Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines

Metro Manila

Tenth Congress

Republic Act No. 8371             October 29, 1997

AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS

CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, CREATING A NATIONAL COMMISSION OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::

CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997."

Section 2. Declaration of State Policies. - The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the
framework of the Constitution:

a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of
national unity and development;

b)The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their
economic, social and cultural well being and shall recognize the applicability of customary
laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domain;

c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and
develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the
formulation of national laws and policies;

d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally
enjoy the full measure of human rights and freedoms without distinctions or discriminations;

e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect
their rights and guarantee respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of
the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national
laws and regulations grant to other members of the population and

f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for
cultural integrity by assuring maximum ICC/IP participation in the direction of education,
 health, as well as other services of ICCs/IPs, in order to render such services more
responsive to the needs and desires of these communities.

Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce
and guarantee the realization of these rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions,
values, beliefs, their rights to their ancestral domains.

CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF TERMS

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

a) Ancestral Domains - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands,inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held
under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present
except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as
a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals, corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their
economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral land, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable
or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and
other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs
but from which their traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities,
particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and
utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time
immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership,continuously, to the present except when interrupted
by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of
government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots;

c) Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title - refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of
possession and ownership of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains identified and delineated
in accordance with this law;

d) Certificate of Ancestral Lands Title - refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands;

e) Communal Claims - refer to claims on land, resources and rights thereon, belonging to the
whole community within a defined territory

f) Customary Laws - refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and
practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective
ICCs/IPs;

g) Free and Prior Informed Consent - as used in this Act shall mean the consensus of all
members of the ICCs/IPs to; be determined in accordance with their respective customary
laws and practices, free from any external manipulation, interference and coercion, and
obtained after fully disclosing the intent and scope of the activity, in a language an process
understandable to the community;

h) Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples - refer to a group of people or

homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by other, who have
continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory,
and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed
customs, tradition and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and culture,
became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise
include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the
populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the
time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present
state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political
institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may
have resettled outside their ancestral domains;

i) Indigenous Political Structure - refer to organizational and cultural leadership systems,

institutions, relationships, patterns and processed for decision-making and participation,
identified by ICCs/IPs such as, but not limited to, Council of Elders, Council of Timuays,
Bodong Holder, or any other tribunal or body of similar nature;

j) Individual Claims - refer to claims on land and rights thereon which have been devolved to
individuals, families and clans including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or
paddies and tree lots;

k) National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) - refers to the office created under
this Act, which shall be under the Office of the President, and which shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans
and programs to recognize, protect and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs;

l) Native Title - refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as
memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have
never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way
since before the Spanish Conquest;

m) Nongovernment Organization - refers to a private, nonprofit voluntary organization that

has been organized primarily for the delivery of various services to the ICCs/IPs and has an
established track record for effectiveness and acceptability in the community where it serves;

n) People's Organization - refers to a private, nonprofit voluntary organization of members of

an ICC/IP which is accepted as representative of such ICCs/IPs;

o) Sustainable Traditional Resource Rights - refer to the rights of ICCs/IPs to sustainably

use,manage, protect and conserve a) land, air, water, and minerals; b) plants, animals and
other organisms; c) collecting, fishing and hunting grounds; d) sacred sites; and e) other
areas of economic, ceremonial and aesthetic value in accordance with their indigenous
knowledge, beliefs, systems and practices; and

p) Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain
ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a
 defined territory devolved to them, by operation of customary law or inherited from their
ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions.

CHAPTER III 
RIGHTS TO ANCESTRAL DOMAINS

Section 4. Concept of Ancestral Lands/Domains. - Ancestral lands/domains shall include such

concepts of territories which cover not only the physical environment but the total environment
including the spiritual and cultural bonds to the area which the ICCs/IPs possess, occupy and use
and to which they have claims of ownership.

Section 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership. - Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the

view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their
cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are
the ICC's/IP's private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot
be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.

Section 6. Composition of Ancestral Lands/Domains. - Ancestral lands and domains shall

consist of all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs as referred under Sec. 3, items (a) and (b) of this
Act.

Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. - The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs t
their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:

a. Rights of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water

traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;

b. Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to
develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to
manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities
for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the
natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the
ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they
sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to
prevent any interfere with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;

c. Right to Stay in the Territories- The right to stay in the territory and not be removed
therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor
through any means other than eminent domain. Where relocation is considered necessary
as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with the free and prior
informed consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned and whenever possible, they shall be
guaranteed the right to return to their ancestral domains, as soon as the grounds for
relocation cease to exist. When such return is not possible, as determined by agreement or
through appropriate procedures, ICCs/IPs shall be provided in all possible cases with lands
of quality and legal status at least equal to that of the land previously occupied by them,
suitable to provide for their present needs and future development. Persons thus relocated
shall likewise be fully compensated for any resulting loss or injury;
 d. Right in Case of Displacement. - In case displacement occurs as a result of natural
catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas
where they can have temporary life support system: Provided, That the displaced ICCs/IPs
shall have the right to return to their abandoned lands until such time that the normalcy and
safety of such lands shall be determined: Provided, further, That should their ancestral
domain cease to exist and normalcy and safety of the previous settlements are not possible,
displaced ICCs/IPs shall enjoy security of tenure over lands to which they have been
resettled: Provided, furthermore, That basic services and livelihood shall be provided to them
to ensure that their needs are adequately addressed:

e. Right to Regulate Entry of Migrants. - Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and
organizations into the domains;

f. Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water. - For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access
to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;

g. Right to Claim Parts of Reservations. - The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains
which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for
common and public welfare and service; and

h. Right to Resolve Conflict. - Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary
laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be
submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary.

Section 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands. - The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs, to
their ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.

a. Right to transfer land/property. - Such right shall include the right to transfer land or
property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and
traditions of the community concerned.

b. Right to Redemption. - In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights
by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted
by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs,or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration
or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not
exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer.

Section 9. Responsibilities of ICCs/IPs to their Ancestral Domains. - ICCs/IPs occupying a duly

certified ancestral domain shall have the following responsibilities:

a. Maintain Ecological Balance- To preserve, restore, and maintain a balanced ecology in

the ancestral domain by protecting the flora and fauna, watershed areas, and other reserves;

b. Restore Denuded Areas- To actively initiate, undertake and participate in the reforestation
of denuded areas and other development programs and projects subject to just and
reasonable remuneration; and

c. Observe Laws- To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act and the rules and
regulations for its effective implementation.
Section 10. Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion. - Unauthorized and unlawful intrusion upon, or
use of any portion of the ancestral domain, or any violation of the rights herein before enumerated,
shall be punishable under this law. Furthermore, the Government shall take measures to prevent
non-ICCs/IPs from taking advantage of the ICCs/IPs customs or lack of understanding of laws to
secure ownership, possession of land belonging to said ICCs/IPs.

Section 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. - The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when
solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
(CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and
delineated.

Section 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended,
or the Land Registration Act 496. - Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to
individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in -interest,
have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since the
immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of
this Act and uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title
to their ancestral lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
Registration Act 496.

For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and
actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a
slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural lands.

The option granted under this Section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval
of this Act.

CHAPTER IV
RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE AND EMPOWERMENT

Section 13. Self-Governance. - The State recognizes the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to self-
governance and self-determination and respects the integrity of their values, practices and
institutions. Consequently, the State shall guarantee the right of ICCs/IPs to freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.

Section 14. Support for Autonomous Regions. - The State shall continue to strengthen and
support the autonomous regions created under the Constitution as they may require or need. The
State shall likewise encourage other ICCs/IPs not included or outside Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordillera to use the form and content of their ways of life as may be compatible with the
fundamental rights defined in the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and other
internationally recognized human rights.

Section 15. Justice System, Conflict Resolution Institutions and Peace Building Processes. -
The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict
resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and
practices within their respective communities and as may be compatible with the national legal
system and with internationally recognized human rights.

Section 16. Right to Participate in Decision -Making. - ICCs/IPs have the right to participate fully,
if they so choose, at all levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and
destinies through procedures determined by them as well as to maintain and develop their own
indigenous political structures. Consequently, the State shall ensure that the ICCs/IPs shall be given
mandatory representation in policy-making bodies and other local legislative councils.

Section 17. Right to Determine and Decide Priorities for Development. - The ICCs/IPs shall
have the right to determine and decide their own priorities for development affecting their lives,
beliefs, institutions, spiritual well-being, and the lands they own, occupy or use. They shall
participate in the formulation,implementation and evaluation of policies, plans and programs for
national, regional and local development which may directly affect them.

Section 18. Tribal Barangays. - The ICCs/IPs living in contiguous areas or communities where they
form the predominant population but which are located in municipalities, provinces or cities where
they do not constitute the majority of the population, may form or constitute a separate barangay in
accordance with the Local Government Code on the creation of tribal barangays.

Section 19. Role of Peoples Organizations. - The State shall recognize and respect the role of
independent ICCs/IPs organizations to enable the ICCs/IPs to pursue and protect their legitimate
and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.

Section 20. Means for Development /Empowerment of ICCs/IPs. - The Government shall

establish the means for the full development/empowerment of the ICCs/IPs own institutions and
initiatives and, where necessary, provide the resources needed therefor.

CHAPTER V
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 21. Equal Protection and Non-discrimination of ICCs/IPs. - Consistent with the equal
protection clause of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Charter of the United
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women and International Human Rights Law, the State shall, with due
recognition of their distinct characteristics and identity, accord to the members of the ICCs/IPs the
rights, protections and privileges enjoyed by the rest of the citizenry. It shall extend to them the same
employment rights, opportunities, basic services, educational and other rights and privileges
available to every member of the society. Accordingly, the State shall likewise ensure that the
employment of any form of force of coersion against ICCs/IPs shall be dealt with by law.

The State shall ensure that the fundamental human rights and freedoms as enshrined in the
Constitution and relevant international instruments are guaranteed also to indigenous women.
Towards this end, no provision in this Act shall be interpreted so as to result in the diminution of
rights and privileges already recognized and accorded to women under existing laws of general
application.

Section 22. Rights during Armed Conflict. - ICCs/IPs have the right to special protection and
security in periods of armed conflict. The State shall observe international standards, in particular,
the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, for the protection of civilian populations in circumstances of
emergency and armed conflict, and shall not recruit members of the ICCs/IPs against their will into
armed forces, and in particular, for the use against other ICCs/IPs; not recruit children of ICCs/IPs
into the armed forces under any circumstance; nor force indigenous individuals to abandon their
lands, territories and means of subsistence, or relocate them in special centers for military purposes
under any discriminatory condition.
Section 23. Freedom from Discrimination and Right to Equal Opportunity and Treatment. - It
shall be the right of the ICCs/IPs to be free from any form of discrimination, with respect to
recruitment and conditions of employment, such that they may enjoy equal opportunities as other
occupationally-related benefits, informed of their rights under existing labor legislation and of means
available to them for redress, not subject to any coercive recruitment systems, including bonded
labor and other forms of debt servitude; and equal treatment in employment for men and women,
including the protection from sexual harassment.

Towards this end, the State shall within the framework of national laws and regulations, and in
cooperation with the ICCs/IPs concerned, adopt special measures to ensure the effective protection
with regard to the recruitment and conditions of employment of persons belonging to these
communities, to the extent that they are not effectively protected by the laws applicable to workers in
general.

ICCs/IPs shall have the right to association and freedom for all trade union activities and the right to
conclude collective bargaining agreements with employers' conditions. They shall likewise have the
right not to be subject to working conditions hazardous to their health, particularly through exposure
to pesticides and other toxic substances.

Section 24. Unlawful Acts Pertaining to Employment. - It shall be unlawful for any person:

a. To discriminate against any ICC/IP with respect to the terms and conditions of
employment on account of their descent. Equal remuneration shall be paid to ICC/IP and
non-ICC/IP for work of equal value; and

b. To deny any ICC/IP employee any right or benefit herein provided for or to discharge them
for the purpose of preventing them from enjoying any of the rights or benefits provided under
this Act.

Section 25. Basic Services. - The ICC/IP have the right to special measures for the immediate,
effective and continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions, including in the areas
of employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.
Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous women, elderly,
youth, children and differently-abled persons. Accordingly, the State shall guarantee the right of
ICCs/IPs to government 's basic services which shall include, but not limited to water and electrical
facilities, education, health and infrastructure.

Section 26. Women. - ICC/IP women shall enjoy equal rights and opportunities with men, as
regards the social, economic, political and cultural spheres of life. The participation of indigenous
women in the decision-making process in all levels, as well as in the development of society, shall
be given due respect and recognition.

The State shall provide full access to education, maternal and child care, health and nutrition, and
housing services to indigenous women. Vocational, technical, professional and other forms of
training shall be provided to enable these women to fully participate in all aspects of social life. As far
as possible, the State shall ensure that indigenous women have access to all services in their own
languages.

Section 27. Children and Youth. - The State shall recognize the vital role of the children and youth
of ICCs/IPs in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, moral,
spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. Towards this end, the State shall support all government
programs intended for the development and rearing of the children and youth of ICCs/IPs for civic
efficiency and establish such mechanisms as may be necessary for the protection of the rights of the
indigenous children and youth.

Section 28. Integrated System of Education. - The State shall, through the NCIP, provide a
complete, adequate and integrated system of education, relevant to the needs of the children and
Young people of ICCs/IPs.

CHAPTER VI
CULTURAL INTEGRITY

Section 29. Protection of Indigenous Culture, traditions and institutions. - The state shall
respect, recognize and protect the right of the ICCs/IPs to preserve and protect their culture,
traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and
policies.

Section 30. Educational Systems. - The State shall provide equal access to various cultural
opportunities to the ICCs/IPs through the educational system, public or cultural entities,
scholarships, grants and other incentives without prejudice to their right to establish and control their
educational systems and institutions by providing education in their own language, in a manner
appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning. Indigenous children/youth shall have
the right to all levels and forms of education of the State.

Section 31. Recognition of Cultural Diversity. - The State shall endeavor to have the dignity and
diversity of the cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations of the ICCs/IPs appropriately reflected in
all forms of education, public information and cultural-educational exchange. Consequently, the
State shall take effective measures, in consultation with ICCs/IPs concerned, to eliminate prejudice
and discrimination and to promote tolerance, understanding and good relations among ICCs/IPs and
all segments of society. Furthermore, the Government shall take effective measures to ensure that
State-owned media duly reflect indigenous cultural diversity. The State shall likewise ensure the
participation of appropriate indigenous leaders in schools, communities and international cooperative
undertakings like festivals, conferences, seminars and workshops to promote and enhance their
distinctive heritage and values.

Section 32. Community Intellectual Rights. - ICCs/IPs have the right to practice and revitalize
their own cultural traditions and customs. The State shall preserve, protect and develop the past,
present and future manifestations of their cultures as well as the right to the restitution of cultural,
intellectual, religious, and spiritual property taken without their free and prior informed consent or in
violation of their laws, traditions and customs.

Section 33. Rights to Religious, Cultural Sites and Ceremonies. - ICCs/IPs shall have the right
to manifest, practice, develop teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies;
the right to maintain, protect and have access to their religious and cultural sites; the right to use and
control of ceremonial object; and the right to the repatriation of human remains. Accordingly, the
State shall take effective measures, in cooperation with the burial sites, be preserved, respected and
protected. To achieve this purpose, it shall be unlawful to:

a. Explore, excavate or make diggings on archeological sites of the ICCs/IPs for the purpose
of obtaining materials of cultural values without the free and prior informed consent of the
community concerned; and

b. Deface, remove or otherwise destroy artifacts which are of great importance to the
ICCs/IPs for the preservation of their cultural heritage.
Section 34. Right to Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Practices and to Develop own
Sciences and Technologies. - ICCs/IPs are entitled to the recognition of the full ownership and
control and protection of their cultural and intellectual rights. They shall have the right to special
measures to control, develop and protect their sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations,
including human and other genetic resources, seeds, including derivatives of these resources,
traditional medicines and health practices, vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals, indigenous
knowledge systems and practices, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions,
literature, designs, and visual and performing arts.

Section 35. Access to Biological and Genetic Resources. - Access to biological and genetic
resources and to indigenous knowledge related to the conservation, utilization and enhancement of
these resources, shall be allowed within ancestral lands and domains of the ICCs/IPs only with a
free and prior informed consent of such communities, obtained in accordance with customary laws of
the concerned community.

Section 36. Sustainable Agro-Technical Development. - The State shall recognize the right of
ICCs/IPs to a sustainable agro-technological development and shall formulate and implement
programs of action for its effective implementation. The State shall likewise promote the bio-genetic
and resource management systems among the ICCs/IPs and shall encourage cooperation among
government agencies to ensure the successful sustainable development of ICCs/IPs.

Section 37. Funds for Archeological and Historical Sites. - The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to
receive from the national government all funds especially earmarked or allocated for the
management and preservation of their archeological and historical sites and artifacts with the
financial and technical support of the national government agencies.

CHAPTER VII
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (NCIP)

Section 38. National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities /Indigenous Peoples

(NCCP). - to carry out the policies herein set forth, there shall be created the National Commission
on ICCs/IPs (NCIP), which shall be the primary government agency responsible for the formulation
and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being
of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.

Section 39. Mandate. - The NCIP shall protect and promote the interest and well-being of the
ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions.

Section 40. Composition. - The NCIP shall be an independent agency under the Office of the
President and shall be composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs, one (1) of
whom shall be the Chairperson. The Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines from a list of recommendees submitted by authentic ICCs/IPs: Provided, That the seven
(7) Commissioners shall be appointed specifically from each of the following ethnographic areas:
Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island Groups including Mindoro, Palawan,
Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and
Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao: Provided, That at least two (2) of the seven (7)
Commissioners shall be women.

Section 41. Qualifications, Tenure, Compensation. - The Chairperson and the six (6)
Commissioners must be natural born Filipino citizens, bonafide members of ICCs/IPs as certified by
his/her tribe, experienced in ethnic affairs and who have worked for at least ten (10) years with an
ICC/IP community and/or any government agency involved in ICC/IP, at least 35 years of age at the
time of appointment, and must be of proven honesty and integrity: Provided, That at least two (2) of
the seven (7) Commissioners shall be the members of the Philippine Bar: Provided, further, That the
members of the NCIP shall hold office for a period of three (3) years, and may be subject to re-
appointment for another term: Provided, furthermore, That no person shall serve for more than two
(2) terms. Appointment to any vacancy shall only be for the unexpired term of the predecessor and
in no case shall a member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity: Provided,
finally, That the Chairperson and the Commissioners shall be entitled to compensation in
accordance with the Salary Standardization Law.

Section 42. Removal from Office. - Any member of the NCIP may be removed from office by the
President, on his own initiative or upon recommendation by any indigenous community, before the
expiration of his term for cause and after complying with due process requirement of law.

Section 43. Appointment of Commissioners. - The President shall appoint the seven (7)
Commissioners of the NCIP within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act.

Section 44. Powers and Functions. - To accomplish its mandate, the NCIP shall have the following
powers, jurisdiction and function:

a) To serve as the primary government agency through which ICCs/IPs can seek
government assistance and as the medium, thorough which such assistance may be
extended;

b) To review and assess the conditions of ICCs/IPs including existing laws and policies
pertinent thereto and to propose relevant laws and policies to address their role in national
development;

c) To formulate and implement policies, plans, programs and projects for the economic,
social and cultural development of the ICCs/IPs and to monitor the implementation thereof;

d) To request and engage the services and support of experts from other agencies of
government or employ private experts and consultants as may be required in the pursuit of
its objectives;

e) To issue certificate of ancestral land/domain title;

f) Subject to existing laws, to enter into contracts, agreements, or arrangement, with

government or private agencies or entities as may be necessary to attain the objectives of
this Act, and subject to the approval of the President, to obtain loans from government
lending institutions and other lending institutions to finance its programs;

g) To negotiate for funds and to accept grants, donations, gifts and/or properties in whatever
form and from whatever source, local and international, subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines, for the benefit of ICCs/IPs and administer the same in
accordance with the terms thereof; or in the absence of any condition, in such manner
consistent with the interest of ICCs/IPs as well as existing laws;

h) To coordinate development programs and projects for the advancement of the ICCs/IPs
and to oversee the proper implementation thereof;
 i) To convene periodic conventions or assemblies of IPs to review, assess as well as
propose policies or plans;

j) To advise the President of the Philippines on all matters relating to the ICCs/IPs and to
submit within sixty (60) days after the close of each calendar year, a report of its operations
and achievements;

k) To submit to Congress appropriate legislative proposals intended to carry out the policies
under this Act;

l) To prepare and submit the appropriate budget to the Office of the President;

m) To issue appropriate certification as a pre-condition to the grant of permit, lease, grant, or

any other similar authority for the disposition, utilization, management and appropriation by
any private individual, corporate entity or any government agency, corporation or subdivision
thereof on any part or portion of the ancestral domain taking into consideration the
consensus approval of the ICCs/IPs concerned;

n) To decide all appeals from the decisions and acts of all the various offices within the
Commission:

o) To promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act;

p) To exercise such other powers and functions as may be directed by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines; and

q) To represent the Philippine ICCs/IPs in all international conferences and conventions

dealing with indigenous peoples and other related concerns.

Section 45. Accessibility and Transparency. - Subject to such limitations as may be provided by

law or by rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, all official records, documents and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, as well as research data used as basis
for policy development of the Commission shall be made accessible to the public.

Section 46. Officers within the NCIP. - The NCIP shall have the following offices which shall be
responsible for the implementation of the policies herein after provided:

a. Ancestral Domains Office - The Ancestral Domain Office shall be responsible for the
identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land/domains. It shall also be
responsible for the management of ancestral lands/domains in accordance with the master
plans as well as the implementation of the ancestral domain rights of the ICCs/IPs as
provided in Chapter III of this Act. It shall also issue, upon the free and prior informed
consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned, certification prior to the grant of any license, lease or
permit for the exploitation of natural resources affecting the interests of ICCs/IPs in
protecting the territorial integrity of all ancestral domains. It shall likewise perform such other
functions as the Commission may deem appropriate and necessary;

b. Office on Policy, Planning and Research - The Office on Policy, Planning and Research
shall be responsible for the formulation of appropriate policies and programs for ICCs/IPs
such as, but not limited to, the development of a Five-Year Master Plan for the ICCs/IPs.
Such plan shall undergo a process such that every five years, the Commission shall
endeavor to assess the plan and make ramifications in accordance with the changing
situations. The Office shall also undertake the documentation of customary law and shall
establish and maintain a Research Center that would serve as a depository of ethnographic
information for monitoring, evaluation and policy formulation. It shall assist the legislative
branch of the national government in the formulation of appropriate legislation benefiting
ICCs/IPs.

c. Office of Education, Culture and Health - The Office on Culture, Education and Health
shall be responsible for the effective implementation of the education, cultural and related
rights as provided in this Act. It shall assist, promote and support community schools, both
formal and non-formal, for the benefit of the local indigenous community, especially in areas
where existing educational facilities are not accessible to members of the indigenous group.
It shall administer all scholarship programs and other educational rights intended for ICC/IP
beneficiaries in coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the
Commission on Higher Education. It shall undertake, within the limits of available
appropriation, a special program which includes language and vocational training, public
health and family assistance program and related subjects.

It shall also identify ICCs/IPs with potential training in the health profession and encourage
and assist them to enroll in schools of medicine, nursing, physical therapy and other allied
courses pertaining to the health profession.

Towards this end, the NCIP shall deploy a representative in each of the said offices who
shall personally perform the foregoing task and who shall receive complaints from the
ICCs/IPs and compel action from appropriate agency. It shall also monitor the activities of
the National Museum and other similar government agencies generally intended to manage
and preserve historical and archeological artifacts of the ICCs /IPs and shall be responsible
for the implementation of such other functions as the NCIP may deem appropriate and
necessary;

d. Office on Socio-Economic Services and Special Concerns - The Office on Socio-

Economic Services and Special Concerns shall serve as the Office through which the NCIP
shall coordinate with pertinent government agencies specially charged with the
implementation of various basic socio-economic services, policies, plans and programs
affecting the ICCs/IPs to ensure that the same are properly and directly enjoyed by them. It
shall also be responsible for such other functions as the NCIP may deem appropriate and
necessary;

e. Office of Empowerment and Human Rights - The Office of Empowerment and Human
Rights shall ensure that indigenous socio- political, cultural and economic rights are
respected and recognized. It shall ensure that capacity building mechanisms are instituted
and ICCs/IPs are afforded every opportunity, if they so choose, to participate in all level
decision-making. It shall likewise ensure that the basic human rights, and such other rights
as the NCIP may determine, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations are protected and
promoted;

f. Administrative Office - The Administrative Office shall provide the NCIP with economical,
efficient and effective services pertaining to personnel, finance, records, equipment, security,
supplies, and related services. It shall also administer the Ancestral Domains Fund; and

g. Legal Affairs Office - There shall be a Legal Affairs Office which shall advice the NCIP on
all legal matters concerning ICCs/IPs and which shall be responsible for providing ICCs/IPs
 with legal assistance in litigation involving community interest. It shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the basis of complaints filed by the ICCs/IPs against a natural or juridical
person believed to have violated ICCs/IPs rights. On the basis of its findings, it shall initiate
the filing of appropriate legal or administrative action to the NCIP.

Section 47. Other Offices. - The NCIP shall have the power to create additional offices as it may
deem necessary subject to existing rules and regulations.

Section 48. Regional and Field Offices. - Existing regional and field offices shall remain to function
under the strengthened organizational structure of the NCIP. Other field office shall be created
wherever appropriate and the staffing pattern thereof shall be determined by the NCIP: Provided,
That in provinces where there are ICCs/IPs but without field offices, the NCIP shall establish field
offices in said provinces.

Section 49. Office of the Executive Director. - The NCIP shall create the Office of the Executive
Director which shall serve as its secretariat. The office shall be headed by an Executive Director who
shall be appointed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines upon the recommendation of
the NCIP on a permanent basis. The staffing pattern of the office shall be determined by the NCIP
subject to existing rules and regulations.

Section 50. Consultative Body. - A body consisting of the traditional leaders, elders and
representatives from the women and youth sectors of the different ICCs/IPs shall be constituted by
the NCIP from the time to time to advise it on matters relating to the problems, aspirations and
interests of the ICCs/IPs.

CHAPTER VIII
DELINEATION AND RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS

Section 51. Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Domains. - Self-delineation shall be

guiding principle in the identification and delineation of ancestral domains. As such, the ICCs/IPs
concerned shall have a decisive role in all the activities pertinent thereto. The Sworn Statement of
the Elders as to the Scope of the territories and agreements/pacts made with neighboring ICCs/IPs,
if any, will be essential to the determination of these traditional territories. The Government shall take
the necessary steps to identify lands which the ICCs/IPs concerned traditionally occupy and
guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession thereto. Measures shall be
taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs concerned to land which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting
cultivators.

Section 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be
done in accordance with the following procedures:

a. Ancestral Domains Delineated Prior to this Act - The provisions hereunder shall not apply
to ancestral domains/lands already delineated according to DENR Administrative Order No.
2, series of 1993, nor to ancestral lands and domains delineated under any other
community/ancestral domain program prior to the enactment of his law. ICCs/IPs enactment
of this law shall have the right to apply for the issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Title (CADT) over the area without going through the process outlined hereunder;
b. Petition for Delineation - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated
by the NCIP with the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation
filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;

c. Delineation Paper - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including

census of all community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral
Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be
done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine
involvement and participation by the members of the communities concerned;

d. Proof required - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or
community under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession
or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners
which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents:

1. Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;

2. Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;

3. Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial
grounds, sacred places and old villages;

4. Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries

entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other ICCs/IPs;

5. Survey plans and sketch maps;

6. Anthropological data;

7. Genealogical surveys;

8. Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting

grounds;

9. Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains,

rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like; and

10. Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.

e. Preparation of Maps - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based
thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete
with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features and landmarks
embraced therein;

f. Report of Investigation and Other Documents - A complete copy of the preliminary census
and a report of investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;

g. Notice and Publication - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native
language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least
fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and
regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
 once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto
within fifteen (15) days from the date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no
such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided,
further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are
not available;

h. Endorsement to NCIP - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection
process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a
favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is
deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional
evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed
patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of
rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all
concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP:
Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with
a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to
the selection below.

i. Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies -

The Chairperson of the NCIP shall certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain. The
secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Department of the Interior and Local Government, and Department of Justice,
the Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, and any other government
agency claiming jurisdiction over the area shall be notified thereof. Such notification shall
terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction previously claimed;

j. Issuance of CADT - ICCs/IPs whose ancestral domains have been officially delineated and
determined by the NCIP shall be issued a CADT in the name of the community concerned,
containing a list of all those identified in the census; and

k. Registration of CADTs - The NCIP shall register issued certificates of ancestral domain
titles and certificates of ancestral lands titles before the Register of Deeds in the place where
the property is situated.

Section 53. Identification, Delineation and Certification of Ancestral Lands. -

a. The allocation of lands within any ancestral domain to individual or indigenous corporate
(family or clan) claimants shall be left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance
with customs and traditions;

b. Individual and indigenous corporate claimants of ancestral lands which are not within
ancestral domains, may have their claims officially established by filing applications for the
identification and delineation of their claims with the Ancestral Domains Office. An individual
or recognized head of a family or clan may file such application in his behalf or in behalf of
his family or clan, respectively;

c. Proofs of such claims shall accompany the application form which shall include the
testimony under oath of elders of the community and other documents directly or indirectly
attesting to the possession or occupation of the areas since time immemorial by the
individual or corporate claimants in the concept of owners which shall be any of the authentic
 documents enumerated under Sec. 52 (d) of this act, including tax declarations and proofs of
payment of taxes;

d. The Ancestral Domains Office may require from each ancestral claimant the submission of
such other documents, Sworn Statements and the like, which in its opinion, may shed light
on the veracity of the contents of the application/claim;

e. Upon receipt of the applications for delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims,
the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the publication of the application and a copy of
each document submitted including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs
concerned in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document
shall also be posted at the local, provincial, and regional offices of the NCIP and shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks
to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from the date of
such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a
radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed
sufficient if both newspapers and radio station are not available

f. Fifteen (15) days after such publication, the Ancestral Domains Office shall investigate and
inspect each application, and if found to be meritorious, shall cause a parcellary survey of
the area being claimed. The Ancestral Domains office shall reject any claim that is deemed
patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification. In case of rejection, the
Ancestral Domains office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned,
containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP. In case of
conflicting claims among individual or indigenous corporate claimants, the Ancestral domains
Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a
preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to
Sec. 62 of this Act. In all proceedings for the identification or delineation of the ancestral
domains as herein provided, the Director of Lands shall represent the interest of the
Republic of the Philippines; and

g. The Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare and submit a report on each and every
application surveyed and delineated to the NCIP, which shall, in turn, evaluate or corporate
(family or clan) claimant over ancestral lands.

Section 54. Fraudulent Claims. - The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written request from the
ICCs/IPs, review existing claims which have been fraudulently acquired by any person or
community. Any claim found to be fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community
may be cancelled by the NCIP after due notice and hearing of all parties concerned.

Section 55. Communal Rights. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, areas within the ancestral domains,
whether delineated or not, shall be presumed to be communally held: Provide, That communal rights
under this Act shall not be construed as co-ownership as provided in Republic Act. No. 386,
otherwise known as the New Civil Code.

Section 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. - Property rights within the ancestral domains
already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected.

Section 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. - The ICCs/IPs shall have the priority
rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the
ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the
development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written
agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own
decision making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided, finally, That the all
extractions shall be used to facilitate the development and improvement of the ancestral domains.

Section 58. Environmental Consideration. - Ancestral domains or portion thereof, which are found
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest
cover, or reforestation as determined by the appropriate agencies with the full participation of the
ICCs/IPs concerned shall be maintained, managed and developed for such purposes. The ICCs/IPs
concerned shall be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such areas
with the full and effective assistance of the government agencies. Should the ICCs/IPs decide to
transfer the responsibility over the areas, said decision must be made in writing. The consent of the
ICCs/IPs should be arrived at in accordance with its customary laws without prejudice to the basic
requirement of the existing laws on free and prior informed consent: Provided, That the transfer shall
be temporary and will ultimately revert to the ICCs/IPs in accordance with a program for technology
transfer: Provided, further, That no ICCs/IPs shall be displaced or relocated for the purpose
enumerated under this section without the written consent of the specific persons authorized to give
consent.

Section 59. Certification Precondition. - all department and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease,
or entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that the
area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certificate shall only be issued after
a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domain Office of the area concerned:
Provided, That no certificate shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and
written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government
agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease,
or production sharing agreement while there is pending application CADT: Provided, finally, That the
ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not
satisfied the requirement of this consultation process.

Section 60. Exemption from Taxes. - All lands certified to be ancestral domains shall be exempt
from real property taxes, specially levies, and other forms of exaction except such portion of the
ancestral domains as are actually used for large-scale agriculture, commercial forest plantation and
residential purposes and upon titling by other by private person: Provided, that all exactions shall be
used to facilitate the development and improvement of the ancestral domains.

Section 61. Temporary Requisition Powers. - Prior to the establishment of an institutional

surveying capacity whereby it can effectively fulfill its mandate, but in no case beyond three (3) years
after its creation, the NCIP is hereby authorized to request the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) survey teams as well as other equally capable private survey teams,
through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), to delineate ancestral domain perimeters. The DENR
Secretary shall accommodate any such request within one (1) month of its issuance: Provided, That
the Memorandum of Agreement shall stipulate, among others, a provision for technology transfer to
the NCIP.

Section 62. Resolution of Conflicts. - In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse
claims within the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which cannot be resolved,
the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the
delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among
ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary
process shall be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry
out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That in any decision, order, award or ruling of the
NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to
the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.

Section 63. Applicable Laws. - Customary laws, traditions and practices of the ICCs/IPs of the land
where the conflict arises shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims and ownerships,
hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes. Any doubt or ambiguity in the application of
laws shall be resolved in favor of the ICCs/IPs.

Section 64. Remedial Measures. - Expropriation may be resorted to in the resolution of conflicts of

interest following the principle of the "common good". The NCIP shall take appropriate legal action
for the cancellation of officially documented titles which were acquired illegally: Provided, That such
procedure shall ensure that the rights of possessors in good faith shall be respected: Provided,
further, That the action for cancellation shall be initiated within two (2) years from the effectivity of
this Act: Provided, finally, That the action for reconveyance shall be a period of ten (10) years in
accordance with existing laws.

CHAPTER IX
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS

Section 65. Primary of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve ICCs/IPs,
customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.

Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no
such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided
under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

Section 67. Appeals to the Court of Appeals. - Decisions of the NCIP shall be appealable to the
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review.

Section 68. Execution of Decisions, Awards, Orders. - Upon expiration of the period here
provided and no appeal is perfected by any of the contending parties, the Hearing Officer of the
NCIP, on its own initiative or upon motion by the prevailing party, shall issue a writ of execution
requiring the sheriff or the proper officer to execute final decisions, orders or awards of the Regional
Hearing Officer of the NCIP.

Section 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP. - The NCIP shall have the power and authority:

a. To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed
before it as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

b. To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts,
records, agreements and other document of similar nature as may be material to a just
determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this
Act;
 c. To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties
therefor; and

d. To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending therefore it which, if
not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the
case or seriously affect social or economic activity.

Section 70. No restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. - No inferior court of the Philippines
shall have the jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the
NCIP or any of its duly authorized or designated offices in any case, dispute or controversy to, or
interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.

CHAPTER X
ANCESTRAL DOMAINS FUND

Section 71. Ancestral Domains Fund. - There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the
Ancestral Domains Fund, an initial amount of the One Hundred thirty million pesos(P130,000,000) to
cover compensation for expropriated lands, delineation and development of ancestral domains. An
amount of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000) shall be sourced from the gross income of the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) from its lotto operation, Ten millions pesos (P10,000,000) from
the gross receipts of the travel tax of the preceding year, the fund of the Social Reform Council
intended for survey and delineation of ancestral lands/domains, and such other source as the
government may be deem appropriate. Thereafter such amount shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act. Foreign as well as local funds which are made available for the
ICCs/IPs through the government of the Philippines shall be coursed through the NCIP. The NCIP
may also solicit and receive donations, endowments shall be exempted from income or gift taxes
and all other taxes, charges or fees imposed by the government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.

CHAPTER XI
PENALTIES

Section 72. Punishable Acts and Applicable Penalties. - Any person who commits violation of
any of the provisions of this Act, such as, but not limited to, authorized and/or unlawful intrusion
upon any ancestral lands or domains as stated in Sec. 10, Chapter III, or shall commit any of the
prohibited acts mentioned in Sections 21 and 24, Chapter V, Section 33, Chapter VI hereof, shall be
punished in accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, That no such
penalty shall be cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment: Provided, further, That neither shall the
death penalty or excessive fines be imposed. This provision shall be without prejudice to the right of
any ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of existing laws. In which case, any person who violates any
provision of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of not less than nine (9)
months but not more than twelve (12) years or a fine not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or both such fine and
imprisonment upon the discretion of the court. In addition, he shall be obliged to pay to the ICCs/IPs
concerned whatever damage may have been suffered by the latter as a consequence of the unlawful
act.

Section 73. Persons Subject to Punishment. - If the offender is a juridical person, all officers such
as, but not limited to, its president, manager, or head of office responsible for their unlawful act shall
be criminally liable therefor, in addition to the cancellation of certificates of their registration and/or
license: Provided, That if the offender is a public official, the penalty shall include perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.
 CHAPTER XII
MERGER OF THE OFFICE FOR NORTHERN CULTURAL COMMUNITIES (ONCC) AND THE
OFFICE FOR SOUTHERN CULTURAL COMMUNITIES (OSCC)

Section 74. Merger of ONCC/OSCC. - The Office for Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC) and
the Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), created under Executive Order Nos. 122-B
and 122-C respectively, are hereby merged as organic offices of the NCIP and shall continue to
function under a revitalized and strengthened structures to achieve the objectives of the NCIP:
Provided, That the positions of Regional Directors and below, are hereby phased-out upon the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, further, That officials and employees of the phased-out offices who
may be qualified may apply for reappointment with the NCIP and may be given prior rights in the
filing up of the newly created positions of NCIP, subject to the qualifications set by the Placement
Committee: Provided, furthermore, That in the case where an indigenous person and a non-
indigenous person with similar qualifications apply for the same position, priority shall be given to the
former. Officers and employees who are to be phased-out as a result of the merger of their offices
shall be entitled to gratuity a rate equivalent to one and a half (1 1/2) months salary for every year of
continuous and satisfactory service rendered or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to
them on the basis of the highest salary received. If they are already entitled to retirement benefits or
the gratuity herein provided. Officers and employees who may be reinstated shall refund such
retirement benefits or gratuity received: Provided, finally That absorbed personnel must still meet the
qualifications and standards set by the Civil Service and the Placement Committee herein created.

Section 75. Transition Period. - The ONCC/OSCC shall have a period of six (6) months from the
effectivity of this Act within which to wind up its affairs and to conduct audit of its finances.

Section 76. Transfer of Assets/Properties. - All real and personal properties which are vested in,
or belonging to, the merged offices as aforestated shall be transferred to the NCIP without further
need of conveyance, transfer or assignment and shall be held for the same purpose as they were
held by the former offices: Provided, That all contracts, records and documents shall be transferred
to the NCIP. All agreements and contracts entered into by the merged offices shall remain in full
force and effect unless otherwise terminated, modified or amended by the NCIP.

Section 77. Placement Committee. - Subject to rules on government reorganization, a Placement

Committee shall be created by the NCIP, in coordination with the Civil Service Commission, which
shall assist in the judicious selection and placement of personnel in order that the best qualified and
most deserving persons shall be appointed in the reorganized agency. The placement Committee
shall be composed of seven (7) commissioners and an ICCs/IPs representative from each of the first
and second level employees association in the Offices for Northern and Southern Cultural
Communities (ONCC/OSCC), nongovernment organizations (NGOs) who have served the
community for at least five (5) years and peoples organizations (POs) with at least five (5) years of
existence. They shall be guided by the criteria of retention and appointment to be prepared by the
consultative body and by the pertinent provisions of the civil service law.

CHAPTER XIII
FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 78. Special Provision. - The City of Baguio shall remain to be governed by its Chapter and
all lands proclaimed as part of its townsite reservation shall remain as such until otherwise
reclassified by appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior land rights and titles recognized and/or
required through any judicial, administrative or other processes before the effectivity of this Act shall
remain valid: Provided, further, That this provision shall not apply to any territory which becomes part
of the City of Baguio after the effectivity of this Act.
Section 79. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to finance the initial implementation of this
Act shall be charged against the current year's appropriation of the ONCC and the OSCC.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for its continued implementation shall be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 80. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - Within sixty (60) days immediately after
appointment, the NCIP shall issue the necessary rules and regulations, in consultation with the
Committees on National Cultural Communities of the House of Representatives and the Senate, for
the effective implementation of this Act.

Section 81. Saving Clause. - This Act will not in any manner adversely affect the rights and benefits
of the ICCs/IPs under other conventions, recommendations, international treaties, national laws,
awards, customs and agreements.

Section 82. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act or any portion thereof is
declared unconstitutional by a competent court, other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 83. Repealing Clause. - Presidential Decree NO. 410, Executive Order Nos. 122-B and
122-C, and all other laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with
this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 84. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen days (15) days upon its publication in the
Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: 29 October 1997.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 135385               December 6, 2000

ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, 

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO
CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI
KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-
ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU
EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY,
TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY
DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY,
LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA
GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES,
LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA
G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,
MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO
A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY,
HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID,
MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY
SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR.,
JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS
MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA,
represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father
TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS,intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. 1 In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October
13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.

On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the
IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors
of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the
leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for
Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition
be dismissed.

On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to
Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be
dismissed.

The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.

Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and
during the hearing.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable
public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are
private but community property of the indigenous peoples;

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains
and ancestral lands;

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;

(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;

"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and

"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners. 3

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral
domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of
the Constitution.4

These provisions are:

"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;

"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is
an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments,
Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the
jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;

"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous
peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the
interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and

"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples." 5

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of
the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control
over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6

Petitioners pray for the following:

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;

"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the
NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
Implementing Rules;

"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
 "(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management
to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371; and

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of
Philippine natural resources."7

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice
and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the
IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On
the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 8371.

Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights
may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.

As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.

Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago,
and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate opinion

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, p. 114.

2
 Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.
 3
 Id. at 23-25.

4
 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws."

5
 Rollo, pp. 25-27.

6
 Id. at 27-28.

7
 Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO, J.:

PRECIS

A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the
Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard
Posner1 wrote:2

"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most 'past-
dependent,' of the professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient
practices, ancient texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and
interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is suspicious of innovation,
discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes
are obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same
token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms with history."

When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), it

introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled
constitutional and jural precepts on state ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense
and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its distinct sociology and the
labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by
the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to fulfill the
constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities' right to their ancestral land
but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.

This Opinion discusses the following:

I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.

A. The Laws of the Indies

 B. Valenton v. Murciano

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

D. The Philippine Constitutions

II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).

A. Indigenous Peoples

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

2. Their Concept of Land

III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.

A. Legislative History

IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.

A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and
do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.

1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired

2. The concept of native title

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government

(b) Indian Title to land

(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

3. The option of securing a torrens title to the ancestral land

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands

2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral
domains does not deprive the State of ownership over the natural resources, control
and supervision in their development and exploitation.
 (a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the
parameters of Section 7(a) of the law on ownership of ancestral domains and
is ultra vires.

(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the

IPRA is allowed under Paragraph 3, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Consitution.

(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA

may be harmonized with Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.

V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous Movement.

DISCUSSION

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THE PHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.

A. The Laws of the Indies

The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state's power of dominium.3 This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The "Regalian
Doctrine" or jura regaliais a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into
the country through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e.,
more specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set
the policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to the Philippine Islands in the following manner:

"We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the
royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of
grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to
our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures,
and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present
condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what
may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them
more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of
as we may wish.

We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at
such time as shall to them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of
tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by
them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper
deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be
restored to us to be disposed of at our will." 4

The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of "discovery" and conquest. Consequently, all lands
became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took
charge of distributing the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military
and civilian.5 Private land titles could only be acquired from the government either by purchase or by
the various modes of land grant from the Crown.6
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.7 The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims. The law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880.
The Royal Decree of 1894, or the "Maura Law," was partly an amendment of the Mortgage Law as
well as the Laws of the Indies, as already amended by previous orders and decrees. 8 This was the
last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of all
agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the state.

Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government of
the United States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands.
In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act No.
926, the first Public Land Act.

B. Valenton v. Murciano

In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.9

Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time
occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860.
Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial
treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had
lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment,
asserting that their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in
the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against everyone, including the
State; and that the State, not owning the land, could not validly transmit it.

The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of "those special laws
which from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies." 10 The
question posed by the Court was: "Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription as
against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extent was it recognized?"

Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in
the Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a
specific colony, the Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862,
it was decreed that until regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the
Philippine Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, theOrdenanza of the Intendentes of
1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.11

Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, the
court interpreted it as follows:

"In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the
Crown which have not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded
him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands not so granted, that did not
belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted
lands, because some private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory
part of the law all the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities
named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or
showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention
of the law that mere possession for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the
land possessed by them without any action on the part of the authorities." 12
The preamble stated that all those lands which had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by
the kings who preceded him, belonged to the Crown.13 For those lands granted by the king, the
decree provided for a system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors of
agricultural land should exhibit their title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown. 14

The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown's
principal subdelegate to issue a general order directing the publication of the Crown's instructions:

"x x x to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the
promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x x x
cultivated or tenanted, may x x x appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by
virtue of which said lands are occupied. x x x. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the
parties interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated,
without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and
they will be granted to others."15

On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands "wrongfully occupied"
by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with
contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs'
case fared no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under the
earlier ones. Thus as a general doctrine, the Court stated:

"While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession
for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the
proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State
remained the absolute owner."16

In conclusion, the Court ruled: "We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these
Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any
action by the State."17Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to mere possession.
Murciano, on the other hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the
provincial secretary. In effect, Valenton upheld the Spanish concept of state ownership of public
land.

As a fitting observation, the Court added that "[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government
from earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain title deeds therefor from
the State, has been continued by the American Government in Act No. 926."18

C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System

Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed
rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of
the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their
titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the
completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and
grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public
lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; 19 and that the government's title to public
land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States.20 The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in
the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, 21 and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands. 22

Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law
was passed under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation
of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos
the same privileges.23 After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936
by Commonwealth Act No. 141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law
and it is essentially the same as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the
transitory provisions on the rights of American citizens and corporations during the Commonwealth
period at par with Filipino citizens and corporations. 24

Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496,
or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all
public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a
verbatim copy of the Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898, 25 which, in turn, followed the
principles and procedure of the Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who
patterned it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that
the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the
owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted
or the law warrants or reserves.26 The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all
claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly
facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.27

D. The Philippine Constitutions

The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating
objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the
natural resources of the country.28 There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in
favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the
Regalian doctrine.29 State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to
secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization.30 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not
certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the
Convention approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine. 31

Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources," reads as follows:

"Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period
exceeding twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant."
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the "National
Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation," to wit:

"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation,
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant."

The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on "National

Economy and Patrimony," to wit:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and utilization
of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State
may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may
be the measure and limit of the grant.

x x x."

Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated

therein, whether on public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State
ownership that petitioners claim is being violated by the IPRA.

II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.

Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997" or the
IPRA.

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership
and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of
these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership
under customary law which traces its origin to native title.

Other rights are also granted the ICCs/IPs, and these are:
 - the right to develop lands and natural resources;

- the right to stay in the territories;

- the right in case of displacement;

- the right to safe and clean air and water;

- the right to claim parts of reservations;

- the right to resolve conflict;32

- the right to ancestral lands which include

a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs,

subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned;

b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if
the transfer is to a non-member of the ICC/IP and is tainted by vitiated consent of the
ICC/IP, or if the transfer is for an unconscionable consideration. 33

Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-
governance and empowerment,34 social justice and human rights,35 the right to preserve and protect
their culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their
own sciences and technologies.36

To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of
seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas- Region I and
the Cordilleras; Region II; the rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon,
Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern
Mindanao; and Central Mindanao. 37 The NCIP took over the functions of the Office for Northern
Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities created by former President
Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure. 38

Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When still
unresolved, the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers. 39 The
NCIP's decisions may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized
and/or unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with
customary laws or imprisoned from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from P100,000.00
to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay damages.40

A. Indigenous Peoples

The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities
(ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that
of "IPs" is the contemporary international language in the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 16941 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.42
ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:

"Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous Peoples- refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously
lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under
claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories,
sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who
have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous
religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall
likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the
populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of
inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries,
who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may
have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains."

