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A REVIEW OF SECTION 41A OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE, 1973

Written by Aaditya Gore

M.A. (Police Administration), LL.M (Human Rights), UGC NET (Criminology), Advocate

ABSTRACT

The power to arrest possessed by the Police under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974) (‘CrPC’) is of a thorough nature and has been sought to be modulated through various
judicial and legislative devices.

Section 41A was first introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008
(5 of 2009), which provided that in all cases where arrest is not required u/s 41(1) of the CrPC,
the investigating officer ‘may’ issue a notice of appearance, which by the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2010 (41 of 2010) was made mandatory as ‘shall’.

Nevertheless, sub-section 3 of Section 41-A of the CrPC provides that where an accused person
complies with such notice u/s 41A (1) and attends before the Police officer issuing such notice,
such Police officer can still arrest if he/she believes that such arrest is necessary. This power to
arrest is subject only to the condition of recording such satisfaction, but without any judicial
control over its exercise.

The Supreme Court has laid down that a preliminary inquiry must be conducted in cases where
a cognizable offence is not disclosed by the information received. The scope of such
preliminary inquiry is limited to gauging whether such information reveals a cognizable
offence which may justify the registration of a First Information Report. The procedure u/s 41A
of CrPC therefore is not contemplated at the stage of preliminary inquiry to receive self-
inculpatory material from a proposed accused.

Self-incrimination at the pre-FIR stage is unknown to criminal law and is illegal.

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The purpose of this paper is to explore the real position of law with respect to procedural justice
at the stage of investigation and to suggest legislative changes to streamline the same.

Keywords: Section 41A, Code of Criminal Procedure, Notice of Appearance, Arrest, arbitrary
exercise of power, investigation, processual justice

POWER TO ARREST

The power to arrest a person suspected of committing an offence is a significant instance of the
coercive power of the Statei. It is an important power possessed by an investigating agency and
is necessary in order to unravel the truthii. Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(‘CrPC’) lays down the standards for the investigator to satisfy himself/herself on whether to
arrest a suspect/accused:

“41. When police may arrest without warrant. —

(1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest
any person—

[(a) who commits, in the presence of a police officer, a cognizable offence;

(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been
received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may
extend to seven years whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied,
namely:—

(i) the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or
suspicion that such person has committed the said offence;

(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary—

(a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or

(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or

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(c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering
with such evidence in any manner; or

(d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person
acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the
Court or to the police officer; or

(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be
ensured, and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reasons in writing:

[Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required
under the provisions of this sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the
arrest.]

(ba) against whom credible information has been received that he has committed a cognizable
offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to more than seven years
whether with or without fine or with death sentence and the police officer has reason to believe
on the basis of that information that such person has committed the said offence;]

(c) who has been proclaimed as an offender either under this Code or by order of the State
Government; or

(d) in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen
property and who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference
to such thing; or

(e) who obstructs a police officer while in the execution of his duty, or who has escaped, or
attempts to escape, from lawful custody; or

(f) who is reasonably suspected of being a deserter from any of the Armed Forces of the Union;
or

(g) who has been concerned in, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or
credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been
concerned in, any act committed at any place out of India which, if committed in India, would
have been punishable as an offence, and for which he is, under any law relating to extradition,
or otherwise, liable to be apprehended or detained in custody in India; or

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(h) who, being a released convict, commits a breach of any rule made under sub-section (5) of
section 356; or

(i) for whose arrest any requisition, whether written or oral, has been received from another
police officer, provided that the requisition specifies the person to be arrested and the offence
or other cause for which the arrest is to be made and it appears therefrom that the person might
lawfully be arrested without a warrant by the officer who issued the requisition.

[(2) Subject to the provisions of section 42, no person concerned in a non-cognizable offence
or against whom a complaint has been made or credible information has been received or
reasonable suspicion exists of his having so concerned, shall be arrested except under a
warrant or order of a Magistrate.]”iii

The powers of arrest possessed by a Police officer are thus truly wide and encompass all such
situations in which it may be difficult to obtain a warrant of arrest from a Magistrate.

