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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 164538 August 9, 2010

METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
ROGELIO REYNADO and JOSE C. ADRANDEA,** Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"It is a hornbook doctrine in our criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is
not affected by a compromise, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted
and punished by the government on its own motion, even though complete
reparation [has] been made of the damage suffered by the private offended
party. Since a criminal offense like estafa is committed against the State, the
private offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the
law imposes for the commission of the crime."1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks
the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision2 dated October 21, 2002 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 58548 and its further Resolution3 dated July 12, 2004 denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.4

Factual Antecedents

On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged
respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. In the
affidavit5 of petitioner’s audit officer, Antonio Ivan S. Aguirre, it was alleged that
the special audit conducted on the cash and lending operations of its Port Area
branch uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by
respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc.
(Universal); that respondents were the only voting members of the branch’s
credit committee authorized to extend credit accommodation to clients up to
₱200,000.00; that through the so-called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal,
which has a paid-up capital of only ₱125,000.00 and actual maintaining balance of
₱5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling ₱81,652,000.006 against
uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at petitioner’s Port Area
branch; that, consequently, Universal was able to utilize petitioner’s funds even
before the seven-day clearing period for regional checks expired; that Universal’s
withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were without prior
approval of petitioner’s head office; that the uncleared checks were later
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed"; and, that
respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.
In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions
with Universal and claimed that they only intended to help the Port Area branch
solicit and increase its deposit accounts and daily transactions.

Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt
Settlement Agreement7 whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the
former in the total amount of ₱50,990,976.278 as of February 4, 1997 and
undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly amortizations in the sum of ₱300,000.00
starting January 15, 1997, covered by postdated checks, "plus balloon payment of
the remaining principal balance and interest and other charges, if any, on
December 31, 2001."9

Findings of the Prosecutor

Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie

M. Edad (Prosecutor Edad) in her Resolution10 dated July 10, 1997 found
petitioner’s evidence insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa. According
to Prosecutor Edad:

The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts complainant bank in

estoppel to argue that the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made
even before the filing of this case, the relations between the parties [have]
change[d], novation has set in and prevented the incipience of any criminal
liability on the part of respondents.11

Thus, Prosecutor Edad recommended the dismissal of the case:

WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, it is respectfully recommended that
the case be dismissed.12

On December 9, 1997, petitioner appealed the Resolution of Prosecutor Edad to

the Department of Justice (DOJ) by means of a Petition for Review.13

Ruling of the Department of Justice

On June 22, 1998, the DOJ dismissed the petition ratiocinating that:

It is evident that your client based on the same transaction chose to file estafa
only against its employees and treat with kid gloves its big time client Universal
who was the one who benefited from this transaction and instead, agreed that it
should be paid on installment basis.

To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification

under the law which will result in grave injustice against herein respondents.
Thus, if your client agreed that no estafa was committed in this transaction with
Universal who was the principal player and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more
so with herein respondents whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with
Universal.

Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how
respondents misappropriated the ₱53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your
client after its checks deposited with Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover,
fraud is not present considering that the Executive Committee and the Credit
Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which they
approved. Further, no damage was caused to your client as it agreed [to] the
settlement [with] Universal.14
A Motion for Reconsideration15 was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied
on March 1, 2000 by then Acting Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero.16

Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari &

Mandamus.17

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

By Decision18 of October 21, 2002, the CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice. Citing jurisprudence19 wherein we ruled that while novation
does not extinguish criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of such liability as
long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information in court.20 Hence,
according to the CA, "[j]ust as Universal cannot be held responsible under the bills
purchase transactions on account of novation, private respondents, who acted in
complicity with the former, cannot be made liable [for] the same transactions."21
The CA added that "[s]ince the dismissal of the complaint is founded on legal
ground, public respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to file an
information in court."22

Incidentally, the CA totally ignored the Comment23 of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) where the latter, despite being the statutory counsel of public
respondent DOJ, agreed with petitioner that the DOJ erred in dismissing the
complaint. It alleged that where novation does not extinguish criminal liability for
estafa neither does restitution negate the offense already committed.24

Additionally, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended that failure to
implead other responsible individuals in the complaint does not warrant its
dismissal, suggesting that the proper remedy is to cause their inclusion in the
information.25 This notwithstanding, however, the CA disposed of the petition as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly, DISMISSED.

Consequently, the resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the
Secretary of Justice are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.26

Hence, this instant petition before the Court.

