LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no.

125865 January 28, 2000

Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang

Respondent: People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA
stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country.
Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration
which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the
latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was
denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.

ISSUES:
(1)   Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard to Section
45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.
(2)   Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

HELD:
(1)   NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to
the exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not
possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2)   NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case.
Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted
by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases
falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Hence, SC denied the petition.

International public officials have been defined as: “x x x persons who, on the basis of an international
treaty constituting a particular international community, are appointed by this international community,
or by an organ of it, and are under its control to exercise, in a continuous way, functions in the interest
of this particular international community, and who are subject to a particular personal status.”

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 125865           January 28, 2000

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant
issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received
an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered
by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the
country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC
judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set
aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued.
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court. 1âwphi1.nêt

The petition is not impressed with merit.

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered
by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving  ex-
parte the DFA's advice and in motu propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice
to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due
process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in
what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution
evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that
1 

the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the
charges. 2

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

 Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and immunities:

a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was
done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the
ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA
protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so
desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name
of official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is
3 

well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction. It appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the
4 

Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case
of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in
the receiving state outside his official functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of a
5 

crime is not part of official duty.

Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to
say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC
such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked
6 

only when specifically granted by law. The rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
7 

investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides the absence of
8 

preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity
of the information or otherwise render it defective. 9

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 1âwphi1.nêt

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

See United States v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990].

1 

Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 [1991].

2 

K.H. Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357, 368 [1992].

3 
 Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 [1990]; Animos v. Phil. Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214
4 

[1989]; Dumlao v. CA, 114 SCRA 247 [1982].

Sec. 31, 1 (c); See also Minucher v. CA, 214 SCRA 242 [1992].

5 

See Del Rosario, Jr. v. Bartolome, 270 SCRA 645 [1997].

6 

People v. Abejuela, 38 SCRA 324 [1971].

7 

Sec. 1, Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

8 

People v. Gomez, 117 SCRA 72 [1982]; People v. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 [1961].
9