IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

______________

Record No. 201067

______________

PAUL GOLDMAN,
Petitioner,
v.
THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al.,
Respondents.
______________

RESPONSE TO VERIFIED PETITION

FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND/OR PROHIBITION
______________

MARK R. HERRING TOBY J. HEYTENS (#90788)

Attorney General Solicitor General
ERIN B. ASHWELL (#79538) MARTINE E. CICCONI (#94542)
Chief Deputy Attorney General MICHELLE S. KALLEN (#93286)
Deputy Solicitors General
SAMUEL T. TOWELL (#71512)
JESSICA MERRY SAMUELS (#89537)
Deputy Attorney General
Assistant Solicitor General
ZACHARY R. GLUBIAK (#93984)
John Marshall Fellow
Office of the Attorney General
202 North Ninth Street
Richmond, Virginia 23219
(804) 786-7773
(804) 371-0200 (fax)
September 4, 2020 [email protected]
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................... ii

MOTION TO DISMISS .............................................................................. 1

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT.............................................................................................. 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................... 5

I. Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the ballot language ............ 6

II. Neither mandamus nor prohibition is an appropriate vehicle

for relief here ................................................................................... 10

III. The General Assembly has broad discretion to select ballot

language ........................................................................................... 14

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND FILING .......................................... 20

i
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Board of Sup’rs of Amherst Cty. v. Combs,

160 Va. 487 (1933)................................................................................. 11

Burch v. Hardwicke,
64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 51 (1873) .................................................................. 14

Burch v. Hardwicke,
71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 24 (1878) .................................................................. 13

C. Givens Brothers, LLC v. Town of Blacksburg,

273 Va. 281 (2007)................................................................................. 13

Coleman v. Pross,
219 Va. 143 (1978)..................................................................... 15, 16, 17

Coward v. Wellmont Health System,

295 Va. 351 (2018)................................................................................... 6

Fund for Animals v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,

53 Va. Cir. 405 (Richmond Cir. Ct. 2000) ............................................ 16

Gannon v. State Corp. Com’n,

243 Va. 480 (1992)......................................................................... 4, 5, 12

Goldman v. Landsidle,
262 Va. 364 (2001)......................................................................... 7, 9, 10

Howell v. McAuliffe,
292 Va. 320 (2016)........................................................................... 6, 8, 9

In re Commonwealth’s Attorney for City of Roanoke,

265 Va. 313 (2003)............................................................................. 5, 13

Lafferty v. Sch. Ed. of Fairfax Cnty.,

293 Va. 354 (2017)......................................................................... 7, 9, 10

ii
Park v. Northam, et al.,
Record No. 200767 (Aug. 24, 2020) .............................................. passim

Scott v. James,
114 Va. 297 (1912)................................................................................. 12

State ex rel. Voters First v. Ohio Ballot Board,

978 N.E. 2d 119 (Ohio 2012) ........................................................... 17, 18

Westlake Props., Inc. v. Westlake Pointe Prop. Owners Ass’n,

273 Va. 107 (2007)................................................................................... 7

Wilkins v. West,
264 Va. 447 (2002)................................................................................... 7

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Va. Const. art. XII, § 1...................................................................... passim

STATUTORY AUTHORITIES

2020 Va. Acts Ch. 1071 .......................................................................... 2, 3

Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-612 ........................................................................... 3

Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-614 ........................................................................... 3

Va. Code Ann. § 30-19.9 ........................................................................... 18

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Justin Mattingly & Andrew Cain, Virginia Officials Prepare for

Surge in Mail-in Voting After Practice Is Used Widely in
Municipal Elections, Richmond Times Dispatch (May 22, 2020) ......... 4

iii
 MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondents State Board of Elections, Chairman Robert Brink,

Vice-Chairman John O’Bannon, and Secretary Jamila D. LeCruise

move to dismiss the verified petition for a writ of mandamus and/or

prohibition because petitioner lacks standing, neither mandamus or

prohibition is available in these circumstances, and Article XII, § 1

affords the General Assembly broad discretion to frame the ballot

question regarding a proposed constitutional amendment.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

As his filing makes clear, petitioner strongly opposes the proposed

constitutional amendment to create a commission to draw congressional

and state legislative districts in Virginia. And, to be sure, there may be

serious questions about the wisdom of the proposed amendment and the

process it would establish for redistricting, which (as petitioner points

out (Pet. ¶¶ 24–32)) would shift responsibility for drawing maps from

the legislature to this Court in some circumstances. But petitioner’s

disagreement with the proposed amendment does not afford him

standing to challenge the General Assembly’s decision to put it on the

1
ballot, nor does it render unconstitutional the language the legislature

chose to describe it. Even if it did, relief would not be available through

a writ of mandamus or prohibition.

