Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests

Sen. Estrada v. The Ombudsman

G.R. Nos: 212140-41, January 21, 2015

FACTS:
Sen. Estrada was served with a criminal complaint on November 25, 2013 and December 3, 2013 for cases of
plunder. The first one was filed by the NBI and the Ombudsman. The second one was filed by the FIO of the
Ombudsman.
On March 20, 2014, Estrada asked file for a Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter Affidavits of the
other Respondents. His request was predicated on the right of the respondent to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished and to have access to the evidence on record.
The Ombudsman however argued that Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Sec 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman doe not entitle Estrada to be furnished with all the filings of the respondents.
The Ombudsman reiterated that Estrada’s rights in the conduct of preliminary investigation depend on the rights granted
to him by law and these cannot be based on whatever rights he believes that he is entitled to or those that may be derived
from the phrase “due process of the law”. Therefore, his request was not granted. But he was later on given copies of the
filings of the public respondents.
The Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-
respondents with one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Sen. Estrada prayed for
the issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges against him.

Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the
present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.

Sen. Estrada then filed before the Ombudsman a motion to suspend proceedings because the denial of his Request to be
furnished copies of counter-affidavits of his co-respondents deprived him of his right to procedural due process, and he
has filed a (Rule 65) Petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Estrada was denied with procedural due process.
RULING:
There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents.

1.  Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his
constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory
requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section
4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim.

2.  What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the respondent
with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-
affidavit is issued to the respondent. What Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses , not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the
counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of
discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen.
Estrada’s Request.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests

3.  Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that a respondent
“shall have access to the evidence on record,” this provision should be construed in relation to Section 4(a) and (b) of the
same Rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(i) Section 4(a) states that “the investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute
affidavits to substantiate the complaint.” The “supporting witnesses” are the witnesses of the complainant, and do not
refer to the co-respondents.

(ii) Section 4(b) states that “the investigating officer shall issue an order attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and all
other supporting documents, directing the respondent” to submit his counter-affidavit. The affidavits referred to in Section
4(b) are the affidavits mentioned in Section 4(a). Clearly, the affidavits to be furnished to the respondent are the affidavits
of the complainant and his supporting witnesses.

(iii) Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[t]he respondent shall have the
right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at
his expense.” A respondent’s right to examine refers only to “the evidence submitted by the complainant.”
Proceedings before the Ombudsman: Administrative case vs. Criminal case

4.  Justice Velasco’s dissent relies on the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes (Reyes case), an administrative
case, in which a different set of rules of procedure and standards apply. Sen. Estrada’s Petition, in contrast, involves the
preliminary investigation stage in a criminal case. Rule III on the Procedure in Administrative Cases of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in the Reyes case, while Rule II on the Procedure in Criminal Cases of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman applies in Sen. Estrada’s Petition. In both cases, the Rules of
Court apply in a suppletory character or by analogy.

5.  In the Reyes case, failure to furnish a copy of the counter-affidavits happened in the administrative proceedings on the
merits, which resulted in Reyes’ dismissal from the service. In Sen. Estrada’s Petition, the denial of his Request happened
during the preliminary investigation where the only issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of determining
whether an information should be filed, and does not prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits
of his co-respondents during the pre-trial or even during the trial.

Preliminary investigation

6.  It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause,
and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary
investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights,
such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. Thus, the rights of a respondent in
a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.

7.  The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-
founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof.  A preliminary
investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.

8.  It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses
which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall
only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where
the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity
to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests

9.  Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused,
we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

10.  Moreover, a person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in the present case when he filed his Request,
is not yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand the full exercise of the rights of an accused person.

11.  The right to a preliminary investigation is statutory, not constitutional.” In short, the rights of a respondent in a
preliminary investigation are merely statutory rights, not constitutional due process rights. An investigation to determine
probable cause for the filing of an information does not initiate a criminal action so as to trigger into operation Section
14(2), Article III of the Constitution. It is the filing of a complaint or information in court that initiates a criminal action.

12.  The constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not apply in preliminary
investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement of his right to confront the witnesses
against him. iA preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an
accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.

Probable cause

13.  Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted. x x x. The term does not mean “actual or positive cause” nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge.

14. It is also important to stress that the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a
party’s accusation or defense or on the admissibility or veracity of testimonies presented. Thus, probable cause can be
established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is
admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.

Administrative due process standards in Ang Tibay does not apply in a preliminary investigation

15.  However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial
evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial
evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence. To
require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of
evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial
evidence of guilt.

16.  The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a
preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant
the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs
“only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify conviction’

Petition for Certiorari is premature

17.  Although it is true that, in its 27 March 2014 Order, the Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, the Ombudsman
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
subsequently reconsidered its Order. On 7 May 2014, the same date that Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition, the
Ombudsman issued a Joint Order that furnished Sen. Estrada with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents,
and directed him to comment within a non-extendible period of five days from receipt of said Order. Sen. Estrada did not
file any comment.

18.  We underscore Sen. Estrada’s procedural omission. Sen. Estrada did not file any pleading, much less a motion for
reconsideration, to the 27 March 2014 Order. Sen. Estrada immediately proceeded to file this Petition for Certiorari before
this Court. The present Petition for Certiorari is premature.

19.  A motion for reconsideration allows the public respondent an opportunity to correct its factual and legal errors. Sen.
Estrada, however, failed to present a compelling reason that the present Petition falls under the exceptions to the general
rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari. This Court has
reiterated in numerous decisions that a motion for reconsideration is mandatory before the filing of a petition for
certiorari.