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or

homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on
communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied,
possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share
common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their
resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include
descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have
been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains.

1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao,
Mindoro, Negros, Samar, Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of
110 tribes and are as follows:

1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region- Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao,
Kalinga, Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag
of Isabela, Cagayan; Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva
Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.

2. In Region III- Aetas.

3. In Region IV- Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan
or Mangyan, Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental
Mindoro; Tadyawan of Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao't bato
of Palawan.

4. In Region V- Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and
Kabihug of Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay, Cimaron of
Sorsogon; and the Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.

5. In Region VI- Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros
Occidental; the Corolano and Sulod.
 6. In Region VII- Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.

7. In Region IX- the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the
Kalibugan of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.

8. Region X- Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon,
Matigsalog, Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of
Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of
Agusan del Sur, Misamis Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan
provinces, and the Umayamnon of Agusan and Bukidnon.

9. In Region XI- There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the
Dibabaon, Mansaka of Davao del Norte; B'laan, Kalagan, Langilad, T'boli and Talaingod of
Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and
Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South Cotabato; the Mangguangon of Davao and South
Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del Sur; Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of
South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del sur and South Cotabato.

10. In Region XII- Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and
Iranon.43

How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back to as early as 25,000
to 30,000 B.C.

Before the time of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the
Negritos, Indonesians and Malays.44 The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common
cultural features which became the dominant influence in ethnic reformulation in the archipelago.
Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millenium B.C. augmented
these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese
porcelain, silk and traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of pre-
colonial society.45

The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering became
supplementary activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the
soil.46 From the hinterland, coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially
homogeneous culture, a basically common way of life where nature was a primary
factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was influenced by, and responded to, common
ecology. The generally benign tropical climate and the largely uniform flora and fauna favored
similarities, not differences.47 Life was essentially subsistence but not harsh.48

The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had
languages that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them not only as media
of daily communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their literary moods. 49 They
fashioned concepts and beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be
part of their lives.50 They had their own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality
of the soul and life after death. Their rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they
called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul
spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the animals and birds, for they seemed to
consider the objects of Nature as something to be respected. They venerated almost any object that
was close to their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between man and the object
of nature.51
The unit of government was the "barangay," a term that derived its meaning from the Malay word
"balangay," meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores.52 The barangay was basically
a family-based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was
different and ruled by a chieftain called a "dato." It was the chieftain's duty to rule and govern his
subjects and promote their welfare and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all
the functions of government. He was the executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme
commander in time of war.53

Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from
generation to generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They were
preserved in songs and chants and in the memory of the elder persons in the community. 54 The
written laws were those that the chieftain and his elders promulgated from time to time as the
necessity arose.55 The oldest known written body of laws was the Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel
at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and the Principal Code of
Sulu.56 Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various subjects, such as inheritance,
divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment, property rights, family relations and
adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through a court composed by
the chieftain as "judge" and the barangay elders as "jury." Conflicts arising between subjects of
different barangays were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral
barangays acted as arbiters. 57

Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The
chiefs merely administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an
extension of the family with chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual,
therefore, participated in the community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a
member of the barangay.58 This ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept
of mutual sharing of resources so that no individual, regardless of status, was without
sustenance. Ownership of land was non-existent or unimportant and the right of usufruct was
what regulated the development of lands.59 Marine resources and fishing grounds were likewise
free to all. Coastal communities depended for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing sharing
concept similar to those in land communities.60 Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and
elders, by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and benefits.
But their rights, related to either land and sea, were subject to their responsibility to protect the
communities from danger and to provide them with the leadership and means of survival. 61

Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The
Sultanate of Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by
Tawi-tawi, Sulu, Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic groups were within this jurisdiction:
Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon. 62 The Sultanate of Maguindanao spread out from Cotabato
toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. 63

The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in
common but was private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The
Code contains a provision on the lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no provision for the
acquisition, transfer, cession or sale of land.64

The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspi therefore were primitive economies where
most production was geared to the use of the producers and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations.
They were not economies geared to exchange and profit. 65 Moreover, the family basis of barangay
membership as well as of leadership and governance worked to splinter the population of the islands
into numerous small and separate communities.66
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos
living in barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first
tasks imposed on the missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos
together in a reduccion.67 As early as 1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying
solicitous attitude towards the natives.68 The Spaniards regarded it a sacred "duty to conscience and
humanity to civilize these less fortunate people living in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord
them the "moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance
afforded them by the same laws."69

The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent would
be constructed. All the new Christian converts were required to construct their houses around the
church and the unbaptized were invited to do the same. 70 With the reduccion, the Spaniards
attempted to "tame" the reluctant Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa
real/plaza complex as focal point. Thereduccion, to the Spaniards, was a "civilizing" device to make
the Filipinos law-abiding citizens of the Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately
adopt Hispanic culture and civilization. 71

All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands
not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas,
belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants were made to non-
Filipinos.72

The abrogation of the Filipinos' ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of
public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and
law.73 The concept that the Spanish king was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or
colonies was imposed on the natives, and the natives were stripped of their ancestral rights
to land.74

Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified the
Filipinos according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types . First
were the Indios, the Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland populations.
Second, were the Moros or the Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous
communities.75

The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the Spaniards
and was allowed certain status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were
regarded as the lowest classes.76

The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from
Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not
pursue them into the deep interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate
concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and
inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative security.77 Thus, the infieles, which were
peripheral to colonial administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also
thwarted the Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly evolved Christian
community.78Their own political, economic and social systems were kept constantly alive and vibrant.

The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of
suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the
other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically related populace
through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos. 79
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900,
addressed the existence of the infieles:

"In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same
course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to
maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are
now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling
to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and,
without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent
barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs." 80

Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of civilization,
the American government chose "to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity
and with the national conscience." 81

The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian

Filipinos. The term "non-Christian" referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and
more directly, "to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities."82

Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act
No. 253 creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the
Interior, the BNCT's primary task was to conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized
Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, with a "special view to determining the most
practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and prosperity." The BNCT
was modeled after the bureau dealing with American Indians. The agency took a keen
anthropological interest in Philippine cultural minorities and produced a wealth of valuable materials
about them.83

The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging
issue then was the conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.

In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed R.A. No. 1888, an "Act to effectuate in a more rapid and
complete manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-Christian
Filipinos or national cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent the integration of
all said national cultural minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on National
Integration charged with said functions." The law called for a policy of integration of indigenous
peoples into the Philippine mainstream and for this purpose created theCommission on National
Integration (CNI).84 The CNI was given, more or less, the same task as the BNCT during the
American regime. The post-independence policy of integration was like the colonial policy of
assimilation understood in the context of a guardian-ward relationship.85

The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and
Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II,
a tidal wave of Christian settlers from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands
and wide open spaces in Mindanao.86 Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the
Torrens system resulted in the titling of several ancestral lands in the settlers' names. With
government initiative and participation, this titling displaced several indigenous peoples from
their lands. Worse, these peoples were also displaced by projects undertaken by the national
government in the name of national development. 87

It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:

"The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural
communities in the formulation and implementation of State policies." 88

For the first time in Philippine history, the "non-Christian tribes" or the "cultural minorities"
were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as "cultural
communities." More importantly this time, their "uncivilized" culture was given some recognition
and their "customs, traditions, beliefs and interests" were to be considered by the State in the
formulation and implementation of State policies.President Marcos abolished the CNI and
transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities
(PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration
into the larger community, and at the same time "protect the rights of those who wish to preserve
their original lifeways beside the larger community."89 In short, while still adopting the integration
policy, the decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life. 90

In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410, otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands

Decree. The decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates to members of the
national cultural communities who were given up to 1984 to register their claims. 91 In 1979,
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems was created under E.O. No. 561 which
provided a mechanism for the expeditious resolution of land problems involving small settlers,
landowners, and tribal Filipinos.92

Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980's, some 100,000 Kalingas and
Bontoks of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National
Power Corporation (NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon
Sugar Industries Company (BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was
authorized by law in 1979 to take approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became the NDC-
Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most of the land was possessed by the Agusan
natives.93 Timber concessions, water projects, plantations, mining, and cattle ranching and other
projects of the national government led not only to the eviction of the indigenous peoples from their
land but also to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment. 94

The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of
preservation.Invoking her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created
the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for
Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President. 95

The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal
Filipinos to preserve their way of life.96 This Constitution goes further than the 1973
Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains,
the State has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.

2. Their Concept of Land

Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream.
They are non-Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a
system of self-government not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic
of the Philippines. They follow ways of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of
the rest of the population.97 The kind of response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial
threat worked well to their advantage by making it difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode
their customs and traditions. The "infieles societies" which had become peripheral to colonial
administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base of archipelagic culture.
The political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented arrangement of
power and authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient
communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division of labor and
distinction of functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms of life portraying
the varieties of social courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant. 98

Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples' existence. There is no traditional

concept of permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more
accurately applies to the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the
secondary owners or stewards of the land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses
his claim of ownership, and the land reverts to the beings of the spirit world who are its true and
primary owners. Under the concept of "trusteeship," the right to possess the land does not only
belong to the present generation but the future ones as well. 99

Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no one owns the land except the gods
and spirits, and that those who work the land are its mere stewards. 100 Customary law has a strong
preference for communal ownership, which could either be ownership by a group of individuals or
families who are related by blood or by marriage,101 or ownership by residents of the same locality
who may not be related by blood or marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary
laws draws its meaning from the subsistence and highly collectivized mode of economic production.
The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team occupation like hunting, foraging for forest
products, and swidden farming found it natural that forest areas, swidden farms, orchards, pasture
and burial grounds should be communally-owned.102 For the Kalingas, everybody has a common
right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land are shared in
common.

Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions
individual ownership. The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system
of individual ownership. It is limited because while the individual owner has the right to use and
dispose of the property, he does not possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined
under our Civil Code.103 Under Kalinga customary law, the alienation of individually-owned land is
strongly discouraged except in marriage and succession and except to meet sudden financial needs
due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops.104Moreover, and to be alienated should first be
offered to a clan-member before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be
sold to a non-member of the ili.105

Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples' economic and social system. The concept
of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin,
our national land laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral
lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent. 106

III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.

A. The Legislative History of the IPRA

It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth
Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills- Senate
Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.

Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier,107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of

four proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and
Natural Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the
comprehensive version of Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which was a result of six regional
consultations and one national consultation with indigenous peoples nationwide.108 At the
Second Regular Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier, in his sponsorship speech, gave a
background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:

"The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the
dominance and neglect of government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their
Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were
pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their ancestral land and with the
massive exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population, they
became marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious
conspiracy against the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the
resettlement of people to their ancestral land, which was massive during the Commonwealth and
early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine first introduced to our
system by Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the government
passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to
migrant homesteaders within the traditional areas of the ICCs."109

Senator Flavier further declared:

"The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the land
long before any central government was established. Their ancestors had territories over which they
ruled themselves and related with other tribes. These territories- the land- include people, their
dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the animals. This is their environment
in its totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives through political,
economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutable proof to
this.

Their survival depends on securing or acquiring land rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending
on it. Otherwise, IPs shall cease to exist as distinct peoples." 110

To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based
on two postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) the principle of parens patriae.

According to Senator Flavier, "[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine
reinstated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution," our "decisional laws" and jurisprudence
passed by the State have "made exception to the doctrine." This exception was first laid down in
the case of Cariño v. Insular Governmentwhere:

"x x x the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural
communities as one of private ownership, which, in legal concept, is termed "native title." This ruling
has not been overturned. In fact, it was affirmed in subsequent cases." 111

Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, C.A. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410,
P.D. 1529, R.A. 6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These
laws, explicitly or implicitly, and liberally or restrictively, recognized "native title" or "private right" and
the existence of ancestral lands and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator
Flavier continued:

"x x x the executive department of government since the American occupation has not implemented
the policy. In fact, it was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard
shown during the period unto the Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine Republic
when government organized and supported massive resettlement of the people to the land of the
ICCs."

Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their ancestral
land. The bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriae inherent in the supreme
power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that
persons suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual
inequality in their relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.

Senate Bill No. 1728 was passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in
favor and none against, with no abstention.112

House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural
Communities. It was originally authored and subsequently presented and defended on the floor
by Rep. Gregorio Andolana of North Cotabato.113

Rep. Andolana's sponsorhip speech reads as follows:

"This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that would
promote, recognize the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national
unity and development.

Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government's obligation to assure and ascertain
that these rights shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws
that remained long before this Republic was established shall be preserved and promoted. There is
a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and early approval of the substitute bill
shall bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 12 million Filipinos that
they be considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000." 114

Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated in
the Constitution. He also emphasized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cariño v.
Insular Government which recognized the fact that they had vested rights prior to the establishment
of the Spanish and American regimes.115

After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was
approved on Second Reading with no objections.

IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.

A. Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands are the Private Property of Indigenous Peoples
and Do Not Constitute Part of the Land of the Public Domain.

The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and
ancestral lands.Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in
Section 3 [a] and [b] of the Indigenous Peoples Right Act, viz:

"Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging
to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held
under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government
and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and
cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other
lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial
grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may
no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for
their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized
by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other
voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but
not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots."

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied
or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or
any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral
domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and
includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators.116

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains
except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed
but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These
lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden
farms and tree lots.117

The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures embodied in
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, signed by then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala. 118 DAO No. 2 allowed the
delineation of ancestral domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of
Ancestral Land Claims (CALC's) and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC's) to IPs.

The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by the
IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). 119 The guiding principle in
identification and delineation is self-delineation. 120 This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive role
in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto. 121

The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51
and 52 of the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in Section
53 of said law.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding
by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned. 122 The allocation of lands within the
ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the
ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions. 123 With respect to
ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land
Title (CALT).124

CADT's and CALT's issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of
Deeds in the place where the property is situated. 125

(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired

The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two
modes: (1) bynative title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under
the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.

(2) The Concept of Native Title

Native title is defined as:

"Sec. 3 [l]. Native Title- refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as
memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been
public lands and are thusindisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the
Spanish Conquest."126

Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public
lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish
Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral lands) by
virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected. 127 Formal recognition, when solicited by
ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which
shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated. 128

Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title,
however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and
domains. The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never
to have been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably
presumed to have never been public lands and are private.

(a) Cariño v. Insular Government129

The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular
Government.130Cariño firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of
any royal grant from the State.

In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146 hectares
of land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and
occupied by his ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the
property for the holding of cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño
inherited the land in accordance with Igorot custom. He tried to have the land adjusted under the
Spanish land laws, but no document issued from the Spanish Crown. 131 In 1901, Cariño obtained a
possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage Law. 132 The North American colonial
government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public road on the land prompting him
to seek a Torrens title to his property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a
U.S. military reservation133 was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military
detachment was detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including
Cariño, off the land.134

In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño's application for absolute ownership to the land.
Both the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of
Benguet which reversed the land registration court and dismissed Cariño's application. The
Philippine Supreme Court135 affirmed the C.F.I. by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case
to the U.S. Supreme Court.136 On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine
and contended that Cariño failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25,
1880, which required registration of land claims within a limited period of time. Cariño, on the other,
asserted that he was the absolute owner of the land jure gentium, and that the land never formed
part of the public domain.

In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the U.S. Supreme Court held:

"It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were
held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not
recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of civilization with
themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign
nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that,
as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power.
When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How
far a new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past,
and how far it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide." 137

The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with the
new colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had to be decided under U.S. law.

The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American constitutionalist's concept of "due

process" as well as the pronounced policy "to do justice to the natives." 138 It was based on the strong
mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that "No law shall be enacted in said
islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny
to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." The court declared:

"The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States.
Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose
of the whites in America was to occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our
taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent
with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice
to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, chapter
1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United
States are to be administered 'for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.' It is reasonable to suppose
that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own
is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own. The same statute made a bill of rights,
embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards
to all. It provides that 'no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws.' In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that
the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace the
inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such by
ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and that it
proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association,- of the
profoundest factors in human thought,- regarded as their own." 139

The Court went further:

"Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes,
the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed
to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have
been public land. Certainly in a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we
ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt." 140

The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or
memory went, and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to
"never have been public land."

Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the 1904
decision ofValenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found no proof that the Spanish
decrees did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valenton appeared to
recognize that the natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine
declared in the preamble of the Recopilacion was all "theory and discourse" and it was observed that
titles were admitted to exist beyond the powers of the Crown, viz:

"If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof
that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the
older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty
clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal
grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines
into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of the
the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3
Philippine 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the
exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is
true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all
titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles
were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in
their books." (Emphasis supplied).141

The court further stated that the Spanish "adjustment" proceedings never held sway over
unconquered territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to convey
to the natives that failure to register what to them has always been their own would mean loss of
such land. The registration requirement was "not to confer title, but simply to establish it;" it was "not
calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it."

By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank
enough, however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land
under Spanish law because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various
interpretations which may be given them. But precisely because of the ambiguity and of the
strong "due process mandate" of the Constitution, the court validated this kind of title. 142 This
title was sufficient, even without government administrative action, and entitled the holder to a
Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes explained:

"It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not
without difficulties for courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice
the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the
fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the
opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should
not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property,
through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain." 143

Thus, the court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registration of the 148 hectares in
Baguio Municipality in his name.144

Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as
"native title." It simply said:

"The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government
of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials would not
have granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff was
entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question
good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of
the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when the present government
seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of native titles through an
important part of the Island of Luzon, at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would
not have permitted and had not the power to enforce." 145

This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term "native title" in the entire length of
the Cariñodecision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term "native title" may be traced to
Professor Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at the University of the Philippines College of
Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch published an article in the Philippine
Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law.146 This article was made
after Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal communities throughout the country and studied the
origin and development of Philippine land laws.147 He discussed Cariñoextensively and used the
term "native title" to refer to Cariño's title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in said
case.

(b) Indian Title

In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of "native title" as defined
by Justice Holmes in Cariño "is conceptually similar to "aboriginal title" of the American
Indians.148 This is not surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American
regime, government policy towards ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference to native
Americans.149 This was clearly demonstrated in the case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.150

In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor to
remove the Mangyans from their domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio
Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some
Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for trying to escape from the reservation, filed for
habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board Resolution. This Court denied the
petition on the ground of police power. It upheld government policy promoting the idea that a
permanent settlement was the only successful method for educating the Mangyans, introducing
civilized customs, improving their health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which they
roamed.151 Speaking through Justice Malcolm, the court said:

"Reference was made in the President's instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine
Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically
identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes.
Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.

From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a
state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the
Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when
and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary
authority of the United States.152

x x x.

As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly
identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist
in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on
these reservations, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so
located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general
good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that
the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and
that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation of the
Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United
States."153

Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian
reservation is a part of the public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and occupation of
a tribe or tribes of Indians.154 It may be set apart by an act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive
order, but it cannot be established by custom and prescription. 155

Indian title to land, however, is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the
"aboriginal right of possession or occupancy."156 The aboriginal right of possession depends on
the actual occupancy of the lands in question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in the
sense that such lands constitute definable territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or
nation.157 It is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action,
although in numerous instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing their
aboriginal possession and delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting their
boundaries.158

American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians' or native Americans' rights to land they have
held and occupied before the "discovery" of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest
definitive statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in
1823 in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh.159

In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of
two (2) Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs
being private persons. The only conveyance that was recognized was that made by the Indians to
the government of the European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed
out that the potentates of the old world believed that they had made ample compensation to the
inhabitants of the new world by bestowing civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition,
said the court, they found it necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war,
to establish the principle that discovery gives title to the government by whose subjects, or by
whose authority, the discovery was made, against all other European governments, which
title might be consummated by possession.160 The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to the
nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing
settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated that:

"Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by
themselves. The rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between
them.

In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance,

entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted
to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession
of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave
exclusive title to those who made it.

While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they
asserted the ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a
consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of
the natives. These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy."161

Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire
Indian land and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer- whether to England, France, Spain or
Holland- did this right belong and not to any other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of
the right nonetheless did not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by
purchase or conquest, exercised its right, the concerned Indians were recognized as the "rightful
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it." Grants made by the
discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were held to convey a title to the
grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer purchased the land from
the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an absolute title
unrestricted by Indian rights.

The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title
paramount to the title of the United States itself to other parties, saying:

"It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession
has never been questioned. The claim of government extends to the complete ultimate title,
charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive power of acquiring that right."162

It has been said that the history of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the
universal recognition of this principle.163

The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and their native lands without
having to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. citizens. 164
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.165 In this case, the State of Georgia
enacted a law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or
permit from the Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor.
The plaintiffs, who were white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a
violation of the Act.

The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties
established between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress
regulating intercourse with them. It characterized the relationship between the United States
government and the Indians as:

"The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for
the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into
their country. That power was naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged under the
protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of the British power in their neighborhood, and the
establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to the declaration, on the part of
the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States, and of no other power.
They assumed the relation with the United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.

This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful, not that
of individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the laws of a
master."166

It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial
boundaries and recognize their right of occupancy over all the lands within their domains. Thus:

"From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and
intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm
purpose to afford that protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802,
which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and
having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but
guaranteed by the United States.

x x x.

"The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil
from time immemorial,with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which
excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the
coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates
imposed on themselves, as well as on the Indians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to
them, means "a people distinct from others." x x x.167

The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of
Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with
treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States." 168

The discovery of the American continent gave title to the government of the discoverer as against all
other European governments. Designated as the naked fee, 169 this title was to be consummated by
possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the
Indians' legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original
inhabitants of the land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the
Indians' land- either by purchase, "defensive" conquest, or cession- and in so doing, extinguish the
Indian title. Only the discoverer could extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate
dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations of Europe respected the rights of the natives as
occupants, they all asserted the ultimate dominion and title to be in themselves. 170

As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands
occupied by the Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign- first the
discovering European nation and later the original 13 States and the United States- a right of
occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless recognized. The Federal Government
continued the policy of respecting the Indian right of occupancy, sometimes called Indian title, which
it accorded the protection of complete ownership. 171 But this aboriginal Indian interest simply
constitutes "permission" from the whites to occupy the land, and means mere possession not
specifically recognized as ownership by Congress. 172 It is clear that this right of occupancy based
upon aboriginal possession is not a property right. 173 It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the
federal government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to extinguish the right of
occupancy at will.174 Thus, aboriginal title is not the same as legal title. Aboriginal title rests on
actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time. 175 It entails that land owned by
Indian title must be used within the tribe, subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to
another sovereign government nor to any citizen. 176 Such title as Indians have to possess and
occupy land is in the tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in
the tribal property usually depends upon tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally being
held in communal ownership.177

As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term "public lands," which is ordinarily used to
designate such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. 178 Indian land
which has been abandoned is deemed to fall into the public domain. 179 On the other hand, an Indian
reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use and occupation of a tribe of
Indians.180 Once set apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land, and until the
Indian title is extinguished, no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict the
nation's power to dispose of, them. 181

The American judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of
indigenous Americans.182 And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second,
indigenous property systems are also recognized. From a legal point of view, certain benefits can be
drawn from a comparison of Philippine IPs to native Americans. 183 Despite the similarities between
native title and aboriginal title, however, there are at present some misgivings on whether
jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S.
recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over their land; title to the land, however, is deemed
to have passed to the U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal title of ownership is not
specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress. 184 The protection of
aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment by persons other than the Federal
Government.185 Although there are criticisms against the refusal to recognize the native Americans'
ownership of these lands,186 the power of the State to extinguish these titles has remained firmly
entrenched.187

Under the IPRA, the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the ancestral
domains and ancestral lands.188 The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between
its application in the Philippines vis-à-vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on
the peculiar facts of each case.
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique

In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the IPRA grants
ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is
private and was never public. Cariño is the only case that specifically and categorically
recognizes native title. The long line of cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title and
the private character of ancestral domains and lands. Cariño was cited by the succeeding
cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land Act which is a
different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must
be public agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act
are complied with, the possessor of the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right
to a grant of the land.189 The land ceases to be part of the public domain, 190 ipso jure,191 and is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory period.

It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands192 that the court declared that the rule that all
lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public
domain has an exception. This exception would be any land that should have been in the
possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind
of possession that would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. 193 Oh Cho, however,
was decided under the provisions of the Public Land Act and Cariñowas cited to support the
applicant's claim of acquisitive prescription under the said Act.

All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open and
adverse possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long, continuous,
open and adverse possession in the concept of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens 194 and
members of the national cultural minorities 195 that converts the land from public into private and
entitles the registrant to a torrens certificate of title.

(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is
Private.

The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is
further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned
ancestral lands. For purposes of registration under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into public agricultural land
which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is thatancestral land is
private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for
registration purposes. To wit:

"Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the
Land Registration Act 496- Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their
individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest,
have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since time
immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of
this Act and uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title
to their ancestral lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
Registration Act 496.

For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and
actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a
slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural lands.

The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval
of this Act."196

ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a torrens certificate of title over their individually-owned
ancestral lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be
individually, not communally, owned.

Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in
the concept of owner since time immemorial197 or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims
are uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of
registration, the individually-owned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and are actually
used for agricultural, residential, pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified
as public agricultural lands regardless of whether they have a slope of 18% or more.

The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the requirements
of the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act. C.A. 141, the Public Land Act, deals
specifically with lands of the public domain. 198 Its provisions apply to those lands "declared open to
disposition or concession" x x x "which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes,
nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor those on
which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law x x x or which
having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so."199 Act 496, the Land Registration Act,
allows registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral domains and
lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of C.A. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA
itself converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per
cent (18%) or over,200 from private to public agricultural land for proper disposition.

The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless
a limited period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the
date of approval of the IPRA.

Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and
Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a)
agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same
Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral domains but it does not classify them under any
of the said four categories. To classify them as public lands under any one of the four classes
will render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs
which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the
ICCs/IPs.201

The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to "protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands" and that "Congress provide for the applicability of
customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain." 202 It is
the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and
lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.
B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of
ownership under thecivil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period,
and harkens to Section 44 of the Public Land Act on administrative legalization (free patent) of
imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles. Thus:

"Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four
hectares and who since July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands
subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon while the same has not
been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free
patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.

A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether
disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding
paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent application he is
not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under the provision of the Public
Land Law.203

x x x.

"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [perfection of Spanish titles] xxx.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years
shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof."204

Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public agricultural
land but because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years
(judicial confirmation), the land has become private. Open, adverse, public and continuous
possession is sufficient, provided, the possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession
has to be confirmed judicially or administratively after which a torrens title is issued.
A torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the rights
of ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427,
428 and 429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the
Philippines through the Civil Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over
things or rights. It primarily includes the right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned.
And the right to enjoy and dispose of the thing includes the right to receive from the thing what it
produces,205 the right to consume the thing by its use,206 the right to alienate, encumber, transform or
even destroy the thing owned, 207 and the right to exclude from the possession of the thing owned by
any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing. 208

1. The Indigenous Concept of Ownership and Customary Law.

Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes
the indigenous concept of ownership of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:

"Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership.- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural
integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the
ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be
sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights."

The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held
under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral
domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply because it is
not part of the public domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is
owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The IPRA itself provides
that areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be communally
held.209 These communal rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights
under the Civil Code.210 Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the
property held in common. The Civil Code expressly provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership." Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing in
common, insofar as his share is concerned. 211 To allow such a right over ancestral domains may be
destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the very community itself. 212

Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much
less corporate condominium rights. A corporation can exist only for a maximum of fifty (50) years
subject to an extension of another fifty years in any single instance. 213 Every stockholder has the right
to disassociate himself from the corporation.214 Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved
voluntarily or involuntarily.215

Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but
extends to all generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the
reason why the ancestral domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot
be transferred, sold or conveyed to other persons. It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.

Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are
communal. These lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to
the members of the same ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject
to the right of redemption of the ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a
non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that "customary law govern property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains," 216 the IPRA, by legislative fiat,
introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under
customary law.217

Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a
source of law.218 Some articles of the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in
cases where no codal provision is applicable. 219 In other words, in the absence of any applicable
provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and liabilities. 220

Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies
to ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil
law. The indigenous concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged and
recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on land titling and land
registration.221

To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The CADT
is merely a "formal recognition" of native title. This is clear from Section 11 of the IPRA, to wit:

"Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.- The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains
by virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by
ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall
recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated."

The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is "belongingness" to the land,
being people of the land- by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall,
and the faithful nurture of the land by the sweat of one's brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation
to the land- the possession of stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and the mutuality of
blessings between man and land; from man, care for land; from the land, sustenance for man. 222

C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA Do Not Violate the Regalian Doctrine Enshrined in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands

The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands.
Section 7 provides for the rights over ancestral domains:

"Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.- The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights include:

a) Right of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water

traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;

b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right
to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or
used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation
and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms
and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
 ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures,
pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private,
that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the
right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation
and encroachment upon these rights;"

c) Right to Stay in the Territories.- The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed
therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor
through any means other than eminent domain. x x x;

d) Right in Case of Displacement.- In case displacement occurs as a result of natural

catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas
where they can have temporary life support systems: x x x;

e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.- Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and
organizations into their domains;

f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.-For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access
to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;

g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.- The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains
which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for
common and public welfare and service;

h) Right to Resolve Conflict.- Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary
laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be
submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary."

Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:

"Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.- The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their
ancestral lands shall be recognized and protected.

a) Right to transfer land/property.- Such right shall include the right to transfer land or
property rights to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and
traditions of the community concerned.

b) Right to Redemption.- In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights
by virtue of any agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted
by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs, or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration
or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not
exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer."

Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership over their ancestral domains which

covers (a) lands, (b) bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred
places, (d) traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any
time within the domains. The right of ownership includes the following rights: (1) the right to
develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to stay in the territories; (c) the right to
resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry of migrants; (e) the right to
safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains as reservations;
and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.

Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains,
Section 8 gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the
same ICCs/IPs or non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to
secure a torrens title over the ancestrallands, but not to domains.

2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains
Does Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision
in their Development and Exploitation.

The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is
declared in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and
other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated.The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or, it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms
and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino

citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers
in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the state shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution." 223

All lands of the public domain and all natural resources- waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources- are owned by the State. The Constitution provides that in the
exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full control
and supervision, and may undertake the same in four (4) modes:
 1. The State may directly undertake such activities; or

2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements

with Filipino citizens or qualified corporations;

3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino

citizens;

4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and

other mineral oils, the President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving technical or financial assistance.

As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in
the exploration, development and utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly
undertake the exploitation and development by itself, or, it may allow participation by the private
sector through co-production,224 joint venture,225 or production-sharing agreements.226 These
agreements may be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The State, through
Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For the
large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils,
the State, through the President, may enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with
foreign-owned corporations.

Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of
1991 (R.A. 7076) the three types of agreements, i.e., co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing, may apply to both large-scale227 and small-scale mining.228 "Small-scale mining" refers to
"mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do
not use explosives or heavy mining equipment." 229

Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over
the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral
domains includesownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and limited in Section 7
(a) as:

"Sec. 7. a) Right of ownership- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;"

The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains." It will be noted that this enumeration
does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the
traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources
found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not
cover "waters,minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests ortimber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources"
enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.

The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section 7(a) complies
with the Regalian doctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7
(a) of the IPRA And is Unconstitutional.

The Rules Implementing the IPRA230 in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:

"Section 1. Rights of Ownership. ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural
resources and all improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/ lands.
These rights shall include, but not limited to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to
use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to recover ownership, and the rights or interests
over land and natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to lands lost
through fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable price."

Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over "lands, waters and
natural resources." The term "natural resources" is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section
7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership
over land does not necessarily include the right to claim ownership over the natural resources found
on or under the land.231 The IPRA itself makes a distinction between land and natural
resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the land within the
ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that speak of natural resources, and
these provisions, as shall be discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the right of ownership
over these resources.

The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and
categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the
Implementing Rules in general.232Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the
law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion of "natural resources" in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of
the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

(b) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraph 3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.

Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants
the ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz:

"Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to
develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and
conserve natural resourceswithin the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future
generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources
found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources
in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will
affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by
the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;"

The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) of the IPRA enumerates the
following rights:

a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied;

 b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the
responsibilities for future generations;

c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein;

d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources for
the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws;

e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation
of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains
and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a
result of the project;

f) the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights.233

Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for future
generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their allocation and utilization, and
"negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring
ecological and environmental protection and conservation measures." It must be noted that the
right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration
which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and
conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and
development of natural resources.

Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form of management or
stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization
or negotiate the terms for their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure
that the natural resources within their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and
that the "utilization" of these resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant to
national and customary laws.234

The limited rights of "management and use" in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate
small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale
utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution "in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal
fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance
and survival."235 Section 7 (b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these
resources and ensure environmental and ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by
their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.

(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed

Under Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 57 of the IPRA provides:

"Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.- The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in
theharvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the
ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the
development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written
agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own
decision-making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may
exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under
the same contract."

Section 57 speaks of the "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural

resources within ancestral domains" and "gives the ICCs/IPs 'priority rights' therein." The
terms "harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation" of any natural resources within
the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-scale utilization. It is utilization not merely for
subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use that require technology other than manual
labor.236 The law recognizes the probability of requiring a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate
in the development and utilization of the natural resources and thereby allows such participation for
a period of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. This may be done on condition
that a formal written agreement be entered into by the non-member and members of the ICCs/IPs.

Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to "manage and conserve" the natural
resources. Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs "priority rights" in the development or
exploitation thereof. Priority means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural
resources does not necessarily mean ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there
is a superior entity that owns these resources and this entity has the power to grant preferential
rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.

Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said
doctrine that all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It
incorporates by implication the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the
light of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution237 in relation to Section 57 of IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural
resources, may directly undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources
by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as owners of
the land on which the natural resources are found by entering into a co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into any of
said agreements with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-member to participate in its agreement
with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs
under the agreement shall be protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable
for another 25 years.

To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the
State, as owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly
undertake the development and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the
priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering into an agreement with them for such development and
exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether
natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-member to participate in the
agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the
resources are found, the right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the
same time, a priority in their large-scale development and exploitation. Section 57 does not
mandate the State to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options
and it is within its discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in
the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the large-scale development of the
natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour
alwaysunder State supervision or control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and
ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give
due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural resources lie,
have traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.

Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following
provision:

"Section 59. Certification Precondition.- All departments and other governmental agencies shall
henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease,
or entering into any production-sharing agreement. without prior certification from the NCIP that the
area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued
after a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area
concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by the NCIP without the free and prior
informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no department,
government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession,
license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a
CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance
with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process."

Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural

resources shall not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and government agencies
without prior certification from the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not overlap with
any ancestral domain. The NCIP certification shall be issued only after a field-based investigation
shall have been conducted and the free and prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained.
Non-compliance with the consultation requirement gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend
any project granted by any department or government agency.

As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession,
license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area
subject of the agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the
NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any
concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the
ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained.
Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie
within the ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57
of the IPRA apply.

V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS

INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.

The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching back to
prehistoric times. The movement received a massive impetus during the 1960's from two sources.
First, the decolonization of Asia and Africa brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples
controlling their own destinies. Second, the right of self-determination was enshrined in the UN
Declaration on Human Rights.238 The rise of the civil rights movement and anti-racism brought to the
attention of North American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and Maori in New Zealand the
possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms.

In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded, 239 and during the 1980's,
indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the
first Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People's
Alliance that carried out successful campaigns against the building of the Chico River Dam in 1981-
82 and they have since become one of the best-organized indigenous bodies in the world. 240

Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a
result of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights
and the destruction of the indigenous peoples' environment, together with the national governments'
inability to deal with the situation. 241Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and
environmental protection, and have become a part of today's priorities for the international agenda. 242

International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs and
specific rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank, for example, first adopted a policy
on IPs as a result of the dismal experience of projects in Latin America. 243 The World Bank now
seeks to apply its current policy on IPs to some of its projects in Asia. This policy has provided an
influential model for the projects of the Asian Development Bank. 244

The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares as a
State policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and
development.245 The IPRA amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the international
category of IPs,246 and is heavily influenced by both the International Labor Organization (ILO)
Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.247

ILO Convention No. 169 is entitled the "Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries"248 and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and many other international instruments on
the prevention of discrimination.249 ILO Convention No. 169 revised the "Convention Concerning the
Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in
Independent Countries" (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international law
made it appropriate to adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples "with a view to
removing the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards," and recognizing the aspirations of
these peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and economic
development."250

CONCLUSION

The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious
differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine government
through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation. 251 Largely
unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society,
specifically, the indigenous peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the
evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the understanding of contemporary problems. 252 It is
through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to understand Filipino society not in
terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The Philippines
became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the
evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the
Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization, 253 it is this
Court's duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and
affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.

With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997.

Footnotes

 Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
1

Chicago Law School.

2
 The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 67, Summer 2000, No. 3, p. 573.

3
 Dominium is distinguished from imperium which is the government authority possessed by
the state expressed in the concept of sovereignty- Lee Hong Hok v. David, 48 SCRA 372,
377 [1972].

 Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 543 [1904]; See also Florencio D.R. Ponce, The
4

Philippine Torrens System, p. 13 [1964].

5
 Antonio H. Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, p. 5 [1986]; these grants were better known as
repartimientos and encomiendas. Repartimientos were handouts to the military as fitting
reward for their services to the Spanish crown. The encomiendas were given to Spaniards to
administer and develop with the right to receive and enjoy for themselves the tributes of the
natives assigned to them.- Ponce, supra, p. 12, citing Benitez, History of the Philippines, pp.
125-126.

6
 Narciso Pena, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 2 [1994].

7
 The Mortgage Law is a misnomer because it is primarily a law on registration of property
and secondarily a mortgage law- Ponce, supra, at 16.

8
 Ponce, supra, at 15.

9
 3 Phil. 537 [1904].

10
 Id. at 540.

11
 Id. at 548.

12
 Id. at 543-544.

13
 Id. at 543.
  Id. at 542-543. These comments by the court are clear expressions of the concept that
14

Crown holdings embraced both imperium and dominium—Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and

Roan Libarios, The Interface Between National Land Law and Kalinga Land Law, 58 P.L.J.
420, 423 [1983].

15
 Id. at 545-546.

16
 Id. at 543.

17
 Id. at 557.

18
 Id. at 553-554; Valenton was applied in Cansino v. Valdez, 6 Phil. 320 [1906]; Tiglao v.
Insular Government, 7 Phil. 80 [1906]; and Cariño v. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 132 [1906];
all decided by the Philippine Supreme Court.

19
 Please see Section 70, Act 926.

20
 Ponce, supra, at 33.

21
 Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572 [1909]; also cited in Ponce, supra, at 32.

 Archbishop of Manila v. Director of Lands, 27 Phil. 245 [1914]; also cited in Ponce, supra,
22

at 32.

23
 Antonio H. Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, p. 250 [1961].

24
 Ponce, supra, at 32.

25
 Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 26 [1982]; Noblejas, supra, at 32.

26
 Noblejas, supra, at 32.

27
 Ponce, supra, at 123-124; Noblejas, supra, at 33.

28
 2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592 [1937].

29
 Id. at 600.

30
 Id. at 600-601.

31
 Ibid.

32
 Section 7.

33
 Section 8.

34
 Sections 13 to 20.

35
 Sections 21 to 28.
36
 Sections 29 to 37.

37
 Sections 38 and 40.

38
 Sections 74 to 77.

39
 Section 69.

40
 Section 73.

 Convention Conerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27,
41

1989.

 Guide to R.A. 8371, published by the Coalition for Ips Rights and ancestral Domains in
42

cooperation with the ILO and Bilance-Asia Department, p. 4 [1999]—hereinafter referred to

as Guide to R.A. 8371.

 Taken from the list of IPs sbmitted by Rep. Andolana to the house of Representatives
43

during the deliberations on H.B. No. 9125—Interpellations of Aug. 20, 1997, pp. 00086-
00095. "lost tribes" such as the Lutangan and Tatang have not been included.

44
 How these people came to the Philippines may be explained by two theories. One view,
generally linked to Professor Otley H. Beyer, suggests the "wave theory"—a series of arrivals
in the archipelago bringing in different types and levels of culture. The Negritos, dark-skinned
pygmies, came between 25,000 to 30,000 B.C. Their cultural remains are preserved by the
Negrito-type Filipinos found in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Their relatively inferior culture
did not enable them to overcome the pressures from the second wave of people, the
Indonesians A and B who came in 5,000 and 3,500 B.C. They are represented today by the
Kalinga, Gaddang, Isneg, Mangyan, Tagbanua, Manobo, Mandaya, Subanon, and Sama.
The first group was pushed inland as the second occupied the coastal and downriver
settlements. The last wave involved Malay migrations between 500 B.C. and 1,500 A.D. they
had a more advanced culture based on metal age technology. They are represented by the
Christianized and Islamized Filipinos who pushed the Indonesian groups inland and
occupied much of the coastal, lowland and downstream areas.

A second view is postulated by Robert Fox, F. Landa Jocana, Alfredo Evangelista,

and Jesus Peralta. Jocano maintains that the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays
stand co-equal as ethnic groups without any one being dominant, racially or
culturally. The geographic distribution of the ethno-linguistic groups, which shows
overlapping of otherwise similar racial strains in both upland and lowland cultures or
coastal and inland communities, suggests a random and unstructured advent of
different kinds of groups in the archipelago—Samuel K. Tan, A History of the
Philippines, published by the Manila Studies Association, Inc. and the Philippine
National Historical society, Inc., pp. 33-34 [1997]; Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of
the Filipino People, p. 21 [1990].

45
 Tan, supra, at 35-36.

 Onofre D. Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Philippine Centennial (1898-1998)

46

Edition, vol. 1, p. 13, Aklahi foundation, Inc. [1989]. It was in 800-1,000 A.D. that the Ifugaos
of Northern Luzon built the rice terraces—Id. at 37.
47
 Id. at 5-6.

48
 Id. at 13.

49
 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, p. 54 [1990].

50
 Corpuz, supra, at 5.

51
 Id. at 44-45.

52
 Agoncillo, supra, at 40.

53
 Id. at 40-41.

54
 Rafael Iriarte, History of the Judicial System, the Philippine Indigenous Era Prior to 1565,
unpublished work submitted as entry to the Centennial Essay-Writing Contest sponsored by
the National Centennial Commission and the Supreme Court in 1997, p. 103, citing Perfecto
V. Fernandez, Customs Laws in Pre-Conquest Philippines, UP Law Center, p. 10 [1976].

55
 Agoncillo, supra, at 41.

 Amelia Alonzo, The History of the Judicial System in the Philippines, Indigenous Era Prior
56

to 1565,unpublished work submitted as entry to the Centennial Essay-Writing Contest

sponsored by the National Centennial Commission and the Supreme Court in 1997.

57
 Agoncillo, supra, at 42.

58
 Renato Constantino, A Past Revisited , p. 38 [1975].

 Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, published by the Manila Studies Ass’n., Inc.
59

and the Phil. National Historical Society, Inc., p. 43 [1997].

60
 Id.

61
 Id. at 43-44.

62
 Tan, supra, at 47-48.

63
 Id. at 48-49.

64
 Cacho v. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil. 616, 625-627 [1914]; see also Ponce, The
Philippine Torrens System, pp. 11-12 [1964]. In Philippine pre-colonial history, there was
only one recorded transaction on the purchase of land. The Maragtas Code tells us of the
purchase of Panay Island by ten Bornean datus led by Datu Puti from the Atis under
Marikudo in the 13th century. The purchase price for the island was a gold salakot and a
long gold necklace – Agoncillo, supra, at 25.

65
 Constantino, supra, at 38.

66
 Corpuz, supra, at 39.
  Resettlement- "bajo el son de la campana" (under the sound of the bell) or "bajo el toque
67

de la campana" (Under the peal of the bell).

68
 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 17 [1939].

69
 Id. at 17, citing the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.

70
 Agoncillo, supra, at 80.

71
 Id. at 80.

72
 Corpuz, supra, at 277-278.

73
 Id. at 277.

 Id., N.B. But see discussion in Cariño v. Insular Government, infra, where the United
74

States Supreme Court found that the Spanish decrees in the Philippines appeared to
recognize that the natives owned some land. Whether in the implementation of these
decrees the natives’ ancestral rights to land were actually respected was not
discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court; see also Note 131, infra.

75
 Tan, supra, at 49-50.

76
 Id. at 67.

77
 Id. at 52-53.

78
 Id. at 53.

79
 Id. at 55.

80
 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 17 [1939].

 Memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi v. Provincial Board of

81

Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 714 [1919]; also cited in People v. Cayat, supra, at 17-18.

82
 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra, at 693.

83
 Charles Macdonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between Segregation and
Integration, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, p. 348, ed. by R.H. Barnes, A. Gray and B.
Kingsburry, pub. by Association for Asian Studies [1995]. The BNCT made a Bontok and
subanon ethnography, a history of Sulu genealogy, and a compilation on unhispanized
peoples in northern Luzon.—Owen J. Lynch, Jr., The Philippine Colonial Dichotomy:
Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 P. L. J. 139-140 [1988].

84
 R.A. No. 1888 of 1957.

 See People v. Cayat, supra, at 21; See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.

85

660, 694 [1919]

86
 MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 351.

 The construction of the Ambuklao and Binga dams in the 1950’s resulted in the eviction of
87

hundreds of Ibaloi families – Cerilo Rico S. Abelardo, Ancestral Domain Rights: Issues,

Responses, and Recommendations, Ateneo Law Journal, vol. 38, No. 1, p. 92 [1993].

88
 Section 11, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution.

89
 Presidential Decrees Nos. 1017 and 1414.

 The PANAMIN, however, concentrated funds and resources on image-building, publicity,

90

and impact projects. In Mindanao, the agency resorted to a policy of forced resettlement on
reservations, militarization and intimidation- MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the
Philippines, supra, at 349-350.

91
 No occupancy certificates were issued, however, because the government failed to release
the decree’s implementing rules and regulations- Abelardo, supra, at 120-121.

92
 Id., Note 177.

93
 Id., at 93-94.

94
 MacDonald, Indigenous People of the Philippines, supra, at 351.

95
 E.O. Nos. 122-A, 122-B and 122-C. The preamble of E.O. No. 122-B states:

"Believing that the new government is committed to formulate more vigorous policies,
plans, programs, and projects for tribal Filipinos, otherwise known as Indigenous
Cultural Communities, taking into consideration their communal aspirations, customs,
traditions, beliefs, and interests, in order to promote and preserve their rich cultural
heritage and insure their participation in the country’s development for national unity;
xxx"

 Article II, sec. 22; Article VI, sec. 5, par. 2; Article XII, sec. 5; Article XIII, sec. 6; Article XIV,
96

sec. 17; and Article XVI, sec. 12.

97
 MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 345.

98
 Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, p. 54 [1997].

99
 Cordillera Studies Program, Land Use and Ownership and Public Policy in the Cordillera,
29-30 [n.d.]; also cited in Dante B. Gatmaytan, Ancestral Domain Recognition in the
Philippines: Trends in Jurisprudence and Legislation, 5 Phil. Nat. Res. L.J. No. 1, pp. 47-48
[1992].

 Abelardo, Ancestral Domain Rights, supra, at 98-99, citing Ponciano L. Bennagen,

100

Indigenous Attitudes Toward Land and Natural Resources of Tribal Filipinos, 31 National
Council of Churches in the Philippines Newsletter, Oct.-Dec. 1991, at 4-9.

101
 Id. at 99, citing June Prill-Brett, Bontok Land Tenure (UP Law library, mimeographed).
  Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface of National Land Law and
102

Kalinga Law, 58 P.L.J. 420, 440-441 [1983].

103
 Ibid.

104
 Ibid.

105
 Ibid.

106
 Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface, supra, at 420.

 Senate Bill No. 1728 was co-sponsored by Senator Macapagal-Arroyo and co-authored by
107

Senators Alvarez, Magsaysay, Revilla, Mercado, Enrile, Honasan, Tatad, Maceda, Shahani,
Osmena and Romulo.

The Eighth Congress, through Senators Rasul, Estrada and Romulo filed a bill to
operationalize the mandate of the 1987 Constitution on indigenous peoples. The bill
was reported out, sponsored an interpellated but never enacted into law. In the Ninth
Congress, the bill filed by Senators Rasul and Macapagal-Arroyo was never
sponsored and deliberated upon in the floor.

 Sponsorship Speech of Senator Flavier, Legislative History of SBN 1728, Tenth Congress,
108

Second Regular Session, Senate, Oct. 16, 1996, pp. 15-16.

109
 Id. at 12.

110
 Id. at 17-18.

111
 Id. at 13.

 Journal of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, Senate, Session No. 5, Aug. 5-6, 1997,
112

pp. 86-87.