STATEMENT

1. During its 2020 legislative session, the General Assembly

voted to send to the voters a proposed constitutional amendment that

would establish the Virginia Redistricting Commission and confer on it

the responsibility to draw congressional and state legislative districts

following each census. See 2020 Va. Acts Ch. 1071 (SB 236), § 6A(a), (b).

Under the proposed amendment, the Commission would be required to

submit plans for new districts by a certain date, the General Assembly

would be required to vote on those plans without change, and any

redistricting plan approved by the General Assembly would not be

subject to veto by the Governor. § 6A(e), (f). If the Commission failed to

agree on a plan to submit to the General Assembly by the deadline—or

if the General Assembly failed to approve a submitted plan—

responsibility for establishing congressional and legislative districts

would fall to this Court. § 6A(f), (g).

2. The ballot language that is the subject of petitioner’s

2
challenge was included in the legislation proposing the redistricting

amendment and was finalized more than four-and-a-half months ago.

See 2020 Va. Acts Ch. 1071, § 2 (SB 236) (“The ballot shall contain the

following question . . . .”). The current form of the ballot language

passed both houses of the General Assembly in March and was signed

into law by the Governor on April 10, 2020. 1

The election at which Virginians will consider the proposed

redistricting amendment will take place on November 3, 2020. Local

registrars must have the official ballot printed “at least 45 days

preceding the election,” Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-614—which this year is

Saturday, September 19—and make absentee ballots available at the

same time, § 24.2-612. As respondents have previously explained,

election officials anticipate a surge in demand for mail-in ballots this

year and have indicated that the process for printing ballots must begin

earlier than in previous years. See Response to Mot. to Expedite at 1–2;

see also Justin Mattingly & Andrew Cain, Virginia Officials Prepare for

1 See Virginia’s Legislative Information System, SB 236:

Constitutional Amendment, Apportionment, Virginia Redistricting
Commission (last visited September 3, 2020), available at
https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?201+sum+SB236.

3
Surge in Mail-in Voting After Practice Is Used Widely in Municipal

Elections, Richmond Times Dispatch (May 22, 2020). 2 Indeed, some

jurisdictions have already begun printing ballots and the rest are poised

to do so imminently as of the day of this filing. Response to Mot. to

Expedite at 1–2.

3. On August 27, 2020, petitioner (a single individual) sought

an original writ of mandamus and/or prohibition in this Court and

moved for an expedited hearing. Respondents did not object to

expedited consideration and notified the Court that the process of

printing ballots was already underway in some jurisdictions. See

Response to Mot. to Expedite 2. This Court directed respondents to file

a responsive pleading by 5 p.m. on September 4, 2020.

LEGAL STANDARD

1. “A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedial process,

which is not awarded as a matter of right but in the exercise of sound

judicial discretion.” Gannon v. State Corp. Com’n, 243 Va. 480, 482

(1992). “Due to the drastic character of the writ, the law has placed

2 available at https://roanoke.com/news/virginia/virginia-officials-
prepare-for-surge-in-mail-in-voting-after-practice-is-used-widely-
in/article_f2fe6cbf-593e-5f0d-b9e3-8a5e83739e2a.html.

4
safeguards around it.” Id. “Consideration should be had for the urgency

which prompts an exercise of the discretion, the interests of the public

and third persons, the results which would follow upon a refusal of the

writ, as well as the promotion of substantial justice.” Id. “In doubtful

cases, the writ will be denied” and mandamus will be granted only

“where the right involved and the duty sought to be enforced are clear

and certain.” Id.