HISTORY OF THE ‘NOTICE OF APPEARANCE’

The 177th Report of the Law Commission of Indiaiv quotesv from the Royal Commission Report
on Criminal Procedurevi:

“The Royal Commission in the above-said Report at page 46 also suggested: “To help to reduce
the use of arrest we would also propose the introduction here of a scheme that is used in Ontario
enabling a police officer to issue what is called an ‘appearance notice’. That procedure can be
used to obtain attendance at the police station without resorting to arrest provided a power to
arrest exists, for example to be finger-printed or to participate in an identification parade. It
could also be extended to attendance for interview at a time convenient both to the suspect and
to the police officer investigating the case….”vii

The ‘appearance notice’ under Canadian criminal procedure is “A notice issued by a police
officer requiring the accused’s appearance before a judge or justice of the peace to answer a
charge. This is typically given instead of arresting the accused.”viii

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A ‘promise to appear’ under Canadian criminal procedure is “A written promise in

accordance with Form 10 of the Criminal Code to attend court at a particular place and time.
It is a potential basis upon which bail can be granted.”ix

The Supreme Court has held in Joginder Kumar’s case that:

“A person is not liable to arrest merely on the suspicion of complicity

in an offence. There must be some reasonable justification in the
opinion of the officer effecting the arrest that such arrest is necessary
and justified. Except in heinous offences, an arrest must be avoided if
a police officer issues notice to person to attend the Station House
and not to leave the Station without permission would do.”x

Even the refusal to grant anticipatory bail does not necessarily obligate an investigating officer
to arrest an accused personxi

Section 41A was introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of
2009). However, soon after the enactment of this Amendment, representations were received
by the Union Governmentxii and hence, certain amendments were brought in by the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2010 (41 of 2010). The earlier sub-section (1) of section
41A read:

“The police officer may, in all cases where the arrest of a person is
not required under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 41,
issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable
complaint has been made, or credible information has been received,
or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable
offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be
specified in the notice.”xiii (emphasis supplied here)

The 2010 amendment made it obligatory for a police officer to issue such notice by substituting
‘shall’ in place of ‘may’ vide section 3(a) of the 2010 amendment Actxiv. The amendment also
enacted a proviso to section 41(1)(b)(ii) providing for recording of reasons for not arresting an
accusedxv.

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It was not until the Supreme Court directed in the case of Arnesh Kumarxvi that the provision
for issuing a notice of appearance under section 41A was seriously implemented. The Supreme
Court laid down that:

“Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not

arrest accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorise
detention casually and mechanically. In order to ensure what we have
observed above, we give the following direction:

(1) All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to
automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-A of the IPC is
registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under
the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41, Cr.PC;

(2) All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified
sub-clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);

(3) The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish
the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while
forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further
detention;

(4) The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall

peruse the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and
only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise
detention;

(5) The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the

Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case
with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the
Superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded
in writing;

(6) Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A of Cr.PC be served

on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case,

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which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District

for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

(7) Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from
rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action,
they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be
instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.

(8) Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the

judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action
by the appropriate High Court.

We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to
the cases under Section 498-A of the I.P.C. or Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven
years or which may extend to seven years; whether with or without
fine.”xvii

The directions laid down in Arnesh Kumar’s case are a salutary set of instructions in order to
avoid unnecessary arrest. However, the safeguards in this case deal with the incident of arrest
and the power of arrest itself is not curtailed thereby.

In the case of Hema Mishra v. State of UP and Ors.xviii the Supreme Court has held that

“21. Above mentioned provisions make it compulsory for the police to

issue a notice in all such cases where arrest is not required to be made
under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of the amended Section 41. But, all
the same, unwillingness of a person who has not been arrested to
identify himself and to whom a notice has been issued under Section
41A, could be a ground for his arrest. Legislation has laid down various
parameters, warranting arrest of a person, which itself is a check on
arbitrary or unwarranted arrest and the right to personal liberty
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”xix

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Citing this qualification in the case of Hema Mishra, the Bombay High Court has held in the
case of Jagdishprasad Joshi v. State of Maharashtraxx that

“The interpretation done by the Apex Court and the provision itself
show that whenever notice is issued to any person by the investigating
officer, such person is bound to comply with the terms of the notice
considering the wording of section and considering provision of
Section 41-A(1) which provides that satisfaction of the investigating
officer is sufficient for issuing such notice and that can be done even on
reasonable suspicion. It can be said that Courts are not expected to
lightly interfere in this power of the police. It always needs to be kept
in mind by the Courts that it is the statutory power given to the police
to make investigation and the persons interested are always trying to
use some provisions to protract the things.”xxi (emphasis supplied here)