 Co-authors of the bill were Reps. Ermita, Teves, Plaza, Calalay, Recto, Fua, Luciano,
113

Abad, Cosalan, Aumentado, de la Cruz, Bautista, Singson, Damasing, Romualdo, Montilla,

Germino, Verceles—Proceedings of Sept. 4, 1997, pp. 00107-00108.

114
 Sponsorship speech of Rep. Andolana of House Bill No. 9125, March 20, 1997.

115
 Interpellation of Aug. 20, 1997, 6:16 p.m., p. 00061.

116
 Section 3 [a], IPRA.

117
 Section 3 [b], IPRA.

118
 Guide to R.A. 8371, p. 14.

119
 Section 44 [e], IPRA.

120
 Section 51, IPRA.
121
 Guide to R.A. 8371, p. 15.

 A CADT refers to a title formally recognizing the right of possession and ownership of
122

ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains identified and delineated in acordance with the IPRA
—Rule II [c], Rules & Regulations Implementing the IPRA, NCIP Admin. Order No. 1.

123
 Section 53 [a], IPRA.

 A CALT refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral
124

lands- Rule II [d], Implementing Rules, NCIP A.O. No. 1.

125
 Section 52 [k], IPRA.

126
 Section 3 [1], IPRA.

127
 Section 11, IPRA.

128
 Ibid.

129
 41 Phil. 935 (1909), 212 U.S. 449, 53 L.Ed. 594.

 Sponsorship Speech of Senator Juan Flavier, Leg. History of SBN 1728, Tenth Congress,
130

Second Regular Session, Oct. 16, 1996, p. 13.

 It was the practice of the Spanish colonial government not to issue titles to Igorots—Owen
131

J. Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary
Philippine Land Laws (1900-1913), 63 P.L.J. 249, 288 [1988], citing the testimony of
Benguet Provincial Governnor William F. Pack, Records at 47, Cariño.

132
 Maura Law or the Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1894.

133
 Later named Camp John Hay.

134
 Lynch, Invisible Peoples, supra, at 288-289.

135
 7 Phil. 132 [1906].

136
 In 1901, Cariño had entered into a promissory agreement with a U.S. merchant in Manila.
The note obliged Cariño to sell the land at issue "as soon as he obtains from the
Government of the United States, or its representatives in the Philippines, real and definitive
title." See Lynch, Invisible Peoples, supra, at 290, citing Government’s Exhibit G, Records, at
137-138, Cariño.

137
 Cariño v. Insular Government, supra, at 939.

138
Ibid.

139
Id. at 940.

140
Id. at 941.
141
Id. at 941-942.

Aranal-Sereno and Libarios, The Interface Between Kalinga Land Law, supra at 428-This
142

artcile was one of those circulated among the Constitutional Commissioners in the
formulation of Sec. 5, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (4 Record of the Constitutional
Commission 33).

143
Id. at 944.

Certificate of Title No. 2 covering the 148 hectares of Baguio Municipality was issued not in
144

the name of Cariño who died on June 6, 1908, but to his lawyers John Hausserman and
Charles Cohn and his attorney-in-fact Metcalf Clarke. Hausserman, Cohn and Clarke sold
the land to the U.S. Government in a Deed of Quitclaim-Richel B. Langit, Igorot Descendants
Claim Rights to Camp John Hay, Manila Times, p. 1, Jan. 12, 1998.

145
Id. at 939.

146
57 P.L.J. 268, 293-296 [1982].

From 1987 to 1988, Prof. Lynch allowed the P.L.J. to publish parts of his doctoral
147

dissertation at the Yale Law School entitled "Invisible Peoples: A History of Philippine Land
Law." Please see the Legal Bases of Philippine Colonial Sovereignty: An Inquiry, 62 P.L.J.
279 [1987]; Land Rights, Land Laws and Land Usurpation: The Spanish Era (1568-1898), 63
P.L.J. 82 [1988]; The Colonial Dichotomy: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 P.L.J. 112;
Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws
(1900-1913), 63 P.L.J. 249.

"Native title" is a common law recognition of pre-existing aboriginal land interests in

148

Autsralia- Maureen Tehan, Customary Title, Heritage Protection, and Property Rights in
Australia: Emerging Patterns of Land Use in the Post-Mabo Era, 7 Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal, No. 3, p. 765 [June 1998].

149
Lynch, Native Titles, supra, Note 164, p. 293.

150
39 Phil. 660 [1919].

151
Id. at 712-713.

152
Id. at 694.

153
Id. at 700.

154
42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 29 [1944 ed.].

There are 3 kinds of Indian reservations: (a) those created by treaties prior to 1871; (b)
155

those created by acts of Congress since 1871; and (c) those made by Executive Orders
where the President has set apart public lands for the use of the Indians in order to keep
them within a certain territory- 42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 29 citing Sioux Tribe of Indians v. U.S.
94 Ct. Cl. 150, 170, certiorari granted 62 S. Ct. 631, 315 U.S. 790, 86 L. Ed. 1194, affirmed
62 S. Ct. 1095, 316 U.S. 317, 86 L. Ed. 1501. It is observed that the first two kinds may
include lands possessed by aboriginal title. The last kind covers Indian reservations
proper.

Until 1871, Indian tribes were recognized by the United States as possessing the
attributes of nations to the extent that treaties were made with them. In that year,
however, Congress, by statute, declared its intention thereafter to make the Indian
tribes amenable directly to the power and authority of the United States by the
immediate exercise of its legislative power over them, instead of by treaty. Since
then, Indian affairs have been regulated by acts if Congress and by contracts with
the Indian tribes practically amounting to treaties- 41 Am Jur 2d, Indians, Sec. 55
[1995 ed].

156
42 C.J.S. Indians, Sec. 28 [1944 ed.].

Ibid.; see also U.S. v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., Ariz., 62 S. Ct. 248, 314 U.S. 339, 86 L. Ed.
157

260 [1941].

158
Ibid.

159
8 Wheat 543, 5 L. Ed. 681 [1823].

160
Id. at 680.

161
Id. at 689.

Id. at 696; see also 41 ALR Fed 425, Annotation: Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal
162

Title to Indian Lands, Sec. 2[a] [1979].

163
Buttz v. Northern Pac.R. Co., Dak., 7 S. Ct. 100, 119 U.S. 55, 30 L. Ed. 330, 335 [1886].

Lynch, Native Title, supra, at 293-294; Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn. L.R. 48-49
164

[1947].

165
6 Pet 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 [1832].

166
Id. at 499.

167
Id. at 500.

168
Id. at 501.

The title of the government to Indian lands, the naked fee, is a sovereign title, the
169

government having no landlord from whom it holds the fee- Shoshone Tribe of Indians of
Wind River Reservation in Wyoming v. U.S., 85 Ct. Cl. 331, certiorari granted U.S. v.
Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 58 S. Ct. 609, 303 U.S. 629, 82 L. Ed. 1090, affirmed 58 S. Ct.
794, 304 U.S. 111, 82 L. Ed. 1213, 1218-1219 [1938].

Buttz v. Northern Pac. R. Co., Dak., at 30 L. Ed. 330, 335; Beecher v. Wetherby, Wis., 95
170

U.S. 517, 24 L. Ed. 440, 441 [1877]; see also 42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 28 [1944 ed.].
 Annotation, Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal title to Indian Lands, 41 ALR Fed 425,
171

Sec. 2 [b] [1979]- hereinafter cited as Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands.

Ibid.; see also Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., 348 U.S. 272, 99 L. Ed. 314, 320, 75 S. Ct. 313
172

[1955], reh den 348 U.S. 965, 99 L. Ed. 753, 75 S. Ct. 521.

173
Ibid.; Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., at 99 L. Ed. 320.

Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 39 L. Ed. 2d 73, 94 S Ct. 772
174

[1974]; U.S. v. Alcea Bank of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 91 L. Ed. 29. 67 S. Ct. 167 [1946].

For compensation under the Indian Claims Commission Act, the proof of aboriginal title
175

rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time prior to the loss
of the property. (The Indian Claims Commission Act awards compensation to Indians whose
aboriginal titles were extinguished by the government through military conquest, creation of a
reservation, forced confinement of Indians and removal of Indians from certain portions of
the land an the designation of Indian land into forest preserve, grazing district, etc.)
- Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Secs. 2[a], 3[a], pp. 431, 433, 437.

176
Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Sec. 2[b], p. 435.

177
41 Am Jr 2d, Indians, Sec. 59 [1995 ed.].

An allotment of Indian land contains restrictions on alienation of the land. These restrictions
178

extend to a devise of the land by will- Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. U.S., 235 U.S. 37, 59 L. Ed.
116,. 35 S. Ct. 6 [1914]; A railroad land grant that falls within Indian land is null and void-
Northern P. R. Co. v. U.S., 227 U.S. 355, 57 L.Ed. 544,33 S. Ct. 368 [1913]; Portions of
Indian land necessary for a railroad right of way were, by the terms of the treaty, declared
"public land," implying that land beyond the right of way was private- Kindred v. Union P.R.
Co., 225 U.S. 582, 56 L. Ed. 1216, 32 S. Ct. 780 [1912]; see also 41 Am Jur 2d, Indians,
Sec. 58 [1995 ed].

179
Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Sec. 2[a], p. 433.

180
42 C.J.S. Indians, Sec. 29 [1944 ed.]

181
Ibid.

182
North American Indians have made much progress in establishing a relationship with the
national government and developing their own laws. Some have their own government-
recognized constitutions. Usually the recognition of Indian tribes depends on whether the
tribe has a reservation. North American tribes have reached such an advanced stage that
the main issues today evolve around complex jurisdictional and litigation matters. Tribes
have acquired the status of sovereign nations within another nation, possessing the right to
change and grow- Jose Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from
the Environmental and Human Rights Perspective, Texas International Law Journal, vol. 32:
97, 104 [1997].

183
Lynch, Native Title, supra, at 293.
 Dante Gatmaytan, Ancestral Domain Recognition in the Philippines: Trends in
184

Jurisprudence and Legislation, 5 Phil. Nat. Res. L.J. No. 1, pp. 43, 40 [Aug. 1992]; see also
Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., supra, at 320.

185
Ibid.

D. Gatmaytan, supra, citing Churchill, The Earth is Our Mother: Struggles for American
186

Indian Land and Liberation in the Contemporary United States, The State of Native America:
Genocide, Colonization and Resistance 139 (M. Jaimes 1992); and Indian Law Resource
Center, United States Denial of Indian Property Rights: A Study in Lawless Power and Racial
Discrimination, Rethinking Indian Law 15 (National Lawyers Guild, Committee on Native
American Struggles 1982).

Id., Note 28, stating that some earlier decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have held that
187

Congress is subject to the strictures of the Constitution in dealing with Indians. When an
Indian property is taken for non-Indian use, the U.S. government is liable for payment of
compensation, and an uncompensated taking may be enjoined. F. Cohen, Handbook of
Federal Indian Law 217 [1982], citing Shoshone Tribe v. U.S. 299 U.S. 476 [1937]; Choate v.
Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 [1912]; and Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 [1919].

188
See Discussion, infra, Part IV (c) (2).

189
Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 [1925]; Herico v. Dar, 95 SCRA 437 [1980].

190
Ibid.

Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 509 [1986]; Director of
191

Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]; Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapina, 235 SCRA
567 [1994].

192
75 Phil. 890 [1946].

193
Id. at 892.

194
Sec. 48 [b], C.A. 141.

195
Sec. 48 [c], C.A. 141, as amended. This provision was added in 1964 by R.A. 3872.

196
Section 12, IPRA.

"Time immemorial" refers "to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain
197

ICCs/Ips are known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a
defined territory devolved to them, by operation of customary law or inherited from their
ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions." (Sec. 3 [p], IPRA).

198
Section 2, C.A. 141.

199
Section 8, C.A. 141.

 The classification of ancestral lands 18% in slope or over as alienable in the IPRA is an
200

exception to Section 15, P.D. 705, the Revised Forestry Code.

  Charles MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between Segregation and
201

Integration, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, supra, at pp. 345, 350.

202
 Section 5, Article XII, 1987 Constitution.

203
 Words in bold were amendments introduced by R.A. 3872 in 1964.

 Words in bold were amendments introduced by R.A. 3872 on June 18, 1964. On January
204

25, 1977, however, Sec. 48 [b] and 48 [c] were further amended by P.D. 1073 stating that
these provisions on cultural minorities apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain- Please see Republic v. CA and Paran, 201 SCRA 1, 10-11 [1991].

205
 Jus utendi, jus fruendi.

206
 Jus abutendi.

207
 Jus disponendi.

 Jus vindicandi. Please see Tolentino, Civil Code, vol. II, pp. 45-46 [1992]; see also
208

Tolentino, vol. I, pp. 12-14.

209
 Sec. 55, IPRA provides:

"Sec. 55. Communal rights.- Subject to Section 56 hereof, areas within the ancestral
domains, whether delineated or not, shall be presumed to be communally held:
provided, That communal rights under this Act shall not be construed as co-
ownership as provided in Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the New Civil
Code."

210
 Ibid.

211
 Article 494, Civil Code.

 Antonio M. La Vina, Arguments for Communal Title, Part II, 2 Phil. Nat. Res. L. J. 23 [Dec.
212

1989].

213
 Section 11, Corporation Code.

214
 Sections 60-72, Corporation Code.

 Section 117, Corporation Code. Please see also La Vina, Arguments for Communal Title,
215

Part II, supra, at 23.

216
 Section 5, par. 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution.

 Customary law is recognized by the Local Government Code of 1991 in solving disputes
217

among members of the indigenous communities, viz:

 "Sec. 412 (c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities.- The
customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities shall be applied in settling
disputes between members of the cultural communities."

 Law writes custom into contract-Hongkong & Shanghai Bank v. Peters, 16 Phil. 284
218

[1910].

The Civil Code provides:

"Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced."

"Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence."

 Article 78 on marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian

219

provinces- this is now Art. 33 of the Family Code; Art. 118, now Art. 74 of the Family Code
on property relations between spouses; Art. 577 on the usufructuary of woodland; Art. 657
on easement of right of way for passage of livestock; Arts. 678, 1315, 1376, 1522, 1564 and
1577. Please see Aquino, Civil Code, vol. 1, p. 25.

 Castle Bros. v. Gutierrez Hermanos, 11 Phil. 629 [1908]; In Re: Firm Name of Ozaeta
220

Romulo, 92 SCRA 1 [1979]; Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 [1988]; Please see
Aquino, Civil Code, vol. 1, p. 26 for a list of other cases.

 This situation is analogous to the Muslim code or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (P.D.
221

1083) which took effect on February 4, 1977 despite the effectivity of the Civil Code and the
Family Code. P.D. 1083 governs persons, family relations and succession among Muslims,
the adjudication and settlement of disputes, the organization of the Shari’a courts, etc.

 Mariflor P. Pagusara, The Kalinga Ili: Cultural-Ecological Reflections on Indigenous

222

Theora and Praxis of Man-Nature Relationship, Dakami Ya Nan Dagami, p. 36, Papers and
Proceedings of the 1st Cordillera Muti-Sectoral Land Congress, 11-14 March 1983,
Cordillera Consultative Committee [1984].

223
 Section 2, Article XII.

 A "co-production agreement" is defined as one wherein the government provides input to

224

the mining operation other than the mineral resource- Section 26 (b), R.A. 7942, the
Philippine Mining Act of 1995.

 A "joint venture agreement" is one where a joint-venture company is organized by the

225

government and the contractor with both parties having equity shares, and the government
entitled to a share in the gross output- Section 26 (c), R.A. 7942.

 A mineral "production-sharing agreement" is one where the government grants to the

226

contractor the exclusive right to conduct mining operations within a contract area and shares
in the gross output. The contractor provides the financing, technology, management and
personnel necessary for the implementation of the agreement- Section 26 (a), R.A. 7942.

227
 Section 26, R.A. 7942.
228
 Section 3 [d], People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) provides:

"Sec. 3 [d] 'Small-scale mining contract' refers to co-production, joint venture or

mineral production sharing agreement between the State and a small-scale mining
contractor for the small-scale utilization of a plot of mineral land."

229
 Section 3 [b], R.A. 7076.

230
 NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998.

 In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228, 239 [1988], Cruz, J., ponente, it was
231

declared that if a person is the owner of a piece of agricultural land on which minerals are
discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the
said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong- also cited in
H. de Leon, Phil. Constitutional Law, Principles and Cases, vol. 2, pp. 800-801 [1999].

232
 See Ground I, Grounds to Issue Writ of Prohibition, Petition, p. 14.

233
 Section 7 (b) is subject to Section 56 of the same law which provides:

"Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes.- Property rights within the ancestral
domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be
recognized and respected."

The law took effect 15 days upon publication in the O.G. or in any 2 newspapers of
general circulation (Sec. 84, IPRA). The IPRA was published in the Chronicle and
Malaya on Nov. 7, 1997.

 Section 9 of the IPRA also gives the ICCs/IPs the ff. responsibilities over their ancestral
234

domains:

(a) Maintain Ecological Balance- To preserve, restore, and maintain a balanced

ecology in the ancestral domain by protecting the flora and fauna, watershed areas,
and other reserves;

(b) Restore Denuded Areas.- To actively initiate, undertake and participate in the

reforestation of denuded areas and other development programs and projects
subject to just and reasonable renumeration;

(c) Observe Laws.- To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act and the
rules and regulations for its effective implementation."

Section 58 of the same law also mandates that ancestral domains or portions
thereof, which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation as determined
by appropriate agencies with the full participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be
maintained, managed and developed for such purposes. The ICCs/IPs concerned
shall be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such
areas with the full and effective assistance of government agencies.
  Hector S. de Leon, Textbook on the New Philippine Constitution pp. 473-474 [1987] citing
235

the 1986 UP Law Constitution Project, The National Economy and Patrimony, p. 11.

 Under the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, "small-scale mining" refers to "mining activities
236

which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use
explosives or heavy mining equipment"- Section 3 [b], R.A. 7076.

237
 See infra., pp. 77-79?.

 Andrew Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, ed. By
238

Barnes, Gray and Kingsbury, pub. By Ass'n. for Asian Studies, at 35, 42 [1995].

239
 E.g. International Indian Treaty Council, World Council of IPs.

 Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, supra, at 44, citing the International Work Group
240

for Indigenous Affairs, 1988.

 Jose Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from the Environmental
241

and Human Rights Perspective, 32 Texas International Law Journal 97, 102 [1997].

 Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach

242

to the Asian Controversy, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 92: 414, 429
[1998].

 The World Bank supported the Chico Dam project. Due to the Kalingas' opposition, the
243

WB pulled out of the project but the conflict between the Philippine government and the
natives endured long after- Marcus Colchester, Indigenous Peoples' Rights and Sustainable
Resource Use in South and Southeast Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, supra, pp. 59, 71-
72.

244
 Kingsbury, supra, at 417.

245
 Section 22, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

 Interpellation of Senator Flavier on S.B. No. 1728, Deliberation on Second Reading,

246

November 20, 1996, p. 20.

 Guide to R.A. 8371, Coalition for IPs Rights and Ancestral Domains, the International
247

Labor Organization, and the ILO-Bilance- Asia Dep't, p. 3 [1999].

248
 Also referred to as the "Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989."

249
 See Introduction to ILO Convention No. 169, par. 4.

250
 Id., pars. 5 and 6.

 Perfecto V. Fernandez, Towards a Definition of National Policy on Recognition of Ethnic

251

Law within the Philippine Legal Order, 55 P.L.J. 383, 385 [1980].
  Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, Manila Studies Association, Inc. and the Phil.
252

National Historical Society, Inc., p. 6 [1997].

253
 Fernandez, supra, at 385, 391.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.:

An issue of grave national interest indeed deserves a proper place in any forum and, when it
shows itself in a given judicial controversy, the rules of procedure, like locus standi, the
propriety of the specific remedy invoked, or the principle of hierarchy of courts, that may
ordinarily be raised by party-litigants, should not be so perceived as good and inevitable
justifications for advocating timidity, let alone isolationism, by the Court.

A cardinal requirement, to which I agree, is that one who invokes the Court’s adjudication must have
a personal and substantial interest in the dispute; 1 indeed, the developing trend would require
a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated in order to
ensure that one is the proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial power. 2 The rule requires a
party to aptly show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be
redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant his invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction and to
render legally feasible the exercise of the Court’s remedial powers in his behalf. If it were otherwise,
the exercise of that power can easily become too unwieldy by its sheer magnitude and scope to a
point that may, in no small measure, adversely affect its intended essentiality, stability and
consequentiality.

Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exits, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance and paramount interest to the nation, 3 the Court must take the liberal approach that
recognizes the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as citizens and taxpayers, to raise
constitutional issues that affect them.4 This Court thus did so in a case5 that involves the
conservation of our forests for ecological needs. Until and exact balance is struck, the Court
must accept an eclectic notion that can free itself from the bondage of legal nicety and hold
trenchant technicalities subordinate to what may be considered to be of overriding concern.

The petition seeks a declaration by the Court of unconstitutionality of certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 8371, a law that obviously is yet incapable of exact equation in its significance to the nation
and its people now and in the generations yet to come. Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise also
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 ("IPRA"), enacted into law in 1997 and made
effective on 22 November 1997, is apparently intended to be a legislative response to the 1987
Constitution which recognizes the rights of indigenous cultural communities "within the framework of
national unity and development"6 and commands the State, "subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national development policies and programs," to protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands in order to ensure their economic, social,
and cultural well-being.7
Among the assailed provisions in IPRA is its Section 3(a) which defines "ancestral domains" to
embrace "all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal
areas, and natural resources" including "ancestral lands, forest, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or
otherwise," over which indigenous cultural communities/indigenous
peoples ("ICCs/IPs") could exercise virtual ownership and control.

IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains covering
literally millions of hectares. The notion of community property would comprehend not only
matters of proprietary interest but also some forms of self-governance over the curved-out
territory. This concept is elaborated in Section 7 of the law which states that the "rights of ownership
and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected,"
subsumed under which would encompass the right of ownership (paragraph a); the right to
develop, control and use lands and natural resources, including "the right to negotiate the
terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws;" (par. b); the right to stay in the territories (par. c); the right to return to
their abandoned lands in case of displacement (par. d); the right to regulate entry of
migrants (par. e); the right to claim parts of ancestral domains previously reserved (par. g);
and the right to resolve land conflicts in accordance primarily with customary law (par. h).
Concurrently, Section 57 states that ICCs/IPs shall be given "priority rights in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains." These provisions of IPRA, in their totality, are, in my view, beyond the context of
the fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable
abdication, of State authority over a significant area of the country and its patrimony.

Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses that all "lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries,
forest or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State," and, with the exception of agricultural lands, "shall not be alienated." It ordains that the
"exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State."8

These provisions had roots in the 1935 Constitution which, along with some other specific mandates
in the 1935 Constitution, forming Article XII under the title "Conservation and Utilization of Natural
Resources", were derived largely from the report of the Committee on Nationalization and
Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources.9 According to the Committee report, among the
principles upon which these provisions were based, was "that the land, minerals, forest and other
natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation," and should thereby "be
preserved for those under the sovereign authority of the Nation and for their posterity." 10 The
delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention were of the unanimous view that the "policy on
natural resources, being fundamental to the nation’s survival should not be left to the changing mood
of the lawmaking body."11

The 1987 Constitution, like the precursor provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, thus
expresses thisregalian doctrine of the old, and the domainial doctrine of the new, that all lands and
natural resources belong to the state other than those which it recognizes to be of private
ownership. Except for agricultural lands of the public domain which alone may be alienated,
forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources, of the country must
remain with the state, the exploration, development and utilization of which shall be subject
to its full control and supervision albeit allowing it to enter into co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization. 12

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cariño vs. Insular Government,13 holding that a
parcel of land held since time immemorial by individuals under a claim of private ownership is
presumed never to have been public land and cited to downgrade the application of the regalian
doctrine, cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. It is in
them that sovereignty resides and from them that all government authority emanates. 14 It is not then
for a court ruling or any piece of legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for
the former to adapt to the latter, and it is the sovereign act that must, between them, stand
inviolate.

The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide "for
the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domains." I do not see this statement as saying that Congress
may enact a law that would simply express that "customary laws shall govern" and end it there. Had
it been so, the Constitution could have itself easily provided without having to still commission
Congress to do it. Mr. Chief Justice Davide has explained this authority of Congress, during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Convention, thus:

"Mr. Davide. x x x Insofar as the application of the customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain is concerned, it is
respectfully submitted that the particular matter must be submitted to Congress. I understand that
the idea of Comm. Bennagen is for the possibility of the codification of these customary laws. So
before these are codified, we cannot now mandate that the same must immediately be applicable.
We leave it to Congress to determine the extent of the ancestral domain and the ownership thereof
in relation to whatever may have been codified earlier. So, in short, let us not put the cart ahead of
the horse."15

The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the customary
laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of, the
stream of laws. The "due process clause," as I so understand it in Tanada vs. Tuvera16 would
require an apt publication of a legislative enactment before it is permitted to take force and effect.
So, also, customary laws, when specifically enacted to become part of statutory law, must first
undergo that publication to render them correspondingly binding and effective as such.

Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points, and I would respectfully urge Congress to re-
examine the law. Indeed, the State is exhorted to protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands, a task that would entail a balancing of interest between
their specific needs and the imperatives of national interest.

WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the petition.

Footnotes

1
 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89; Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236,
244.
 2
 Am Jur § 189, p. 591, S. vD., 410 US 641, 35 L Ed 2d 536, 93 S Ct 1146.

3
 Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 540; Tañada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA
27, 36, 37.

4
 Defensor Santiago, Miriam, Constitutional Law, First Edition, 1994, p. 11; see also Rev. Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J., on the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 Ed.,
pp. 336-337.

5
 Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792.

6
 Art. 11, Sec. 22.

7
 Art. XII, Sec. 5.

8
 Sec. 2.

9
 II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 594.

10
 Ibid., p. 595.

11
 Ibid., p. 600.

 CONST., Art. XII, Sec. 2; Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc., vs. Factoran, Jr., 240
12

SCRA 100.

13
 41 Phil. 935.

14
 CONST., Art. II, Sec. 1.

15
 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 32.

16
 146 SCRA 446.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

You ask if we own the land. . . How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the race own the
land because only the race lives forever. To claim a piece of land is a birthright of every man. The
lowly animals claim their place; how much more man? Man is born to live. Apu Kabunian, lord of us
all, gave us life and placed us in the world to live human lives. And where shall we obtain life? From
the land. To work (the land) is an obligation, not merely a right. In tilling the land, you possess it. And
so land is a grace that must be nurtured. To enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal exhortation of
Apu Kabunian to all his children. Land is sacred. Land is beloved. From its womb springs …life.

- Macli-ing Dulag, Chieftain of the Kalinga Tribe (quoted in Ponciano L. Bennagen, "Tribal Filipinos"
in Indigenous View of Land and the Environment, ed. Shelton H. Davis, the World Bank Discussion
Papers, No. 188, pp. 71-72.)

It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with,
rather than in violation of, the Constitution. 1 The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact
a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate
the specific purpose of the law.2

The challenged provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) must be construed in view of
such presumption of constitutionality. Further, the interpretation of these provisions should take into
account the purpose of the law, which is to give life to the constitutional mandate that the rights of
the indigenous peoples be recognized and protected.

The struggle of our indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands and domains and therefore,
their heritage, is not unique. It is one that they share with the red-skinned "Indians" of the United
States, with the aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand and the Sazmi of Sweden, to
name a few. Happily, the nations in which these indigenous peoples live all have enacted measures
in an attempt to heal an oppressive past by the promise of a progressive future. Thus has the
international community realized the injustices that have been perpetrated upon the indigenous
peoples. This sentiment among the family of nations is expressed in a number of documents, the
most recent and most comprehensive of which is the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by its resolution on August 26, 1994. Among the rights
recognized by the UN Draft is the restitution of lands, territories and even the resources which the
indigenous peoples have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been
confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without the free and informed consent of the indigenous
peoples.

A Historical Backdrop on the Indigenous Peoples

The term "indigenous" traces its origin to the Old Latin word indu, meaning "within." In the sense the
term has come to be used, it is nearer in meaning to the Latin word indigenus, which means
"native."3 "Indigenous" refers to that which originated or has been produced naturally in a particular
land, and has not been introduced from the outside. 4 In international law, the definition of what
constitutes "indigenous peoples" attains some degree of controversy. No definition of the term
"indigenous peoples" has been adopted by the United Nations (UN), although UN practice has been
guided by a working definition in the 1986 Report of UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo: 5

Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with
pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves
distinct from other sections of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They
form at present non-dominant sections of society and are determined to preserve, develop and
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions
and legal systems.

This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into the
present, of one or more of the following factors:
 (a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;

(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;

(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal
system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, life-style, etc.);

(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means
of communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or
normal language);

(e) Residence in certain parts of the country; or in certain regions of the world;

(f) Other relevant facts.6

In Philippine constitutional law, the term "indigenous peoples" pertains to those groups of Filipinos
who have retained a high degree of continuity from pre-Conquest culture. 7 Philippine legal history,
however, has not been kind to the indigenous peoples, characterized them as
"uncivilized,"8 "backward people,"9 with "barbarous practices"10 and "a low order of intelligence."11

Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, IPRA now employs the
politically-correct conjunctive term "indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural communities" as follows:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.- For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx

(h) Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities. - refer to a group of people or homogenous

societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as
organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of
ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing
common bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have,
through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions
and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples
shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the
populations which inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of
inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present State boundaries,
who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may
have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral
domains x x x.

Long before the Spaniards set foot in these islands, the indigenous peoples were already plowing
our soil and hunting in our forests. The Filipinos of Aeta and Malay stock, who were the original
inhabitants of our archipelago, were, at that time, practicing a native culture. From the time the
Spaniards arrived up to the early part of the American regime, 12 these native inhabitants resisted
foreign invasion, relentlessly fighting for their lands. Today, from the remote uplands of Northern
Luzon, to Palawan, Mindoro and Mindanao, the indigenous peoples continue to live on and cultivate
their ancestral lands, the lands of their forefathers.

Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same stock as the indigenous peoples, our national
culture exhibits only the last vestiges of this native culture. Centuries of colonial rule and neocolonial
domination have created a discernible distinction between the cultural majority and the group of
cultural minorities.13 The extant Philippine national culture is the culture of the majority; its indigenous
roots were replaced by foreign cultural elements that are decidedly pronounced, if not
dominant.14 While the culture of the majority reoriented itself to Western influence, the culture of the
minorities has retained its essentially native character.

One of every six Filipinos is a member of an indigenous cultural community. Around twelve million
Filipinos are members of the one hundred and ten or so indigenous cultural
communities,15 accounting for more than seventeen per centum of the estimated seventy million
Filipinos16 in our country. Sadly, the indigenous peoples are one of the poorest sectors of Philippine
society. The incidence of poverty and malnutrition among them is significantly higher than the
national average. The indigenous peoples are also among the most powerless. Perhaps because of
their inability to speak the language of law and power, they have been relegated to the fringes of
society. They have little, if any, voice in national politics and enjoy the least protection from
economic exploitation.

The Constitutional Policies on Indigenous Peoples

The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution of our less fortunate
brothers, fittingly saw the historic opportunity to actualize the ideals of people empowerment and
social justice, and to reach out particularly to the marginalized sectors of society, including the
indigenous peoples. They incorporated in the fundamental law several provisions recognizing and
protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples, to wit:

Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework
of national unity and development.17

Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies
and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains. 18

Sec. 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and
its increments.19

Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable
in accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, including lands of
the public domain under lease or concession, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small
settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. 20

Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider
these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies. 21
Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from such
communities.22

IPRA was enacted precisely to implement the foregoing constitutional provisions. It provides, among
others, that the State shall recognize and promote the rights of indigenous peoples within the
framework of national unity and development, protect their rights over the ancestral lands and
ancestral domains and recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains. 23 Moreover, IPRA
enumerates the civil and political rights of the indigenous peoples; 24 spells out their social and
cultural rights;25 acknowledges a general concept of indigenous property right and recognizes title
thereto;26 and creates the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President. 27

Preliminary Issues

A. The petition presents an actual controversy.

The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the existence of an appropriate
case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. 28

Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. 29 The threshold
issue, therefore, is whether an "appropriate case" exists for the exercise of judicial review in the
present case.

An "actual case or controversy" means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe for
resolution and susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or
anticipatory,30 or that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. 31 A
petition raising a constitutional question does not present an "actual controversy," unless it alleges a
legal right or power. Moreover, it must show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term
"controversy" is the presence of opposing views or contentions. 32 Otherwise, the Court will be forced
to resolve issues which remain unfocused because they lack such concreteness provided when a
question emerges precisely framed from a clash of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a
multi-faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests. 33 The controversy must also
be justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination. 34

In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been
enacted, and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and
the government agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be
successfully maintained that we should await the adverse consequences of the law in order to
consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the
petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership
over lands of the public domain and other natural resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is
set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient
authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional process.

B. Petitioners, as citizens and taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise the constitutional
questions herein.

In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will
sustain, a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. 35 Evidently, the rights asserted by petitioners as
citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the citizens, the violation of which may result only
in a "generalized grievance".36 Yet, in a sense, all citizen’s and taxpayer’s suits are efforts to air
generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the allocation of power. 37

In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude with regard to standing. 38 The proper party
requirement is considered as merely procedural, 39 and the Court has ample discretion with regard
thereto.40 As early as 1910, the Court in the case of Severino vs. Governor General 41 held:

x x x When the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, the relator must show some
personal or special interest in the subject matter, since he is regarded as the real party in interest
and his right must clearly appear. Upon the other hand, when the question is one of public
right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are
instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. 42

This Court has recognized that a "public right," or that which belongs to the people at large, may also
be the subject of an actual case or controversy. In Severino, we ruled that a private citizen may
enforce a "public right" in behalf of other citizens. We opined therein that:

… The right which [petitioner] seeks to enforce is not greater or different from that of any other
qualified elector in the municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which he would suffer in
case he fails to obtain the relief sought would not be greater or different from that of the other
electors; but he is seeking to enforce a public right as distinguished from a private right. The real
party in interest is the public, or the qualified electors of the town of Silay. Each elector has the
same right and would suffer the same injury. Each elector stands on the same basis with
reference to maintaining a petition whether or not the relief sought by the relator should be
granted.43

In Tañada v. Tuvera,44 the Court enforced the "public right" to due process and to be informed of
matters of public concern.

In Garcia vs. Board of Investments,45 the Court upheld the "public right" to be heard or consulted on
matters of national concern.

In Oposa v. Factoran,46 the Court recognized the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law."47Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that:

Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation-aptly and fittingly stressed by petitioners-the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind.48

Petitioners, as citizens, possess the "public right" to ensure that the national patrimony is not
alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the guardian of
the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without distinction as to ethnicity, it
follows that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that any grant of concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony strictly complies with constitutional requirements.
Thus, the preservation of the integrity and inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subject of
a citizen’s suit.

In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that a taxpayer has the right
to enjoin public officials from wasting public funds through the implementation of an unconstitutional
statute,49 and by necessity, he may assail the validity of a statute appropriating public funds. 50 The
taxpayer has paid his taxes and contributed to the public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the
manner by which the proceeds of his taxes are spent. The expenditure by an official of the State for
the purpose of administering an invalid law constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 51

The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: "An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the
Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating the National Commission
on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor,
and for Other Purposes." In the same manner, Section 79 authorizes for the expenditure of public
funds by providing that "the amount necessary to finance [its] initial implementation shall be charged
against the current year's appropriation for the Office for Northern Cultural Communities (the
"ONCC") and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities (the "OSCC")," 52which were merged as
organic offices of the NCIP.53 Thus, the IPRA is a valid subject of a taxpayer’s suit.

C. The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.

Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said
entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 54 Mandamus,
on the other hand, is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when said
entity or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or when said entity or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 55

In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from implementing the challenged
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules and the assailed DENR Circular No. 2, series of
1998, and that the same officials be enjoined from disbursing public funds for the implementation of
the said law and rules. They further ask that the Secretary of the DENR be compelled to perform his
duty to control and supervise the activities pertaining to natural resources.

Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from implementing the questioned
provisions of the IPRA and from disbursing funds in connection therewith if the law is found to be
unconstitutional. Likewise,mandamus will lie to compel the Secretary of the DENR to perform his
duty to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the
country’s natural resources. Consequently, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an
improper remedy for the relief sought.

D. Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, the Court assumes
jurisdiction over the petition in view of the importance of the issues raised therein.

Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should initially pass
upon the issues of a case. That way, as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is
shorn of all but the important legal issues or those of first impression, which are the proper subject of
attention of the appellate court. This is a procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to
improve the administration of justice.

This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although this Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,56 such
concurrence does not give a party unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The resort to this
Court’s primary jurisdiction to issue said writs shall be allowed only where the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify such invocation.57 We held in People v. Cuaresma58 that:

A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only where there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Court’s docket x x x.59 (Emphasis supplied.)

IPRA aims to rectify the historical injustice inflicted upon indigenous peoples. Its impact upon the
lives not only of the indigenous peoples but also upon the lives of all Filipinos cannot be denied. The
resolution of this case by the Court at the earliest opportunity is necessary if the aims of the law are
to be achieved. This reason is compelling enough to allow petitioners’ invocation of this Court’s
jurisdiction in the first instance.

Substantive Issues

Primary Issue

The issue of prime concern raised by petitioners and the Solicitor General revolves around the
constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 and
59. These provisions allegedly violate Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by
law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress, may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers,
lakes, bays and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.

Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition of their right of ownership 60 over
ancestral lands and ancestral domains by virtue of native title. 61 The term "ancestral lands" under
the statute refers to landsoccupied by individuals, families and clans who are members of
indigenous cultural communities, including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots. These lands are required to have been "occupied, possessed and
utilized" by them or through their ancestors "since time immemorial, continuously to the
present".62 On the other hand, "ancestral domains" is defined as areas generally belonging to
indigenous cultural communities, including ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential and
agricultural lands, hunting grounds, worship areas, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by
indigenous cultural communities but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home
ranges of indigenous cultural communities who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators. Ancestral
domains also include inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein. 63 Again, the same
are required to have been "held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously to the present". 64 Under Section 56, property rights within the ancestral domains already
existing and/or vested upon effectivity of said law "shall be recognized and respected."

Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to ancestral lands,
ancestral domains, and natural resources are unconstitutional. The fundamental question is, who,
between the State and the indigenous peoples, are the rightful owners of these properties?

It bears stressing that a statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation, of the
fundamental law.65 The reason is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have acted
within its authority and adhered to the constitutional limitations. Accordingly, courts should presume
that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law and one which
operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. 66

A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands
and ancestral domains are not unconstitutional.

In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are part of the public domain
and, thus, owned by the State, pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioners and
the Solicitor General advance the following arguments:

First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law acquired exclusive dominion
over the Philippines by virtue of discovery and conquest. They contend that the Spanish King under
the theory of jura regalia, which was introduced into Philippine law upon Spanish conquest in 1521,
acquired title to all the lands in the archipelago.
Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
owned by the State. They invoke the theory of jura regalia which imputes to the State the ownership
of all lands and makes the State the original source of all private titles. They argue that the Philippine
State, as successor to Spain and the United States, is the source of any asserted right of ownership
in land.

Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cariño doctrine exists. However,
petitioners maintain that the doctrine merely states that title to lands of the public domain may be
acquired by prescription. The Solicitor General, for his part, argues that the doctrine applies only to
alienable lands of the public domain and, thus, cannot be extended to other lands of the public
domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.

Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over ancestral lands and
ancestral domains existed by virtue of the Cariño doctrine, such native title was extinguished upon
the ratification of the 1935 Constitution.

Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to
protect that rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. However,
they contend that the mandate is subject to Section 2, Article XII and the theory of jura
regalia embodied therein. According to petitioners, the recognition and protection under R.A. 8371 of
the right of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains is far in excess of the legislative
power and constitutional mandate of Congress.

Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State,
petitioners posit that R.A. 8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of non-agricultural lands of the public domain and other natural resources.

I am not persuaded by these contentions.

Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of jura regalia is
understandable. Not only is the theory well recognized in our legal system; it has been regarded,
almost with reverence, as the immutable postulate of Philippine land law. It has been incorporated
into our fundamental law and has been recognized by the Court. 67

Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant,
express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government,
and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land
titles in the Philippines has persisted because title to land must emanate from some source for it
cannot issue forth from nowhere. 68

In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal rights,69 or those rights which the King has
by virtue of his prerogatives.70 In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has over
anything in which a subject has a right of property or propriedad.71 These were rights enjoyed during
feudal times by the king as the sovereign.

The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while
the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain
conditions, the King theoretically retained the title. 72 By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the
original proprietor of all lands, and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were
held.73 The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest. 74
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since
time immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño vs. Insular Government75 the United States
Supreme Court, reversing the decision76of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following
pronouncement:

x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present.
It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory
goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to
have been public land. x x x.77 (Emphasis supplied.)

The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership
of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and
independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.

In Cariño, an Igorot by the name of Mateo Cariño applied for registration in his name of an ancestral
land located in Benguet. The applicant established that he and his ancestors had lived on the land,
had cultivated it, and had used it as far they could remember. He also proved that they had all been
recognized as owners, the land having been passed on by inheritance according to native custom.
However, neither he nor his ancestors had any document of title from the Spanish Crown. The
government opposed the application for registration, invoking the theory of jura regalia. On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court held that the applicant was entitled to the registration of his native
title to their ancestral land.

Cariño was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the U.S. Court
were binding as precedent in our jurisdiction. 78 We applied the Cariño doctrine in the 1946 case
of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands,79 where we stated that "[a]ll lands that were not acquired from the
Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain, but [a]n exception to the
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption
that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even
before the Spanish conquest." 80

Petitioners however aver that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Cariño was premised on the fact
that the applicant had complied with the requisites of acquisitive prescription, having established that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property since time immemorial.
In effect, petitioners suggest that title to the ancestral land applied for by Cariño was transferred from
the State, as original owner, to Cariño by virtue of prescription. They conclude that the doctrine
cannot be the basis for decreeing "by mere legislative fiat…that ownership of vast tracts of land
belongs to [indigenous peoples] without judicial confirmation." 81

The Solicitor General, for his part, claims that the Cariño doctrine applies only to alienable lands of
the public domain and, as such, cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.

There is no merit in these contentions.

A proper reading of Cariño would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only to lands
which have always been considered as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether
alienable or otherwise. A distinction must be made between ownership of land under native title and
ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State. Ownership by virtue of native title
presupposes that the land has been held by its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the
concept of an owner since time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or
its successors-in-interest, the United States and the Philippine Government. There has been no
transfer of title from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as
memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State involves a
conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private land, which
presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person. Since native title assumes that the
property covered by it is private land and is deemed never to have been part of the public domain,
the Solicitor General’s thesis that native title under Cariñoapplies only to lands of the public domain
is erroneous. Consequently, the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks under the Constitution 82 is irrelevant to the application of
the Cariño doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of lands of the
public domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.

Legal history supports the Cariño doctrine.

When Spain acquired sovereignty over the Philippines by virtue of its discovery and occupation
thereof in the 16th century and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 which it entered into with
Portugal,83 the continents of Asia, the Americas and Africa were considered as terra nullius although
already populated by other peoples.84 The discovery and occupation by the European States, who
were then considered as the only members of the international community of civilized nations, of
lands in the said continents were deemed sufficient to create title under international law. 85

Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, this did not mean
that it acquired title to all lands in the archipelago. By virtue of the colonial laws of Spain, the
Spanish Crown was considered to have acquired dominion only over the unoccupied and
unclaimed portions of our islands.86

In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to deprive the natives of their
property. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was under instruction of the Spanish King to do no harm to the
natives and to their property. In this regard, an authority on the early Spanish colonial period in the
Philippines wrote:

The government of [the King of Spain] Philip II regarded the Philippines as a challenging opportunity
to avoid a repetition of the sanguinary conquests of Mexico and Peru. In his written instructions for
the Adelantado Legazpi, who commanded the expedition, Philip II envisaged a bloodless pacification
of the archipelago. This extraordinary document could have been lifted almost verbatim from the
lectures of the Dominican theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, delivered in the University of Salamanca.
The King instructed Legazpi to inform the natives that the Spaniards had come to do no harm to their
persons or to their property. The Spaniards intended to live among them in peace and in friendship
and "to explain to them the law of Jesus Christ by which they will be saved." Although the Spanish
expedition could defend themselves if attacked, the royal instructions admonished the commander to
commit no aggressive act which might arouse native hostility. 87

Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdings including native land
occupancy.88 Thus, the Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias expressly conferred ownership of lands
already held by the natives.89The royal decrees of 1880 and 1894 did not extinguish native title to
land in the Philippines. The earlier royal decree, dated June 25, 1880, provided that all those in
"unlawful possession of royal lands" must legalize their possession by means of adjustment
proceedings,90 and within the period specified. The later royal decree, dated February 13, 1894,
otherwise known as the Maura Law, declared that titles that were capable of adjustment under the
royal decree of 1880, but for which adjustment was not sought, were forfeited. Despite the harsh
wording of the Maura Law, it was held in the case of Cariño that the royal decree of 1894 should not
be construed as confiscation of title, but merely as the withdrawal of the privilege of registering such
title.91

Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the Philippines to the United States,
contrary to petitioners’ assertion that the US merely succeeded to the rights of Spain, including the
latter’s rights over lands of the public domain. 92 Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, the
cession of the Philippines did not impair any right to property existing at the time. 93 During the
American colonial regime, native title to land was respected, even protected. The Philippine Bill of
1902 provided that property and rights acquired by the US through cession from Spain were to be
administered for the benefit of the Filipinos. 94 In obvious adherence to libertarian principles,
McKinley’s Instructions, as well as the Philippine Bill of 1902, contained a bill of rights embodying the
safeguards of the US Constitution. One of these rights, which served as an inviolable rule upon
every division and branch of the American colonial government in the Philippines, 95 was that "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." 96 These vested rights
safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902 were in turn expressly protected by the due process
clause of the 1935 Constitution. Resultantly, property rights of the indigenous peoples over their
ancestral lands and ancestral domains were firmly established in law.

Nonetheless, the Solicitor General takes the view that the vested rights of indigenous peoples to
their ancestral lands and domains were "abated by the direct act by the sovereign Filipino people of
ratifying the 1935 Constitution."97 He advances the following arguments:

The Sovereign, which is the source of all rights including ownership, has the power to restructure the
consolidation of rights inherent in ownership in the State. Through the mandate of the Constitutions
that have been adopted, the State has wrested control of those portions of the natural resources it
deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence. It has been held that the State may
impair vested rights through a legitimate exercise of police power.

Vested rights do not prohibit the Sovereign from performing acts not only essential to but
determinative of social welfare and existence. To allow otherwise is to invite havoc in the established
social system. x x x

Time-immemorial possession does not create private ownership in cases of natural resources that
have been found from generation to generation to be critical to the survival of the Sovereign and its
agent, the State.98

Stated simply, the Solicitor General’s argument is that the State, as the source of all titles to land,
had the power to re-vest in itself, through the 1935 Constitution, title to all lands, including ancestral
lands and ancestral domains. While the Solicitor General admits that such a theory would
necessarily impair vested rights, he reasons out that even vested rights of ownership over ancestral
lands and ancestral domains are not absolute and may be impaired by the legitimate exercise of
police power.

I cannot agree. The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the Solicitor General,
while embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any misunderstanding. It simply declares
that "all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State."99 Nowhere does it state that certain lands which are "absolutely
necessary for social welfare and existence," including those which are not part of the public domain,
shall thereafter be owned by the State. If there is any room for constitutional construction, the
provision should be interpreted in favor of the preservation, rather than impairment or
extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated otherwise, Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution
cannot be construed to mean that vested right which had existed then were extinguished and that
the landowners were divested of their lands, all in the guise of "wrest[ing] control of those portions of
the natural resources [which the State] deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and
existence." On the contrary, said Section restated the fundamental rule against the diminution of
existing rights by expressly providing that the ownership of lands of the public domain and other
natural resources by the State is "subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concessions." The
"existing rights" that were intended to be protected must, perforce, include the right of
ownership by indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains. The words of the law
should be given their ordinary or usual meaning,100 and the term "existing rights" cannot be assigned
an unduly restrictive definition.

Petitioners concede that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution101to protect the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral
domains. Nonetheless, they contend that the recognition and protection under IPRA of the right of
ownership of indigenous peoples over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are far in excess of the
legislative power and constitutional mandate of the Congress, 102since such recognition and
protection amount to the alienation of lands of the public domain, which is proscribed under Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution.

Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to "protect the rights of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands." In its general and ordinary sense, the term "right" refers
to any legally enforceable claim. 103 It is a power, privilege, faculty or demand inherent in one person
and incident upon another.104 When used in relation to property, "right" includes any interest in or title
to an object, or any just and legal claim to hold, use and enjoy it. 105 Said provision in the Constitution
cannot, by any reasonable construction, be interpreted to exclude the protection of the right of
ownership over such ancestral lands. For this reason, Congress cannot be said to have exceeded
its constitutional mandate and power in enacting the provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 7(a)
and 8, which recognize the right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over ancestral lands.