2. “A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy employed

to redress the grievance growing out of an encroachment of

jurisdiction.” In re Commonwealth’s Attorney for City of Roanoke, 265

Va. 313, 316 (2003) (quotations omitted). “The writ does not lie to

correct error but only to prevent exercise of the jurisdiction of the court

by the judge to whom it is directed when the judge either has no

jurisdiction or is exceeding his/her jurisdiction.” Id. at 316–17.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner raises numerous policy arguments against the proposed

redistricting amendment. But those arguments, no matter how

persuasive, are better suited for debate at the ballot box than in this

Court. The single legal claim raised in the petition—that the ballot

5
language the General Assembly directed to be used to describe the

proposed amendment violates Article XII, § 1 of the Virginia

Constitution—fails for at least three reasons. 3 First, petitioner lacks

standing. Second, petitioner fails to state a claim for which mandamus

relief is available and likewise fails to state a proper claim for a writ of

prohibition. Third, Article XII, § 1 affords the General Assembly broad

discretion to submit a proposed amendment to the voters “in such

manner at it shall prescribe.” Va. Const. art. XII, § 1. For all of those

reasons, the petition should be dismissed.

I. Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the ballot language

1. Whether petitioner has standing to seek a writ of mandamus

or prohibition “is a threshold issue and a question of law.” Howell v.

McAuliffe, 292 Va. 320, 330 (2016); see id. (emphasizing that the

“general requirements of standing apply to applications for writs of

mandamus and prohibition”).

“The concept of standing concerns itself with the characteristics of

3 Although petitioner makes passing references to other

constitutional violations, see, e.g., Pet. ¶¶ 73, 100, 103, 142, 175, 251, he
“fails to develop [his] argument” on these points. Coward v. Wellmont
Health System, 295 Va. 351, 367 (2018). Accordingly, “the[se] issue[s]
[are] waived.” Id.

6
the [individuals] who file[] suit.” Westlake Props., Inc. v. Westlake

Pointe Prop. Owners Ass’n, 273 Va. 107, 120 (2007) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “It is not enough to simply ‘tak[e] a

position and then challeng[e] the government to dispute it.’” Park v.

Northam, Record No. 200767, at 5 (Aug. 24, 2020) (Park Order) (quoting

Lafferty v. School Ed. of Fairfax Cnty., 293 Va. 354, 361, 365–66

(2017)). Rather, “[t]o have standing to challenge governmental action, a

party must allege facts indicating he or she has suffered a

‘particularized’ or ‘personalized’ injury due to the action.” Id. (quoting

Wilkins v. West, 264 Va. 447, 460 (2002)). “[T]o establish . . . standing to

seek mandamus relief, [a] petitioner[] ha[s] to identify a specific

statutory right to relief or a direct—special or pecuniary—interest in

the outcome of this controversy that is separate from the interest of the

general public.” Id. at 6. 4

2. Petitioner falls well short of meeting those standards.

4Although petitioner makes passing reference to several statutes

(see Pet. ¶¶ 3, 61), he does not explain how those statutes have been
violated, much less allege that “any of those statutes ‘gives [him] a
legally enforceable right to have a court compel [respondents] to
perform [their] duties in the manner [he] request[s].’” Park Order at 6
n.3 (quoting Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 374 (2001)).

7
 a. Petitioner insists that this Court’s decision in Howell’ v.

McAuliffe, 292 Va. 320 (2016), resolves the standing question in his

favor. See Pet. ¶¶ 193–200. But the Howell Court took pains to

“emphasize that [its] standing conclusion rest[ed] heavily on the

unprecedented circumstances of [that] case,” 292 Va. at 334, which

involved a particular type of previously recognized injury—vote

dilution—that the plaintiff voters would experience as a direct result of

the challenged action. See id. at 332 (explaining that all registered

voters were “directly affected by the allegedly unconstitutional

expansion of the statewide electorate” (emphasis added)).

Petitioner’s claims are far afield from those asserted in Howell.

