed in Aldovino, penned by no other than Justice Brion himself, the dispositive portion
read: "The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to
serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term."32 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, while Justice Brion likewise concludes that the action before the COMELEC was a petition for
disqualification and not for the denial or cancellation of his COC, I cannot entirely agree with his
reasoning.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Barbara Ruby Talaga in G.R. 196804, and DISMISS
the petition of Philip M. Castillo in G.R. 197015 for lack of merit.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, G.R. 196804, pp. 218, 220.
2
Docketed as SPA 09-029 (DC:); id at 88-91.
3
Id.
4
For the periods of October 13 to November 14, 2005 and September 4 to October 30, 2009;
id at 229.
Issued by the COMU .EC's Second Division 011 November 21l, 2007 and affirmed by the
5
COMELEC En Banc on October 7, 2008.
6
December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 234.
7
Id. at 266.
8
Rollo, G.R. 196804, pp. 98-101.
9
Id. at 102-105.
10
Id. at 106-124.
11
Id. at 126.
12
Id. at 130-131.
13
Id. at 133-134.
14
Id. at 176-179.
15
Id. at 135-138.
16
Id. at 142-145.
17
370 Phil. 642 (1999).
18
Rollo, G.R. 196804, pp. 185-214.
19
Id. at 283-298.
20
Id. at 305-318.
21
Id. at 361-375.
22
Supra note 17.
23
Rollo, G.R. 196804, pp. 42-52.
24
Id. at 506-507.
25
356 Phil. 467 (1998).
26
Supra note 17.
27
Id.
28
Rollo, G.R. 196804, pp. 490-491, 527-529.
29
505 Phil. 468 (2005).
Part IV, Rule 18, Section 13(b) in relation to Part V, B, Rule 25 of the 1993 COMELEC
30
Rules of Procedure.
31
Rollo, G.R. 197015, pp. 35-36.
32
Supra note 6, at 266-267.

SEPARATE OPINION
REYES, J.:
I concur with the ponencia’s conclusion that Section 44 of the Local Government Code (LGC) should
be applied in filing the permanent vacancy created in the office of the mayor. However, I hold a
different view on the nature of the petition filed to challenge of Ramon Talaga (Ramon).
The petition filed against Ramon is

one for disqualification and not for
cancellation of certificate of
candidacy (COC).
It is well to remember that Philip Castillo (Castillo) challenged Ramon’s candidacy by filing a petition
which seeks to deny due course or cancel the COC of the latter on the ground that he already
served three (3) consecutive terms as City Mayor of Lucena. I am of the view that the petition must
be treated as one for disqualification since the ground used to support the same, i.e. the violation of
the three-term limit, is a disqualifying circumstance which prevents a candidate from pursuing his
candidacy.
Indeed, the violation of the three-term limit is not specifically enumerated as one of the grounds for
the disqualification of a candidate under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) or
Section 40 of the LGC. Similarly, however, the same ground is not particularly listed as a ground for
petition for cancellation of COC under Section 78 of the OEC, in relation to Section 74 thereof. The
mentioned provisions read:
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
the best of his knowledge.
The debate in the categorization of the violation of the three-term limit stemmed from the statement
of the candidate in his COC that "he is eligible to the office he seeks to be elected to." The ponencia
took this statement to embrace the candidate’s express declaration that he had not served the same
position for three (3) consecutive terms. With all due respect, I believe it is reading beyond the plain
meaning of the statement. The COC is a declaration by the candidate of his eligibility specifically that
he possesses all the qualifications required by the office. The candidate is, in effect, declaring that
he possesses the minimum or basic requirements of the law for those intending to run for public
office. These requirements are stated in the following provisions of the Constitution and the LGC:
Sections 3 and 6 of Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on
the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter,
and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born

citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to
read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election.
Sections 2 and 3 of Article VII of the Constitution:
Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Sec. 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office
and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may be removed from office in the
same manner as the President.
xxxx
Section 39 of the LGC:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxxx
(c) Candidates for the position of Mayor or Vice-Mayor of independent component cities, component
cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
Basically, the qualifications for running for public office relate to age, residence, citizenship and
status as registered voter. These facts are material as they are determinative of the fitness of the
candidate for public office. In imposing these qualifications, the law seeks to confine the right to
participate in the electoral race to individuals who have reached the age when they can seriously
reckon the significance of the responsibilities they wish to assume and who are, at the same time,
familiar with the current state and pressing needs of the community.
Thus, when a candidate declares in his COC that he is eligible to the office for which he seeks to be
elected, he is attesting to the fact that he possesses all the qualifications to run for public office. It
must be deemed to refer only to the facts which he expressly states in his COC, and not to all other
facts or circumstances which can be conveniently subsumed under the term "eligibility" for the
simple reason that they can affect one’s status of candidacy. To hold the contrary is to stretch the
concept of "eligibility" and, in effect, add a substantial qualification before an individual may be
allowed to run for public office.
On the other hand, the grounds for disqualification pertain to acts committed by an aspiring local
servant, or to a circumstance, status or condition which renders him unfit for public service.
Possession of any of the grounds for disqualification forfeits the candidate of the right to participate
in the electoral race notwithstanding the fact he has all the qualifications required under the law for
those seeking an elective post.
The violation of the three-term limit is a circumstance or condition which bars a candidate from
running for public office. It is thus a disqualifying circumstance which is properly a ground for a
petition for disqualification.
Section 44 of the LGC was properly