The second paragraph of Section 5, Article XII also grants Congress the power to "provide for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership
and extent of ancestral domains." In light of this provision, does Congress have the power to decide
whether ancestral domains shall be private property or part of the public domain? Also, does
Congress have the power to determine whether the "extent" of ancestral domains shall include the
natural resources found therein?

It is readily apparent from the constitutional records that the framers of the Constitution did not
intend Congress to decide whether ancestral domains shall be public or private property. Rather,
they acknowledged that ancestral domains shall be treated as private property, and that customary
laws shall merely determine whether such private ownership is by the entire indigenous cultural
community, or by individuals, families, or clans within the community. The discussion below between
Messrs. Regalado and Bennagen and Mr. Chief Justice Davide, then members of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, is instructive:

MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madame President. May I seek some clarifications from either
Commissioner Bennagen or Commissioner Davide regarding this phrase "CONGRESS SHALL
PROVIDE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS
OR RELATIONS in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain," because
ordinarily it is the law on ownership and the extent thereof which determine the property rights or
relations arising therefrom. On the other hand, in this proposed amendment the phraseology is that it
is the property rights or relations which shall be used as the basis in determining the ownership and
extent of the ancestral domain. I assume there must be a certain difference in the customary laws
and our regular civil laws on property.

MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly the reason, Madam President, why we will leave it to Congress to
make the necessary exception to the general law on property relations.

MR. REGALADO. I was thinking if Commissioner Bennagen could give us an example of such a
customary law wherein it is the property rights and relations that determine the ownership and the
extent of that ownership, unlike the basic fundamental rule that it is the ownership and the extent of
ownership which determine the property rights and relations arising therefrom and consequent
thereto. Perhaps, these customary laws may have a different provision or thrust so that we could
make the corresponding suggestions also by way of an amendment.

MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly my own perception.

MR. BENNAGEN. Let me put it this way.

There is a range of customary laws governing certain types of ownership. There would be

ownership based on individuals, on clan or lineage, or on community. And the thinking
expressed in the consultation is that this should be codified and should be recognized in relation to
existing national laws. That is essentially the concept. 106 (Emphasis supplied.)

The intention to treat ancestral domains as private property is also apparent from the following
exchange between Messrs. Suarez and Bennagen:

MR. SUAREZ. When we speak of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain, are we thinking in terms of the tribal
ownership or community ownership or of private ownership within the ancestral lands or ancestral
domain?

MR. BENNAGEN. The concept of customary laws is that it is considered as ownership by

private individuals, clans and even communities.

MR. SUAREZ. So, there will be two aspects to this situation. This means that the State will set aside
the ancestral domain and there is a separate law for that. Within the ancestral domain it could accept
more specific ownership in terms of individuals within the ancestral lands.

MR. BENNAGEN. Individuals and groups within the ancestral domain. 107 (Emphasis supplied.)

It cannot be correctly argued that, because the framers of the Constitution never expressly
mentioned Cariño in their deliberations, they did not intend to adopt the concept of native title to
land, or that they were unaware of native title as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.108 The
framers of the Constitution, as well as the people adopting it, were presumed to be aware of the
prevailing judicial doctrines concerning the subject of constitutional provisions, and courts should
take these doctrines into consideration in construing the Constitution. 109

Having thus recognized that ancestral domains under the Constitution are considered as private
property of indigenous peoples, the IPRA, by affirming or acknowledging such ownership through its
various provisions, merely abides by the constitutional mandate and does not suffer any vice of
unconstitutionality.
Petitioners interpret the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs" in Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to mean "as subject
to the provision of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution," which vests in the State ownership of all
lands of the public domain, mineral lands and other natural resources. Following this interpretation,
petitioners maintain that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are the property of the State.

This proposition is untenable. Indeed, Section 2, Article XII reiterates the declarations made in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions on the state policy of conservation and nationalization of lands of the
public domain and natural resources, and is of paramount importance to our national economy and
patrimony. A close perusal of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveals that the
framers of the Constitution inserted the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" mainly
to prevent the impairment of Torrens titles and other prior rights in the determination of what
constitutes ancestral lands and ancestral domains, to wit:

MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one question. I want to clear this section protecting ancestral lands. How
does this affect the Torrens title and other prior rights?

MR. BENNAGEN. I think that was also discussed in the committee hearings and we did say that in
cases where due process is clearly established in terms of prior rights, these two have to be
respected.

MR. NATIVIDAD. The other point is: How vast is this ancestral land? Is it true that parts of Baguio
City are considered as ancestral lands?

MR. BENNAGEN. They could be regarded as such. If the Commissioner still recalls, in one of the
publications that I provided the Commissioners, the parts could be considered as ancestral domain
in relation to the whole population of Cordillera but not in relation to certain individuals or certain
groups.

MR. NATIVIDAD. The Commissioner means that the whole Baguio City is considered as ancestral
land?

MR. BENNAGEN. Yes, in the sense that it belongs to Cordillera or in the same manner that Filipinos
can speak of the Philippine archipelago as ancestral land, but not in terms of the right of a particular
person or particular group to exploit, utilize, or sell it.

MR. NATIVIDAD. But is clear that the prior rights will be respected.

MR. BENNAGEN. Definitely. 110

Thus, the phrase "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" was intended by the framers of the
Constitution as a reiteration of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of
property without due process of law.

There is another reason why Section 5 of Article XII mandating the protection of rights of the
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands cannot be construed as subject to Section 2 of the same
Article ascribing ownership of all public lands to the State. The Constitution must be construed as a
whole. It is a rule that when construction is proper, the whole Constitution is examined in order to
determine the meaning of any provision. That construction should be used which would give effect to
the entire instrument.111
Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands and other
natural resources should be read together with the other provisions thereof which firmly recognize
the rights of the indigenous peoples. These, as set forth hereinbefore, 112 include: Section 22, Article
II, providing that the State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the
framework of national unity and development; Section 5, Article XII, calling for the protection of the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social,
and cultural well-being, and for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains; Section 1, Article XIII,
directing the removal or reduction of social, economic, political and cultural inequities and
inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good; Section 6,
Article XIII, directing the application of the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship in the
disposition and utilization of other natural resources, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of
small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands; Section 17, Article
XIV, decreeing that the State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions; and Section 12,
Article XVI, authorizing the Congress to create a consultative body to advise the President on
policies affecting indigenous cultural communities.

Again, as articulated in the Constitution, the first goal of the national economy is the more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth.113 Equity is given prominence as the first
objective of national economic development.114 The framers of the Constitution did not, by the phrase
"subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs,"
intend to establish a hierarchy of constitutional norms. As explained by then Commissioner (now
Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., it was not their objective to make certain interests primary or
paramount, or to create absolute limitations or outright prohibitions; rather, the idea is towards the
balancing of interests:

BISHOP BACANI. In Commissioner Davide’s formulation of the first sentence, he says: "The State,
SUBJECT TO THE provisions of this Constitution AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND
PROGRAMS shall guarantee the rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands to
insure their economic, social and cultural well-being." There are at least two concepts here which
receive different weights very often. They are the concepts of national development policies and
programs, and the rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands, et cetera. I would
like to ask: When the Commissioner proposed this amendment, which was the controlling concept? I
ask this because sometimes the rights of cultural minorities are precisely transgressed in the interest
of national development policies and programs. Hence, I would like to know which is the controlling
concept here. Is it the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands or is it national
development policies and programs.

MR. DAVIDE. It is not really a question of which is primary or which is more paramount. The
concept introduced here is really the balancing of interests. That is what we seek to attain. We
have to balance the interests taking into account the specific needs and the specific interests also of
these cultural communities in like manner that we did so in the autonomous regions. 115 (Emphasis
supplied.)

B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the State’s ownership over the natural resources
within the ancestral domains.

Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the public
domain and other natural resources,116 as well as the State’s full control and supervision over the
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources. 117 Specifically, petitioners and the
Solicitor General assail Sections 3 (a),118 5,119and 7120 of IPRA as violative of Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution which states, in part, that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State." 121 They would have the Court
declare as unconstitutional Section 3(a) of IPRA because the inclusion of natural resources in the
definition of ancestral domains purportedly results in the abdication of State ownership over these
resources.

I am not convinced.

Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and
composition of ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining
whether a particular area is to be considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other
words, Section 3(a) serves only as a yardstick which points out what properties are within the
ancestral domains. It does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources
to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title.

The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind, important to ensure
that no unnecessary encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral domains will result
during the delineation process. The mere fact that Section 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include
the natural resources found therein does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural
resources as private property of the indigenous peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section
3(a) cannot be construed as a source of ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural
resources simply because it recognizes ancestral domains as their "private but community property."

The phrase "private but community property" is merely descriptive of the indigenous peoples’
concept of ownership as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. In Civil Law, "ownership"
is the "independent and general power of a person over a thing for purposes recognized by law and
within the limits established thereby." 122 The civil law concept of ownership has the following
attributes: jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the
right to consume the thing by its use, jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform
and even destroy that which is owned and jus vidicandi or the right to exclude other persons from
the possession the thing owned. 123 In contrast, the indigenous peoples’ concept of ownership
emphasizes the importance of communal or group ownership. By virtue of the communal character
of ownership, the property held in common "cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed" 124 because it was
meant to benefit the whole indigenous community and not merely the individual member. 125

That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous peoples is
also clear from the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on Section 7 which recites
the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains, to wit:

CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8126 rights to ancestral domain, this is where we

transferred the other provision but here itself -

HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I maybe allowed to make a very short Statement. Earlier, Mr.
Chairman, we have decided to remove the provisions on natural resources because we all
agree that that belongs to the State. Now, the plight or the rights of those indigenous communities
living in forest and areas where it could be exploited by mining, by dams, so can we not also provide
a provision to give little protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any mining areas
should be done in their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this
has been disturbing our people especially in the Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our lawyers or
the secretariat could just propose a provision for incorporation here so that maybe the right to
consultation and the right to be compensated when there are damages within their ancestral lands.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Yes, very well taken but to the best of my recollection both are already
considered in subsequent sections which we are now looking for.

HON. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. First of all there is a line that gives priority use for the indigenous people
where they are. Number two, in terms of the mines there is a need for prior consultation of source
which is here already. So, anyway it is on the record that you want to make sure that the secretariat
takes note of those two issues and my assurance is that it is already there and I will make sure that
they cross check.

HON. ADAMAT. I second that, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Okay, thank you. So we now move to Section 8, there is a Senate version
you do not have and if you agree we will adopt that. 127 (Emphasis supplied.)

Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over the
natural resources. In fact, Section 7(a) merely recognizes the "right to claim ownership over lands,
bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional
hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains."
Neither does Section 7(b), which enumerates certain rights of the indigenous peoples over the
natural resources found within their ancestral domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis-a-
vis the natural resources.

What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples’ rights and welfare in relation to the
natural resources found within their ancestral domains, 128 including the preservation of the ecological
balance therein and the need to ensure that the indigenous peoples will not be unduly displaced
when State-approved activities involving the natural resources located therein are undertaken.

Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has not been
recognized in the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case of Reavies v. Fianza129 in
support of their thesis that native title to natural resources has been upheld in this
jurisdiction.130 They insist that "it is possible for rights over natural resources to vest on a private (as
opposed to a public) holder if these were held prior to the 1935 Constitution." 131 However, a judicious
examination of Reavies reveals that, contrary to the position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court
did not recognize native title to natural resources. Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous
peoples to claim ownership of minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.

While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of land by virtue
of time immemorial possession in the concept of an owner was acknowledged and recognized as far
back during the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as
regards natural resources. The unique value of natural resources has been acknowledged by the
State and is the underlying reason for its consistent assertion of ownership and control over said
natural resources from the Spanish regime up to the present. 132 Natural resources, especially
minerals, were considered by Spain as an abundant source of revenue to finance its battles in wars
against other nations. Hence, Spain, by asserting its ownership over minerals wherever these may
be found, whether in public or private lands, recognized the separability of title over lands and that
over minerals which may be found therein. 133

On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for its
nationals. As the owner of natural resources over the Philippines after the latter’s cession from
Spain, the United States saw it fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit
minerals in public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral lands. A person who acquired
ownership over a parcel of private mineral land pursuant to the laws then prevailing could exclude
other persons, even the State, from exploiting minerals within his property. 134Although the United
States made a distinction between minerals found in public lands and those found in private lands,
title in these minerals was in all cases sourced from the State. The framers of the 1935 Constitution
found it necessary to maintain the State’s ownership over natural resources to insure their
conservation for future generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the country through
economic domination; and to avoid situations whereby the Philippines would become a source of
international conflicts, thereby posing danger to its internal security and independence. 135

The declaration of State ownership and control over minerals and other natural resources in the
1935 Constitution was reiterated in both the 1973136 and 1987 Constitutions.137

Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the ancestral domains belong to
the State, the Court deems it necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the NCIP with respect to
ancestral domains under Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only to the lands and not to
the natural resources therein.

Section 52[i] provides:

Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies. - The
Chairperson of the NCIP shall certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain. The secretaries
of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
Department of Interior and Local Government, and Department of Justice, the Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, and any other government agency claiming jurisdiction over the
area shall be notified thereof. Such notification shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction
previously claimed.

Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may still be under the
administration of other agencies of the Government, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform,
with respect to agricultural lands, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources with
respect to timber, forest and mineral lands. Upon the certification of these areas as ancestral domain
following the procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53 of the IPRA, jurisdiction of the government
agency or agencies concerned over lands forming part thereof ceases. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction
of government agencies over the natural resources within the ancestral domains does not
terminate by such certification because said agencies are mandated under existing laws to
administer the natural resources for the State, which is the owner thereof. To construe Section 52[i]
as divesting the State, through the government agencies concerned, of jurisdiction over the natural
resources within the ancestral domains would be inconsistent with the established doctrine that all
natural resources are owned by the State.

C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not unconstitutional.

The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and conserve the natural
resources found on the ancestral domains, to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation
and utilization of these resources, and to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
such natural resources.138 The statute also grants them priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. 139 Before the
NCIP can issue a certification for the renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or for the
perfection of any production-sharing agreement the prior informed written consent of the indigenous
peoples concerned must be obtained. 140 In return, the indigenous peoples are given the responsibility
to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains or portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
areas, forest cover, or reforestation. 141

The Solicitor General argues that these provisions deny the State an active and dominant role in the
utilization of our country’s natural resources. Petitioners, on the other hand, allege that under the
Constitution the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may only be
undertaken by the State, either directly or indirectly through co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements.142 To petitioners, no other method is allowed by the Constitution.
They likewise submit that by vesting ownership of ancestral lands and ancestral domains in the
indigenous peoples, IPRA necessarily gives them control over the use and enjoyment of such
natural resources, to the prejudice of the State. 143

Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources must be under the full control and supervision of the
State, which may directly undertake such activities or enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements. This provision, however, should not be read in isolation to avoid a
mistaken interpretation that any and all forms of utilization of natural resources other than the
foregoing are prohibited. The Constitution must be regarded as consistent with itself
throughout.144 No constitutional provision is to be separated from all the others, or to be considered
alone, all provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the fundamental law. 145

In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural
resources stated in paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself states in the third
paragraph of the same section that Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by its citizens.146 Further, Section 6, Article XIII, directs the State, in the disposition
and utilization of natural resources, to apply the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship.147 Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII mandates the State to protect the rights of
subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of marine and fishing resources.148 Clearly, Section 2,
Article XII, when interpreted in view of the pro-Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of our fundamental law,
and in harmony with the other provisions of the Constitution rather as a sequestered
pronouncement,149 cannot be construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of utilization of
natural resources without the State’s direct participation.

Through the imposition of certain requirements and conditions for the exploration, development and
utilization of the natural resources under existing laws,150 the State retains full control over such
activities, whether done on small-scale basis 151 or otherwise.

The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural resources under
Sections 7(b) and 57 of IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under existing laws, such as
the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. 7942).
R.A. 7076 expressly provides that should an ancestral land be declared as a people’s small-scale
mining area, the members of the indigenous peoples living within said area shall be given priority in
the awarding of small-scale mining contracts.152 R.A. 7942 declares that no ancestral land shall
be opened for mining operations without the prior consent of the indigenous cultural
community concerned153 and in the event that the members of such indigenous cultural community
give their consent to mining operations within their ancestral land, royalties shall be paid to
them by the parties to the mining to the contract.154

In any case, a careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the indigenous
peoples are duly circumscribed. These rights are limited only to the following: "to manage and
conserve natural resources within territories and uphold it for future generations; to benefit and
share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; to negotiate
the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws; to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a
result of the project, and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment of these rights."

It must be noted that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section 7(b) pertains
only to theexploration of natural resources. The term "exploration" refers only to the search or
prospecting of mineral resources, or any other means for the purpose of determining the existence
and the feasibility of mining them for profit.155 The exploration, which is merely a preliminary activity,
cannot be equated with the entire process of "exploration, development and utilization" of natural
resources which under the Constitution belong to the State.

Section 57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples "priority rights" in the utilization of
natural resources and not absolute ownership thereof. Priority rights does not mean exclusive rights.
What is granted is merely the right of preference or first consideration in the award of privileges
provided by existing laws and regulations, with due regard to the needs and welfare of indigenous
peoples living in the area.

There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or mechanical character in the grant
of concessions. Nor does the law negate the exercise of sound discretion by government entities.
Several factors still have to be considered. For example, the extent and nature of utilization and the
consequent impact on the environment and on the indigenous peoples’ way of life are important
considerations. Moreover, the indigenous peoples must show that they live in the area and that they
are in the best position to undertake the required utilization.

It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a blanket
authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. The utilization of said natural resources is
always subject to compliance by the indigenous peoples with existing laws, such as R.A. 7076 and
R.A. 7942 since it is not they but the State, which owns these resources.

It also bears stressing that the grant of priority rights does not preclude the State from undertaking
activities, or entering into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with private
entities, to utilize the natural resources which may be located within the ancestral domains. There is
no intention, as between the State and the indigenous peoples, to create a hierarchy of values;
rather, the object is to balance the interests of the State for national development and those of the
indigenous peoples.

Neither does the grant of priority rights to the indigenous peoples exclude non-indigenous peoples
from undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains upon authority granted by the
proper governmental agency. To do so would unduly limit the ownership rights of the State over the
natural resources.

To be sure, the act of the State of giving preferential right to a particular sector in the utilization of
natural resources is nothing new. As previously mentioned, Section 7, Article XIII of the Constitution
mandates the protection by the State of "the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and
offshore."
Section 57 further recognizes the possibility that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources
within the ancestral domains may disrupt the natural environment as well as the traditional activities
of the indigenous peoples therein. Hence, the need for the prior informed consent of the indigenous
peoples before any search for or utilization of the natural resources within their ancestral domains is
undertaken.

In a situation where the State intends to directly or indirectly undertake such activities, IPRA requires
that the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples be obtained. The State must, as a matter
of policy and law, consult the indigenous peoples in accordance with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution that national development policies and programs should involve a systematic
consultation to balance local needs as well as national plans. As may be gathered from the
discussion of the framers of the Constitution on this point, the national plan presumably takes into
account the requirements of the region after thorough consultation. 156 To this end, IPRA grants to the
indigenous peoples the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, and the right not to be removed therefrom
without their free and prior informed consent.157 As to non-members, the prior informed consent takes
the form of a formal and written agreement between the indigenous peoples and non-members
under the proviso in Section 57 in case the State enters into a co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreement with Filipino citizens, or corporations. This requirement is not peculiar
to IPRA. Existing laws and regulations such as the Philippine Environmental Policy, 158 the
Environmental Impact System,159 the Local Government Code160 and the Philippine Mining Act of
1995161already require increased consultation and participation of stakeholders, such as indigenous
peoples, in the planning of activities with significant environment impact.

The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the indigenous peoples must be
procured before the NCIP can issue a certification for the "issuance, renewal, or grant of any
concession, license or lease, or to the perfection of any production-sharing agreement," must be
interpreted, not as a grant of the power to control the exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources, but merely the imposition of an additional requirement for such concession or
agreement. The clear intent of the law is to protect the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples
which may be adversely affected by the operation of such entities or licensees.

Corollary Issues

A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.

The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be deprived the equal protection of the laws."

Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains under Section
3(a) and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands. They argue that the inclusion of private lands in the
ancestral lands and ancestral domains violates the due process clause. 162 Petitioners’ contention is
erroneous.

Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains
are "subject to Section 56," which reads:

Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. – Property rights within the ancestral domains already
existing and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and protected.
Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of indigenous
peoples, but not those who are not members of such communities. Following their interpretation,
IPRA, under Section 56, recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and
ancestral domains, subject to the vested rights of the same communities to such ancestral
lands and ancestral domains. Such interpretation is obviously incorrect.

The "property rights" referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals, whether
indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origins of
the ownership of these "property rights." The IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights"
regardless of whether they pertain to indigenous or non-indigenous peoples. Where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.163What IPRA only requires is that these "property
rights" already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.

Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens titles
within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes strict procedural
requirements for the proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains as safeguards
against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land, whether or not he is member of an
indigenous cultural community. In all proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral
domains, the Director of Lands shall appear to represent the interest of the Republic of the
Philippines.164 With regard to ancestral domains, the following procedure is mandatory: first,
petition by an indigenous cultural community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation
and census by the Ancestral domains Office ("ADO") of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the
ADO; fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of the
final report of the ADO.165 With regard to ancestral lands, unless such lands are within an ancestral
domain, the statute imposes the following procedural requirements: first, application; second,
posting and publication; third, investigation and inspection by the ADO; fourth, delineation; lastly,
evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of a report by the ADO.166 Hence, we cannot sustain the
arguments of the petitioners that the law affords no protection to those who are not indigenous
peoples.

Neither do the questioned sections of IPRA on the composition and powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP167 and the application of customary law,168 violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioners point out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of
indigenous peoples,169 and that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
indigenous peoples,170 including even disputes between a member of such communities and one
who is not a member, as well as over disputes in the delineation of ancestral domains. 171 Petitioners
clarify that they do not claim that the members of the NCIP are incapable of being fair and impartial
judges. They merely contend that the NCIP will notappear to be impartial, because a party who is
not a member of an indigenous cultural community "who must defend his case against [one who is]
before judges who are all members of [indigenous peoples] cannot but harbor a suspicion that they
do not have the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 172

In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA prescribes that customary laws shall be applied first in
disputes involving property, succession and land, 173 and that such laws shall likewise be used in
disputes involving indigenous peoples.174 They assert that "[w]hen the dispute involves a member of
an [indigenous cultural community and another who is not], a resolution of such a dispute based on
customary laws. . . would clearly be a denial of due process. . . [because those who are not
indigenous peoples] do not know what these customary laws are." 175

Petitioners’ concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the
indigenous peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable,
of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A person’s possession of the trait of impartiality
desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous
peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the non-indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter
have no monopoly of the concept of justice.

In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of its quasi-judicial
powers. Section 67 states that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals
by petition for review. The regular remedies under our rules of procedure are likewise available to
any party aggrieved by the decision of the NCIP.

Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,
suffice it to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Said provision states, "The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains."
Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely
of primacy of use.176 The IPRA prescribes the application of such customary laws where these
present a workable solution acceptable to the parties, who are members of the same indigenous
group. This interpretation is supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules which states:

RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS

Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands, involving
ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by
the concerned parties through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed
ancestral domain or land is located.

All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a non-
ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and
adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedures Before the
NCIP to be adopted hereafter. (Emphasis supplied.)

The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations
in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains,177 where all the parties
involved are members of indigenous peoples,178 specifically, of the same indigenous group. It
therefore follows that when one of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group,
or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of customary law
is not required.

Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in disputes
concerning ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice.
The utilization of customary laws is in line with the constitutional policy of recognizing the application
thereof through legislation passed by Congress.

Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this jurisdiction. Under
the Civil Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact according to the
rules of evidence,179and it is not contrary to law, public order or public policy. 180 Moreover, the Local
Government Code of 1991 calls for the recognition and application of customary laws to the
resolution of issues involving members of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of
customary laws in the settling of disputes if such are ordinarily used in barangays where majority of
the inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples. 181
B. Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the
President’s power of control over the Executive Department.

The second corollary issue is whether the Implementing Rules of IPRA violate Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution, which provides that:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

The assailed provision of the Implementing Rules provides:

Rule VII. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)

xxx

Part II: NCIP as an Independent Agency Under the Office of the President

Section 1. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programs to recognize, promote and protect the rights and well-being of
indigenous peoples. It shall be an independent agency under the Office of the President. As such,
the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a
lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. This
relationship shall be carried out through a system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day
administration or all those pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the discretion of the
Chairperson of the Commission, as the Chief Executive Officer.

Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power of control of the President
over the NCIP by characterizing the relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President as "lateral
but autonomous...for purposes of policy and program coordination."

Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules
characterize the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President, such
characterization does not remove said body from the President’s control and supervision.

The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights
and well being of the indigenous peoples and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as
their rights thereto.182 It has been granted administrative,183 quasi-legislative184 and quasi-judicial
powers185 to carry out its mandate. The diverse nature of the NCIP’s functions renders it impossible
to place said agency entirely under the control of only one branch of government and this,
apparently, is the reason for its characterization by Congress as an independent agency. An
"independent agency" is defined as an administrative body independent of the executive branch or
one not subject to a superior head of department, as distinguished from a "subordinate agency" or
an administrative body whose action is subject to administrative review or revision. 186

That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all instances is
evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals, 187 like those of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless,
the NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed by Congress "under the office of
the President" and, as such, is still subject to the President’s power of control and supervision
granted under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution 188 with respect to its performance of
administrative functions, such as the following: (1) the NCIP must secure the President’s approval in
obtaining loans to finance its projects;189 (2) it must obtain the President’s approval for any
negotiation for funds and for the acceptance of gifts and/or properties in whatever from and from
whatever source;190 (3) the NCIP shall submit annual reports of its operations and achievements to
the President, and advise the latter on all matters relating to the indigenous peoples; 191 and (4) it
shall exercise such other powers as may be directed by the President. 192 The President is also given
the power to appoint the Commissioners of the NCIP193 as well as to remove them from office for
cause motu proprio or upon the recommendation of any indigenous community. 194

To recapitulate:

(1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs (a) and (b), 5, 6, 7, and 8)
affirming the ownership by the indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands and domains by
virtue of native title do not diminish the State’s ownership of lands of the public domain,
because said ancestral lands and domains are considered as private land, and never to
have been part of the public domain, following the doctrine laid down in Cariño vs. Insular
Government;195

(2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals, mineral lands and other
natural resources in the State is not violated by Sections 3, 5, 7, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the
IPRA which grant certain rights to the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found
within the ancestral domains, e.g., to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation
and utilization of the same, as well as priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation thereof. The State retains full control over the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources even with the grant of said rights to the
indigenous peoples, through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the utilization
of natural resources under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 196and
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.197 Moreover, the rights granted to indigenous peoples for
the utilization of natural resources within their ancestral domains merely amplify what has
been earlier granted to them under the aforesaid laws;

(3) While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to their ancestral
lands and domains, it also protects the vested rights of persons, whether indigenous or non-
indigenous peoples, who may have acquired rights of ownership lands or rights to explore
and exploit natural resources within the ancestral lands and domains; 198

(4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions (Sections
40, 51-54, 62, 63, 65 and 66) of the IPRA which, among others, establish the composition of
the NCIP, and prescribe the application of customary law in certain disputes involving
indigenous peoples. The fact the NCIP is composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not
mean that it is incapable of being impartial. Moreover, the use of customary laws is
sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution; and

(5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as an independent
agency under the Office of the President does not infringe upon the President’s power of
control under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, since said provision as well as
Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the NCIP under the Office of the President, and
therefore under the President’s control and supervision with respect to its administrative
functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the Court of Appeals, like those of the
NLRC and the SEC.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Footnotes

1
 Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 89 SCRA
69 (1979); Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil 674
(1952).

2
 In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).

3
 In Philippine Colonial history, the term indio applied to indigenous throughout the vast
Spanish empire. India was a synonym for all of Asia east of the Indus River. Even after it
became apparent that the explorer Christopher Columbus was not able to reach territories
lying off the east coast of Asia, the Spanish persisted in referring to all natives within their
empire as los Indios. (Owen J. Lynch, Jr., THE PHILIPPINE COLONIAL DICHOTOMY:
Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 PL J 112 [1988] citing R. BERKHOFER, THE WHITE
MAN’S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE
PRESIDENT 5 [1979].

4
 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1976), p. 1151.

5
 Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructivist Approach
to the Asian Controversy, 92 The American Journal of International Law 414, 419 (1998)
citing Jose Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against indigenous
population, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1986/ 7/ Add. 4, paras. 379-80.

6
 Ibid. This definition is criticized for taking the potentially limited, and controversial view of
indigenous peoples by requiring "historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial
societies that developed on their territories."

7
 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 34.

8
 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 680 (1919).

 Hearing before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-Third
9

Congress, Third Session on HR 18459, pp. 346, 351. Quoted in Rubi at 686.

 United States President McKinleys’ Instruction to the Philippine Commission, April 7, 1900,
10

quoted in Rubi at 680.

11
 US v. Tubban, 29 Phil. 434, 436 (1915).

 See Owen J. Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples And A Hidden Agenda: The Origins of
12

Contemporary Philippine Land Laws (1900-1913), 63 PLJ 249 (1988).

 For an introduction to the chasm that exists between Philippine Law and Indigenous
13

Custom Law, see Owen J. Lynch, Jr., Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An
Introductory Survey 52 PLJ 268 (1982); and the Philippine Indigenous Law Collection: An
Introduction and Preliminary Bibliography, 58 PLJ 457 (1983), by the same author.

 See Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited (1975), pp. 26-41; Teodoro
14

Agoncillo, A History of the Filipino People, 8th ed., pp. 5, 74-75.

 Response of Rep. Gregorio A. Andolana to the interpellation of Rep. John Henry R.

15

Osmeña on ouse Bill No. 9125, Journal of August 20 and 21, 1997 of the House of
Representatives, p.20.

16
 Philippines Yearbook (1998 ed.), p. 366.

17
 Article II of the Constitution, entitled State Principles and Policies.

18
 Article XII of the Constitution, entitled National Economy and Patrimony.

19
 Article XIII of the Constitution, entitled Social Justice and Human Rights.

20
 Ibid.

 Article XIV of the Constitution, entitled Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture, and
21

Sports.

22
 Article XVI of the Constitution, entitled General Provisions.

23
 SECTION 2. Declaration of State Policies . - The State shall recognize and promote all the
rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder
enumerated within the framework of the Constitution:

a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework
of national unity and development;

b) The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure
their economic, social and cultural well being and shall recognize the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership
and extent of ancestral domain;

c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve
and develop their cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in
the formulation of national laws and policies;

d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall
equally enjoy the full measure of human rights and freedoms without distinction or
discrimination;

e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to
protect their rights and guarantee respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure
that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal footing from the rights and
opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the
population; and
 f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the
ICCs/IPs for cultural integrity by assuring maximum ICC/IP participation in the
direction of education, health, as well as other services of ICCs/IPs, in order to
render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of these
communities.

Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary
mechanisms to enforce and guarantee the realization of these rights, taking into
consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs, interests and institutions, and
to adopt and implement measures to protect their rights to their ancestral domains.

24
 See Sections 13-20, R.A. 8371.

25
 See Sections 21-37, R.A. 8371.

26
 See Sections 4-12, R.A. 8371.

27
 See Sections 38-50, R.A. 8371.

 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392, 400 (1980), citing People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
28

(1937).

29
 Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, 262 SCRA 492, 513 (1996).

30
 Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 104 (1996).

31
 Muskrat v. United States, 219 US 346, 362 (1913).

32
 WEBSTERS’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1976, p. 497.

33
 United States v. Freuhauf, 365 US 146 (1961).

 Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 364
34

(1989); Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993).

35
 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937).

36
 Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337, 342 (1983).

37
 US v. Richardson, 418 US 166, 194 S Ct 2940, 41 L Ed 2d 678 (1974).

 Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, 135 (1994), citing, among others, Philconsa v.
38

Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); CLU V. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991);
Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Osmena v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750
(1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA
290 (1992).

In Kilosbayan v. Morato (250 SCRA 130 [1995]) the Court discoursed on the rule on
standing as follows: taxpayers may sue on the claim of illegal disbursement of funds,
or to assail the constitutionality of a tax measure; voters may question the validity of
 election laws; citizens may raise constitutional questions of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and, legislators may question the validity of
official acts which infringe their prerogatives.

39
 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949).

 Assn. of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA
40

343, 364-365 (1989).

41
 16 Phil. 366 (1910), citing HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES.

42
 Id., at 371.

43
 Id., at 374-375.

44
 136 SCRA 27, 37 (1985).

45
 177 SCRA 374, 383 (1989).

46
 224 SCRA 792 (1993).

47
 Id., at 805.

48
 Ibid.

49
 Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300, 306 (1966).

50
 Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479, 487 (1965), citing 11 Am Jur 761.

 Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333, 358-359 (1976); Pascual v. Secretary of Public

51

Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 (1972).

52
 Section 79. Appropriations.- The amount necessary to finance the initial implementation of
this Act shall be charged against the current year's appropriation of the ONCC and the
OSCC. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for its continued implementation shall
be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

 Section 74. Merger of ONCC/OSCC.—The Office for Northern Cultural Communities

53

(ONCC) and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), created under Executive
Order Nos. 122-B and 122-C respectively, are hereby merged as organic offices of the NCIP
and shall continue to function under a revitalized and strengthened structure to achieve the
objectives of the NCIP x x x.

54
 Section 2, Rule 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

55
 Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

56
 Article VIII of the Constitution states:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

 (1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.

xxx

Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), as amended, provides:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction.-The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas

corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction;

x x x.

Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases.- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
original jurisdiction:

(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,

habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective
regions; and

(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.

57
 Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154, 173-174 (1997).

58
 172 SCRA 415 (1989).

59
 Id., at 424.

60
 Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.—The rights of ownership and possession of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall
include:

(a) Right of Ownership. – The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water
traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional

(b) hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time
within the domains;

xxx

 Section 3(l) Native Title – refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far
61

back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs,
have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that
way since before the Spanish Conquest; x x x

Section 3(p) Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far back as
memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied, possessed in the
 concept of owners, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by operation of
customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in accordance with their customs
and traditions.

62
 Section 3(b) Ancestral Lands – Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs
since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under
claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a
consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by the
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots,
rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots;

63
 Section 3(a) Ancestral Domains – Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally
belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources
therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by Indigenous peoples, by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement
by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary
dealings entered into by the government and private individuals/corporations, and which are
necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral
lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether
alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively
be occupied by Indigenous peoples but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still
nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.

64
 Ibid.

 Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958); San Miguel Corporation v. Avelino, 89 SCRA 69
65

(1979).

66
 In re Guarina, 24 Phil 37 (1913).

67
 See Lee Hong Hok vs. David, 48 SCRA 372 (1972).

68
 Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1994 rev. ed., p. 15.

69
 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 3rd revision, p. 1759.

70
 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 1282.

71
 76 Corpus Juris Secundum, citing Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 566.

 Washburn, p. 44; see also Williams, Principles Of The Law On Real Property, 6th ed.
72

(1886), p.2; Bigelow, p. 2.

73
 Warvelle, Abstracts and Examination of Title to Real Property (1907), p.18.

74
 1 Dictionary of English Law (Jowitt, ed.), p. 797.
75
 41 Phil. 935, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L Ed. 594 (1909).

76
 Cariño vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 132 (1906). The Philippine Supreme Court in this
case held that in the Philippines, there is no conclusive presumption of a grant of title to land
from the Government founded merely upon long possession of the same by the applicant.

77
 Cariño vs. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 941.

78
 Section 10, Philippine Bill of 1902.

79
 75 Phil 890 (1946).

80
 Id., at 892.

81
 Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, p. 861.

82
 Section 3, Article XII, Constitution.

83
 Under the Treaty of Tordesillas, the world was divided between Spain and Portugal, with
the former having exclusive power to claim all lands and territories west of the Atlantic Ocean
demarcation line (Lynch, The Legal Bases of Philippine Colonial Sovereignty, 62 Phil L J
279, 283 [1987]).

 See AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5th ed., 142-

84

143.

85
 See Cruz, International Law, 1996 ed., pp. 106-107.

86
 Cariño v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 939.

This point finds significance in light of the distinction between sovereignty and
dominion. Sovereignty is the right to exercise the functions of a State to the exclusion
of any other State (Case Concerning the Island of Las Palmas [1928], UNRIAA II
829, 838). It is often referred to as the power of imperium, which is defined as the
government authority possessed by the State (Bernas, The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary Vol. 2, p. 419). On the other hand,
dominion, or dominium, is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property such
as lands and natural resources.

Dominium was the basis for the early Spanish decrees embracing the theory of jura
regalia. The declaration in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that all lands
of the public domain are owned by the State is likewise founded on dominium (Ibid.).
If dominium, not imperium, is the basis of the theory of jura regalia, then the lands
which Spain acquired in the 16th century were limited to non-private lands, because
it could only acquire lands which were not yet privately-owned or occupied by the
Filipinos. Hence, Spain acquired title only over lands which were unoccupied and
unclaimed, i.e., public lands.

 Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipinos Responses,
87

1565-1700 (1959), pp. 8-9.

88
 Cariño vs. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 943.

 Book 4, Title 12, Law 9, decreed by Philip II, 1 June 1594. We order that grants of farms
89

and lands to Spaniards be without injury to the Indians and that those which have been
granted to their loss and injury, be returned to the lawful owners.

Book 4, Title 12, Law 14. We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all
lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away by our royal
predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining the royal crown and
patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of
grant be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that x x x after
distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and
pasteurage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to
dispose of as we wish. [Quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 542-543
(1904).] (Emphasis supplied.)

Book 6, Title 1, Law 15, decreed by King Philip II, at Madrid, 7 November 1574. We
command that in the Philippine Islands the Indians not be removed from one to
another settlement by force and against their will.

Book 6, Title 1, Law 23, otherwise known as Ordinance 10 of 1609 decreed by Philip
III. It is right that time should be allowed the Indians to work their own individual lands
and those of the community.

Book 6, Title 1, Law 32, decreed by Philip II, 16 April 1580. We command the
Viceroys, Presidents, and Audiencias that they see to it that the Indians have
complete liberty in their dispositions.

Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754. Where such possessors shall not be able to
produce title deeds it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession,
as a valid title by prescription; x x x. [Quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, supra, at
546.] (Emphasis supplied.)

 Article 6 of the royal decree of June 25, 1880, quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, supra note
90

89 at 549.

91
 Cariño v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 944.

92
 Memorandum of Petitioners, par. 3.4, Rollo, pp. 845-846.

93
 The Treaty of Paris reads in part:

Article III. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine
Islands, x x x.

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars, within three
months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

xxx
 Article VIII. In conformity with the provisions of Articles One, Two, and Three of this
treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands of the
West Indies, in the Island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the
buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable
property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain and as such
belong to the Crown of Spain.

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to
which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the property or
rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of
provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic
bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess
property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of
whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.

94
 The statute reads in part:

Section 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the
Philippine Islands under the treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other property as shall be
designated by the President of the United States for military and other reservations of
the Government of the United States, are hereby placed under the control of the
Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants
thereof, except as provided by this Act.

 McKinley’s Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, in Mendoza, From

95

McKinley’s Instructions to the New Constitution: Documents on the Philippine Constitutional

System (1978) p. 71.

96
 Id., at 65-75; Section 5, Philippine Bill of 1902.

97
 Solicitor General’s Memorandum, Rollo, p. 668-669.

98
 Id, at 668.

99
 Section 1, Article XII, 1935 Constitution reads:

All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty five years, except as to water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
100
 Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank, 104 Phil 598 (1954).

 Sec. 5, Article XII. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
101

development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains.

102
 See Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 863-864.

103
 Sibal, Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, p. 893.

104
 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 1189.

105
 Ibid.

106
 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 32.

107
 Id., at 37.

108
 Solicitor General’s Memorandum, Rollo, p. 665.

109
 Torres v. Tan Chim, 69 Phil 518 (1940); CIR v.Guerrero, 21 SCRA 180 (1967).

110
 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 36.

111
 See 1 COOLEY, CONST., LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., pp. 127-129.

112
 See pp. 8-9 of this Opinion for the full text of the constitutional provisions mentioned.

113
 Section 1, Article XII provides:

The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of

opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods
and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country
shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including
corporations, cooperatives and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged
to broaden the base of their ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
  Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, p. 800, citing the sponsorship speech
114

of Dr. Bernardo Villegas, Chairman of the Committee on National Economy and Patrimony.

115
 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 34.

116
 Petition, Rollo, pp.18-19.

117
 Id., at 20.

118
 Section 3. Definition of Terms. -For Purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

a) Ancestral Domains. -Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally

belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by
ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since
time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and
private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic,
social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands, individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for
their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs
who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.

 Section 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership- Indigenous concept of ownership sustains

119

the view that ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material
bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that
ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all
generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers
sustainable traditional resource rights.

 Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.—The rights of ownership and possession of

120

ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall
include:

(a) Right of Ownership. – The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water

traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and
fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;

(b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. – Subject to Section 56 hereof,

right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned,
or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold
the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from
allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate
the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and
intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to
 receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a
result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent
any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights; x x x
(Emphasis supplied.)

121
 Section 2, Article XII, Constitution.

 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, p.
122

42 (1983); see also Articles 427 and 428, Civil Code.

123
 Id., at 43.

124
 Section 5, R.A. 8371.

125
 Ibid.

 Should be Section 7. The Transcript of Session Proceedings of the deliberations of the

126

Bicameral Conference Committee on National Cultural Communities regarding House Bill

No. 9125 refers to Section 8 but the Committee was actually discussing Section 7 on Rights
to Ancestral Domains.

 Transcript of Session Proceedings, Bicameral Conference Committee on National Cultural

127

Communities, October 9, 1997, XIV-2.

128
 Sections 7 (b) and Section 57, R.A. 8371.

129
 40 Phil. 1017 (1909), 215 US 16, 54 L Ed 72.

 Ibid. The facts of the case were discussed in Fianza vs. Reavies, (7 Phil. 610 [1909]) thus:
130

Jose Fianza, et al., members of the Igorot tribe, claimed that he and his predecessors had,
for more than fifty years prior to 1901, possessed a certain parcel of mineral land on which
were found two gold mines. The same parcel of land was also claimed by an American, J.F.
Reavies, who entered the land in 1901 and proceeded to locate mining claims according to
the mining laws of the United States. The Philippine Supreme Court held that Fianza, et al.
were the rightful owners of the mineral lands pursuant to Section 45 of the Philippine Bill of
1902 which in sum states that where a person have held or worked on their mining claims for
a period equivalent to ten years, evidence of such possession and working of the claims for
such period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto. On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court and held that
the indigenous peoples were the rightful owners of the contested parcel of land, stating that
the possession and working by Fianza, et al. of the mining claim in the Philippine Islands for
the time required under the Section 45 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to establish the right to a
patent, need not have been under a claim of title.

131
 Memorandum of Intervenors Flavier, et al., Rollo, p. 918.

 Article I of the Decree of Superior Civil Government of January 29, 1864 provided that
132

"The supreme ownership of mines throughout the kingdom belong to the crown and the king.
They shall not be exploited except by persons who obtained special grant from this superior
government and by those who may secure it thereafter, subject to this regulation."
(FRANCISCO, PHILIPPINE LAWS ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 2nd ed. [1956], p. 14,
citing the unpublished case of Lawrence v. Garduno, G.R. No. 19042.)

Article 2 of the Royal Decree of May 14, 1867 (the Spanish Mining Law), the law in
force at the time of the cession of the Philippines to the United States contained a
similar declaration, thus:

The ownership of the substances enumerated in the preceding article (among them
those of inflammable nature) belongs to the state, and they cannot be disposed of
without an authorization issued by the Superior Civil Governor.

The Spanish Civil Code contained the following analogous provisions affirming the
State’s ownership over minerals:

Art. 339. Property of public dominium is-

xxx

2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use,
is employed in some public service, or in the development of the national wealth,
such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines,
until granted to private individuals.

Art. 350. The proprietor of land is the owner of the surface and of everything under it
and may build, plant or excavate thereon, as he may see fit, subject to any existing
easements and to the provisions of the Laws on Mines and Waters and to police
regulations.

After the Philippines was ceded to Spain, the Americans continued to adhere to the
concept of State-ownership of natural resources. However, the open and free
exploration, occupation and purchase of mineral deposits and the land where they
may be found were allowed under the Philippine Bill of 1902. Section 21 thereof
stated:

Sec. 21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands,
both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and open to
exploration, occupation and purchase, and the land in which they are found, to
occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of said
Islands: Provided, That when on any lands in said Islands entered and occupied as
agricultural lands under the provisions of this Act, but not patented, mineral deposits
have been found, the working of such mineral deposits is hereby forbidden until the
person, association, or corporation who or which has entered and is occupying such
lands shall have paid to the Government of said Islands such additional sum or sums
as will make the total amount paid for the mineral claim or claims in which said
deposits are located equal to the amount charged by the Government for the same
as mineral claims.

Other natural resources such as water and forests were similarly regarded as
belonging to the State during both the Spanish and American rule in the Philippines,
viz:
Article 33 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 defined waters of public ownership
as (1) the waters springing continuously or intermittently from lands of the public
domain; (2) the waters of rivers; and (3) the continuous or intermittent waters of
springs and creeks running through their natural channels.

Article 1 of the same law states:

The following are also part of the national domain open to public use:

1. The coasts or maritime frontiers of the Philippine territory with their coves,
inlets, creeks, roadsteads, bays and ports

2. The coast of the sea, that is, the maritime zone encircling the coasts, to
the full width recognized by international law. The state provides for and
regulates the police supervision and the uses of this zone as well as the right
of refuge and immunity therein, in accordance with law and international
treaties.

With respect to forests, there are references made regarding State-ownership of

forest lands in Supreme Court decisions (See Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23
SCRA 1183, 1198-1199 [1968]; Director of Lands vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5, 11
[1975]; Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175, 184 [1908]; Montano vs. Insular
Government, 12 Phil 572, 584 [1909]).

The State’s ownership over natural resources was embodied in the 1935, 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution declared:

All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time
of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and
no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
another twenty -five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.

Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provided:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of
the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural
resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation water supply, fisheries,
 or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

133
 Noblejas, Philippine Law on Natural Resources 1961 Revised Ed., p. 6

 See Laurel (ed.), Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. VI, pp.
134

494-495.

 Explanatory Note of the Committee on Nationalization of Lands and Natural Resources,

135

September 14, 1934, reproduced in Laurel (ed.), Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional
Convention, Vol. VII, pp. 464-468; see also De Leon and De Leon, Jr., Philippine
Constitutional Law: Principles and Cases, Vol. 2, pp. 801-802.

136
 Section 8, Article XIV, see note 139 for the full text of the provision.

137
 Paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State. with the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations and associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.

 Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.—The rights of ownership and possession

138

of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights
shall include:

xxx

b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.- Subject to Section 56 hereof,

right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned,
or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and
uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits
from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right
to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources
in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the
conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an
informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains
and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain
as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to
prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;
139
 Section 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.-The ICCs/IPs shall have priority
rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources
within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to
take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not
exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years:
Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned
or that the community, pursuant to its own decision making process, has agreed to allow
such operation: Provided, finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and take
appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract.

140
 Section 59. Certification Precondition - All departments and other governmental agencies
shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing, or granting any concession,
license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior certification
from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such
certification shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is conducted by the
Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be
issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of
Indigenous peoples concerned: Provided, further, That no department, government
agency or government-owned or controlled corporation may issue new concession, license,
lease, or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT:
Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance
with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process.

 Section 58. Environmental Considerations.- Ancestral domains or portions thereof, which

141

are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,

wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation as determined by appropriate
agencies with the full participation of the Indigenous peoples concerned shall be maintained,
managed and developed for such purposes. The Indigenous peoples concerned shall be
given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such areas with
the full and effective assistance of government agencies. Should the Indigenous
peoples decide to transfer the responsibility over the areas, said decision must be made in
writing. The consent of the Indigenous peoples should be arrived at in accordance with its
customary laws without prejudice to the basic requirements of existing laws on free and prior
informed consent: Provided, That the transfer shall be temporary and will ultimately revert to
the Indigenous peoples in accordance with the program for technology transfer; Provided,
further, That no Indigenous peoples shall be displaced or relocated for the purpose
enumerated under this section without the written consent of the specific persons authorized
to give consent.

