Apelanio v. Arcanys, Inc.
Apelanio v. Arcanys, Inc.
Apelanio v. Arcanys, Inc.
DECISION
PERALTA , J : p
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated November 19, 2015 and the Resolution 3
dated July 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 08340, reversing the
Decision 4 dated August 30, 2013 and the Resolution 5 dated December 19, 2013 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. VAC-06-000360-2013
(RAB Case No. VII-11-1700-12) which set aside the Decision 6 dated April 30, 2013 of
the Labor Arbiter.
The facts are as follows:
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Julius Q. Apelanio was hired by respondents
Arcanys, Inc. and Chief Executive O cer (CEO) Alan Debonneville as a Usability/Web
Design Expert. He was placed on a "probationary status" for a period of six months.
During the said period, respondent corporation evaluated his performance in terms of
his dependability, e ciency, initiative, cooperation, client responsiveness, judgment,
punctuality, quality and quantity of work, professionalism, and attitude towards
customers, colleagues, and respondent corporation as a whole. Although petitioner
was aware that he was undergoing evaluation, he was allegedly not informed of what
the passing grade was or what constituted as "reasonable standards of satisfactory
performance."
During his second (2nd) month evaluation on July 3, 2012, petitioner received a
rating of 3.06. On his fourth (4th) month evaluation, he received a rating of 2.99. On
October 3, 2012, his sixth (6th) month evaluation, he received a rating of 2.77.
Respondents then served petitioner a letter 7 informing him that they were not
converting his status into a regular employee since his performance fell short of the
stringent requirements and standards set by respondent corporation. Petitioner was
given his nal pay 8 and he signed a Waiver, Release and Quitclaim 9 in favor of
respondents. CAIHTE
Petitioner averred that when his probationary contract was terminated, he was
immediately offered a retainership agreement lasting from October 10, 2012 until
October 24, 2012, which involved a similar scope of work and responsibilities. He was
told that he did not meet the "reasonable standards of satisfactory performance," but
was nevertheless offered said retainership agreement with identical requirements on a
project basis, without security of tenure, with lesser pay, and without any labor standard
bene ts. Petitioner was confused with the arrangement, but agreed since he had a
family to support. He believed that he was still undergoing respondents' evaluation.
On October 26, 2012, after the lapse of the retainership agreement, petitioner
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was offered another retainership agreement, from October 25, 2012 to November 12,
2012, again with an identical scope of work but at a reduced daily rate of P857.14,
down from the daily rate of P1,257.15 from the initial agreement.
As a result, petitioner became suspicious of the respondent corporation's
motives and consulted with a lawyer, who informed him that said practice was illegal.
He then refused to sign the second retainership agreement, and questioned why they
offered him another retainership agreement if he was deemed unquali ed for the
position. Petitioner alleged that respondents found him quali ed for the position, but
opted to hire his services on a per project basis, justifying the lesser pay and the lack of
security of tenure and labor standard benefits.
On the other hand, respondents stated that they hired petitioner as a web
designer and was made aware that he would be placed on probationary status, and that
his failure to meet the stringent requirements and standards set forth would terminate
his employment contract.
As a matter of fact, several days before the end of petitioner's probationary
contract on October 5, 2012, respondents requested petitioner to sign the termination
notice. Petitioner signed the termination notice; and respondents released and paid
petitioner his nal pay on October 23, 2012. Petitioner also executed a Waiver, Release,
and Quitclaim dated November 16, 2012 1 0 in favor of respondents, indicating therein
that he had no further claim whatsoever against the company and that he had received
his full pay. DETACa
Respondents led a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC denied it. Thus, via
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, respondents went to the
Court of Appeals and sought that the Decision dated August 30, 2013 and the
Resolution dated December 19, 2013 of the NLRC be reversed and set aside.
In the assailed Decision 1 6 dated November 19, 2015, the Court of Appeals
granted the petition and reversed the NLRC's Decision and Resolution, and reinstated
the Decision dated April 30, 2013 of the Labor Arbiter dismissing petitioner's complaint
for illegal dismissal.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner was properly terminated at the end of
the probationary period since he failed to qualify by the standards that were made
known to him at the commencement of his engagement.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision, but the Court of Appeals
denied the same in its Resolution 1 7 dated July 22, 2016.
Thus, via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, before this Court, petitioner raised the
lone issue:
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WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE WELL-REASONED DECISION
AND RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC. 1 8
The petition is unmeritorious.
Petitioner maintains that the retainership agreements offered to him contained
GM Bantug's signature, and that said signature signi ed the validity of the subject
agreements. We disagree.
Jurisprudence is replete with circumstances stating that an employer may
unilaterally prepare an employment contract, stating the terms and conditions required
of a potential employee, and that a potential employee had only to adhere to it by
signing it. 1 9 Such contract is known as a contract of adhesion, which is allowed by law
albeit construed in favor of the employee in case of ambiguity. In Philippine
Commercial International Bank v. CA , 2 0 the Court de ned in detail the meaning of a
contract of adhesion, to wit:
A contract of adhesion is de ned as one in which one of the parties
imposes a ready-made form of contract, which the other party may accept or
reject, but which the latter cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in
the contract, while the other party merely a xes his signature or his "adhesion"
thereto, giving no room for negotiation and depriving the latter of the
opportunity to bargain on equal footing. Nevertheless, these types of contracts
have been declared as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the
party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely. 2 1 (Citations
omitted.) cSEDTC
Footnotes
* On wellness leave.
1. Rollo, pp. 8-21.
2. Id. at 25-31. Penned by Associate Justice Edward B. Contreras, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi.
3. Id. at 22-23.
4. Id. at 96-105.
5. Id. at 109-110.
6. Id. at 72-82.
7. CA rollo, p. 84.
9. Id. at 84.
10. Id.
11. Supra note 6.
22. Polotan, Sr. v. CA (Eleventh Div.) , 357 Phil. 250, 257 (1998).
23. Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. v. CA, 364 Phil. 947, 953-954 (1999).
24. Supra note 2, at 29.
25. Jimenez v. NLRC, et al., 326 Phil. 89, 95 (1996).
26. International Catholic Migration Commission v. NLRC, 251 Phil. 560, 569 (1989).