Even crediting all of petitioner’s allegations, no vote dilution would

follow “directly” from the action complained of—here, the inclusion of

the challenged language on the November 3 ballots. According to

petitioner, by drafting a misleading description of the redistricting

amendment, the General Assembly made it more likely that the

amendment will pass. See, e.g., Pet. ¶¶ 104, 105, 150. But no matter

how much more likely passage might be as a result of the ballot

language, there is no guarantee that the amendment will be approved

8
and, if the proposed amendment fails, there will be no change to the

status quo. And even if the amendment is approved, it is impossible to

know what the result of the newly constructed commission’s work would

be, much less whether petitioner’s or anyone else’s votes will be diluted

as a result of that work. Accordingly, unlike the petitioners in Howell—

who this Court repeatedly emphasized claimed a direct and immediate

injury (see 292 Va. at 332–34)—petitioner’s alleged injury relies on

“future or speculative facts,” which cannot confer standing. Lafferty,

293 Va. at 361.

b. Absent inapt comparisons to the vote-dilution injury alleged

in Howell, it is apparent that petitioner does not claim an interest in

this case that is “separate from the interest of the general public.” Park

Order at 6; see also Goldman v. Landsidle, 262 Va. 364, 372–73 (2001).

Petitioner asserts that he is a “recognized . . . expert[] in running

statewide political campaigns” and claims “experience and expertise” on

the issues involved in this case. Pet. ¶¶ 227, 231. But this Court has

already considered and rejected those sorts of arguments by holding

that “zealous interest in [a] topic alone is not sufficient to create

standing.” Lafferty, 293 Va. at 364.

9
 Nor does it matter that petitioner claims to be among the class of

would-be voters who oppose the proposed constitutional amendment

that the challenged ballot language describes. Regardless of their

substantive views on the redistricting amendment, any Virginia citizen

might share petitioner’s view that the language the legislature chose to

describe it is somehow deficient. For that reason, petitioner cannot

establish that he maintains an “interest in the proceedings different

from that of the public at large.” Goldman, 262 Va. at 374. In any event,

petitioner “offers no facts to support [his] assertion” that the ballot

language is particularly damaging to him as compared with supporters

of the proposed amendment, and his “bald concern” that the language

the General Assembly chose will make passage more likely “cannot

afford him standing.” Park Order at 6; see also Lafferty, 293 Va. at 361–

62 (student’s factually unsupported assertion of fear of discipline for

violating his school’s revised anti-discrimination policy did not establish

an “injury sufficient for standing” to challenge the policy’s legality).

II. Neither mandamus nor prohibition is an appropriate vehicle for

relief here

Beyond failing for lack of standing, neither mandamus nor

prohibition would be available under these circumstances.

10
 1. a. “It is well settled as a fundamental principle in the law

of mandamus . . . that courts will not grant this extraordinary remedy

where to do so would be fruitless and unavailing.” Board of Sup’rs of

Amherst Cty. v. Combs, 160 Va. 487, 496 (1933). As this Court has

explained, “[i]f it appear[s] that the writ would be ineffectual to

accomplish the object in view, either from the want of power of the

respondent to perform the act required, or on the part of the court

granting the writ to compel its performance, the court will refuse to

interfere.” Id. at 496–97; see also Park Order at 11.

Those principles bar relief here. Petitioner seeks an order

forbidding various executive officials from issuing ballots containing the

language to which he objects. See, e.g., Pet. ¶ 12. But petitioner does not

deny that the legislature is empowered to propose a constitutional

amendment via a ballot initiative, as it did with the redistricting

amendment. See Pet. ¶¶ 83–84. And even if this Court were to forbid

respondents from issuing ballots with the challenged language, neither

this Court nor respondents would determine what words or phrases

would replace it—that responsibility belongs to the General Assembly,

which could exercise its discretion to draft replacement language

11
petitioner might still find objectionable. For that reason, “it is at best

unclear whether directing [respondents] not to [issue ballots containing

the challenged language] could provide any actual relief to” petitioner.

Park Order at 11.

b. Mandamus is also inappropriate here for another reason—

judicial intervention at this point would significantly disrupt an ongoing

electoral process. Like a request for an injunction, a petition for a writ

of mandamus requires “[c]onsideration . . . for the urgency which

prompts an exercise of the discretion, the interests of the public and

third persons, the results which would follow upon a refusal of the writ,

as well as the promotion of substantial justice.” Gannon v. State Corp.

