3 Illegal Recruitment

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 123146 June 17, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ALONA BULI-E and JOSEFINA (JOSIE) ALOLINO, Appellants.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Appellants Alona Buli-e and Josefina Alolino assail the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 15, finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment committed in large
scale and eight counts of estafa.
On March 16, 1993, the following information was filed against Jose
Alolino and appellants, Alona Buli-e and Josefina Alolino:
The undersigned accuses ALONA BULI-E, JOSEFINA (JOSIE) ALOLINO

and JOSE ALOLINO for VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 38 (b), PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED BY P.D. 1920 FURTHER AMENDED BY
P.D. 2018, committed in large scale, which is an act of economic
sabotage, and by a syndicate, committed as follows:
That during the period from March 1991 to July 1992, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused representing themselves to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and hire and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a
fee, recruit and promise employment / job placement to the following
persons:
1. Constancio Macli-ing
2. Jesssica Estay
3. Sidolia Fias-eo
4. John Mangili
5. Nieva Lampoyas
6. Sabado Agapito
7. Joseph Oratil and
8. Joel Oratil
in Taiwan without first obtaining or securing license or authority from

the proper government agency
1
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On the same day, eight separate informations for estafa were also filed
against Jose Alolino and appellants Alona Buli-e (Buli-e for brevity) and
Josefina Alolino (Josefina, for brevity). Except as to the dates,
amounts involved2 and the names of complainants, the following
information in Criminal Case No. 11123-R typified the seven other
informations for the crime of estafa:
That on or about the 12th day of July, 1992, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud one Constancio Macli-ing by way of false pretenses, which are
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud,
as follows, to wit: the accused knowing fully well that they are not
authorized job recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad
convinced said Constancio Macli-ing and pretended that they could
secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of
₱15,000.00 when in truth and in fact they could not; the said
Constancio Macli-ing, deceived and convinced by the false pretenses
employed by the accused, parted away the total sum of ₱15,000.00 in
favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Constancio Macli-ing in the aforementioned amount of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (₱15,000.00), Philippine Currency.3
Jose Alolino was never apprehended and remains at large. Upon

arraignment, appellants pleaded not guilty to each of the nine
informations filed against them. A joint trial ensued since the cases
involved the same factual milieu.
Evidence for the prosecution showed that on various dates from June
1990 to July 1992, complainants went to the house of appellant Buli-e
at No. 63 Sanitary Camp, Baguio City upon learning that she was
recruiting workers for overseas employment. A cousin of complainant
Lampoyas, whom Buli-e helped deploy abroad, introduced Lampoyas
to Buli-e in 1990.4 The brothers Oratil went to see Buli-e about possible
overseas employment in April 1992.5 Mangili inquired from Buli-e if she
was recruiting workers for overseas employment also in April
1992.6Sabado and Macli-ing approached Buli-e for possible overseas
work in May 1992,7 while Estay, accompanied by her sister, went to
see Buli-e on June 17, 1992.8 Fias-eo approached Buli-e on July 13,
1992, accompanied by Lampoyas.9
Buli-e confirmed to complainants that she was, in fact, recruiting

contract workers for Taiwan and that, although she did not have a
license of her own to recruit, her boss in Manila who was a licensed
recruiter, was in the process of getting her one which would soon be
issued.10 Buli-e identified her superiors in Manila to be the spouses
Jose11 and Josefina Alolino. Josefina was connected with Rodolfo S.
2
Ibuna Employment Agency (RSI for brevity), a private employment
agency licensed to recruit overseas contract workers. Buli-e informed
complainants that requirements for application of overseas work
included submission of bio-data, passport, NBI clearance, and medical
examination clearance to show that the applicant is physically and
mentally fit. There was also a placement fee of ₱40,000 of which
₱15,000 must be paid in advance. Buli-e told complainants that if they
were interested in applying, they may submit to her said requirements
which she, in turn, will submit to her boss who was in charge of
processing the necessary documents.
In the case of complainant Lampoyas who originally applied with Buli-e

for employment in Kuwait, she was informed by Buli-e that the latter
was working for a certain Jessie Agtarep. 12 Lampoyas gave Buli-e
₱4,000 on March 14, 1991 as downpayment for the placement fee and
₱5,000 on August 24, 1991. Lampoyas’ application papers were
processed by Jamal Enterprises in Makati, Metro Manila but in 1992 ,
Buli-e transferred Lampoyas’ application to appellant Josefina, whom
Buli-e referred to as her new boss.13 Lampoyas was enticed to work in
Taiwan instead of Kuwait and was assured that her deployment papers
would be processed more quickly.14
From March to August 1992, Buli-e accompanied complainants, on

separate occasions, to Manila where they had their medical check-up
at Saints Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita. Lampoyas had her
medical check-up in March 199215 while Mangili and Joseph Oratil had
their medical check-up in May 1992.16 On June 20, 1992, Estay had her
medical check-up,17 while Agapito and Macli-ing had their medical
examination on July 5, 1992.18 Fias-eo had her medical examination on
July 20, 1992 while Joel Oratil had his medical examination in August
1992. Complainants paid for the medical examination, the results of
which were given to Buli-e.
Immediately after complainants had undergone medical examination,

Buli-e brought them to No. 11 Concorde Street, Airman’s Village, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila purportedly to introduce them to her boss, the
spouses Alolino. Complainants, except for Macli-ing and Agapito, were
able to meet only Jose Alolino on the same day that they had
undergone medical examination. Jose Alolino allegedly told
complainants that his wife, Josefina, was in Taiwan following up
applications but he assured them that they too would be deployed
abroad in a matter of months.19Mangili, Estay, and the brothers Oratil
were able to meet Josefina personally when they returned to the
residence of the Alolinos in Manila to follow up their
applications.20 Fias-eo and Lampoyas, on the other hand, never met
Josefina personally although they were able to talk to her over the
telephone several times when they were following up the status of
their applications.21 It was during these telephone conversations that
Josefina instructed Fias-eo and Lampoyas to have their medical
3
examinations and secure their NBI clearance in Manila accompanied by
Buli-e whom she identified as her agent.22
Complainants were assured by one or both of the spouses that they

were licensed to recruit overseas contract workers and that they can
deploy workers within two to three months. 23 Complainants were
informed by Buli-e and Josefina that deployment for Taiwan is on a
first-come, first-served basis and that those who can comply with the
requirements, particularly the advance payment of ₱15,000, shall be
deployed first.24
On different dates from May 1992 to July 1992, complainants handed

to Buli-e at Sanitary Camp, Baguio City their advance payments of
P15,000 for which they were issued receipts. 25 Mangili paid ₱11,000 on
May 22, 1992 and ₱4,000 on June 18, 1992. 26 The Oratil brothers paid
₱15,000 each in installments from May 1992 to July 15, 1992. 27Macli-
ing paid ₱15,000 on July 12, 1992. 28 Fias-eo gave Buli-e ₱15,000 on
July 13, 1992.29 In addition to her previous payments amounting to
P9,000, Lampoyas paid Buli-e ₱5,000 also on July 13, 1992. 30 Estay
gave ₱15,000 on July 21, 1992 31 while Agapito paid Buli-e ₱15,000 on
July 22, 1992.32 Buli-e assured complainants that she delivered the
payments to Josefina. Aside from giving the downpayment of the
placement fee, complainants complied with the rest of the
requirements which included submission of pictures, bio-data,
passports, NBI clearances and medical examination reports.
After months of waiting and despite compliance with all the

requirements, complainants were not deployed abroad as promised by
appellants. From August 1992 to February 1993, complainants trooped
to Buli-e’s house but Buli-e merely kept on telling them to wait. When
complainants called up Josefina by long distance telephone, they were
also told just to wait.
Weary of the interminable waiting, complainants went to the POEA

office in Baguio City on February 2, 1993, to check whether appellants
were indeed licensed to recruit overseas contract workers. They were
dismayed to find out that appellants had no license to recruit in Baguio
City or any part of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). On the
same day, complainants filed their complaints with the POEA-CAR and
the Prosecutor’s Office of Baguio City.
After appellants were apprehended and during their detention at the

Baguio City Jail, Josefina, through counsel, refunded complainant Fias-
eo ₱15,000 for his downpayment on the placement fee. 33 Complainant
Mangili also demanded a refund and he was paid by Josefina, again
through her counsel, the sum of ₱25,000 for his advance payment of
₱15,000 and as reimbursement of the actual expenses he incurred for
his application.34
4
During trial, Buli-e testified that she worked for RSI and had been
referring applicants to the agency before 1991. She met Josefina a
year after she resigned from RSI. 35 In 1990, Buli-e had an applicant for
Singapore, a certain Prescilla Laoayan from Baguio City. Buli-e referred
Prescilla to RSI which, through Mrs. Fe Go, handled the processing of
her application. As part of the requirements of the agency, Prescilla
had to undergo training at the house of Josefina, who was then the
Marketing Director of RSI. In 1991, Josefina sent Buli-e a note,
through Prescilla, telling her to go to the house of Josefina at No.11
Concorde Street, Airman’s Village, Las Piñas, Metro Manila to discuss
matters about recruitment of workers. Buli-e went to the house of
Josefina as requested and it was then that she was appointed as an
agent of Josefina.36 Buli-e was tasked to find job applicants for Taiwan,
Korea or Singapore whom she can refer to RSI through Josefina. Buli-e
would then be paid for each referral. When Buli-e asked Josefina if the
latter was authorized or had any license to recruit for overseas
placement, Josefina answered in the affirmative.37
Thereafter, Buli-e started recruiting job applicants for Taiwan,

Singapore and Korea at her house in No. 63 Sanitary Camp, Baguio
City. Complainants sought her of their own accord and Buli-e informed
them of the requirements for job application which consisted of
submission of bio-data, passport, NBI clearance and placement fee of
₱40,000 of which ₱15,000 must be paid in advance upon instructions
of Josefina. Josefina allegedly instructed Buli-e to accompany
complainants to Sts. Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita, Manila for
medical check-up.38 Buli-e was likewise instructed by Josefina to
accompany some of the complainants in securing their NBI clearance
and to receive whatever documents complainants will be submitting
including the ₱15,000 advance payment, all of which should be
submitted to Josefina. Buli-e said that she submitted the documents
and the payments either to Jose Alolino or to Josefina. 39 She clarified
that she did not have a hand in securing the passports of
complainants40 and received instructions from Josefina only when she
communicated with Josefina through the telephone or went to Manila.
She averred that she and several members of her family also tried to
apply for overseas work with Josefina and paid the latter ₱100,000. 41
Buli-e presented Mrs. Nonette Legaspi-Villanueva, Unit Coordinator of

POEA-CAR, to testify that RSI was a licensed employment agency and
that Josefina was a licensed recruiter at the time that Buli-e had
dealings with her co-appellant. Mrs. Villanueva testified that she has
been with the POEA since 1985. Part of her functions included
administrative and technical supervision of the staff regarding
employment, facilitation, licensing, investigation and monitoring of the
provincial recruitment authority as well as issuance of authorization to
personnel to conduct inspection of licensed agencies in the City of
Baguio.42 Mrs.Villanueva said that, as per the certification of the Chief
of the Licensing Branch of the POEA, RSI was a private employment
agency with a license which expired on July 14, 1992. Josefina Alolino
5
was included in the list of the personnel submitted by the agency in
July 1990 as Marketing Consultant.43 Mrs. Villanueva, however,
clarified that licenses or permits to recruit workers are territorial in
nature so that an agency licensed in Manila can only engage in
recruitment activities within the place specified in the license although
the applicants may be non-residents of Metro Manila. She further
testified that she cannot remember if Buli-e was given any authority to
recruit in Baguio City.44
Josefina, on the other hand, testified that on September 16, 1987, she
was appointed as one of the four Marketing Directors of RSI which was
located in 408 Jovan Condominium, Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila. RSI, represented by Rodolfo S. Ibuna as proprietor, was
a private employment agency with a license which expired on July 14,
1992. As Overseas Marketing Director of RSI, Josefina was tasked to
represent the agency in negotiating with employers in Taiwan,
Malaysia, United States and Singapore45 for said employers to avail of
the services of RSI in recruiting, hiring, processing and deploying
Filipino contract workers. She was also authorized to solicit applicants
for overseas placement through advertisements, referrals, walk-ins,
etc., and to undertake screening, evaluation and final selection of
applicants. As per agreement with RSI, Josefina was entitled to a
certain share for each successful negotiation with a foreign employer. 46
Josefina denied that Buli-e was her agent and insisted that she never
gave Buli-e authority to recruit for RSI. On the contrary, Buli-e
allegedly informed Josefina that she was an agent of Mrs. Fe Go,
another marketing Director of RSI. Sometime in 1991, Mrs. Go
referred to Josefina a certain Prescilla Laoayan, who wanted to apply
as a domestic helper in Taiwan. Upon being told that she could not be
deployed unless she would give a downpayment of ₱15,000 for the
placement fee, Prescilla informed Josefina that she already gave
₱15,000 to an agent whom she identified to be Buli-e. Josefina then
wrote a note for Buli-e informing her that there was a problem
regarding the processing of Prescilla’s application. Prescilla delivered
the note to Buli-e who in turn went to see Josefina at her house in No.
11 Concorde Street, Airman’s Village, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. Josefina
said that she and Buli-e merely talked about Prescilla’s application and
that was the first time that Josefina met and talked with Buli-e
although she had already seen her before in the office of Mrs. Fe Go. 47
Josefina testified that herein complainants were originally referred by

Buli-e to Mrs. Fe Go who, in turn, referred them to her. Josefina said
that she accepted referrals from Buli-e even though the latter was not
her agent nor connected with RSI because their agency accepts
referrals from everyone. In 1992, Buli-e, claiming that complainants
authorized and designated her to act as their spokesperson, went to
the house of Josefina several times to follow up the progress of their
applications.48
6
Josefina denied having given Buli-e instructions to accompany
complainants to Saints Peter and Paul Medical Clinic in Ermita, Manila.
She also denied having an understanding with Buli-e to receive
payments from each of complainants and to bring them to her house
in Las Piñas, Metro Manila.49 Josefina explained that the deployment of
complainants was delayed because the Taiwanese government
changed its previous policy of allowing foreign employment agencies
like RSI to negotiate directly with prospective employers in Taiwan.
Foreign employment agencies were instead allowed to negotiate only
with local employment agencies in Taiwan, which, in turn, were
responsible for negotiating with the Taiwanese employers. The change
in the policy caused delay in the deployment of complainants since the
local employment agencies in Taiwan demanded additional
requirements such as additional fees. Josefina said she informed
complainants of the delay and the reason for it but complainants could
not wait to be deployed and, instead, demanded the refund of their
payments.50
On March 2, 1993, Josefina allegedly gave Buli-e ₱75,000 with the

instruction that she was to give complainant Lampoyas ₱5,000 as
refund, and ₱10,000 each to complainants Macli-ing, Estay, Fias-eo,
Mangili, Agapito, and the Oratil brothers. Upon having been
approached by complainants for the refund of their money, Josefina
informed them that she already gave their refunds through Buli-e.
Complainants, however, claimed that they did not receive their refunds
from Buli-e. When complainants could not wait for the refund of their
payments and failed to see Josefina who was always out of the country
due to her work, they filed the present cases.51
Emelita Racelis testified that she was an employee of RSI from 1989 to
1992 and was one of the two persons assigned to Josefina. 52 Ms.
Racelis said that Buli-e frequently went to the RSI, bringing applicants
with her three times a month. Among the applicants whom Buli-e
referred to RSI through one of the marketing directors, Mrs. Fe Go,
was a certain Prescilla Laoayan. Racelis said that Laoayan was
endorsed by Mrs. Go to Josefina because it is the practice that when
the applicant of one of the marketing directors cannot be deployed,
the applicant will be endorsed to another marketing director with a job
opening. Josefina, however, had trouble deploying Ms. Laoayan whose
placement fee had not been forwarded by Buli-e to RSI.53
On July 4, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive

portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 11122-R, the Court finds the accused

Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, by direct participation and in conspiracy with each other,
of the crime of illegal recruitment in a large scale as defined and
7
penalized under Article 38(b) in relation to Article 39 of PD 442
as amended by PD 2018 and sentences each of them to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱100,000.00 each, and to pay
the costs.
2. In Criminal case No. 11123-R to 11130-R (8 counts), the court

finds the accused Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino guilty
beyond reasonable doubt by direct participation and in
conspiracy with each other of the crime of Estafa as charged in
the Informations in the aforesaid 8 cases as defined and
penalized under Article 315 first paragraph in relation to No. 2
(a) of the same article and sentences each of them, applying the
indeterminate sentence law, to an imprisonment ranging from six
(6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum
to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of
prision mayor as maximum in each of the aforesaid 8 cases; to
indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties Constancio
Macli-ing, Jessica Estay, Sidolia Fias-eo, John Mangili, Sabado
Agapito, Joseph Oratil and Joel Oratil the sum of ₱15,000.00
each and Nieva Lampoyas the sum of ₱14,000.00 as actual
damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs.
The accused Alona Buli-e and Josefina (Josie) Alolino being detention
prisoners are entitled to be credited 4/5 of their preventive
imprisonment in the service of their sentence in accordance with
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.54
In rendering the decision, the trial court ruled that by their acts, Buli-e
and Josefina, conspired and confederated with one another in the
illegal recruitment of complainants for overseas employment. Buli-e
performed the recruitment activities in Baguio and Josefina, in Manila.
The trial court specifically noted Buli-e’s acts of accompanying the
complainants to Manila for their medical examinations, securing
complainants’ NBI clearances and passports as well as receiving
complainants’ downpayments for the purported placement fee as an
indication that she directly participated in the recruitment of all
complainants. The trial court observed that Buli-e practically confessed
her acts of recruitment in open court and justified the same by
claiming that she was just acting as an agent of Josefina or was
authorized to act in behalf of the latter.
As regards Josefina, the trial court held that she directly participated in
the recruitment of complainants even if she did not personally go to
Baguio City since she received the applications and other requirements
such as NBI clearances, passports, bio-data as well as the advanced
payments of complainants from Buli-e. Either she or her husband Jose,
or both of them, entertained complainants who were brought by Buli-e
8
to their home at No. 11 Concorde Street, Airman’s Village, Las Piñas,
Metro Manila. The spouses repeatedly promised to work or make
arrangements for complainants’ deployment abroad.
The trial court ruled that the authority given to Josefina as Overseas
Marketing Director of RSI, a duly licensed employment agency, was
confined to negotiating with foreign employers in Taiwan and she was
not supposed to recruit overseas Filipino workers. The court stressed
that assuming Josefina was authorized to recruit in Manila, she had no
authority to do so in Baguio City. Citing Article 29 of the Labor Code
which states that no license or authority shall be used directly or
indirectly by any person other than the one in whose favor it was
issued or at any place other than that stated in the license or
authority, nor may such license or authority be transferred or
conveyed to any other person or entity, the trial court ruled that
appellants could not use the RSI license in Manila to recruit overseas
contract workers in Baguio City.
The trial court further noted that the license of RSI employment office
was already suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14, 1992.
Consequently, the authority given by RSI to Josefina was likewise
suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on July 14, 1992.
Finally, the trial court said that Josefina’s act of returning the
advanced payments of some of complainants would not exculpate her
and only proved that she had in fact received money from
complainants who were made to believe that they would be deployed
abroad at the soonest possible time.
With regard to the eight charges of estafa filed against appellants, the
trial court convicted them on the ground that all the elements of estafa
were present under each of the eight charges filed. The trial court held
that appellants through false pretenses and fraudulent acts
represented to complainants that they had the power, authority and
capacity to deploy workers abroad for a fee of ₱40,000, of which
₱15,000 should be paid as advance payment. The false pretenses and
fraudulent acts were executed prior to or simultaneous with appellants’
taking the sum of ₱15,000 as advance payment from each of private
complainants55 which were received by Buli-e in Baguio City and turned
over by her to Josefina in Manila. Complainants relied on the pretenses
and misrepresentations of appellants and parted with substantial sums
of money as advance payments of their placement fees. As a result of
the false pretenses and misrepresentations, complainants were
damaged and prejudiced to the extent of the sums they had given as
downpayment since appellants failed to send them abroad as
promised.
In her appeal before us, appellant Buli-e contends that the trial court
erred:
9
I. IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE DEFENSE OF THE CO-ACCUSED
ALONA BULI-E THAT SHE MERELY REFERRED THE PRIVATE OFFENDED
PARTIES TO CO-ACCUSED SPOUSES JOSE AND JOSEFINA ALOLINO,
WHOM SHE HONESTLY BELIEVED TO BE BONA FIDE OVERSEAS JOB
RECRUITERS;
II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN HEREIN