On November 8, 2004, we required27 respondents to file Comment, not a motion

to dismiss, on the petition within 10 days from notice. The OSG filed a
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment28 while respondent Jose C.
Adraneda (Adraneda) submitted his Comment29 on the petition. The Secretary of
Justice failed to file the required comment on the OSG’s Manifestation and
Motion in Lieu of Comment and respondent Rogelio Reynado (Reynado) did not
submit any. For which reason, we issued a show cause order30 on July 19, 2006.
Their persistent non-compliance with our directives constrained us to resolve that
they had waived the filing of comment and to impose a fine of ₱1,000.00 on
Reynado. Upon submission of the required memorandum by petitioner and
Adraneda, the instant petition was submitted for resolution.

Issues

Petitioner presented the following main arguments for our consideration:

1. Novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish

criminal liability.
2. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear
criminally liable for the offense charged.

Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt Settlement

Agreement with Universal did not absolve private respondents from criminal
liability for estafa. Petitioner submits that the settlement affects only the civil
obligation of Universal but did not extinguish the criminal liability of the
respondents. Petitioner thus faults the CA in sustaining the DOJ which in turn
affirmed the finding of Prosecutor Edad for committing apparent error in the
appreciation and the application of the law on novation. By petitioner’s claim,
citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tonda,31 the "negotiations pertain [to]
and affect only the civil aspect of the case but [do] not preclude prosecution for
the offense already committed."32

In his Comment, Adraneda denies being a privy to the anomalous transactions

and passes on the sole responsibility to his co-respondent Reynado as the latter
was able to conceal the pertinent documents being the head of petitioner’s Port
Area branch. Nonetheless, he contends that because of the Debt Settlement
Agreement, they cannot be held liable for estafa.

The OSG, for its part, instead of contesting the arguments of petitioner, even
prayed before the CA to give due course to the petition contending that DOJ
indeed erred in dismissing the complaint for estafa.

Given the facts of the case, the basic issue presented before this Court is whether
the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement precluded petitioner from
holding respondents liable to stand trial for estafa under Art. 315 (1)(b) of the
Revised Penal Code.33
Our Ruling

We find the petition highly meritorious.

Novation not a mode of extinguishing

criminal liability for estafa; Criminal liability for estafa not affected by compromise
or novation of contract.

Initially, it is best to emphasize that "novation is not one of the grounds

prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal
liability."34

In a catena of cases, it was ruled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by
a compromise or novation of contract. In Firaza v. People35 and Recuerdo v.
People,36 this Court ruled that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement or belated
payment to the offended party of the money swindled by the accused does not
extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. We also held in People v. Moreno37
and in People v. Ladera38 that "criminal liability for estafa is not affected by
compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be
prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion even though
complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the
offended party." Similarly in the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Tonda39 cited by petitioner, we held that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement of
or compromise as to the amount misappropriated, after the commission of the
crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender, and not his criminal liability.

Thus, the doctrine that evolved from the aforecited cases is that a compromise or
settlement entered into after the commission of the crime does not extinguish
accused’s liability for estafa. Neither will the same bar the prosecution of said
crime. Accordingly, in such a situation, as in this case, the complaint for estafa
against respondents should not be dismissed just because petitioner entered into
a Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal. Even the OSG arrived at the same
conclusion:

Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement

entered into between petitioner and Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes
merely the civil aspect of the latter’s liability as a corporate entity but not the
criminal liability of the persons who actually committed the crime of estafa
against petitioner Metrobank. x x x40

Unfortunately for petitioner, the above observation of the OSG was wittingly
glossed over in the body of the assailed Decision of the CA.

Execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement did not prevent the incipience of
criminal liability.

Even if the instant case is viewed from the standpoint of the law on contracts, the
disposition absolving the respondents from criminal liability because of novation
is still erroneous.

Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, "contracts take effect only between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or
by provision of law." The civil law principle of relativity of contracts provides that
"contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or
prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with
knowledge thereof."41
In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not parties to the
agreement. The intention of the parties thereto not to include them is evident
either in the onerous or in the beneficent provisions of said agreement. They are
not assigns or heirs of either of the parties. Not being parties to the agreement,
respondents cannot take refuge therefrom to bar their anticipated trial for the
crime they committed. It may do well for respondents to remember that the
criminal action commenced by petitioner had its genesis from the alleged fraud,
unfaithfulness, and abuse of confidence perpetrated by them in relation to their
positions as responsible bank officers. It did not arise from a contractual dispute
or matters strictly between petitioner and Universal. This being so, respondents
cannot rely on subject settlement agreement to preclude prosecution of the
offense already committed to the end of extinguishing their criminal liability or
prevent the incipience of any liability that may arise from the criminal offense.
This only demonstrates that the execution of the agreement between petitioner
and Universal has no bearing on the innocence or guilt of the respondents.

Determination of the probable cause, a function belonging to the public

prosecutor; judicial review allowed where it has been clearly established that the
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion.

In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime

has been committed and whether there is probable cause that the accused is
guilty thereof.42 The Secretary of Justice, however, may review or modify the
resolution of the prosecutor.

"Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial."43 Generally, a public
prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where
respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent
and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law."44 Tested against these guidelines, we find
that this case falls under the exception rather than the general rule.

A close scrutiny of the substance of Prosecutor Edad’s Resolution dated July 10,
1997 readily reveals that were it not for the Debt Settlement Agreement, there
was indeed probable cause to indict respondents for the crime charged. From her
own assessment of the Complaint-Affidavit of petitioner’s auditor, her preliminary
finding is that "Ordinarily, the offense of estafa has been sufficiently
established."45 Interestingly, she suddenly changed tack and declared that the
agreement altered the relation of the parties and that novation had set in
preventing the incipience of any criminal liability on respondents. In light of the
jurisprudence herein earlier discussed, the prosecutor should not have gone that
far and executed an apparent somersault. Compounding further the error, the
DOJ in dismissing petitioner’s petition, ruled out estafa contrary to the findings of
the prosecutor. Pertinent portion of the ruling reads:

Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how
respondents misappropriated the ₱53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your
client after its checks deposited with Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover,
fraud is not present considering that the Executive Committee and the Credit
Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which they
approved. Further, no damage was caused to your client as it agreed [to] the
settlement [with] Universal.46

The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the

Complaint are matters of defense best left to the trial court’s deliberation and
contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case. To emphasize, a
preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause is "not a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the
parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded
belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof."47 A "finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged."48 So we
held in Balangauan v. Court of Appeals:49

Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of DOJ for
affirming the dismissal of the criminal complaints for estafa and/or qualified
estafa are determinative of whether or not it committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In requiring "hard facts and solid
evidence" as the basis for a finding of probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl
and Katherene liable to stand trial for the crime complained of, the DOJ
disregards the definition of probable cause – that it is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence
to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term
does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty.
It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. While probable cause
demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would
justify conviction." Herein, the DOJ reasoned as if no evidence was actually
presented by respondent HSBC when in fact the records of the case were
teeming; or it discounted the value of such substantiation when in fact the
evidence presented was adequate to excite in a reasonable mind the probability
that petitioners Bernyl and Katherene committed the crime/s complained of. In so
doing, the DOJ whimsically and capriciously exercised its discretion, amounting to
grave abuse of discretion, which rendered its resolutions amenable to correction
and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.

In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a prima facie case of estafa
exists against respondents. As perused by her, the facts as presented in the
Complaint-Affidavit of the auditor are reasonable enough to excite her belief that
respondents are guilty of the crime complained of. In Andres v. Justice Secretary
Cuevas50 we had occasion to rule that the "presence or absence of the elements
of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits."51

Thus confronted with the issue on whether the public prosecutor and the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in disposing of the case
of petitioner, given the sufficiency of evidence on hand, we do not hesitate to rule
in the affirmative. We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may
arise when a lower court or tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence.

Non-inclusion of officers of Universal not a ground for the dismissal of the

complaint.

The DOJ in resolving to deny petitioner’s appeal from the resolution of the
prosecutor gave another ground – failure to implead the officers of Universal. It
explained:

To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification

under the law which will result in grave injustice against herein respondents.
Thus, if your client agreed that no estafa was committed in this transaction with
Universal who was the principal player and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more
so with herein respondents whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with
Universal.521avvphi1

The ratiocination of the Secretary of Justice conveys the idea that if the charge
against respondents rests upon the same evidence used to charge co-accused
(officers of Universal) based on the latter’s conspiratorial participation, the non-
inclusion of said co-accused in the charge should benefit the respondents.
The reasoning of the DOJ is flawed.

Suffice it to say that it is indubitably within the discretion of the prosecutor to

determine who must be charged with what crime or for what offense. Public
prosecutors, not the private complainant, are the ones obliged to bring forth
before the law those who have transgressed it.

Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court53 mandates that all criminal actions
must be commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the
People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible
therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the
charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the
offense. The proper remedy under the circumstances where persons who ought
to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private complainant is
definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the information. As
the OSG correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have been the inclusion
of certain employees of Universal who were found to have been in cahoots with
respondents in defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot seriously argue
that because the officers of Universal were not indicted, respondents themselves
should not likewise be charged. Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to
justify desistance by the public prosecutor from prosecution of the criminal case
just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof were charged.

Mandamus a proper remedy when resolution of public respondent is tainted with

grave abuse of discretion.

Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall issue when "any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station."54 The writ of mandamus is not available to control
discretion neither may it be issued to compel the exercise of discretion. Truly, it is
a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine which persons
appear responsible for the commission of a crime. However, the moment he finds
one to be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to charge him therewith and
to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation, the rule loses its discretionary
character and becomes mandatory. Thus, where, as in this case, despite the
sufficiency of the evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the
corresponding information against the person responsible, he abuses his
discretion. His act is tantamount to a deliberate refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, gravely abused his
discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of
estafa as acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored
the latter’s finding and proceeded with the questioned resolution anchored on
purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of probable cause as
pointed out in Balangauan. To be sure, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not
subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.55 The
present case calls for the application of the exception. Given the facts of this case,
petitioner has clearly established that the public prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58548 promulgated on October 21, 2002 affirming the
Resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of Justice,
and its Resolution dated July 12, 2004 denying reconsideration thereon are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The public prosecutor is ordered to file the
necessary information for estafa against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* In lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 876
dated August 2, 2010.

** Sometimes referred to as Jose C. Andraneda and Jose C. Adraneda in other

parts of the records.

1 Tamayo v. People, G.R No. 174698, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 312, 323-324.

2 CA rollo, pp. 195-202; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz and

concurred in by Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and Amelita G. Tolentino.

3 Id. at 249-251; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz and concurred in by

Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) and
Amelita G. Tolentino.

4 Id. at 205-215.

5 Id. at 33-47.

6 Id. at 43.

7 Id. at 65-69.

8 Id. at 65.

9 Id. at 69.
10 Id. at 48-50.

11 Id. at 49.

12 Id. at 50.

13 Id. at 51-64.

14 Id. at 72.

15 Id. at 73-85.

16 Id. at 86.

17 Id. at 2-32.

18 Id. at 195-202.

19 Diongzon v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1090 (1999).

20 Id. at 1097.

21 Ca rollo, p. 201.
22 Id.

23 Id. at 139-147.

24 Id. at 142-143.

25 Id. at 144.

26 Id. at 202.

27 Rollo, p. 197.

28 Id. at 219-235.

29 Id. at 208-217.

30 Id. at 240.

31 392 Phil. 797 (2000).

32 Id. at 811.

33 ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxxx

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods

or any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property;

xxxx

34 Ocampo-Paule v. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil. 463, 471 (2002); Revised Penal
Code, Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is
totally extinguished: 1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties;
and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment; 2) By service of the sentence;
3) By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects; 4) By
absolute pardon; 5) By prescription of the crime; 6) By prescription of the penalty;
and 7) By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this
Code.

35 G.R. No. 154721, March 22, 2007, 518 SCRA 681, 694.
36 G.R. No. 168217, June 27, 2006, 493 SCRA 517, 536.

37 373 Phil 336, 349 (1999).

38 398 Phil. 588; 602 (2000).

39 Supra note 31 at 811-812.

40 CA rollo, p. 219.

41 Integrated Packaging Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 835, 845

(2000).

42 Rules of Court, Rule 112, Section 1.

43 Baviera v. Paglinawan, G.R. Nos. 168380 and 170602, February 8, 2007, 515
SCRA 170, 184.

44 Glaxosmithkline Philippines, Inc. v. Khalid Mehmood Malik, G.R. No. 166924,

August 17, 2006, 499 SCRA 268, 273.

45 CA rollo, p. 49.

46 Id. at 72.
47 Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207, 226 (1997).

48 Ang-Abaya v. Ang, G.R. No. 178511, December 4, 2008, 573 SCRA 129, 142.

49 G.R. No. 174350, August 13, 2008, 562 SCRA 184, 206-207.

50 499 Phil. 36 (2005).

51 Id. at 49-50.

52 CA rollo, p. 72.

53 SEC. 2. The complaint or information. – The complaint or information shall be

in writing, in the name of the People of the Philippines and against all persons
who appear to be responsible for the offense involved.

54 Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 3.

55 Public Utilities Department v. Hon. Guingona, Jr., 417 Phil. 798, 805 (2001).

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