CASES DIGESTs

GR NO. 103507

1. LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 103507 February 17, 1997

FACTS

Through their separate petitions for review, Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta (Tabuena and Peralta,
for short) appeal the Sandiganbayan decision dated October 12, 1990, as well as the Resolution dated
December 20. 1991 denying reconsideration, convicting them of malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Tabuena and Peralta were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt Of having malversed the total amount of
P55 Million of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) funds during their incumbency as General
Manager and Acting Finance Services Manager, respectively, of MIAA, and were thus meted the following
sentence:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 11758, accused Luis A. Tabuena is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay a fine of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P25,000,000.00), the amount malversed. He shall also reimburse the Manila International Airport
Authority the sum of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00).
In addition, he shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public office,
(2) In Criminal Case No. 11759, accused Luis A. Tabuena is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum, and
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay a fine of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P25,000,000.00), the amount malversed. He shall also reimburse the Manila International
Airport Authority the sum of TWENTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P25,000,000.00).
In addition, he shall suffer the penalty of  perpetual special disqualification from public office.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 11760, accused Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are each sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
minimum and twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and for each of them to pay
separately a fine of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) the amount malversed. They shall also
reimburse jointly and severally the Manila International Airport Authority the sum of FIVE MILLION
PESOS (P5,000,000.00).
In addition, they shall both suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from public office.

A co-accused of Tabuena and Peralta was Gerardo G. Dabao, then Assistant General Manager of MIAA, has
remained at large.

There were three (3) criminal cases filed (nos. 11758, 11759 and 11760) since the total amount of P55
Million was taken on three (3) separate dates of January, 1986. Tabuena appears as the principal accused —
he being charged in all three (3) cases.

The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves, "out of the
ordinary" and "not based on the normal procedure". Not only were there no vouchers prepared to support
the disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55 Million was
presented. Defense witness Francis Monera, then Senior Assistant Vice President and Corporate
Comptroller of PNCC, even affirmed in court that there were no payments made to PNCC by MIAA for the
months of January to June of 1986.

The position of the prosecution was that there were no outstanding obligations in favor of PNCC at the time
of the disbursement of the P55 Million. On the other hand, the defense of Tabuena and Peralta, in short,
was that they acted in good faith. Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying with the MARCOS
Memorandum which ordered him to forward immediately to the Office of the President P55 Million in cash
as partial payment of MIAA's obligations to PNCC, and that he (Tabuena) was of the belief that MIAA indeed
had liabilities to PNCC. Peralta for his part shared the same belief and so he heeded the request of Tabuena,
his superior, for him (Peralta) to help in the release of P5 Million.

ISSUES

With the rejection by the Sandiganbayan of their claim of good faith which ultimately led to their
conviction, Tabuena and Peralta now set forth a total of ten (10) errors committed by the Sandiganbayan
for this Court's consideration. It appears, however, that at the core of their plea that we acquit them are the
following:

1. the Sandiganbayan convicted them of a crime not charged in the amended informations, and
2. they acted in good faith.

RULINGS

Anent the first proposition, Tabuena and Peralta stress that they were being charged with intentional
malversation, as the amended informations commonly allege that: . . . accused . . . conspiring,
confederating and other, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to defraud the
government, take and misappropriated the amount of . . . .

But it would appear that they were convicted of malversation by negligence. In this connection, the Court's
attention is directed to p. 17 of the December 20, 1991 Resolution (denying Tabuena's and Peralta's motion
for reconsideration) wherein the Sandiganbayan said: On the contrary, what the evidence shows is that
accused Tabuena delivered the P55 Million to people who were not entitled thereto, either as
representatives of MIAA or of the PNCC.

It proves that Tabuena had deliberately consented or permitted through negligence or abandonment, some
other person to take such public funds. Having done so, Tabuena, by his own narration, has categorically
demonstrated that he is guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of P55 Million of public funds.
(Emphasis supplied.)

To support their theory that such variance is a reversible flaw, Tabuena and Peralta argue that:

1. While malversation may be committed intentionally or by negligence, both modes cannot be committed
at the same time.
2. The Sandiganbayan was without jurisdiction to convict them of malversation of negligence where the
amended informations charged them with intentional malversation. 7
3. Their conviction of a crime different from that charged violated their constitutional right to be informed
of the accusation.8

We do not agree with Tabuena and Peralta on this point. Illuminative and controlling is "Cabello v.
Sandiganbayan" where the Court passed upon similar protestations raised by therein accused-petitioner
Cabello whose conviction for the same crime of malversation was affirmed, in this wise:

. . . even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by
negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of this case his
conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed
either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the
perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. . . .

In Samson vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., we held that an accused charged with willful or intentional
falsification can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence, thus: While a criminal negligent act
is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in  Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor. G.R. No.
L-6641, July 28, 1995, but a distinct crime in our Penal Code, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal
Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information exclusively
charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.
This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but
from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification
which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not act with criminal intent but
merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as
an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful
falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when
there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this
Tribunal.