In the case of Amandeep Singh Johar v. State of NCT of Delhi and Anr.xxii the Delhi High Court
has laid down a model format for issuance of notice under section 41A of the CrPC which
contains a warning at the end of the model notice format which states “Failure to attend/comply
with the terms of this Notice, can render you liable for arrest under Section 41A(3) and (4) of
CrPC.”xxiii

However, sub-section 3 of section 41A contains a wider premise for arresting in spite of the
fact that an accused appears before the investigating officer in response to the notice of
appearance:

“41-A(3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the
notice, he shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in
the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the
opinion that he ought to be arrested.”xxiv

The review of the legality, propriety and justifiability of the arrest is a post-arrest judicial
control. There is no pre-arrest regulation of this power under sub-section 3 of section 41A of
the CrPC.

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‘Reasonable complaint’, ‘Credible information’, ‘Reasonable suspicion’, ‘Preliminary

investigation’ and the check on custodial self-incrimination

Reasonable complaint, credible information and reasonable suspicion are among the grounds
provided for arresting a suspect under section 41(1)(b) and for issuing notice of appearance
under section 41A(1). The power to arrest on the basis of these terms has been dealt with by
the High Court of Tripura as follows:

“Under Section 54(1) first, a police officer can arrest a person who has
been concerned in any cognizable offence or against whom credible
information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists of his
having been so concerned. It is clear from this that a cognizable
offence must have been committed and the person sought to be
arrested must have been concerned with the said offence or at least
reasonable suspicion existed of his having been so concerned. It is
not enough to arrest under Section 54 that there was likelihood of a
cognizable offence being committed in the future.”xxv

For obvious reasons, the terms cannot be narrowed down to specific instances or defined
exhaustively, otherwise, the power to arrest might be rendered meaningless by unforeseen
circumstances. However, the usage of the terms definitely circumscribes the power of arresting
a suspect to such cases and circumstances where facts reasonably justify its exercise.

One more judicial remedy to curb the abuse of power to arrest evolved by the Supreme Court
is that of ‘preliminary inquiry’xxvi where before the registration of a First Information Report
under section 154 of the CrPC, a preliminary inquiry into the veracity of the complaint must
be conducted in order to ensure that the information received is credible. The Supreme Court
has directed that:

“111) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:

(i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if
the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no
preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.
(ii) If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence
but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be

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conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or

not.
(iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the
FIR must be registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in
closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must be
supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one week. It
must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not
proceeding further.
(iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if
cognizable offence is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring
officers who do not register the FIR if information received by him
discloses a cognizable offence.
(v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or
otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the
information reveals any cognizable offence.
(vi) As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be
conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The
category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as
under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal
prosecution, for example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter
without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions
which may warrant preliminary inquiry.
(vii) While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the
complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time bound and, in
any case, it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the
causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry.

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(viii) Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record

of all information received in a police station, we direct that all
information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in
registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and
meticulously reflected in the said Diary and the decision to conduct a
preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above.”xxvii
(emphasis supplied here)

The purpose of the preliminary inquiry thus, is only to ascertain whether the information
received discloses any cognizable offences or not. The Police at the stage of the preliminary
inquiry are not entitled to summon the proposed accused and to fish out information that may
lead to inculpate such accused person in a cognizable offence to be registered later. It is
submitted that the practice of summoning prospective accused persons by resorting to section
41A(1) of the CrPC at the stage of preliminary inquiry prescribed in Lalita Kumari’s case, is
unfounded and illegal. First of all, section 41A(1) contemplates the receipt of a ‘reasonable
complaint’, ‘credible information’ or ‘reasonable suspicion’. The stage of preliminary inquiry
is described in direction (ii) laid down in Lalita Kumari’s case, where “the information received
does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry”xxviii Thus, the
procedure of preliminary inquiry cannot be twisted to gather self-incriminating material from
a prospective accused in order to fix criminal liability upon such accused prior to the
registration of crime. Section 41A(1) contemplates the securing of the attendance of an accused
person in cases where the arrest of the accused is not required under section 41(1) of the CrPC.
It thus contemplates the registration of a First Information Report and the naming of an accused
therein.