142
 Citing Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

143
 Memorandum of Petitioners, Id., at 840-841.

 State v. Lathrop, 93 Ohio St 79, 112 NE 209, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, §
144

100.

 Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 US 8, 51 L Ed 345, cited in 16 Am Jur
145

2d Constitutional Law, § 100.

146
 Third paragraph, Section 2, Article XII, Constitution –
 The Congress may, by law, allow small scale-utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

147
 Section 6, Article XIII, Constitution –

The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to
agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of
the indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural
estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.

148
 Section 7, Article XIII, Constitution –

The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local
communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources,
both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through
appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing
assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve
such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just
share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

 Bower v. Big Horn Canal Assn. (Wyo) 307 P2d 593, cited in 16 Am Jur 2d Constitutional
149

Law, § 100.

 Republic Act No. 7076 (the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991), Republic Act No. 7942 (the
150

Philippine Mining Act of 1995).

 Section 3(b) of R.A. 7076 defines "small-scale mining" as referring to mining activities
151

which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use
explosives or heavy mining equipment.

152
 Section 7, R.A. 7076 provides:

Ancestral lands. - No ancestral land may be declared as a people’s small-scale

mining area without the prior consent of the cultural communities
concerned: Provided, That, if ancestral lands are declared as peole’s small-scale
mining areas, the members of the cultural communities therein shall be given priority
for the awarding of a people’s small-scale mining contract.

153
 Section 16, R.A. 7492.

154
 Section 17, R.A. 7942.

155
 Sec. 3(q), Chapter 1, Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995).

156
 4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 37.
157
 Sections 7(a) and (b), R.A. 8371.

158
 Presidential Decree No. 1151 (1971).

159
 Presidential Decree No. 1586 (1978) and DENR Administrative Order No. 37 (1996).

160
 Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).

161
 Republic Act No. 7942.

162
 Petition, Rollo, pp. 23-25.

163
 Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590, 596 (1995).

164
 Section 53 (f), R.A. 8371.

165
 Section 52, R.A. 8371.

166
 Section 53, R.A. 8371.

167
 Sections 40, 51, 52, 53, 54, 62 and 66, R.A. No. 8371.

168
 Sections 63 and 65, R.A. No. 8371.

 Section 40. Composition.- The NCIP shall be an independent agency under the Office of
169

the President and shall be composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to the ICCs/IPs,
one (1) of whom shall be the Chairperson. The Commissioners shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines from a list of recommendees submitted by authentic ICCs/IPs:
Provided, That the seven (7) Commissioners shall be appointed specifically from each of the
following ethnographic areas, Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II, the rest of Luzon;
Island Groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas;
Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao:
Provided, That at least two (2) of the seven (7) Commissioners shall be women.

 Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.- The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have
170

jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Provided, however, That
no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies
provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same
has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
petition with the NCIP.

 Section 62. Resolution of Conflicts.- In cases of conflicting interest, where there are
171

adverse claims within the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which can
not be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the
disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute
is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of their respective
ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That
any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any
matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this
Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof.

172
 Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo ,pp. 873-874.

 Section 3 (f). Customary Laws - refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages,
173

customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by
respective ICCs/IPs;

xxx

Sec. 63. Applicable Laws. - Customary laws, traditions and practices of the ICCs/IPs
of the land where the conflict arises shall be applied first with respect to property
rights, claims and ownerships, hereditary succession and settlement of land
disputes. Any doubt or ambiguity in the application and interpretation of laws shall be
resolved in favor of the ICCs/IPs.

 Sec. 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve ICCs/IPs,
174

customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.

175
 Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, pp.875-876.

176
 R.A. 8371 states:

Sec. 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve
ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.

177
 See Secs. 62 and 63, R.A. 8371.

178
 Sec. 65, R.A. 8371.

179
 The Civil Code provides:

Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.

180
 The Civil Code provides:

Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not
be countenanced.180

181
 R.A. No. 7160 reads:

Sec. 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. –

xxx

(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous

peoples, local systems of settling disputes of indigenous peoples, local systems of
settling disputes through their councils of datus or elders shall be recognized without
prejudice to the applicable provisions of this Code.
 182
 Sec. 38, R.A. 8371.

183
 Secs. 44 (a), (b), (c),(d), (f), (g), (h), (I), (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (p), (q), R.A. 8371.

184
 Sec. 44 (o), R.A. 8371.

185
 Secs. 44 (e), 51-54, 62, R.A. 8371.

186
 1 Am Jur 2d, Administrative Law, § 55.

187
 Sec. 62, R.A. 8371.

 Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
188

offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

189
 Sec. 44 (f), R.A. 8371.

190
 Sec. 44 (g), R.A, 8371.

191
 Sec. 44 (j), R.A. 8371.

192
 Sec. 44 (p), R.A. 8371.

193
 Sec. 40, R.A. 8371.

194
 Sec. 42, R.A. 8371.

195
 Supra note 75.

196
 R.A. 7076.

197
 R.A. 7942.

198
 Section 56, R.A. 8371.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION

MENDOZA, J.:

This suit was instituted to determine the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Petitioners do not complain of any injury as
a result of the application of the statute to them. They assert a right to seek an adjudication of
constitutional questions as citizens and taxpayers, upon the plea that the questions raised are of
"transcendental importance."
The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, §1 extends only to cases and controversies for
the determination of such proceedings as are established by law for the protection or enforcement of
rights, or the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs. 1 In this case, the purpose of the suit is
not to enforce a property right of petitioners against the government and other respondents or to
demand compensation for injuries suffered by them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but
only to settle what they believe to be the doubtful character of the law in question. Any judgment that
we render in this case will thus not conclude or bind real parties in the future, when actual litigation
will bring to the Court the question of the constitutionality of such legislation. Such judgment cannot
be executed as it amounts to no more than an expression of opinion upon the validity of the
provisions of the law in question.2

I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, §1 of the Constitution to determine
in the abstract whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive departments in enacting the IPRA.
Our jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies. No one reading Art. VIII, §5 can fail to note
that, in enumerating the matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins with the
phrase "all cases. . . ."

The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there has been a grave
abuse of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, §1 not really to give the judiciary a roving commission to
right any wrong it perceives but to preclude courts from invoking the political question doctrine in
order to evade the decision of certain cases even where violations of civil liberties are alleged.

The statement is based on the ruling of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia,3 in which this Court,
adopting the submission of the Solicitor General, formulated the following test of its jurisdiction in
such cases:

[J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the
Court not that the President’s decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the
rebellion and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did
not act arbitrarily.

That is why Art. VII, §18 now confers on any citizen standing to question the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, who chaired the Committee on the Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission,
was the author of the opinions of the Court in Lopez v. Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia.

Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or
controversies without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the government
and erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress,
with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would
be permitting in this case were we to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional
validity of the IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute
only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its
face.

The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of
freedom of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the
validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional but it might be if applied to
others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the statute
"on its face" rather than "as applied" is permitted in the interest of preventing a "chilling" effect on
freedom of expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is
unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far
inseparable from the rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not possible.

For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or controversy is not only to act
without jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in adjudicating abstract or hypothetical questions, its
decision will be based on speculation rather than experience. Deprived of the opportunity to observe
the impact of the law, the Court is likely to equate questions of constitutionality with questions of
wisdom and is thus likely to intrude into the domain of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it
cannot be too often repeated, cannot take place in a vacuum.

Some of the brethren contend that not deciding the constitutional issues raised by petitioners will be
a "galling cop out"4 or an "advocacy of timidity, let alone isolationism." 5 To decline the exercise of
jurisdiction in this case is no more a "cop out" or a sign of "timidity" than it was for Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison6 to hold that petitioner had the right to the issuance of his
commission as justice of the peace of the District of Columbia only to declare in the end that after all
mandamus did not lie, because §13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred original jurisdiction
on the United States Supreme Court to issue the writ of mandamus, was unconstitutional as the
court’s jurisdiction is mainly appellate.

Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered for the institution of the power of judicial review, and so
that there can be no doubt of this power of our Court, we in this country have enshrined its principle
in Art. VIII, §1. Now, the exercise of judicial review can result either in the invalidation of an act of
Congress or in upholding it. Hence, the checking and legitimating functions of judicial review so well
mentioned in the decisions7 of this Court.

To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy is not to
show timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal department of government whose acts,
unless shown to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are presumed to be valid. The polestar
of constitutional adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in the Angara case when he said that
"this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota, presented."8 For the exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a
necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals. 9 Until,
therefore, an actual case is brought to test the constitutionality of the IPRA, the presumption of
constitutionality, which inheres in every statute, must be accorded to it.

Justice Kapunan, on the other hand, cites the statement in Severino v. Governor
General,10 reiterated in Tanada v. Tuvera,11 that "when the question is one of public right and the
object of mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real
party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as
such is interested in the execution of the laws." On the basis of this statement, he argues that
petitioners have standing to bring these proceedings. 12

In Severino v. Governor General,13 the question was whether mandamus lay to compel the Governor
General to call a special election on the ground that it was his duty to do so. The ruling was that he
did not have such a duty. On the other hand, although mandamus was issued in Tanada v.
Tuvera, it was clear that petitioners had standing to bring the suit, because the public has a right to
know and the failure of respondents to publish all decrees and other presidential issuances in the
Official Gazette placed petitioners in danger of violating those decrees and issuances. But, in this
case, what public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them
except in general and in common with other citizens.
For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.

Footnotes

1
 Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 761 (1966).

2
 Muskrat v. United States, 279 U.S. 346, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911).

3
 42 SCRA 448, 481 (1971) (emphasis on the original).

4
 Panganiban, J., Separate Opinion, p. 2.

5
 Vitug, J., Separate Opinion, p. 1.

6
 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

7
 Occeña v. Commission on Elections; Gonzales v. The National Treasurer, 104 SCRA 1
(1981); Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 104 SCRA 59 (1981).

8
 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).

9
 Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806
(1955).

10
 16 Phil. 366 (1913).

11
 136 SCRA 27 (1985).

12
 Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion, pp. 21-23.

13
 Supra note 10.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring and Dissenting)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur with the draft ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in its well-crafted handling of
the procedural or preliminary issues. In particular, I agree that petitioners have shown an actual case
or controversy involving at least two constitutional questions of transcendental importance, 1 which
deserve judicious disposition on the merits directly by the highest court of the land. 2 Further, I am
satisfied that the various aspects of this controversy have been fully presented and impressively
argued by the parties. Moreover, prohibition and mandamus are proper legal remedies 3 to address
the problems raised by petitioners. In any event, this Court has given due course to the Petition,
heard oral arguments and required the submission of memoranda. Indeed, it would then be a galling
copout for us to dismiss it on mere technical or procedural grounds.

Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Must Be Within the Constitutional Framework

With due respect, however, I dissent from the ponencia’s resolution of the two main substantive
issues, which constitute the core of this case. Specifically, I submit that Republic Act (RA) No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, violates and contravenes
the Constitution of the Philippines insofar as -

1. It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain,
waters, x x x and other natural resources" which, under Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, "are owned by the State" and "shall not be alienated." I respectfully reject the
contention that "ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not public lands and have never
been owned by the State." Such sweeping statement places substantial portions of
Philippine territory outside the scope of the Philippine Constitution and beyond the collective
reach of the Filipino people. As will be discussed later, these real properties constitute a third
of the entire Philippine territory; and the resources, 80 percent of the nation's natural wealth.

2. It defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources," which the Constitution expressly requires
to "be under the full control and supervision of the State."

True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural communities’ right to
their ancestral lands, but such mandate is "subject to the provisions of this Constitution." 4 I concede
that indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded
preferential rights to the beneficial use of public domains, as well as priority in the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to the
fundamental law.

Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less in life,
Congress in its wisdom may grant preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and
sisters, subject to the irreducible caveat that the Constitution must be respected. I personally believe
in according every benefit to the poor, the oppressed and the disadvantaged, in order to empower
them to equally enjoy the blessings of nationhood. I cannot, however, agree to legitimize perpetual
inequality of access to the nation's wealth or to stamp the Court's imprimatur on a law that offends
and degrades the repository of the very authority of this Court - the Constitution of the Philippines.

The Constitution Is a Compact

My basic premise is that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all other laws
must conform.5 It is the people's quintessential act of sovereignty, embodying the principles upon
which the State and the government are founded. 6 Having the status of a supreme and all-
encompassing law, it speaks for all the people all the time, not just for the majority or for the minority
at intermittent times. Every constitution is a compact made by and among the citizens of a State to
govern themselves in a certain manner.7 Truly, the Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant
made by all the Filipinos to govern themselves. No group, however blessed, and no sector, however
distressed, is exempt from its compass.
RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples,
admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the state policy
enshrined in our Constitution to "recognize and promote the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development." 8 Though laudable and well-
meaning, this statute, however, has provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from
which it claims origin and authority. More specifically, Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and
other related provisions contravene the Regalian Doctrine - the basic foundation of the State's
property regime.

Public Domains and Natural Resources Are Owned by the State and Cannot Be Alienated or Ceded

Jura regalia was introduced into our political system upon the "discovery" and the "conquest" of our
country in the sixteenth century. Under this concept, the entire earthly territory known as the
Philippine Islands was acquired and held by the Crown of Spain. The King, as then head of State,
had the supreme power or exclusive dominion over all our lands, waters, minerals and other natural
resources. By royal decrees, though, private ownership of real property was recognized upon the
showing of (1) a title deed; or (2) ancient possession in the concept of owner, according to which a
title could be obtained by prescription.9 Refusal to abide by the system and its implementing laws
meant the abandonment or waiver of ownership claims.

By virtue of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Philippine archipelago was ceded to the United States. The
latter assumed administration of the Philippines and succeeded to the property rights of the Spanish
Crown. But under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the US Government allowed and granted patents to
Filipino and US citizens for the "free and open x x x exploration, occupation and purchase [of mines]
and the land in which they are found."10 To a certain extent, private individuals were entitled to own,
exploit and dispose of mineral resources and other rights arising from mining patents.

This US policy was, however, rejected by the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 when it crafted and
ratified our first Constitution. Instead, the said Constitution embodied the Regalian Doctrine, which
more definitively declared as belonging to the State all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals
and other natural resources.11 Although respecting mining patentees under the Philippine Bill of
1902, it restricted the further exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, both as to
who might be entitled to undertake such activities and for how long. The pertinent provision reads:

"SECTION 1 [Art. XIII]. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least
sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,
and license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-
five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other
than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant."

The concept was carried over in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Hence, Sections 8 and 9,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution, state:

"SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement
lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or
lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant.

SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The National
Assembly, in the national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or associations to enter into
service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance with any foreign
person or entity for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources. Existing valid and binding service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other
forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such."

Similarly, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

"SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizen, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by
such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In
cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

"The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

"The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as
well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers,
lakes, bays and lagoons.

"The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical
or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law,
based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such
agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical
resources.

"The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution."

The adoption of the Regalian Doctrine by the Philippine Commonwealth was initially impelled by the
desire to preserve the nation's wealth in the hands of the Filipinos themselves. Nationalism was
fervent at the time, and our constitutional framers decided to embody the doctrine in our fundamental
law. Charging the State with the conservation of the national patrimony was deemed necessary for
Filipino posterity. The arguments in support of the provision are encapsulated by Aruego as follows:
"[T]he natural resources, particularly the mineral resources which constituted a great source of
wealth, belonged not only to the generation then but also to the succeeding generation and
consequently should be conserved for them."12

Thus, after expressly declaring that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, all forces of
energy and other natural resources belonged to the Philippine State, the Commonwealth absolutely
prohibited the alienation of these natural resources. Their disposition, exploitation, development and
utilization were further restricted only to Filipino citizens and entities that were 60 percent Filipino-
owned. The present Constitution even goes further by declaring that such activities "shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State." Additionally, it enumerates land classifications and
expressly states that only agricultural lands of the public domain shall be alienable. We quote below
the relevant provision:13

"SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands,
and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according
to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more
than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. x x x."

Mr. Justice Kapunan upholds private respondents and intervenors in their claim that all ancestral
domains and lands are outside the coverage of public domain; and that these properties - including
forests, bodies of water, minerals and parks found therein - are private and have never been part of
the public domain, because they have belonged to the indigenous people’s ancestors since time
immemorial.

I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution.
Indeed, no one is exempt from its all-encompassing provisions. Unlike the 1935 Charter, which was
subject to "any existing right, grant, lease or concession," the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions
spoke in absolute terms. Because of the State’s implementation of policies considered to be for the
common good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of
ownership.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 this Court said that once minerals are found even in private land,
the State may intervene to enable it to extract the minerals in the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative. The land is converted into mineral land and may not be used by any private person,
including the registered owner, for any other purpose that would impede the mining operations. Such
owner would be entitled to just compensation for the loss sustained.

In Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. IAC,15 the Court clarified that while mining claim holders and
patentees have the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim, their rights
are not absolute or strictly one of ownership. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of
pertinent mining laws was deemed an abandonment or a waiver of the claim.

Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine political history cannot
be set aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be. The perceived lack of
understanding of the cultural minorities cannot be remedied by conceding the nation’s resources to
their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more privileged simply because they have chosen to
ignore state laws. For having chosen not to be enfolded by statutes on perfecting land titles,
ICCs/IPs cannot now maintain their ownership of lands and domains by insisting on their concept of
"native title" thereto. It would be plain injustice to the majority of Filipinos who have abided by the law
and, consequently, deserve equal opportunity to enjoy the country’s resources.

Respondent NCIP claims that IPRA does not violate the Constitution, because it does not grant
ownership of public domains and natural resources to ICCs/IPs. "Rather, it recognizes and
mandates respect for the rights of indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains that
had never been lands of the public domain."16 I say, however, that such claim finds no legal support.
Nowhere in the Constitution is there a provision that exempts such lands and domains from its
coverage. Quite the contrary, it declares that all lands of the public domain and natural resources
"are owned by the State"; and "with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated."

As early as Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 17 the Court declared as belonging to the public domain all
lands not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant under laws, orders or
decrees promulgated by the Spanish government; or by possessory information under Act 496
(Mortgage Law).

On the other hand, Intervenors Flavier et al.18 differentiate the concept of ownership of ICCs/IPs from
that which is defined in Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code. They maintain that "[t]here are
variations among ethnolinguistic groups in the Cordillera, but a fair synthesis of these refers to ‘x x x
the tribal right to use the land or to territorial control x x x, a collective right to freely use the particular
territory x x x [in] the concept of trusteeship.'"

In other words, the "owner" is not an individual. Rather, it is a tribal community that preserves the
property for the common but nonetheless exclusive and perpetual benefit of its members, without the
attributes of alienation or disposition. This concept, however, still perpetually withdraws such
property from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. The
perpetual and exclusive character of private respondents’ claims simply makes them repugnant to
basic fairness and equality.

Private respondents and intervenors trace their "ownership" of ancestral domains and lands to the
pre-Spanish conquest. I should say that, at the time, their claims to such lands and domains was
limited to the surfaces thereof since their ancestors were agriculture-based. This must be the
continuing scope of the indigenous groups’ ownership claims: limited to land, excluding the natural
resources found within.

In any event, if all that the ICCs/IPs demand is preferential use - not ownership - of ancestral
domains, then I have no disagreement. Indeed, consistent with the Constitution is IPRA’s Section
5719- without the too-broad definitions under Section 3 (a) and (b) - insofar as it grants them priority
rights in harvesting, extracting, developing or exploiting natural resources within ancestral domains.

The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must fail. Our
Constitution vests the ownership of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the Filipino
people. As the protector of the Constitution, this Court has the sworn duty to uphold the tenets of
that Constitution - not to dilute, circumvent or create exceptions to them.

Cariño v. Insular Government Was Modified by the Constitution

In this connection, I submit that Cariño v. Insular Government20 has been modified or superseded by

our 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Its ratio should be understood as referring only to a means
by which public agricultural land may be acquired by citizens. I must also stress that the claim of
Petitioner Cariño refers to land ownership only, not to the natural resources underneath or to the
aerial and cosmic space above.

Significantly, in Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals,21 a Decision handed down after
our three Constitutions had taken effect, the Court rejected a cultural minority member's registration
of land under CA 141, Section 48 (c).22 The reason was that the property fell within the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve. This Court quoted with favor the solicitor general’s following statements:

"3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of law involved,
as to include even forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is to unconstitutionally
apply such provision. For, both the 1973 and present Constitutions do not include timber or forest
lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973 Constitution states that ‘with the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural
resources shall not be alienated.’ The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also expressly
states that ‘with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated’."

Just recently, in Gordula v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court also stated that "forest land is incapable of
registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title. To be sure, the defense of indefeasiblity of a
certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the state in an action for
reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest
reservation, the patent covering forest land being void ab initio."

RA 8371 Violates the Inalienability of Natural Resources and of Public Domains

The ponencia theorizes that RA 8371 does not grant to ICCs/IPs ownership of the natural resources
found within ancestral domains. However, a simple reading of the very wordings of the law belies
this statement.

Section 3 (a)24 defines and delineates ancestral domains as "all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a
claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement x x x. It shall include ancestral lands, forests,
pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and
disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds x x x bodies of water, mineral and other natural resourcesx
x x." (Emphasis ours.)

Clearly, under the above-quoted provision of IPRA, ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs encompass the
natural resources found therein. And Section 7 guarantees recognition and protection of
their rights of ownership and possession over such domains.

The indigenous concept of ownership, as defined under Section 5 of the law, "holds that ancestral
domains are the ICC’s/IP’s private but community property which belongs to all generations and
therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed." Simply put, the law declares that ancestral
domains, including the natural resources found therein, are owned by ICCs/IPs and cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed. Not only does it vest ownership, as understood under the Civil Code; it adds
perpetual exclusivity. This means that while ICCs/IPs could own vast ancestral domains, the majority
of Filipinos who are not indigenous can never own any part thereof.

On the other hand, Section 3 (b)25 of IPRA defines ancestral lands as referring to "lands occupied,
possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial x x
x, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, x x x including, but not limited to,
residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots." Section 8
recognizes and protects "the right of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands."
Such ownership need not be by virtue of a certificate of title, but simply by possession since time
immemorial.

I believe these statutory provisions directly contravene Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, more
specifically the declaration that the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals and natural
resources – none of which, except agricultural lands, can be alienated. In several cases, this Court
has consistently held that non-agricultural land must first be reclassified and converted into alienable
or disposable land for agricultural purposes by a positive act of the government. 26 Mere possession
or utilization thereof, however long, does not automatically convert them into private properties. 27 The
presumption is that "all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Hence, x x x all applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden of
overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the
property involved was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of
public lands, the property must be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present
competent and persuasive proof to substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general statements, or
mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of possession and title." 28

Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sections 3 are merely
definitions and should not be construed independently of the other provisions of the law. But,
precisely, a definition is "a statement of the meaning of a word or word group." 29 It determines or
settles the nature of the thing or person defined. 30 Thus, after defining a term as encompassing
several items, one cannot thereafter say that the same term should be interpreted as excluding one
or more of the enumerated items in its definition. For that would be misleading the people who would
be bound by the law. In other words, since RA 8371 defines ancestral domains as including the
natural resources found therein and further states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then
it means that ICCs/IPs can own natural resources.

In fact, Intervenors Flavier et al. submit that everything above and below these ancestral domains,
with no specific limits, likewise belongs to ICCs/IPs. I say that this theory directly contravenes the
Constitution. Such outlandish contention further disregards international law which, by constitutional
fiat, has been adopted as part of the law of the land. 31

No Land Area Limits Are Specified by RA 8371

Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12
hectares of alienable public land, whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More than that, but not
exceeding 500 hectares, they may hold by lease only.

RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by their
mere definitions, they could cover vast tracts of the nation's territory. The properties under the
assailed law cover everything held, occupied or possessed "by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial." It also includes all "lands which may
no longer be exclusively occupied by [them] but from which they traditionally had access to for their
subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shifting cultivators."
Nomadic groups have no fixed area within which they hunt or forage for food. As soon as they have
used up the resources of a certain area, they move to another place or go back to one they used to
occupy. From year to year, a growing tribe could occupy and use enormous areas, to which they
could claim to have had "traditional access." If nomadic ICCs/IPs succeed in acquiring title to their
enlarging ancestral domain or land, several thousands of hectares of land may yet be additionally
delineated as their private property.

Similarly, the Bangsa Moro people's claim to their ancestral land is not based on compounded or
consolidated title, but "on a collective stake to the right to claim what their forefathers secured for
them when they first set foot on our country."32 They trace their right to occupy what they deem to be
their ancestral land way back to their ancient sultans and datus, who had settled in many islands that
have become part of Mindanao. This long history of occupation is the basis of their claim to their
ancestral lands.33

Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been claimed by various ICCs/IPs as
ancestral domains; and over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral lands. 34 Based on ethnographic
surveys, the solicitor general estimates that ancestral domains cover 80 percent of our mineral
resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 million hectares of land in the country. 35 This
means that four fifths of its natural resources and one third of the country's land will be concentrated
among 12 million Filipinos constituting 110 ICCs,36 while over 60 million other Filipinos constituting
the overwhelming majority will have to share the remaining. These figures indicate a violation of the
constitutional principle of a "more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth" among
Filipinos.

RA 8371 Abdicates the State Duty to Take Full Control and Supervision of Natural Resources

Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that "[t]he exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." The State
may (1) directly undertake such activities; or (2) enter into co-production, joint venture or production-
sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by
Filipinos.37 Such agreements, however, shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period
and under terms and conditions as may be provided by law.

But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar
as natural resources found within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their rights of
ownership and possession, they may develop and manage the natural resources, benefit from and
share in the profits from the allocation and the utilization thereof. 38 And they may exercise such right
without any time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for a like period.39 Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit,
develop and utilize natural resources must also be limited to such period.

In addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources,40 a right vested by the Constitution only in the State. Congress,
through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of a minority group the State's power of ownership and
full control over a substantial part of the national patrimony, in contravention of our most
fundamental law.

I make clear, however, that to the extent that ICCs/IPs may undertake small-scale utilization of
natural resources and cooperative fish farming, I absolutely have no objection. These undertakings
are certainly allowed under the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Having already disposed of the two major constitutional dilemmas wrought by RA 8371 – (1)
ownership of ancestral lands and domains and the natural resources therein; and (2) the ICCs/IPs'
control of the exploration, development and utilization of such resources – I believe I should no
longer tackle the following collateral issues petitioners have brought up:

1. Whether the inclusion of private lands within the coverage of ancestral domains amounts
to undue deprivation of private property

2. Whether ICCs/IPs may regulate the entry/exit of migrants

3. Whether ancestral domains are exempt from real property taxes, special levies and other
forms of exaction

4. Whether customary laws and traditions of ICCs/IPs should first be applied in the
settlements of disputes over their rights and claims

5. Whether the composition and the jurisdiction of the National Commission of Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) violate the due process and equal protection clauses

6. Whether members of the ICCs/IPs may be recruited into the armed forces against their will

I believe that the first three of the above collateral issues have been rendered academic or, at least,
no longer of "transcendental importance," in view of my contention that the two major IPRA
propositions are based on unconstitutional premises. On the other hand, I think that in the case of
the last three, it is best to await specific cases filed by those whose rights may have been injured by
specific provisions of RA 8371.

Epilogue

Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, provides:

"SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies
and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social, and cultural well being.

"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain."

Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the rights of ICCs/IPs:
(1) the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and (2) national development policies and programs.

Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society. This does
not, however, give Congress any license to accord them rights that the Constitution withholds from
the rest of the Filipino people. I would concede giving them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the
preservation of their ancestral lands and domains. 41 But to grant perpetual ownership and control of
the nation's substantial wealth to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have chosen to
live and abide by our previous and present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but also
subversive of the rule of law.

In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively mandating
"reverse discrimination." In seeking to improve their lot, it would be doing so at the expense of the
majority of the Filipino people. Such short-sighted and misplaced generosity will spread the roots of
discontent and, in the long term, fan the fires of turmoil to a conflagration of national proportions.

Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to coddle the
few, however disadvantaged they may have been. Neither can a just society be approximated by
maiming the healthy to place them at par with the injured. Nor can the nation survive by enclaving its
wealth for the exclusive benefit of favored minorities.

Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of opportunities and
privileges that are open to all and by preventing the powerful from exploiting and oppressing them.
This is the essence of social justice – empowering and enabling the poor to be able to compete with
the rich and, thus, equally enjoy the blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity.

WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and

to DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and related
provisions of RA 8371.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 180206               February 4, 2009

THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO CITY, represented by REINALDO BAUTISTA, JR., City
Mayor; THE ANTI-SQUATTING COMMITTEE, represented by ATTY. MELCHOR CARLOS R.
RAGANES, CITY BUILDINGS and ARCHITECTURE office, represented by OSCAR FLORES;
and PUBLIC ORDER and SAFETY OFFICE, Represented by EMMANUEL REYES, Petitioners. 
vs.
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional Officer-National Commission on Indigenous People-CAR,
ELVIN GUMANGAN, NARCISO BASATAN and LAZARO BAWAS, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioners, the City Government of Baguio City, represented by its Mayor, Reinaldo Bautista, Jr., the
Anti-Squatting Committee, represented by Atty. Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes; the City Buildings and
Architecture Office, represented by Oscar Flores; and the Public Order and Safety Office,
represented by Emmanuel Reyes and later substituted by Gregorio Deligero, assail the Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895, dated April 16, 2007, and its Resolution 2 dated
September 11, 2007, which affirmed the injunctive writ issued by the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) against the demolition orders of petitioners.

The following undisputed facts are culled from the assailed Decision:

The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued by the City Mayor of Baguio City,
Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal structures constructed by Lazaro Bawas,
Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol Watershed
Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City, without the required building permits and in violation
of Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 1096 and
Republic Act No. 7279.

Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition advices dated September 19, 2006 were issued
informing the occupants thereon of the intended demolition of the erected structures on October 17
to 20, 2006. Consequently, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas (hereinafter
private respondents) filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio
City through its Acting City Mayor, Reynaldo Bautista, the City Building and Architecture Office, the
Anti-Squatting Task Force, and the Public Order and Safety Division, among others, (collectively
called petitioners) before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative
Region (NCIP-CAR), Regional Hearing Office, La Trinidad, Benguet, docketed as Case No. 31-CAR-
06.

In their petition, private respondents basically claimed that the lands where their residential houses
stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing openly and
continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been expressly recognized in
Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of the Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus,
contended that the demolition of their residential houses is a violation of their right of possession and
ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the Constitution and the law, perforce, must be restrained.

On October 16 and 19, 2006, Regional Hearing Officer Atty. Brain S. Masweng of the NCIP issued
the two (2) assailed temporary restraining orders (TRO) directing the petitioners and all persons
acting for and in their behalf to refrain from enforcing Demolition Advice dated September 18, 2006;
Demolition Order dated September 19, 2006; Demolition Order No. 25, Series of 2004; Demolition
Order No. 33, Series of 2005; and Demolition Order No. 28, Series of 2004, for a total period of
twenty (20) days.

Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution dated November 10, 2006 granting the
private respondents’ application for preliminary injunction subject to the posting of an injunctive bond
each in the amount of P10,000.00.3

Acting on the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners, 4 the Court of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of
the NCIP over the action filed by private respondents and affirmed the temporary restraining orders
dated October 165 and 19, 2006,6 and the Resolution dated November 10, 2006, 7 granting the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, issued by the NCIP. The appellate court also ruled that
Baguio City is not exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA).

Petitioners assert that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear and decide main actions for injunction
such as the one filed by private respondents. They claim that the NCIP has the authority to issue
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction only as auxiliary remedies to cases
pending before it.

Further, the IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be governed by its Charter. Thus, private
respondents cannot claim their alleged ancestral lands under the provisions of the IPRA.

Petitioners contend that private respondents are not entitled to the protection of an injunctive writ
because they encroached upon the Busol Forest Reservation and built structures thereon without
the requisite permit. Moreover, this Court, in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals, 8 had already
declared that the Busol Forest Reservation is inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how
long, cannot convert the same into private property. Even assuming that private respondents have a
pending application for ancestral land claim, their right is at best contingent and cannot come under
the protective mantle of injunction.

Petitioners also claim that the Busol Forest Reservation is exempt from ancestral claims as it is
needed for public welfare. It is allegedly one of the few remaining forests in Baguio City and is the
city’s main watershed.

Finally, petitioners contend that the demolition orders were issued pursuant to the police power of
the local government. 1avvphi1

In their Comment9 dated March 1, 2007, private respondents defend the jurisdiction of the NCIP to
take cognizance of and decide main actions for injunction arguing that the IPRA does not state that
the NCIP may only issue such writs of injunction as auxiliary remedies. Private respondents also
contend that the IPRA does not exempt Baguio City from its coverage nor does it state that there are
no ancestral lands in Baguio City.

As members of the Ibaloi Indigenous Community native to Baguio City, private respondents are
treated as squatters despite the fact that they hold native title to their ancestral land. The IPRA
allegedly now recognizes ancestral lands held by native title as never to have been public lands.

Private respondents aver that the Busol Forest Reservation is subject to ancestral land claims. In
fact, Proclamation No. 1510 dated April 27, 1922, which declared the area a forest reserve, allegedly
did not nullify the vested rights of private respondents over their ancestral lands and even identified
the claimants of the particular portions within the forest reserve. This claim of ownership is an
exception to the government’s contention that the whole area is a forest reservation.

Lastly, private respondents assert that the power of the city mayor to order the demolition of certain
structures is not absolute. Regard should be taken of the fact that private respondents cannot be
issued building permits precisely because they do not have paper titles over their ancestral lands, a
requirement for the issuance of a building permit under the National Building Code.

Petitioners’ Reply to Comment 11 dated June 11, 2008 merely reiterates their previous arguments.

We shall first dispose of the elemental issue of the NCIP’s jurisdiction.

The NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programs to protect and promote the rights and well-being of indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well
as their rights thereto.12 In order to fully effectuate its mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction
over all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition precedent to the
NCIP’s assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes is that the parties thereto shall have exhausted
all remedies provided under their customary laws and have obtained a certification from the Council
of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved.13

In addition, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on
Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP, reiterates the jurisdiction of the NCIP over
claims and disputes involving ancestral lands and enumerates the actions that may be brought
before the commission. Sec. 5, Rule III thereof provides:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.—The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the
implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the
following:

(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):

a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of

ICCs/IPs;

b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed
consent of ICCs/IPs;

c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary

laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;

d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:

a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and

settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled
under customary laws; and

b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371.

(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:

a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of

Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by,
and issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A.
8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of
registration.

In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction over the dispute in accordance with the
foregoing provisions, it is necessary to resolve, on the basis of the allegations in their petition,
whether private respondents are members of ICCs/IPs. In their petition 14 filed before the NCIP,
private respondents, members of the Ibaloi tribe who first settled in Baguio City, were asserting
ownership of portions of the Busol Forest Reservation which they claim to be their ancestral lands.
Correctly denominated as a petition for injunction as it sought to prevent the enforcement of the
demolition orders issued by the City Mayor, the petition traced private respondents’ ancestry to
Molintas and Gumangan and asserted their possession, occupation and utilization of their ancestral
lands. The petition also alleged that private respondents’ claim over these lands had been
recognized by Proclamation No. 15 which mentions the names of Molintas and Gumangan as having
claims over portions of the Busol Forest Reservation. 15

Clearly then, the allegations in the petition, which axiomatically determine the nature of the action
and the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal,16 squarely qualify it as a "dispute(s) or controversy(s) over
ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs" within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO. 1avvphi1
The IPRA, furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power to issue temporary restraining orders and
writs of injunction. Sec. 69 thereof states:

Sec. 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.—The NCIP shall have the power and authority:

a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed
before it as well as those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts,
records, agreements, and other document of similar nature as may be material to a just
determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this
Act;

c) To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties
therefor; and

d) To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending before it which, if not
restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case
or seriously affect social or economic activity. [Emphasis supplied]

NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 echoes the above-quoted provision in Sec. 82, Rule XV,
which provides:

Sec. 82. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.—A writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order may be granted by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Sections 59 and
69 of R.A. [No.] 8371 when it is established, on the basis of sworn allegations in a petition, that the
acts complained of involving or arising from any case, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties, or seriously affect social or economic activity. This
power may also be exercised by RHOs in cases pending before them in order to preserve the rights
of the parties.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP may issue temporary restraining orders
and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action
is for injunction. The power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties
to a dispute over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action which may cause
them grave or irreparable damage or injury. In this case, the Regional Hearing Officer issued the
injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect and preserve the rights of private
respondents who are undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.

Parenthetically, in order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the IPRA even provides that no
restraining order or preliminary injunction may be issued by any inferior court against the NCIP in
any case, dispute or controversy arising from or necessary to the

interpretation of the IPRA and other laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains. 17

Petitioners argue that Baguio City is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA, and necessarily the
jurisdiction of the NCIP, by virtue of Sec. 78 thereof, which states:
SEC. 78. Special Provision.—The City of Baguio shall remain to be governed by its Charter and all
lands proclaimed as part of its townsite reservation shall remain as such until otherwise reclassified
by appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior land rights and titles recognized and/or acquired
through any judicial, administrative or other processes before the effectivity of this Act shall remain
valid: Provided, further, That this provision shall not apply to any territory which becomes part of the
City of Baguio after the effectivity of this Act. [Emphasis supplied]
lavvphil.net

The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own charter. Its exemption
from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of
prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA
demands that the city’s charter respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles.

The crucial question to be asked then is whether private respondents’ ancestral land claim was
indeed recognized by Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their right thereto may be protected by an
injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show
that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which injunction is directed are
violative of said right.18

Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private respondents’
ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families, the
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest
Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. In fact, Proclamation No. 15
explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement. It provides:

Pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen hundred and twenty-six of Act Numbered Twenty-
seven Hundred and eleven[,] I hereby establish the Busol Forest Reservation to be administered by
the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose of conserving and protecting water and timber, the protection
of the water supply being of primary importance and all other uses of the forest are to be
subordinated to that purpose. I therefore withdraw from sale or settlement the following described
parcels of the public domain situated in the Township of La Trinidad, City of Baguio, Mountain
Province, Island of Luzon, to wit:

The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable in
Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals.19 The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such
precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with
jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.

All told, although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
injunction, we are not convinced that private respondents are entitled to the relief granted by the
Commission.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
SP No. 96895 dated April 16, 2007 and its Resolution dated September 11, 2007 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Case No. 31-CAR-06 entitled, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro
Bawas v. Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City, et al. is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO 
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 180882               February 27, 2013

THE BAGUIO REGREENING MOVEMENT, INC., represented by ATTY. ERDOLFO V.

BALAJADIA; ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT CITY AND PARKS OFFICE, represented by its
Officer-in Charge, Cordelia C. Lacsamana; and THE BUSOL FOREST RESERVATION TASK
FORCE, represented by its Team Leader, Victor Dictag, Petitioners, 
vs.
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, in his capacity as Regional Hearing Officer, NCIP-CAR; ELIZABETH
MAT-AN, for herself and as representative of the heirs of Rafael; JUDITH MARANES, for
herself and as representative of the heirs of Molintas; HELEN LUBOS, for herself and as
representative of the heirs of Kalomis; MAGDALENA GUMANGAN QUE, for herself and as
representative of the heirs of Gumangan; Spouses ALEXANDER AMPAGUEY and LUCIA
AMPAGUEY; and Spouses CARMEN PANA YO and MELANIO PANAYO, Respondents.

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rule on Civil Procedure
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 78570
insofar as it affirmed the issuances of National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) Hearing
Officer Brain Masweng, and the Resolution of the same court dated December 11, 2007 denying
petitioners’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

Herein private respondents Elizabeth Mat-an, Judith Maranes, Helen Lubos, Magdalena Gumangan
Que, spouses Alexander and Lucia Ampaguey, and spouses Melanio and Carmen Panayo, claiming
that their parents inherited from their ancestors several parcels of land in what is now known as the
Busol Watershed Reservation, filed before the NCIP a Petition for Injunction, with an application for
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), and thereafter a Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Baguio District Engineer’s Office, the Office of the City Architect and Parks
Superintendent, and petitioners The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. and the Busol Task Force
from fencing the Busol Watershed Reservation.

In their Petition before the NCIP, private respondents claim that they are members of the Ibaloi and
Kankanaey tribes of Baguio City. Their ancestors’ ownership of the properties now known as the
Busol Watershed Reservation was allegedly expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 issued by
Governor General Leonard Wood. As owners of said properties, their ancestors paid the realty taxes
thereon. The fencing project of petitioners would allegedly impede their access to and from their
residences, farmlands and water sources, and dispossess them of their yard where tribal rituals and
ceremonies are usually held.

On October 21, 2002, NCIP Regional Hearing Officer Brain S. Masweng issued a TRO, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition in order and that grave injustice may result should the acts
complained of be not immediately restrained, a Temporary Restraining Order is hereby issued
pursuant to Section 69 (d) of R.A. 8371, ordering the respondents namely, the Baguio District
Engineer’s Office, represented by Engineer Nestor M. Nicolas, the Project Contractor, Mr. Pel-ey,
the Baguio Regreening Movement Inc., represented by Atty. Erdolfo V. Balajadia, the Busol Task
Force, represented by its Team Leader, Moises G. Anipew, the Baguio City Architect and Parks
Superintendent Office, represented by Arch. Ignacio Estipona, and all persons acting for and their
behalf (sic) of the respondents, their agents and/or persons whomever acting for and their behalf
(sic), to refrain, stop, cease and desist from fencing and/or constructing fences around and between
the areas and premises of petitioners, ancestral land claims, specifically identified in Proclamation
No. 15 as Lot "A" with an area of 143,190 square meters, included within the boundary lines, Lot "B"
77,855 square meters, included within the boundary lines, Lot "C" 121,115 square meters, included
within the boundary lines, Lot "D" 33,839 square meters, included within the boundary lines, Lot "E"
87,903 square meters, included within the boundary lines, Lot "F" 39,487 square meters, included
within the boundary lines, Lot "G" 11,620 square meters, included within the boundary lines, Lot "H"
17,453 square meters, included within the boundary lines, Lot "J" 40,000 square meters, included
within the boundary lines, all described and embraced under Proclamation No. 15, the land
embraced and described under the approved plan No. 12064 of the then Director of Lands,
containing an area of 186, square meters surveyed for Gumangan, the land covered by LRC PSD
52910, containing an area of 77,849 square meters as surveyed for Emily Kalomis, that land
covered by survey plan 11935 Amd, containing an area of 263153 square meters as surveyed for
Molintas, and that land covered by AP-7489, containing an area of 155084 as surveyed for the heirs
of Rafael.
This Restraining Order shall be effective for a period of twenty (20) days from receipt hereof.

Meantime, the respondents are further ordered to show cause on November 5, 2002 (Tuesday) at
2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, why petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction should not be granted.2

On November 6, 2002, Atty. Masweng denied petitioners’ motion to dissolve the TRO, explaining
that a TRO may be issued motu proprio where the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant
will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury. He further stated that petitioners failed to comply
with the procedure laid down in Section 6, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

On November 12, 2002, Atty. Masweng issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby issued against the respondents, their
agents, or persons acting for and in their behalves (sic), ordering them to refrain, cease and desist
from implementing their fencing project during the pendancy (sic) of the aboveentitled case in any
portion of petitioners’ ancestral land claims within the Busol Watershed Reservation. The lands
being identified under Proclamation No. 15 as lot[s] ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, and ‘J’, including
the lands covered by Petitioners’ approved survey plans as follows: that land identified and plotted
under Survey Plan No. B.L. FILE No. II-11836, September, 1916 surveyed for Gumangan; that land
covered by PSD-52910, May, 1921, surveyed for Emily Kalomis; that land covered by survey plan II-
11935 Amd, 1916, surveyed for Molintas; and that land covered by Survey Plan No. AP 7489, March
1916, surveyed for the heirs of Rafael.

The writ of preliminary injunction shall be effective and shall be enforced only upon petitioners’
compliance with the required injunctive bond of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) each in
compliance with Section 3, R.A. 8975. 3

Atty. Masweng ruled that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) and, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, may issue injunctive writs. According to Atty. Masweng, the allegations in the verified
petition show that private respondents invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), when they sought to enjoin petitioners
from fencing their ancestral lands within the Busol Watershed Reservation. Petitioners’ fencing
project violated Section 58 of the IPRA, which requires the prior written consent of the affected
ICCs/IPs. The NCIP therefore has authority to hear the petition filed by private respondents and to
issue the injunctive writ. As regards petitioners’ contention that the issuance of the TRO violated
Presidential Decree No. 1818, Atty. Masweng applied the Decision of this Court in Malaga v.
Penachos, Jr.,4 and held that:

Respondent’s project of fencing the Busol Watershed is not in the exercise of administrative
discretion involving a very technical matter. This is so since the implementation of the fencing project
would traverse along lands occupied by people who claim that they have a legal right over their
lands. The fence would actually cut across, divide, or segregate lands occupied by people. The
effect of it would fence in and fence out property claims. In this case, petitioners invoke their
constitutional rights to be protected against deprivation of property without due process of law and of
taking private property without just compensation. Such situations involve pure question of law. 5

As regards the invocation of res judicata by petitioners, Atty. Masweng held that they failed to
present copies of the Decisions supposedly rendered by the Regional Trial Court and the Supreme
Court.
On November 29, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order. On June
20, 2003, Atty. Masweng denied said Motion on the ground that the same was filed out of time.

Petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Atty. Masweng in issuing the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction.

On April 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing petitioners’ Petition
for Certiorari. The dispositive portion of the Decision is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the assailed orders of
public respondent AFFIRMED. Nevertheless, private respondents are hereby enjoined from (i)
introducing constructions at the Busol Watershed and Forest Reservation and (ii) engaging in
activities that degrade the resources therein until viable measures or programs for the maintenance,
preservation and development of said reservation are adopted pursuant to Sec. 58 of Rep. Act No.
8371.6

The Court of Appeals ruled that since the petition before the NCIP involves the protection of private
respondents’ rights to their ancestral domains in accordance with Section 7(b), (c) and (g) 7 of the
IPRA, the NCIP clearly has jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Section 66. The Court of
Appeals also upheld the conclusion of Atty. Masweng that the NCIP can issue injunctive writs as a
principal relief against acts adversely affecting or infringing on the rights of ICCs or IPs, because
"(t)o rule otherwise would render NCIP inutile in preventing acts committed in violation of the IPRA." 8

As regards petitioners’ allegations that government reservations such as the subject Busol
Watershed cannot be the subject of ancestral domain claims, the Court of Appeals pointed out that
Section 589 of the IPRA in fact mandates the full participation of ICCs/IPs in the maintenance,
management, and development of ancestral domains or portions thereof that are necessary for
critical watersheds. The IPRA, thus, gives the ICCs/IPs responsibility to maintain, develop, protect,
and conserve such areas with the full and effective assistance of government agencies. 10

Despite ruling in favor of private respondents, the Court of Appeals nevertheless found merit in
petitioners’ own application for injunction and observed that certain activities by private respondents
without regard for environmental considerations could result in irreparable damage to the watershed
and the ecosystem. Thus, the Court of Appeals enjoined private respondents from introducing
constructions at the Busol Watershed and from engaging in activities that degrade its resources,
until viable measures or programs for the maintenance, preservation and development of said
reservation are adopted pursuant to the aforementioned Section 58 of the IPRA.

Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioners assert the following grounds:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

NCIP’S ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DESPITE CLEAR AND PATENT VIOLATION OF P.D. 1818,
SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 68-94 AND SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 11-2000;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

ACT OF THE NCIP IN ISSUING A 20-DAYS TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER EX
PARTE SANS THE MANDATORY NOTICE AND HEARING FOR THE ISSUANCE
THEREOF;
 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE
NCIP’S ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DESPITE ABSOLUTE
ABSENCE OF CLEAR, UNMISTAKABLE AND POSITIVE LEGAL RIGHTS ON THE PART
OF THE APPLICANTS;

4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE NCIP HEARING OFFICER HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE OF INJUNCTION
INVOLVING A GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT;

5. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN BRUSHING ASIDE

SECTION 78, A SPECIAL PROVISION OF REPUBLIC ACT 8371 WHICH EXCLUDES THE
CITY OF BAGUIO FROM THE COVERAGE OF ANCESTRAL LAND CLAIMS
APPLICATIONS;

6. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING RULE

XIII OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES OF REPUBLIC ACT 8371, EVEN IF THE
PROVISIONS OF SAID RULE XIII CLEARLY OVERSTEPPED AND EXCEEDED SECTION
78 OF R.A. 8371.11

TRO and Preliminary Injunction against Government Infrastructure Projects

The governing law as regards the prohibition to issue restraining orders and injunctions against
government infrastructure projects is Republic Act No. 8975, 12 which modified Presidential Decree
No. 1818, the law cited by the parties, upon its effectivity on November 26, 2000. 13 Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 8975 provides:

Section 9. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, including Presidential Decree Nos. 605, 1818 and
Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with
this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Thus, in GV Diversified International, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,14 we ruled that Presidential
Decree No. 1818 have been effectively superseded by Republic Act No. 8975. The prohibition is
thus now delineated in Section 3 of said latter law, which provides:

Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and
Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. – No court, except the Supreme Court, shall issue any
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against the
government, or any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private,
acting under the government’s direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:

(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or location of any
national government project;

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as defined under

Section 2 hereof;

(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of any such contract

or project;

(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and

 (e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary for such
contract/project.