Sen. Estrada’s Petition for Certiorari constitutes forum shopping and should be summarily dismissed

20.  Sen. Estrada’s Motion for Reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution prayed that the Ombudsman
reconsider and issue a new resolution dismissing the charges against him. In this Motion for Reconsideration, Sen. Estrada
assailed the Ombudsman’s 27 March 2014 Joint Order denying his Request, and that such denial is a violation of his right
to due process. The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Motion for Reconsideration in its 4 June 2014 Joint Order.
Clearly, Sen. Estrada expressly raised in his Motion for Reconsideration with the Ombudsman the violation of his right to
due process, the same issue he is raising in this petition.

21.  The rule against forum shopping is not limited to the fulfillment of the requisites of litis pendentia. To determine
whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Undergirding the
principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same
subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same matter should
not be the subject of controversy in court more than once in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided, for
the sake of the stability in the rights and status of persons.

22.  Despite the fact that what was filed was a petition for certiorari, a recourse that – in the usual course and because of
its nature and purpose – is not covered by the rule on forum shopping. The exception from the forum shopping rule,
however, is true only where a petition for certiorari is properly or regularly invoked in the usual course; the
exception does not apply when the relief sought, through a petition for certiorari, is still pending with or has as yet to be
decided by the respondent court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial body, e.g., a motion for
reconsideration of the order assailed via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as in the present case.

23.  Sen. Estrada resorted to simultaneous remedies by filing this Petition alleging violation of due process by the
Ombudsman even as his Motion for Reconsideration raising the very same issue remained pending with the Ombudsman.
This is plain and simple forum shopping, warranting outright dismissal of this Petition.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Simon v. Commission of Human Rights
G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994
FACTS:
A "Demolition Notice," signed by Carlos Quimpo in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated
Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to the private respondents (being the officers
and members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-
period of three days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. Respondents
were informed that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".

On 12 July 1990, the respondents, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint with the CHR asking the
CHR Chairman Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA.

The CHR issued an Order, directing the QC Mayor's office (petitioners) "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties
at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR.

Convinced that on 28 July 1990, the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls, the CHR ordered
the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light
housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest.

A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioners stating that the CHR's authority should be understood as being confined only
to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not
civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business.”

In an Order, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls despite the "order to
desist", and it imposed a fine of P500 on each of them. In a separate Order, the CHR denied the petitioners' motion to
dismiss. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the recourse to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CHR is authorized to hear and decide “demolition cases” and to impose a fine for contempt.
RULING:
Commission on Human Rights is a fact-finding body, and does not exercise quasi-judicial powers

1.  The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was created by the 1987 Constitution. It was formally constituted by then
President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163 in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. The CHR
replaced the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. The powers and functions of the CHR are defined by Sec. 17, Art.
XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

2.  The CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-
judicial body. However, in Cariño vs. Commission on Human Rights, the court stated:

"The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not
a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have."

Scope of the CHR's investigative powers is limited t0 “human rights violations involving civil and political rights"

3.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be
understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus
seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is
generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

4.  Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to
"investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights”

5.  The term "civil rights" has been defined as referring "(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or
country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of
government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as
otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such
term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action." Also quite
often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and
seizures, and imprisonment for debt.

6.  The term “political rights” refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration
of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights
appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.

7.  Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a
Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate
Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the
"(1) protection of rights of political detainees,
(2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures,
(3) fair and public trials,
(4) cases of disappearances,
(5) salvagings and hamletting, and
(6) other crimes committed against the religious."

While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of
priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in
peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit
to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation.

8.  In the particular case at hand, what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as
temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park."
More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy
national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical
that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if its is not, in
fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance,
we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by
the Constitution.

Scope of CHR's contempt powers apply only to violations of its operational guidelines and rules of procedure
essential to carry out its investigatorial powers
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests

9.  On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR
acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the
Rules of Court."

10.  That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational
guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for
contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant
information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a
semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but
prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.

CHR has no power to issue injunctive writs

11.  The constitutional provision directing the CHR to 'provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection' may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law'. It is never derived by implication.
(see EPZA vs CHR)

12.  Evidently, the 'preventive measures and legal aid services' mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and
judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf
of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ,
for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued `by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and
interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.

13.  The Commission does not have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to
any appropriate agency of government.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization (PBMEO) V. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc, and CIR
G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973

FACTS:
Petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization ( PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union, composed of the
employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. (PBMCI).

On March 1, 1969, PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as
those in the regular second (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M.) and and third shifts (from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.). They informed the
company - PBMCI - of their proposed demonstration.

A meeting was called by PBMCI on March 3, 1969. The union was informed that any demonstration should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the company. For which reason, Atty. C.S. de Leon, as PBMCI's spokesperson, warned
the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved
by the Company, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because
such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike.

Another meeting was called in the afternoon where PBMCI appealed to the PBMEO representatives that the workers for
the first shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work in order not
to violate the provisions of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' All those who will not follow this warning
of the Company shall be dismissed.

PBMEO proceeded with the demonstration as planned. PBMCI filed charges in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
against the union members and officers composing the first shift for violating the CBA provisions on strike/lockout.

The CIR issued an Order finding PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and its officers (petitioners) as directly
responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status
as employees of the company.

Petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969 the aforesaid order and that they filed on September 29, 1969,
because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday, a motion for reconsideration (MR) of said order.

PBMCI averred that petitioners received the order on September 22, 1969, thus the MR was filed beyond the 5 day period
under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations. The CIR dismissed the MR of petitioner for
being pro forma and for being filed out of time.

Petitioners filed with the CIR a petition for relief from the dismissal. Without waiting for any resolution on their petition
for relief, they filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the workers who joined the protest violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement

RULING:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to
survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are
absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women
by whom we shall be governed.”

Primacy of right of free expression and of assembly over property rights

1.  In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for
their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution. The pretension of their employer that it
would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights.