APPELLANT BULI-E AND SPOUSES ALOLINO IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIMES OF LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT AND ESTAFA;
AND
III. HOLDING CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E LIABLE FOR ESTAFA WHEN

THERE WAS NO SHOWING THAT SAID ACCUSED BENEFITED FROM
THE ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION.
Appellant Josefina, on the other hand, presents the following

assignments of error:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING JOSEFINA ALOLINO GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND IN
CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E OF THE CRIME OF
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED
UNDER ARTICLE 38[b] IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 39 OF P.D. 442 AS
AMENDED BY P.D. 2018 AND IN SENTENCING EACH OF THEM TO LIFE
IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF ₱100,000.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED JOSEFINA

ALOLINO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT BY DIRECT
PARTICIPATION AND IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED ALONA
BULI-E OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION
IN THE AFORESAID 8 CASES AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER
ARTICLE 315 FIRST PARAGRAPH IN RELATION TO NO. 2[A] OF THE
SAME ARTICLE.
We shall discuss the interrelated issues together.
Under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement

refer to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and include referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not; provided that any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment or placement.
The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale

are (1) the accused engages in acts of recruitment and placement of
workers defined under Article 13(b) or in any prohibited activities
under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused has not complied
with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority to
recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) the
10
accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.56 When illegal recruitment is committed in
large scale or when it is committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is carried
out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another, it is considered as an offense involving
economic sabotage.
The factual backdrop shows that appellants engaged in recruitment

activities involving eight persons. The recruitment activities were made
by appellants without having the license or authority to do so as
evidenced by the certification issued by Legal Officer of the POEA
Regional Extension Unit, Cordillera Administrative Region, which stated
that Alona Buli-e, Hilario Antonio,57 Josie Alolino and Jose Alolino were
not licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment in the City of Baguio or in any part of the region. 58
Appellant Buli-e herself does not deny that she had no license or
authority to recruit workers for overseas employment. She, however,
insists that she had never directly participated in recruiting
complainants since it was in fact complainants who sought her help in
applying for overseas employment. Buli-e explained that she merely
"referred" complainants to the spouses Alolino whom she honestly
believed to be bona fide overseas job recruiters and, since she,
herself, had intentions of applying for overseas work, she tagged along
with complainants to Manila to see the spouses Alolino. Inasmuch as
she and complainants were all from Baguio City, complainants
allegedly designated her to conduct all negotiations and follow up of
their applications with the spouses.
Buli-e’s claim deserves scant consideration. It is true that Buli-e did

not actively seek complainants to recruit them for overseas
employment. It was complainants who sought her out. Nevertheless,
when complainants approached her, Buli-e gave complainants the
impression that she had the ability to send workers abroad by saying
that although she did not have a license of her own to recruit, her
boss, who was a licensed recruiter, was already in the process of
securing her a license.59 She not only informed complainants of the
requirements in applying for overseas employment and even
accompanied them to Manila to procure the necessary documents such
as passport, medical and NBI clearances. 60 It was she who brought
them to the house of the spouses Alolino and it was also she who
received from complainants advanced payments for placement fee
which she handed over to the spouses. Her claim that she and her
relatives were also victims of illegal recruitment by the spouses Alolino
is not substantiated.
We also find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court that
Josefina Alolino conspired and confederated with Buli-e in recruiting
applicants for overseas employment from Baguio City although neither
she nor Buli-e had license or authority to do so. Her claim that she did
11
not have a direct participation in the recruitment in Baguio City and
that she merely assisted the complainants by referring them to RSI to
facilitate their papers does not merit credence. There is no showing
that complainants ever set foot in the RSI office. They were always
brought by Buli-e to the house of the spouses Alolino in Las Piňas after
their medical check up. Complainants, who were with other applicants,
were entertained and generously fed breakfast or dinner by one or
both of the spouses who assured them that they would be able to fly
to Taiwan in just a matter of months. 61 Although Josefina alleged that
the documents and payments were handed by Buli-e to the RSI office,
Josefina could show no proof to substantiate her claim. It is significant
to note that after the informations for illegal recruitment and eight
counts of estafa were already filed in court, some of the complainants
were given a refund of their advances for the placement fees by
Josefina herself, through counsel, and not by RSI.
Josefina’s acts clearly show that she and Buli-e acted in concert
towards the accomplishment of a common felonious purpose which
was to recruit workers for overseas employment even though they had
no license to do so. Settled is the rule that if it is proved that two or
more persons, aimed, by their acts, at the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, although
apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred even though no actual
meeting between or among them to coordinate ways and means is
proved. 62
Josefina, however, maintains that as Overseas Marketing Director for

RSI, she was authorized to solicit applicants for overseas placement
through advertisements, referrals, walk-ins, etc. and to undertake
screening, evaluation and final selection of applicants.
Apart from her bare testimony, there is nothing on record to

corroborate Josefina’s claim that as Marketing Director she was
authorized to solicit applicants for overseas placement through
advertisements, referrals, walk-ins, etc. Josefina did not bother to
formally offer as evidence the document allegedly supporting her claim
that part of her duties as Marketing Director included recruitment of
overseas contract workers. The document not having been formally
offered in court cannot be considered, pursuant to Section 34, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the Licensing Branch of the POEA confirmed that the license
of RSI had already been suspended on June 8, 1992 and expired on
July 14, 1992.63 Consequently, even if Josefina was licensed to recruit
workers for overseas employment, her authority to do so ceased when
the license of her agency, RSI, was suspended and when it eventually
expired. Josefina, however, despite the suspension and expiration of
the RSI license, continued to engage in recruitment activities for
12
overseas employment. Except for Lampoyas who met Jose Alolino at
the latter’s house in March 1992, and Mangili and Joseph Oratil who
met Jose Alolino in May 1992, complainants were entertained at the
house of the Alolinos after the license of RSI had already been
suspended. Lampoyas, Macli-ing and Mangili completed the ₱15,000
downpayment of the placement fee after the license of RSI had
already been suspended. The rest of complainants gave payments for
the placement fee after the license of RSI had already expired.
Furthermore, Josefina’s alleged authority to recruit applicants for

overseas employment as Marketing Director of RSI was only confined
to Metro Manila. Article 29 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 29. Non-transferability of license or authority – No license or

authority shall be used directly or indirectly by any person other than
the one in whose favor it was issued or at any place other than that
stated in the license or authority, nor may such license or authority be
transferred, conveyed or assigned to any other person or entity. Any
transfer of business address, appointment or designation of any agent
or representative including the establishment of additional offices
anywhere shall be subject to the prior approval of the Secretary of
Labor.
We are not persuaded by Josefina’s claim that no recruitment activity

was being done outside of the territorial permit of RSI and it was only
incidental that complainants who were referred to her by Buli-e were
residents of Baguio City. As earlier discussed, there is no indication
that complainants ever set foot in the RSI office. They were always
brought by Buli-e to Las Piňas, Metro Manila where they were
entertained by one or both of the spouses Alolino who repeatedly
assured them that they would be able to fly to Taiwan in a matter of
months. Josefina, who claims to have authority to recruit applicants for
overseas employment in behalf of RSI, should have known that
licensed agencies are prohibited from conducting any provincial
recruitment, job fairs or recruitment activities of any form outside of
the address stated in the license, acknowledged branch or extension
office, without securing prior authority from the POEA. 64 Pursuant to
the POEA rules and regulations, Josefina could recruit applicants for
overseas employment and process their applications only at the RSI
office in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila since there was no showing that
RSI had an acknowledged branch or extension office in Baguio City or
that the prior approval of the POEA for provincial recruitment or
recruitment activities outside the RSI office was obtained.
Finally, the trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty of eight
(8) counts of estafa.1âwphi1 It is settled that a person convicted of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can also be convicted of
violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa provided that
the elements of the crime are present. 65 The elements for estafa are:
(a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
13
means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. 66
Appellants deceived complainants into believing that they had the

authority and capability to send them to Taiwan for employment. By
reason or on the strength of such assurance, complainants parted with
their money in payment of the placement fees. Since the
representations of appellants proved to be false, paragraph 2(a),
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable. Buli-e’s claim that
she did not benefit from the money collected from complainants since
she gave the payments to Josefina is of no moment. It was clearly
established that she acted in connivance with Josefina in defrauding
complainants. As regards Josefina, the fact that she returned the
payment of some of the complainants will not exculpate her from
criminal liability. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by
compromise or novation, for it is a public offense which must be
prosecuted and punished by the government on its own motion even
though complete reparation has been made of the damage suffered by
the offended party.67
The actual damages in the sum of ₱15,000 awarded to each of

complainants Fias-eo and Mangili, however, should be deleted
inasmuch as said amounts have already been reimbursed by Josefina
during her detention.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,

Branch 15, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the actual
damages awarded to Fias-eo and Mangili in Criminal Cases Nos.
11125-R and 11126-R are deleted. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ.,

concur.
Footnotes
1
Vol. I Records, p. 1.
2
All complainants, except for Lampoyas, gave Buli-e the total
sum of ₱15,000 each as downpayment for the placement fee.
Lampoyas gave Buli-e a total of ₱14,000 as downpayment.
3
Records, Criminal Case No. 1123-R, p. 1.
4
TSN, October 11, 1993, p. 3.
5
TSN, November 19, 1993, p 5; TSN, March 15, 1994, p. 3.
14
6
TSN, September 16, 1993, p. 4.
7
TSN, September 30, 1993, p. 5; October 15, 1993, p. 3.
8
9
TSN, August 26, 1993, pp. 4-5.
10
TSN, September 17, 1993, pp. 15-16; TSN, October 1, 1993,
p. 19.
11
Identified by Buli-e to complainant Mangili as a retired general
named Felipe Alolino; TSN, September 17, 1993, p. 13; TSN,
October 15, 1993, pp. 40-41.
12
TSN, October 14, 1993, p. 5.
13
TSN, October 11, 1993, pp. 7-8; TSN, October 14, 1993, p. 6.
14
TSN, October 11, 1993, p. 11; TSN, October 14, 1993, p. 6.
15
TSN, October 11, 1993, p. 14.
16
TSN, September 16, 1993, p. 5; TSN, November 19, 1993, p.
12.
17
TSN, September 3, 1993, pp. 17-18.
18
TSN, September 30, 1993, pp. 10-11; TSN, October 15, 1993,
pp. 9-11.
19
TSN, August 26, 1993, p. 15; TSN, September 3, 1993, pp. 38-
39; TSN, September 16, 1993, p. 8.
20
21
TSN, August 26, 1993, pp. 16-17; TSN, October 14, 1993, pp.
9-11.
22
23
TSN, September 30, 1993, p. 12; TSN, October 15, 1993, pp.
15-16.
24
25
Exhibits "CC," "D," "HH," "II," "J," "K," "O," "X," "Y," Folder of
Exhibits.
26
27
TSN, November 19, 1993, pp. 9, 17.
15
28
TSN, October 15, 1993, p. 7.
29
TSN, August 26, 1993, p. 6. The receipt which was marked as
Exhibit "D," however, shows that Fias-eo gave Buli-e ₱15,000 on
July 3, 1992.
30
TSN, October 11, 1993, pp. 6-7.
31
32
33
TSN, August 26, 1993, pp. 42- 43.
34
TSN, September 17, 1993, pp. 9-10, 19.
35
TSN, August 19, 1994, pp. 21-22.
36
TSN, August 19, 1994, pp. 15, 17-18.
37
TSN, August 16, 1994, p. 9.
38
TSN, August 19, 1994, pp. 25-26.
39
TSN, October 24, 1994, p. 18.
40
TSN, August 17, 1994, p. 17
41
TSN, August 17, 1994, pp. 22-23.
42
TSN, October 25, 1994, pp. 2-3.
43
TSN, October 25, 1994, pp. 3-5.
44
TSN, October 25, 1994, pp. 6-7, 9.
45
TSN, November 11, 1994, p. 10.
46
TSN, December 7, 1994, p. 7.
47
TSN, November 11, 1994, pp. 11-17.
48
TSN, November 11, 1994 p. 19.
49
TSN, December 7, 1994, pp. 19-21.
50
TSN, November 24, 1994, pp. 20-22.
51
TSN, November 24, 1994, pp. 24-26.
52
TSN, January 11, 1995, pp. 10-11.
16
53
TSN, January 11, 1995, pp. 7-9.
54
Rollo, p. 100.
55
Complainant Lampoyas gave a total of ₱14,000 to Buli-e as
downpayment.
56
People v. Ladera, 344 SCRA 647, 657 [2000]; People v.
Chowdury, 325 SCRA 572, 581 [2000]
57
Hilario Antonio is the common-law spouse of appellant Buli-e.
Although initially included as respondent, the prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of charges against him during the
preliminary investigation for want of probable cause. The
prosecutor stated that there was no sufficient evidence to prove
that Hilario had in any way participated in the transactions
entered into between complainants and appellants including Jose
Alolino. Vol. I, Records, p. 5.
58
Exhibit "A," Folder of Exhibits.
59
TSN, October 1, 1993, p. 19.
60
TSN, October 15, 1993, pp. 33-34.
61
TSN, September 16, 1993, pp.7-8; TSN, March 15, 1994, pp.
10-11.
62
People v. Mateo, 179 SCRA 303, 320 [1989].
63
Exhibit "C," Folder of Exhibits.
64
POEA Implementing Rules and Regulations, Book II, Rule II,
Section 16.
65
People v. Banzales, 336 SCRA 64, 77 [2000]; People v. Ong,
322 SCRA 38, 56 [2000]
66
Article 315, par 2[a], Revised Penal Code.
67
People v. Moreno, 314 SCRA 556, 566 [1999], citing People v.
Benitez, 108 Phil. 920, 922 [1960].
17
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150530. February 20, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX

BAYTIC, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ALEX BAYTIC appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City[1] finding him guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale
and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00. Accused is further ordered to reimburse complaining
witnesses Ofelia Bongbonga, Millie Passi and Nolie
Bongbonga P3,500.00, P4,000.00 and P4,000.00, respectively,
representing the amounts fraudulently taken from them.
On 24 September 1998 Kennedy Hapones accompanied by accused
Alex Baytic went to the house of his aunt Ofelia Bongbonga at 514
Tabigo Street, Manggahan, Quezon City. There they found Ofelia, Nolie
and Zenaida, all surnamed Bongbonga, together with Millie Passi,
Yolanda Barrios and Elvira Nacario. Accused Alex Baytic told the girls
that he was looking for workers willing to work in Italy as utility
personnel. He explained that interested applicants should give him
money for processing of their medical certificate, certificate of
employment and other travel documents. Since the offer appeared to
be a good opportunity to work abroad, Ofelia Bongbonga on the same
day gave the accused P3,500.00, followed by Millie Passi
with P4,000.00 the next day, and Nolie Bongbonga with P4,000.00 on
5 October as their placement fees. All these transactions were
evidenced by receipts issued by accused Alex Baytic.
According to private complainant Ofelia Bongbonga, accused Baytic
promised her and her two (2) co-applicants an interview by his cousin,
18
a doctor from Italy, on 7 October 1998 at the Corinthian
Gardens. However, on the appointed date of their interview, the
accused failed to appear. Ofelia, Millie and Nolie frantically searched
for him but he was nowhere to be found.Ofelia further testified that
sometime in January 1999 they heard over the radio that accused
Baytic was arrested in Pasig City for illegal recruitment activities. Upon
inquiry from the radio station, she learned that the accused was
already detained at the Pasig Provincial Jail, so she followed him
there. Thereafter, she and her two (2) other companions, Millie and
Nolie, who were likewise victimized by the accused filed the instant
case against him.
On the witness stand, both private complainants Millie Passi and
Nolie Bongbonga corroborated the testimony of Ofelia Bongbonga on
every material point. In particular, Millie Passi recounted that she was
also enticed to part with P4,000.00 when Baytic promised her a good
paying job abroad. According to her, there was no reason for her to be
suspicious of the identity of the accused as well as of his
representations since he was a good friend of her cousin Kennedy
Hapones.
Like the two (2) other complainants, Nolie Bongbonga averred that
the accused through misrepresentations persuaded her to give
him P4,000.00 for the processing of certain travel documents. As proof
thereof she presented a receipt dated 5 October 1998 purportedly
signed and issued by the accused.
Accused Alex Baytic, testifying in his defense, not only denied the
accusations against him but also insisted that it was actually Kennedy
Hapones, a new acquaintance, who was the illegal recruiter. He
recounted that sometime in November 1999, he went to the house of
Hapones who was trying to recruit him for deployment
abroad. According to the accused, Hapones told him to
prepare P250,000.00 although the former eventually accepted an
initial advance payment of P4,500.00. He again met Hapones the
following month when the latter told him and a group of other
applicants, including Ofelia Bongbonga, that their requirements were
ready. That was the last time he saw Hapones who, he later learned,
had already left for abroad. He was suspected of being in cahoots with
Hapones because whenever the latter and the applicants talked,
Hapones would always point at him, although he never had the
opportunity to know what Hapones had actually said to them.
But the trial court sustained the complaining witnesses and gave
more credence to their straightforward and consistent testimonies. It
opined that all the essential requisites of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale as defined in Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor
Code[2] were present -
x x x x The accused made representations to each of the complainants

