ANTONIO TAN, DANILO DOMINGO and ROBERT LIM vs.

AMELITO BALLENA et
al
G.R. No. 168111 July 4, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners Antonio Tan, Danilo Domingo and Robert Lim were officers of Footjoy
Industrial Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing shoes
and other kinds of footwear, prior to the cessation of its operations sometime in February 2001.
Respondent Amelito Ballena and one hundred thirty-nine (139) other employees of Footjoy, filed
a Joint Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan against the
company and petitioners Tan and Domingo in their capacities as owner/president and
administrative officer, respectively.
They alleged that the company did not regularly report the respondent employees for
membership at the Social Security System (SSS) and that it likewise failed to remit their SSS
contributions and payment for their SSS loans, which were already deducted from their wages.

According to respondents, these acts violated Sections 9, 10, 22 and 24, paragraph (b) of
Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 8282; as well as Section 28, paragraphs
(e), (f), and (h) thereof, in relation to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners blamed the economic distress that beset their company for their failure to timely pay
and update the monthly SSS contributions of the employees. Petitioners thereafter underlined
their good faith and lack of criminal culpability when they acknowledged their fault and
demonstrated their willingness to pay their obligations by executing a memorandum of
agreement with the SSS on 10 April 2001.

The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution, which found probable
cause to charge Footjoy, Antonio Tan, and Danilo Domingo with violations of Sections 9, 10 and
24, paragraph (b) in relation to Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f) and (h) of the Social Security Law.
The Provincial Prosecutor filed two informations against petitioners Tan, Domingo and Lim in
the RTC of Bulacan.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ, alleging, inter alia, that the Assistant
Prosecutor committed grave and manifest error when he found probable cause to charge them
with the alleged offenses.
The DOJ resolved to grant the petition for review. The Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan was
directed to cause the withdrawal of the informations for violation of the Social Security Law
earlier filed against respondents Antonio Tan, Danilo Domingo, and Robert Lim and to report the
action thereon within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the DOJ resolution, but the same was denied.

Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Only two employees signed the original Petition's verification and certification of non-
forum shopping and the same was filed one day beyond the period allowed by the rules. The
appellate court initially resolved to dismiss the original petition precisely for these reasons in a
Resolution dated 29 November 2002. When asked to reconsider, the appellate court ordered the
filing of an amended petition in order to include all the original complainants. An amended
petition was then filed in compliance with the said order, but only one hundred eighty (180) of
the two hundred forty (240) original complainants signed the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals then granted the motion for reconsideration and
resolved to reinstate the petition. Thereafter, the assailed decision that upheld the filing of the
informations against the petitioners was issued.

1st Topic: Procedural Issue – Filed beyond the reglementary period

Issue:
whether or not the court of appeals committed grievous error and acted without
jurisdiction when it gave due course to the respondents' petition for certiorari despite the
fact that it was filed out [of] time.

Ruling:
No. The reglementary period within which a Petition for Certiorari must be filed
is provided for under the first paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65, to wit:
The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not
later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

This Court finds no fault in the assailed actions of the Court of Appeals.
It is a well-settled principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. In deciding a case, the appellate court has the discretion whether or not to
dismiss the same, which discretion must be exercised soundly and in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play, taking into account the circumstances of the case. It is a far
better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and
afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of
the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression
of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of
justice.

The Court cannot fault the act of the Court of Appeals in ordering submission of
an amended petition and the reinstatement of the same despite the original petition's late
filing, considering the obvious merits of the case.

2nd Topic: Procedural Issue – Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping

Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals committed grievous error when it gave due
course to the respondents' petition for certiorari despite the fact that the two (2)
signatories thereat were not able to show that they were duly authorized by the other
petitioners to file the petition on their behalf.

Ruling:
 No. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it gave due course
to the amended petition despite the signing of the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping of only some, and not all, of the original complainants.

Under justifiable circumstances, we have already allowed the relaxation of the

requirements of verification and certification so that the ends of justice may be better
served. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith; while the purpose of the aforesaid
certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping.

In the present case, the circumstances squarely involve a verification that was not
signed by all the petitioners therein. Thus, we see no reason why we should not uphold
the ruling of the Court of Appeals in reinstating the petition despite the said formal
defect.

On the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping, the well-settled rule

is that all the petitioners must sign the certification of non-forum shopping. The rule,
however, admits of an exception and that is when the petitioners show reasonable cause
for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must be able to convince
the court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of
justice.

In the case at bar, counsel for the respondents disclosed that most of the
respondents who were the original complainants have since sought employment in the
neighboring towns of Bulacan, Pampanga and Angeles City. Only the one hundred eighty
(180) signatories were then available to sign the amended Petition for Certiorari and the
accompanying verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Considering the total
number of respondents in this case and the elapsed period of almost two years since the
filing of the Joint Complaint Affidavit on 19 March 2001 and the filing of the amended
petition on 13 March 2003, we hold that the instant case sufficiently falls under the
exception to the aforesaid rule. Thus, the Court of Appeals cannot be said to have erred in
overlooking the above procedural error.

3rd Topic: Probable cause

Issue:
Whether or not the court of appeals committed serious error when it reversed the
resolution of the doj which found out that the petitioners could not be indicted for any
violation of the sss law for want of probable cause.

Ruling:
No. Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of
the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.
 The determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes cognizable by the RTC are concerned, and
notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by
law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor.
The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable
cause is subject to the power of review by the DOJ.

In deciding the respondents' Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the DOJ committed palpable mistake in reversing the Final Resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutor and, in so doing, acted with grave abuse of discretion.

After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we agree with the Court of
Appeals' findings that there was indeed probable cause to indict petitioners for the
offenses charged.

In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties'

evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Certainly, it
does not involve the determination of whether or not there is evidence beyond reasonable
doubt pointing to the guilt of the person. Only prima facie evidence is required; or that
which is, on its face, good and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of
facts constituting the party's claim or defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted,
will remain sufficient. Therefore, matters of evidence are more appropriately presented
and heard during the trial.

4th Topic: Mala in se, Mala prohibita

Issue:
Whether good faith and lack of criminal intent can be a defense for the offense
charged

Ruling:
No. On the part of the petitioners, they have not denied their fault in not remitting
the SSS contributions and loan payments of the respondents in violation of Section 28,
paragraphs (e), (f) and (h) of the SSS Law. Instead, petitioners interposed the defenses of
lack of criminal intent and good faith, as their failure to remit was brought about by
alleged economic difficulties, and they have already agreed to settle their obligations with
the SSS through a memorandum of agreement to pay in installments.1avvphi1
As held by the Court of Appeals, the claims of good faith and absence of criminal intent
for the petitioners' acknowledged non-remittance of the respondents' contributions
deserve scant consideration. The violations charged in this case pertain to the SSS Law,
which is a special law. As such, it belongs to a class of offenses known as mala prohibita.

The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in
se; and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them,
called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with
which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent
governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When
an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.

Thus, the petitioners' admission in the instant case of their violations of the
provisions of the SSS Law is more than enough to establish the existence of probable
cause to prosecute them for the same.