SCADA Systems Made Simple: Executive
SCADA Systems Made Simple: Executive
SCADA Systems Made Simple: Executive
Executive summary
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems capture data from remote devices like
valves and pumps to monitor and control various
processes. This paper discusses the four
components of a typical SCADA system,
operational challenges inherent to these systems,
and how technological advances have been
incorporated to improve SCADA proficiency.
998-2095-01-19-12AR0
Summary
Introduction ..................................................................................................... p 3
Security ........................................................................................................... p 10
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... p 11
SCADA Systems Overview
Executive summary
This white paper discusses the various components found in a typical Remote
SCADA System, the operational challenges inherent in these types of systems,
and how various technological advances have been implemented to drive
forward SCADA System proficiency.
Introduction
Historically, SCADA products have been produced that are generic with a ‘one
shoe fits all’ approach to various markets. As SCADA has matured to provide
specific solutions to specific SCADA markets it has provided solutions for wide
area network SCADA systems that rely on tenuous communication links. These
types of SCADA systems are used extensively throughout the Oil & Gas market
due to the fact that assets are spread over large geographical areas.
Looking at the overall structure of a SCADA system, there are four distinct levels
within SCADA, these being;
i. Field instrumentation,
We will discuss each of these levels in detail, describing their function, how
SCADA has changed over the past 30 years and the impact of security
requirements and regulatory compliance on SCADA system operations.
Radio
Serial
Dial-up
Figure 1:
SCADA System Overview
Field Instrumentation
“You can’t control what you don’t measure” is an old adage, meaning that
instrumentation is a key component of a safe and optimised control system.
Traditionally, pumps and their corresponding operational values would have been
manually controlled i.e. an operator would start/stop pumps locally and valves
would have been opened/closed by hand. Slowly over time, these instruments
would have been fitted with feedback sensors, such as limit switches, providing
connectivity for these wired devices into a local PLC or RTU, to relay data to the
SCADA host software.
Figure 2:
Progress of Instrumentation
In terms of regulatory compliance, instrumentation for the oil & gas industry has
had to comply with hazardous class, division and group classifications. The
requirement is that the instrument must be designed for the location or area in
which it has been placed, eg. an environment where the existence of explosive
vapours during normal operating conditions, or during abnormal conditions, are
known.
If we go back 30 years, an RTU was a ‘dumb’ telemetry box for connecting field
instruments. The RTU would ‘relay’ the data from the instruments to the SCADA
host without any processing or control but had well-developed communication
interfaces or telemetry. In the 1990s control programming was added to the
RTU so it operated more like a PLC. PLCs on the other hand could always do
the control program but lacked communication interfaces and data logging
capability, which has been added to some extent over the past decade.
In terms of environmental and regulatory compliance, PLCs and RTUs have the
same type of requirements as instrumentation in that they operate in the same
environment. However, PLCs have traditionally not been as environmentally
compliant as RTUs. This is mainly due to the fact that PLCs were designed to
operate in areas, such as factory floors, where the environment was already
conditioned to some degree.
Twenty years ago the communication network would have been leased lines or
dial-up modems which were very expensive to install and maintain, but in the
last 10-15 years many users have switched to radio or satellite communications
to reduce costs and eliminate the problematic cabling issues. More recently,
other communication types have been made available that include cellular
communications and improved radio devices that can support greater
communication rates and better diagnostics. However, the fact that these types
of communication media are still prone to failure is a major issue for modern,
distributed SCADA systems.
At the same time as the communication medium changed so too did the
protocols. Protocols are electronic languages that PLCs and RTUs use to
exchange data, either with other PLCs and RTUs or SCADA Host platforms.
Traditionally, protocols have been proprietary and the product of a single
manufacturer. As a further development, many manufacturers gravitated to a
single protocol, MODBUS, but added on proprietary elements to meet specific
functionality requirements. For the Oil & Gas industry there are a number of
variants of MODBUS, including but not limited to, MODBUS ASCII, MODBUS
RTU, Enron MODBUS and MODBUS/TCP. This provided a communication
standard for the retrieval of flow or process data from a particular RTU or PLC.
In recent years, protocols have appeared that are truly non-proprietary, such
as DNP (Distributed Network Protocol). These protocols have been created
independently of any single manufacturer and are more of an industry standard;
many individuals and manufacturers have subscribed to these protocols and
contributed to their development. However, these protocols have yet to develop
significantly enough to have a broad appeal to the application process and
regulation requirements for oil & gas markets. Consequently, the oil and gas
market is still heavily invested in MODBUS variants. As the benefits of these
protocols become more apparent to users, it is expected that they will be more
readily accepted and become a component of standard solutions provided
specifically for oil and gas markets.
Radio
Serial
Dial-up
Communications are
These are now
prone to failure. Causes
a software element
loss of data and loss of
in SCADA Host.
visibility. Protocols like DNP
mitigate this.
Figure 3:
Wide Area Network SCADA
Traditionally, SCADA Host software has been the mechanism to view graphical
displays, alarms and trends. Control from the SCADA Host itself only became
available when control elements for remote instruments were developed.These
systems were isolated from the outside world and were the domain of operators,
technicians and engineers. Their responsibility was to monitor, maintain and
engineer processes and SCADA elements. With advancements in Information
Technology (IT) this is no longer the case. Many different stake holders now
require real time access to the data that the SCADA Host software generates.
Accounting, maintenance management and material purchasing requirements
are preformed or partly preformed from data derived from the SCADA system.
Many of the initial SCADA Host products were developed specifically for the
manufacturing environment where a SCADA system resided within a single
building or complex, and did not posses many of the telemetry communication
features required by SCADA systems for geographically distributed assets.
Remote client
ACCESS
Third Party
Database
Figure 4:
SCADA Host Platform
There is a drive towards operational safety for SCADA Host systems within the
oil and gas industry. 49 CFR 195.446 Control Room Management regulations
look at SCADA Host software and how it functions in terms of operations,
maintenance and management. It also covers the degree of integration of the
SCADA system itself and its use of open architecture and standards.
Security
Security for SCADA systems has in recent years become an important and hotly
debated topic. Traditionally SCADA systems were isolated entities that were
the realm of operators, engineers and technicians. This has meant that SCADA
Host platforms were not necessarily developed to have protected connections
to public networks. This left many SCADA host platforms open to attack as they
did not have the tools necessary to protect themselves.
Solutions for remote asset and SCADA host communication security have very
different requirements. Security has to also be viewed overall, and not just in
terms of the SCADA system itself. For example, if somebody wanted to disrupt
production, they would not necessarily need to access the SCADA system to
do this. If a gas wellhead site or a monitoring point on a gas pipeline is remotely
situated, it could be easily compromised by a trespasser. If the asset is critically
important, other solutions that may or may not form part of the SCADA system
itself would have to be considered. e.g. camera surveillance security.
There are a number of standards available that describe how to secure a SCADA
system, not just in terms of the technology employed, but in terms of practices
and procedures. This is very important since the security solution to SCADA
is not a technological silver bullet, but a series of practices and procedures
in conjunction with technological solutions. These practices and procedures
would include items of training, SCADA Host access and procedures to follow
when SCADA security has been compromised. In modern SCADA systems IT
departments are integral to implementing and maintaining SCADA security for
an organisation and should be included in setting up practices, procedures and
implementing technologies.
Conclusion
• Develop and employ open standards to further ease the integration of assets
within a SCADA system using best practices defined by open groups and
not a single manufacturing entity. This will in turn reduce the cost of owning
SCADA.
Schneider Electric
Telemetry & Remote SCADA Solutions
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