that he could send them to Italy as janitor/utility aides through direct
hiring, which constitutes a promise of employment which amounted to
19
recruitment as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. The
testimonies of the three prosecution witnesses that they were actually
recruited for overseas employment by the accused and were induced
by him to part with their money retain undiminished probative worth
and weight. The receipts (Exhibits A, C, and D) respectively issued to
the complainants are sufficient proofs of his guilt as against accuseds
mere denial of the signatures appearing therein. The modus
operandi of the accused was well established by the corroborative
testimonies of the witnesses. [3]
Accused-appellant now prays that the Court to take a second hard

look at his conviction in view of the alleged failure of the prosecution
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He takes exception to the
finding of the trial court that all the elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale are present. He argues that the first
element, i.e., the accused engages in the recruitment and placement
of workers, defined under Art. 13, or in any prohibited activities under
Art. 34, of the Labor Code, is not present because he did not solicit
any money from the complainants nor did he promise them
employment in Italy. The truth of the matter, according to him, is that
he himself was victimized by Kennedy Hapones, the real illegal
recruiter. He explained that when Hapones could not be contacted, the
complainants vented their anger towards him, being Hapones constant
companion.
Such being the case, accused-appellant insists that the second
element, which is the absence of license or authority to recruit, could
not have been present because there was in fact no need for him to
apply for the license as he was not in the recruitment business.
We are not impressed. Illegal recruitment is committed when two
(2) elements concur. First, the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to enable one to engage lawfully in
recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes
either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement
defined under Art. 13, par. (b), or any prohibited practices
enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code. In case of illegal
recruitment in large scale, a third element is added: that the accused
commits the acts against three or more persons, individually or as a
group.[4]
The first element is present. POEA representative Flordeliza
Cabusao presented in evidence a certification from one Hermogenes
Mateo, Director III, Licensing Branch, showing that accused-appellant
was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment.[5]
The second element is likewise present. Accused-appellant is
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement under Art. 13, par. (b),
of the Labor Code when he made representations to each of the
complainants that he could send them to Italy for employment as
utility personnel. Prosecution witness Ofelia Bongbonga categorically
20
stated that accused-appellant promised her employment for a fee, a
testimony corroborated by both complaining witnesses Nolie
Bongbonga and Millie Passi. His promises and misrepresentations gave
the complainants the distinct impression that he had the authority to
engage in recruitment, thus enabling him to collect from them various
amounts for recruitment and placement fees without license or
authority to do so.
Accused-appellants vain attempt at exculpating himself by
pinpointing Hapones as the culprit cannot mislead this Court from his
transparent and obvious machinations. His self-serving statement that
he himself was a victim of Hapones wilts in the face of the
complaining-witnesses testimonies that he made promises of
employment, solicited money from them and even signed receipts as
proof of payment. His protestations notwithstanding, he failed to prove
that the complaining witnesses were incited by any motive to testify
falsely against him. It is contrary to human nature and experience for
persons to conspire and accuse a stranger of a crime, or even a casual
acquaintance for that matter, that would take the latters liberty and
send him to prison just to appease their feeling of rejection and
assuage the frustration of their dreams to go abroad. [6] His denials
cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the prosecution
witnesses. Accused-appellant's unsubstantiated denials cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.[7]
There is therefore no discernible reason to disturb the findings of
the trial court, which is in the best position to assess the witnesses'
credibility and to appreciate complainants' candor and truthfulness. [8]
Accused-appellant recruited at least three (3) persons, giving them
the impression that he had the authority to deploy people abroad. As
such, his crime of economic sabotage can be categorized as illegal
recruitment in large scale punishable by life imprisonment and a fine
of P100,000.00, now increased to a minimum of P500,000.00 by virtue
of Rep. Act No. 8042, also known as the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995." [9]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision finding accused-appellant
ALEX BAYTIC guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, sentencing him
to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 as well as
reimburse complainants Ofelia Bongbonga, Millie Passi, and Nolie
Bongbonga the amounts of P3,500.00, P4,000.00 and P4,000.00,
respectively, is AFFIRMED.Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
21
[1]
Decision penned by Judge Estrella T. Estrada, RTC-Br. 82, Quezon
City.
[2]
The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are: 1) that the
offender undertakes any recruitment activity defined under
Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article
34 of the Labor Code; 2) that the offender does not have a
license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers; and 3) that the offender commits the
same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
[3]
Rollo, p. 145.
[4]
People v. De La Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, 24 January 2001, 350
SCRA 163.
[5]
Original Records, p. 102.
[6]
People v. Librero, G.R. No. 132311, 28 September 2000, 341 SCRA
229.
[7]
People v. Icalla, G.R. No. 136173, 7 March 2001, 353 SCRA 805.
[8]
People v. Minanga, G.R. No. 130670, 31 May 2000, 332 SCRA 558.
[9]
Complete Title - An Act to Institute the Policies of Overseas
Employment and Establish a Higher Standard of Protection and
Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, their Families and
Overseas Filipinos in Distress, and for other purposes.
22
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 95207-17 January 10, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ENRIQUE TAGUBA AND MIRAFE TAGUBA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Mirafe Taguba.
Public Attorney's Office for Enrique Taguba.
CRUZ, J.:
Enrique Taguba and Mirafe Taguba were both charged with eight
counts of illegal recruitment and three counts of estafa in separate
informations1 commonly worded (except only as to the date of the
offense, the name of the complainant and the amount involved) as
follows:
The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses ENRIQUE C.

TAGUBA, MIRAFE TAGUBA and JANE DOE, true name, real
23
identity and present whereabouts of the last-mentioned
accused still unknown, of the crime of "ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT", committed as follows:
That (date of commission) in Caloocan City, Metro manila,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, representing themselves to
have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for
employment abroad did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, for a fee recruit and promise
employment/job placement to one (name of complainant),
without first securing the required license or authority from
the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
Contrary to law.
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses ENRIQUE C.

TAGUBA, MIRAFE TAGUBA and JANE DOE, true name, real
identity and present whereabouts of the last-mentioned
accused still unknown, of the crime of "ESTAFA," committed
as follows:
That (date of commission) in Caloocan City, Metro Manila,

the above-named and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, defrauded and
deceived one (name of plaintiff ) in the following manner,
to wit: said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representation which they made to said
complainants to the effect that they have the capacity or
power to recruit or employ complainant abroad and could
facilitate the necessary papers in connection therewith if
given the necessary amount to meet the requirements
thereof, knowing said manifestations and representations to
be false and fraudulent and were made only to induce said
complainant to give and deliver, as in fact the latter did
give and deliver to said accused the amount of
P________ ,but said accused, once in possession of the
said amount, with intent to defraud, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate
and convert to their on personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the complainant in the
aforementioned amount of P__________ .
Contrary to law.
Trial of the cases was held jointly.
24
The complainants, namely, Jesus Garcia, Gilbert Fabrigas, Josefina
Sarrion, Myrna Roxas, Elena Santiago, Federico Sagurit, Manuel
Aquiban, Violeta Porte, Renelito Cerbito, Danilo Pacheco, narrated
almost identical versions of the deception practiced on them by the
accused.
These witnesses testified that Enrique an Mirafe approached them on

separate occasions and assured them that upon their payment of a
specified sum of money they would be sent to Korror, Palau, to work
variously as a waiter,2fisherman,3 master
cutter,4 dressmaker,5 farmer,6 laborer,7 mason carpenter8 or macho
dancer. 9
The consideration for their recruitment ranged from P2,200.00 to

P20,000.00 while the promised monthly wages ranged from $300.00
top $500.00.
The required payments were made by them from loans they had
contracted or from the proceeds of the sale of their properties.
However, no overseas employment materialized. Only Gilbert Fabrigas
and Norman Sarrion (the son of Josefina Sarrion) were able to reach
Korror but after three months, during which they were not given any
work, they were deported to Manila for expired visas. 10 The rest of the
complainants were never even able to leave the Philippines.
In his defense, Enrique Taguba first claimed that he merely happened

to be at RAY/DECO office when the complainants submitted their
papers. RAY/DECO is a corporation licensed to recruit workers for
employment abroad with which he had entered into a joint venture.
From the office, the documents were submitted to the foreign
employer, who brought them to Korror. 11
He later declared that a special power of attorney issued to him by

RAY/DECO authorized him to recruit and hire contract workers. It was
by virtue of this authorization that he recruited the complainants. At
the same hearing, however, he retracted his statement, reiterating his
earlier claim that he had no participation in the complainants'
transactions with the company. The sole exception was when he
accompanied Gilbert Fabrigas and Norman Sarrion to Korro upon
RAY/DECO's request. 12
Mirafe, on the other hand, averred that she was working as a domestic
helper in Korror when the alleged irregularities happened. She
presented a round-trip Continental Airline ticket issued in her name on
May 3, 1985, for Manila - Korror - Manila 13 and a certification issued
by the Manager of Air Nauru that on March 3, 1986, she was a
passenger of Air Nauru Flight No. 420 bound for Manila from Korror. 14
25
After trial, Judge Adoracion C. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court in
Caloocan City declared them guilty of all the charges in a decision
dated June 4, 1990. 15
For the offense of illegal recruitment on a grand scale, each was

sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P100,000.00. They were also held jointly and severally liable for the
reimbursement of the money they received from the complainants. 16
For each of the three counts of estafa, they were both meted the
penalty of four years, two months and one day ofprision correccional.
In addition, they were held solidarily liable for the return of the money
given them by the complainants. 17
In their challenged to the decision, the appellants stress that they call
the failure of the prosecution to prove that they were not holders of
licenses to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers
abroad; the unrebutted evidence of Marife Taguba's absence in the
Philippines during the commission of the alleged crimes; the imposition
of a penalty which was not yet in effect and the alleged crime of illegal
recruitment on a grand scale were committed; and the lack of
sufficient evidence to support their conviction for estafa.
The appellants argue that before one can be held guilty of illegal
recruitment, two elements have to be established, to wit, that (1) the
offender is not a licensee or holder of authority to lawfully engage in
the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the offender
undertook the recruitment activities defined under Article 13(b) or any
of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code. Their argument is that the prosecution has the burden of
proving beyond reasonable doubt each of the elements of the offense
charged and that this burden had not been discharged in the cases
against them.
The appellants also contend that the penalty of life imprisonment for
illegal recruitment committed on a large scale is not applicable to them
because the presidential decree imposing this penalty was published in
the Official Gazette only on February 10, 1986. P.D. 2018 was thus not
yet effective at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes
imputed to them. Only two of the eight complainants for illegal
recruitment testified that they were recruited after February 10, 1986.
If at all, therefore, the appellants can only be convicted of eight
separate counts of illegal recruitment under Art. 39 (c) of the Labor
Code, which is subject to a lesser penalty.
Regarding the charges of estafa, the appellants' claim they had made
no representation they had the capacity to recruit and send the
complainants abroad. This is clear from the testimony of Josefina
Sarrion herself, who declared as follows:
26
Q. The accused in this case did not say that they
had (a) recruitment office to you (sic)?
A. They did not, sir.
Q. The accused did not say to you or represent

to you that they had (a) permit to recruit?
A. They did not, sir. 18
The Solicitor General maintains in the appellee's brief that it was

incumbent on the accused to prove that they were licensed to recruit
workers, conformably to the well-settled rule that any party who
asserts the affirmative of an issue has the burden of presenting
evidence required to obtain a favorable judgment. 19 He agrees,
however, that PD 2018 is inapplicable and that the appellants can only
be held guilty of eight counts of illegal recruitment and penalized in
accordance with Sec. 39 (c) of the Labor Code.
Our rulings follow.
The record shows that the prosecution indeed failed to establish that
the appellants had not been issued licenses to recruit for overseas
employment. It had moved to present Cecilia E. Curso, Chief of the
Licensing and Evaluation Division of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency, so she could testify that the accused were not
licensed recruiters, but this was never done.
Rule 131 Sec. 2, of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal cases. — In criminal

cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on
the prosecution. A negative fact alleged by the prosecution
need not be proved unless it is an essential ingredient of
the offense.
Non-possession of a license to recruit is an essential ingredient of the

crime of illegal recruiting. As it is an indispensible requisite for the
conviction of the pretended recruiter, the burden of establishing this
element is upon the prosecution. In the case before us, the
prosecution cannot deny its failure to show that no license had indeed
been issued to either of the appellees by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration.
This would have been a fatal omission under ordinary circumstances.

Fortunately for the prosecution, however, this flaw was repaired by
appellant Enrique Taguba himself when he testified as follows:
Q. In connection with the operation of your

office, do you have the authority to recruit?
27
A. I have a special power of attorney issued by
the general manager of Ray/Deco, International
Development Corporation.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Mr. Taguba you stated that you were clothed

with a special power of attorney, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And according to the special power of

attorney you were then authorized as attorney-
in-fact of Ray/Deco to recruit and hire Filipino
contract workers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And this is the only evidence or authority for

your having recruited Filipino contractual
workers?
A. I have submitted several papers, sir.
Q. By virtue of the special power of attorney you

recruited all these complainants namely: (At this
juncture, the prosecuting fiscal read the names
listed in the information)?
A. Yes, sir. 20
The special power of attorney 21 granted to Enrique by RAY/DECO did

not operate as a license to recruit workers on his own behalf, which is
what he did. Besides, the special power of attorney only authorized
him:
1. To represent our Agency, RAY/DECO International

Development and Employment Corporation, and to
negotiate and deal with any person, company, Employer or
Principal in foreign countries who may be interested in
engaging the services of and appointing our Agency in the
recruitment and hiring of Filipino contractual workers for
employment abroad.
2. To enter into such negotiations he may deem proper,

reasonable and advantageous to the Agency and to see to it
that all documents and papers necessary, required and
proper in the appointment of our Agency by the Principal or
Employer as well as in the recruitment and hiring of the
workers are all in proper order; and
28
3. Finally, it is a condition of this Power of Attorney that our
aforesaid Legal Representative shall not demand, collect
and receive from the Principal or Employer any fee or sums
of money without our prior consent and approval.
It is clear from the above-quoted document that Enrique's authority

was confined to negotiating with foreign employers for the
appointment of RAY/DECO as their agency in the recruiting of Filipino
workers for employment abroad. What he was supposed to recruit was
not Filipino overseas workers but the foreign employers to which the
workers were to be assigned.
It is significant that the only authority the appellants could invoke was
this special power of attorney although he did not speak of "several
papers". These did not include any license. It strikes us that if they
had been issued a license to recruit, there would have been no reason
why they did not present it in evidence to exculpate them from liability
under the Labor Code.
Mirafe's defense of alibi is not acceptable either. The fact that she left
for Korror on May 3, 1985, and arrived in Manila on march 3, 1986,
does not prove that in between these dates, she did not come back to
the Philippines to practice her deceptions. The tickets and certification
she submitted were not the best evidence to establish her absence
from the Philippines on the dates the offenses were committed. What
she should have submitted to the trial court was her passport, where
the holder's departure/arrivals are officially indicated.
Curiously, the ticket issued to her on may 3, 1985, by Continental for

Manila - Korror - Manila was used by her in going to Korror but not in
coming back to Manila. She claims to have returned to Manila on
March 3, 1986, but via Air Nauru instead. Why she did not avail herself
of the pre-paid Continental return trip ticket to Manila raises some
doubt on her credibility. Could it be that she had earlier used her
return ticket in coming back to Manila and that she went back later to
Korror, from which she returned to the Philippines on March 3, 1986,
on board Air Nauru Flight 420? At any rate, the certification by the
manager of Air Nauru is hearsay and inadmissible because he was not
presented at the trial to affirm it.
The appellees argue that they cannot be held liable for estafa because
they were prevented from complying with their promise due to their
incarceration. This is not true. Enrique Taguba accompanied Norman
Sarrion and Gilbert Fabrigas to Korror on December 29, 1985. After a
week, Taguba came back to the Philippines, leaving the two to stay
there for three months and fend for themselves without any work. All
this happened before Enrique and Marife were arrested and detained
on March 9, 1986 and March 10, 1986, respectively. 22
29
In the case of Jesus Garcia, the promised employment on March 2,
1986, never came. Learning that Enrique had been apprehended,
Garcia even gave him money for his bail. The money was an additional
consideration for his overseas employment, but even after Enrique's
release, Garcia remained unemployed. In fact, Enrique cannot validly
argue that his detention prevented him from fulfilling his obligation
because he had in fact already defaulted prior to his arrest.
The appellants' claim that they had made no representation that they
could send complainants abroad is belied by the following testimonies
of the complainants:
Myrna Roxas:
Q. Did you talk with the two accused at that

time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you talk about?
A. They told us, sir, that they are having us

employed as dressmakers at Palau.
Q. Who is this who told you that you would be

employed at Palau?
A. Enrique Taguba and Mirafe Taguba, your

Honor.
Q. What was or what were the conditions for

your employment at Palau, Guam?
A. They told us sir that if we give P5,000.00 we

will have medical examination, NBI clearance
and then passport. 23
Gilbert Fabrigas:
Q. Did he tell you how you were supposed go for

employment abroad?
A. Yes, sir. He told me as long as I pay.
Q. For how much did he require you to pay for

your employment abroad?
A. P20,000.00, sir.
30
Q. Were you able to comply with that
requirement to pay P20,000.00 in order to go
abroad for employment?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you pay that or give that amount of