Com’n, 243 Va. 480, 482 (1992). Given that the process of printing

ballots is already underway, see pp. 3–4, supra—and ordering changes

at this late stage would disrupt local officials’ efforts to meet statutorily

imposed deadlines and risk disenfranchising hundreds of thousands of

voters who have requested mail-in ballots—“the interests of the public

and third persons” and “the promotion of substantial justice” heavily

favor non-intervention. Accord Scott v. James, 114 Va. 297 (1912)

(declining to entertain a request to enjoin the Secretary of the

12
Commonwealth from distributing ballots containing a measure to

amend the Constitution on the ground that the General Assembly was

not authorized to propose amendments to two constitutional provisions

in a single ballot question). 5

2. Petitioner is likewise not entitled to a writ of prohibition.

“[P]rohibition is a proceeding between courts bearing the relation of

supreme and inferior,” Burch v. Hardwicke, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 24, 39

(1878) (emphasis added), and the writ is issued “only to prevent exercise

of the jurisdiction of the court by the judge to whom it is directed when

the judge either has no jurisdiction or is exceeding his/her jurisdiction,”

In re Commonwealth’s Attorney for City of Roanoke, 265 Va. 313, 316–

17 (2003) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added). The “restriction of the

writ [of prohibition] to judicial proceedings—to courts alone—has been

distinctly and repeatedly sanctioned by this court.” Burch v. Hardwicke,

5For similar reasons, and because the challenged ballot language

was included in legislation signed into law on April 10, 2020 (see pp. 2–
3, supra), petitioner’s claim may also be barred by laches. This Court,
however, does not appear to have addressed the operation of laches in a
mandamus action. See C. Givens Brothers, LLC v. Town of Blacksburg,
273 Va. 281, 283 n.6 (2007) (declining to consider assignment of error
involving laches). Because petitioner is not entitled to mandamus in any
event, the Court need not resolve that question here.

13
64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 51, 59 (1873). Because petitioner does not seek to

compel the proper exercise of jurisdiction by an inferior court, his

request for a writ of prohibition fails as a matter of law.

III. The General Assembly has broad discretion to select ballot

language

As previously noted, the petition raises numerous policy

arguments against the proposed redistricting amendment that warrant

substantial consideration at the ballot box. But petitioner’s legal claim

fails because the Constitution affords the legislature broad discretion to

submit a proposed constitutional amendment to the voters as it sees fit.

Article XII, § 1 reads as follows:

Any amendment or amendments to this Constitution may

be proposed in the Senate or House of Delegates, and if the
same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members
elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendment
or amendments shall be entered on their journals, the name
of each member and how he voted to be recorded, and
referred to the General Assembly at its first regular session
held after the next general election of members of the House
of Delegates. If at such regular session or any subsequent
special session of that General Assembly the proposed
amendment or amendments shall be agreed to by a majority
of all the members elected to each house, then it shall be the
duty of the General Assembly to submit such proposed
amendment or amendments to the voters qualified to vote
in elections by the people, in such manner as it shall
prescribe and not sooner than ninety days after final
passage by the General Assembly. If a majority of those

14
 voting vote in favor of any amendment, it shall become part
of the Constitution on the date prescribed by the General
Assembly in submitting the amendment to the voters.

Va. Const. art. XII, § 1.

Although petitioner repeatedly states that he “is not questioning”

the General Assembly’s power to propose an amendment through a

ballot question (see Pet. ¶¶ 84, 238), he insists that Article XII, § 1

imposes an implicit obligation on the legislature to ensure that the

language it uses to describe a proposed amendment is sufficiently

solicitous of minority views and that private parties may turn to the

courts to seek enforcement of that obligation. See, e.g., Pet. ¶¶ 65, 95.

Neither the text of Article XII, § 1 nor the authorities petitioner cites

support that claim.

Petitioner relies heavily on Coleman v. Pross, 219 Va. 143 (1978),

where this Court held that several proposed amendments were invalid

because the General Assembly that considered them omitted one of four

proposed amendments agreed to by the previous General Assembly. Id.

at 150–51. But Coleman was quite different from this case. In Coleman,

this Court emphasized that “a presumption of validity . . . attaches to

. . . any statute enacted into law by the General Assembly,” including

15
proposals to amend the Constitution. 219 Va. at 153. The Court

explained, however, that “[u]nder the unambiguous language of Article

XII, Section 1, if any constitutional amendments are proposed in one

house, ‘the same’ must be agreed to by a majority of the members

elected to each house, referred to the next regular session after the

intervening general election of House of Delegates members, agreed to

by a majority of the members elected to each house, and submitted to

the qualified voters.” Id. at 154 (emphasis added). The Court thus

concluded that “strict compliance with these mandatory provisions” was

required before a proposed amendment could be submitted to the

voters. Id.