applied in filling the permanent
vacancy in the office of the mayor.
I agree with the ponencia’s conclusion that Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice-Mayor
should succeed to the office of the mayor. Section 44 of the LGC clearly states:
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice
Mayor.  If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc affirmed Ramon’s disqualification on May 5,

2010. This eventuality could have given Castillo, the candidate who received the second highest
number of votes, the right to be proclaimed to the office of the mayor. However, it must be noted that
the COMELEC gave due course to Barbara Ruby Talaga’s (Barbara) COC as substitute candidate
for Ramon and was even proclaimed Mayor of Lucena City. It was only after the elections that a
petition was filed to challenge Barbara’s eligibility and was ruled upon by the COMELEC.
Specifically, on January 11, 2011, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition and the
petition-in-intervention filed by Alcala. However, on May 20, 2011, the COMELEC en banc issued a
Resolution, reversing the ruling of the Second Division, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
1. REVERSING and SETTING SIDE the January 11, 2011 Resolution of the Second
Division;
2. GRANTING the petition-in-intervention of Roderick A. Alcala;

Lucena City and CANCELLING the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation issued
therefore;
the LGC;
xxxx
Upon the finality of the foregoing resolution, a permanent vacancy was created in the office of the
mayor which therefore must be filled in accordance with Section 44 of the LGC.
Castillo, the candidate who received the second highest number of votes, cannot be deemed to have
won the elections. It is well-settled that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does
not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office. The votes intended for the
disqualified candidate should not be considered null and void, as it would amount to disenfranchising
the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.1 The lone instance when the second placer can take the
stead of a disqualified candidate was pronounced in Labo v. COMELEC,2 viz:
If the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their
votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
Based on the circumstances obtaining in this case, Barbara’s disqualification was not notoriously
known in Lucena City since the COMELEC was only able to rule on her disqualification after the
elections. Thus, during the election day, the electorate reasonably assumed that Barbara is a
qualified candidate and that the votes they cast in her favor will not be misapplied. Little did they
know that the candidate they voted for will eventually be disqualified and ousted out of office.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petitions.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 761.
2
G.R. No. 105111, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297.

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.R. No.

196804 October 9, 2012

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 197015

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

2. GRANTING the petition in intervention of Roderick A. Alcala;

3. ANNULLING the election and proclamation of respondent Barbara C. Talaga as mayor of

the office he was seeking to be elected to.

The pertinent portions of Castillo’s petition follow:

The petition prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena City. 19

The petitions lack merit.

Existence of a valid CoC is a condition

circumstances may result from the granting of the petitions, to wit:

Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a

Declaration of Ramon’s disqualification

must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, thus:

Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

The Court rules that it was.

(Rollo, p. 31; Emphasis ours.)

(p.43, Rollo; Emphasis ours.)

Elected Vice Mayor must succeed

City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Rollo (G.R. No. 196804), pp. 50-51.

Id. at 94, 96.

Rollo (G.R. No. 196804), pp. 99-100.

December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601.

petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of

In Re: COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election System in

Section 7. Motion for reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a Decision, Resolution,

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Section 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. –

(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a

Section 5. Promulgation. - The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the Commission or a

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

The CoC and the Qualifications for its Filing.

A necessarily related provision is Section 39 of LGC 1991 which states:

The Concept of Disqualification and

d. Those with dual citizenship;

e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;

g. The insane or feeble-minded.

Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of

As to the period for filing:

As to the effects of a successful suit:

Violation of the three-term limit rule

a. The Three-Term Limit Rule.

b. Is the Rule an Eligibility Requirement or a Disqualification?

terms immediately before filing his application.

c. Filing of Petition and Effects.

To be sure, a constitutional breach cannot be allowed to remain unattended because of the

I shall consider the case on the basis of these positions.