The law places certain necessary checks on custodial self-incrimination and thus, circumscribes
the scope of custodial investigation to fact-finding, subject to the safeguard against self-
incrimination, even in matters of procedure.

An accused person cannot be summoned to produce documents incriminating

himself/herselfxxix or to record statements incriminating himself/herselfxxx. Refusal to self-
incriminate and ‘confess’ cannot be a ground for seeking cancellation of bailxxxi.

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Thus, the use of preliminary inquiry or a notice of appearance to get an accused to self-
incriminate is not contemplated by law. The purpose of the preliminary inquiry is to gauge
from the materials of the complaint whether a cognizable offence is made out and if so, to
register an offence. The purpose of the notice of appearance is to secure the attendance of an
accused person to aid investigation in cases where the punishability of the alleged offences
does not exceed 7 years. The Police are supposed to be able to gather materials for filing a
charge sheet from their fact-finding where the accused person is protected from self-
incrimination in any form and at all stages of the criminal process, preliminary inquiry,
investigation as well as trial. The Police need to be trained not to use the procedure of
preliminary inquiry and notice of appearance to gather pre-investigation evidence to
incriminate the proposed accused and then register a formal First Information Report with the
materials gathered.

MAKING THE POWER UNDER SUB-SECTION 41A (3) OF THE CRPC

MAGISTRATE-WARRANTABLE IN ORDER TO MAKE SECTION 41A
TRULY JUST

With regard to the safeguards against pre-investigation evidence gathering from the accused
which may amount to self-incrimination (and not other forms of preliminary fact-finding) and
the general safeguards against self-incrimination, the power of the investigating officer under
section 41A(3) to effect an arrest for reasons to be recorded in writing, even in cases where the
accused person attends before the investigating officer in response to a notice of appearance
under section 41A(1), needs to be subjected to the statutory control of warranting of such arrests
by Judicial Magistrates and a show-cause notice to the prospective arrestee on why such arrest
should not be effected. The latter part of the proposed procedure is necessary, as sub-section 3
of section 41A presupposes that the accused is attending in deference to the notice of
appearance and is not absconding from the process of investigation.

In the absence of the above proposed procedural control, every case of notice of appearance
invariably goes to the District Court or to the High Court for granting anticipatory bail under
section 438 of the CrPC. This defeats the purpose of mitigating the procedural excess of
impending arrest, as an accused person fearing the possibility of arrest under sub-section 3 of

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section 41A, would move an anticipatory bail application, which also takes up the time of the
investigating officer.

A warrantable arrest after show-cause would also leave it open to the proposed arrestee to move
an anticipatory bail application. However, the person taking the decision on the application for
warrant to arrest would be a judicially trained officer, who is not a part of the executive
administration and this would help to curb the menace of abuse of the power to arrest as the
investigating officer would have to show good cause for effecting arrest. Being a judicial
proceeding, the investigating officer would also be liable to face charges of contempt and
perjury for wrong and misleading statements, if any are made, which the present procedure
does not provide.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

1. From the above discussion, it is clear that just because an investigating agency
possessing powers under the CrPC has the power to arrest an accused for the reasons
under section 41 of the CrPC, it is not necessary to arrest an accused person in every
case where a criminal offence is registered and is under investigation.
2. A fair amount of discretion has to be left with the investigating officer to be fair to
the public purpose of investigation, which is to find out the truth in the case of
criminal offences, which are classically treated as offences against the peace of the
society at large. However, this cannot be at the cost of common procedural fairness.
If a procedure is codified for protecting an accused from unnecessary arrest and for
pre-FIR preliminary inquiry, it must be interpreted for the purpose of protecting an
accused from unnecessary harassment. Such procedure therefore, cannot be implied
by any chance, to cause prejudice to a prospective accused or accused person.
3. Looking at the safeguards built into the law, securing the custody of an accused
person to get himself/herself to ‘confess’ is not one of the purposes of allowing arrest
under the law. The grounds justifying an arrest have to be interpreted strictly in terms
of section 41 of the CrPC, and cannot be stretched by abuse of the procedure of
preliminary inquiry and notice of appearance to get a prospective accused or accused