P20,000.00 to Atty. Taguba?
A. On November 23, 1985, I gave him

P10,000.00 and on December 27, 1985, I gave
him another P10,000.00, sir. 24
Substantially similar narrations were made by other complainants.
The indisputable fact is that the appellants gave the distinct assurance
that they had the ability to send the complainants abroad, employing
false pretenses and imaginary business transactions to beguile their
victims. The complainants willingly gave their hard-earned money to
the appellants in hopes of the overseas employment deceitfully
promised them by the latter.
It is also evident from the testimonies of the complainants that the

deceptions were practiced on them by both appellants, who
cooperated with each other in fleecing the complainants of their
money. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. 25 It is clear from the evidence of record that appellants,
who were live-in partners, were moved by a common design to
victimize the complainants. As a consequence, they are enmeshed in
the same criminal liability for their conspiracy, which make the act of
one the act of both.
The Court agrees that the appellants cannot be convicted of illegal

recruitment on a large scale because only two of the complainants,
Jesus Garcia and Elena Santiago, categorically testified that their
recruitment came after February 10, 1986. This was the date when
P.D. 2018, the law defining and penalizing illegal recruitment in a large
scale, took effect.
P.D. 2018 has amended Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code by

providing inter alia as follows:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — . . .
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in

a large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance
with Article 39 hereof.
31
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise
or scheme defined under this first paragraph hereof. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group.
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Art. 39. Penalties. — (a) The penalty of the

imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of

authority under this Title found violating any provision
thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall,
upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a
fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,00 or
both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the
Court.
P.D. 2018 cannot apply to the appellants retroactively as it would be

an ex post facto law to them. A law is ex post facto if it refers to a
criminal act, punishes an act which was innocent when done, and
retroacts to the disadvantage of the accused. 26 Prior to the said date,
recruiting on a large scale was not yet punished with the penalty
imposed in the said decree.
Moreover, each of the eight informations for illegal recruitment

charged the appellants with illegally recruiting only one person. It is a
basic right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him and, if he is found guilty, to be penalized
only for the offense specified in the information or necessarily included
in such offense. 27 Under the decree, illegal recruiting on a large scale
can take place only when it is committed against three or more
persons, individually or as a group.
The proper penalty for the illegal recruitment committed by appellants

is provided for in Art. 39 (c) of the Labor Code, to wit, imprisonment of
not less than four years nor more than eight years or fine of not less
than P20,000.00 nor more than P100,000.00 or both such
imprisonment and fine, at the court's discretion. We hereby fix the
penalty at from four to eight years and a fine of P50,000.00 for each
of the eight charges. The amounts ordered reimbursed to the
32
complainants are affirmed except the amount reimbursable to Manuel
Aquiban, which was reduced form P10,000.00 to P6,000.00, the
amount actually delivered by him to the appellants.
Regarding the estafa, we shall accept the modification of the penalty

as suggested by the Solicitor General, after applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, to two years, eleven months and ten days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months and twenty days
of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count of the offense. The
monetary awards by the trial court are affirmed.
Duplicity is condemnable under any circumstance but it becomes

doubly deplorable when exercised on the poor and unemployed, as in
the case before us. The complainants were desperate for a living and
were willing to work even away from their families so they could lift
themselves from their penury. The appellants took advantage of their
plight and enticed them with dollar earnings. The complainants
succumbed to their wiles and raised the money demanded of them,
borrowing what they could and selling what little they had. All they got
was disenchantment. The appellants were like vultures preying on the
victims and feeding on their broken dreams.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, but with the

following modifications:
(1) For each of the 8 counts of illegal recruiting in Criminal Cases

Nos. C-26359; C-26364; C-26367; C- 26370; C-26371; C-26374 and
C-26389, the appellants are sentenced to a penalty of four to eight
years imprisonment and a fine of P50,000.00. The amounts ordered by
the trial court to be reimbursed to the respective complainants are
affirmed except the amount reimbursable to Manuel Aquiban, which is
reduced to P6,000.00.
(2) For each of the three counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos.
C-26343; C-26347 and C-26348, the appellants are sentenced to two
years, eleven months and ten days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six years, eight months and twenty days of prision
mayor, as maximum. The amounts ordered reimbursed to the
respective complainants are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 5-15. The complainants in the informations for

illegal recruiting were Jesus Garcia, Violeta Porte, Federico
Sagurit, Jr., Manuel Aquiban, Elena Santiago, Renelito
33
Cerbito, Danilo Pacheco and Myrna Roxas. The
complainants in the informations for estafa were Jesus
Garcia, Josefina Sarrion and Gilbert Fabrigas.
2 TSN, March 30, 1987, p. 18.
3 TSN, March 18, 1987, p. 13.
4 TSN, June 15, 1990, p. 5.
5 TSN, February 11, 1987, p. 4.
6 TSN, October 13, 1986, p. 7.
7 February 11, 1987, p. 12.
8 Ibid., p. 18.
9 TSN, July 28, 1987, p. 6.
10 TSN, March 30, 1987, p. 20.; TSN, March 18, 1987, pp.
18-19.
11 TSN, July 3, 1989, pp. 5, 7, 8.
12 TSN, Jan. 15, 1990, p. 6; TSN, July 3, 1989, pp. 2-3.
13 Exhibit 1, for Marife Taguba.
14 Exhibit 2, for Marife Taguba.
15 Rollo, pp. 28-40.
16 Garcia, P18,000.00; Aquiban, P6,000.00; Roxas,

P5,000.00; Porte, P5,000.00; Cerbito, P8,000.00 and
$40.00; Pacheco, P5,000.00 and $50.00; Fabrigas,
P20,000.00; Sarrion, P15,000.00; Santiago, P5,00.00;
Sagurit, P8,000.00.
17 Garcia, P18,000.00; Fabrigas, P20,000.00; Sarrion,

P15,000.00.
18 TSN, March 30, 1987, p. 30.
19 Republic v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 290.
20 TSN, July 3, 1989; TSN, January 15, 1990, pp. 4-5.
21 Exhibit 1, Enrique Taguba.
22 Exhibit B & B-1.
34
23 TSN, February 10, 1987, p. 3.
24 TSN, March 18, 1987, pp. 9-10.
25 Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
26 Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74, In re: Kay Villegas Kami Inc.,

35 SCRA 429; Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686.
27 Rule 120 Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 105204 March 9, 1995

vs.
THELMA REYES and NICK REYES, accused, THELMA
REYES accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Laguna, Branch 35, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
35
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of
the accused Thelma Reyes beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Recruitment defined and penalized under Article 38,
P.D. No. 442 as amended, the Court hereby sentences said
accused to suffer a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00 and to indemnify
Rosalino Bitang and Fabian Baradas, Mr. de Castro, Lorenzo
Blanza and Ramon Mendoza the sum of P45,000.00 and to
pay the costs.
Appellant Thelma Reyes was charged together with her husband Nick
Reyes, but the latter was at large and so has remained up to now.
Consequently, the trial proceeded only with respect to Thelma Reyes in
view of her plea of not guilty.
The prosecution's first witness, Rosalino Bitang, testified that

sometime in 1985, he and five others (Lorenzo Blanza, Fabian
Baradas, Edgardo Garcia, Ramon Mendoza and Dionisio de Castro)
went to the house of the appellant in Los Baños, Laguna, to apply for
employment abroad; that he gave P5,000 to Nick Reyes as
downpayment for the recruitment fees; that Nick Reyes handed the
money to his wife Thelma Reyes, and afterward issued a receipt (Exh.
A), which reads:
RECEIPT
RECEIVED from MR. RIZALINO BITANG the amount of FIVE

THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
Manila, September 19, 1985.
(SGD.) NICK N.
REYES, SR.
Bitang testified that on January 14, 1986, he and his companions paid
P34,000.00 more to the spouses through Dionisio de Castro. Of this
amount, P8,500.00 was for his (witness Bitang's) placement fee, while
the balance was for payment of his companions' fees. As before Nick
Reyes received the amount and gave it to his wife, Thelma Reyes,
after which he issued a receipt (Exh. B) which reads:
RECEIPT
RECEIVED from MR. DIONISIO DE CASTRO the amount of

THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND (P34,000.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency for the following: Edgardo Garcia Ramon Mendoza
Lorenzo Blanza, Fabian Barradas, and Rosalino Bitang.
Manila, January 14, 1986.
36
(SGD) NICHOL
REYES SR.
According to complainant, Nick Reyes promised to notify them as soon

as they were accepted for employment so that they could leave for
abroad, but this promise was not fulfilled. He said that he checked with
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and found
out that the spouses were not licensed recruiters. A certification to this
effect was issued to him by the POEA. (Exh. C)
The other complainant Fabian Baradas also testified. He stated that he

was introduced to Thelma Reyes sometime in September, 1985 at
Lemery, Batangas, while the latter was recruiting workers for
deployment in Saudi Arabia.
On several occasions between September and December, 1985, he

and several others went to appellant's house at Junction, Los Baños
Laguna for overseas employment and were required to submit travel
documents, such as passports, birth certificates and NBI clearances
and to pay various amounts of money.
On January 9, 1986, he gave P6,000.00 to Nick and Thelma Reyes,

through his godfather Dionisio de Castro, for which Nick Reyes issued
to him a receipt (Exh. E), reading:
RECEIPT
Received from Mr. Dionisio de Castro the amount of Six

Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency.
Manila, January 9, 1986.
(SGD.) NICK N.
REYES
On January 14, 1986, he paid the additional amount of P12,000.00 to

Reyes through Dionisio de Castro as evidenced by Exh. B. The money
was supposed to cover the cost of the processing papers. However, as
no job was forthcoming, he went to the POEA to inquire, and, like
Rosalino Bitang, he learned that the spouses were not licensed
recruiters.
The complainants both testified that as soon as they obtained the

POEA certification that appellant and her husband were not licensed to
recruit, they demanded from the spouses the return of their money
and when the latter did not give back their money, they filed the
complaint in this case.
Only the appellant Thelma Reyes testified in her behalf. She claimed
that she met the witnesses Bitang and Baradas only when they were
37
looking for her husband at their house in Los Baños, Laguna, between
March and May of 1986. She denied having met them before.
She admitted that the receipts (Exhs. A, B and E) were all written and
signed by her husband, but she denied she had anything to do with
her husband's activities. She said they had been estranged since
March 1986 precisely because she did not approve of her husband's
illegal activities. She claimed that she had told her husband that, even
though they were poor, they could live on their earning and the
monthly support of P10,000.00 which they were receiving from her
mother-in-law who lived in the United States.
According to appellant, she and her husband saw each other only
occasionally, whenever they visited their children in Los Baños where
they were studying because she lived in Singalong, Manila. She
presumed that her husband had told complainants to go to the house
in Los Baños which they were merely renting for their children and that
she was included in the complaint only because her husband could not
be located.
On cross-examination she admitted that there were fourteen (14)

other cases of Illegal Recruitment filed and/or pending against her and
her husband in different courts of Manila and claimed that some of the
cases had been dismissed or settled after she had refunded the money
of the complainants.
Testifying on rebuttal for the prosecution, Rosalino Bitang stated that

it was Thelma Reyes herself who gave the job applicants the address
and sketch of their house in Los Baños, Laguna, and that she
represented to him that she was negotiating for job placements
abroad. Bitang reiterated that money paid to Nick Reyes was given to
Thelma Reyes who counted it before Nick Reyes issued receipts.
On the basis of the parties' evidence, the trial court found Thelma
Reyes guilty of illegal recruitment and sentenced her as stated in the
beginning. Hence this appeal.
Appellant claims that the trial court erred —
1. IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS MARSHALLED

THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE
ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNDER
ARTICLE 38, P.D. NO. 442.
2. IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THERE ARE ONLY

TWO COMPLAINANTS IN THE INFORMATION FILED ON
DECEMBER 11, 1986 AGAINST THE ACCUSED HENCE THEY
CANNOT BE PROSECUTED UNDER ARTICLE 38, P.D. NO.
442.
38
3. IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE VERBAL TESTIMONIES OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS RATHER THAN THE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.
We shall now deal with these contentions of appellant.
First. Appellant contends that the testimonies of Bitang and Baradas

are insufficient to sustain conviction. She contends that Dionisio de
Castro, who allegedly advanced P34,000.00 for the complainants and
their companions, should have been presented to corroborate the
claim of the claimants.
The contention is without merit. To be sure, an accused can be

convicted on the strength of the testimony of a single witness, if such
testimony is credible and positive and produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.1 That the witness is also the complainant in a case
makes little difference as long as the court is convinced beyond doubt
that the witness is telling the truth. For instance, in Hernandez
v. Court of Appeals2 this Court held:
Petitioner claims that the decision of the trial court is not

supported by the evidence, which is contrary to the findings
of the Court of Appeals that said decision is "in accordance
with law and the evidence" (Rollo,
p. 12). He points out that the appellate court should not
have believed the trial court's conclusion that "the sole
testimony of the offended party would have sufficed to
sustain her assertions" (Rollo, p. 47). He claims that self-
serving declarations of a party favorable to himself are not
admissible and that none of the alleged witnesses to the
transactions were presented.
The common objection known as "self-serving" is not

correct because almost all testimonies are self-serving. The
proper basis for objection is "hearsay" (Wenke, Making and
Meeting Objections, 69).
Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between

self-serving statements and testimonies made in court.
Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of
court advocating his own interest; they do not include a
party's testimony as a witness in court (National
Development Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission,
19 SCRA 861 [1967]).
Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the

adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-
examination, and their admission would encourage
fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party's
39
testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity
on the part of the opposing party for cross-examination.
It is not true that none of the alleged witnesses to the

transactions was presented in court (Rollo, p. 13). Yolanda
Dela Rosa, an eye-witness to some of the transactions,
testified for the prosecution. Assuming that Dela Rosa was
not presented as a witness, the testimony of de Leon
sufficed to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The
conviction of an accused may be on the basis of the
testimony of a single witness (People v. Rumeral, 200 SCRA
194 [1991]). In determining the value and credibility of
evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not counted (People
v. Villalobos, 209 SCRA 304 [1992]).
In the case at bar, the trial court gave weight to the testimonies of
complainants because,
Except for the denial of accused Thelma Reyes that she has
nothing to do with the recruitment of the complaining
witnesses as well as the collection of the amount from
them, said accused failed to sufficiently overthrow the
convincing testimony of the complaining witnesses that
accused Thelma Reyes was present and even counted the
money evidenced by Exhibit[s] "A" and "B" after her
husband hands it to her and that her husband Nick Reyes
who issued the receipts to the complainants.
Moreover, when the issue is the credibility of witnesses, appellate

courts will in general not disturb the findings of the trial court unless
certain facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case. This is because the trial court heard the testimony
of the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.3
With respect to the fact that Dionisio de Castro was not presented to
testify, it is sufficient to say that there was no necessity for this
because there is no question that the amount of P34,000.00 which he
had advanced for the complainants and others was received by Nick
Reyes.
Second. Appellant contends that the receipts constitute the best

evidence to show that only Nick Reyes received the amounts stated
therein because only his signature appears on the receipts. That the
receipts were signed by Nick Reyes alone only proves that it was to
him that the amounts were paid. What, on the other hand,
complainants are saying is that appellant is guilty because she and her
husband, conspiring together, acted and made them believe that they
were licensed recruiters. If so, the acts of the husband were likewise
40
those of her. Indeed, the evidence shows that after receiving the
amounts from complainants, Nick Reyes handed the money paid to the
appellant and that Nick Reyes issued the receipts in question only after
appellant Thelma Reyes had counted it.
Appellant claims that she and her husband separated in 1985 precisely
because she did not want to be involved in his illegal activities. This
seems to be us to be a convenient way to dissociate herself, but her
mere claim is not enough to overcome the evidence of the
prosecution. If there was anyone whose testimony needed
corroboration it was appellant.
Taking another tack, appellant points out that complainants cannot

explain why the purpose for which payment was made is not stated in
the receipts nor why the receipts purport to have been issued in
"Manila" and not in Los Baños where they said they had made all the
payments. She argues that if the illegal recruitment was made in
Manila, then the Regional Trial Court of Laguna had no jurisdiction to
try the case.
The circumstances pointed out by appellant only underscores the

deviousness of appellant and her husband. Complainants have an
elementary education only. It is not for them — but for appellant and
her husband — to explain these circumstances because it was the
latter who made-the receipts. It is not far fetched that they made the
receipts this way precisely to create doubt as to their real import. It is
enough that complainants positively identified the appellant and her
husband as having illegally recruited them and collected money from
them. Their testimonies have not been successfully rebutted by the
lame denial of appellant.
Third. Appellant contends that in any event the testimonies of the two
complainants could not be the basis for a finding of illegal recruitment
on a large scale and for imposing the penalty of life imprisonment on
her. The Labor Code prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment for
illegal recruitment when committed on a "large scale." Art. 38 (b) of
the Code provides:
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in

large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance
with Article 39 hereof.
And Art. 39 (a) provides:
Art. 39. Penalties. — (a) The penalty of life imprisonment

and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall
be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage as defined herein.
We agree with this contention.

41
In this case the information against appellant mentioned only the two
complainants Fabian Baradas and Rosalino Bitang as having been
illegally recruited by appellant and her husband. The trial Court,
however, held appellant guilty of illegal recruitment on a large scale
because aside from Baradas and Bitang, appellant and her husband
allegedly recruited others, namely, Lorenzo Blanza, Edgardo Garcia,
Ramon Mendoza, and Dionisio de Castro.
This is error. To be sure, Blanza and Garcia, according to complainant

Baradas were able to obtain overseas employment. On the other hand,
with respect to De Castro there is no evidence that he, too, had been
illegally recruited by the spouses. What appears in the record is that
he advanced the amount of P34,000.00 in behalf of the complainants
and the three others. Only two, therefore, had been illegally recruited.
There are, it is said, 14 other cases filed pending in the courts against
the accused for illegal recruitment. These cases cannot be taken into
account for the purpose of Art. 38(b). When the Labor Code speaks of
illegal recruitment "committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group," it must be understood as referring to the
number of complainants in each case who are complainants therein,
otherwise, prosecutions for single crimes of illegal recruitment can be
cummulated to make out a case of large scale illegal recruitment. In
other words, a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be
based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more
persons whether individually or as a group.
Moreover, even it Blanza and Garcia had been illegally recruited so as

to make the number of persons illegally recruited four and make the
crime that of illegal recruitment on a large scale, since this was not
alleged in the information and this is the more serious offense which
includes that which was charged, the appellant can only be found
guilty of the less serious offense charged, pursuant to Rule 120, §4.
Accordingly, appellant must be punished under Art. 39(c) of the Labor

Code which provides:
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of

authority under this Title found violating any provision
thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall upon
conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine
of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both
such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another

one is rendered, finding appellant Thelma Reyes guilty of illegal
recruitment on two (2) counts and is hereby sentenced for each crime
to suffer imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day to 8 years and pay a fine
of P50,000.00; and ordered to indemnify Rosalino Bitang in the
42
amount of P13,500.00 and Fabian Baradas in the amount of
P18,000.00 and pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 People v. Mendoza, 223 SCRA 108, G.R. No. 97931,

(1993).
2 228 SCRA 429, 436-7 (1993).
3 People v. Hangad, 227 SCRA 244 (1993).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 112175 July 26, 1996
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ENGINEER RODOLFO DIAZ, accused-appellant.
43

TORRES, JR., J.:p
Rodolfo 'Erwin' Diaz seeks the mandate of this Court to review the
decision dated September 2, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court, 11th
Judicial Region, Branch 10, Davao City, 1 in Criminal Case No. 26, 993-
92 convicting him of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale,
and sentencing him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P100,000.00 plus the costs.
In an Information dated August 15, 1992, Assistant City Prosecutor

David W. Natividad of Davao City charged appellant of violating
Articles 38 (a) and 38 (b) in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code, as
amended, as follows:
That sometime in the month of July 1992, in the City of