This prohibition shall apply to all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a private party,
including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such
bidders involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued,
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally
decide that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.

If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void, the court may, if
appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning bidder or order
a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any liability that the guilty party may incur under the
existing laws. (Emphasis supplied.)

Should a judge violate the preceding section, Republic Act No. 8975 provides the following penalty:

Section 6. Penal Sanction. — In addition to any civil and criminal liabilities he or she may incur under
existing laws, any judge who shall issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction in violation of Section 3 hereof, shall suffer the penalty of
suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay. (Emphasis added.)

It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the prohibition covers only judges, and does not apply to
the NCIP or its hearing officers. In this respect, Republic Act No. 8975 conforms to the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 60515 and Presidential Decree No. 1818,16 both of which enjoin only the
courts. Accordingly, we cannot nullify the assailed Orders on the ground of violation of said laws.

The Court’s Previous Decision in G.R. No. 180206

On February 4, 2009, this Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 180206, a suit which involved
several of the parties in the case at bar. In G.R. No. 180206, the City Mayor of Baguio City issued
three Demolition Orders with respect to allegedly illegal structures constructed by private
respondents therein on a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation. Private respondents filed a
Petition for Injunction with the NCIP. Atty. Masweng issued two temporary restraining orders
directing the City Government of Baguio to refrain from enforcing said Demolition Orders and
subsequently granted private respondents’ application for a preliminary injunction. The Court of
Appeals, acting on petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari, affirmed the temporary restraining orders and
the writ of preliminary injunction.

This Court then upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP on the basis of the allegations in private
respondents’ Petition for Injunction. It was similarly claimed in said Petition for Injunction that private
respondents were descendants of Molintas and Gumangan whose claims over the portions of the
Busol Watershed Reservation had been recognized by Proclamation No. 15. This Court thus ruled in
G.R. No. 180206 that the nature of the action clearly qualify it as a dispute or controversy over
ancestral lands/domains of the ICCs/IPs.17 On the basis of Section 69(d)18 of the IPRA and Section
82, Rule XV19 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03, the NCIP may issue temporary restraining
orders and writs of injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main
action is for injunction.20

On petitioners’ argument that the City of Baguio is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA and,
consequently, the jurisdiction of the NCIP, this Court ruled in G.R. No. 180206 that said exemption
cannot ipso facto be deduced from Section 7821 of the IPRA because the law concedes the validity of
prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity. 22

Lastly, however, this Court ruled that although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction, it was not convinced that private respondents were entitled
to the relief granted by the Commission. 23 Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land claim, as it merely identifies the Molintas and
Gumangan families as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation, but does not
acknowledge vested rights over the same.24 Since it is required before the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction that claimants show the existence of a right to be protected, this Court, in G.R.
No. 180206, ultimately granted the petition of the City Government of Baguio and set aside the writ
of preliminary injunction issued therein. 1âwphi1

In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents present the very same arguments and
counter-arguments with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the Busol Watershed
Reservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at
bar, except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. In both cases, petitioners claim (1)
that Atty. Masweng is prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary
injunction against government infrastructure projects; (2) that Baguio City is beyond the ambit of the
IPRA; and (3) that private respondents have not shown a clear right to be protected. Private
respondents, on the other hand, presented the same allegations in their Petition for Injunction,
particularly the alleged recognition made under Proclamation No. 15 in favor of their ancestors.
While res judicatadoes not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar and
G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer),
we are constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the instant petitiOn. The Court explained
the principle of stare decisis25in Ting v. Velez-Ting26:

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and
stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. (Citations
omitted.)

We have also previously held that "under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to
all future cases where the facts are substantially the same." 27

However, even though the principal action in the case at bar is denominated as a petition for
injunction, the relief prayed for and granted by the NCIP partakes of the nature of a preliminary
injunction in the sense that its effectivity would cease the moment the NCIP issues its decision in an
appropriate action. The conclusions of this Court in both the case at bar and that in G.R. No. 180206
as regards private respondents' ancestral land claim should therefore be considered provisional, as
they are based merely on the allegations in the complaint or petition and not on evidence adduced in
a full-blown proceeding on the merits by the proper tribunal. Private respondents are therefore not
barred from proving their alleged ancestral domain claim in the appropriate proceeding, despite the
denial of the temporary injunctive relief prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78570 dated April 30, 2007 and December
11, 2007, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176951               December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President

JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in
his personal capacity as taxpayer Petitioners, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO
DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and
MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF
GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY
OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG,
CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF
CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 177499               December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President

JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in
his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS
NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF
GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF
GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY
OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG,
CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF
CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 178056               December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President

JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in
his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners, 
vs.
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and
MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF
GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY
OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG,
CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF
CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR. J.:

Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to
its spirit or intent,1 for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter,
and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. 2 Put a bit differently,
that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and
that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the
lawmakers.3 Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would
defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.4

So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal

branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption
of constitutionality of statutes.5 This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of
government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the
government to accord a becoming courtesy for each other’s acts, and not to interfere inordinately
with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults
against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain,
the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that
no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed. 6 Consequently, before a law duly challenged is
nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the
Court.7

BACKGROUND

The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines
(LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas 8 assail the constitutionality of the sixteen
(16) laws,9 each converting the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter)
and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant
to subject laws.

By Decision10 dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and
nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section
10, Article X and the equal protection clause.

Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for reconsideration, raising, as one
of the issues, the validity of the factual premises not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let
alone established, which became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration. 11 By
Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the motion for reconsideration.

A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent LGUs prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable Court reconsider its "Resolution"
dated March 31, 2009, in so far as it denies for "lack of merit" respondents’ "Motion for
Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 and in lieu thereof, considering that new and meritorious
arguments are raised by respondents’ "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 to
grant afore-mentioned "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 and dismiss the
"Petitions For Prohibition" in the instant case.

Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, voting 6-6, disposed of the motion as follows:

By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for
lack of merit. The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of
31 March 2009.

The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a
prohibited pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention x x x filed by
counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let
entry of judgment be made in due course. x x x

On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by
Declaring Instead that Respondents’ "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31,
2009" and "Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached ‘Second Motion for Reconsideration of
the Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings
Thereon."

Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court declared the May 14, 2009 motion adverted to as
expunged in light of the entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro,
however, taking common cause with Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the
April 28, 2009 Resolution and to recall the entry of judgment, stated the observation, and with
reason, that the entry was effected "before the Court could act on the aforesaid motion which was
filed within the 15-day period counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution." 12

Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 to
which some of the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed their respective comments. The
Court will now rule on this incident. But first, we set and underscore some basic premises:

(1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice Leonardo-De
Castro noted, indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive of the matter of the
correctness of the factual premises upon which the said decision was predicated. The 6-6
vote on the motion for reconsideration per the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied
the motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues have already been passed upon"
reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November
18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic issues raised in the motion for reconsideration
of the said decision;

(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 was
precipitated by the tie vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution. This
May 14, 2009 motion––which mainly argued that a tie vote is inadequate to declare a law
unconstitutional–– remains unresolved; and

(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality
of a law shall be heard by the Court en banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority
of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon.

The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolution boils
down to whether or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only
to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration
where the Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of a law or like issuances.
Or, as applied to this case, would a minute resolution dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for
reconsideration on the sole stated ground––that the "basic issues have already been passed"––
suffice to hurdle the voting requirement required for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
cityhood laws in question?

The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the initial
motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues had already been passed upon" betrayed an evenly
divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had
indeed passed upon the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at
the end of the day, the single issue that matters and the vote that really counts really turn on the
constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote
reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote on the issue of whether or not the
cityhood laws infringe the Constitution. Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of
the 6-6 vote, should be deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or
invalidity of the laws in question is, on the merits, secured.

It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the "majority of the Members"
contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which requires that:

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law shall
be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon. (Emphasis added.)

Webster defines "majority" as "a number greater than half of a total." 13 In plain language, this means
50% plus one. In Lambino v. Commission on Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a
separate opinion, expressed the view that "a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-
majority cannot write a rule with precedential value." 14

As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote in the
determination of a case involving the constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether
such determination is made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion for reconsideration. This is
as it should be, for, to borrow from the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco: "x x x [E]ven assuming x x x
that the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the ‘majority’ was initially reached in the x x
x ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for
reconsideration."15

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the
complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing that:

SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. – Where the court en banc is equally divided in
opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after
such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be
dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all
incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC – x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the Court En
Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as
the case may be, who actually took part in the deliberation of the motion.

If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.

But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted
provisions ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases
"shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon." To repeat, the last vote on the
issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution––a
6-6 deadlock.
On the postulate then that first, the finality of the November 18, 2008 Decision has yet to set in, the
issuance of the precipitate16 entry of judgment notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on
the second motion for reconsideration did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the cityhood
laws, the Court is inclined to take another hard look at the underlying decision. Without belaboring in
their smallest details the arguments for and against the procedural dimension of this disposition, it
bears to stress that the Court has the power to suspend its own rules when the ends of justice would
be served thereby.17 In the performance of their duties, courts should not be shackled by stringent
rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application must be eschewed, if they result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Substantial rights must not
be prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a
case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order. 18 Time
and again, this Court has suspended its own rules or excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require. 19

While perhaps not on all fours with the case, because it involved a purely business transaction, what
the Court said in Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan20 is most apropos:

To reiterate what the Court has said in Ginete vs. Court of Appeals and other cases, the rules of
procedure should be viewed as mere instruments designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
They are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the
very rationale for their conception and existence. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The
power to suspend or even disregard rules, inclusive of the one-motion rule, can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court has already declared to be final. The peculiarities of
this case impel us to do so now.

The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs’ motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14, 2009 motion to consider the second motion for
reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second motion
for reconsideration.

This brings us to the substantive aspect of the case.

The Undisputed Factual Antecedents in Brief

During the 11th Congress,21 fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before the House of
Representatives.22 Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became laws. The twenty-four
(24) other bills were not acted upon.

Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No. 2157 23 to amend
Sec. 450 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991. The proposed amendment sought to increase the income requirement to qualify for
conversion into a city from PhP 20 million average annual income to PhP 100 million locally
generated income.

In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June 30, 2001. As
thus amended by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 now provides that "[a] municipality x x x
may be converted into a component city if it has a [certified] locally generated average annual
income x x x of at least [PhP 100 million] for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000
constant prices."
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted in July 2001 House
(H.) Joint Resolution No. 2924 which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from the income
requirement prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were not
acted upon during the previous Congress. The 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving
H. Joint Resolution No. 29.

Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House of Representatives
re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate
for approval.

The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate session held on
November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that passing H. Resolution No. 1 would,
in net effect, allow a wholesale exemption from the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on
the municipalities. For this reason, he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of
individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to become cities and then forwarding them to
the Senate for proper action.25

Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual
cityhood bills. Common to all 16 measures was a provision exempting the municipality covered from
the PhP 100 million income requirement.

As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual cityhood bills, all of which
eventually lapsed into law on various dates. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC, within thirty
(30) days from its approval, to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the
conversion.

As earlier stated, the instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation
of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal-protection clause. The
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities, the petitioners bemoan, will reduce the share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of the internal
revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the LGC of 1991. 26

Petitioners-in-intervention, LPC members themselves, would later seek leave and be allowed to
intervene.

Aside from their basic plea to strike down as unconstitutional the cityhood laws in question,
petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention collectively pray that an order issue enjoining the
COMELEC from conducting plebiscites in the affected areas. An alternative prayer would urge the
Court to restrain the poll body from proclaiming the plebiscite results.

On July 24, 2007, the Court en banc resolved to consolidate the petitions and the petitions-in-
intervention. On March 11, 2008, it heard the parties in oral arguments.

The Issues

In the main, the issues to which all others must yield pivot on whether or not the cityhood laws
violate (1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and (2) the equal protection clause.

In the November 18, 2008 Decision granting the petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, for the Court,
resolved the twin posers in the affirmative and accordingly declared the cityhood laws
unconstitutional, deviating as they do from the uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion
prescribed by the LGC of 1991. In so doing, the ponencia veritably agreed with the petitioners that
the Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language, requires that all the criteria for the creation of
a city shall be embodied and written in the LGC, and not in any other law.

After a circumspect reflection, the Court is disposed to reconsider.

Petitioners’ threshold posture, characterized by a strained interpretation of the Constitution, if

accorded cogency, would veritably curtail and cripple Congress’ valid exercise of its authority to
create political subdivisions.

By constitutional design27 and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create political

subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character. 28 But even without any constitutional
grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a
province, city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent case, Sema v. CIMELEC.29 The
1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless provides for the creation of LGUs, thus:

Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied.)

As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political
subdivisions "in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code," subject to
the approval of the voters in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators
of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as
amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that these indicators or criteria must
be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute. Doubtless, the code they are referring to is
the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the
respondent LGUs from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the
Constitution.

Petitioners’ posture does not persuade.

The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save for the use of the
term "barrio" in lieu of "barangay," "may be" instead of "shall," the change of the phrase "unit or
units" to "political unit" and the addition of the modifier "directly" to the word "affected," the aforesaid
provision is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads:

Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or

its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected. (Emphasis supplied.)

It bears notice, however, that the "code" similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions is
clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the aforementioned plenary power of
Congress to create political units. Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating
political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria,
standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation. Thus, the only conceivable reason
why the Constitution employs the clause "in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the
criteria. The eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in his treatise on Constitutional
Law, specifically on the subject provision, explains:
Prior to 1965, there was a certain lack of clarity with regard to the power to create, divide, merge,
dissolve, or change the boundaries of municipal corporations. The extent to which the executive may
share in this power was obscured by Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan. 30 Pelaez v. Auditor
General subsequently clarified the Cardona case when the Supreme Court said that "the authority to
create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature." 31 Pelaez, however, conceded that
"the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between
adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature-involving as it does, the adoption of
means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities." 32Pelaez was silent about
division, merger, and dissolution of municipal corporations. But since division in effect creates a new
municipality, and both dissolution and merger in effect abolish a legal creation, it may fairly be
inferred that these acts are also legislative in nature.

Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a legacy from the 1973 Constitution, goes
further than the doctrine in the Pelaez case. It not only makes creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities x x x subject to "criteria
established in the local government code,"thereby declaring these actions properly legislative,
but it also makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries "subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." 33 x x x
(Emphasis added.)

It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the
reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991. 34 Be it
noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the
then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to
isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP
337. Also, they would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they
did in Art. X, Sec. 335 of the Constitution.

Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated
set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of
viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the
ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after
making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier
codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009
upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of
the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the
cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier
mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified
indicators.

Petitioners’ theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any other law
strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009
embodying the new and increased income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of
unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA
9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood
laws.

As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly decreased the income
criterion vis-à-vis the respondent LGUs, but without necessarily being unreasonably discriminatory,
as shall be discussed shortly, by reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it earlier raised to
PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent
requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the following uniform provision of the cityhood laws:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. – The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

In any event, petitioners’ constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we were to assume
purely ex hypothesi the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a
municipality to a city shall be in accordance with, among other things, the income criterion set forth
in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We shall explain.

Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the Court finds
that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be
exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws, which merely
carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final analysis, to the "criteria established in the
Local Government Code," pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now
proceed to discuss this exemption angle. 36

Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution are
those detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the heading "Requisites for Creation." The
section sets the minimum income qualifying bar before a municipality or a cluster of barangays may
be considered for cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an average regular annual
income "of at least ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years" as a minimum income
standard for a municipal-to-city conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was superseded by
the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that "[a] municipality or cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, x x x of at least twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices x x x."
RA 9009 in turn amended said Sec. 450 by further increasing the income requirement to PhP 100
million, thus:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be

converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last
two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:

xxxx

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law
is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis 37 or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. 38 To obviate this aberration,
and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, 39 resort should
be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter. 40

It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences derivable
therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent. 41

The rationale behind the enactment of RA 9009 to amend Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 can
reasonably be deduced from Senator Pimentel’s sponsorship speech on S. Bill No. 2157. Of
particular significance is his statement regarding the basis for the proposed increase from PhP 20
million to PhP 100 million in the income requirement for municipalities wanting to be converted into
cities, viz:
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in the whole set of
proposed amendments that we have introduced to precisely amend the [LGC]. However, it is a fact
that there is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when
the [LGC] was approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with
41 more municipalities applying for conversion x x x. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive
that before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no municipalities.

It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other things, that the financial
requirement, which, under the [LGC], is fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a
municipality to have the right to be converted into a city, and the P100 million should be sourced
from locally generated funds.

Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of the pendency of several
bills on cityhood, wherein the applying municipalities were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20
million-income threshold. These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally noteworthy is the ensuing
excerpts from the floor exchange between then Senate President Franklin Drilon and Senator
Pimentel, the latter stopping short of saying that the income threshold of PhP 100 million under S.
Bill No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that have pending cityhood bills, thus:

THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point. x x x

THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate which propose the
conversion of a number of municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present standard.

We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a law, will the
Chamber apply the standard as proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for
consideration?

SENATOR PIMENTEL, Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill x x x [if]
approved, retroact to the bills that are pending in the Senate for conversion from municipalities to
cities.

THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that view? Or does it not
become a policy of the Chamber, assuming that this bill becomes a law x x x that it will apply to
those bills which are already approved by the House under the old version of the [LGC] and are now
pending in the Senate? The Chair does not know if we can craft a language which will limit the
application to those which are not yet in the Senate. Or is that a policy that the Chamber will adopt?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that provision
because what we are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no
retroactivity clause, I do not think that the bill would have any retroactive effect.

THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the
Chamber will not be affected.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.42 (Emphasis and underscoring

supplied.)

What the foregoing Pimental-Drilon exchange eloquently indicates are the following complementary
legislative intentions: (1) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum
income requirement of PhP 100 million that S. Bill No. 2159 proposes; and (2) RA 9009 would not
have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned.

Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis for the inclusion of the
exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent of Congress of not according retroactive
effect to RA 9009. Not only do the congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the
cityhood laws from the income requirement of PhP 100 million. Congress has now made its intention
to exempt express in the challenged cityhood laws.

Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In
construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and
to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the
policy and objects of the legislature.43 In fact, any interpretation that runs counter to the legislative
intent is unacceptable and invalid. 44 Torres v. Limjapcould not have been more precise:

The intent of a Statute is the Law. – If a statute is valid, it is to have effect according to the purpose
and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is x x x the essence of the law and the primary rule of
construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in
enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it
leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In
construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature x x
x.45 (Emphasis supplied.)

As emphasized at the outset, behind every law lies the presumption of

constitutionality.46 Consequently, to him who would assert the unconstitutionality of a statute belongs
the burden of proving otherwise. Laws will only be declared invalid if a conflict with the Constitution
is beyond reasonable doubt. 47 Unfortunately for petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention, they failed
to discharge their heavy burden.

It is contended that the deliberations on the cityhood bills and the covering joint resolution were
undertaken in the 11th and/or the 12th Congress. Accordingly, so the argument goes, such
deliberations, more particularly those on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain
municipalities, are without significance and would not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing the
cityhood laws that were passed during the 13th Congress, Congress not being a continuing body.

The argument is specious and glosses over the reality that the cityhood bills––which were already
being deliberated upon even perhaps before the conception of RA 9009––were again being
considered during the 13th Congress after being tossed around in the two previous Congresses.
And specific reference to the cityhood bills was also made during the deliberations on RA 9009. At
the end of the day, it is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing legislative body. What is
important is that the debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken in the
enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa, were part of
its legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the
law.48 And of course the earlier cited Drilon-Pimentel exchange on whether or not the 16
municipalities in question would be covered by RA 9009 is another vital link to the historical chain of
the cityhood bills. This and other proceedings on the bills are spread in the Congressional journals,
which cannot be conveniently reduced to pure rhetoric without meaning whatsoever, on the
simplistic and non-sequitur pretext that Congress is not a continuing body and that unfinished
business in either chamber is deemed terminated at the end of the term of Congress.
This brings us to the challenge to the constitutionality of cityhood laws on equal protection grounds.

To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to respondent

municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption from the standard PhP 100 million minimum income
requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the Constitution, which in part provides that no person shall "be
denied the equal protection of the laws."

Petitioners’ challenge is not well taken. At its most basic, the equal protection clause proscribes
undue favor as well as hostile discrimination. Hence, a law need not operate with equal force on all
persons or things to be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution.

The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of due process,
every unfair discrimination being an offense against the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
nonetheless come as a separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more
specific protection against any undue discrimination or antagonism from government. Arbitrariness in
general may be assailed on the basis of the due process clause. But if a particular challenged act
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protection clause.49 This constitutional protection extends to all persons, natural or artificial, within
the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to
protection only insofar as their property is concerned. 50

In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal
protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of
the cityhood laws. The LCP’s claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on
account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the
ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-
cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be
allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption
clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the
conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property
as such.

As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does not require
absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal
protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual differences
between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to
classify,51 necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply
equally to all members of the same class.52 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met
by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause.

As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16) municipalities by the cityhood
laws rests on substantial distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the
erstwhile PhP 20 million income criterion instead of the stringent income requirement prescribed in
RA 9009, are substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. Looking back, we
note that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009. There lies
part of the tipping difference. And years before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009,
respondents LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of
1991. Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for their conversion remained unacted
upon by Congress. As aptly observed by then Senator, now Manila Mayor, Alfredo Lim in his speech
sponsoring H. Joint Resolution No. 1, or the cityhood bills, respondent LGUs saw themselves
confronted with the "changing of the rules in the middle of the game." Some excerpts of Senator
Lim’s sponsorship speech:

x x x [D]uring the Eleventh Congress, fifty-seven (57) municipalities applied for city status, confident
that each has met the requisites for conversion under Section 450 of the [LGC], particularly the
income threshold of P20 million. Of the 57 that filed, thirty-two (32) were enacted into law; x x x while
the rest – twenty-four (24) in all – failed to pass through Congress. Shortly before the long recess of
Congress in February 2001, to give way to the May elections x x x, Senate Bill No. 2157, which
eventually became [RA] 9009, was passed into law, effectively raising the income requirement for
creation of cities to a whooping P100 million x x x. Much as the proponents of the 24 cityhood bills
then pending struggled to beat the effectivity of the law on June 30, 2001, events that then unfolded
were swift and overwhelming that Congress just did not have the time to act on the measures.

Some of these intervening events were x x x the impeachment of President Estrada x x x and the
May 2001 elections.

The imposition of a much higher income requirement for the creation of a city x x x was unfair; like
any sport – changing the rules in the middle of the game.

Undaunted, they came back during the [12th] Congress x x x. They filed House Joint Resolution No.
29 seeking exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. For the second time,
[however], time ran out from them.

For many of the municipalities whose Cityhood Bills are now under consideration, this year, at the
closing days of the [13th] Congress, marks their ninth year appealing for fairness and justice. x x x

I, for one, share their view that fairness dictates that they should be given a legal remedy by which
they could be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the
criteria set forth under the [LGC] prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Hence, when House Joint
Resolution No. 1 reached the Senate x x x I immediately set the public hearing x x x. On July 25,
2006, I filed Committee Report No. 84 x x x. On September 6, I delivered the sponsorship x x x.

x x x By November 14, the measure had reverted to the period of individual amendments. This was
when the then acting majority leader, x x x informed the Body that Senator Pimentel and the
proponents of House Joint Resolution No. 1 have agreed to the proposal of the Minority Leader for
the House to first approve the individual Cityhood Bills of the qualified municipalities, along with the
provision exempting each of them from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. x x x This led to
the certification issued by the proponents short-listing fourteen (14) municipalities deemed to be
qualified for city-status.

Acting on the suggestion of Senator Pimentel, the proponents lost no time in working for the
approval by the House of Representatives of their individual Cityhood Bills, each containing a
provision of exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. On the last session day of
last year, December 21, the House transmitted to the Senate the Cityhood Bills of twelve out of the
14 pre-qualified municipalities. Your Committee immediately conducted the public hearing x x x.

The whole process I enumerated [span] three Congresses x x x.

In essence, the Cityhood Bills now under consideration will have the same effect as that of House
Joint Resolution No. 1 because each of the 12 bills seeks exemption from the higher income
requirement of RA 9009. The proponents are invoking the exemption on the basis of justice and
fairness.

Each of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for conversion into a component city based on the
old requirements set forth under Section 450 of the [LGC], prior to its amendment by RA 9009,
namely: x x x53(Emphasis supplied.)

In hindsight, the peculiar conditions, as depicted in Senator Lim’s speech, which respondent LGUs
found themselves in were unsettling. They were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment
of RA 009. Because of events they had absolutely nothing to do with, a spoiler in the form of RA
9009 supervened. Now, then, to impose on them the much higher income requirement after what
they have gone through would appear to be indeed "unfair," to borrow from Senator Lim. Thus, the
imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they would be
allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status, using the criteria set
forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Truly, the peculiar conditions of
respondent LGUs, which are actual and real, provide sufficient grounds for legislative classification.

To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining, cannot question the wisdom of
the congressional classification, if reasonable, or the motivation underpinning the classification. 54 By
the same token, they do not sit to determine the propriety or efficacy of the remedies Congress has
specifically chosen to extend. That is its prerogative. The power of the Legislature to make
distinctions and classifications among persons is, to reiterate, neither curtailed nor denied by the
equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the
classification is without reasonable basis.

The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of respondent
LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million income requirement was meant to reduce the
inequality occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009. From another perspective, the
exemption was unquestionably designed to insure that fairness and justice would be accorded
respondent LGUs. Let it be noted that what were then the cityhood bills covering respondent LGUs
were part and parcel of the original 57 conversion bills filed in the 11th Congress, 33 of those
became laws before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the challenged cityhood
laws were not acted upon due, inter alia, to the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related
jueteng scandal investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted
impeachment.

While the equal protection guarantee frowns upon the creation of a privileged class without
justification, inherent in the equality clause is the exhortation for the Legislature to pass laws
promoting equality or reducing existing inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a
real sense an attempt on the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt the respondent LGUs.
These laws positively promoted the equality and eliminated the inequality, doubtless unintended,
between respondent municipalities and the thirty-three (33) other municipalities whose cityhood bills
were enacted during the 11th Congress. Respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities,
which had already been elevated to city status, were all found to be qualified under the old Sec. 450
of the LGC of 1991 during the 11th Congress. As such, both respondent LGUs and the 33 other
former municipalities are under like circumstances and conditions. There is, thus, no rhyme or
reason why an exemption from the PhP 100 million requirement cannot be given to respondent
LGUs. Indeed, to deny respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to
the 33 other municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly situated, is tantamount to denying
the former the protective mantle of the equal protection clause. In effect, petitioners and petitioners-
in-intervention are creating an absurd situation in which an alleged violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution is remedied by another violation of the same clause. The irony is not lost
to the Court.

Then too the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 is not limited in application only to conditions existing
at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all time, as long as the contemplated
conditions obtain. To be more precise, the legislative intent underlying the enactment of RA 9009 to
exclude would-be-cities from the PhP 100 million criterion would hold sway, as long as the
corresponding cityhood bill has been filed before the effectivity of RA 9009 and the concerned
municipality qualifies for conversion into a city under the original version of Sec. 450 of the LGC of
1991.

Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood laws is an application of the
non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights, but a
mere declaration of prior qualification and/or compliance with the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009.

Lastly and in connection with the third requisite, the uniform exemption clause would apply to
municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant
with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20 million. It
is hard to imagine, however, if there are still municipalities out there belonging in context to the same
class as the sixteen (16) respondent LGUs. Municipalities that cannot claim to belong to the same
class as the 16 cannot seek refuge in the cityhood laws. The former have to comply with the PhP
100 million income requirement imposed by RA 9009.

A final consideration. The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the creating, but
challenged, cityhood laws in the plebiscites held in the affected LGUs is now an operative fact. New
cities appear to have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and
employees. Other resulting events need not be enumerated. The operative fact doctrine provides
another reason for upholding the constitutionality of the cityhood laws in question.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court ought to abandon as it hereby abandons and sets
aside the Decision of November 18, 2008 subject of reconsideration. And by way of summing up the
main arguments in support of this disposition, the Court hereby declares the following:

(1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the
cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words, Congress
intended the subject cityhood laws to be exempted from the income requirement of PhP 100
million prescribed by RA 9009;

(2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of
1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income requirement;

(3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is really immaterial if
Congress is not a continuing body. The hearings and deliberations during the 11th and 12th
Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which
were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being considered during the 13th Congress.
Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction
if the literal application of the law results in absurdity or injustice.

(4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending
cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from
 other municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20
million income level exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.

And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it, petitioners
have not overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question.

WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs’ Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to
Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents’ ‘Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009’ and ‘Motion for Leave to File and to Admit
Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain
Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the
March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of
judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.

The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws,
namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408,
9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(No part)
REYNATO S. PUNO*
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No part)
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(No part)
ROBERTO A. ABAD
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

FIRST DIVISION

July 6, 2015

G.R. No. 156022

AURELLANO AGNES, EDUARDO AGNES, ESPIRITU AGNES, ESTELLA AGNES, PANTALEON

AGNES, FILOTEO APUEN, IMELDA APUEN, MOISES APUEN, ROGELIO APUEN, GONZALO
AUSTRIA, JAVIER AUSTRIA, BONIFACIO EGUIA, LYDIA EGUIA, MANUEL GABARDA, SR.,
MELECIO GARCIA, CRISTOBAL LOQUIB, MARIA LOQUIB, MATERNO LOQUIB, GEORGE
MACANAS, MODESTO MANLEBTEN, JUANITO AUSTRIA, CONCHITA BERNAL, AURELIO
BERNAL, PABLITO BOGANTE, FELICIANO CANTON, ALFREDO CANETE, CECILIA CANETE,
CHERRY DE MESA, ROBERTO NOVERO, PERLITO PABIA, RODRIGO SABROSO, JUAN
T,ALORDA, and RAFAELA TRADIO, Petitioners, 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari  essentially seeking the reversal of the April 24, 2002
1

Decision  of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 46222, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
2

Agnes, et al.," which affirmed the February 23, 1994 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
3

Palawan, Branch 49, Fourth Judicial Region, Puerto Princesa City in Civil Case No. 2262, entitled
"Republic of the Philippines v. Aurellano Agnes, et al."

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Calauit Island (Calauit) is a 3,600-hectare island that forms part of the Calamianes Island group in
the Province of Palawan.

The petitioners claim to be among the more than 250 families ("settlers") who lived in Calauit  as
4

successors of the early settlers therein. They are members of the "Balik Calauit Movement," which
was organized for the purpose of reclaiming the lands they used to occupy. The settlers lay claim on
the lands of Calauit either (1) through a predecessor, who had become a titled owner by virtue of Act
No. 926;  or (2) by means of an imperfect title, which they, by themselves or their ancestors, had
5

acquired by way of "unbroken, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and cultivation"  of 6

the lands therein until their relocation in 1977.

In 1973, the Bureau of Lands started to survey Calauit. After some time, the surveyors met some
resistance to the continued survey, but the settlers were told that it was being done for purposes of
titling the latter’s landholdings, as well as to determine how much land may be apportioned for
people coming from Busuanga who were to be relocated in the area in view of the establishment of
the Yulo King Ranch. In 1975, however, the settlers were told that the supposed titling of their
landholdings was not going to push through as the island was going to be set up as a zoo for rare
and exotic animals from other countries.  Further, they were told that instead, they would be resettled
7

in Halsey and Burabod in Culion, where the lands were claimed to be more fertile and where full
government services and facilities such as irrigation, electricity, waterworks, public markets, roads,
housing, school, and health care, would be provided by the government. 8

The petitioners alleged that, along with the other settlers, they could not refuse the offer because
they were harassed and intimidated by members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC). In their
petition and answers to written interrogatories, they mentioned instances of violence and
harassment by PC soldiers.  They were also told that they had no choice but to leave Calauit, as the
9

island was government property and that, as illegal settlers, they could be sued. 10

The terms of the proposed relocation was later embodied in individual Resettlement

Agreements  wherein the government, through the Secretary of Natural Resources, among other
11

things, undertook to provide the signatory settler the following: (1) an agricultural lot in exchange for
the area he would be vacating; and (2) payment for the improvements on the properties to be
vacated, as ascertained in individualized appraisal sheets.  In exchange, the signatory settler
12

agreed to (1) be resettled to any selected resettlement area in Busuanga; (2) relinquish "totally his
rights and claim (sic) over the land thereon in favor of the Government;" and (3) vacate the premises
upon receipt of fifty percent (50%) of the total amount of the appraised value of the improvements,
with the other half to be paid upon proof of actual evacuation from the property. 13

On August 31, 1976, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Pres. Marcos) signed Presidential
Proclamation No. 1578, which declared the Island of Calauit as a Game Preserve and Wildlife
Sanctuary, viz.:

PROCLAMATION NO. 1578

DECLARING AS A GAME PRESERVE AND WILDLIFE SANCTUARY A CERTAIN PARCEL OF

LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN EMBRACED AND SITUATED IN THE ISLAND OF CALAUIT,
MUNICIPALITY OF NEW BUSUANGA, ISLAND OF BUSUANGA, PROVINCE OF PALAWAN.

Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority vested in
me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby withdraw from sale,
settlement, exploration or exploitation and set aside and declare, subject to private rights, if any
there be, as a Game Preserve and Wildlife sanctuary a certain parcel of land of the public domain
embraced and situated in the island of Calauit, Municipality of New Busuanga, island of Busuanga,
province of Palawan, which tract of land is more particularly described as follows:

"A parcel of land (Calauit Island) bounded on the North by Mindoro Strait; on the East by Mindoro
Strait; on the South by the Municipality of New Busuanga, Palawan and Illultuk Bay; and on the West
by the South China Sea; situated in the Municipality of New Busuanga, Calamianes Group, Province
of Palawan, Island of Busuanga; containing an area of THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
(3,400) HECTARES, more or less."

NOTE: These data are approximate and subject to future survey.

The hunting, wounding, taking or killing within said territory of any wild animals or birds and/or the
destruction of any vegetation or any act causing disturbance to the habitat of the wildlife herein
protected are hereby prohibited.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippines to be affixed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 31st day of August in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-six.

(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President of the Philippines

By the President:

(SGD.) JUAN C. TUVERA

Presidential Assistant

Thereafter, the Department of Natural Resources  (DNR) established the Calauit Special Project
14

(CSP) to manage and operate the Calauit Sanctuary.

On March 11, 1977, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1626, declaring certain portions of
the Culion Leper Colony Reservation excluded from the Reservation and opening them to
disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act. These portions, known as Halsey and
Burabod, became the resettlement areas for the settlers of Calauit.

In 1981, the Presidential Committee for the Conservation of the Tamaraw (PCCT) absorbed the
CSP; and in 1985, it entered into a contract with the Conservation and Resource Management
Foundation, Inc. (CRMF) to carry out the functions of the CSP.

According to petitioners, life in the resettlement areas was unbearable. They claimed that the lands
in Halsey and Burabod were unsuitable for habitation and agriculture; and that the government failed
to comply with the promised services and facilities. 15

After the EDSA People Power and the ouster of Pres. Marcos, the settlers formed the "Balik Calauit
Movement," and aired their collective grievances to the new administration of then President
Corazon C. Aquino (Pres. Aquino). 16

Some of the settlers tried to return to the Island but were driven away by the CRMF; thus, they went
to the Philippine Commission on Human Rights (PCHR) to file a complaint against the government
and CRMF. A fact-finding commission was established by the PCHR and dialogues were held
among the parties. On February 17 and 23, 1987, the fact-finding commission submitted two
memoranda  recommending (1) the repeal of Proclamation No. 1578 for being violative of the
17

settlers’ Bill of Rights; and (2) the immediate return of the settlers to Calauit.

In June 1987, the petitioners, with the other settlers, once again tried to return to Calauit, with
success this time around.

Meantime, the PCHR referred the aforementioned complaint to then DNR Secretary Fulgencio
Factoran, who, on July 14, 1987 issued an Order  directing the settlers who returned to Calauit to
18

"immediately vacate the sanctuary and return to their resettlement areas of Halsey [and] Burabod."
In response to the above Order, the concerned settlers filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court,
docketed asG.R. No. 80034, entitled "Reynaldo Rufino, et al. v. Hon. Secretary Fulgencio Factoran,
et al." In a Resolution dated February 16, 1988, this Court dismissed the petition for being factual in
19

nature, to wit:

G.R. No. 80034 (Reynaldo Rufino, et al. vs. Hon. Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, et al.). It appearing
from the allegations and arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings that the issues
presented to the Court for determination are mainly factual in nature, among them the manner of the
petitioners’ transfer from Calawit to Halsey and Burabod, the conditions obtaining in the places to
which they have been relocated, the terms and conditions of their resettlement, including the
benefits, if any, extended to them by the government, the number of persons involved in the Back-to-
Calawit Movement, and whether or not there have really been violations of human rights against the
petitioners, the Court, not being a trier of facts, Resolved to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice
to the filing by the petitioners of the appropriate action before the regional trial court for trial and
determination of the said factual issues.20

On March 10, 1988, the petitioners filed a petition with the RTC, Branch 134, Makati, Metro Manila,
docketed asCivil Case No. 88-298, entitled "Reynaldo Rufino, et al. v. Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, et
al.," for the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), to enjoin the latter from implementing Secretary Factoran’s July 14, 1987 Order,
and for the declaration of nullity of Proclamation No. 1578 for being unconstitutional. 21

In an Order dated April 6, 1988, the RTC of Makati, denied the motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, and upheld the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1578. 22

On April 17, 1989, the RTC of Makati issued another Order  dismissing the case without prejudice,
23

to wit:

On motion of counsel for defendants and there being no objection on the part of counsel for the
plaintiffs, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without prejudice.

The foregoing Order was prompted by petitioners’ manifestation that they had a pending appeal
before the Office of the President relative to the July 14, 1987 Order of DENR Secretary Factoran
directing the petitioners and the other settlers to leave Calauit and return to their resettlement areas
in Halsey and Burabod.  The Office of the President ultimately denied said appeal.
24

Some of the settlers failed to comply with Secretary Factoran’s July 14, 1987 Order to vacate
Calauit; thus, the Republic of the Philippines (herein respondent), represented by the DENR
Secretary, filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Recovery of Possession with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against herein petitioners before the RTC, Branch 49, Puerto Princesa
City.  The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 2262, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
25

Aurellano Agnes, et al."

In said Complaint, herein respondent alleged that the petitioners’ repossession and reoccupation of
portions of Calauit are patently unlawful and grossly reproachable as they had already waived and
relinquished whatever rights they had on the island when they signed and executed their respective
Resettlement Agreements. The respondent claimed that by returning to Calauit, the petitioners
breached their contracts, the Resettlement Agreements, which they voluntarily and freely executed.
Moreover, by virtue of Proclamation No. 1578, which closed Calauit to exploitation and settlement,
the respondent contended that the petitioners are staying on the island as "squatters" on public land.
The respondent also complained of the great damage and disturbance the petitioners were doing to
the natural resources and the protected animals in Calauit. 26
In their "Answer with Counterclaims,"  herein petitioners alleged that the Resettlement Agreements
27

were executed with deceit, intimidation, misrepresentation, and fraud; hence they are illegal and
void. They also contested their admissibility on the ground that they are private documents, which
have not been authenticated. They also claim that it was actually the respondent who breached its
contract by providing poor resettlement areas, which resulted in their subhuman and marginal
existence. The petitioners denied causing damage to the island and the animals in Calauit, as they
only occupied the coastal areas, away from the animals’ roaming grounds and habitat. The
petitioners then prayed for the nullification of the Resettlement Agreements for having been procured
through violence, intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation, and fraud. In the alternative, they called for
the rescission of the contracts for respondent’s material breach of its obligations. Lastly, they asked
for Twenty-Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos each as temperate, exemplary, and moral damages.

Ruling of the RTC

On February 23, 1994, the RTC of Puerto Princesa City rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders the defendants (with the exception of Alfredo Aunang,
Juana Apuen, Eufricinia Bello, Bartolome Darol, Eduardo de Mesa, Aurora Eco, Eleuterio Fresnillo,
Jovita Gabarda, Fausto Lledo, Pampilo Sabroso, Ismael, Rafaela and Regalado Tradio)  and 28

anyone claiming under them to vacate the respective areas where they have resettled at Calauit
Island, Busuanga, Palawan.

Plaintiff-Republic through the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources, is ordered to

procure another suitable Relocation Sites for defendants within six months from receipt of this
Decision.29

The RTC held that the Resettlement Agreements, being duplicates of the originals and records of
the Republic of the Philippines, are public documents notwithstanding their lack of notarization. As
such, they are admissible in evidence even if the parties’ signatures were not authenticated. The
RTC also held that the vices of consent allegedly attached to the Resettlement Agreements would
have served to render the agreements merely voidable and not void. However, the four-year period
within which the petitioners could bring an action for annulment had long prescribed. On the issue of
rescission, the RTC held that even assuming that the petitioners had grounds for rescission, they
"could not unilaterally rescind the agreements, since the right to rescind must be invoked judicially."30

The RTC, in deciding against the petitioners’ return to Calauit, proclaimed:

National Interest in the preservation of Calauit as Game Preserve and Sanctuary is the overriding
factor which argues against the right of [petitioners] to return to Calauit. Assuming that the
Resettlement Areas provided by [Respondent]-Republic did not measure up to the expectations of
[petitioners], the recourse was not to renege on their Agreements by returning to Calauit and
contributing to the disturbance or destruction of the Preserve, but to demand that [Respondent]
deliver the fair value of the properties they vacated.

[Respondent]-Republic is not entirely free from blame for what appears to have been an unwise
choice of Relocation Sites and should be given an opportunity to rectify the mistake. 31

The petitioners sought the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the RTC’s decision in their Appeal docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 46222, entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Aurellano Agnes, et al."
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision promulgated on April 24, 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed ruling of the
RTC, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated February 23, 1994, of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49, Fourth Judicial Regional,
Palawan docketed as Civil Case No. 2262, is hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. 32

The Court of Appeals concurred in the findings and conclusions of the RTC. In addition, it disputed
the petitioners’ claim of ownership on the lands of Calauit; and held that absent any proof to the
contrary, the presumption that Calauit is of public domain and thus belongs to the State stands. The
Court of Appeals explained its pronouncement in this wise:

Pursuant to [Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution], all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. Corollarily, all lands not otherwise appearing to be within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Ergo, a positive act of the government is
needed to declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
x x x. Therefore, to acquire ownership of public land, the same must first be released from its original
classification and reclassified as alienable or disposable land. In the absence of such classification,
the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Thus, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of state ownership of land lies upon the
claimant. x x x.

xxxx

x x x [T]he law itself stated that only alienable and disposable lands, particularly agricultural lands,
can be acquired through possession and occupation for at least 30 years. Since the subject property
is still unclassified when [the petitioners] and their ancestors occupied the same, whatever
possession they or their predecessors may have had and however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. Moreover, the fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation
purposes in the names of [petitioners] or their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove
ownership. This is due to the fact that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess land when not supported by evidence or other persuasive proof
to substantiate their claim. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.

Considering that the [petitioners] failed to present convincing evidence and persuasive proof to
substantiate their claim, the presumption of State ownership stands. It is also well to note that the
bases of [respondent]’s superior right of possession and ownership was sufficiently supported both
by law and jurisprudence.  (Citations omitted.)
33

The petitioners moved for the reconsideration  of the aforequoted Decision, which was subsequently
34

denied in a Resolution  dated November 18, 2002.

35

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari premised on the following assignments of error:

Issues

I. THE COURT A QUO’S RULING REJECTING PETITIONERS’ CLAIMS OF OWNERSHIP OF THE

LANDHOLDINGS IN DISPUTE, ABSENT "POSITIVE" PROOF OF ALIENABILITY THEREOF, IS
CONTRARY NOT ONLY TO THE APPLICABLE LAW AND THE CONTROLLING DECISIONS OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT BUT TO THE UNCONTROVERTED DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON
RECORD AND THE RESPONDENT’S ADMISSIONS AS WELL.

II. IN REJECTING THE PETITIONERS’ CLAIMS OF OWNERSHIP OF THE LANDHOLDINGS IN

DISPUTE, THE COURT A QUO HAS GONE BEYOND THE ISSUES RAISED BY RESPONDENT
AND HAS IN EFFECT COLLATERALLY ATTACKED AND NULLIFIED THE CERTIFICATES OF
TITLE IN THE NAMES OF PETITIONERS’ ANCESTORS, CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE. 36

III. THE COURT A QUO’S IMPOSITION OF THE REQUIREMENT OF THE PRESENTATION OF

AN EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF ALIENABILITY AS A CONDITION TO THE RECOGNITION
OF PETITIONERS’ ALREADY PERFECTED CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT. 37

IV. THE COURT A QUO’S RULING WITHHOLDING RECOGNITION OF PETITIONERS’

PERFECTED CLAIMS TO THEIR CALAUIT LANDHOLDINGS RUNS COUNTER TO THE
CONTROLLING CASE OF Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corp. v. Court of
Appeals INVOLVING CLOSELY SIMILAR FACTS. 38

V. THE COURT A QUO VIOLATED THE BASIC RULES OF EVIDENCE AND CONTRAVENED

SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE IN ADMITTING THE UNNOTARIZED RESETTLEMENT
AGREEMENTS IN DISPUTE DESPITE THE FACT THAT NOT A SINGLE WITNESS WAS
PRESENTED TO DISCLOSE THEIR SOURCE AND TO ATTEST TO THEIR DUE EXECUTION
AND DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF THE OFFICIAL APPROVALS REQUIRED FOR THEIR
COMPLETENESS AS OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS. 39

VI. THE DECISION HAS IGNORED THE UNREBUTTED TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND THE
DOCUMENTED ADMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT ESTABLISHING THE VIOLENCE, THREATS,
FRAUD AND DECEIT EMPLOYED TO COMPEL PETITIONERS TO SUBMIT TO THEIR
RELOCATION, AND WARRANTING A DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF THE
RESETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS, ASSUMING THEIR EXECUTION BY PETITIONERS.

VII. THE COURT A QUO FURTHER IGNORED THE UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONIAL

EVIDENCE AND THE DOCUMENTED ADMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT, ESTABLISHING THE
NON-ARABLE CHARACTER OF THE LANDS ALLOTTED TO PETITIONERS IN THE
RESETTLEMENT SITES AND THE SUBHUMAN CONDITIONS PREVAILING THEREIN WHICH
JUSTIFIED THE UNILATERAL RESCISSION OF THE RESETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS,
ASSUMING ARGUENDOTHEIR EXECUTION BY PETITIONERS. 40

VIII. THE TRIAL COURT AND [THE] COURT OF APPEALS HA[VE] ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION
IN GRANTING RESPONDENT THE RIGHT TO EVICT PETITIONERS AGAIN AND TO HAVE
THEM RELOCATED IN "A MORE SUITABLE" RESETTLEMENT SITE. 41

IX. IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ CLAIM FOR DAMAGES THE COURT A QUO HAS

OVERLOOKED AND IGNORED THE UNCONTRADICTED FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE. 42

Initially, this petition was denied in a Resolution  dated February 3, 2003 for noncompliance with the
43

Rules of Court, to wit:

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the petition for review on certiorari of the decision
dated April 24, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46222 for failure to comply with
requirement no. three (3), as the copy of the assailed decision submitted is not duly certified as a
true copy thereof. Also, it lacks a written explanation why the service or filing thereof was not done
personally [Section 11, Rule 13, Rules of Civil Procedure].

In any event, even if the petition complied with the aforesaid requirements, it would still be denied,
as petitioners failed to show that a reversible error had been committed by the appellate court.

The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration  on March 19, 2003, which this Court denied with
44

finality on April 7, 2003.45

On June 2, 2003, the petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration with
their Second Motion for Reconsideration, wherein their "pro bono" counsels pleaded for leniency for
"their shortcomings." From June 2 to 20, 2003, the Court received several pleadings  from various
46 47

lawyers who were entering their appearances as collaborating pro bono counsels for the petitioners
and who manifested that they were adopting the Second Motion for Reconsideration filed on June 2,
2003.

