Patricia Sibayan V. Emilio Costales, Et Al. G.R. No. 191492 JULY 4, 2016 Perez, J
Patricia Sibayan V. Emilio Costales, Et Al. G.R. No. 191492 JULY 4, 2016 Perez, J
Patricia Sibayan V. Emilio Costales, Et Al. G.R. No. 191492 JULY 4, 2016 Perez, J
DOCTRINE: The right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege,
and it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
RTC dismissed the case as the action of the petitioner is already barred by
laches. Motion for Reconsideration was also denied which made the petitioner
elevate the matter to the CA.
CA ordered petitioner to file Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from receipt of the
copy of the notice. The petitioner’s counsel received notice on November 17,
2008. However, the petitioner was only able to file the brief on June 19, 2009
or 139 days after the lapse of reglementary period.
CA dismissed the case on the ground of the petitioner’s failure to file her
Appellant’s Brief on time. Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Hence,
here comes the filing of a petition for review on Certiorari. Petitioner alleged
that dismissal of the case was erroneous as she should not be bind by the
gross negligence of his counsel in filing the Appellant’s Brief. He also further
claimed that denial of appeal would be tantamount to deprivation of her
property without due process of law.
RULING: YES.
Rule 44, Sec 7 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure provides that, it shall be the
duty of the appellant to file the brief with the court, within 45 days from receipt
of the notice of clerk. Furthermore, Rule 50, Sec 1 (e) provides that the failure
of the appellant to file the required number of copies of brief on time would be
grounds for dismissal of appeal, subject to the discretion of the CA. Further,
right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege, and it may be
availed only upon compliance of the Rules. Otherwise, the right to appeal is
abandoned and lost. Sibayan’s counsel was not able to file the brief on the
reglementary period which consequently results in the abandonment of the
appeal and dismissal of the case. Hence, the appeal is considered dismissed or
abandoned by the failure to file appellant’s brief.
AILEEN ANGELA S. ALFORNON v. RODULFO DELOS
SANTOS AND EDSEL A. GALEOS
G.R. No. 203657
July 11, 2016
BRION, J.
DOCTRINE: A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the
issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.
The CA reversed the CSC and found that the dismissal was in order.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Petition for Review involves a question of law.
(2) Whether the CA erred in finding that Alfornon’s right to due process was not
violated.
RULING:
(1) YES, it does. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set
of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted. Alfornon essentially questions the application of the
law and jurisprudence on the issues of (1) whether she was afforded due
process before she was dismissed from the service, and (2) whether she
committed a lesser degree of dishonesty, warranting a less harsh penalty
than dismissal. No further examination of the truth or falsity of the
facts is required in this case because Alfornon admitted that she
failed to disclose in her PDS that she had been previously charged with
estafa.
(2) YES. The CA correctly ruled that there was substantial compliance with
the procedure laid down in the URACCS (now RRACCS) before Alfornon’s
dismissal was resolved. Memorandum No. 2009-23 WAS in sufficient
compliance of the notice rules, since Alfornon was apprised of the
charges against her and the requirement for submission of her written
explanation, which she was actually able to submit.
FACTS: Beronia filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, praying for backwages,
damages, and attorney’s fees against Barrio Fiesta Restaurant. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in Beronia’s favor. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on
appeal. Beronia appealed the NLRC’s Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). In
the June 21, 2012 decision, the CA reinstated the LA’s decision, declaring that
Beronia had been dismissed without just cause and without the observance of
due process.
On November 29, 2012, the petitioners, through new counsel, filed with the
CA an Entry of Appearance with Manifestation and Motion for
Reconsideration. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for being 138
days late.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was timely filed.
RULING: NO, the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was filed well beyond
the fifteen-day reglementary period. There is no question that the
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the CA’s decision 138
days beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing the motion. The
records show that petitioner the petitioners’ counsel of record (prior to new
counsel) has received a copy of the CA’s June 21, 2012 decision on June 29,
2012, even though, subsequently, petitioners manifested that they had
terminated their counsel of record’s services on February 19, 2013.
The supposed negligence of the petitioners’ former counsel was the result of
their actions and inactions, hence, is binding on the petitioners. In the
petitioners’ case, they were themselves aware that Beronia sought
reconsideration of the NLRC decision as they had, in fact, personally opposed
this motion instead of through their counsel on record, Ligon, et al. Had they
still been represented by their counsel, through Atty. Chuas they claim, the
latter would have signed and filed the opposition in their behalf. Viewed in this
light, the petitioners must have known that Ligon, et al.no longer represented
them in this case; this was true even at the NLRC level and before the case
reached the CA.
Considered together, the January 5, 2011 opposition and the February 25,
2013 letter of Atty. Chua more than sufficiently show that there could
not have been any miscommunication between the petitioners and
their former counsel that could have reasonably prevented the petitioners
from immediately acting on Beronia’s certiorari petition before the CA.