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person to produce self-incriminatory material which the investigating agency can use
against such accused person.
4. In order to realise the purpose of section 41A of the CrPC, it is necessary to amend
sub-section 3 thereof and to make every proposed arrest in cases where an accused
person attends before the investigating officer in response to a notice of appearance,
subject to the satisfaction of a Judicial Magistrate who may hear both sides and issue
a warrant of arrest only after being satisfied of the need for arresting of the accused
who has attended in response to the notice of appearance. Again, the binding
principles of protection against self-incrimination should be built into such
amendment, i.e. it should be provided in the amended sub-section 3 that the
following shall not be grounds for authorising arrest under sub-section 3 where a
Police officer applies for a warrant of arrest of an accused even when such accused
attends investigation before such police officer in response to a notice of appearance
under section 41A(1) of the CrPC:
a) Refusal to self-incriminate or ‘confess’;
b) Refusal to produce self-incriminatory material including documents or objects;
c) Refusal to record self-incriminatory statements.
5. Defining by legislative amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the
term ‘preliminary inquiry’ and specifically barring from such inquiry, the
procurement of evidence from a prospective accused.

The proposed reforms will make section 41A of the CrPC truly fair and just and enable a true
realisation of its legislative purpose.

ENDNOTES

i
Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and Anr., AIR 2014 SC 2756
ii
State Represented by CBI v. Anil Sharma, AIR 1997 SC 3806
iii
Code of Criminal Procedure, Available at:
https://indiacode.nic.in/acts/11.%20Code%20of%20Criminal%20Procedure,%201973.pdf (Last visited on
February 5, 2019)
iv
Law Commission of India, 177th Report on Law Relating to Arrest (December 2001) (Volume I), available at:
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/177rptp1.pdf (Last visited on February 5, 2019)
v
Law Commission of India, 177th Report on Law Relating to Arrest (December 2001) (Volume II), available at:
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/177rptp2.pdf (Last visited on February 5, 2019)

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vi
Description of 'Royal Commission on Criminal Procedures’, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedures, 1978-
1984. LSE Library Archives and Special Collections. GB 97 RCCP' on the Archives Hub website, available at:
https://archiveshub.jisc.ac.uk/data/gb97-rccp (Last visited on February 5, 2019)
vii
Law Commission of India, 177th Report on Law Relating to Arrest (December 2001) (Volume II), available at:
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/177rptp2.pdf (Last visited on February 5, 2019)
viii
Irwin Law, ‘Appearance Notice’, available at: https://www.irwinlaw.com/cold/appearance_notice (Last
visited on February 5, 2019)
ix
Irwin Law, ‘Promise to Appear’, available at: https://www.irwinlaw.com/cold/promise_to_appear (Last
visited on February 5, 2019)
x
Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P, (1994) 4 SCC 260
xi
M.C. Abraham v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 2 SCC 649
xii
Debate in Lok Sabha. Dated 12th August 2010. Union Law Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram, available at:
http://164.100.47.194/Loksabha/Debates/DebateAdvSearch15.aspx (Last visited on February 5, 2019)
xiii
Gazette notification of Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of 2009), available at:
http://egazette.nic.in/WriteReadData/2009/E_6_2010_016.pdf (Last visited on February 5, 2019)
xiv
Gazette notification of Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2010 (41 of 2010), available at:
http://egazette.nic.in/writereaddata/2010/E_50_2010_011.pdf (Last visited on February 5, 2019)
xv
Ibid
xvi
AIR 2014 SC 2756
xvii
Ibid
xviii
AIR 2014 SC 1066
xix
Ibid
xx
Criminal Writ Petition No. 416 of 2015 (Aurangabad Bench), Order dated 31 st March 2015
xxi
Ibid
xxii
W.P.(C) 7608/2017, Order dated 7th February 2018
xxiii
Ibid
xxiv
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), S. 41A(3) added by section 6 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of 2009)
xxv
Easih Mia v. Tripura Administration, 1962 CrLJ 673
xxvi
Lalita Kumari v. Government of UP, (2011) 11 SCC 331
xxvii
Ibid
xxviii
Ibid
xxix
Shyamlal Mohanlal Choksi v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1251 : State Represented by Inspector of Police
v. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate, (2004) 5 SCC 729
xxx
Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025
xxxi
Santosh s/o Dwarkadas Fafat v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 1759 of 2017 (Supreme Court),
Decided on 10th October 2017 : Selvi v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263

JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES AND RESEARCH

Volume 6 Issue 5 – ISSN 2455 2437
October 2020
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