On June 9, 2003, the Bishop of the Apostolic Vicariate of Taytay, Palawan, also wrote then Chief
Justice Hilario Davide to plead for the admission of the Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the petitioners, whom he claimed were under his pastoral jurisdiction as he was their parish priest in
1977-1978 and 1985-1989. 48

In consideration of all the above pleadings, in a Resolution dated June 25, 2003, this Court resolved
to: (1) grant the petitioners’ motion to admit their Second Motion for Reconsideration; (2) set aside its
February 3, 2003 Resolution; (3) reinstate the present petition; (4) require the respondent to
comment to the petition; and (5) note the other pleadings and letters filed before it.
49

In the meantime, on March 25, 2008, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8371, entitled "The Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Act of 1997," the Office of the President, through the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), issued a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) No. R04-BUS-
50

0308-062  over 3,683.2324 hectares of land in the Municipality of Busuanga, Province of Palawan,
51

in favor of the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community, which comprised the communities of
Barangays Calauit and Quezon, Calauit Island, and Municipality of Busuanga. The pertinent portions
of the CADT read as follows:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

WHEREAS, pursuant to the mandates of the 1987 Philippine Constitution to protect the rights of
Indigenous Cultural Communities to their ancestral lands and domains, respect and preserve their
culture and ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being, and in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. 8371, ‘AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/ INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CREATING THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,’ the members of the
indigenous Cultural Community/ies belonging to the TAGBANUA *** indigenous peoples, located
at Municipality of Busuanga, Province of Palawan and comprising the communities
of Barangays Calauit and Quezon, Calauit Island, Municipality of Busuanga, Province of
Palawan, having continuously occupied, possessed and utilized, since time immemorial,
under a claim of ownership certain ancestral domain situated in Municipality of Busuanga,
Province of Palawan, Island of Luzon, Philippines containing an area of Three Thousand Six
Hundred Eighty-Three and 2324/10000 (3,683.2324) hectares more or less, more particularly
bounded and described on Page 2 hereof are hereby recognized of their rights thereto.

NOW THEREFORE, said Indigenous Cultural Community of TAGBANUA*** Indigenous Peoples,

whose members at the time of this issuance appear hereunder as Annex A, is hereby issued this
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title:

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD IN OWNERSHIP, the above described ancestral domain as their private
but community property, which belongs to all generations of the said Indigenous Cultural
Community/Indigenous Peoples.

TO DEVELOP, CONTROL, MANAGE and UTILIZE COLLECTIVELY the said ANCESTRAL

DOMAINwith all the rights, privileges and responsibilities appurtenant thereto, subject to the
condition that the said ancestral domain shall NOT be SOLD, DISPOSED, nor DESTROYED.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, and by authority of R.A. 8371, the National Commission on Indigenous

Peoples, hereby causes these letters to be made patent and the seal of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples to be hereunto affixed.

Issued in Quezon City, Philippines on this 25th day of March, 2008. 52

In view of the foregoing development on October 19, 2011, this Court issued a Resolution  requiring
53

the parties "to move in the premises by informing the Court, within ten (10) days from notice, of
supervening events and/or subsequent developments pertinent to the case which may be of help to
the Court in its immediate disposition x x x."

The petitioners, in a Manifestation,  emphasized at the outset that no event has transpired, which
54

may have rendered the case herein moot and academic. The petitioners reiterated that the relief
they are after is theirindividual titles to the areas they are currently occupying in the Calauit Island.

And, in their Compliance  the petitioners averred further that the issuance of the CADT "in favor of
55

the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community amounts to an affirmation and recognition of the
property rights of their ancestors from whom [they] traced their present individual claims." Thus, the
petitioners claim that there is factual and legal bases for this Court to proceed and confirm
their right of ownership over the subject properties in the Calauit Island.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the respondent Republic of the
Philippines manifested that per Memorandum dated March 5, 2012 by the Regional Executive
Director, DENR-IVMIMAROPA, the following are the updates on the ground:

3. Verification made by this office on the status of occupation of the Balik Calauit Movement
(BCM) as stated in Civil Case No. 2262 particularly the forty-seven (47) defendants
(Aurellano Agnes, et al.) and as confirmed by Bgy. Chairman Gabarda of Bgy. Buluang
Busuanga, Palawan wherein Calauit Island is a Sitio of said Barangay, disclosed that forty
(40) are at present in the Calauit Island and seven (7) are outside Calauit Island. The latter
are Eufricina Bello, Cherry Demesa, Eduardo Demesa, Jovita Gabarda, Manuel Gabarda,
Sr., Ismael Tradio and Rafaella Tradio who settled to adjacent and other Barangay[s] of
Busuanga, Palawan. Further, of the forty-seven (47) BCM members, nine (9) of them were
already dead (Juana Apuen, Javier Austria, Conchita Barcebal, Aurora Eco, Lydia Equia,
Fausto Lledo, Materno Loquib, George Macanas and Juan Talorda) and one (1) was put in
jail (Bonifacio Equia) at the Provincial Jail in Puerto Princesa City x x x.
 4. During the resettlement of BCM, Barangay[s] Halsey and Burabod in Culion, Palawan are
the barangay[s] which were identified as resettlement sites.  With this, some BCM members
1âwphi1

have applied and awarded with titles. They are Eduardo Agnes, Espiritu Agnes, Pantaleon
Agnes, Filatea Apuen, Juana Apuen, Moises Apuen, Alfredo Aunang, Javier Austria, Aurelio
Bernal, Pablito Bogante, Alfredo Canete, Bartolome Darol, Melecia Garcia, Modesto
Manlebten, Roberto Novero, Perlita Pabia, Pampilo Sabroso, Rodrigo Sabroso, Ismael
Tradio, Regalado Tradio, and Tirso Ustares, Jr. aside from other land areas they have
acquired in Busuanga, Palawan x x x.

5. Recent documents acquired from National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)-

Provincial Office, Puerto Princesa City particularly the photocopied technical descriptions of
the awarded Ancestral Domain showed that the Island of Calauit as plotted by this Office
was covered by Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) R04-BUS-0308-062
bearing CADT-Lot No. 1-Ade-0403-005-Gni covering 3,572.9731 hectares, more or
less aside from other islets included known as Lot No. 2-Maltanobong Island-Ade-0403-005,
Lot. No. 3-Dimipac Island-Ade-0403-005-Gni, Lot No. 4-Ade-0403-005-Gni, and Lot No. 5-
Ade-0403-005-Gni with corresponding areas which are adjacent to Calauit Island x x x.

6. At present, [a] certain Roy Dabuit is the Acting Chairman of the Tagbanua Indigenous
Cultural Community who is the recipient of the said CADT in Calauit Island and other islets.

7. Furthermore, the undersigned was able to take pictures on the portions of Calauit Island
which were occupied by the BCM and Indigenous People belonging to the Tagbanua Tribe.
They have built houses made of light materials, school (elementary and day care), small
causeway and tribal hall.

8. Moreover, the Calauit Preserve and Wildlife Sanctuary still exist in the Island of Calauit
and placed under the management of the Provincial Government of Palawan thru an
Executive Order. The issuance of CADT over Calauit Island including the Calauit Preserve
and Wildlife Sanctuary under Presidential Proclamation 1578 is another current problem. 56

Thus, the OSG submitted that "the instant petition must be decided on the merits considering that
the area in dispute remains to be a Game and Wildlife Preserve and petitioners persist on their
illegal occupation thereof."
57

Notwithstanding the matters raised by the petitioners in this case, a review of the Complaint, Answer
with Counterclaims, and the rest of the record of the instant petition readily reveals that the
fundamental issue of the controversy between the parties may be summed up into these: whether or
not the Resettlement Agreements are valid; and, more importantly, whether or not the petitioners
may be compelled to vacate Calauit by virtue of their obligations enumerated in the Resettlement
Agreements.

Ruling of this Court

With the issuance by the Office of the President of the CADT, an ostensive successor to
the Resettlement Agreements, to the Tagbanua Indigenous Cultural Community (ICC), the resolution
of the question on the propriety or impropriety of the latter contract and their effects on the continued
stay of the settlers on Calauit appears to have been rendered moot and academic.

Under the CADT, the Tagbanua ICC is given authority "TO HAVE AND HOLD IN OWNERSHIP, the
x x x described ancestral domain as their private but community property, which belongs to all
generations of the said Indigenous Cultural Community/Indigenous Peoples"; and "TO DEVELOP,
CONTROL, MANAGE and UTILIZE COLLECTIVELY the said ANCESTRAL DOMAIN with all the
rights, privileges and responsibilities appurtenant thereto, subject to the condition that the said
ancestral domain shall NOT be SOLD, DISPOSED, norDESTROYED."

To be precise, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8371 recognizes that the rights to ancestral domains
carry with it the rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains, which
shall include the following:

Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. - The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:

a. Rights of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water

traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;

b. Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. – Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to
develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to
manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities
for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the
natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the
ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they
may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government
to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;

c. Right to Stay in the Territories - The right to stay in the territory and not to be
removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed
consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. Where relocation is
considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place
only with the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned and whenever
possible, they shall be guaranteed the right to return to their ancestral domains, as
soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist. When such return is not possible,
as determined by agreement or through appropriate procedures, ICCs/IPs shall be
provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to
that of the land previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present
needs and future development. Persons thus relocated shall likewise be fully
compensated for any resulting loss or injury;

d. Right in Case of Displacement. - In case displacement occurs as a result of natural

catastrophes, the State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas
where they can have temporary life support systems: Provided, That the displaced ICCs/IPs
shall have the right to return to their abandoned lands until such time that the normalcy and
safety of such lands shall be determined: Provided, further, That should their ancestral
domain cease to exist and normalcy and safety of the previous settlements are not possible,
displaced ICCs/IPs shall enjoy security of tenure over lands to which they have been
resettled: Provided, furthermore, That basic services and livelihood shall be provided to them
to ensure that their needs are adequately addressed;
 e. Right to Regulate Entry of Migrants. - Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and
organizations into the domains;

f. Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water. - For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access
to integrated systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;

g. Right to Claim Parts of Reservations. - The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains
which have been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for
common and public welfare and service; and

h. Right to Resolve Conflict. - Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary
laws of the area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be
submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary.
(Emphasis supplied.)

More significantly, the aforequoted provision provides that the right to ancestral domain carries with
it the right to "stay in the territory and not to be removed therefrom." And the CADT was issued
notwithstanding the existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 1578, which recognized the
existence of private rights already extant at the time. Thus, although the issuance of the CADT in
favor of the Tagbanua ICC to develop, control, manage, and utilize Calauit does not affect the
propriety or impropriety of the execution of the Resettlement Agreements per se, the same,
however, gainsays the avowed consequence of said contracts, that is, to remove and transfer the
settlers from Calauit to the resettlement areas in Halsey and Burabod.

Verily, in Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,  this Court emphasized that:
58

It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial
rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of
moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual
substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal
of the petition. (Citations omitted.)

From the above pronouncement, there is no justiciable controversy anymore in the instant petition in
view of the issuance of CADT. There is no longer any purpose in determining whether the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the RTC since any declaration thereon would be of no
practical use or value.

Clearly, any decision of this Court on the present petition, whether it be an affirmance or a reversal
of the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, would be equivalent in effect to an affirmance or an
invalidation of the challenged Decision of the RTC. But the Office of the President’s issuance of a
2008 Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title in favor of the settlers, including the petitioners, negates
the need to resolve the issues raised in theComplaint and Answer with Counterclaims – whether or
not the petitioners may be compelled to vacate Calauit by virtue of their obligations enumerated in
the Resettlement Agreements.

The issuance by the respondent of CADT No. R04-BUS-0308-062 over 3,683.2324 (the entire area
subject of theResettlement Agreements) in favor of the settlers, including the petitioners, provide
their occupation and/or settlement on the subject land an apparent color of authority at the very least
by virtue of Republic Act No. 8371. Precisely, under the law, a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title
"refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of possession and ownership of ICCs/[Indigenous
Peoples (IPs)] over their ancestral domains  identified and delineated in accordance with [the]
59
law."  Therefore, the settlers continued stay in Calauit has become a non-issue. As such, any
60

discussion on the matter of the propriety of the Resettlement Agreements and their effects would be
mere surplusage.

Although the moot and academic principle admits of certain exceptions,  none are applicable in this
61

case.

But emphasis must be made that the disposition of the instant petition does not at all touch on the
propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the CADT.  Such a question is not for this Court to take on
1awp++i1

at this time as, in fact, it is not raised herein.

Relative to the recent prayer of the petitioners that they be awarded individual titles of ownership
over portions of Calauit as the issuance of CADT in favor of the Tagbanua ICC amounts to an
affirmation and recognition of the property rights of their ancestors from whom they trace their
present individual claims,  this Court points out that under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8371,
62

individual members of cultural communities, with respect to individually owned ancestral lands, the
option to secure title to the same must be done in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.

In light of the foregoing, the issues invoked by the parties no longer need to be discussed.

WHEREFORE, the April 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46222 is SET
ASIDE, and Civil Case No. 2262 is DISMISSED, for being moot and academic. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

epublic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Tenth Congress

Republic Act No. 8435             December 22, 1997

AN ACT PRESCRIBING URGENT RELATED MEASURES TO MODERNIZE THE AGRICULTURE

AND FISHERIES SECTORS OF THE COUNTRY IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THEIR
PROFITABILITY, AND PREPARE SAID SECTORS FOR THE CHALLENGES OF THE
GLOBALIZATION THROUGH AN ADEQUATE, FOCUSED AND RATIONAL DELIVERY OF
NECESSARY SUPPORT SERVICES, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::
Section 1. Short Title. - This act shall be known as the "Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization
Act of 1997."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The goals of the national economy are more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the
key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural
development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and
natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. In pursuit of
these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.

Thus, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to enable those who belong to the agriculture and
fisheries sectors to participate and share in the fruits of development and growth in a manner that
utilizes the nations resources in the most efficient and sustainable way possible by establishing a
more equitable access to assets, income, basic and support services and infrastructure.

The State shall promote food security, including sufficiency in our staple food, namely rice and white
corn. The production of rice and white corn shall be optimized to meet our local consumption and
shall be given adequate support by the State.

The State shall adopt the market approach in assisting the agriculture and fisheries sectors while
recognizing the contribution of the said sector to food security, environmental protection, and
balanced urban and rural development, without neglecting the welfare of the consumers, especially
the lower income groups. The state shall promote market-oriented policies in agricultural production
to encourage farmers to shift to more profitable crops.

The state shall empower the agricultural and fisheries sector to develop and sustain themselves.
Toward this end,the State shall unsure the development of the agriculture and fisheries sectors in
accordance with the following principles:

a) Poverty Alleviation and Social Equity. - The State shall ensure that the poorer sectors of
society have equitable access to resources, income opportunities, basic and support
services and infrastructure especially in areas where productivity is low as a means of
improving their quality of life compared with other sectors of society;

b) Food Security. - The State shall assure the availability, adequacy, accessibility of food
supplies to all at all times;

c) Rational Use of Resources. - The State shall adopt a rational approach in the allocation of
public investments in agriculture and fisheries in order to assure efficiency and effectiveness
in the use of scarce resources and thus obtain optimal returns on its investments;

d) Global Competitiveness. - The State shall enhance the competitiveness of the agriculture
and fisheries sectors in both domestic and foreign markets;

e) Sustainable Development. - The State shall promote development that is compatible with
the preservation of the ecosystem in areas where agriculture and fisheries activities are
 carried out. The State should exert care and judicious use of the country's natural resources
in order to attain long-term sustainability;

f) People Empowerment. - The State shall promote people empowerment by enabling all
citizens through direct participation or through their duly elected, chosen or designated
representatives the opportunity to participate in policy formulation and decision-making by
establishing the appropriate mechanisms and by giving them access to information; and

g) Protection from Unfair Competition. - The State shall protect small farmers and fisher folk
from unfair competition such as monopolistic and oligopolistic practices by promoting a policy
environment that provides them priority access to credit and strengthened cooperative-based
marketing system.

Section 3. Statement of Objectives. - This Act shall have the following objectives:

a) To modernize the agriculture and fisheries sectors by transforming these sectors from a
resource-based to a technology-based industry;

b) To enhance profits and incomes in the agriculture and fisheries sectors, particularly the
small farmers and fisherfolk, by ensuring equitable access to assets, resources and services,
and promoting higher-value crops, value-added processing, agribusiness activities, and
agro-industrialization;

c) To ensure the accessibility, availability and stable supply of food to all at all times;

d) To encourage horizontal and vertical integration, consolidation and expansion of

agriculture and fisheries activities, group functions and other services through the
organization of cooperatives, farmers' and fisherfolk's associations, corporations, nucleus
estates, and consolidated farms and to enable these entities to benefit from economies of
scale, afford them a stronger negotiating position, pursue more focused, efficient and
appropriate research and development efforts and enable them to hire professional
managers;

e) To promote people empowerment by strengthening people's organizations, cooperatives

and NGO's and by establishing and improving mechanisms and resources for their
participation in government decision-making and implementation;

f) To pursue a market-driven approach to enhance the comparative advantage of our

agriculture and fisheries sectors in the world market;

g) To induce the agriculture and fisheries sectors to ascend continuously the value-added
ladder by subjecting their traditional or new products to further processing in order to
minimize the marketing of raw, unfinished or unprocessed products;

h) To adopt policies that will promote industry dispersal and rural industrialization by
providing incentives to local and foreign investors to establish industries that have backward
linkages to the country's agriculture and fisheries resource base;

i) To provide social and economic adjustment measures that increase productivity and
improve market efficiency while ensuring the protection and preservation of the environment
and equity for small farmers and fisherfolk; and
 j) To improve the quality of life of all sectors.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. -

"Agrarian Reform Community" is a barangay at the minimum or a cluster of contiguous

barangays where there is a critical mass of farmers or farm workers and which features the
main thrust of agrarian development land tenure improvement and effective delivery of
support services.

"Agricultural Lands" refers to lands devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of trees, raising of livestock, poultry, fish or aquiculture production,
including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices
performed in conjunction with such farming operations by persons whether natural or
juridical and not classified by the law as mineral land, forest land, residential land,
commercial land, or industrial land.

"Agricultural Land Use Conversion" refers to the process of changing the use of agricultural
land to non-agricultural uses.

"Agricultural Sector" is the sector engaged in the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry, or fish, including the harvesting and
marketing off such farm products, and other farm activities and practices.

"Agricultural Mechanization" is the development, adoption, manufacture and application of

appropriate location-specific, and cost-effective agricultural technology using human, animal,
mechanical, electrical and other non-conventional sources of energy for agricultural
production and post-harvest operations consistent with agronomic conditions and for efficient
and economic farm management.

"Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization" is the process of transforming the agriculture and
fisheries sectors into one that is dynamic, technologically advanced and competitive yet
centered on human development guided by the sound practices of sustainability and the
principles of social justice.

"Agro-Processing Activities" refers to the processing of raw agricultural and fishery products
into semi-processed or finished products which include materials for the manufacture for
food and/or non-food products, pharmaceuticals and other industrial products.

"Banks" collective used, means government banks and private banks, rural banks and
cooperative banks.

"Basic Needs Approach to Development" involves the identification, production and

marketing of wage goods and services for consumption of rural communities.

"Communal Irrigation System (CIS)" is an irrigation system that is managed by a bona fide
Irrigators Association.

"Competitive Advantage" refers to competitive edge in terms of product quality and/or price.
It likewise refer to the ability to produce a product with the greatest relative efficiency in the
use of resources.
"Cooperatives" refers to duly registered associations of persons with a common bond of
interest who have voluntarily joined together to achieve a lawful common social and
economic end, making equitable contributions to the capital required and accepting a fair
share of the risks and benefits of the undertaking in accordance with universally accepted
cooperatives principles.

"Department" refers to the Department of Agriculture.

"Economic Scale " refers to the minimum quantity of volume of goods required to be

efficient.

"Economies of Scale" refers to the decrease in unit cost as more units are produced due to
the spreading out of fixed costs over a greater number of units produced.

"Empowerment" involves providing authority, responsibility and information to people directly

engaged in agriculture and fishery production, primarily at the level of the farmers, fisher folk
and those engaged in food and non-food production and processing, in order to give them
wider choices and enable them to take advantage of the benefits of the agriculture and
fishery industries.

"Extension Services" refers to the provision of training, information, and support services by
the government and non-government organizations to the agriculture and fisheries sectors to
improve the technical, business, and social capabilities of farmers and fisher folk.

"Farmer's and Fisherfolk's Organizations or Associations" refer to farmers and fisherfolks

cooperatives, associations or corporations duly registered with appropriate government
agencies and which are composed primarily of small agricultural producers, farmers, farm,
workers, agrarian reform beneficiaries, fisher folk who voluntarily join together to form
business enterprises or non-business organizations which they themselves own, control and
patronize.

"Farm-to-Market Roads" refer to roads linking the agriculture and fisheries production sites,
coastal landing points and post-harvest facilities to the market and arterial roads and
highways.

"Fisheries" refers to all systems or networks of interrelated activities which include the
production, growing, harvesting, processing, marketing, developing, conserving, and
managing of all aquatic resources and fisheries areas.

"Fisheries Sector" is the sector engaged in the production, growing, harvesting, processing,
marketing, developing, conserving, and managing of aquatic resources and fisheries areas.

"Fishing" refers to the application of techniques using various gear in catching fish and other
fisheries products.

"Fishing Grounds" refers to areas in any body of water where fish and other aquatic
resources congregate and become target of capture.

"Food Security" refers to the policy objective, plan and strategy of meeting the food
requirements of the present and future generations of Filipinos in substantial quantity,
ensuring the availability and affordability of food to all, either through local production or
importation, of both, based on the country's existing and potential resource endowment and
related production advantages, and consistent with the over all national development
objectives and policies. However, sufficiency in rice and white corn should be pursued.

"Fresh Agricultural And Fishery Products" refers to agricultural and fisheries products newly
taken or captured directly from its natural state or habitat, or those newly harvested or
gathered from agricultural areas or bodies of water used for aquiculture.

"Global Competitiveness" refers to the ability to compete in terms of price, quality and value
of agriculture and fishery products relative to those of other countries.

"Gross Value-Added" refers to the total value, excluding the value of non-agricultural of
fishery intermediate inputs, of goods and services contributed by the agricultural and
fisheries sectors.

"Head works" refers to the composite parts of the irrigation system that divert water from
natural bodies of water such as river, streams, and lakes.

"Industrial Dispersal" refers to the encouragement given to manufacturing enterprises to

establish their plants in rural areas. Such firms normally use agricultural raw materials either
in their primary or intermediate state.

"Irrigable Lands" refers to lands which display marked characteristics justifying the operation
of an irrigation system.

"Irrigated Lands" refers to lands services by natural irrigation or irrigation facilities. These
include lands where water is not readily available as existing irrigation facilities need
rehabilitation or upgrading or where irrigation water is not available year-round.

"Irrigation System" refers to a system of irrigation facilities covering contiguous areas.

"Irrigators' Association (IA)" refers to an association of farmers within a contiguous area

served by a National Irrigation System or Communal Irrigation System.

"Land Use" refers to the manner of utilizing the land, including its allocation, development
and management.

"Land Use Plan" refers to a document embodying a set of policies accompanied by maps
and similar illustrations which represent the community-deserved pattern of population
distribution and a proposal for the future allocation of land to the various land-using activities,
in accordance with the social and economic objectives of the people. It identifies the location,
character and extent of the area's land resources to be used for different purposes and
includes the process and the criteria employed in the determination of the land use.

"Land Use Planning" refers to the act of defining the allocation, utilization, development and
management of all lands within a given territory or jurisdiction according to the inherent
qualities of the land itself and supportive of sustainable, economic, demographic, socio-
cultural and environmental objectives as an aid to decision-making and legislation.

"Main Canal" refers to the channel where diverted water from a source flows to the intended
area to be irrigated.
"Market Infrastructure" refers to facilities including, but not limited to, market buildings,
slaughterhouses, holding pens, warehouses, market information centers, connecting roads,
transport and communication and cold storage used by the farmers and fisher folk in
marketing their produce.

"National Information Network (NIN)" refers to an information network which links all offices
and levels of the Department with various research institutions and local end-users, providing
easy access to information and marketing services related to agriculture and fisheries.

"National Irrigation System (NIS)" refers to a major irrigation system managed by the
National Irrigation Administration.

"Network of Protected Areas for Agricultural and Agro-industrial Development (NPAAD)"

refers to agricultural areas identified by the Department through the Bureau of Soils and
Water Management in coordination with the National Mapping and Resources Information
Authority in order to ensure the efficient utilization of land for agriculture and Agro-industrial
development and promote sustainable growth . The NPAAD covers all irrigated areas, all
irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects with firm funding commitments; all
alluvial plain land highly suitable for agriculture whether irrigated or not; Agro-industrial crop
lands or lands presently planted to industrial crops that support the viability of existing
agricultural infrastructure and agro-based enterprises, highlands, areas located at an
elevation of five hundred (500) meters or above and have the potential for growing semi
temperate and high-value crops; all agricultural lands that are ecological fragile, the
conversion of which will result in serious environmental degradation, and mangrove areas
and fish sanctuaries.

"On-Farm Irrigation Facilities" refers to composite facilities that permit entry of water to paddy
areas and consist of farm ditches and turnouts.

"Primary Processing" refers to the physical alteration of raw agricultural or fishery products
with or without the use of mechanical facilities.

"Post-Harvest Facilities" includes, but is not limited to , threshing, drying, milling, grading ,
storing, and handling of produce and such other activities as stripping, winnowing, chipping
and washing.

"Post -Harvest Facilities" includes, but it is not limited to, threshers, moisture meters, dryers,
weighing scales, milling equipment, fish ports, fish landings, ice plants and cold storage
facilities, processing plants, warehouses, buying stations, market infrastructure and
transportation.

"Premature Conversion of Agricultural Land" refers to the undertaking of any development

activity, the results of which modify or alter the physical characteristics of the agricultural
lands to render them suitable for non-agricultural purposes, without an approved order of
conversion from the DAR.

"Resource Accounting" refers to a tracking changes in the environment and natural

resources biophysically and economically (in monitory terms)

"Resource-based" refers to the utilization of natural resources.

"Rural Industrialization" refers to the process by which the economy is transformed from one
that is predominantly agricultural to one that is dominantly industrial and service-oriented.
Agriculture provides the impetus and push for industry and services through the market that
it creates, the labor that it absorbs, and the income that it generates which is channeled to
industry and services. As development continues, with agriculture still an important sector,
industry and services begin to generate income and markets and concomitantly increase
their share of total income.

"Strategic Agriculture and Fisheries Development Zones (SAFDZ)" refers to the areas within
the NAPAAD identified for production, Agro-Processing and marketing activities to help
develop and modernize, either the support of government, the agriculture and fisheries
sectors in an environmentally and socio-cultural sound manner.

"Secondary Canal" refers to the channel connected to the main canal which distributes
irrigation to specific areas.

"Secondary Processing" refers to the physical transformation of semi-processed agricultural

or fishery products.

"Shallow Tube Well (STW)" refers to a tube or shaft vertically set into the ground for the
purpose of bringing ground water to the soil surface from a depth of less than 20 meters by
suction lifting.

"Small Farmers and Fisherfolk" refers to natural person dependent on small-scale

subsistence farming and fishing activities as their primary source of income.

"Small and Medium Enterprise (SME)" refers to any business activity or enterprise engaged
in industry, agribusiness and/or services, whether single proprietorship, cooperative,
partnership or corporation whose total assets, inclusive of those arising from loans but
exclusive of the land on which the particular business entity's office, plan and equipment are
situated, must have value falling under the following categories:

Micro - not more than P 1,500,000

Small - P 1,500,001 to P 15,000,000

Medium - P15,000,001 to P 60,000,000

The Department, in consultation with the Congressional Oversight Committee on Agricultural

and Fisheries Modernization, may adjust the above values as deemed necessary.

"Socio-culturally Sound" means the consideration of the social structure of the community
such as leadership pattern, distribution of roles across gender and age groups, the diversity
of religion and other spiritual beliefs, ethnicity and cultural diversity of the population.

"Technology-based" refers to utilization of technology.

"Zoning Ordinance" refers to a local legislation approving the development land use plan and
providing for the regulations and other conditions on the uses of land including the limitation
of the infrastructure that may be placed within the territorial jurisdiction of a city or
municipality.
 TITLE I
PRODUCTION AND MARKETING SUPPORT SERVICES

Chapter 1
Strategic Agricultural and Fisheries Development Zones

Section 5. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to ensure that all sectors of the
economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop through the
rational and sustainable use of resources peculiar to each area in order to maximize agricultural
productivity, promote efficiency and equity and accelerate the modernization of the agriculture and
fisheries sectors of the country.

Section 6. Network of Areas for Agricultural and Agro-Industrial Development. - The

Department shall, within six (6) months after the approval of this Act, and in consultation wit the local
government units , appropriate government agencies, concerned non-government organizations
(NGOs)and organized farmers' and fisherfolk's groups, identify the strategic Agriculture and
Fisheries Development Zones (SAFDZ) within the network of protected areas for agricultural and
agro-industrial development to ensure that lands are efficiently and sustainably utilized for food and
non-food production and agro-industrialization.

The SAFDZ which shall serve as centers where development in the agriculture and fisheries sectors
are catalyzed in an environmentally and socio-cultural sound manner, shall be identified on the basis
of the following criteria

a. Agro-climatic and environmental conditions giving the area as competitive advantage in

the cultivation, culture, production and processing of particular crops, animals and aquatic
products;

b. Strategic location of the area for the establishment of agriculture or fisheries infrastructure,
industrial complexness, production and processing zones;

c. Strategic location and of the area for market development and market networking both at
the local and international levels; and

d. Dominant presence of agrarian reform communities (ARCs) and/or small owner-cultivators

and amortizing owners/agrarian reform beneficiaries and other small farmers and fisher folk
in the area.

The SAFDZ shall have an integrated development plan consisting of production, processing,
investment, marketing, human resources and environmental protection components.

Section 7. Modern Farms. - The Department in coordination with the local government units
(LGUs) and appropriate government agencies, may designate agrarian reform communities (ARCs)
and other areas within the SAFDZ suitable for economic scale production which will serve as model
farms.

Farmer-landowners whose lands are located within these designated areas shall be given the option
to enter into a management agreement with corporate entities with proven competence in farm
operations and management, high-end quality production and productivity through the use of up-to-
date technology and collateral resources such as skilled manpower, adequate capital and credit, and
access to markets, consistent with the existing laws.
Section 8. Mapping. - The Department, through the Bureau of Soils and Water Management
(BSWM), in coordination with the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA)
and the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) shall undertake the mapping of network
of areas for agricultural and agro-industrial development for all municipalities, cities and an
appropriate scale. The BSWM may call on other agencies to provide technical and other logistical
support in this undertaking .

Section 9. Delineation of Strategic Agriculture and Fisheries Development Zones. - The

Department, in consultation with the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Department of Trade and
Industry, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Science and
Technology, the concerned LGU's, the organized farmers and fisher folk groups, the private sector
and communities shall, without prejudice to the development of identified economic zones and free
ports, establish and delineate based on sound resource accounting, the SAFDZ within one (1) year
from the effectivity of this Act.

All irrigated lands, irrigable lands already covered by irrigation a projects with firm funding
commitments, and lands with existing or having the potential for growing high-value crops so
delineated and included within the SAFDZ shall not be converted for a period of five (5) years front
the effectivity for this Act: Provided, however,That not more than five percent (5%) of the said lands
located within the SAFDZ may be converted upon compliance with existing laws, rules, regulations,
executive order and issuances, and administrative orders relating to land use conversion: Provided,
further, That thereafter 1) a review of the SAFDZ, specifically of the productivity of the areas,
improvement of the quality of life of farmers and fisher folk, and efficiency and defectiveness of the
support services shall be conducted by the Department and the Department of Agrarian Reform, in
coordination with the Congressional Oversight Committee on Agricultural Committee and Fisheries
Modernization; 2) conversion may be allowed, if at all, on a case-to-case basis subject to existing
laws, rules, regulations, executive orders and issuances, and administrative orders governing land
use conversion; 3) in case of conversion, the land owners will pay the Department the amount
equivalent to the government's investment cost including inflation.

Section 10. Preparation of Land Use and Zoning Ordinance. - Within one (1) year from the
finalization of the SAFDZ, in every city and municipality, all cities and municipalities shall have
prepared their respective land use and zoning ordinance incorporating the SAFDZ, where
applicable. Thereafter, all land use plans and zoning ordinances shall be updated every four (4)
years or as often as may be deemed necessary upon the recommendation of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board and must be completed within the first year of the term of office of the mayor.
If the cities/municipalities fail to comply with the preparation of zoning and land use plans, the DILG
shall impose the penalty as provided for under Republic Act No.7160

Section 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature Conversion. - Any person or
juridical entity who knowingly or deliberately causes any irrigated agricultural lands seven (7)
hectares or larger, whether contiguous for not, within the protected areas for agricultural
development, as specified under Section 6 in relation to Section 9 of this Act, to lie idle and
unproductive for a period exceeding one (1) year, unless due to force majeure, shall be subject to an
idle land tax of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) per hectare per year. In addition, the violator,
shall be required to put back such lands to productive agricultural use. Should the continued
agricultural inactivity, unless due to force majeure, exceed a period of two (2) years, the land shall
be subject to escheat proceedings.

Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion shall be penalized with imprisonment of
two (2) to six (6) years, or a fine equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the government's
investment cost, or both, at the discretion of the court, and an accessory penalty of forfeiture of the
land and any improvement thereon.

In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after determining, in an administrative
proceedings, that violation of this law has been committed:

a. Consolation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use conversion; and

b. Backlisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent conversion applications

that they may file with the DAR.

Section 12. Protection of Watershed Areas. - All watersheds that are sources of water for existing
and potential irrigable areas and recharge areas of major aquifers identified by the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural resources shall be preserves as such at
all times.

Chapter 2
Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Plan

Section 13. Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Plan (AFMP). - The Department, in

consultation with the farmers and fisher folk, the private sector, NGOs, people's organizations and
the appropriate government agencies and offices, shall formulate and implement a medium- and
long-term comprehensive Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Plan.

The Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Plan shall focus on five (5) major concerns:

a. Food security;

b. Poverty alleviation and social equity;

c. Income enhancement and profitability, especially for farmers and fisher folk;

d. Global competitiveness; and

e. Sustainability.

Section 14. Food Security , Poverty Alleviation, Social Equity and Income Enhancement. - The
Department, in coordination with other concerned departments or agencies, shall formulate medium-
and long-term plans addressing food security, poverty alleviation, social equity and income
enhancement concerns based on, but not limited to, the following goals and indicators for
development:

a. Increased income and profit of small farmers and fisherfolk;

b. Availability of rice and other staple foods at affordable process;

c. Reduction of rural poverty and income inequality;

d. Reduction of the incidence of malnutrition;

 e. Reduction of rural unemployment and underemployment; and

f. Improvement in land tenure of small farmers.

Section 15. Global Competitiveness and Sustainability. - The Department shall formulate

medium-and-long-term plans aimed at enhancing the global competitiveness and sustainability of
the country in agriculture and fisheries based on, but not limited to, the following goals and indicators
for development:

a. Increase in the volume, quality and value of agriculture and fisheries production for
domestic consumption and for exports;

b. Reduction in post-harvest losses;

c. Increase in the number/types and quality of processed agricultural and fishery products;

d. Increase in the number of international trading partners in agriculture and fishery products;

e. Increase in the number of sustainable agriculture and fisheries firms engaged in domestic
production, processing, marketing and export activities;

f. Increase in and wider level of entrepreneurship among farmers and fisher folk in the area;

g. Increase in the number of farms engaged in diversified farming; and

h. Reduced use of agro-chemicals that are harmful to health and the environment.

Section 16. Global Climate Change. - The Department, in coordination with the Philippine
Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Service Administration (P. A. G. A. S. A.) and such
other appropriate government agencies, shall devise a method of regularly monitoring and
considering the effect of global climate changes, weather disturbances, and annual productivity
cycles for the purpose of forecasting and formulating agriculture and fisheries production programs.

Section 17. Special Concerns. - The Department shall consider the following areas of concerns,
among other in formulating the AFMP:

a. Strategies and programs aimed to achieve growth and profitability targets in the context of
the constraints and challenges of the World Trade Organization (WTO);

b. Programs arising from the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program;

c. Identification of SAFDZ;

d. Infrastructure and market support for the SAFDZ;

e. Infrastructure support to make agriculture and fisheries production inputs, information and
technology readily available to farmers, fisherfolk, cooperatives and entrepreneurs;

f. Credit programs for small farmers and fisher folk, and agricultural graduates;
 g. Comprehensive and integrated agriculture and fisheries research, development and
extension services;

h. Preservation of biodiversity, genetic materials and the environment;

i. Adequate and timely response against environmental threats to agriculture and fisheries;

j. Rural non-farm employment;

k. Access to aquatic resources by fisher folk;

l. Basic needs program for the impoverished sectors of society who will be affected by
liberalization;

m. Indigenous peoples;

n. Rural youth;

o. Women;

p. Handicapped persons; and

q. Senior citizens.

Section 18. Monitoring and Evaluation. - The Department shall develop the capability of
monitoring the AFMP through a Program Benefit Monitoring and Evaluation System (PBMES). In
addition, it can secure the services of independent consultants and external evaluators in order to
assess its over-all impact. The Department shall make periodic reports to the Congressional
Oversight Committee on Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization.

Section 19. Role of Other Agencies. - All units and agencies of the government shall support the
Department in the implementation of the AFMP.

In particular, the Department of Public Works and Highways shall coordinate with the Department
with respect to the infrastructure support aspect of the plan order to accomplish networking of
related infrastructure facilities.

The Department of Interior and Local Government shall provide assistance to the Department in
mobilizing resources under the control of local government units.

The Department of Trade and Industry, Agrarian Reform, Science and Technology, and Environment
and Natural Resources shall coordinate their investment programs and activities to complement the
Department's implementation of the AFMP.

The Department of Education, Culture and Sports, the Technical Educational and Skills
Development Authority, the Department of Health with the Department of Social Services and
Development shall coordinate with the Department to determine the financial requirements of small
farmers and fisherfolk to adjust to the effects of modernization as envisioned in the Agriculture and
Fisheries Modernization Plan.
The departments referred above shall be required to identify in their budget proposals the allocation
intended for the improvement of the environmental and other conditions affecting agriculture and
fisheries.

Congressional initiatives shall also be coordinated by the Committees on Agriculture on both Houses
to complement and enhance the programs and activities of the Department in the implementation of
the AFMP.

Chapter 3
Credit

Section 20. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to alleviate poverty
and promote vigorous growth in the countryside through access to credit by small farmers, fisher
folk, particularly the women involved in the production, processing and trading of agriculture and
fisheries products and the small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) and industries engaged in
agriculture and fisheries.

Interest rates shall be determined by market forces, provided that existing credit arrangements with
agrarian reform beneficiaries are not affected. Emphasis of the program shall be on proper
management and utilization.

In this regard, the State enjoins the active participation of the banking sector and government
financial institutions in the rural financial system.

Section 21. Phase-out of the Directed Credit Programs (DCPs) and Provision for the Agro-
Industry Modernization Credit and Financing Program (AMCPP). - The Department shall
implement existing DCPs; however, the Department shall, within a period of four (4) years from the
effectivity of this Act, phase-out all DCPs and deposit all its loanable funds including those under the
Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF) including new funds provided by this Act for the
AMCFP and transfer the management thereof to cooperative banks , rural banks, government
financial institutions and viable NGOs for the Agro-Industry Modernization Credit Financing Program
(AMCFP). Interest earnings of the said deposited loan funds shall be reverted to the AMCFP.

Section 22. Coverage. - An agriculture, fisheries and agrarian reform credit and financing system
shall be designed for the use and benefit of farmers, fisher folk those engaged in food and non-food
production, processing and trading, cooperatives, farmers'/fisherfolk's organization, and SMEs
engaged in agriculture hereinafter referred to in this chapter as the "beneficiaries"

Section 23. Scope of the Agro-Industry Modernization Credit and Financing Program

(AMCFP).. - The Agro-Industry Modernization Credit and Financing Program shall include the
packaging and delivery of various credit assistance programs for the following:

a. Agriculture and fisheries production including possessing of fisheries and agri-based

products and farm inputs;

b. Acquisition of work animals, farm and fishery equipment and machinery;

c. Acquisition of seeds, fertilizer, poultry, livestock, feeds and other similar items;

d. Procurement of agriculture and fisheries products for storage, trading , processing and
distribution;
 e. Acquisition of water pumps and installation of tube wells for irrigation;

f. Construction , acquisition and repair of facilities for production, processing , storage,

transportation, communication, marketing and such other facilities in support of agriculture
and fisheries;

g. Working capital for agriculture and fisheries graduates to enable them to engage in
agriculture and fisheries related economic activities;

h. Agribusiness activities which support soil and water conservation and ecology-enhancing
activities;

i. Privately-funded and LGU-funded irrigation systems that are designed to protect the
watershed;

j. Working capital for long-gestating projects; and

k. Credit guarantees on uncollaterized loans to farmers and fisherfolks.

Section 24. Review of the mandates of Land Bank of the Philippines Crop Insurance Corporation,
Guarantee Fund For Small and Medium Enterprises, Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee
Corporation, Agricultural Credit Policy Council. - The Department of Finance shall commission and
independent review of the charters and the respective programs of the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP), Philippine Crop Insurance Corporation (PCIC), Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium
Enterprises (GFSME), Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation (Quendancor), and
Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC), and recommend policy changes and other measures to
induce the private sectors participation in lending to agriculture and to improve credit access by
farmers and fisherfolk: Provided, That agriculture and fisheries projects with long gestation period
shall be entitled to a longer grace period in repaying the loan based on the economic life of the
project.

The Land Bank of the Philippines, shall, in accordance with its original mandate, focus primarily on
plans and programs in relation to the financing of agrarian reform and the delivery of credit services
to the agriculture and fisheries sectors, especially to small farmers and fisherfolk.

The review shall start six (6) months after the enactment of this Act. Thereafter, the review shall
make recommendations to the appropriate Congressional Committees for possible legislative
actions and to the Executive Branch for policy and program changes within six (6) months after
submission.

Section 25. Rationalization of Credit Guarantee Schemes and Funds. - All existing credit
guarantee schemes and funds applicable to the agriculture and fishery sectors shall be rationalized
and consolidated into an Agriculture and Fisheries Credit Guarantee Fund. The rationalization shall
cover the credit guarantee schemes and funds operated by the Quendancor, the GFSME and the
Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund. The Agriculture and Fisheries Credit Guarantee Fund shall
be managed and implemented by the Quendancor Provided, That representation to the Quendancor
Board shall be granted to cooperatives, local government units and rural financial institutions;
Provided, further, That credit guarantee shall be given only to small-scale agriculture and fisheries
activities and to countryside micro-small, and medium enterprises. It may also cover loan guarantees
for purchase orders and sales contracts.
The Agriculture and Fisheries Credit Guarantee Fund shall be funded by at least ten percent (10%)
of the funding allocation for the AMCFP.

Chapter 4
Irrigation

Section 26. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to use its natural resources
rationally and equitably. The state shall prevent the further destruction of watersheds, rehabilitate
existing irrigation systems and promote the development of irrigation systems that are effective,
affordable, appropriate, and efficient.

In the choice of location-specific irrigation projects, the economic principle of comparative advantage
shall always be adhered to.

Section 27. Research and Development. - Irrigation Research and Development (R&D) shall be
pursued and priority shall be given to the development of effective, appropriate , and efficient
irrigation and water management technologies.

The Department shall coordinate with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
concerning the preservation and rehabilitation of watersheds to support the irrigation systems.

Section 28. Criteria for Selection of Irrigation Development Scheme. - The Selection of

appropriate scheme of irrigation development shall be location-specific and based on the following
criteria:

a. Technical feasibility;

b. Cost-effectiveness;

c. Affordability, low investment cost per unit area;

d. Sustainability and simplicity of operation;

e. Recovery of operation and maintenance cost;

f. Efficiency in water use;

g. Length of gestation period; and

h. Potential for increasing unit area productivity.

All irrigation projects shall, in addition to the criteria enumerated above, be subjected to a social
cost-benefit analysis.

Section 29. Simplified Public Bidding. - The construction, repair, rehabilitation, improvement, or

maintenance of irrigation projects and facilities shall follow the Commission on Audit (COA) rules on
simplified public bidding.
Irrigation projects undertaken by farmers, farmer's organizations and other private entities whose
funding is partly or wholly acquired by way of loan from government financial institutions shall not be
subject to the bidding requirements of the government.

Section 30. National Irrigation Systems (NIS). - The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) shall
continue to plan, design, develop, rehabilitate, and improve the NISs. It shall continue to maintain
and operate the major irrigation structures including the head works and main canals.

In addition, the NIA is mandated to gradually turn over operation and maintenance of the National
Irrigation System's secondary canals and on-farm facilities to Irrigators' Associations

Section 31. Communal Irrigation Systems (CIS). - The Department shall, within five (5) years from
the effectivity of this Act, devolve the planning, design and management of CISs, including the
transfer of NIA's assets and resources in relation to the CIS, to the LGUs. The budget for the
development, construction, operation and maintenance of the CIS and other types of irrigation
systems shall be prepared by and coursed through the LGUs. The NIA shall continue to provide
technical assistance to the LGUs even after complete devolution of the Irrigation Systems to the
LGUs, as may be deemed necessary.

Section 32. Minor Irrigation Schemes. - The Department shall formulate and develop a plan for
the promotion of a private sector-led development of minor irrigation systems, such as Shallow Tube
Wells (STWs), Low-Lift pumps (LLPs) and other inundation systems. the plan shall be included in
the Short-term Agriculture and fisheries Modernization Plan.

Section 33. Other Irrigation Construction Schemes. - The Government shall also encourage the
construction of irrigation facilities through other viable schemes for the construction of irrigation such
as build-operate-transfer, build-transfer and other schemes that will fast-track the development of
irrigation systems.

Section 34. Guarantee of the National Government. - To make build-operate-transfer (BOT)

projects for irrigation attractive to proponents, the national government shall issue the need payment
guarantee for BOT projects which shall answer for default of the National Irrigation Administration.
Such amounts needed to answer for the payment guarantee is hereby to be appropriated.

Section 35. Irrigation Service Fees (ISF). - Upon effectivity of this Act, the NIA shall immediately
review the ISF rates and recommend to the Department reasonable rates within six (6) months from
the effectivity of this Act.

Section 36. Monitoring and Evaluation. - The Department shall monitor the implementation of
R&D programs and irrigation projects. The Department shall review all existing irrigation systems
every four (4) years, to determine their viability or ineffectiveness. The Department shall employ the
services of independent evaluators to assess the overall impact of the country's irrigation
development .

Section 37. Exemption from Election Ban. - The repair, maintenance and rehabilitation of
irrigation facilities as well as BOT irrigation projects shall be exempted from the scope of the election
ban on public works.

Chapter 5
Information and Marketing Support Service
Section 38. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to empower Filipino
farmers and fisherfolk, particularly the women, involved in agriculture and fisheries through the
provision of timely, accurate and responsive business information and efficient trading services
which will link them to profitable markets for their products. They shall likewise be given innovative
support toward the generation of maximum income through assistance in marketing.

Section 39. Coverage. - A market information system shall be installed for the use and benefit of,
but not limited to, the farmers and fisher folk, cooperatives, traders, processors, the LGUs and the
Department.

Section 40. The Marketing Assistance System. - The Department shall establish a National
Marketing Assistance Program that will immediately lead to the creation of a national marketing
umbrella in order to ensure the generation of the highest possible income for the farmers and fisher
folk or groups of farmers and fisher folk, matching supply and demand in both domestic and foreign
markets.

Section 41. National Information Network. - A National Information Network (NIN) shall be set up
from the Department level down to the regional, provincial and municipal offices within one (1) year
from the approval of this Act taking into account existing information networks and seems.

The NIN shall likewise link the various research institutions for easy access to data on agriculture
and fisheries research and technology. All departments, agencies, bureaus, research institutions,
and local government units shall consolidate and continuously update all relevant information and
data on a periodic basis and make such data available on the Internet.

Section 42. Information and Marketing Service. - The NIN shall provide information and
marketing services related to agriculture an fisheries which shall include the following:

a. Supply data;

b. Demand data

c. Price and Price trends;

d. Product standards for both fresh and processed agricultural and fisheries projects;

e. Directory of, but not limited to cooperatives, traders, key market centers, processors and
business institutions concerned with agriculture and fisheries at the provincial and municipal
levels;

f. Research information and technology generated from research institutions involved in

agriculture and fisheries;

g. International, regional and local market forecasts; and

h. Resource accounting data.

Section 43. Initial Set-up. - The Department shall provide technical assistance in setting -up the
NIN at the local level through the cooperatives and the LGUs Provided , That , at the local level, a
system that will make marketing information and services related to agriculture and fisheries will be
readily available in the city/municipal public market for the benefit of the producers, traders and
consumers.

Section 44. Role of Government Agencies. - The Bureau of Agricultural Statistics will serve as the
central information server and will provide technical assistance to end-users in accessing and
analyzing product and market information and technology.

The Department of Transportation and Communications shall provide technical and infrastructure
assistance to the Department in setting up the NIN.

LGUs shall coordinate with the Department for technical assistance in order to accelerate the
establishment and training of information end-users in their respective jurisdictions.