Their failure to act on Beronia’s certiorari petition, therefore, was due solely to
their own fault or negligence, not to their former counsel’s as they claim.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. The COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS
of MANUEL BOLAÑOS
G.R. No. 221636
JULY 11, 2016
JARDELEZA, J.
FACTS: The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) subjected the land of the
private respondents to the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Private respondents rejected the valuation of the petitioner
but the latter still deposited the amount of the valuation in their favor. Private
respondents filed before Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), a case for determination of just
compensation. The SAC ordered the petitioner to re-value the property, which
it did, but the new valuation was still rejected by the private respondent. A
notice of appeal under Rule 41 was filed by the private respondent. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that private respondents availed a
wrong mode of appeal. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion to
dismiss on grounds of liberality in the construction of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not appeals from the decision of the SAC must be via a
petition for review under Rule 42 and not by an ordinary appeal.
RULING: YES.
The proper mode of appeal from the decisions of RTCs sitting as SACs is by
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not through an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41. Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law clearly and categorically states that said
mode of appeal should be adopted.
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a
notice of appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is
submitted. A petition for review hastens the award of fair recompense to
deprived landowners for the government-acquired property, an end not
foreseeable in an ordinary appeal.
Considering, therefore, that private respondents resorted to a wrong mode of
appeal, their notice of appeal did not toll the running of the reglementary
period under Section 60 of RA No. 6657. Consequently, the decision of the SAC
became final and executory.
Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held,
time and again, that the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due
process but is merely a statutory privilege. Thus, the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding
appeal will render the judgment final and executory.
Petitioner did not elevate the case to the Civil Service Commission proper.
Instead, he filed a special civil action for mandamus before the RTC. He
invoked an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies:
when the question is purely legal. He argued that because the PARO II position
did not require CES eligibility and was not declared to be a CES position,
respondent can be compelled through mandamus to change his status from
temporary to permanent. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the petition for mandamus was proper.
RULING: YES. Before parties are allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
it is a precondition that they must have availed themselves of all the means of
administrative processes afforded to them. Where the enabling statute
indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of
administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts -for reasons of law, comity,
and convenience -will not entertain a case unless the available administrative
remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative
forum.
The Court has laid down tests to distinguish questions of fact from questions of
law: when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, or when it
becomes clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question is one of fact. It was grave error for the trial court to have ignored the
red flags raised by both parties.
This case is different from Buena, Jr. v. Benito, wherein the issue of whether
the position for which the respondent therein was appointed required career
service eligibility was held to be a purely legal question. In that case, the direct
recourse to the courts from the Decision of the CSCRO fell under an exception
to the doctrine. There are at least three material differences between this case
and Buena.
First, in Buena, the question was whether the position is in the CES. In this
case, the question is whether petitioner was eligible for a permanent
appointment to the PARO II position, which had already been classified as a
third-level position requiring CSEE or CES.
The issue is therefore not one of law, but of the merit and fitness of the
appointee, which is a question of fact.
Second, in Buena, no evidence was presented to the trial court that could have
created doubt as to the truth or falsity of the allegation. In this case, the
qualification standards for the position were presented, but were
unacknowledged as a matter of fact by the trial court.
Third, in Buena, the petition for mandamus was filed after the appointment
had been issued by the regional governor. The element of a clear legal right
was met in Buena because Section 19, Art. VII of Republic Act No. 9054
(Organic Act for the ARMM) designated the regional governor as the
appointing authority in the ARMM. In this case, petitioner had no clear
legal right to compel respondent to attest to his appointment, because at
the time of filing, he had no appointment to a permanent position.
FACTS: Respondent Cabe and Cardona II (Cardona II), executed a Deed of Sale
with Pacto de Retro over a parcel of land. For failure of Cardona II to
repurchase the property from her within one year as agreed upon in the deed,
Cabe filed a Petition for Consolidation of Ownership. The trial court granted the
Petition through a Decision dated 20 May 2002. Cardona II questioned the trial
court's Decision by filing with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Rule 65 Petition for
Certiorari which was dismissed by the CA. The Supreme Court also denied
Cardona’s appeal. An Entry of Judgment was issued.
Accordingly, respondent Cabe filed a motion for execution of the RTC Decision.
The RTC issued a Writ of Execution.
Thereafter, Cabe prayed for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, which Judge
Lim, as acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 2, granted.
RULING: YES. Jurisprudence provides only these four instances when a writ of
possession may issue: ( 1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property,
provided that the mortgagor has possession, and no third party has
intervened; and ( 4) execution sales.
Here, respondent Cabe sought the writ as a consequence of the trial court's
Decision ordering the consolidation of the title over the subject property and
vesting absolute ownership thereof in her name. Since the instant case clearly
does not fall among the four instances enumerated above, the issuance of the
Writ of Possession was not proper.