2.  In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position  as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions, and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusion

3.  The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to
man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. While the Bill of Rights also protects
property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation
only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are
imprescriptible.

4.  The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights . On the other hand,
a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.

The mass demonstration by the petitioners was not in violation of the CBA

5.  The demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen, not against their employer. Said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of
expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before the
appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig.

6.  To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, as "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.

7.  The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court,
for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be
an illegal picketing or strike. The CIR concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same
is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of
work.

PBMCI is guilty of unfair labor practice

8.  Because of the refusal on the part of PBMCI to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration
against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of
grievances, the company committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 thereof guarantees to the employees the right "to
engage in concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for
an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
The threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration.

Dismissal of the union leaders was a denial of social justice

9.  The dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being
absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees.
Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article
XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor . . ." The Court of Industrial Relations as an agency
of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the
working man.

10.  Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or
termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to charge said one-day absence against
their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as
aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families
aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the oppressive hand of the
petty tyrants in the localities.

A violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction

11.  It has been established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence
its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Both the Court of Industrial Relations and PBMCI trenched upon the
constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to
which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human
rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in
the instant case are a nullity.

Procedural rules cannot prevail over the Constitution

12.  The exercise and enjoyment of their rights must not be nullified by a mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court
of Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegated legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield
to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. Otherwise, these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated
by a rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal.

13.  The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22,
1969 of the order. Does the mere fact that the MR was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning
employees? To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights
sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the
Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and
logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of
necessity should be affirmed.

CIR may suspend application of its procedural rules as may be equitable and just under the circumstances

14.  The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at
bar, is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter. Under Section 20, 'The Court of
Industrial Relations shall adopt its rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of
justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in
exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits
of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision, the industrial court is
disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted to the
specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the
purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (see Ang Tibay v. C.I.R)

5 day period to file MR is unreasonable

15. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is
unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days
within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not
have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Fermin v. People
G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008

FACTS:
Cristy Fermin is the publisher and Bogs Tugas is the editor-in-chief of Gossip Tabloid. The June 14, 1995 headline and
lead story of the tabloid says that it is improbable for Annabelle Rama to go to the US should it be true that she is evading
her conviction in an estafa case herein the Philippines for she and husband Eddie have more problems/cases to confront
there. This was said to be due to them, especially Annabelle’s, using fellow Filipinos’ money and failure to remit proceeds
to the manufacturing company of the cookware they were selling.

"MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING
ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE"

"IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG

ASUNTO NILA DU N, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA
MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG
NADISPALKO NILA, NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA
STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA
SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA"

On complaint of spouses, two (2) criminal information for libel were filed against the accused before the RTC.

The RTC found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel.

Aggrieved, petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA which affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but acquitted Tugas on
account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous article.

ISSUE:

Whether or not both the publisher and the Editor-in-chief are guilty of libel based on the libelous article written by
Fermin.

Whether or not Fermin can validly raise trhe defense of press freedom.

RULING:

In U.S. v. Taylor, which provides that: “Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial
publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number of each
newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same.” In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was
made to the Spanish text of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb “publicar.” Thus, it was held
that Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published, but also
the person who prints or publishes it.

Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is not
required, if the accused has been specifically identified as “author, editor, or proprietor” or “printer/publisher” of the
publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this case. It is worthy to note that petitioner was not only the “publisher,” as
shown by the editorial box of Gossip Tabloid but also its “president” and “chairperson” as she herself admitted on the
witness stand. Obviously, petitioner had full control over the publication of articles in the said tabloid. Her excuse of
lack of knowledge, consent, or participation in the release of the libelous article fails to persuade. Following SC’s ruling
in Ocampo, petitioner’s criminal guilt should be affirmed, whether or not she had actual knowledge and
participation, having furnished the means of carrying on the publication of the article purportedly prepared by the
members of the Gossip Reportorial Team, who were employees under her control and supervision.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of Fermin for libel should be upheld.  CA erred in acquitting Tugas,
he being the editor-in-chief. But the SC cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Tugas because with his
acquittal by the CA, SC would run afoul of his constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Fermin cannot validly raise the defense of press freedom.

If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of
public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are
considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and
intrigue writers and commentators such as Fermin, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and
dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print,
about their personal lives.
Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. Although a
wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or
against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of
constitutionally protected speech.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Tulfo v. People
G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008

FACTS:
On the complaint of Atty. Carlos "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4) separate informations were filed
on September 8, 1999 with RTC Pasay City. These were assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 99-
1597 to 99-1600, and charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as
national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the
daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the publication of the articles in the column "Direct Hit"
in the issues of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999.

In his (Erwin Tulfo) series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs as being
involved in criminal activities, and was using his public position for personal gain. He went even further than that, and
called Atty. So an embarrassment to his religion, saying "ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw sa miyembro
nito." He accused Atty. So of stealing from the government with his alleged corrupt activities. And when Atty. So filed a
libel suit against him, Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty. So, saying, " Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty.
So dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-expose ang kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs]."