Moreover; Section 5, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court does not require that all the essential elements of the
offense charged in the information be proved, it being sufficient that some of said essential elements or
ingredients thereof be established to constitute the crime proved. . . .

The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no
moment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the
result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it would
be incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal
intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.

Subsequently, we ruled in People vs. Consigna, et.  al., that the aforestated rationale and arguments also
apply to the felony of malversation, that is, that an accused charged with willful malversation, in an
information containing allegations similar to those involved in the present case, can be validly convicted of
the same offense of malversation through negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of
perpetrating the offense.
Going now to the defense of good faith, it is settled that this is a valid defense in a prosecution for
malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the accused. Thus, in the two (2) vintage, but
significant malversation cases of "US v. Catolico" and "US v. Elvina,"  the Court stressed that:

To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences as, in law, is equivalent to
criminal intent. The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea — a crime is not committed if the mind
of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.

The rule was reiterated in "People v. Pacana," although this case involved falsification of public documents
and estafa: Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.

In so far as Tabuena is concerned, with the due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS Memorandum we
are swayed to give credit to his claim of having caused the disbursement of the P55 Million solely by reason
of such memorandum. From this premise flows the following reasons and/or considerations that would
buttress his innocence of the crime of malversation.

First. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS
Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the
presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said than done. Marcos was undeniably
Tabuena's superior — the former being then the President of the Republic who unquestionably exercised
control over government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. 

Thus, even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the
subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith. Such is the
ruling in "Nassif v. People" the facts of which, in brief, are as follows:

Accused was charged with falsification of commercial document. A mere employee of R.J. Campos, he
inserted in the commercial document alleged to have been falsified the word "sold" by order of his
principal. Had he known or suspected that his principal was committing an improper act of falsification, he
would be liable either as a co-principal or as an accomplice. However, there being no malice on his part, he
was exempted from criminal liability as he was a mere employee following the orders of his principal. 

Second. There is no denying that the disbursement, which Tabuena admitted as "out of the ordinary", did
not comply with certain auditing rules and regulations such as those pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, to
wit:

a) [except for salaries and wages and for commutation of leaves] all disbursements above P1,000.00
should be made by check (Basic Guidelines for Internal Control dated January 31, 1977 issued by
COA)
b) payment of all claims against the government had to be supported with complete documentation
(Sec. 4, P.D. 1445, "State Auditing Code of the Philippines). In this connection, the Sandiganbayan
observed that:
There were no vouchers to authorize the disbursements in question. There were no bills to support
the disbursement. There were no certifications as to the availability of funds for an unquestionably
staggering sum of P55 Million. 
c) failure to protest (Sec. 106, P.D. 1445)

But this deviation was inevitable under the circumstances Tabuena was in. He did not have the luxury of
time to observe all auditing procedures of disbursement considering the fact that the MARCOS
Memorandum enjoined his "immediate compliance" with the directive that he forward to the President's
Office the P55 Million in cash. Be that as it may, Tabuena surely cannot escape responsibility for such
omission. But since he was acting in good faith, his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature,
and not criminal. This follows the decision in "Villacorta v. People" where the Court, in acquitting therein
accused municipal treasurer of Pandan, Catanduanes of malversation after finding that he incurred a
shortage in his cash accountability by reason of his payment in good faith to certain government personnel
of their legitimate wages leave allowances, etc., held that: Nor can negligence approximating malice or
fraud be attributed to petitioner. If he made wrong payments, they were in Good faith mainly to
government personnel, some of them working at the provincial auditor's and the provincial treasurer's
offices And if those payments ran counter to auditing rules and regulations, they did not amount to a
criminal offense and he should only be held administratively or civilly liable.

Likewise controlling is "US v. Elvina" where it was held that payments in good faith do not amount to
criminal appropriation, although they were made with insufficient vouchers or improper evidence. In fact,
the Dissenting Opinion's reference to certain provisions in the revised Manual on Certificate of Settlement
and Balances — apparently made to underscore Tabuena's personal accountability, as agency head, for
MIAA funds — would all the more support the view that Tabuena is vulnerable to civil sanctions only
Sections 29.2 and 295 expressly and solely speak of "civilly liable," describe the kind of sanction imposable
on a superior officer who performs his duties with "bad faith, malice or gross negligence"' and on a
subordinate officer or employee who commits "willful or negligent acts . . . which are contrary to law,
morals, public policy and good customs even if he acted under order or instructions of his superiors."

Third. The Sandiganbayan made the finding that Tabuena had already converted and misappropriated the
P55 Million when he delivered the same to Mrs. Gimenez and not to the PNCC, proceeding from the
following definitions/concepts of "conversion": "Conversion", as necessary element of offense of
embezzlement, being the fraudulent "appropriation to one's own use' of another's property which does not
necessarily mean to one's personal advantage but every attempt by one person to dispose of the goods of
another without right as if they were his own is conversion to his own use." (Terry v. Water Improvement
Dist. No. 5 of Tulsa County, 64 p, 2d 904, 906, 179 Okl. 106) — At p. 207, Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition 9A.