Here, in contrast, there is no constitutional language,

unambiguous or otherwise, requiring a ballot question to describe every

detail of the proposed amendment or include minority views. Coleman,

219 Va. at 154. To the contrary, the text of Article XII, § 1 specifically

acknowledges the General Assembly’s broad discretion “to submit . . .

proposed . . . amendments to the voters qualified to vote in elections by

the people, in such manner as it shall prescribe.” Va. Const. art. XII, § 1

(emphasis added); see Fund for Animals v. Virginia State Bd. of

16
Elections, 53 Va. Cir. 405, at *2 (Richmond Cir. Ct. 2000) (rejecting

claim that Article XII, § 1 requires the ballot to include the text of a

proposed amendment and recognizing that the legislature is empowered

to submit an amendment to voters in the manner it chooses). For that

reason, this Court’s holding in Coleman does nothing to advance

petitioner’s claim.

The Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in State ex rel. Voters First

v. Ohio Ballot Board, 978 N.E. 2d 119 (Ohio 2012) (Voters First ),

likewise does not support petitioner’s argument. Petitioner relies on

language in that decision for the proposition that, “‘to pass

constitutional muster, [t]he text of a ballot statement . . . must fairly

and accurately present the question or issue to be decided.’” Pet. ¶ 136

(quoting Voters First, 978 N.E. 2d at 126). But the state constitutional

provision at issue in Voters First differed from Virginia’s in critical

respects. Unlike Article XII, § 1—which empowers the General

Assembly to submit a proposed amendment to the voters “in such

manner as it shall prescribe”—the constitutional provision at issue in

Voters First specifically required that any ballot language “properly

identify the substance of the proposal to be voted upon.” Voters First,

17
978 N.E. 2d at 125. Regardless of whether it would be preferable for it

to do so, our current state constitution contains no such language. 6 And

because the Virginia Constitution expressly recognizes the General

Assembly’s power to “prescribe” the “manner” in which a proposed

amendment will appear on the ballot, Va. Const. art. XII, § 1, the

challenged ballot language does not run afoul of Article XII, § 1.

CONCLUSION

The verified petition for a writ of mandamus and/or prohibition

should be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,

THE STATE BOARD OF

ELECTIONS; et al.

By: /s/ Martine E. Cicconi

Mark R. Herring Martine E. Cicconi (VSB #94542)
Attorney General Deputy Solicitor General
Erin B. Ashwell (VSB #79538) Toby J. Heytens (VSB #90788)
Chief Deputy Attorney Solicitor General

6 Instead, the Code of Virginia requires the Board of Elections to

provide an explanation of a proposed amendment. Under Code § 30-
19.9, the Board is required to print and deliver the explanation to local
registrars for posting at polling places on election day; to post the
explanation on the internet; and to publish it in newspapers once in the
week before voter registration ends and once in the week leading up to
the election. Petitioner does not take issue with the explanation
provided by the Board of Elections. See Pet. ¶¶ 124–129.

18
General Michelle S. Kallen (VSB #93286)
Deputy Solicitor General
Samuel T. Towell (VSB #71512)
Deputy Attorney General Jessica Merry Samuels (VSB #89537)
Assistant Solicitor General
Zachary R. Glubiak (VSB #93984)
John Marshall Fellow

19
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND FILING

I certify under Rule 5:26(h), and pursuant to the Court’s June 2,

2020 Order In Re: Electronic Filing of Pleadings During COVID-19

Emergency, on September 4, 2020, this document was filed

electronically with the Court through VACES. This brief complies with

Rule 5:26(b) because the portion subject to that rule does not exceed 50

pages. A copy was electronically mailed to:

Paul Goldman
P.O. Box 17033
Richmond, VA 23221
Email: [email protected]

Pro Se Petitioner

/s/ Martine E. Cicconi

Martine E. Cicconi

20