In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that he neither knew
Atty. So nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified that his criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South
Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but against a person by the name of Atty. "Ding" So at the South Harbor.
Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of certain people to use other people's names to advance their corrupt practices. He
also claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as per his source in the
Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further testified that he did not do any research on Atty. So before
the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to rely on his source, and that he had several sources in the Bureau of
Customs, particularly in the South Harbor.
In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. In a Decision
dated June 17, 2003, the Eighth Division of the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE:
            Whether or not Tulfo’s articles are qualified privileged communications
RULING:
No. The commentaries were substantiated attack over Atty. So. and it cannot be countenanced as being privileged
just because the target was a public official. Tulfo made no verification nor research about his commentary. He just relied
on his sources in BoC
The freedom of the press is one of the cherished hallmarks of our democracy; but even as we strive to protect and
respect the fourth estate, the freedom it enjoys must be balanced with responsibility. There is a fine line between freedom
of expression and libel, and it falls on the courts to determine whether or not that line has been crossed.
            The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the same when it came to commentaries made
on public figures and matters of public interest. Even in cases wherein the freedom of the press was given greater weight
over the rights of individuals, the Court, however, has stressed that such freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The
exercise of this right or any right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal burden of responsible
exercise of that right. The recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the rights
of others.
Tulfo claimed knowledge of people using the names of others for personal gain, and even stated that he had been
the victim of such a practice. He argued then that it may have been someone else using the name of Atty. So for corrupt
practices at the South Harbor, and this person was the target of his articles. This argument weakens his case further, for
even with the knowledge that he may be in error, even knowing of the possibility that someone else may have used Atty.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
So's name, as Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to verify the information given by his source or even to ascertain the
identity of the person he was accusing.
Although the falsity of the article does not prove malice, the existence of press freedom must be done in a
consistent with good faith and reasonable care. This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles.
This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify his story
and instead misinforming the public.
The test laid down is the “reckless disregard” test, and Tulfo failed to meet that test.
The evidence of malice was further proved when Tulfo published another article which lambasted Atty. So after
the commencement of an action. Tulfo did not relent nor did he pause to consider his actions, but went on to continue
defaming Atty. So. This is a clear indication of his intent to malign Atty. So., no matter the cost.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Celdran v. People
G.R. No. 220127, March 21, 2018

FACTS:
The case stemmed from an incident where Carlos Celdran was alleged to have been mocking and disrespected the
gathering of religious people.
The facts of the case established that in celebration of the second anniversary of the May They Be One Campaign
(MTBC) and the launching of the Hand Written Bible which coincided with the feast of Saint Jerome, a throng of people
composed mainly of catholic church dignitaries intermixed with those of different religions such as members of the
military, police, media, non-catholics, students, representatives of various religious organizations gathered around the
Manila Cathedral in the afternoon of September 30, 2010.
While Brother Edgar J. Tria Tirona was reading a passage from the Bible around 3:00 p.m., petitioner entered the Manila
Cathedral clad in a black suit and a hat. Petitioner went to the center of the aisle, in front of the altar and suddenly brought
out a placard emblazoned with the word “DAMASO.” Commotion ensued when petitioner started shouting while inside
the church saying “Bishops, stop involving yourself (sic) in politics,” 9 disrupting and showing disrespect to an otherwise
solemn
The defense, on the other hand, alleged that the incident did not happen during the celebration of the holy mass and
nothing happened that disturbed the proceedings celebration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused disrupted and showed disrespect to the solemn celebration of the religion.
RULING:
Yes. Accused is guilty of violation Article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. The Supemre Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals in its finding that the acts of petitioner were meant to mock, insult, and ridicule those clergy whose beliefs and
principles were diametrically opposed to his own. Petitioner failed to show any irreversible error in the uniform findings
of the courts, the Supreme Court denied his petition.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Gamboa v. Chan
G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012

FACTS:
On December 8, 2009, Pres. Gloria Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 which created the Zenarosa
Commission which was tasked to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to
eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon the conclusion
of its investigation, the Zenarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report
which involves Marynette Gambos, the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, to have been maintaining PAGs.
She alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP-Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. On 6 and 7 July 2010,
ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians
alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media. Thus,
she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos
Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zenarosa Commission. As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless
inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her
supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.
She contended that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a
Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials
of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
The respondents alleged that they had acted within the bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation
and surveillance of Gamboa and asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the following
requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
RTC however dismissed her petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that
the subject information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the Zenarosa Commission
without the benefit of prior verification. But they ruled that there was a violation of her right to privacy. This prompted
her to file for an instant Appeal by Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is invoked
as opposed to the State’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty, or security.
RULING:
No.
Right to Privacy – Not Absolute when…
The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint.
However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right to privacy is
not an absolute right. Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are
required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may
nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the truth and to
informational privacy.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
It seeks to protect a person's right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in
order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and
the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
 The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by
the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and
civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.

          Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state
aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining
PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard,
respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in
which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
The State interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of Information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
Thus, the privilege of the writ of habeas data was denied.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Social Security System Employees Association v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989

FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of
SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public
Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to
work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be
ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be
declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual
employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same
salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of
P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of
discrimination and unfair labor practices.

ISSUE:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the
strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work?
RULING:
1. No. They do not have the right to strike. The Court maintains that Art. IX (B), Sec. 2(5), allowing for the right
to self-organization to government employees, do not include with it the right to strike.
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with
the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes.
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31]
On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to
the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-
outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.”
Therefore, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, they are prohibited
from doing so. In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees”
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum
prohibiting strikes.
2. Yes. The resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is
appropriate.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
University of the East v. Pepanio and Bueno
G.R. No. 193897, January 23, 2013

FACTS:
In 1992, DECS issued the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which requires college faculty
members to have a master's degree as a minimum educational qualification for acquiring regular status.

University of the East hired respondent Mariti D. Bueno (Bueno) in 1997 and respondent Analiza F. Pepanio (Pepanio) in
2000, both on a semester-to-semester basis to teach in its college. During this time, the 1994 CBA was still in force. It
provided that UE shall extend only semester-to-semester appointments to college faculty staffs who did not possess the
minimum qualifications. Meantime, DECS-CHED-TESDA-DOLE Joint Order 1 was issued which provides that teaching
or academic personnel who do not meet the minimum academic qualifications shall not acquire tenure or regular status.

Then in 2001, UE and the faculty union entered into a new CBA that would have the school extend probationary full-time
appointments to full-time faculty members who did not yet have the required postgraduate degrees provided that the latter
would obtain such requirement during their probationary period. Hence, UE extended probationary appointments to
Bueno and Pepanio. The two, however, failed to obtain post-graduate degrees.