Since the Writ of Possession in this case was issued as part of the execution
process, it is likewise subject to this rule. Consequently, as the judgment being
executed does not involve a disposition on Cabe's right of possession, the Writ
of Possession itself is a patent nullity. Deprived of possession, Cabe's remedy is
not a Writ of Possession, but any of the available actions for the recovery of
possession of real property, specifically the following: accion interdictal, when
the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year; accion publiciana,
when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; or accion
reinvindicatoria, which seeks the recovery of ownership.
FELICISIMO FERNANDEZ, et al. v. SPS. ISAAC AND CONCEPCION RONULO
G.R. No. 187400
JULY 13, 2016
SERENO, CJ
On appeal, the DENR Secretary reversed the ruling and deemed respondent’s
claims as a collateral attack against the title of the spouses Ligon. Respondents
moved for the reconsideration of the Decision, but the DENR Secretary denied
their motion.
RULING:
The appeal may be given due course on the basis of the second Motion for
Reconsideration.
Both parties presented allegations that the other committed technical
procedural lapses in the course of this case. However, in some cases, it is a far
better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice. In
those cases, in which technicalities are dispensed with, the courts do not mean
to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law.
Public interest and the interest of substantial justice require that the instant
case be resolved on the merits, and not on mere technical grounds, for the
following reasons:
1. DENR Regional Director Principe's findings are in direct conflict
with those of the DENR Secretary; hence, there is a need to review the
arguments raised and evidence submitted by the parties.
2. Petitioners benefitted from the relaxation of the rules when they
were able to file a Motion for Reconsideration before the DENR Regional Office
and an appeal before the DENR even after the prescribed period had lapsed;
they cannot question the same liberality afforded to respondents by the OP.
3. The present controversy involves both parties' sacrosanct right to
property, which is protected by the constitutional provision that "[n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Moreover, it bears stressing that rules of procedure are construed liberally in
proceedings before administrative bodies.
WILFRED GACUS YAMSON, et al. v. DANILO C. CASTRO AND GEORGE F.
INVENTOR
G.R. Nos. 194763-64
JULY 20, 2016
REYES, J.
FACTS: Petitioners and respondents are all officials and employees of the
Davao City Water District (DCWD). Petitioners were charged for anomalies
surrounding the drilling contracts for two related projects named VES 15 and
21.
The bids and awards committee (PBAC-B) issued Resolution No. 05-97 to
dispense with the advertisement requirement in the conduct of the bidding
and instead, opted to send letters to accredited well drillers and invited their
participation in the VES 15 and VES 21 WELL drilling projects. Thereafter, in
Resolution No. 06-97, PBAC-B resolved, "due to the urgency, importance and
necessity of the well drilling project," to endorse the matter to the head of
agency for approval, with a "recommendation that the project be pursued by a
negotiated agreement contract with [HYDROCK] taking into account its
track record, efficiency of performance, and quoted price." The DCWD Board of
Directors approved the recommendation and directed a notice of award to
issue.
After more than six years, the respondents filed a joint Affidavit-Complaint
with the Ombudsman, charging the petitioners with Violation of Section 3( e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
the alleged non-observance of the proper bidding procedure in the VES 21
Project and for allegedly giving Hydrock unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the "surreptitious" grant of the contract to it. The case was
docketed as OMB-M-C-05-0051-A.
Two weeks after, the respondents filed another joint Affidavit-Complaint with
the Ombudsman, likewise charging the petitioners with Violation of Section 3(
e) of R.A. No. 3019, this time for the VES 15 Project, docketed as OMB-M-C-
05-0054-A.
Less than two months later, the respondents filed two separate Joint
Affidavit- Complaints with the Ombudsman, administratively charging the
petitioners with Grave Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority, Dishonesty and
Gross Negligence. The respondents adopted the allegations in the
separate criminal complaints they filed with the Ombudsman against
the petitioners in OMB-M-C-05-0051-A and OMB-M-C-05-0054-A as bases for
the administrative charges.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation on the rule against forum shopping.
Ruling: YES. The rule on forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or
proceedings, and not to administrative cases. Nonetheless, A.O. No. 07, as
amended by A.O. No. 17, explicitly removed from the ambit of the rule the
administrative cases filed before it when it required the inclusion of a
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping in complaints filed before it. Thus, Section
3 of Rule III (Procedure in Administrative Cases) provides:
Sec. 3. How initiated. -An administrative case may be initiated by
a written complaint under oath accompanied by affidavits of witnesses and
other evidence in support of the charge. Such complaint shall be
accompanied by a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping duly subscribed
and sworn to by the complainant or his counsel. An administrative
proceeding may also be ordered by the Ombudsman or the respective
Deputy Ombudsman on his initiative or on the basis of a complaint originally
filed as a criminal action or a grievance complaint or request for assistance.