Davao, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovementioned accused, purporting himself to have
the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad, particularly Brunei and
Japan, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully recruit and
promise employment/job placement abroad to Mary Anne
Navarro, Maria Theresa Fabricante and Maria Elena
Ramirez, without first securing the required license and/or
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 2
The antecedent facts found by the Court a quo reads:
Mary Anne Navarro was 22 years old, single and a student

of the University of the Immaculate Concepcion in 1992,
taking up bachelor of science in music, Davao City.
Maria Theresa Fabricante was 23 years old, single and

jobless in 1992. She is accordingly a commerce graduate of
the Notre Dame University in Cotabato City.
Maria Elena Ramirez was 27 years old, married and a

businesswoman in 1992. She is accordingly a college
graduate of the University of Mindanao in Davao City where
she finished the course of bachelor of science in commerce,
major in management.
From the combined testimonies of these three

complainants, the Court has gathered that this is what
happened, which gave rise to this case:
In June 1992 they were all enrolled at the

Henichi Techno Exchange Cultural Foundation in
44
Davao City, studying Niponggo. Their teacher
was Mrs. Remedios Aplicador.
One day Mrs. Aplicador told them that if they

wanted to go and work abroad, particularly
Brunei where they could earn a salary of
"$700.00 for four hours daily work," she would
refer them to Mr. Paulo Lim who knew one Engr.
Erwin Diaz who was recruiting applicants for
Brunei (tsn 9-7-92 pp. 10-11 & tsn 9-8-92 p.
34).
Accompanied by Mrs. Aplicador, the three

complainants went to Mr. Paulo Lim who
explained to them that he was not the one
recruiting workers but Engr. Diaz (tsn 9-8-92 p.
34). Mr. Lim informed them that his children had
already applied with Engr. Diaz and that the
requirements were bio-data, passport, medical
checkup, I.D. and income tax return, and
P2,500.00 for processing of their papers (tsn 9-
7-92 pp. 11 & 23-24 & 9-8-92 pp. 46 & 58).
Telling them that he knew "pretty well the
recruiter" Engr. Diaz and that "We don't have to
worry we can really go abroad and as a matter
of fact he said that his three children were
applying (to go) to Brunei," he offered to
accompany them to Engr. Erwin Diaz at the
office of the CIS (tsn 9-7-92 p.11). They asked
Mr. Lim when he was available, and he said July
18 (1992), Saturday morning (tsn 9-8-92 p. 34).
On July 18, Mr. Paulo Lim and Mrs. Remedios

Aplicador accompanied the three complainants to
Engr. Diaz who was then being detained in the
CIS Detention Center in Davao City and
introduced them to him. The complainants asked
Engr. Diaz why he was "inside the cell." and he
explained that four applicants had filed a case
against him "because they could not accept that
they were sick of hepatitis and that the CIS
elements are just making money out of it" (tsn
9-8-92 p. 35). They asked him if he was
"recruiting applicants for Brunei" and "he said
yes"; they also inquired what were the
requirements, and he said four passport size
pictures of each applicant, bio-data, income tax
return, medical certificate, NBI clearance,
passport, P2,500.00 for processing of the papers
of each applicant, and P65,000.00 as placement
45
fee, but only P20,000.00 for plane fare was to be
paid by each applicant, the balance of
P45,000.00 was to be paid by means of salary
deductions (tsn 9-7-92 p. 12; tsn 9-8-92 p. 35 &
p. 59). The P2,500.00 for processing of their
respective applications was to be paid at the
house of Engr. Diaz at 14 Aries Street, GSIS
Heights, Davao City, with telephone no. 8-46-71
(tsn 9-7-92 p. 12).
Mary Anne Navarro paid P2,300.00 to Engr. Diaz

at his residence on July 22, 1992 (Exh. "C").
There is no explanation by her why she paid only
P2,300.00 and not P2,500.00.
Maria Theresa Fabricante paid only P2,000.00 to

Engr. Diaz also on July 22, 1992 (Exh. "E"). She
paid only that amount because, according to her
testimony, she already had a passport and Engr.
Diaz said she was required to pay only
P2,000.00 (tsn 9-8-92 p. 35).
Maria Elena Ramirez paid to Engr. Diaz

P2,500.00 but she lost her receipt (tsn 9-8-92 p.
59). However, it was returned to her by Engr.
Diaz on August 17, 1992 (Exh. "G").
Exhibit "G" is a RECEIPT signed by the three

complainants acknowledging the return to them
respectively of the amounts of P2,300.00,
P2,000.00 and P2,500.00 by the accused and his
wife who also signed it as witnesses (tsn 9-8-92
p. 43).
After submitting to the accused all the required

papers and undergoing medical examination
(before the return of said amounts to the
complainants), they asked him when they could
leave. The accused told them to wait for three to
four weeks as his papers were still being
processed by the CIS (tsn 9-7-92 p. 15). During
this period when the accused had already been
released from detention (testimony of the
accused, tsn 4-27-93 pp. 16-17), the
complainants kept inquiring from him when they
would be leaving for Brunei, going to his house
several times where they saw many other
applicants like them. But the accused just kept
saying that his papers were still with the CIS
(tsn 9-7-92 p. 15).
46
When he was still detained, he told the
complainants that "the name of his agency is
confidential but the owner thereof is Erlinda
Romualdez" who "used to be her (sic) mistress"
assuring them that "we don't have to worry
about it because he said it is government project
and then he said he will escort us to Philippine
Plaza Hotel for briefing before leaving for abroad
and after the briefing at the Philippine Plaza
Hotel we will proceed to POEA where we will sign
a contract that is the time we will give him the
amount of P20,000.00 and then we will proceed
to the residence of Erlinda Romualdez where we
will be staying for three days" (tsn 9-8-92 pp.
40-41).
Mary Anne Navarro asked her father for

P20,000.00 for her plane fare, and so they
mortgaged their piano for P30,000.00 to Serve
Loan Mart as evidenced by a promissory note for
P30,000.00 (Exh. "D" & tsn 9-7-92 p. 16).
From the borrowed P30,000.00, Mary Anne

Navarro set aside P20,000.00 "for placement fee
and the remaining P10,000.00 I used in buying
travelling bag, dresses, shoes and of course
make up (sic) because we were told that we will
be working there as salesgirls. Then hairband,
pair of earrings and ring" (tsn 9-7-92 pp. 16-
17). It was the accused who told them that they
would be working in one of the department
stores in Brunei and receiving a monthly pay of
$700.00 for working only four hours a day (tsn
9-7-92 p. 17). Earlier, she said Engr. Diaz told
her and her co-complainants herein that the
P20,000.00 was for plane fare (tsn 9-7-92 p.
12).
Maria theresa Fabricante went home to Cotabato

to secure the required P20,000.00. Her father
sold a horse for P5,000.00. As for the balance of
P15,000.00 "Our plan was to mortgage our five
hectare land to a friend of my father."
Q Was the land actually mortgage?
A The money was ready for release.
Q Now, was the money release?
47
A No sir.
Q Why?
A The money was supposed to be released on

August 6, but before that date August 3, I came
back to Davao and went to the office of POEA
and verify whether Engr. Diaz was indeed a
licensed recruiter.
Q What did you find out when you go there?
A He is not registered or in the list. His name

does not appear on the list.
Q With whom did you talk to with the POEA?
A Atty. Evangelio.
Q Now, upon learning that Mr. Diaz is not

included in the masters list, what did you do?
A After knowing that I went to my two

companions Ma. Elena Ramirez and Mary Anne
Navarro and informed them of what I found out
that the agency represented by Engr. Diaz was a
fake agency and I advised them they too should
follow it up by themselves.
Q Now, of your own knowledge, did they do?
A Yes sir.
Q What about you?
A Yes sir, we set a date to go to the POEA but

before that we agreed that we will go and see
Engr. Diaz to get back the money that we paid
as well as the papers.
Q Did you actually go to Engr. Diaz?
A Yes sir.
Q What happened?
A We went to see Eng. Diaz and when we met

him, he greet us by saying: "If you are ready to
leave?" But we told him that we are not going to
leave and we are withdrawing our applications
because we found from the office of the POEA
48
that he is a fake recruiter and so he got angry
and said that if our purpose in going there was
to withdraw, he said we can and we can get back
our documents the next day but he said we will
have to pay him charges. And we said, what for?
He said for labor because he already secured a
plane ticket for us and when I asked where the
plane tickets are? He said it is in Cagayan (tsn 9-
8-92 pp. 38-39)
At the POEA the three complainants learned that the "agency

represented by Engr. Diaz was a fake agency" (tsn 9-8-92 p. 38). The
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration issued a
CERTIFICATION (Exh. "A") which reads:
This is to certify that Eng'r. Diaz a.k.a. Erwin, Rudy, Edwin,

Rodolfo, Ariel Mateo of Aries St., GSIS Subd., Matina,
Davao City; Mr. Paulo Lim and Remedios Aplicador both of
Sto. Rosario St., Buhangin, Davao City were never granted
an authority to conduct recruitment for overseas
employment in Davao City or in any part of Region XI, and
that the agency of the former known as Phil Jap Constr'n
and Tanaka and Diaz Asso. were never been a licensed
agency for overseas recruitment.
This certification is being issued upon the written request of

Ma. Elena Ramirez, Mary Anne Navarro and Ma. Theresa
Fabricante for whatever legal purpose it may serve them
best.
14 August 1992 Davao City, Philippines.
(Sgd) GAUDENCIO DELA PEÑA

Unit Coordinator
The three complainants withdrew their applications from

Engr. Diaz without paying his charges. The mounts they
paid for processing fees were all returned to them by Engr.
Diaz (Exh. "G"). 3
On September 2, 1993 the trial court rendered a decision finding the

appellant guilty of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Rodolfo "Erwin"

Diaz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of large
scale illegal recruitment and sentences him to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, plus the
costs.
49
Accused appellant Diaz predicated the instant appeal on the following
assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

ACCUSED NOT ONLY CONFINED HIMSELF TO FACILITATING
THE PASSPORT AND MEDICAL EXAMINATION OF THE
COMPLAINANTS BUT ALSO PROMISED THEM EMPLOYMENT
ABROAD.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

ACCUSED WAS MERELY A FACILITATOR OF TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS AND NOT AN ILLEGAL RECRUITER.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED

OF THE CRIME CHARGED. 4
The foregoing assigned errors, being intertwined, shall be discussed

together.
The crime of illegal recruitment, as defined under Articles 38 (a) in

relation to Articles 13 (b) and 34 and penalized under Article 39 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 1920 and Presidential
Decree 2018, is any recruitment activity, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34, undertaken by a non-licensee
or non-holder of authority.
Thus, in People v. Cabacang 5 this Court ruled that the crime of illegal

recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely:
1] That the offender has no valid license or authority

required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; and,
2] That the offender undertakes either any activity within

the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under
Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34.
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, provides for the statutory definition of
"recruitment and placement", as follows:
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing,

enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
50
whether for profit or not; Provided that any person or entity
which in any manner offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.
In People v. Panis, 6 we made the pronouncement that any of the acts

mentioned in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement
even if only one prospective worker is involved. The number of
persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of
recruitment and placement.
Article 38 (a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment is an offense which

is essentially committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.
A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person,

corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or
authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of
Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or
cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. 7
Moreover, recruitment and placement activities of agents or

representatives whose appointments by a license or holder of authority
were not previously authorized by the POEA shall likewise constitute
illegal
recruitment. 8
We ruled in People vs. Goce, in this wise:
"Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree

No. 2018, provides that any recruitment activity, including the
prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of said Code, undertaken
by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39 thereof. The same article further
provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage if any of the qualifying circumstances
exist, namely,
a] when illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate,

that is, if carried out by a group of three or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another; or,
b] when illegal recruitment is committed in large scale, that

is, if committed against three or more persons individually
or as a group. 9
Considering the clear import of the foregoing doctrine which spells the
unmistakable intent of the specific provision applicable at bar, the
instant case without doubt involves illegal recruitment in large scale.
The elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, which

are undoubtedly present in this case are:
51
1] the offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
to engage in recruitment and placement activity,
2] the offender undertakes recruitment and placement

activity defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34, and
3] illegal recruitment is committed against three or more

persons individually or as a group. 10
As can be ascertained after a thorough reading of the records,

appellant Diaz was neither a licensee nor a holder of authority to
qualify him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement activity.
Pursuant to the Certification issued by the POEA dated 14th of August

1992, 11 duly signed by Gaudencio de la Pena, Unit Coordinator,
appellant was never granted an authority to conduct recruitment for
overseas employment.
As to the third element of the crime, there were obviously three

persons who were victims of the appellant's nefarious act of large scale
illegal recruitment.
Relative to the question of whether or not appellant Diaz was engaged

in recruitment activity, it is clear from the testimonies of the three
complaints that appellant undertook to recruit them, thus:
Maria Elena Ramirez testified in the following tenor:
Q: When you went to see Mr. Diaz, what

happened?
A: We were introduced by Mr. Lim to Diaz, and

then we asked Diaz if it is true that he's
recruiting applicants for abroad. He said that he
is recruiting applicants for Japan or Brunei and if
we have P20,000 we can go to Brunei and we
will be given priority if we have the amount.
Q: What else did you ask Mr. Diaz?
A: We asked him what were the requirements.
Q: And what did he answer?
A: Well, he told us that we are required to

submit 8 copies of passport, ID photos, income
tax return, passport, medical certificate and the
the amount of P2,500 and he further said that
our placement fee will be P65,000 but all we
have to pay in advance is the amount of P20,000
52
and the remaining balance of P45,000 shall be
given through salary deductions. 12
Maria Theresa Fabricante testified in the following manner:
She declared:
Q: What else did you ask Mr. Diaz?
A: We asked him if he is indeed recruiting

applicants for Brunei. And he said, Yes. After
that we asked him what are the requirements
and he told us that we need passport, four
passport size ID pictures, income tax return and
NBI clearance, and if we have diplomas to attach
with the other documents.
Q: What else did Mr. Diaz tell you to do?
A: He said that if we are interested, he will take

care of the processing of the documents by
giving him the amount of P2,500, and that he
explained that our placement fee will be in the
sum of P65,000 and we will just have to raise
P20,000 for the processing of our visa, plane
tickets and POEA expenses. 13
She continued:
Q: What about your work in Brunei, what did you

ask him?
A: I asked Engr. Diaz whether our work would be

contract worker and he said yeas and we did not
have to worry about it because he said it was a
government project and then he said he would
escort us to Philippine Plaza Hotel for briefing
before leaving for abroad and after the briefing
we will proceed to the POEA where we would
sign our contract and after signing that is the
time we would give the amount of P20,000 and
then we would proceed to the residence of
Erlinda Romualdez where we would be staying
for three days. 14
The same thing was testified to by Mary Anne Navarro. Appellant told
her that he was recruiting contract workers for abroad, particularly
Brunei, and promised her a job opportunity if she can produce various
amounts of money for expenses and processing of documents. 15
53
Testifying in his behalf, appellant denied these complainants'
allegations. He asserted that he never made a promise in favor of
complainants for employment abroad but assisted them in the
procurement of passports and medical certificates.
This Court is not, however, persuaded by appellant's bare denials.
Evidently, greater weight must generally be given to the positive

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the
defendant in weighing contradictory declarations and
statements. 16 We stated this rule with curt emphasis in Goce (supra)
that —
The lame defense consisting of such bare denials by

appellant cannot overcome the evidence presented by the
prosecution proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 17
The acts of the appellant, which were clearly described in the lucid
testimonies of the three victims, such as collecting from each of the
complainants payment for passport, medical tests, placement fee,
plane tickets and other sundry expenses, promising them employment
abroad, contracting and advertising for employment, unquestionably
constitute acts of large scale illegal recruitment.
Appellant sought refuge in the testimonies of his three witnesses that

would give credence to the claim that he was only a facilitator of travel
documents and not a recruiter.
The trial court did not give weight to appellant's allegations.
As observed by the trial court, the testimony of Edgar Macomao, is

incredible which would raise serious doubts about his motive as a
witness. 18 It also describes the testimony of Paulo Lim as unclear and
confusing. 19 Neither was the testimony of Abednigo Neri given much
credit by the trial court.
Admittedly, the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of

witnesses are to be given great weight and a high degree of respect by
the Appellate Court.
In People vs. Reyes (242 SCRA 264), we enunciated the rule that —
When the issue is the credibility of witnesses, appellate

courts will in general not disturb the findings of the trial
court unless certain facts or circumstances of weight have
been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. This is
because the trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during trial. 20
54
In the case at bar, we see no reason to disturb these observations of
the trial court. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no facts or
circumstances had been overlooked or misapplied by the trial court
which might affect the result of the case when considered.
As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, to wit:
With the evidence on record, it is hard to believe that

services promised by the appellant to the three
complainants were to consists only of his assistance in the
procurement of passports and medical certificates for each
of them for they themselves could have easily secured
these documents at a lesser cost. Moreover, the fact that
the appellant still collected P2,000 from Theresa Fabricante
who already had a passport belies his claim that his
services were limited only to procuring a passport and
medical certificate. 21
The accused's assertion that he only assisted in the processing of

passport and medical certificate is nothing more than a frivolous
excuse to divert the truth.
Likewise, it is the settled rule that a person is guilty of illegal

recruitment when he gives the impression that he has the power to
send workers abroad. 22 Appellant Diaz manifestly gave that
impression to the three complainants that he had the ability to send
workers abroad. Misrepresenting himself as a recruiter of workers for
Brunei, he promised them work for a fee and convinced them to give
their money for the purpose of getting an employment overseas.
The findings of the trial court, to which we agree, were arrived at with
meticulous care, to wit:
There is no direct and express denial by Mr. Diaz of the

following testimonies of the complainants:
1] That they had asked Mr. Diaz if he was "recruiting

applicants for Brunei" and he said "Yes".
2] That when asked what his requirements were, he said

four passport size pictures, bio-data, income tax returns,
medical certificates, NBI clearance, passport, P2,500 for
processing fee, and P65,000 as placement fee, but only
P20,000 for plane fare was to be paid as the balance of
P45,000 was payable by salary deductions.
3] That he was asked by the complainants as to what

agency he would be referring them, he said "the name of
the agency is confidential but the owner thereof is one
Erlinda Romualdez, who used to be his mistress"; that the
complainants did not have to worry because "it is a
55
government project and then he said he'd escort us to the
Philippine Plaza Hotel for briefing before leaving for abroad
and after the briefing we will proceed to POEA where we will
sign our contract and after the signing that is the time we
will give the P20,000, and then we will proceed to the
residence of Erlinda Romualdez where we will be staying for
three days."
4] That Mr. Diaz told me the complainants that they would

be working "as salesgirls in one of the department stores in
Brunei, that they will be getting $700 a month and they will
be only working four hours a day"
These are definitely prohibited practices or activities

constituting large scale illegal recruitment according to the
above quoted provisions of the law. There is no denial of
these by the accused. 23
This Court is aware of a new law, RA 8042, otherwise known as