The Cooperative Development Authority shall coordinate with the Department for technical
assistance in order to provide training assistance to cooperatives in the use of market information
and technology.

Section 45. Role of Private Sector. - The NIN shall likewise be accessible to the private sector
engaged in agriculture and fisheries enterprises. The Department shall formulate guidelines and
determine fees for private sector entities that use the NIN.

Chapter 6
Other Infrastructure

Section 46. Agriculture and Fisheries Infrastructure Support Services. - The Department of

Public Works and Highways , the Department of Transportation and Communications, the
Department of Trade and Industry and the LGUs shall coordinate with the Department to address
the infrastructure requirements in accordance with this Act Provided, that The Department and the
LGU shall also strengthen its agricultural engineering support in carrying out the smooth and
expeditious implementation of agricultural infrastructure projects.

Section 47. Criteria for Prioritization. - The prioritization of government resources for rural
infrastructure shall be based on the following criteria:

a. Agro-industrial potential of the area;

b. Socio-economic contributions of the investments in the area;

c. Absence of public investments in the area; and

d. Presence of agrarian reform beneficiaries and other small farmers and fisher folk in the
area.

Section 48. Public Infrastructure Facilities. - Public Infrastructure investments shall give

preference to the kind , type and model of infrastructure facilities that are cost-effective and will be
useful for the production, conservation, and distribution of most commodities and should benefit the
most number of agriculture and fisheries producers and processors.

Section 49. Private Infrastructure Facilities. - For infrastructure facilities primarily benefiting

private investors, the State shall facilitate the purchase and use of such utilities and shall keep to the
minimum the bureaucratic requirements for these types of investments. Private investors include
cooperatives or corporations of agriculture and fisheries producers and processors.

Section 50. Public Works Act. - The Department of Public Works and Highways shall coordinate
with the Department for the purpose of determining the order of priorities for public works funded
under the Public Works Act directly or indirectly affect agriculture and fisheries.

Section 51. Fishports, Seaports and Airports. - The Department of Transportation and

Communications, Philippine Ports Authority and Philippine Fisheries Development Authority shall
coordinate with the Department for the purpose of determining priority fishports, seaports and
airports and facilitating the installation of bulk-handling and storage facilities , and other post-harvest
facilities needed to enhance the marketing of agriculture and fisheries products Provided, that
fishports , seaports an airports are also equipped with quarantine , sanitary and phytosanitary
centers. The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) shall have the mandate to
cancel arrastre and cargo handling franchises among operators whom it deems inefficient and/or
ineffective owing, but not limited to, a past history of under-capitalization, lack of equipment and lack
of professional expertise. The DOTC shall recommend to the Philippine Ports Authority and consult
with ship-owners and ship-operators in assessing the cargo-handling capabilities of cargo operators
prior to extending new franchises or awards.

Section 52. Farm-to-Market Roads. - The Department shall coordinate with the LGUs and the
resident-farmers and fisher folk in order to identify priority locations of farm-to -market roads that
take into account the number of farmer and fisher folk and their families who shall benefit therefrom
and the amount , kind and importance of agricultural and fisheries products produced in the area.

Construction of farm-to-market roads shall be a priority investment of the LGUs which shall provide a
counterpart of not less than ten percent (10%) of the project cost subject to their IRA in the area.

Section 53. Rural Energy. - The Department shall coordinate with the Department of Energy
(DOE), the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the National Electrification
Administration (NEA) and the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for the identification and
installation of appropriate types of energy sources particularly in the use of non-conventional energy
sources for the locality in order to enhance agriculture and fisheries development in the area.

Section 54. Communications Infrastructure. - The Department shall coordinate with the DOTC to
facilitate the installation of telecommunication facilities in priority areas, in order to enhance
agriculture and fisheries development .

Section 55. Water Supply System. - The Department shall coordinate with the DPWH and the
LGUs for the identification and installation of water supply system in the locality for agro-industrial
uses to enhance agriculture and fisheries development in the area.

Section 56. Research and Technology Infrastructure. - The Department in coordination with

other government agencies shall give priority and facilitate the funding of infrastructure necessary for
research ventures such as farm laboratories and demonstration farms with state colleges and
universities that derive their core funds from the Department .

Section 57. Post-Harvest Facilities. - The Department shall coordinate with the Bureau of Post-
Harvest for Research and Extension and the Post-harvest Horticulture, Training and Research
Center of the University of the Philippines, Los Baños, to identify appropriate post-harvest facilities
and technology needed to enhance agriculture and fisheries development in the area.
Section 58. Public Market and Abattoirs. - The Department shall encourage the LGUs to turn over
the management and supervision of public markets and abattoirs to market vendors' cooperatives
and for that purpose, the appropriation for post-harvest facilities shall include the support for market
vendor' facilities.

The Department shall coordinate with the LGUs in the establishment of standardized market
systems and use of sanitary market , facilities , and abattoirs, intended to ensure the food safety and
quality.

All markets shall have a sanitation unit, proper and adequate drainage and sewerage system, ample
water supply, public toilets with lavatories, garbage receptacles, ice plants and cold storage,
adequate lighting and ventilation and supply of electricity to ensure cleanliness and sanitation. Price
monitoring bulletin boards for selected commodities and weighing scales accessible to the public
shall also be established.

Proper protection and preservation of agriculture and fisheries products being sold in the market
shall also be observed. All foods which require no further cooking shall be wrapped , covered , or
enclosed in containers to preserve the freshness and prevent contamination. Selling of products on
market floors shall be prohibited.

Section 59. Agricultural Machinery. - The Department shall give priority to the development and
promotion of appropriate agricultural machinery and other agricultural mechanization technologies to
enhance agricultural mechanization in the countryside.

Chapter 7
Products Standardization and Consumer Safety

Section 60. Declaration of Policy. - It is the policy of the State that all sectors involved in the
production, processing, distribution and marketing of food and non-food agricultural and fisheries
products shall adhere to, and implement the use of product standards in order to ensure consumer
safety and promote the competitiveness of agriculture and fisheries products.

Section 61. Bureau of Agriculture and Fisheries Product Standards. - The Department, within
six (6) months after the approval of this act, and in consultation with the Department of Trade and
Industry and the Bureau of Food and Drug, shall establish the Bureau of Agriculture and Fisheries
Product Standards (BAFPS).

Section 62. Coverage. - The BAFPS shall set and implement standards for fresh, primary-and
-secondary-processed agricultural and fishery products.

Section 63. Powers and Functions. - The BAFPS shall have the following powers and functions:

a. Formulate and enforce standards of quality in the processing, preservation, packaging,

labeling, importation, exportation, distribution, and advertising of agricultural and fisheries
products;

b. Conduct research on product standardization, alignment of the local standards with the
international standards; and

c. Conduct regular inspection of processing plants, storage facilities, abattoirs, as well as

public and private markets in order to ensure freshness, safety and quality of products.
Section 64. Pool of Experts and Advisers. - The BAFPS may coordinate, seek the services of,
and consult with both private and governmental agencies, research institute, educational
establishments and such other individuals and entities with expertise in the field of product standards
and consumer safety.

The Department of Trade and Industry, the Food and Nutrition Research Institute, and the Bureau of
Food and Drug Administration shall provide technical advice and form part of the pool of
experts/advisers of the BAFPS.

TITLE 2
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT

Section 65. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to give priority to
education and training on science and technology in order to accelerate social progress and promote
total human liberation and development.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment, based on sound agriculture and
fisheries development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of
human and natural resources.

Section 66. National Agriculture and Fisheries Education System (NAFES). - The Commission
on Higher Education (CHED), in coordination with the Department and appropriate government
agencies, shall establish a National Agriculture and Fisheries Education System (NAFES) which
shall have the following objectives:

a. To establish, maintain and support a complete and integrated system of agriculture and
fisheries education relevant to the needs of the economy, the community and society.

b. To modernize and rationalize agriculture and fisheries education from the elementary to
the tertiary levels;

c. To unify, coordinate and improve the system of implementation of academic programs that
are geared toward achieving agriculture and fisheries development in the country; and

d. To upgrade the quality , ensure sustainability and promote the global competitiveness, at
all levels, of agriculture and fisheries education.

Section 67. Education Program for Elementary and Secondary Levels. - There is hereby
established an Agriculture and Fisheries Education Program, under the NAFES specially designed
for elementary and secondary levels. The program shall be formulated, organized and implemented
by the DECS with the following objectives:

a. to develop appropriate values that form the foundation for sustained growth in agriculture
and fisheries modernization.

b. to increase the attractiveness of agriculture and fisheries education, so that more young
and talented person will look at agriculture and fisheries as an acceptable option for career
and livelihood;

c. to promote appreciation of science in agriculture and fisheries development;

 d. to develop among students, positive attitudes towards entrepreneurship and global
competition in the agriculture and fisheries business;

e. to improve the present curriculum in the elementary and secondary levels by emphasizing
the core values necessary for agriculture and fisheries modernization; and

f. to develop an outreach program where students, parents and schools become instruments
in effecting positive changes in the pupil's home and community.

Section 68. Post-Secondary Education Program. - There is hereby established a Post-Secondary

Education Program for Agriculture and Fisheries under the NAFES, which shall be formulated and
developed by TESDA in coordination with the appropriate government agencies and the private
sector. The program shall include, among others, the following:

a. a mechanism for a flexible process of curriculum development;

b. integration of the dual training system in the various agricultural curricula and training
programs;

c. integration of entrepreneurship and global competitiveness in the agro-fisheries curricula;

d. institutionalizing agriculture and fisheries skills standards and technical testing and
certification;

e. regular upgrading of learning/training facilities, school buildings , laboratory equipment;

and

f. development of a system for the strict enforcement of school regulations regarding

standards and requirements.

Section 69. Network of National Centers of Excellence for Territory Education. - There is

hereby established a Network of National Centers of Excellence in Agriculture and Fisheries
Education, composed of qualified public and private colleges and universities, duly accredited as
National Centers of Excellence (NCE) in the field of agriculture and fisheries.

For this purpose, the CHED shall formulate and implement a system of accreditation Provided, That
not more than one provincial institute in every province and no more than one national university in
each field in every region shall be accredited as such and Provided, further, That the system shall be
based on the following criteria:

a. institutional accessibility, population, economic contribution of agriculture and fisheries in

the community, and the needs or unique requirements of the area

b. quantity and quality of research studies conducted;

c. degree of utilization of research results;

d. quantity and quality of faculty members;

e. type of facilities;
 f. linkage with international organizations; and

g. potential contribution to agriculture and fisheries development in the target area.

Section 70. Rationalization Plan. - For the purpose of upgrading and maintaining a high decree of
academic excellence in the fields of agriculture and fisheries, all existing public and private colleges
and universities that are not hereinafter designated and accredited as centers of excellence shall be
given adequate time to redirect its program to non-agriculture and/or non-fisheries areas needed by
the province or region and/or merge their program with accredited NCEs in accordance with the
Rationalization Plan to be jointly formulated by CHED and the Philippine Association of State
Universities and Colleges (PASUC) upon consultation with the institution concerned.

The Rationalization Plan shall include a policy for the effective utilization of affected personnel and
facilities, and shall not be construed as to result in the decrease of the budget allocation for the state
universities and colleges concerned.

Section 71. Counterpart Funding from LGUs. - The LGUs shall, within two, (2) years from the
effectivity of this Act, provide at least ten percent (10%) of the Maintenance and Other Operating
Expenses (MOOE) budget for the operation of the provincial institutes within their area of
responsibility.

In consultation with the LGUs, the CHED shall develop a provincial-national partnership scheme for
a reasonable sharing of financial support taking into account social equity factors for poor provinces.

Section 72. National Integrated Human Resource Development Plan in Agriculture and

Fisheries. - The CHED, in coordination with the Department and appropriate government agencies,
shall formulate, develop and implement an integrated human resource development plan in
agriculture and fisheries which shall serve as an instrument that will provide over-all direction in
setting priorities in curricular programs, enrollment, performance targets, and investment programs.

Section 73. Output-Oriented Performance Standards. - In order to ensure the institutional

accountability, efficiency, and quality, there shall be formulated and developed an Output-Oriented
Performance Standards which shall serve as the primary instrument for institutional evaluation.

For this purpose, all public and private universities and colleges, that are designated as centers of
excellence, shall cause to be installed a computerized monitoring and evaluation system that
periodically collects and regularly measures variables indicating institutional performance based on
the Output-Oriented Performance Standards.

Section 74. Evaluation System. - Not later than one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, the
CHED shall establish a baseline information using the Output-Oriented Performance Standards
referred to in Section 73 of this Title. Once every five (5) years thereafter, all designated NCEs in
agriculture and fisheries shall be subject to a third party evaluation.

The evaluation shall include, among others, management and educational experts of national stature
and representatives of key sectors of the agriculture and fisheries industries, as well as
representatives of the Department, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the
Department of Science and Technology, and the National Economic and Development Authority.
Section 75. Agriculture and Fisheries Board. - There shall be created an Agriculture and
Fisheries Board in the Professional Regulation Commission to upgrade the Agriculture and Fisheries
profession.

Those who have not passed the Civil Service Examination for Fisheries and Agriculture but have
served the industry in either private or public capacity for not less than five (5) years shall be
automatically granted eligibility by the Board of Examiners.

The first board of examination for B.S. Fisheries and/or Agriculture Graduates shall be conducted
within one (1) year from the approval of this Act.

Section 76. Continuing Agriculture and Fisheries Education Program. - The Commission on

Higher Education, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and Technical Education and
Skills Development Authority, in coordination with the Department and the public and private
universities and colleges, shall formulate and develop a National and Integrated Continuing
Agriculture and Fisheries Education Program, which shall address the current education and training
requirements of teachers, professors and educators in agriculture and fisheries.

For this purpose, pre-service and in-service training of teachers in Home Economics Livelihood
Education (HELE) for the primary level and Technology and Home Economics (THE) for the
Secondary level, shall be upgraded.

Section 77. Scholarship Program. - The CHED in coordination with the public and private
universities and colleges, TESDA and the DBM, shall develop a national scholarship program that
provides opportunities for deserving academic staff to pursue advanced degrees in agriculture and
fisheries. Where appropriate, such scholarship program shall also provide opportunities for graduate
work in foreign universities.

Section 78. Merit System. - To promote the development of scientific excellence and academic
scholarship, the public and private universities and colleges, in cooperation with the CHED and the
DBM, shall institute an output- oriented unified system of promotion for the academic personnel.

Section 79. Budgetary Allocation Scheme. - The Budgetary Allocation Scheme for NAFES shall
be as follows:

a. The current appropriation or budgets of state universities and colleges, that are herein
designate as NCEs, shall continue and shall be modified and adjusted in succeeding years
in order to meet the standards of the rationalized programs of the institutions as approved by
Congress and shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act;

b. NCEs that are created under this Act shall likewise be provided with budgetary support
based on their programs and a new staffing pattern as approved by DBM and shall be
included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

TITLE 3
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND EXTENSION

Chapter 1
Research and Development
Section 80. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to promote science
and technology as essential for national development and progress.

The State shall likewise give priority to research and development, invention, innovation, and their
utilization and to science and technology education, training, and services. In addition to appropriate
and relevant technology, the state shall support indigenous and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, and their application to the country's productive system and national life.

Section 81. The National Research and Development System in Agriculture and Fisheries. -
The Department, in coordination with the Department of Science and Technology and other
appropriate agencies and research institutions shall enhance, support and consolidate the existing
National Research and Development System in Agriculture and Fisheries within six (6) months from
the approval of this Act. Provided, That fisheries research and development shall be pursued
separately, from but in close coordination with that of agriculture.

Section 82. Special Concerns in Agriculture and Fisheries Research Services. - Agriculture and
Fisheries Research and Development activities shall be multidisciplinary and shall involve farmers,
fisherfolk and their organizations, and those engaged in food and non-food production and
processing including the private and public sectors.

Research institutions and centers shall enjoy autonomy and academic freedom. The Department, in
collaboration with the Department of Science and Technology and other appropriate agencies, shall
harmonize its merit and output-oriented promotion system governing the scientific community in
order to promote increased research excellence and productivity and provide the government
research system a competitive edge in retaining its scientific personnel.

Appropriate technology shall be used to protect the environment, reduce cost of production , improve
product quality and increase value added for global competitiveness.

Section 83. Funds for Research and Development. - Considering the nature of research,
development and extension activities, funding shall be based on the following guidelines:

a. Allocation of multi-year budgets which shall be treated as research and development

grants.

b. The budget for agriculture and fisheries research and development shall be at least one
percent (1%) of the gross value added (GVA) by year 2001 allocating at least one percent
(1%) of the total amount by 1999. The Department of Finance (DOF) in consultation with the
Department shall formulate revenue enhancement measures to fund this facility.

c. At least twenty percent (20%) shall be spent in support of basic research and not more
than eighty percent (80%) shall be used for applied research and technology packaging and
transfer activities.

d. A science fund shall be established from which the scientific community in agriculture and
fisheries shall draw its financial resource for sustained career development, Provide, That
only the interest earnings of the funds shall be used.

The Department and other research agencies, in the national interest, are encouraged to go into co-
financing agreements with the private sector in the conduct of research and development provided
that the terms and conditions of the agreement are beneficial to the country.
Section 84. Excellence and Accountability in Research and Development. - The Department, in
collaboration with the Department of Science and Technology and other appropriate government
agencies, shall formulate the national guidelines in evaluating research and development activities
and institutions, which shall involve an independent and interdisciplinary team of collegial reviewer
and evaluators.

Section 85. Communication of Research Results and Research-Extension Linkage. - Research

information and technology shall be communicated through the National Information Network (NIN)

All government agencies including the state colleges and universities and private educational
institutions selected as NCEs shall be computerized , networked , provided with regular updated
information and shall likewise provide, through the NIN results of research and development
activities and current available technology relating agriculture and fisheries.

Chapter 2
Extension Services

Section 86. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to promote science
and technology as essential for national development and progress. The State shall give priority for
the utilization of research results through formal and non-formal education, extension, and training
services. It shall support the development of a national extension system that will help accelerate the
transformation of Philippine agriculture and fisheries from a resource -based to a technology-based
industry.

Section 87. Extension Services. - Agriculture and Fisheries extension services shall cover the
following major services to the farming and fishing community:

a. Training services;

b. Farm or business advisory services;

c. Demonstration services; and

d. Information and communication support services through trimedia.

Section 88. Special Concerns in the Delivery of Extension services. - The delivery of agriculture
and Fisheries Extension Services shall be multidisciplinary and shall involve the farmers, fisherfolk,
and their organizations and those engaged in food and non-food production and processing,
including the private and public sectors.

There shall be a national merit and promotion system governing all extension personnel, regardless
of source of funding, to promote professionalism and achieve excellence and productivity in the
provision of the government extension services.

Section 89. The National Extension System for Agriculture and Fisheries (NESAF). - The
Department in coordination with the appropriate government agencies, shall formulate a National
Extension System for Agriculture and Fisheries.

The National Extension System for Agriculture and Fisheries shall be composed of three (3)
subsystems:
 a. the national government subsystem which directly complements;

b. The local government subsystems; and

c. the private sector subsystem.

Section 90. The Role of Local Government Units. - The LGUs shall be responsible for delivering
direct agriculture and fisheries extension services.

The provincial governments shall integrate the operations for the agriculture extension services and
shall undertake an annual evaluation of all municipal extension programs.

The extension program of state colleges and universities shall primarily focus on the improvement of
the capability of the LGU extension service by providing:

a) Degree and non-degree training programs;

b) Technical assistance;

c) Extension cum research activities;

d) Monitoring and evaluation of LGU extension projects; and

e) Information support services through the tri-media and electronics.

Section 91. Role of the Private Sector in Extension. - The department shall encourage the
participation of farmers and fisherfolk cooperatives and associations and others in the private sector
in the training and other complementary extension services especially in community organizing, use
of participatory approaches, popularization of training materials, regenerative agricultural
technologies, agri-business and management skills.

The Department is hereby authorized to commission and provide funding for such training and
extension services undertaken by the private sector.

Section 92. The Role of Government Agencies. - The Department, together with state colleges
and universities shall assist in the LGU's extension system by improving their effectiveness and
efficiency through capability-building and complementary extension activities such as:

a) technical assistance;

b) training of LGU extension personnel;

c) improvement of physical facilities;

d) extension cum research; and

e) information support services;

Section 93. Funding for Extension Activities. - Extension activities shall be supported by the
following measures:
 a) allocation of multi-year budgets that shall be treated as grants;

b) allow transfer of funds from the Department to the local government units as extension
grants, and

c) the budget for agriculture and fisheries extension services shall be at least one percent
(1%) of the gross value added (GVA) by year 2001

Section 94. Excellence and Accountability in Extension. - The Department shall formulate the
guidelines in evaluating extension, activities, and institutions, which shall involve an independent and
interdisciplinary team of the collegial reviewers and evaluators.

Section 95. Extension Communication Support for LGU's. - The Department in coordination with
the public and private universities and colleges, shall develop an integrated multimedia support for
national and LGU extension programs. The Department shall assist the LGU's in the computerization
of communication support services to clients and linkages to the NIN.

TITLE 4
RURAL NON-FARM EMPLOYMENT

Chapter 1

Section 96. Declaration of policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to promote full
employment. Economic history, however, shows that as an economy modernizes the number of
workers employed in its agricultural sector declines. It is therefore necessary to formulate policies
and implement programs that will employ workers efficiently in rural areas in order to improve their
standard of living, and reduce their propensity to migrate to urban areas.

Section 97. Objectives. - Rural non-farm employment aims to:

a) promote a basic needs approach to rural development;

b) make rural workers more adaptable and flexible through education and training;

c) promote rural industrialization and the establishment of agro- processing enterprises in

rural communities; and

d)increase the income of rural workers.

Chapter 2
The Basic Needs Program

Section 98. Principles. - The Department, in coordination with the appropriate government

agencies, shall formulate the Basic Needs Program to create employment and cushion the effect of
liberalization based on the following principles:

a) No credit subsidies shall be granted. The normal rules of banking shall apply to all
enterprises involved, provided that existing credit arrangements with ARBs shall not be
affected.
 b) Enterprises can use training, information, advisory and related services of the Government
free of charge.

c) The participation of the private sector shall be voluntary.

Teams composed of specialists from government agencies and the private sectors shall develop
pilot programs in selected locales to establish the planning, implementation and evaluation
procedures.

Section 99. Participation of Government Agencies. - The replication of the program shall be the
responsibility of the local government units concerned in collaboration with the appropriate
government agencies, and the private sector. The local government units shall bear the costs of
promoting and monitoring the basic needs program for which their IRA shall be increased
accordingly as recommended by the Secretary of the Department Provided, That the appropriate
national government agencies shall continue to provide the necessary technical as well as financial
assistance to the LGUs in the replication of the program.

The Cooperatives Development Authority shall encourage the establishment and growth of
associations and cooperatives as vehicles for the stable expansion of basic needs enterprises.

The Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Department of Health, and the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority shall coordinate with the Department and Congress in
the review, rationalization and reallocation of their regular budgets as well as their budgets under the
GATT- related measures fund to finance education, training, health and other welfare services for
farmers and fisherfolk.

Chapter 3
Rural Industrialization
Industry Dispersal Program

Section 100. Principles. - Rural industrialization and industry dispersal programs shall be based on
the interplay of market forces. The Board of Investments (BOI) is hereby required to give the highest
priority to the grant of incentives to business and industries with linkages to agriculture.

Section 101. Role of Government Agencies. - The appropriate government agencies, under the
leadership of the LGUs concerned, shall provide integrated services and information to prospective
enterprises under the one-stop-shop concept.

Local government units are authorized to undertake investment and marketing missions provided
that the costs of such missions are borne by the LGUs concerned. In making their land use plans,
the LGUs, in consultation with the appropriate government agencies concerned, shall identify areas
for industrial parks.

The Department shall coordinate with the Department of Trade and Industry , in particular, the Board
of Investments, in the formulation of investments priorities for rural areas.

The Regional Wage Boards shall consult participating enterprises in this program before they issue
wage orders.

Section 102. Participating Enterprises. - Participating enterprises may request any government

agency for training, technical and advisory services free of cost.
A set of incentives shall be given to enterprises that subcontract part of their production to farmers,
fisherfolk and landless workers during periods when they are not engaged in agricultural activities.

Section 103. Financing. - Except for basic infrastructure and other goods that benefit all citizens,
the facilities of this program should be undertaken and financed by the private sector.

Chapter 4
Training of Workers

Section 104. Role of TESDA. - TESDA shall organize local committees that will advise on the
scope, nature and duration of training for the above-mentioned programs.

TESDA is authorized to request the additional budgetary resources for these programs: Provided,
That after a reasonable period, the task of coordinating the training is transferred to the LGUs
concerned.

Section 105. Role of the DENR. - The Department and the DENR shall organize the training of
workers in coastal resources management and sustainable fishing techniques.

Section 106. Role of the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC). - The TLRC shall
undertake field training in entrepreneurship and management of workers involved in the basic needs
program.

Section 107. Special Training Projects for Women. - The Department, in collaboration with the
appropriate government agencies concerned shall plan and implement special training projects for
women for absorption in the basic needs and rural industrialization programs.

TITLE 5
TRADE AND FISCAL INCENTIVES

Section 108. Taxation policies must not deter the growth of value-adding activities in the rural areas.

Section 109. All enterprises engaged in agriculture and fisheries as duly certified by the Department
in consultation with the Department of Finance and the board of Investment, shall, for five (5) years
after the effectivity of this Act, be exempted from the payment of tariff and duties for the importation
of all types of agriculture and fisheries inputs, equipment and machinery such as, but not limited to,
fertilizer, insecticide, pesticide, tractor, trailers, trucks, farm implements and machinery, harvesters,
threshers, hybrid seeds, genetic materials, sprayers, packaging machinery and materials, bulk-
handling facilities such as conveyors and mini loaders, weighing scales, harvesting equipment,
spare parts of all agricultural equipment, fishing equipment and parts thereof, refrigeration
equipment, and renewable energy systems such as solar panels Provided, however,That the
imported agricultural and fishery inputs, equipment and machinery shall be for the exclusive use of
the importing enterprise.

The Department, in consultation with the Department of Finance and the Board of Investment, shall,
within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, formulate the implementing rules and
regulations governing the importation of agriculture and fishery inputs, equipment and machinery.

Section 110. Any person, partnership, corporation, association and other juridical entity found
circumventing the provisions of Section 109 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
period of not less than six (6) months but not more than one (1) year, or a fine equivalent to two
hundred percent (200%) of the value of the imported materials, or both, at the discretion of the court,
and the accessory penalties of confiscation of the imported goods in favor of the government and
revocation of the privileges given under this title.

In cases where the violator is a juridical entity, the officers responsible in the violation of Section 109
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment prescribed in this Section.

The importation of goods equivalent to or exceeding the declared assets of the enterprise,
partnership, or the authorized capital stock in case of corporations, and/or the resale of the imported
goods shall be a prima facie evidence of the violation of the provisions of Section 109 of this Act.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 111. Initial Appropriation. - For the first year of implementation of this Act, the amount of
Twenty Billion pesos (P20,000,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated. The Department is hereby
authorized to re-align its appropriations in the current year of the date of effectivity of this Act to
conform with the requirements of this Act Provided, That the amount shall be allocated and
disbursed as follows:

1. Thirty percent (30%) for irrigation;

2. Ten percent (10%) for post-harvest facilities Provided, That the Secretary of Agriculture
may invest up to fifty percent (50%) of the said amount to fund post-harvest facilities of
cooperatives, especially market vendors' cooperatives, where said cooperatives exist and
are operational Provided, further, That if no cooperatives are operational, said amount shall
fund the post-harvest facilities of the market -assistance system;

3. Ten percent (10%) for other infrastructure including fishports, seaports, and airports, farm-
and -coast-to-market roads, rural energy, communications infrastructure, watershed
rehabilitation, water supply system, research and technology infrastructure, public markets
and abattoirs;

4. Ten percent (10%) for the Agro-industry Modernization Credit and Financing Program
(AMCFP) to be deposited by the Department in participating rural-based public and private
financial institutions provided that no less than fifty percent (50%) of said funds shall be
deposited in rural banks in cooperative banks;

5. Eight percent (8%) for the implementation of the Farmer-Fisherfolk Marketing Assistance
System and support of market vendors' cooperatives;

6. Ten percent (10%) for research and development, four percent (4%) of which shall be
used to support the Biotechnology Program;

7. Five percent (5%) for capability-building of farmers and fisherfolk organizations and LGUs
for the effective implementation of the agriculture and fisheries programs at the local level;

8. Six percent (6%) for salary supplement of Extension Workers under the LGUs;

9. Five percent (5%) for NAFES , for the upgrading of the facilities of State Universities and
Colleges that will be chosen as national center of excellence in agriculture and fisheries
education;
 10. Four percent (4%) for the National Information Network (NIN) consisting of both the
national and local levels;

11. One-and-three-fourth percent (1.75%) for SUC- and TESDA-administered Rural Non-
Farm Employment Training; and

12. One-fourth percent (0.25%) for the identification of the SAFDZs.

Section 112. Continuing Appropriation. - The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is

hereby mandated to include annually in the next six (6) years, in the President's Program of
expenditures for submission to Congress, and release, an amount not less than Seventeen billion
pesos (P17,000,000,000.00) for the implementation of this Act.

Additional funds over and above the regular yearly budget of the Department shall be sourced from
twenty percent (20%) of the proceeds of the securitization of government assets, including the
Subic, Clark, and other special economic zones.

Other sources of funds shall be from the following:

a. Fifty Percent (50%) of the net earnings of the Public Estates Authority;

b. Loans, grants, bequest, or donations, whether from local or foreign sources;

c. Forty percent (40%) of the TESDA Skills Development Fund;

d. Net proceeds from the privatization of the Food Terminal Inc. (FTI), the Bureau of Animal
Industry (BAI), the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI), and other assets of the Department that
will be identified by the DA Secretary and recommended to the President for privatization;

e. Proceeds from the Minimum Access Volume (MAV) in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8178;

f. Poverty alleviation Fund; and

g. Fifty Percent (50%) of the Support Facilities and Services Fund under Republic Act No.
6657.

Section 113. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Secretary within ninety (90) working
days after the effectivity of this act, together with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of Finance (DOF),
Department of Science and Technology (DOST), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI),
Commission on Higher Education (CHED), Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA), Department of Education , Culture and sports (DECS), Department of Social services and
Development (DSSD), National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), Department of
Budget and Management (DBM), Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Commission on
Audit (COA), Civil Service Commission (CSC), in consultation with other agencies concerned,
farmers, fisherfolk and agribusiness organizations, and in coordination with the Congressional
Oversight committee on Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization, shall promulgate the rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of this act.
The Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Agriculture of both houses of congress copies of the
implementing rules and regulations within thirty (30) days after their promulgation.

Any violation of this section shall render the official/s concerned liable under Republic Act. No. 6713
otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees"
and other existing administrative and/or criminal laws.

Section 114. Congressional Oversight Committee on Agricultural and Fisheries

Modernization. - A congressional Committee on Agricultural and Fisheries Modernization is hereby
created to be composed of the Chairs of the Committee on Agriculture of both Houses, six (6)
members of the House of Representatives and six (6) members of the Senate, to be designated
respectively by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, who shall endeavor to
have the various sectors and regions of the country represented.

The Chairs of the Committees on Agriculture in the Senate and House of Representatives, shall be
respectively, the Chair and Co-Chair of the Oversight Committee. The other members shall receive
no compensation: however, traveling and other necessary expenses shall be allowed.

The Committee shall oversee and monitor the implementation of the Congressional Commission on
Agricultural Modernization (AGRICOM) recommendations as well as all programs, projects and
activities related to agriculture and fisheries, and its allied concerns in both public and private
sectors, with a view to providing all legislative support and assistance within the powers of Congress
to ensure their inclusion, wherever feasible, in the national, regional, provincial, municipal, and
sectoral development plans to recommend the disposal of assets no longer needed by the
Department to fund the modernization program, and to see them through their successful
implementation.

Section 115. Powers and Functions of the Committee. - The Congressional Oversight on

Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization shall have the following powers and functions:

a. Prescribe and adopt guidelines that will govern its work;

b. Hold hearings, receive testimonies and reports pertinent to its specified concerns;

c. Secure from any department, bureau, office or instrumentality of the Government such
assistance as may be needed, including technical information, preparation, and production of
reports and submission of recommendations or plans as it may require;

d. Summon by subpoena any public or private citizen to testify before it, or require by
subpoena duces tecum to produce before it such records, reports or other documents as
may be necessary in the performance of its functions;

e. Use resource persons from the public and private sectors as may be needed;

f. Carry on the winding-up work of AGRICOM, such as editing and printing all technical
reports and studies as well as bibliographic cataloguing of its collection of source materials,
continue its information and advocacy work;

g. Cause to be transferred to the Committee all works, outputs, source materials, and assets,
funds, supplies and equipment of AGRICOM;
 h. Approve the budget for the work of the Committee and all disbursements therefrom ,
including compensation of all personnel;

i. Organize its staff and hire and appoint such employees and personnel whether temporary ,
contractual or on consultancy, subject to applicable rules; and

j. Generally to exercise all the powers necessary to attain the purposes for which its created.

Section 116. Periodic Reports. - The Committee shall submit periodic reports on its findings and
make recommendations on actions to be taken by Congress and the appropriate department, and in
order to carry out the objectives of this Act, an initial amount of Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) is hereby appropriated for the Oversight Committee for the first year of its
operation.

Section 117. Automatic Review. - Every five (5) years after the effectivity of this Act, an
independent review panel composed of experts to be appointed by the President shall review the
policies and programs in the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act and shall make
recommendations, based on its findings, to the President and to both Houses of Congress.

Section 118. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive issuance, rules and regulations
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 119. Separability Clause. - The provisions of this Act are hereby declared to be separable,
and in the event one or more of such provisions are held unconstitutional, the validity of the other
provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 120. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days from the date of its publication in
the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers general circulation.

Approved: 22 December 1997

MALACAÑANG
Manila

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 984 August 18, 1976

PROVIDING FOR THE REVISION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3931, COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, there is a need to modify the organizational structure of the NATIONAL POLLUTION
CONTROL COMMISSION to make it more effective and efficient in the discharge of its functions and
responsive to the demands of the times occasioned by the accelerative phase of the country's
industrialization program;

WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to strengthen this Commission to best protect the people
from the growing menace of environmental pollution; and

WHEREAS, it is urgently necessary to maintain the role of the Commission as the primary agency
responsible for the prevention and control of environmental pollution;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree the revision of Republic Act
No. 3931, to be known as the "National Pollution Control Decree of 1976," to read as follows:

Section 1. Statement of Policy. It is hereby declared a national policy to prevent, abate and control
pollution of water, air and land for the more effective utilization of the resources of this country.

Section 2. Definitions. As used in this Decree:

(a) "Pollution" means any alteration of the physical, chemical and biological properties of any
water, air and/or land resources of the Philippines, or any discharge thereto of any liquid,
gaseous or solid wastes as will or is likely to create or to render such water, air and land
resources harmful, detrimental or injurious to public health, safety or welfare or which will
adversely affect their utililization for domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural,
recreational or other legitimate purposes.

(b) "Sewage" means the water-carried human or animal wastes from residences, buildings,
industrial establishments, or other places, together with such water infiltration and surface
water as may be present. The admixture or sewage and industrial wastes or other wastes as
hereafter defined shall also be considered "sewage."

(c) "Industrial Waste" means any liquid, gaseous or solid matter, or other waste substance or
a combination thereof resulting from any process of industry, manufacturing trade or
business or from the development, processing or recovery or any natural resources which
may cause or tend to cause pollution, or contribute to the pollution of the water, air and land
resources of the Philippines.

(d) "Other Waste" means garbage, refuse, wood residues, sand, lime cinders, ashes, offal,
night-oil, tar, dye stuffs, acids, chemicals, and other substances not sewage or industrial
waste which may cause or tend to cause pollution; or contribute to the pollution of the water,
air and land resources of the Philippines.

(e) "Sewage System or Sewerage System" means pipe lines or conduits, pumping stations,
force mains, constructed drainage ditches, and all other constructions, devices, and
appurtenances used for collecting or conducting sewage, and industrial wastes or other
wastes to a point of treatment, discharge or ultimate disposal.

(f) "Treatment Works" means any method, construction device or appliance appurtenant
thereto, installed for the purpose of treating, neutralizing, stabilizing, disinfecting, or
disposing of sewage, industrial waste or other wastes, or for the recovery of by-product from
such sewage, industrial waste or other wastes.

(g) "Sewage Works" means individually or collectively those constructions or devices use for
collecting, pumping, treating, and disposing of sewage, industrial wastes or other waste, or
for the recovery of by-products from such sewage, industrial waste or other waste.

(h) "Outlet" means the terminus of a sewage works or point of emergence in the water, air
and land resources of the Philippines of any sewage, industrial wastes or other wastes.

(i) "Commission" means the National Pollution Control Commission.

 (j) "Person" or "Persons" includes any being, natural or juridical, susceptible of rights and
obligations or of being the subject of legal relations.

Section 3. Creation of the National Pollution Control Commission; Members. There is hereby

created and established a National Pollution Control Commission under the Office of the President.
The Commission shall be headed by one full-time commissioner and assisted by two full-time deputy
commissioners, one of whom shall be responsible for standard-setting and monitoring and the other
for enforcement.

The Commissioner shall be a man of proven executive ability. The Deputy Commissioner for
Standard-Setting and Monitoring shall preferably be a sanitary engineer, while the Deputy
Commissioner for Enforcement shall preferably be a lawyer. The Commissioner and the Deputy
Commissioners must have technical expertise in the field of pollution control.

The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines.

Section 4. Inter-Agency Advisory Council. There is created an Inter-Agency Advisory Council,

attached to the Commission, which shall be composed of representatives designated by the
Secretaries of the Department of Agriculture, Health, Industry, Justice, Labor, Local Government and
Community Development, National Defense, Natural Resources, and Public Works, Transportation
and Communications; the heads of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, National Economic and
Development Authority, the National Science Development Board and the Human Settlements
Commission. The Commissioner shall head the Inter-Agency Advisory Council. Representatives
from the private sector as may be affected, may be invited to the deliberations of the Council.

Section 5. Organization of the Commission. The Commission shall have a Water Pollution Control
Division, an Air Pollution Control Division, a Research and Development Division, a Legal Division,
an Administrative Division and such other divisions or units as may be approved in the General
Appropriation Act. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as to automatically terminate or
abolish any existing position in the Commission nor shall it be construed as a prohibition against
termination of any position.

The Commission shall also establish such regional offices as may be necessary.

The Commission shall provide such technical, scientific and other services, including the necessary
laboratory and other facilities as may be required to carry out the provisions of this Decree:
Provided, That the Commission may secure such services as it may deem necessary from other
agencies of the National Government, and may make arrangements for the compensation of such
services. The Commission may also employ and compensate, within appropriations available
therefor, such consultants, experts, advisors, or assistants on a full or part-time basis as may be
necessary, coming from government or private business entities, associations, or from local or
foreign organizations, to carry out the provisions of this decree any may prescribe their powers,
duties and responsibilities.

The Commission may conduct scientific experiments, investigations and research to discover
economical and practical methods of preventing water, air and land pollution. To this end, the
Commission may cooperate with any public or private agency in the conduct of such experiments,
investigations and research, and may accept sums of money, for and in behalf of the National
Government, given by any international, national or other public or private agency for water, air and
land pollution control activities, surveys or programs.
Section 6. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) Determine the location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes, effects and other pertinent
information regarding pollution of the water, air and land resources of the country; take such
measures, using available methods and technologies, as it shall deem best to prevent or
abate such pollution; and conduct continuing researches and studies on the effective means
for the control and abatement of pollution.

(b) Develop comprehensive multi-year and annual plans for the abatement of existing
pollution and the prevention of new or imminent pollution, the implementation of which shall
be consistent with the national development plan of the country. Such plans shall indicate
priorities and programs during the year.

(c) Issue standards, rules and regulations to govern the approval of plans and specifications
for sewage works and industrial waste disposal systems and the issuance of permits in
accordance with the provisions of this Decree; inspect the construction and maintenance of
sewage works and industrial waste disposal system for compliance to plans.

(d) Adopt, prescribe, and promulgate rules and regulations governing the procedures of the
Commission with respect to hearings, plans, specifications, designs, and other data for
sewage works and industrial waste disposal system, the filing of reports, the issuance of
permits, and other rules and regulations for the proper implementation and enforcement of
this Decree.

(e) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Decree and its
implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.

(f) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the
conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.

(g) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be
reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage,
industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal
system or parts thereof: Provided, however, That the Commission, by rules and regulations,
may require subdivisions, condominium, hospitals, public buildings and other similar human
settlements to put up appropriate central sewerage system and sewage treatment works,
except that no permits shall be required of any new sewage works or changes to or
extensions of existing works that discharge only domestic or sanitary wastes from a single
residential building provided with septic tanks or their equivalent. The Commission may
impose reasonable fees and charges for the issuance or renewal of all permits herein
required.

(h) After due notice and hearing, the Commission may also revoke, suspend or modify any
permit issued under this decree whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate
pollution.

(i) Set up effluent, stream, ambient and emission standards and promulgate rules and
regulations therefor: Provided, That local governments, development authorities, and other
similar government instrumentalities or agencies may set up higher standards subject to the
written approval of the Commission.
 (j) Serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or restitution of the damages and
losses resulting from pollution.

(k) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or

instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Decree and its implementing rules and
regulations and the orders and decisions of the Commission.

(l) Consult, participate, cooperate and enter into agreement with other agencies of the
government, and with affected political groups, political subdivisions, and enterprises in the
furtherance of the purpose of this Decree.

(m) Collect and disseminate information relating to water, air, and land pollution and the
prevention, abatement and control thereof.

(n) Authorize its representative to enter at all reasonable times any property of the public
dominion and private property devoted to industrial, manufacturing, processing or
commercial use without doing damage, for the purpose of inspecting and investigating
conditions relating to pollution or possible or imminent pollution.

(o) Prepare and submit sixty days after the close of each calendar year an annual report to
the President and such periodic reports of activities as may be required from time to time.
The annual report shall include the extent to which the objectives in the plans referred to
under Sec. 6 (b) have been achieved.

(p) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out
its duties and responsibilities under this Decree.

Section 7. (a) Public Hearing. Public hearings shall be conducted by the Commissioner, Deputy
Commissioners or any senior official duly designated by the Commissioner prior to issuance or
promulgation of any order or decision by the Commissioner requiring the discontinuance of
discharge of sewage, industrial wastes or other wastes into the water, air or land resources of the
Philippines as provided in this Decree: Provided, That whenever the Commission find a prima facie
evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety
or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the
Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the
temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or person generating such
sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be
immediately executory and shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or
abates the said pollution within the allowable standards, or modified or nullified by a competent
court.

All records of the proceedings of said hearings shall be filed with the Commission. All
inquiries, hearings, investigations and proceedings conducted by the Commission shall be
governed by rules adopted by the Commission, and in the conduct thereof the Commission
shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence: Provided, That the Commissioners or any
of the duly designated Hearing Officers may summarily punish for contempt, by a fine not
exceeding two hundred pesos, any person committing such misconduct in the presence of
any of the Commissioners or any of the duly designated Hearing Officers, or so near to them
as to seriously interrupt any hearing or session or any proceeding, or any person willfully fails
or refuses, without just cause, to comply with a summon, subpoena, or subpoena duces
tecum issued by the Commissioners or by the duly designated Hearing Officer or, being
present at a hearing, session or investigation, refuses to be sworn as a witness or to answer
 questions when lawfully required to do so. The Sheriff or other police agencies of the place
where the hearing or investigation is conducted, shall, upon request of the Hearing Officer,
assist in the enforcement of the provisions of this paragraph.

(b) Appeal to Courts. Any decision of the Commission, in the absence of an appeal therefrom
as herein provided, shall become final fifteen days after the date of notification, and judicial
review thereof shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has
exhausted the remedies before the Commission. The Commission shall be deemed to be a
party to any judicial action involving any decision.

(c) Court Review. The decision of the Commission upon any disputed matter may be
reviewed both upon the law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals. For purposes
of such review, the procedure concerning appeals from the Court of First Instance shall be
followed. Appeal from a decision of the Commission must be perfected within fifteen days
from notification of such decision: Provided, however, That any decision of the Commission
involving only questions of law, shall be appealed to the Supreme Court. No appeal shall
stay the execution of any order or decision of the Commission unless the Commissioner
himself or the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court so orders.

(d) Execution of Decision. Any decision or order of the Commission, after the same has
become final and executory, shall be enforced and executed in the same manner as
decisions of Courts of First Instance, and the Commission shall have the power to issue to
the City or Provincial Sheriff or duly constituted authorities whom it may appoint, such writs
of execution as may be necessary for the enforcement of such decision or order and any
person who shall fail or refuse to comply with such decision, order, or writ, after being
required to do so shall, upon application by the Commission, be punished by the proper
court for contempt.

Section 8. Prohibitions. No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise dispose into any of the water,
air and/or land resources of the Philippines, or cause, permit, suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow to
seep or otherwise dispose thereto any organic or inorganic matter or any substance in gaseous or
liquid form that shall cause pollution thereof.

No person shall perform any of the following activities without first securing a permit from the
Commission for the discharge of all industrial wastes and other wastes which could cause pollution:

1. the construction, installation, modification or operation of any sewage works or any

extension or addition thereto;

2. the increase in volume or strength of any wastes in excess of the permissive discharge
specified under any existing permit;

3. the construction, installation or operation of any industrial or commercial establishments or

any extension or modification thereof or addition thereto, the operation of which would cause
an increase in the discharge of waste directly into the water, air and/or land resources of the
Philippines or would otherwise alter their physical, chemical or biological properties in any
manner not already lawfully authorized.

Section 9. Penalties. (a) Any person found violating or failing to comply with any order, decision or
regulation of the Commission for the control or abatement of pollution shall pay a fine not exceeding
five thousand pesos per day for every day during which such violation or default continues; and the
Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to impose the fine after due notice and hearing.
 The fines so imposed shall be paid to the Government of the Philippines through the
Commission, and failure to pay the fine in any case within the time specified in the
above-mentioned Order or Decision shall be sufficient ground for the Commission to
order the closure or the stoppage in the operation of the establishment being
operated and/or managed by said person or persons until payment of the fines shall
have been made. The Commission shall have the power and authority to issue
corresponding writs of execution directing the City or Provincial Sheriff or other
peace officers whom it may appoint to enforce the fine or the order of closure or
stoppage of operations.

Payment of fines may also be enforced by appropriate action in a court of competent

jurisdiction. The remedies provided in this sub-section shall not be a bar to nor shall
affect any other remedies provided for in this Decree but shall be cumulative and
additional to such remedies.

(b) Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of Section Eight of this Decree or its
implementing rules and regulations, or any Order or Decision of the Commission, shall be
liable to a penalty of not to exceed one thousand pesos for each day during which the
violation continues, or by imprisonment of from two years to six years, or by both fine and
imprisonment, and in addition such person may be required or enjoined from continuing such
violation as hereinafter provided.

(c) Any person who shall refuse, obstruct, or hamper the entry of the duly authorized
representatives of the Commission into any property of the pubic domain or private property
devoted to industrial manufacturing, processing or commercial use during reasonable hours
for the purpose of inspecting or investigating the conditions therein relating to pollution or
possible or imminent pollution, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or
imprisonment of not exceeding one month, or both.

(d) Any person who violates any of the provisions of, or fails to perform any duty imposed by
this Decree or its implementing rules and regulations or by Order or Decision of the
Commission promulgated pursuant to this Decree hereby causing the death of fish or other
aquatic life, shall in addition to the penalty above prescribed, be liable to pay the government
for damages for fish or aquatic life destroyed.

(e) In case the violator is a juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed on the managing
head responsible for the violation.

Section 10. Jurisdiction. The Commission shall have no jurisdiction over waterworks or sewage

system operated by the Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System, but the rules and regulations
issued by the Commission for the protection and prevention of pollution under the authority herein
granted shall supersede and prevail over any rules or regulations as may heretofore have been
issued by other government agencies or instrumentalities on the same subject.

In case of development projects involving specific human settlement sites or integrated regional or
sub- regional projects, such as the Tondo Foreshore Development Authority and the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, the Commission shall consult with the authorities charged with the planning
and execution of such projects to ensure that their pollution control standards comply with those of
the Commission. Once minimum pollution standards are established and agreed upon, the
development authorities concerned may, by mutual agreement and prior consultation with the
Commission, undertake the pollution control activities themselves.
Section 11. Appropriations. Such amount as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Decree, which in no case shall be less than five million pesos, is hereby appropriated yearly for the
operating expenses of the Commission out of any funds in the National Treasury.

Section 12. Repealing Clause. Any provision of laws, presidential decree, executive order, rules and
regulations and/or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, are hereby repealed
and/or modified accordingly.

Section 13. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-six.