The rule against forum shopping prohibits the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Forum
shopping may be committed in three ways: (1) through litis pendentia -filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer,
the previous case not having been resolved yet; 2) through res judicata -filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved; and 3) splitting of causes of
action -filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with
different prayers -the ground to dismiss being either litis pendentia or res
judicata.
Common in these is the identity of causes of action. Cause of action has been
defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another."
In this case, a review of the Affidavit-Complaints separately filed by the
respondents in OMB-M-A-05-104-C and OMB-M-A-05-093-C reveals the
respondents' violation of the prohibition via the first mode, that is, through
litis pendentia. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties,
or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and ( c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata
in the other.
FACTS: Bautista filed a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and award of damages before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities 11 of Palayan City (MTCC) against respondents. They alleged that
respondents, with the help of soldiers from Fort Magsaysay, by means of
stealth, strategy, force, threat, and intimidation, entered the parcels of
land which they have been occupying in the concept of owner for more than
ten ( 10) years. After proceedings, the MTCC ruled in Bautista’s favor and
ordered respondent to vacate the subject land.
On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the MTCC Decision. Finding
respondents to be the lawful possessors of the subject land.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and thereafter granted
respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of execution from which
Bautista, et al. sought reconsideration. The CA, meanwhile, denied Bautista's
Motion for Extension, for failure to pay the required docket fees.
Subsequently, Bautista filed a Petition for Review before the CA, with
appropriate payment of the prescribed docket fees, assailing the RTC Decision
and the Order denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in merely noting without action Bautista,
et al.' s Petition for Review and other subsequent pleadings, thus, denying
them due course.
In this regard, the Rules of Court require that in an appeal by way of a petition
for review, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely
filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. To perfect
the appeal, the party has to file the petition for review and to pay the docket
fees within the prescribed period. The law and its intent are clear and
unequivocal that the petition is perfected upon its filing and the payment of the
docket fees. Consequently, without the petition, the CA cannot be said to have
acquired jurisdiction over the case.
Applying the foregoing parameters, the appellate jurisdiction did not attach
with the filing of J. Bautista's Motion for Extension. Notably, the pleading filed
was a mere motion for extension and not a petition for review, and there was
no payment of the required docket fees.
Besides, J. Bautista filed the motion ostensibly on behalf of the rest of the
petitioners in the courts a quo but records are bereft of evidence to show that
they had authorized him to do so. Thus, in CA-G.R. SP No. 139159-UDK, the
CA did not acquire appellate jurisdiction for two (2) reasons: one, it was merely
a Motion for Extension and not a proper Petition for Review, and two, there was
no payment of the required docket fees.
GRACE PARK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND WOODLINK REALTY
CORP v. EAST WEST BANKING CORP.
G.R. No. 210606
JULY 27, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld the dismissal of Civil Case No.
543-M-2010 pending before the RTC-Malolos on the ground of forum shopping
in the concept of litis pendentia.
RULING: NO, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 543-M-
2010 on the ground of forum shopping and/ or litis pendentia.
FACTS: Petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Isulan, Sultan
Kudarat a case against herein respondents for recovery of possession of real
property, rentals, damages, and attorney's fees, with an additional prayer for
injunctive relief, in connection with a 422,129-square meter parcel of land.
After obtaining a favorable judgment, petitioners executed the same.
Respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Issue an Order to the Sheriff
Prohibiting Him from Executing an Alleged Judgment in the Above-Entitled
Case, seeking to restrain petitioners from enforcing the decision on the
ground that since the record thereof was not reconstituted, then there is no
judgment in said case to be enforced; and that for failure to reconstitute the
record, petitioners have no other recourse but to file the case anew, as Act
No. 311017 requires. The trial court granted the motion, and denied
petitioners’ subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioners filed an original Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which was
denied on various procedural grounds.
First, petitioners’ failure to implead the trial court is not fatal, although
violative of Section 5, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules, which states as follows:
Sec. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. – When the petition filed
relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as
private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or
respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in
the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and
defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent
or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such
proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents
only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or
respondents. Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the
petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an
answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is
elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondents shall be
included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically
directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings
therein.
In Abdulrahman v. The Office of the Ombudsman, this Court held that “neither
the misjoinder nor the non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action,” particularly a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Third, 0n the argument that only one of the heirs, Saya Guiambangan Darus,
verified the CA Petition for Certiorari, without proof of authority to file the same
obtained from the other heirs, this is not fatal. As heirs, they all share a
common interest; indeed, even if the other heirs were not impleaded, the
Petition may be heard, as any judgment should inure to their benefit just the
same. As co-owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for
ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of
possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an
action, even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because
the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.