UE informed Bueno and Pepanio that their probationary status is about to expire since they lack the required post-
graduate qualification. However, Bueno and Pepanio demanded that they should be considered as regular employees since
they were hired in 1997 and 2000, when what was in force was the 1994 CBA which did not require a masters degree
before attaining regular status. UE did not heed to their demands.

Thus, they filed a case for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. The LA ruled in their favor. Dissatisfied, UE
appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the LAs ruling.
On September 27, 2006 the NLRC Third Division set aside the LA Decision. It rejected the technical objection and ruled
that the four-semester probationary period provided under the old CBA did not automatically confer permanent status to
Bueno and Pepanio. They still had to meet the standards for permanent employment provided under the Manual of
Regulations and the Joint Order mentioned above. The non-renewal of their contract was based on their failure to obtain
the required postgraduate degrees and cannot, therefore, be regarded as illegal.
On petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reinstating the LAs Decision by reason of technicality.
This prompted UE to file the present petition.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not UE filed a timely appeal to the NLRC from the Decision of the LA
Whether or not Bueno and Pepanio were validly terminated from their employment.

RULING:

1. Yes. UE filed a timely appeal to the NLRC

The records fail to show that Atty. Mison in fact received the alleged registry notice from the post office on March 22,
2005 that required him to claim his mail. Respondents have not presented a copy of the receipt evidencing that notice.
The Court has no choice but to consider the registry return receipt bearing the date April 4, 2005 which showed the
date of Atty. Mison's receipt of a copy of the LA Decision a conclusive proof of service on that date. Reckoned from
April 4, UE filed its appeal to the NLRC on time.

2. Yes. They were validly terminated.

 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Respondents argue that UE hired them in 1997 and 2000, when what was in force was the 1994 CBA between UE
and the faculty union. Since that CBA did not yet require a master's degree for acquiring a regular status and since
respondents had already complied with the three requirements of the CBA, namely, (a) that they served full-time; (b) that
they rendered three consecutive years of service; and (c) that their services were satisfactory,18 they should be regarded as
having attained permanent or regular status.

But the policy requiring postgraduate degrees of college teachers was provided in the Manual of Regulations as
early as 1992. Indeed, recognizing this, the 1994 CBA provided even then that UE was to extend only semester-to-
semester appointments to college faculty staffs, like respondents, who did not possess the minimum qualifications for
their positions.

The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The operation of
educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in
possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions. Government
regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from ill-
prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required to take an
examination22or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment.
Here, UE gave respondents Bueno and Pepanio more than ample opportunities to acquire the postgraduate degree
required of them. But they did not take advantage of such opportunities. Justice, fairness, and due process demand that an
employer should not be penalized for situations where it had little or no participation or control.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Tabalarin v. Hon. Gutierrez (NMAT Case)
G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1988

FACTS:
Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into
colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully
take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the
Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not
taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region,
a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the
Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional
requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning
with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future.
After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April
1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are
constitutional.
RULING:
YES. Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition
for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the
sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general
community. An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well-being of the
population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps
the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of
passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that
the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to
the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in
our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known. We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT
as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection
of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our
bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Marcos v. Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

FACTS:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But
President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood
firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove
that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of

1. accumulated foreign debt

2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and
prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner
questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision
was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted
outside her jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal
protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3
of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. – NO
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and decided to bar their return. – NO
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
RULING:
Right to travel is distinct from Right to return to one's country; enjoys a different protection

1.  It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries
or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the
right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related
to the right to travel.

2.  The Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat (i) the
right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, (ii) the right to leave a country, and (iii) the right
to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.

Right to Return to One's Country is not guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, but nevertheless recognized as a
generally accepted principle of international law

3.  The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived"
thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

President’s residual power in the interest of national security

4.  The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the
duty of the President, as steward of the people. More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers
as protector of the peace. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution.

5. The president, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of
executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in
scattered provisions of the Constitution.

6.  The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions,
or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a
matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such
request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether
it must be granted or denied.

Exercise of President's residual power not a political question, but subject to Judicial Review

7.  The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into
areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But
nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President,
for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the
President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We
cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant.
Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved
to the people.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests

8.  When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official
concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.

9.  The question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it
was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be
said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.

10.  The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not changed the factual scenario
under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has
been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as
to the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision
to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the
"legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world." 

EO 292, BOOK 3, TITLE I, CHAPTER 7

Other Powers

SECTION 19. Powers Under the Constitution.—The President shall exercise such other powers as are provided for in the
Constitution.

SECTION 20. Residual Powers.—Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers
and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated
above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests

Baldoza v. Hon. Dimaano

A.M. No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976

FACTS:
            In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges
Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow employees
of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with
their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.

            Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records but that the
same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected.  He further
asserted that a court has the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and furnishing copies may
be refuse when the motivation is not serious and legitimate interest, out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify
private site or promote public scandal.

Judge Dimaano answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records but that
the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He further
contends that the restrictions were imposed for the following reasons:
1.) For fear of an abuse in the exercise of the right,
2.) There has been recent tampering of padlocks of the door of the Court
3.) Request of such a magnitude cannot be immediately granted without adequate deliberation and advisement,
4.) Authority should first be secured from the Supreme Court

The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At the
preliminary hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint but the
motion was denied by the Investigating Judge. After formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of respondent.

ISSUE:
            Whether or not the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection of the docket books infringe
upon the right of individuals to information.

RULING:
            No. As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket
books of respondent certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and
conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records predicated on the right of the
people to acquire information on matters of public concern.

Reasonable restrictions on access to records not a violation of the Constitutional right to information

1.  The Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public concern and
thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions,
subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information of general
interest.

2.  Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not
believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of
the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is
not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy.