Migrant Workers for Overseas Employment, which was approved on
June 07, 1995. It is An Act to Institute the Policies of Overseas
Employment and Establish a Higher Standard of Protection and
Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers, their Families and
Overseas Filipinos in Distress and for Other Purposes. This new law,
amends the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines
and gives a new definition of the crime of illegal recruitment and
provides for its higher penalty.
We are not in anyway applying the otherwise restrictive provisions of

this new law as it is not applicable in the case at bar, considering the
rule that crimes are punishable by the laws in force at the time of their
commission.
In synthesis, considering the positive testimonies of the complainants

against the negative bare denials of accused-appellant, no other
conclusion could be arrived at but to sustain the conviction of accused-
appellant finding the latter guilty of large scale illegal recruitment
beyond reasonable doubt.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the Decision appealed from

dated September 2, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects, with
costs against accused-appellant Rodolfo Diaz.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
56
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120389. November 21, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ALEXANDER ALEX BENEMERITO and PRECY BENEMERITO
(at large), accused.
ALEXANDER ALEX BENEMERITO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
57
This is an appeal by accused-appellant Alexander Alex Benemerito
from a Joint Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 91, convicting him of illegal recruitment and three counts of
estafa. The dispositive portion of the decision reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:
1. Finding accused Alexander Alex Benemerito guilty beyond

reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment in large scale, as defined in Article 38, in
relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended by
P.D. No. 2018 in Crim. Case No. Q-93-51511 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to
pay a fine of P100,000.00, and to pay the cost;

reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of estafa in
Crim Case No. Q-93-51513 and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum; to indemnify Benjamin Quitoriano in
the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the cost;

reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of Estafa in
Crim. Case No. Q-93-51514 and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, to indemnify Fernando Arcal in the
amount ofP50,000.00 and to pay the costs;

reasonable doubt, as principal, of the crime of estafa in
Crim. Case No. Q-93-51515 and sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Carlito
Gumarang in the amount of P95,000.00 and to pay the
costs; and,
5. Acquiting accused Alexander Alex Benemerito of the crime of

Estafa in Crim. Case No. Q-93-51512 for lack of evidence. [2]
58
The amended information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-51511
charged the accused-appellant and his sister, Precy Benemerito, with
the crime of large Scale Illegal Recruitment allegedly committed, as
follows:
That sometime during the months comprised from February to August

1993 in Quezon City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, without
any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously recruit and promise employment to Brunei to the persons
of FERNANDO ARCAL, ROLANDO ESPINO, CARLITO B. GUMARANG,
BENJAMIN J. QUITORIANO, JULIO CABALLA and JOSE AQUINO, JR., by
then and there requiring them to submit certain documentary
requirements and exacting from them the total amount
of P583,000.00, Philippine Currency as recruitment fees without the
required necessary license or authority from the Department of Labor
and Employment.
That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the

same was perpetrated against six (6) persons individually or as a
group as penalized under Article 38 in relation to Article 39 as
amended by P.D. No. 2018 of the labor Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The amended information in Criminal Case No. Q-93-51512 charged

them with Estafa allegedly committed, thus:
That sometime during the months comprised from February to August

1993 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud JOSE N. AQUINO, JR.
in the following manner, to wit: representation which they made to
said JOSE N. AQUINO, JR. to the effect that they had the power and
capacity to recruit and employ JOSE N. AQUINO, JR. as worker and
could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the
necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of
other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said JOSE N.
AQUINO, JR. to give and deliver, as in fact gave and delivered to said
accused the amount of P17,000.00 on the strength of said
manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that
the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as
in fact did obtain the amount of P17,000.00 which amount once in
possession, with intent to defraud him, wilfully, unlawfully and
59
feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said JOSE N.
AQUINO, JR. in the aforesaid amount of P17,000.00 Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-51513, Q-93-51514

and Q-93-51515, charging the accused-appellant and Precy
Benemerito with Estafa in each case, contain substantially the same
allegations as that in Criminal Case No. Q-93-51512, except as to the
names of the complainants and the amounts involved viz., (a)
Benjamin Quitoriano and P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. Q-93-
51513;[5] (b) Fernando Arcal and P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. Q-
93-51514;[6] and (c) Carlito Gumarang and P105,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. Q-93-51515.[7]
Only the accused-appellant was arrested, while Precy Benemerito
has remained at large up to the present. These cases were
consolidated and joint trial thereon was had only against the accused-
appellant after he entered a plea of innocence in the five cases on 27
April 1994.
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were complainants
Bejamin Quitoriano, Fernando Arcal and Carlito Gumarang; and
Graciano Oco, the Senior Labor and Employment Officer of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Fernando
Arcal was recalled as a rebuttal witness.
The trial court summarized the evidence for the prosecution as
follows:
Benjamin Quitoriano claims to have known both Alex and Precy

Benemerito since birth as they are townmates in Gonzaga, Cagayan.
Sometime in February, 1993, he met Alex and Precy Benemerito in
Gonzaga, Cagayan and the two offered him a job as helper mechanic
in Japan and Alex said that they would leave together as he was also
applying for a job there. Alex told him to prepare his passport, pictures
and certificate of former employment. On March 8, 1993, he went to
the residence of Alex and Precy Benemerito at 150-A Scout
Hernandez, Kamuning, Quezon Cityand he submitted the papers to
them. Precy told him to pay a placement fee of P100,000.00 but he
said that he had only P50,000.00, which he gave to Precy. Precy asked
Alex to count the money and told him to deposit the same in the bank
and she issued a receipt for said amount (Exh. A). With respect to the
balance of P50,000.00, Benjamin Quitoriano requested that he be
60
allowed to pay the same in installment by way of salary
deduction. Precy then asked him to sign a two-year contract which
provided for a salary of one lapad or 10,000 yen a day and medical
and housing benefits.Precy gave him a referral for medical
examination and told Alex to accompany him to the clinic. Alex
accompanied him to the clinic and assured him of the promised job as
they would leave together.
Carlito Gumarang, another townmate of Alex and Precy Benemerito,

was told by the latters mother sometime in February, 1993 that her
children were recruiting people for employment and gave him their
address at 150-A Scout Fernandez, Kamuning, Quezon City where he
could see them if he was interested. He went to said address and
talked to Alex and Precy who told him that he could leave for Japan to
work as helper mechanic within forty-five (45) days after full payment
of the placement fee of P105,000.00. He paid the amount
of P105,000.00 in four (4) installments to Precy in the presence of
Alex, who counted the money, and Precy gave him the corresponding
receipts (Exh. H, I, J and K). He also submitted the necessary
documents, such as application form, passport, NBI clearance and
certificate of employment to Alex. He was asked by Alex to sign a
contract of employment as helper mechanic which provided for a
salary of one lapad or the equivalent ofP2,500.00 a day.
Fernando Arcal was accompanied by his friend, Marcelo Leal, to the

house of Alex and Precy at 150-A Scout Fernandez, Kamuning, Quezon
City sometime in August, 1992 but the two told him that there was no
available job. He returned to said place in March, 1993 and he was
shown by Alex and Precy a job order for fifty (50) mechanic helpers
for Japan with a salary rate of one lapad orP2,500.00 a day. Alex told
him to have a medical examination and accompanied him to the clinic
in Malate. After three days, Alex and Precy told him that he passed the
medical examination and to raise money for the processing of his
application. He paid the total amount of P50,000.00 in five
installments, as evidenced by four (4) receipts issued by Precy (Exh.
C, D, E, and F), while his last payment in the amount of P5,000.00
on June 15, 1993 was received by Alex who issued the corresponding
receipt (Exh. G), as Precy had already left for Brunei. Alex asked him
to sign the contract, attended to the processing of his papers, counted
the money given by him as placement fee and assured him that he
would be able to leave.
As the complainants were not able to leave for Japan as promised,

Benjamin Quitoriano, Carlito Gumarang and Fernando Arcal, together
61
with other job applicants, filed a complaint against Alex and Precy
Benemerito before the NBI. They likewise secured a Certification from
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration that Alexander
Benemerito and Precy Benemerito are not licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment (Exh. B and B-1), which was
confirmed in open court by Graciano Oco, Senior Labor and
Employment Officer who personally verified the same from the records
of the Office.[8]
The defense presented the accused-appellant whose testimony is

summarized by the trial court as follows:
Alexander Benemerito tried to show that after graduating from high

school, he worked as jeepney conductor in his hometown, Binaga,
Gonzaga, Cagayan. In December, 1992, his sister Precy visited their
place and convinced him to work abroad. On January 7, 1993, he went
to the apartment at 150-A Scout Fernandez, Kamuning, Quezon City,
which Precy was sharing with the owner, Mrs. Susie Mana and the
latters son and four maids. He applied for a janitorial work in Brunei
and submitted the required documents to Precy, who offered to
shoulder the expenses. Precy likewise told him to stay in said
apartment while his papers were being processed and he helped in the
household chores and in the store of Susie Mana located at Agham
Road, Quezon City, for which he was paid P50.00 a day by the
latter. He admitted having seen Benjamin Quitoriano, Carlito
Gumarang and Fernando Arcal in said apartment when they talked to
Precy in connection with their application for overseas employment
and that he accompanied Benjamin Quitoriano to the clinic upon the
latters request. However, he denied having participated in the
transaction of Precy with the three complainants or having issued the
receipt in favor of Fernando Arcal (Exh. G) as he was outside the
apartment cleaning the vehicle of Susie Mana or watering the plants
while they talked with Precy. He further claimed that the complainants
admitted before the NBI agents who arrested him that he had nothing
to do with their transaction with Precy Benemerito, who left for Brunei
in August, 1993, and that it was only before the Inquest Fiscal that the
complainants pointed to him as the one who received the money,
which he denied. Jaime Roblegado claimed to have gone to the house
of Precy Benemerito in Fedruary, March and April, 1993 in connection
with his application for employment as computer programmer in
Brunei, that it was only Precy who entertained him and the other
applicants, including Fernando Arcal, whom he saw in the house and
although Alex Benemerito was also in said place, he did not see the
latter entertain any applicants as Alex was either cleaning a car or the
62
living room of the house; and that he had a chance to ask Alex why he
was in said place and the latter told him that Precy is his sister and
that he was also an applicant and following up his papers.[9]
In its Joint Decision[10] dated 2 May 1995 and promulgated the

following day, the trial court declared that the testimonies of the
complainants were positive and credible, and found that accused Alex
Benemerito, together with his sister Precy Benemerito, [was] positively
identified by Benjamin Quitoriano, Carlito Gumarang and Fernando
Arcal as having promised them employment abroad for a fee [and
that] [a]s shown by a Certification of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, both Alex and Precy Benemerito are
neither licensed nor authorized by said office to recruit workers for
overseas employment (exhibits B and B-1).
The trial court further observed that accused Alex Benemerito has
not denied that he is a townmate of both Benjamin Quitoriano and
Carlito Gumarang and it is difficult to believe that said complainants
would fabricate a story that would result in the imprisonment for life of
the accused. With respect to Fernando Arcal, while he did not know the
accused personally, it was against human nature and experience for a
stranger to accuse another stranger of a most serious crime merely to
mollify his hurt feelings.[11]
The trial court debunked the accused-appellantss testimony as
inherently weak for being a mere denial and that Susie Mana did not
corroborate his claim that he worked as her houseboy and stayed in
her apartment.[12]
The trial court then concluded that the evidence for the prosecution
established all the elements of the crimes charged, thus:
Thus, the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale is committed when

a person (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Article
13(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 of the
Labor Code; (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (c) commits
the same against three or more persons, individually or as a
group. (People vs. Coronacion, 237 SCRA 227, 239).[13]
On the other hand, the elements of estafa in general are (1) that the
accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by
means of deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party (People vs. Ong,
204 SCRA 942).
63
In the cases at bar, accused Alex Benemerito and his sister Precy gave
the complainants the impression that they could give them
employment abroad so that the complainants were convinced to give
them the money they demanded in their desire to be able to earn one
lapad or the equivalent of P2,500.00 a day as represented to
them. Benjamin Quitoriano and Fernando Arcal each gave accused
Alex Benemerito and his sister the amount of P50,000.00, as
evidenced by the receipts issued to them (Exh. A, C to G). With
respect to Carlito Gumarang, he presented receipts evidencing his
payment of a total amount of P95,000.00 (Exh. I, J and K). The
receipts dated August 24, 1992 for the amount of P10,000.00 (Exh. H)
is in the name of Shally Flor Gumarang, a sister of Carlito Gumarang
and likewise an applicant, and cannot thus be considered as part of the
payment of Carlito Gumarang. The fact that the receipts were signed
only by Precy Benemerito is of no moment, in view of the insistence of
the complainants that the money was given by them to both Alex and
Precy Benemerito in consideration of their promise of overseas
employment as the money was counted first by Alex Benemerito after
which Precy Benemerito issued the receipts to the complainant. Thus,
the acts of accused Alex Benemerito and his sister establish a common
criminal design towards the accomplishments of the same unlawful
purpose, evidencing conspiracy between them. [14]
The complainant in Civil Case No. Q-93-51512, however, was

unable to testify; hence the trial court declared that the case must
perforce fail for lack of evidence. [15] The trial court then rendered
judgment as quoted in the opening paragraph of this ponencia.
In due time, the accused-appellants filed his appeal and in his
Appellants Brief[16] contends that the trial court committed the
following errors:
I.
x x x IN HOLDING THAT A CONSPIRACY EXIST BETWEEN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ALEX BENEMERITO AND HIS CO-
ACCUSED SISTER PRECY BENEMERITO; AND IN CONVICTING
HIM OF THE CRIME AS PRINCIPAL.
II.
x x x IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED APPELLANT ON
GROUNDS OF REASONABLE DOUBT BY APPLYING THE
EQUIPOSE RULE.[17]
As to his first assigned error, the accused appellant maintains that
his conviction was based mainly on his association with Precy
64
Benemerito, his sister and co-accused, which the trial court
appreciated as evidence of conspiracy. He claims such a conclusion to
be erroneous for even assuming he helped his sister entertain the
complainants, he did so only because, like the complainants, he was
also an applicant eager to work abroad, and his sister promised to pay
for his placement fee. Further, he had no knowledge of his sisters
criminal intent and might even be considered a victim of his sister.
The accused-appellant also argues that some of the complainants
knew that he was not a part of any conspiracy, hence they did not
include his name in the complaint filed with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), and if he were, he would have gone into hiding
instead of facing his accusers.[18]
In the second assigned error, the accused-appellant assert that he
should be acquitted under the equipoise rule in view of the doubts as
to his guilt as shown in his arguments under the first assigned error,
and that the evidence points in fact to his sister Precy Benemerito as
the recruiter who received the money from the complainants. [19]
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, disagrees
with the accused-appellant and recommends that we affirm in toto the
impugned decision.
A careful review of the record discloses that the trial courts findings
of fact are supported by the evidence and its conclusions are in accord
with the law and jurisprudence. We hold, therefore, that the crimes of
large scale illegal recruitment and three counts of estafa were
committed, and that the accused-appellant is guilty thereof beyond
reasonable doubt. We have no alternative but to dismiss the appeal
and affirm the judgment, subject to modifications on the penalties
imposed in the cases for estafa.
Indeed, the evidence overwhelmingly established the fact that both
the accused-appellant and his sister Precy Benemerito were engaged
in the business of illegal recruitment.In their testimonies, Fernando
Arcal and Carlito Gumarang were positive, categorical and firm, even
under grueling cross-examination, that the accused-appellant actively
participated in the recruitment process. The latter was present when
each complainant was offered a job in Japan, and the accused-
appellant even made representations as to the existence of such
jobs[20] and accompanied the complainants for their medical
examinations.[21] The accused-appellant likewise received installment
payments from the complainants.[22] These acts demonstrated beyond
doubt that the accused-appellant was not merely an applicant for a job
or an unwitting victim of his sister; on the contrary, he was a knowing
65
and willing participant in the recruitment activities, which were
obviously conducted for profit. We do not then hesitate to rule, as did
the trial court, that the accused-appellant and his sister Precy
Benemerito, who is still at large, were co-conspirators in the
recruitment business which, as hereunder discussed, was illegal and
on a large scale. Conspiracy exist when two or more people come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.[23] It can be inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest. [24] Once conspiracy is established,
the act of one conspirator is the act of the others. [25]
That the accused-appellants name was not included in the sworn
statement of Fernando Arcal filed with the NBI is of no moment. As
correctly ruled by the trial court, this omission was satisfactorily
explained by complainant Fernando Arcal; moreover, all the
complainants identified [the accused-appellant] before the Inquest
Fiscal as the one who received the money from them. [26]
Neither are we persuaded by this plea of innocence allegedly
evidenced by non-flight. This converse of the evidentiary principle of
flight as indicative of guilt, [27] does not necessarily hold true. [28] Non-
flight may not be positively construed as an indication of innocence. [29]
The accused-appellants plea for the application of the equipoise
rule must likewise fail. This rule provides that where the evidence of
the parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused.
[30]
There is, therefore, no equipose if the evidence is not evenly
balanced. Not even a semblance of parity is present in this
case. Against the direct, positive and convincing evidence for the
prosecution, the accused-appellant could only offer a mere denial and
the incredible claim that he was an unwitting victim of his sister Precy
Benemerito. He miserably failed to overcome the prosecutions
evidence, hence the rule is unavailable to him.[31]
We now turn to the criminal liability of the accused-appellant.
Illegal recruitment is defined in Article 38 of the Labor Code, as
amended, as follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. -- (a) Any recruitment activities

including the prohibited activities including the prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by
non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor
66
and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate
complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large

scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage
and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried

out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or
illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or
as a group.
Article 13(b) of the same Code defines recruitment and placement

as:
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,

hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.
To prove illegal recruitment, only two elements need be shown,

