FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-25920. January 30, 1970.]

CCC INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

( Fourth Division ) and CARLOS F. ROBES, respondents.

Kalaw & Felipe for petitioner.

Adalia B. Francisco for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. MOTOR VEHICLES; MOTOR VEHICLES OFFICE; LICENSE, PRIMA FACIE

PROOF OF QUALIFICATION TO DRIVE. — The issuance of a driving license without
previous examination does not necessarily imply that the license issued is invalid. It is
proof that the Motor Vehicles O ce o cial considered Reyes, the driver of the insured-
appellee, quali ed to operate motor vehicles, and the insured was entitled to rely upon
such license. As the law stood in 1961, when the claim arose, the examinations could
be dispensed with in the discretion of the Motor Vehicles Office officials.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; PRACTICE OF DELEGATING
RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE TO COMMISSIONER, AUTHORIZED. — There is nothing
basically wrong with the practice of delegating to a commissioner, usually the clerk of
court, who is a duly sworn court o cer, the reception of both parties and for him to
submit a report thereon to the court. In fact, this procedure is expressly sanctioned by
Revised Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.
3. ID.; ID.; ISSUES NOT SEASONABLY RAISED, DEEMED WAIVED. — We note
that the issue that the proceedings in the trial court were irregular and invalid was
brought up by the appellant insurance company for the rst time only in its motion for
reconsideration led in the Court of Appeals. It was not raised in the trial court, where
the defect could still be remedied. This circumstance precludes ventilation of the issue
of validity of the hearing at this stage; for, if such irregularity is to vitiate the proceeding,
the question should have been seasonably raised, i.e., either before the parties
proceeded with the hearing or before the court handed down its ruling (Perlas vs.
Ehrman, 53 Phil. 607). It is a procedural point that can be waived by consent of the
parties, express or implied. (Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. PSC, I-5458, 16 September
1953)

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L., J : p

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, a rming that of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City) allowing insurance indemni cation of
plaintiff for his damaged car and the payment of attorney's fees.
The following facts are not in dispute:
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 On 1 March 1961, Carlos F. Robes took an insurance, with the CCC Insurance
Corporation, on his Dodge Kingsway car against loss or damage through accident for
an amount not exceeding P8,000.00 (Policy No. MC-1156). On 25 June 1961, and
during the effectivity of the policy, the insured vehicle, while being driven by the owner's
driver, became involved in a vehicle collision along Rizal Avenue Extension, Potrero,
Malabon, Rizal The car was damaged, and the repair was estimated to cost P5,300.00.
As the insurance company refused either to pay for the repair or to cause the
restoration of the car to its original condition, Robes instituted Civil Case No. Q-6063 in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal for recovery not only of the amount necessary for the
repair of the insured car but also of actual and moral damages, attorneys' fees and
costs. Resisting plaintiff's claim, the insurance company disclaimed liability for
payment, alleging that there had been violation of the insurance contract because the
one driving the car at the time of the incident was not an "authorized driver."
After due hearing, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and defendant insurer
was ordered to pay unto the former the cost of repair of the car in the sum of
P5,031.28; the sum of P150.00, for the hauling and impounding of the car at the repair
shop; P2,000.00 as actual damages; and P1,000.00 as attorneys' fees, plus costs.
The insurance company went to the Court of Appeals, raising inter alia the
questions of the quali cation of plaintiff's driver to operate the insured vehicle and the
correctness of the trial court's award to plaintiff of the amount of P5,013.28 as cost of
repairs, and of actual damages and attorneys' fees. In its decision of 31 January 1966,
the Court of Appeals a rmed the ruling of the lower court except the award of actual
damages in the sum of P2,000.00, which was eliminated on the ground that it was too
speculative. Not content, the insurance company led the present petition for review of
the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals on two grounds: (1) that the
proceedings observed in the trial court were irregular and invalid; and (2) that the
damage to the insured car was not covered by the insurance policy because at the time
of the accident it was being driven by one who was not an authorized driver.
The second issue constitutes the main contention of herein appellant, and will be
considered rst. It is vigorously urged by the insurer that the one driving the insured
vehicle at the time of the accident was not an authorized driver thereof within the
purview of the following provision of the insurance policy:
"AUTHORIZED DRIVER:

"Any of the following:

(a) The insured;

(b) Any person driving on the Insured's order or with his

permission, provided that the person driving is permitted in
accordance with licensing laws or regulations to drive the
motor vehicle covered by this Policy, or has been so permitted
and is not disquali ed by order of a court of law or by reason
of any enactment or regulation from driving such Motor
Vehicle." (Italics ours)

It has been found as a fact by the Court of Appeals that Domingo Reyes, the driver who
was at the wheel of the insured car at the time of the accident, does not know how to
read and write; that he was able to secure a driver's license, without passing any
examination therefor, by paying P25.00 to a certain woman; and that the Cavite agency
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 of the Motor Vehicles O ce has certi ed not having issued Reyes' purported driver's
license No. 271703 DP.
In holding that the damage sustained by the car comes within the coverage of
the insurance policy, the Court of Appeals argued that since Reyes' purported driver's
license (Exhibit "A") bears all the earmarks of a duly issued license, then it is a public
document, and petitioner insurance company then has the burden of disproving its
genuineness, which the latter has failed to do. In this respect the Court of Appeals
ruled:
". . . The fact that the Cavite Agency of the Motor Vehicles O ce
states that Drivers License No. 271703 DP was not issued by that o ce,
does not remove the possibility that said o ce may have been mistaken or
that said license was issued by another agency. Indeed Exhibit 13 shows
that a certain Gloria Presa made the notation thereon "no license issued" and
which notation was the basis of the 1st Indorsement, Exhibit 12, signed by
the MVO Cavite City Agency's o cer-in-charge. Neither Gloria Presa nor the
officer-in-charge Marciano A. Monzon was placed on the witness stand to be
examined in order to determine whether said license is indeed void. As it is,
as heretofore pointed out, the fact remains that Domingo Reyes is in
possession of a driver's license issued by the Motor Vehicles O ce which
on its face appears to have been regularly issued."