3. Notwithstanding this, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law.  Thus, access restrictions
imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that
renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.

4.  In this case, it was found out that Judge Dimaano did not act arbitrarily when he allowed the opening and viewing if
the docket books under his supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent
were unreasonable.
The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent certain conditions and
under his control and supervision. it has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were
unreasonable. The access to public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of
public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Government of Hong Kong SAR v. Judge Olalia
G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
Doctrine: International Customary Law: Right to Life and Liberty
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these
obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life,
liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right
to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
FACTS:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an
"Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997. On July 1, 1997, Hong
Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three counts of the offense of "accepting an
advantage as agent” and seven counts of the offense of “conspiracy to defraud”.

An Order of Arrest was issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Manila against Muñoz in lieu of the request received by
the Department of Justice (DOJ) from the Hong Kong Department of Justice for his provisional arrest. On the same day of
the issuance of the warrant, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested and detained him.

Upon petition of Muñoz, the Court of Appeals (CA) declared the Order of Arrest void. The Supreme Court (SC),
however, sustained the validity of the Order of Arrest against Muñoz. This became final and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HK-SAR) filed with the RTC Manila a petition for the
extradition of Muñoz. In response, Muñoz filed a petition for bail. The same was denied for the reason that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that Muñoz is a high “flight risk”. Muñoz filed a motion for
reconsideration which the court granted. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, in turn, filed an urgent motion to
vacate the said order granting bail but it was denied.

Hong Kong-SAR alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting Muñoz to bail, that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited
solely to criminal proceedings.

Muñoz on the other hand contends that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

RULING:
YES. A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Extradition
Extradition has been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of
one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an
extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
may follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. It is
not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is
merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to
secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment.
While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following:
(a) It entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extradite; and
(b) The means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is
shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the interest of justice. Section 20
allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused, pending
receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-
arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential
extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state
following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of
time of the detention should be reasonable.

Public International Law

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the
sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international
law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects of international law are limited only to states was
dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century.

Grant of Bail Available in Extradition Proceedings

While the court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of
the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and
liberty, a re-examination of the Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
The State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings.
Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases,
there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of
every individual is not impaired.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the
Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. However, it does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life,
liberty, and due process. An extraditee cannot be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests

Standard of proof in extradition proceedings

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither
be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise
apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separate Opinion in the case of Government of United States of America v. Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used
in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
but higher than preponderance of evidence.

Case was remanded back to RTC to determine whether he can be granted bail based on clear and convincing
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide
with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Kuroda v. Jalandoni
G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949
National War Crimes Office which prescribes rules and regulations governing the trial of war criminals who committed
war crimes against the Filipino people.
FACTS:
Executive Order (EO) No. 68, established a National War Crimes Office prescribing rules and regulations
governing the trial of accused war criminals.

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the
Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944, was charged before a Military
Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded
and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes
against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of
war" 

Kuroda filed the present petition to (a) challenge the constitutionality of EO No. 68 and (2) prohibit US Attorneys
Melville Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military
Commission.

Kuroda argues that the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of 'crimes' not based on law, national and international.
Hence, the Military Commission is without jurisdiction to try him. Moreover, USA attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert
Port are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines. 

ISSUE:
Whether EO No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office, is constitutional.

RULING:

EO No. 68 is constitutional 

Article 2 of our [1935] Constitution provides in its Section 3, that: “The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.”

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the Hague
Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United
Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and
of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of
war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of
Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies
of international law which are part of the our Constitution.

EO No. 68 is an exercise by the President of his power as Commander in Chief

War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities, incident of war may
remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption
of measure by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary
measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war. Indeed
the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
in the language of a writer a military commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This
includes the period of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective of a treaty of peace and may extend beyond
by treaty agreement. (Yamashita vs. Styer, L-129, 42 OG 664)

The President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war, namely
the trial and punishment of war criminals, through the issuance and enforcement of EO No. 68.

Hague and Geneva conventions are based on the generally accepted principals of international law which form
part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them

Kuroda argues that the Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second
only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are
wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law.  In facts these rules and principles were accepted by
the two belligerent nation (the United State and Japan) who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions
embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained inn treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.

War crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a Commonwealth are triable and
punishable by our present Republic

When the crimes charged against Kuroda were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of
United States and thus we were equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation
contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by our assumption
of full sovereignty. If at all our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the right on our own of trying and
punishing those who committed crimes against crimes against our people. 

The change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those
charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same
sovereign people. (Laurel vs. Misa). By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government
while we were a Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.

Counsel appearing before the Military Commission need not be qualified to practice law in accordance with the
Rules of Court

The Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of court
which govern ordinary civil court. . There is nothing in EO No. 68 which requires that counsel appearing before said
commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it
is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor
even possessed of legal training.