viz., (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken
recruitment activities (or any of the activities enumerated in Article 34
of the Labor Code, as amended); and (2) the said person does not
have a license or authority to do so. It is not required that it be shown
that such person wrongfully represented himself as licensed recruiter.
[32]
A license is a document issued by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a private
employment agency, while an authority is a document issued by the
DOLE authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and
placement activities as a private recruitment agency.[33]
There is large scale illegal recruitment if it is committed against
three (3) or more persons individually or as a group; its elements,
therefore, are the two above mentioned plus the fact that it is
committed against three or more persons.[34]
Large scale illegal recruitment involves economic sabotage, [35] and
is penalized by Article 39(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, with life
imprisonment and a fine ofP100,000.00.
67
The accused-appellant having recruited at least three persons,
giving them the impression of his ability to send workers abroad,
assuring them of their employment in Japan, and collecting various
amounts for alleged processing and placement fees, without license
nor authority to so recruit or offer job placements abroad, thus
committed large scale illegal recruitment.
It is settled in our jurisdiction that a person who commits illegal
recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment and estafa under paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as the former is malum prohibitum where the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while
estafa is malum in sewhere the criminal intent of the accused is
necessary for conviction.[36] In short, a conviction for offenses under
the Labor Code does not bar punishment for offenses punishable by
other laws.[37]
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused
defrauded another: (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of
deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. [38]
All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-
appellant deceived the complainants into believing that he had the
authority and capability to send them abroad for employment; that
there were available jobs for them in Japan for which they would be
hired; and that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the
complainants parted with their money in payment of the various
processing and placement fees. As all these representations of the
accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code is thus applicable.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. The
opening paragraph of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides:
[T]he penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud
is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such a case, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed,
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
68
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the
case may be.
The amount proved to have been defrauded in Criminal Case No.
Q-93-51513 and Criminal Case No. Q-93-51514 was P50,000.00 in
each case. Hence, the penalty prescribed above should be imposed in
its maximum period. The maximum period thereof following the rule
prescribed in the last paragraph of Article 77 of the Revised Penal
Code[39] ranges from six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty one
(21) days to eight (8) years. We add to it two (2) years and nine (9)
months for the amount beyond the firstP22,000.00 (at the rate of one
(1) year for every P10,000.00 and nine (9) months for the
remaining P8,000.00 by ratio and proportion). Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused-appellant can be sentenced
to an Indeterminate penalty whose minimum shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law,
viz.,prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months) and
whose maximum shall be the abovementioned imposable penalty. The
indeterminate penalty can range, therefore, from two (2) years, eleven
(11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to
ten (10) years and nine (9) months of prision mayor, as maximum.
In Criminal Case No. Q-93-51515, the amount proved to have been
defrauded is only P85,000.00, as the receipt for the P10,000.00 is in
the name of Shally Flor Gumarang, not the complainant Carlito
Gumarang. The principal penalty imposable is likewise the maximum
of the prescribed penalty provided for in article 315 as stated in the
immediately preceding paragraph, plus six (6) years and three (3)
months for the amounts beyond the first P22,000.00 (at the rate of
one (1) year for every additional P10,000.00 and three (3) months for
the remaining P3,000.00). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and the foregoing disquisition, the accused-appellant can be sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and three (3) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-93-
51511, Q-93-51512, Q-93-51513, Q-93-51514 and Q-93-51515 is
AFFIRMED, except as to the penalties imposed in the last three cases
which are modified, as stated above. As modified, accused-appellant
ALEXANDER ALEX BENEMERITO is thus sentenced in the said cases to
suffer, as follows:
69
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-93-51513, an indeterminate penalty
ranging from Two (2) years, Eleven (11) months and Ten
(10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to a total of
Ten (10) years and Nine (9) months of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to indemnify complainant Benjamin
Quitoriano in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos;

ranging from Two (2) years, Eleven (11) months and Ten
(10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to a total of
Ten (10) years and Nine (9) months of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to indemnify complainant Fernando Arcal in
the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos; and

ranging from Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to a total of Fourteen (14) years
and Three (3) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and to indemnify complainant Carlito Gumarang in the
amount of Eighty-Five Thousand (P85,000.00) Pesos.
Cost against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.
[1]
Original Record (OR), 161-169. Per Judge Marina l. Buzon.
[2]
OR, 168-169.
[3]
Id., 78; Rollo, 13.
[4]
Id., 80-81; Id., 15-16.
[5]
OR, 82-83 Rollo, 17-18.
[6]
Id., 84-85; Id., 19-20.
[7]
Id., 86-87; Id., 21-22.
[8]
OR, 162-163; Rollo, 47-48.
70
[9]
Id., 163-164; Id., 48-49.
[10]
See footnote 1.
[11]
Citing People v. Coronacion, 237 SCRA 227, 239 [1994]; OR,
167; Rollo, 52.
[12]
Id., 165; Id., 50.
[13]
Id., 167; Id., 52.
[14]
Id., 167-168; Id., 52-53.
[15]
OR. 167-168; Rollo, 52-53.
[16]
Rollo, 62-84.
[17]
Id., 71.
[18]
Citing People v. Javier, 229 SCRA 638 [1994]; People v. Galit,
230 SCRA 486 [1994].
[19]
Citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 [1924].
[20]
TSN, 4 July 1994, 21; TSN, 11 July 1994, 4; TSN, 25 July 1994, 4-
5. 15-17.
[21]
TSN, 11 July 1994, 7-8; TSN, 25 July 1994, 5.
[22]
TSN, 4 July 1994, 6, 28; Id., 6-11, 26-29; Id., 6-7, 21.
[23]
Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
[24]
People v. Martinado, 214 SCRA 712, 732 [1992]; People v.
Canillo, 236 SCRA 22, 41-42 [1994].
[25]
People v. De Leon, 225 SCRA 651, 662 [1993].
[26]
OR, 166; Rollo, 51.
[27]
See People v. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164, 177 [1992].
[28]
People v. Comia, 236 SCRA 185, 195 [1994].
[29]
People v. Enciso, 223 SCRA 675, 688 [1993].
[30]
Federico B. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary [1991-1992
supplement], 30.
[31]
See Corpuz v. People, 194 SCRA 73 [1991]; People v. Deunida
231 SCRA 520 [1994].
[32]
People v. Cabacang, 246 SCRA 530, 537 [1995].
71
[33]
Article 13(d) and (f), Labor Code, as amended.
[34]
People v. Comia, supra note 28, at 193; People v. Bautista, 241
SCRA 216, 222 [1995].
[35]
Section 38(b), Labor Code, as amended; People v. De
Leon, supra note 25, at 658.
[36]
People v. Manungas, 231 SCRA 1, 8 [1994].
[37]
People v. Bautista, supra note 34, at 222, citing People v.
Turda, 233 SCRA 702 [1994]. See also People v. Alforte, 219
SCRA 458 [1993].
[38]
People v. Ong, 204 SCRA 942, 955 [1991].
[39]
It provides: Whenever the penalty prescribed does not have one
of the forms specially provided for in this Code, the periods shall be
distributed, applying by analogy the prescribed rules.
THIRD DIVISION
72
[G.R. No. 107084. May 15, 1998]

vs. DELIA SADIOSA y CABENTA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Accused-appellant Delia Sadiosa was charged with illegal

recruitment in an information that reads:
That on or about and during the period comprise (sic) from January
1992 to March 1992, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused Delia Sadiosa y Cabenta, well knowing that she is not a duly
licensed job recruiter, by means of false representations and
fraudulent allegations to the effect that she could secure employment
as domestic helpers abroad for Benilda Sabado y Domingo, Marcela
Tabernero y Manzano, Erly Tuliao y Sabado and Cely Navarro y
Manzano, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
recruit aforesaid persons and collected from them the amount
of P8,000.00 each, which amount were given to the accused by the
aforesaid complainants upon receipt of which, far from complying with
her obligation aforestated, accused appropriated for herself the said
amount and failed to deploy complainants abroad.
Contrary to law.[1]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.[2] At the

trial that ensued, the prosecution proved the following operative facts
and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime:
Arsenia Conse went to Bayombong, Nueva Ecija in early 1992 where

she met the four complainants, Cely Navarro, Marcela Manzano, Erly
Tuliao and Benilda Domingo. She enticed the four to apply for
overseas employment informing them that she had a cousin who could
send them to Kuwait as domestic helpers. Apparently convinced by
Arsenia Conse, the four went with her on February 5, 1992 to Manila.
Upon arrival, they proceeded to Room 210, Diamond Building, Libertad
St., Pasay City where Arsenia Conse introduced the group to accused-
appellant Delia Sadiosa. The four then applied for work as domestic
helpers.[3]
On that occasion, accused-appellant assured the four that she could

dispatch them to Kuwait[4] and forthwith demanded P8,000.00 from
each of them for processing fee and P1,000.00 for passport (P1,500.00
from complainant Cely Navarro).[5] She assured the group that she
would facilitate the processing of all the necessary documents needed
73
by them. She further promised them that upon payment of the
required fees, they would be able to leave for Kuwait immediately.
The four did give accused-appellant the money demanded although on

different dates. The latter issued the corresponding
[6]
receipts therefor. Again, she assured them that they could leave for
Kuwait on different dates: Cely Navarro and Erly Tuliao on February
17, 1992 which was rescheduled twice on February 19, 1992 and on
February 25, 1992,[7] and Benilda Domingo and Marcela Manzano on
March 17, 1992 which was moved twice on February 24, 1992 and on
March 17, 1992.[8] However, not one of them was able to leave for
Kuwait. When they asked for the return of their money, accused-
appellant refused and ignored their demand. Consequently, the four
filed the complaint for illegal recruitment against accused-appellant.
In addition to the complainants testimonies, the prosecution presented

Virginia Santiago, a Senior Officer in the Licensing Branch and
Inspection Division of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA). She testified that accused-appellant was
neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment.[9]
Accused-appellant herself took the witness stand and testified in her

defense. She resolutely denied having a hand in the illegal
recruitment, claiming that she merely received the money on behalf of
one Mrs. Ganura[10] who owned the recruitment agency called Staff
Organizers, Inc. She accepted the money in her capacity as an officer
of the said recruitment agency. To bolster this claim, she presented
evidence that she remitted the money to Mrs. Ganura
worth P25,000.00[11] although she failed to remit the remaining
amount of P8,000.00 since she was already in detention. [12] Accused-
appellant further claimed that although she was not listed in the POEA
as an employee of the recruitment agency of Mrs. Ganura, she had a
special power of attorney issued by her employer to receive payments
from applicants.
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment

in large scale defined by Article 38 (b) and penalized under Article 39
(a) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1920
and 2018 and disposed of said case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the charge in the information and is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment and pay a fine of P100,000.00. The accused is hereby
ordered to indemnify Benilda Sabado y Domingo, the sum
of P8,000.00; Marcela Tabernero y Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00;
Erly Tuliao y Sabado, the sum of P8,000.00 and Cely Navarro y
Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00. To pay the costs.[13]
74
Accused-appellant now assails the trial courts Decision with the
following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT STATING CLEARLY AND

DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON WHICH ITS JUDGMENT
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS BASED;
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING MOTU PROPRIO

THE INFORMATION FOR NOT CONFORMING SUBSTANTIALLY TO
THE PRESCRIBED FORM, PARTICULARLY AS TO THE DESIGNATION
OF THE OFFENSE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION;
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING MOTU PROPRIO

THE INFORMATION IN VIEW OF ITS INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRADICTORY, CONFLICTING AND IRRECONCILABLE CHARGES
OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315,
PARAGRAPH 1(b) AND ESTAFA UNDER THE SAME ARTICLE BUT
UNDER PARAGRAPH 2(a) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND IN
CONDUCTING TRIAL THEREUNDER;
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT AND IN CONVICTING HER OF THE THE CHARGE IN THE
INFORMATION;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LIABILITY

OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, IF ANY, IS ONLY CIVIL, NOT
CRIMINAL IN NATURE;
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS THE SUM
OF P8,000.00 EACH.
Appellant clearly focuses on the validity and sufficiency of both the

information filed against her and the decision rendered in due course
by the trial court. She asserts that there was a violation of the
constitutional mandate that a judgment of conviction must state
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. With
regard to the information filed against her, appellant contends that it
did not substantially conform to the prescribed form, particularly as to
the designation of the offense and cause of accusation. It should be
75
observed in the aforequoted information that its caption indicates that
she is being charged with illegal recruitment only while the allegations
therein substantiate the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa
committed by fraud or deceit.
It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that the information is
sufficient where it clearly states the designation of the offense by the
statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense.[14] However, there is no need to specify or refer to the
particular section or subsection of the statute that was violated by the
accused. No law requires that in order that an accused may be
convicted, the specific provision penalizing the act charged should be
mentioned in the information.[15] What identifies the charge is the
actual recital of the facts and not that designated by the fiscal in the
preamble thereof. It is not even necessary for the protection of the
substantial rights of the accused, nor the effective preparation of his
defense, that the accused be informed of the technical name of the
crime of which he stands charged. He must look to the facts alleged.[16]
In the instant case, the information filed against accused-appellant
sufficiently shows that it is for the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and penalized in Art.
39 of the same Code although it is designated as for illegal recruitment
only. Under the Code, the essential elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale are as follows:
(1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of workers,

as defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under
Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the
securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers,
whether locally or overseas; and
(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group.[17]
All these elements are to be found in the information. It alleges

that accused-appellant, knowing fully well that she was not a duly
licensed job recruiter, falsely represented that she could secure
employment as domestic helpers abroad for the four complainants.
As such, the purpose of the requirement under Sec. 8, Rule
110[18] to inform and apprise the accused of the true crime of which
she was charged,[19] has been complied with. The main purpose of the
requirement that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
an offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language is to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged so that he could suitably prepare for his
defense. It is also required so that the trial court could pronounce the
proper judgment.[20] This gives substance to the constitutional
76
guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [21]
In the instant case, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that
accused-appellant was fully accorded the right to be informed of the
charges against her. The fact that she put up the defense of having
accepted the money only in her capacity as an officer of the
recruitment agency shows that she fully understood the nature and
cause of the accusation against her.
Furthermore, it is incorrect for accused-appellant to maintain that
the information filed against her contained conflicting and
irreconcilable charges of illegal recruitment, estafa under Article 315
par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code and estafa under the same article
but under par. 2 (a) thereof. While on its face the allegations in the
information may constitute estafa, this Court agrees with the Solicitor
General that it merely describes how accused-appellant was able to
consummate the act of illegal recruitment - through false and
fraudulent representation by pretending that she was a duly-licensed
recruiter who could secure employment for complainants in Kuwait.
These allegations in the information therefore do not render the
information defective or multiplicitous.
It is apropos to underscore the firmly established jurisprudence
that a person who has committed illegal recruitment may be charged
and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
and estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. [22] The crime
of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of
the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in
se where the criminal intent of the accused is necessary for conviction.
[23]
In other words, a person convicted under the Labor Code may be

convicted of offenses punishable by other laws.[24] However, any
person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.[25] When the persons recruited are three or
more, the crime becomes illegal recruitment in large scale under Art.
38 (b) of the Labor Code. In both bases, it is the lack of a necessary
license or permit that renders such recruitment activities unlawful and
criminal.[26]
In the case at bar, accused-appellant could have been validly
charged separately with estafa under the same set of facts in the
illegal recruitment case, but she was fortunate enough not to have
been so charged. Nevertheless, there is no doubt from a reading of the
information, that it accurately and clearly avers all of the ingredients
that constitute illegal recruitment in large scale. The prosecutor simply
captioned the information with the generic name of the offense under
the Labor Code illegal recruitment. No misconceptions would have
been engendered had he been more accurate in the drafting of the
information considering that there are at least four kinds of illegal
77
recruitment under the law.[27] One is simple illegal recruitment
committed by a licensee or holder of authority. The law penalizes such
offender with imprisonment of not less than two years nor more than
five years or a fine of not less than P10,000 nor more than P50,000, or
both such imprisonment and fine. Any person who is neither a licensee
nor a holder of authority commits the second type of illegal
recruitment. The penalty imposed for such offense is imprisonment of
not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less
than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and
fine at the discretion of the court. The third type of illegal recruitment
refers to offenders who either commit the offense alone or with
another person against three or more persons individually or as a
group. A syndicate or a group of three or more persons conspiring and
confederating with one another in carrying out the act circumscribed
by the law commits the fourth type of illegal recruitment by the
law. For the third and fourth types of illegal recruitment the law
prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.
Hence, to avoid misconception and misinterpretation of the
information, the prosecutor involved in this case should have
indicated in its caption, the offense he had clearly alleged in its
body, that the crime charged was for illegal recruitment in large
scale. However, such omission or lack of skill of the prosecutor who
crafted the information should not deprive the people of the right to
prosecute a crime with so grave a consequence against the economic
life of the aggrieved parties. What is important is that he did allege in
the information the facts sufficient to constitute the offense of illegal
recruitment in large scale.
As regards accused-appellants contention that the questioned
decision is void because it failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it was based, this Court is not inclined to grant
credence thereto.
The constitutional requirement that every decision must state
distinctly and clearly the factual and legal bases therefor should indeed
be the primordial concern of courts and judges. Be that as it may,
there should not be a mechanical reliance on this constitutional
provision. The courts and judges should be allowed to synthesize and
to simplify their decisions considering that at present, courts are
harassed by crowded dockets and time constraints. Thus, the Court
held in Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals:
It is understandable that courts with heavy dockets and time

constraints, often find themselves with little to spare in the preparation
of decisions to the extent most desirable. We have thus pointed out
that judges might learn to synthesize and to simplify their
pronouncements. Nevertheless, concisely written such as they may be,
decisions must still distinctly and clearly express at least in minimum
essence its factual and legal bases. [28]
78
In Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[29] the Court
states the reason for the constitutional requirement thus:
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be

informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot
simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and
just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action.
The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a
higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision that
does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. [30]
Under Art. X, Sec. 9 of the 1973 Constitution that contained a

provision similar to Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the present Constitution, the
Court expresses in Bernabe v. Geraldez the following rationale as to
the wide discretion enjoyed by a court in framing its decision:
x x x In the x x x case of Mendoza v. Court of First Instance of Quezon