In effect, the Court of Appeals found that the driver's license No. 271703 DP was
genuine, that is, one really issued by the Motor Vehicles O ce or its authorized deputy;
and this finding of fact is now conclusive and may not be questioned in this appeal.
Nevertheless, the appellant insurer insists that, under the established facts of
this case, Reyes, being admittedly one who cannot read and write, who has never
passed any examination for drivers, and has not applied for a license from the duly
constituted government agency entrusted with the duty of licensing drivers, cannot be
considered an authorized driver.
The fatal aw in appellant's argument is that it studiously ignores the provisions
of law existing at the time of the mishap. Under Section 24 of the revised Motor
Vehicles Law, Act 3992 of the Philippine Legislature, as amended by Republic Acts Nos.
587, 1204 and 2363, 1
"An examination or demonstration to show any applicant's ability to operate
motor vehicles may also be required in the discretion of the Chief , Motor
Vehicles Office or his deputies." (Italics supplied)
and reinforcing such discretion, Section 26 of the Act prescribes further:
"SEC. 26. Issuance of chauffeur's license; professional badge: If,
after examination, or without the same, the Chief, Motor Vehicles O ce or
his deputies, believe the applicant to possess the necessary quali cations
and knowledge, they shall issue to such applicant a license to operate as
chauffeur . . ."(Italics supplied)

It is thus clear that the issuance of a driving license without previous examination
does not necessarily imply that the license issued is invalid. As the law stood in 1961,
when the claim arose, the examinations could be dispensed with in the discretion of the
Motor Vehicles O ce o cials. Whether discretion was abused in issuing the license
without examination is not a proper subject of inquiry in these proceedings, though, as
a matter of legislative policy, the discretion should be eliminated. There is no proof that
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 the owner of the automobile knew that the circumstances surrounding such issuance
showed that it was irregular.
The issuance of the license is proof that the Motor Vehicles O ce o cial
considered Reyes, the driver of the insured-appellee, quali ed to operate motor
vehicles, and the insured was entitled to rely upon such license. In this connection, it
should be observed that the chauffeur, Reyes, had been driving since 1957, 2 and
without mishap, for all the record shows. Considering that, as pointed out by the Court
of Appeals the weight of authority is in favor of a liberal interpretation of the insurance
policy for the bene t of the party insured, and strictly against the insurer, We nd no
reason to diverge from the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that no breach
was committed of the above-quoted provision of the policy.
The next issue assigned is anchored on the fact that the decision of the trial
court was based on evidence presented to and received by the clerk of court who acted
as commissioner, although allegedly, there was no written court order constituting him
as such commissioner, no written request for his commission was made by the parties;
he did not take an oath prior to entering into the discharge of his commission; no
written report of his ndings was ever submitted to the court; and no notice thereof
was sent to the parties, contrary to the speci c provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of
Court.
Actually there is nothing basically wrong with the practice of delegating to a
commissioner, usually the clerk of court, who is a duly sworn court o cer, the
reception of both parties and for him to submit a report thereon to the court. In fact,
this procedure is expressly sanctioned by Revised Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. 3
Petitioner's objection in this case, however, is directed not against its referral to the
clerk of court but against the alleged non-observance of the prescribed steps in
connection with such delegation.
We nd no cause su cient to invalidate the proceedings had in the trial court.
We note that this issue was brought up by the appellant insurance company for the rst
time only in its motion for reconsideration led in the Court of Appeals. It was not
raised in the trial court, where the defect could still be remedied. This circumstance
precludes ventilation of the issue of validity of the hearing at this stage; for, if such
irregularity is to vitiate the proceeding, the question should have been seasonably
raised, i.e., either before the parties proceeded with the hearing or before the court
handed down its ruling. 4 It is a procedural point that can be waived by consent of the
parties, express or implied. 5
For the same reason, appellant cannot insist now on the annulment of the
proceeding on the basis of alleged lack of written consent of the parties to the
commission, or of an order appointing the clerk as commissioner, or of notice of the
submission of his report to the court. Furthermore, appellant has presented no proof
that the clerk of court committed any mistake or abuse in the performance of the task
entrusted to him, or that the trial court was not able to properly appreciate the evidence
in the case because it was received by another person. If indeed there were errors at all,
they would be non-prejudicial and could not justify the holding of a new trial, as urged
by herein petitioner. 6
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is a rmed, with costs against
appellant CCC Insurance Corporation.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
 Footnotes
1. Subsequently replaced by Republic Act No. 4136 (1967).
2. T.s.n., page 4; Record on Appeal, pages 36-88; Appellant's Brief, pages 15-16.

3. Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, (1962) 6 SCRA 300; Cruz vs. Malabayabas, 105
Phil. 708.

4. Perlas vs. Ehrman, 53 Phil. 607.

5. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. PSC, I-5458, 16 September 1953; also Santos vs. De
Guzman, 45 Phil. 646.
6. See Gayon vs. Ubaldo, L-7650, 28 December 1955.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com