Participation of two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty

The appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and
proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a
tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any
relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State Government which has yielded
to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them
representation in said trials. It is of common knowledge that the United State and its people have been equally if not more
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which Kuroda stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a
privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government
to a military tribunal of our country.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 221697, and 221698-700, March 28, 2016
FACTS:
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar on September 3, 1968. Edgardo turned over custody over the infant to
his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his wife. On September 6, 1968, Emiliano registered petitioner as a foundling with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo ).
When petitioner was five years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and
Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption in the MTC. On 13 May 1974, the trial court
granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to
"Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." However, it was only on May 4, 2006 that the OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate
of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
Although petitioner initially enrolled in the University of the Philippines, she opted to continue her studies abroad
and left for the United States of America in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College where she earned her
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.
On July 27, 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., in San
Juan City. Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days
after the wedding ceremony or on July 29, 1991.
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to a son in April 1992. Two daughters followed in July 1998 and June
2004, both born in the Philippines.
On October 18, 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. She obtained a U.S. Passport in
December 2001.
On April 8, 2004, petitioner came back to the Philippines to support her father's candidacy for President in the
May 2004 elections. She returned to the U.S. on July 8, 2004.
On December 13, 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating
medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner returned to the US on February 3,
2005.
Petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first
quarter of 2005. The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools that
they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next semester; coordination with property movers for the relocation
of their household goods to the Philippines. As early as 2004, petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.
Petitioner came home to the Philippines on May 24, 2005. Her three children immediately followed while her
husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home
there. In the second half of 2005, she and her husband purchased a condominium unit at One Wilson Place Condominium
in San Juan City.
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their
family home and continue to reside up to the present. Her children of school age also began attending Philippine private
schools.
On July 7, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic
Act No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. In its July 18, 2006 Order, the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) declared that petitioner is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship. She thereafter secured a
Philippine passport.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship". From then on,
petitioner stopped using her American passport.
On December 9, 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
United States" effective October 21, 2010.
On October 2, 2012, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the
2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines
before May 13, 2013." Having obtained the highest number of votes, she was proclaimed Senator on May 16, 2013.
On October 15, 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In her COC, the
petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May
2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from May 24, 2005. This triggered the filing of several
petitions in the Comelec against her.
 
G.R. No. 221697

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo filed a petition in the Comelec to deny due
course or cancel said COC on the ground that petitioner committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she
claimed that was a natural born Filipino citizen and that she had complied with the 10-year residency requirement.

Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings. Even assuming that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she
became a naturalized American citizen. According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration
she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six years and six
months as of May 2013 Elections. Moreover, petitioner's residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006,
when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225. Petitioner also allegedly failed to reestablish her domicile in
the Philippines.

The COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC contained material
representations which are false. Hence, petitioner's COC was cancelled. The COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
 
G.R. Nos. 221698-700

Three separate petitions were filed by Francisco S. Tatad, Antonio P. Contreras and Amado D. Valdez against
petitioner before the Comelec.

Tatad filed a petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure alleging that
petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. He averred that the fact that
foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers'
intent to exclude them. Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen. Tatad asserts
that international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give
effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. He also stressed that there is no standard state practice that
automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.

Contreras' petition limited the attack to the residency issue. He contended that the reckoning period for computing
petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship was approved by the BI. Petitioner's physical presence in the country before that date could not be valid
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen and as such, she
was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.

The Comelec First Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen and that she failed to complete the
10-year residency requirement, and cancelled petitioner's COC. The COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

Present petition

Petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari to assail the Comelec resolutions on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
 
RULING:

A. Comelec Jurisdiction

COMELEC cannot by itself decide the qualification or lack thereof of an electoral candidate; to disqualify a
candidate, there must be a prior declaration by a final judgment of a competent court.

1.  The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled on
the exclusive ground that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should
hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for
the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC
cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

2.  The [electoral] tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the Vice-
President, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no
such provision for candidates for these positions. Realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the
ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules in 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 Sec 1 (grounds for
disqualification). The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a
mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the
COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, Sec 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. The
assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to
the evident intention of the law. (see Fermin v. COMELEC and Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC )
 
3.  Given the pronouncements in Fermin and Romualdez, on September 2012, Comelec amended its Rule 25, to wit:

Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent
court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or
Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.

4.  The 2012 amendment is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for determining  before
election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a
declaration by a final judgment of a competent court  that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by
the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."

5.  The COMELEC does not have authority to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior
determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
6.  If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided
by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such
prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception
that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are
bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.
 
B. Citizenship qualification

Burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen

7.  COMELEC ruled that petitioner “has the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino
parent.”

8.  The burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private
respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not
shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in
this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

Circumstantial evidence establish that Grace Poe had Filipino parents

9.  COMELEC said that it cannot rule that petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is
certain that such relationship is indemonstrable”.

10.  The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents are
Filipinos. The Solicitor General offered official statistics that from 1965 to 1975 which shows that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino is 99.83 %. Petitioner also
presented census statistics for Iloilo Province showing that 99.62 % of the population were Filipinos.

11.  Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant
in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black
hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

12.  There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical
certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible
under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
 
Foundlings are considered natural-born citizens

(a) Foundlings as Filipino citizens

13.  As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of
silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.

14.  The deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by
the enumeration. Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the
notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit
specific mention. As the Solicitor General points out, “the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic
efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy, i.e, there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because
they are already impliedly so recognized.”

15.  The Court finds no intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three
Constitutions (1935, 1973, 1987) guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests

16.  Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.
Domestic adoption laws, i.e. R.A. No. 8043[Inter-Country Adoption] and R.A. No. 8552 [Domestic Adoption], all
expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
 
(b) Foundlings enjoy natural-born status

17.  Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."

18.  It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling
certificate are “acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship” which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best.
This is erroneous:

(1) "Having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance,
the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities.

(2) The object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child.

(3) The process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of
such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to
perfect it.
 
Citizenship of foundlings under international law

19.  Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires
that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.

20.  Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted
as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: (a) the established, widespread, and consistent practice on
the part of States; and (b) a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it.

(a) UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR (binding as treaties)

21.  The Philippines is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"). The Philippines has also
ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

22.  The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from
birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be
accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A.
No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen ( 18) years old.
 
(b) 1930 Hague Convention and 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (binding as generally
accepted principles of international law)

23.  The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
international law. (1) The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict
of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth" (2) The second
is Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness under which a foundling is
presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found.

24.  That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which effectively affirms
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. (see Razon vs. Tagitis and Mijares v. Ranada)

25.  Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is
rational and reasonable and consistent with the }us sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines.
 