City, (L-5612, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 369) citing Jose v. Santos, (L-
25510, October 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 538) it was pointed out that the
standard expected of the judiciary is that the decision rendered makes
clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts
as established. Nor is there any rigid formula as to the language to be
employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The
discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is
necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form or words which he
must use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by
what the Constitution directs. (51 SCRA 369 at 375) [31]
After careful reflection, this Court finds that the questioned decision
of the court a quo explained the factual findings and legal
justifications, at least in minimum essence, which led to the conviction
of accused-appellant. Thus, the subject decision of Judge Baltazar
Relativo Dizon, after quoting the information for Illegal Recruitment
and stating accuseds plea of not guilty, goes on to summarize the
evidence for the prosecution and the defense as testified to by their
respective witnesses. Before drawing a conclusion, it gives an
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE ON RECORD as follows:
The testimony of the four complaining witnesses are found to be

credible and reliable observing that they answered the questions
propounded by the prosecutor and the defense counsel in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and they
remained consistent, calm and cool on cross-examination. That even
with the rigid cross-examination conducted by the defense counsel the
more their testimonies became firmer and clearer that they were
victims of false pretenses or fraudulent acts of the accused. The herein
79
accused falsely pretended to have possessed power, influence and
qualifications to secure employment as domestic helpers abroad. And
because of her fraudulent acts accused was able to collect from the
four victims the sum of P8,000.00 each [Exh. A, C, E, F (4)].
Verily, the accused admitted that she managed a consultancy firm

under the business name of DCS Service Management and the nature
of her work is to recruit domestic helpers for employment abroad. She
further admitted having received the amount of P8,000.00 from each
of the complainants as processing fee, although she is shifting
responsibility to a certain Mrs. Ganura to whom she delivered the sum
of P25,000.00 (Exh. 1, 1-A). She miserably failed to present this Mrs.
Ganura to testify in this regard despite all efforts exerted by this court,
hence, such assertion of the accused is disregarded, not being reliable.
The fact remains that it was she who transacted with the
complainants, and that accused is neither licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment (Exhibit G). [32]
While it may be true that the questioned decision failed to state the
specific provisions of law violated by accused-appellant, it however
clearly stated that the crime charged was Illegal Recruitment. It
discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense of illegal
recruitment in large scale that was charged in the information, and
accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding
penalty. The dispositive portion of the decision quoted earlier, clearly
states that appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
charge in the information. As earlier stated, the charge in the
information referred to by the decision could mean only that of illegal
recruitment in large scale and not to any other offense.
The situation would have been altogether different and in violation
of the constitutional mandate if the penalty imposed was for illegal
recruitment based on established facts constituting simple illegal
recruitment only. As it is, the trial courts omission to specify the
offense committed, or the specific provision of law violated, is not in
derogation of the constitutional requirement that every decision must
clearly and distinctly state the factual and legal bases for the
conclusions reached by the trial court. The trial courts factual findings
based on credible prosecution evidence supporting the allegations in
the information and its imposition of the corresponding penalty
imposed by the law on such given facts are therefore sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
This Court agrees with the trial court that the prosecution evidence
has shown beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant engaged
in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. Accused-appellant
promised the four complainants employment as domestic helpers in
Kuwait. Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and
placement as referring to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
80
locally or abroad whether for profit or not; provided that any person or
entity which in any manner offers or promises for a fee employment to
two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.[33] All the essential elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, which we have enumerated above, are
present in this case.
The prosecution clearly established the fact that accused-appellant
had no license to recruit from the POEA. Yet, the latter entertained the
four complainants when they applied, promised them jobs as domestic
helpers in Kuwait, and collected fees from them for processing travel
documents only to renege on her promise and fail to return the money
she collected from complainants despite several demands.
As with the trial court, this Court entertains serious doubts
regarding accused-appellants claim that she was only acting in behalf
of a certain Mrs. Ganura. Accused-appellant failed to present evidence
to corroborate her testimony.Neither did she present Mrs. Ganura
despite several opportunities given her by the trial court. The
undisputed fact is that appellant was positively identified as the person
who transacted with the four complainants, promised them jobs and
received money from them. On this score, the court a quo found the
prosecution evidence credible and reliable and observed that the
complaining witnesses testified and answered questions in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner. [34] As this
Court has consistently held in a long line of cases, the trial court was
concededly in the best position to test the credibility of
appellant. Since the trial court did not give credence to accused-
appellants version, this Court is not persuaded by her arguments.
For engaging in recruitment of the four complainants without first
obtaining the necessary license from the POEA, accused-appellant,
therefore, is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, an offense
involving economic sabotage. She should, accordingly, be punished
with life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000 under Article 39 (a) of
the Labor Code, as amended.
In light of the above disquisition, there is no more need to resolve
the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 113 finding appellant Delia Sadiosa y
Cabenta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale and imposing on her life imprisonment, the
payment of the fine of P100,000.00 and the reimbursement of the
amounts defrauded from complainants is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
81
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129577-80. February 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BULU

CHOWDURY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In November 1995, Bulu Chowdury and Josephine Ong were charged

before the Regional Trial Court of Manila with the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale committed as follows:
"That sometime between the period from August 1994 to

October 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, representing themselves to have the capacity to
contract, enlist and transport workers for employment
abroad, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously recruit the herein complainants: Estrella B.
Calleja, Melvin C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis, individually or
as a group for employment in Korea without first obtaining
the required license and/or authority from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration."[1]
They were likewise charged with three counts of estafa committed

against private complainants.[2] The State Prosecutor, however, later
dismissed the estafa charges against Chowdury [3]and filed an amended
information indicting only Ong for the offense.[4]
Chowdury was arraigned on April 16, 1996 while Ong remained at

large. He pleaded "not guilty" to the charge of illegal recruitment in
large scale.[5]
Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses: private complainants Aser

Sasis, Estrella Calleja and Melvin Miranda, and Labor Employment
Officer Abbelyn Caguitla.
Sasis testified that he first met Chowdury in August 1994 when he

applied with Craftrade Overseas Developers (Craftrade) for
employment as factory worker in South Korea. Chowdury, a consultant
of Craftrade, conducted the interview. During the interview, Chowdury
informed him about the requirements for employment. He told him to
submit his passport, NBI clearance, passport size picture and medical
certificate. He also required him to undergo a seminar. He advised him
that placement would be on a first-come-first-serve basis and urged
82
him to complete the requirements immediately. Sasis was also
charged a processing fee of P25,000.00. Sasis completed all the
requirements in September 1994. He also paid a total amount
of P16,000.00 to Craftrade as processing fee. All payments were
received by Ong for which she issued three receipts. [6] Chowdury then
processed his papers and convinced him to complete his payment. [7]
Sasis further said that he went to the office of Craftrade three times to
follow up his application but he was always told to return some other
day. In one of his visits to Craftrades office, he was informed that he
would no longer be deployed for employment abroad. This prompted
him to withdraw his payment but he could no longer find Chowdury.
After two unsuccessful attempts to contact him, he decided to file with
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a case for
illegal recruitment against Chowdury. Upon verification with the POEA,
he learned that Craftrade's license had already expired and has not
been renewed and that Chowdury, in his personal capacity, was not a
licensed recruiter.[8]
Calleja testified that in June 1994, she applied with Craftrade for

employment as factory worker in South Korea. She was interviewed by
Chowdury. During the interview, he asked questions regarding her
marital status, her age and her province. Toward the end of the
interview, Chowdury told her that she would be working in a factory in
Korea. He required her to submit her passport, NBI clearance, ID
pictures, medical certificate and birth certificate. He also obliged her to
attend a seminar on overseas employment. After she submitted all the
documentary requirements, Chowdury required her to pay P20,000.00
as placement fee. Calleja made the payment on August 11, 1994 to
Ong for which she was issued a receipt. [9] Chowdury assured her that
she would be able to leave on the first week of September but it
proved to be an empty promise. Calleja was not able to leave despite
several follow-ups. Thus, she went to the POEA where she discovered
that Craftrade's license had already expired. She tried to withdraw her
money from Craftrade to no avail. Calleja filed a complaint for illegal
recruitment against Chowdury upon advice of POEA's legal counsel. [10]
Miranda testified that in September 1994, his cousin accompanied

him to the office of Craftrade in Ermita, Manila and introduced him to
Chowdury who presented himself as consultant and interviewer.
Chowdury required him to fill out a bio-data sheet before conducting
the interview. Chowdury told Miranda during the interview that he
would send him to Korea for employment as factory worker. Then he
asked him to submit the following documents: passport, passport size
picture, NBI clearance and medical certificate. After he complied with
the requirements, he was advised to wait for his visa and to
pay P25,000.00 as processing fee. He paid the amount of P25,000.00
to Ong who issued receipts therefor. [11] Craftrade, however, failed to
deploy him. Hence, Miranda filed a complaint with the POEA against
Chowdury for illegal recruitment.[12]
83
Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla of the Licensing Branch
of the POEA testified that she prepared a certification on June 9, 1996
that Chowdury and his co-accused, Ong, were not, in their personal
capacities, licensed recruiters nor were they connected with any
licensed agency. She nonetheless stated that Craftrade was previously
licensed to recruit workers for abroad which expired on December 15,
1993. It applied for renewal of its license but was only granted a
temporary license effective December 16, 1993 until September 11,
1994. From September 11, 1994, the POEA granted Craftrade another
temporary authority to process the expiring visas of overseas workers
who have already been deployed. The POEA suspended Craftrade's
temporary license on December 6, 1994.[13]
For his defense, Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer

at Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His primary duty was to interview
job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed the
instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the
agencys President and General Manager, and Mr. Utkal Chowdury, the
agency's Managing Director. Chowdury admitted that he interviewed
private complainants on different dates. Their office secretary handed
him their bio-data and thereafter he led them to his room where he
conducted the interviews. During the interviews, he had with him a
form containing the qualifications for the job and he filled out this form
based on the applicant's responses to his questions. He then submitted
them to Mr. Utkal Chowdury who in turn evaluated his findings. He
never received money from the applicants. He resigned from Craftrade
on November 12, 1994.[14]
Another defense witness, Emelita Masangkay who worked at the

Accreditation Branch of the POEA presented a list of the accredited
principals of Craftrade Overseas Developers [15] and a list of processed
workers of Craftrade Overseas Developers from 1988 to 1994. [16]
The trial court found Chowdury guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. It sentenced him to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00. It further ordered him
to pay Aser Sasis the amount of P16,000.00, Estrella
Calleja, P20,000.00 and Melvin Miranda, P25,000.00. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the

prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused Bulu
Chowdury beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment in large scale, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00
under Art. 39 (b) of the New Labor Code of the Philippines.
The accused is ordered to pay the complainants Aser Sasis
the amount of P16,000.00; Estrella Calleja the amount
of P20,000.00; Melvin Miranda the amount
[17]
of P25,000.00."
84
Chowdury appealed.
The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:
(1) The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined

under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice enumerated
under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) He did not have the license or authority to lawfully

engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and
(3) He committed the same against three or more persons,

individually or as a group.[18]
The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA)

8042[19] states who shall be held liable for the offense, thus:
"The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the
principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of
juridical persons, the officers having control,
management or direction of their business shall be
liable."
The Revised Penal Code which supplements the law on illegal

recruitment[20] defines who are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. The principals are: (1) those who take a direct part in the
execution of the act; (2) those who directly force or induce others to
commit it; and (3) those who cooperate in the commission of the
offense by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.[21] The accomplices are those persons who may not be
considered as principal as defined in Section 17 of the Revised Penal
Code but cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous act.[22] The accessories are those who, having knowledge
of the commission of the crime, and without having participated
therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manner: (1) by profiting
themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the
crime; (2) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the
effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and
(3) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal
of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt at the life of the chief executive, or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. [23]
Citing the second sentence of the last paragraph of Section 6 of RA

8042, accused-appellant contends that he may not be held liable for
the offense as he was merely an employee of Craftrade and he only
performed the tasks assigned to him by his superiors. He argues that
the ones who should be held liable for the offense are the officers
having control, management and direction of the agency.
85
As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons
who may be held liable for illegal recruitment are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. An employee of a company or
corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as
principal, together with his employer, [24] if it is shown that he actively
and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.[25] It has been
held that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from
prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally
causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously
acts, and can act, only by and through its human agents, and it is their
conduct which the law must deter. The employee or agent of a
corporation engaged in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in
the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as principal if,
with knowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he consciously
contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight his
contribution may be.[26] The law of agency, as applied in civil cases,
has no application in criminal cases, and no man can escape
punishment when he participates in the commission of a crime upon
the ground that he simply acted as an agent of any party. [27] The
culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the
offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is
shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of his
superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he may
not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his
employer.[28]
The fundamental issue in this case, therefore, is whether accused-

appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the commission of
the crime charged.
We find that he did not.
Evidence shows that accused-appellant interviewed private

complainants in the months of June, August and September in 1994 at
Craftrade's office. At that time, he was employed as interviewer of
Craftrade which was then operating under a temporary authority given
by the POEA pending renewal of its license.[29] The temporary license
included the authority to recruit workers. [30] He was convicted based on
the fact that he was not registered with the POEA as employee of
Craftrade. Neither was he, in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit
overseas workers. Section 10 Rule II Book II of the Rules and
Regulation Governing Overseas Employment (1991) requires that
every change, termination or appointment of officers, representatives
and personnel of licensed agencies be registered with the POEA.
Agents or representatives appointed by a licensed recruitment agency
whose appointments are not previously approved by the POEA are
considered "non-licensee " or "non-holder of authority" and therefore
not authorized to engage in recruitment activity.[31]
86
Upon examination of the records, however, we find that the
prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant was aware of
Craftrade's failure to register his name with the POEA and that he
actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge. The obligation
to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the
agency.[32] A mere employee of the agency cannot be expected to
know the legal requirements for its operation. The evidence at hand
shows that accused-appellant carried out his duties as interviewer of
Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and
he, in turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the
applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions
to his job description. He merely interviewed the applicants and
informed them of the requirements for deployment but he never
received money from them. Their payments were received by the
agency's cashier, Josephine Ong. Furthermore, he performed his tasks
under the supervision of its president and managing director. Hence,
we hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
accused-appellant's conscious and active participation in the
commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. His conviction,
therefore, is without basis.
This is not to say that private complainants are left with no remedy for
the wrong committed against them. The Department of Justice may
still file a complaint against the officers having control, management
or direction of the business of Craftrade Overseas Developers
(Craftrade), so long as the offense has not yet prescribed. Illegal
recruitment is a crime of economic sabotage which need to be curbed
by the strong arm of the law. It is important, however, to stress that
the government's action must be directed to the real offenders, those
who perpetrate the crime and benefit from it.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to
RELEASE accused-appellant unless he is being held for some other
cause, and to REPORT to this Court compliance with this order within
ten (10) days from receipt of this decision. Let a copy of this Decision
be furnished the Secretary of the Department of Justice for his
information and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago,

JJ., concur.
[1]
Information, Original Records, p. 2.
[2]
Original Records, pp. 16-23.
[3]
Resolution dated March 20, 1996, Original Records, pp. 63-69.
87
[4]
Amended Information for Criminal Case No. 146336, Original
Records, pp. 61-62; Amended Information for Criminal Case No.
146337, Original Records, pp. 89-90.
[5]
Original Records, p. 95.
[6]
Exh. "A", "B" and "C".
[7]
TSN, May 14, 1996, pp. 5-17.
[8]
Id., pp. 19-22.
[9]
Exh. "E".
[10]
TSN, May 15, 1996, pp. 6-21.
[11]
Exh. "L", "M", "N".
[12]
TSN, October 23, 1996, pp. 6-19.
[13]
TSN, July 2, 1996, pp. 8-32.
[14]
TSN, December 17, 1996, pp. 4-30.
[15]
Exh. "7".
[16]
Exh. "8".
[17]
Rollo, p. 24.
[18]
People vs. Peralta, 283 SCRA 81 (1997); People vs. Villas, 277
SCRA 391 (1997); People vs. Santos, 276 SCRA 329 (1997);
People vs. Garcia, 271 SCRA 621 (1997).
[19]
Migrants and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
[20]
Article 10, Revised Penal Code.
[21]
Article 17, supra.
[22]
Article 18, supra.
[23]
Article 19, supra.
[24]
The corporation also incurs criminal liability for the act of its
employee or agent if (1) the employee or agent committed the offense
while acting within the scope of his employment and (2) the offense
was committed with at least some intent to benefit the employer. The
liability is imputed to the corporation not because it actively
participated in the malice or fraud but because the act is done for the
benefit of the corporation while the employee or agent was acting
within the scope of his employment in the business of the corporation,
and justice requires that the latter shall be held responsible for
damages to the individual who suffered by such conduct. [New York
Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. vs. US, 212 U.S. 481, 53 L. ed.
613 (1909); US vs. Basic Construction Co., et al., 711 F.2d 570
(1983); US vs. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399
(1985)].
[25]
See People vs. Goce, 247 SCRA 780 (1995); People vs. Alforte, 219
SCRA 458 1993).
[26]
State vs. Placzek, 380 A.2d 1010 (1977); Wainer vs. US, 82 F.2d
305 (1936).
[27]
People vs. Mc Cauley, 561 P.2d 335 (1977).
[28]
US vs. Gold, 743 F.2d 800 (1984); La Vielle vs. People, 157 P.2d
621 (1945).
[29]
Exh. "K", Certification dated July 1, 1996 signed by Ma. Salome S.
Mendoza, Manager, Licensing Branch, POEA, Original Records, p. 147.
[30]
Testimony of Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla, TSN, July
2, 1996, pp. 27-28.
[31]
Abaca vs. CA, 290 SCRA 657 (1998).
88
[32]
Supra at 30.
89

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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 123146 June 17, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

The undersigned accuses ALONA BULI-E, JOSEFINA (JOSIE) ALOLINO

7. Joseph Oratil and

in Taiwan without first obtaining or securing license or authority from

Jose Alolino was never apprehended and remains at large. Upon

Buli-e confirmed to complainants that she was, in fact, recruiting

In the case of complainant Lampoyas who originally applied with Buli-e

From March to August 1992, Buli-e accompanied complainants, on

Immediately after complainants had undergone medical examination,

Complainants were assured by one or both of the spouses that they

On different dates from May 1992 to July 1992, complainants handed

After months of waiting and despite compliance with all the

Weary of the interminable waiting, complainants went to the POEA

After appellants were apprehended and during their detention at the

Thereafter, Buli-e started recruiting job applicants for Taiwan,

Buli-e presented Mrs. Nonette Legaspi-Villanueva, Unit Coordinator of

Josefina testified that herein complainants were originally referred by

On March 2, 1993, Josefina allegedly gave Buli-e ₱75,000 with the

On July 4, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 11122-R, the Court finds the accused

2. In Criminal case No. 11123-R to 11130-R (8 counts), the court

II. IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN HEREIN

III. HOLDING CO-ACCUSED ALONA BULI-E LIABLE FOR ESTAFA WHEN

Appellant Josefina, on the other hand, presents the following

I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING JOSEFINA ALOLINO GUILTY

II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED JOSEFINA

We shall discuss the interrelated issues together.

Under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement

The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale

The factual backdrop shows that appellants engaged in recruitment

Buli-e’s claim deserves scant consideration. It is true that Buli-e did

Josefina, however, maintains that as Overseas Marketing Director for

Apart from her bare testimony, there is nothing on record to

Furthermore, Josefina’s alleged authority to recruit applicants for

Art. 29. Non-transferability of license or authority – No license or

We are not persuaded by Josefina’s claim that no recruitment activity

Appellants deceived complainants into believing that they had the

The actual damages in the sum of ₱15,000 awarded to each of

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ.,

[G.R. No. 150530. February 20, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEX

x x x x The accused made representations to each of the complainants

Accused-appellant now prays that the Court to take a second hard

G.R. No. 95207-17 January 10, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Mirafe Taguba.

Public Attorney's Office for Enrique Taguba.

The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses ENRIQUE C.

That (date of commission) in Caloocan City, Metro manila,

xxx xxx xxx

The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses ENRIQUE C.

That (date of commission) in Caloocan City, Metro Manila,

Trial of the cases was held jointly.

These witnesses testified that Enrique an Mirafe approached them on