Pangan v. Gatbalite
Pangan v. Gatbalite
Pangan v. Gatbalite
490 Phil. 49
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. NO. 141718, January 21, 2005
BENJAMIN PANGAN Y RIVERA, PETITIONER, VS. HON.
LOURDES F. GATBALITE, AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANGELES CITY, BRANCH
56, AND COL. JAMES D. LABORDO, AS THE CITY JAIL
WARDEN OF ANGELES CITY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 56, rendered on January 31, 2000.[1]
The facts of this case are undisputed. The petitioner was indicted for simple
seduction in Criminal Case No. 85-816, at the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles
City, Branch 3.
During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, counsel for petitioner,
submitted the case for decision without offering any evidence, due to the
petitioner’s constant absence at hearings.
On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged
and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto
mayor.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court.
On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in
the court of origin. Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not
appear. Notice to petitioner was returned unserved with the notation that he
no longer resided at the given address. As a consequence, he also failed to
appear at the scheduled promulgation. The court of origin issued an order
directing the recording of the decision in the criminal docket of the court and
an order of arrest against the petitioner.[2]
Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was
apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24,
2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City. He impleaded as respondent the Acting Chief of
Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga.[3] Petitioner contended that his arrest was
illegal and unjustified on the grounds that:
(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor
prescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal
Code, and
After his transfer to the City Jail of Angeles City on January 25, 2000, petitioner
filed an Amended Petition with the Regional Trial Court, impleading herein
respondent Col. James D. Labordo, the Jail Warden of Angeles City, as
respondent.[5]
In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioner’s detention was pursuant to
the order of commitment (mittimus), issued by Marlon P. Roque, Clerk of Court
III of the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3, dated January 25,
2000.[6]
On January 31, 2000, respondent Judge rendered the decision, which is the
subject of this present appeal, which pronounced:
SO ORDERED.
From the above quoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition for review
on a question purely of law and raised the following issue:
The Decision subject of this appeal, which was based on the 1952
ruling rendered in Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122, 92 Phil. 310, is,
petitioner most respectfully submits, not good case law. It imposes
upon the convict a condition not stated in the law. It is contrary to
the spirit, nature or essence of prescription of penalties, creates an
ambiguity in the law and opens the law to abuse by government.
That, as the respondent RTC Judge noted, petitioner did not attend
the trial at the Municipal Trial Court and the promulgation of his
judgment of conviction in August 9, 1991 is of no moment. His
bond for provisional release was surely cancelled and an order of
arrest was surely issued against petitioner. The undisputed fact is that
on August 9, 1991 the judgment of conviction was promulgated in
absentia and an order for petitioner’s arrest was issued by the
Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch III.
The Regional Trial Court based its decision on the case of Infante v. Warden[11].
In said case, Infante, the petitioner, was convicted of murder and was sentenced
to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal. After serving
fifteen years, seven months and eleven days, he was granted a conditional
pardon. The condition was that “he shall not again violate any of the penal laws
of the Philippines.” Ten years after his release on conditional pardon, Infante
was found guilty by a Municipal Court for driving without a license. Infante
was immediately ordered rearrested for breach of the condition of his pardon.
One of the issues raised by Infante in his petition,
xxx was that the remitted penalty for which the petitioner had been
recommitted to jail – one year and 11 days – had prescribed. xxx [12]
A perusal of the facts in Infante v. Warden reveals that it is not on all fours with
the present case. In Infante, the convict was on conditional pardon when he was
re-arrested. Hence, he had started serving sentence but the State released him.
In the present case, the convict evaded service of sentence from the start, and
was arrested eight years later.
The RTC decision, however, must stand, since it is in accord with applicable
decisions of this Court. The issue raised by petitioner is not novel. Article 93
of the Revised Penal Code[14] has been interpreted several times by the Court.
The case of Tanega v. Masakayan[15] falls squarely within the issues of the
present case. In that case, petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear on the
day of the execution of her sentence. On the same day, respondent judge
issued a warrant for her arrest. She was never arrested. More than a year later,
petitioner through counsel moved to quash the warrant of arrest, on the
ground that the penalty had prescribed. Petitioner claimed that she was
convicted for a light offense and since light offenses prescribe in one year, her
penalty had already prescribed. The Court disagreed, thus:
xxx
In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo[17], the Court cited and reiterated Tanega. Petitioner,
Del Castillo, was charged for violation of Section 178 (nn) of the 1978 Election
Code. The trial court found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of 1 year
as minimum to 3 years as maximum. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court in toto. During the execution of judgment on
October 14, 1987, petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge issued an
order of arrest and the confiscation of his bond. Petitioner was never
apprehended. Ten years later, petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant of
arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed upon him had already
prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial court. Del Castillo, on a petition
for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, questioned the denial by the trial court.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon denial of
his Motion for Reconsideration, Del Castillo raised the matter to this Court.
The Court decided against Del Castillo and after quoting the ratio decidendi of
the Court of Appeals in full, it ratiocinated, thus:
The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any
compelling reason to deviate from our earlier pronouncement clearly
exemplified in the Tanega case.
Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court pronounces that the
prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies
only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence
which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of
penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping
during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of
liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a consequence never evaded
sentence by escaping during the term of his service, the period for prescription
never began.
Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two months
and one day of arresto mayor and should forthwith be released unless he is being
detained for another offense or charge.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[2] RTC Decision, SP. PROC. No. 5784; Rollo, pp. 26 – 27.
[3] Rollo, p. 6.
[4] Rollo, p. 6.
[5] Id.
[8] Rollo, p. 9.
[14] The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the
date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be
interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to
some foreign country with which this Government as no extradition treaty, or
should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of
prescription.
[15] 125 Phil 966 (1967).