It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of
the country in which the foundling is found

26.  Generally accepted principles of international law, under the incorporation clause in Sec 2 Art II of the 1987
Constitution, are based not only on international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph ( c) of the ICJ Statute.

27.  Petitioner's evidence shows that at least 60 countries have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen, and
42 of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. It was also pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or
87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries,
show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals
of the country in which the foundling is found.

28.  Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law. In
particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all
of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. 
 
Repatriation under RA 9225 resulted in Grace Poe's reacquisition of her status as a natural born Filipino citizen

29.  The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is
reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."

30.  Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino. (see Bengson Ill v. HRET)

31.  COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson Ill v. HRET where
the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's
citizenship. In Bengson Ill v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987
Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens. 
 
C. Residency qualification

32. The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines before the day of
the elections. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May
9, 2016," petitioner put in "10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings corresponds to a beginning date of 25
May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests

Requisites to acquire a new domicile

33.  There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile:

(a) residence or bodily presence in a new locality

(b) an intention to remain there
(c) an intention to abandon the old domicile

34.  To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
 
Grace Poe re-established her residency in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005

35.  When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. Petitioner,
however, presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to
the Philippines for good.

36. It is the Comelec's position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in
July 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. Since petitioner was still an American (without
any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006
cannot be counted.

37.  The cases relied on by Comelec are not applicable. In the said cases, because of the sparse evidence on residence, the
Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or
from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together
leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the
children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment
of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment
right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence
here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a
residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines
over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

38.  The COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer
look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program) shows that there is no overriding intent to
treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has
been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the Philippines." 
 
Statements on residency made in 2012 COC is not conclusive ( it is the fact of residence, as borne out by the
evidence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which shall be determinative)

39.  The COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months in her 2015 COC
was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012
COC for Senator. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015
COC as false.

40.  Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as
inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself
introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The
COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests

41.  According to petitioner, in her 2012 COC, she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when
the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. Petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date
earlier given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence would include her passport and the school
records of her children.

42.  It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission
against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent
after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. (see
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC)

43.  It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to
have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24
May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly
stated the pertinent period of residency.

D. Material Misrepresentation as a ground for denying due course to, and cancellation of a COC

Candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation

44.  A candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which
is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the
candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective
office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public
office. (see Ugdoracion, Jr. v. COMELEC)
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
Razon v. Tagitis
G.R. No. 182498, December 3, 2009
Subject:

The Death of Kasim Rendered the Directive to Implead him as a Party to the Case Moot and Academic; Kasim’s
Death does not Erase the Burden of Disclosure and Investigation which Rests on the PNP; The 2009 Decision Considered
Other Evidence and Not Only Kasim’s Report; The Kasim Evidence Amounted to Substantial Evidence Required by the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo

FACTS:
In the 2009 case decided by the Supreme Court, Morced Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank, arrived in Jolo
by boat together with Arsimin Kunnong. When Kunnong returned after buying a boat ticket for Tagitis, the latter was no
longer around. His disappearance was reported to the Jolo Police Station by Kunnong and one Muhammad Matli, a
professor of Muslim Studies. More than a month later, respondent Mary Jean Tagitis, Morced’s wife, filed a petition for
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo with the Court of Appeals, which issued the writ. The PNP Officers then appealed
before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled that the disappearance of Tagitis was an enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo. The government was declared accountable for the enforced disappearance. The Court also held that
the PNP was directly responsible for the disclosure of material facts by Kasim relevant to the disappearance. The case was
then referred to the Court of Appeals for the appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-
CIDG investigations, actions and validation of their results with respect to the enforced disappearance. Lastly, the Court
ordered that Kasim be impleaded in the case.

In this 2010 case, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners. They contended that there was no
sufficient evidence to conclude that Kalim’s disclosure pointed to some government complicity in the disappearance of
Tagiits. Further, the subsequent death of Kasim made it impossible for the compliance of the order of the Supreme Court
to implead him.

RULING:

The Death of Kasim Rendered the Directive to Implead him as a Party to the Case Moot and Academic

This directive can no longer be enforced, and has been rendered moot and academic, given Kasim's demise. The Court
ruled that his intervening death does not necessarily signify the loss of the information Kasim may have left behind,
particularly the network of assets he utilized while he was in the service.

Kasim’s Death does not Erase the Burden of Disclosure and Investigation which Rests on the PNP

The Court ruled that the extinction of Kasim’s personal accountability and obligation to disclose material
information, known to him and his assets, does not also erase the burden of disclosure and investigation that rests with the
PNP and the CIDG.

Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves an interwoven network of informants
existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with the police and the military.

A resourceful investigator, utilizing the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, can
still access or reconstruct the information Kasim received from his asset or network of assets during his lifetime.
 Human Rights Law Module 1 and 2A Case Digests
The continuing obligations imposed by the Supreme Court will not truly be terminated until the enforced
disappearance of the victim Tagitis is fully addressed by the responsible or accountable parties, as directed in the 2009
Decision.

The 2009 Decision Considered Other Evidence and Not Only Kasim’s Report

The Court ruled that the 2009 Decision plainly and pointedly considered other evidence supporting the Court’s
conclusion, particularly the consistent denials by government authorities of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis,
the dismissive approach of the police authorities to the report of the disappearance and the conduct of haphazard
investigations that did not translate into any meaningful results.

The Kasim Evidence Amounted to Substantial Evidence Required by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo

The Court found the argument that the Kasim evidence does not amount to substantial evidence required by the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo to be unmeritorious.

The Court reminded that it continued to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo requires, with some adjustments for flexibility in considering the evidence presented.

When the court ruled that hearsay evidence, which was usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of
evidence, may be admitted as the circumstances of the case may require, it did not thereby dispense with the substantial
evidence rule but merely relaxed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence, maintaining all the time the
standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation.