Anastacio Viaña vs. Alejo Al-Lagadan and Filomena Piga G.R. No. L-8967. May 31, 1956
Anastacio Viaña vs. Alejo Al-Lagadan and Filomena Piga G.R. No. L-8967. May 31, 1956
Anastacio Viaña vs. Alejo Al-Lagadan and Filomena Piga G.R. No. L-8967. May 31, 1956
ALEJO AL-LAGADAN and Furthermore, the report contained that the patron selects and
FILOMENA PIGA engages the crew, and also, that the members thereof are
G.R. No. L-8967. subject to his control and may be dismissed by him. To put it
May 31, 1956 differently, the literal import of said report is open to the
conclusion that the crew has a contractual relation, not with
the owner of the vessel, but with the patron, and that the latter,
FACTS: not the former, is either their employer or their partner.
The fishing sailboat “Magkapatid”,owned by Anastacio Viana, The case was remanded to the Workmen’s Compensation
had a collision with a U.S. Navy vessel and sunk to the waters. Commission, for further proceedings in conformity with the
Alejandro Al-Lagadan, a member of the crew of the former decision of the Supreme Court.
disappeared with the craft. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission ordered Anastacio Viana to pay the claimants,
Alejo Al-Lagadan and Filomena Piga. Petioner said, however,
that this case does not fall within the purview of Act No. 3428,
because Alejandro Al-Lagadan was, at the time of his death,
industrial partner, not his employee. He further contended that
they were in a share basis— owner of the vessel, on one hand
receives one-half of the earnings of the sailboat, the other half
is divided pro rata among the members of the crew. The trial
referee said, as well as the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission that there was an employer-employee relation
between the Respondent and the deceased, Alejandro Al-
Lagadan, and the share which the deceased received at the end
of each trip was in the nature of ‘wages’ which is defined
under section 39 of the Compensation Act. This is so because
such share could be reckoned in terms of money. In other
words, there existed the relation of employer and employee
between the Respondent and Alejandro Al-Lagadan at the time
of the latter’s death.
ISSUE
HELD:
No, the Court did not share with the Trial Referee and
Commission’s view. However, petitioner’s theory to the
effect that the deceased was his partner, not an employee,
simply because he (the deceased) shared in the profits, not in
the losses cannot be accepted. In determining the existence of
employer-employee relationship, the following elements are
generally considered, namely:(1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3)
the power of dismissal;(4) the power to control the employees’
conduct — although the latter is the most important element
(35 Am. Jur. 445). Assuming that the share received by the
deceased could partake of the nature of wages and that the
second element, therefore, exists in the case at bar, the record
does not contain any specific data regarding the third and
fourth elements.
[G.R. No. L-8967. May 31, 1956.] deceased was his industrial partner, not employee. In this
connection, it is alleged in paragraph (6) of the petition:
ANASTACIO VIAÑA, Petitioner, vs. ALEJO AL-
LAGADAN and FILOMENA PIGA, Respondents. “That the practice observed then and now in engaging the
services of crewmen of sailboats plying between Mindoro and
Manila is on a partnership basis, to wit: that the owner of the
CONCEPCION, J.: vessel, on one hand receives one-half of the earnings of the
sailboat after deducting the expenses for the maintenance of
Petitioner Anastacio Viaña owned the fishing sailboat the crew, the other half is divided pro rata among the members
“Magkapatid”, which, in the night of September 3, 1948, sunk of the crew, the ‘patron’ or captain receiving four parts, the
in the waters between the province of Bataan and the island of ‘piloto’ or next in command three parts, the wheelsman or
Corregidor, as a consequence of a collision with the USS ‘timonel’ 1 1/2 parts and the rest of the members of the crew
“TINGLES”, a vessel of the U.S. Navy. Inasmuch as one part each, as per Annex ‘B’ hereof.”
Alejandro Al-Lagadan, a member of the crew of the
“Magkapatid”, disappeared with the craft, his parents, It appears that, before rendering his aforementioned decision,
Respondent Alejo Al-Lagadan and Filomena Piga, filed the the Referee requested Mr. Manuel O. Morente, an attorney of
corresponding claim for compensation under Act No. 3428. the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, “to look into and
After appropriate proceedings, a Referee of the Workmen’s inquire and determine the method of and the basis of engaging
Compensation Commission rendered a decision, dated the services of crewmen for sailboats (batel) of twenty (20)
February 23, 1953: tons or more plying between Manila and Mariveles and
moored along Manila North Harbor”, and that, thereafter, said
“1. Ordering Mr. Anastacio Viaña to pay the above-named Atty. Morente reported:
claimants through the Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
Manila, the sum of P1,560 in lump sum with interest at 6 per “The basis of engaging the services of crewmen of a batel is
cent from September 3, 1948 until fully paid; determined in accordance with the contract executed between
the owner and the patron. The contract commonly followed is
“To pay the sum of P16 to the Workmen’s Compensation on a share basis after deducting all the expenses incurred on
Commission as costs.” the voyage. One half goes to the owner of the batel and the
other half goes to the patron and the members of the crew and
Said decision was, on petition for review filed by Viaña,
divided among themselves on a share basis also in accordance
affirmed by the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, on
with their agreement with the patron getting the lion’s share.
or about October 22, 1954, “with additional fee of P5.00”.
The hiring of the crew is done by the patron himself. Usually,
Said Commissioner, having subsequently denied a
when a patron enters into a contract with the owner of the
reconsideration of this action, Viaña has brought the matter to
batel, he has a crew ready with him.” (Italics supplied.)
us, for review by certiorari, upon the ground that this case
does not fall within the purview of Act No. 3428, because the In sustaining the Referee’s finding to the effect that the
gross income of his business for the year 1947 was allegedly deceased was an employee of Viaña, the Workmen’s
less than P10,000, and because Alejandro Al-Lagadan was, at Compensation Commissioner said:
the time of his death, his (Petitioner’s) industrial partner, not
his employee. “The trial referee found that there was an employer-employee
relation between the Respondent and the deceased, Alejandro
The first ground is untenable, Petitioner not having invoked it Al-Lagadan, and the share which the deceased received at the
before the rendition of the Referee’s decision on February 23, end of each trip was in the nature of ‘wages’ which is defined
1953. The objection to the application of Act No. 3428, upon under section 39 of the Compensation Act. This is so because
said ground, was made for the first time when Petitioner such share could be reckoned in terms of money. In other
sought a review of said decision by the Workmen’s words, there existed the relation of employer and employee
Compensation Commissioner. The non- applicability of said between the Respondent and Alejandro Al-Lagadan at the time
Act to employers whose gross income does not reach P20,000 of the latter’s death.
is, however, a matter of defense, which cannot be availed of
unless pleaded in the employer’s answer to the claim for “We believe that the trial referee did not err in finding the
compensation filed by the employee or his heirs. Petitioner deceased an employee of the Respondent. We cite the
herein having failed to do so, said defense may not now be following cases which illustrate the point at issue:
entertained (Rolan vs. Perez, 63 Phil., 80, 85-86).
‘The officers and crews of whaling and other fishing vessels
As regards the second ground, Petitioner maintains, contrary who are to receive certain proportions of produce of the
to the finding of the Referee and said Commissioner, that the voyage in lieu of wages (Rice vs. Austin, 17 Mass. 206; & C.
61Captains of merchant ships who, instead of wages, receive crew, but, also, that the members thereof are subject to his
shares in the profits of the adventure; (4 Maule & C. 240); or control and may be dismissed by him. To put it differently, the
who take vessels under an agreement to pay certain charges literal import of said report is open to the conclusion that the
and receive a share of the earnings; (Tagard vs. Loring, 16 crew has a contractual relation, not with the owner of the
Mass. 336, 8 Am. Dec. 140; Winsor vs. Cutts, 7 Greenl. Me. vessel, but with the patron, and that the latter, not the former,
261) have generally been held not to be partners with the is either their employer or their partner.
Respondent, and the like. Running a steamboat on shares does
not make the owners partners in respect to the vessel (The Upon the other hand, the very allegations of the petition show
Daniel Koine, 35 Fed. 785); so of an agreement between two otherwise, for Petitioner explicitly averred therein that the
parties to farm on shares; (Hooloway vs. Brinkley, 42 Ga. deceased Alejandro Al-Lagadan was his “industrial partner”.
226); seaman who is to receive pay in proportion to the This implies that a contract of partnership existed between
amount of fish caught is not a partner; (Holdren vs. French, 68 them and that, accordingly, if the crew was selected and
Me. 241); profits in lieu of wages is not a partnership. There is engaged by the “patron”, the latter did so merely as agent or
no true contribution; (Crawford vs. Austin, 34 Md. 49; representative of Petitioner herein. Again, if Petitioner were a
Whitehill vs. Shickle, 43 Mo. 538; Sankey vs. Iron Works, 44 partner of the crew members, then neither the former nor the
Ga. 228.)’“ (Italics supplied.) patron could control or dismiss the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the “pakiaw” contract between an employee
and an employer will not pass the employer-employee
relationship control test wherein the employer has the power
to control the manner and method of the work, on the grounds
that there is no evidence to show that the employer had the
right to direct the manner and methods of the employee’s
work; and on another ground that the employees do not stay in
the work establishment regularly, and is only present
whenever there is work.
RULING:
The Court held that the circumstance of the present case
passed the control test because the test merely calls for the
existence of the right to control the manner na dmethod of
doing work and not the actual exercise of the right.
Considering that petitioner is involved in manufacturing
baskets, it is natural to expect that those working under Dy,
will also observe Dy’s requirements of the size and quality of
the basket or “kaing.” Some control would be necessarily
exercised by Dy as the making of the kaing is subject to Dy’s
specifications.
Since the work is also done in Dy’s establishment, Dy can
easiy exercise control on the men employed. It can also be