Conversion is any interference subversive of the right of the owner of personal property to enjoy and
control it. The gist of conversion is the usurpation of the owner 's right of property, and not the actual
damages inflicted. Honesty of purpose is not a defense. (Ferrera v. Parks, 23 p. 883, 885 19 Or. 141) — At
page 168, id.

The words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it
were one's own. They presuppose that the thing has been devoted to a purpose or use different from that
agreed upon. To appropriate to one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage but
every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. — People vs. Webber, 57 O.G. p. 2933,
2937

By placing them at the disposal of private persons without due authorization or legal justification, he
became as guilty of malversation as if he had personally taken them and converted them to his own use. —
People vs. Luntao, 50 O.G. p. 1182, 1183 

We do not agree. It must be stressed that the MARCOS Memorandum directed Tabuena "to pay
immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this office the sum of FIFTY FIVE
MILLION. . .", and that was what Tabuena precisely did when he delivered the money to Mrs. Gimenez. Such
delivery, no doubt, is in effect delivery to the Office of the President inasmuch as Mrs. Gimenez was Marcos'
secretary then. Furthermore, Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to
receive the P55 Million since he was certainly aware that Marcos, as Chief Executive, exercised supervision
and control over government agencies. And the good faith of Tabuena in having delivered the money to the
President's office (thru Mrs. Gimenez), in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum, was not at all
affected even if it later turned out that PNCC never received the money. Thus, it has been said that: Good
faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation.

Not every unauthorized payment of public funds is malversation. There is malversation only if the public
officer who has custody of public funds should appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or
shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public
funds. Where the payment of public funds has been made in good faith, and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the public officer to whom the fund had been paid was entitled thereto, he is deemed to have
acted in good faith, there is no criminal intent, and the payment, if it turns out that it is unauthorized,
renders him only civilly but not criminally liable.

Fourth. Even assuming that the real and sole purpose behind the MARCOS Memorandum was to siphon-
out public money for the personal benefit of those then in power, still, no criminal liability can be imputed
to Tabuena. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do whatsoever with the execution of the
MARCOS Memorandum. Nor is there proof that he profited from the felonious scheme. In short, no
conspiracy was established between Tabuena and the real embezzler/s of the P5 Million. In the cases of "US
v. Acebedo" and "Ang v. Sandiganbayan", both also involving the crime of malversation, the accused therein
were acquitted after the Court arrived at a similar finding of non-proof of conspiracy. In "Acebedo", therein
accused, as municipal president of Palo, Leyte, was prosecuted for and found guilty by the lower court of
malversation after being unable to turn over certain amounts to the then justice of the peace. It appeared,
however, that said amounts were actually collected by his secretary Crisanto Urbina. The Court reversed
Acebedo's conviction after finding that the sums were converted by his secretary Urbina without the
knowledge and participation of Acebedo. The Court said, which we herein adopt:

No conspiracy between the appellant and his secretary has been shown in this case, nor did such conspiracy
appear in the case against Urbina. No guilty knowledge of the theft committed by the secretary was shown
on the part of the appellant in this case, nor does it appear that he in any way participated in the fruits of
the crime. If the secretary stole the money in question without the knowledge or consent of the appellant
and without negligence on his part, then certainly the latter can not be convicted of embezzling the same
money or any part thereof.

In "Ang", accused-petitioner, as MWSS bill collector, allowed part of his collection to be converted into
checks drawn in the name of one Marshall Lu, a non-customer of MWSS, but the checks were subsequently
dishonored. Ang was acquitted by this Court after giving credence to his assertion that the conversion of his
collections into checks were thru the machinations of one Lazaro Guinto, another MWSS collector more
senior to him. And we also adopt the Court's observation therein, that:

The petitioner's alleged negligence in allowing the senior collector to convert cash collections into checks
may be proof of poor judgment or too trusting a nature insofar as a superior officer is concerned but there
must be stronger evidence to show fraud, malice, or other indicia of deliberateness in the conspiracy
cooked up with Marshall Lu. The prosecution failed to show that the petitioner was privy to the
conspirational scheme. Much less is there any proof that he profited from the questioned acts. Any
suspicions of conspiracy, no matter how sincerely and strongly felt by the MWSS, must be converted into
evidence before conviction beyond reasonable doubt may be imposed. 

The principles underlying all that has been said above in exculpation of Tabuena equally apply to Peralta in
relation to the P5 Million for which he is being held accountable, i.e., he acted in good faith when he, upon
the directive of Tabuena, helped facilitate the withdrawal of P5 Million of the P55 Million of the MIAA
funds.

This is not a sheer case of blind and misguided obedience, but obedience in good faith of a duly executed
order. Indeed, compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude far better than contumacious
disobedience. In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the
signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it
was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of
an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly
without question. Obedientia est legis essentia. Besides, the case could not be detached from the realities
then prevailing as aptly observed by Mr Justice Cruz in his dissenting opinion:

We reject history in arbitrarily assuming that the people were free during the era and that the Judiciary was
independent and fearless. We know it was not: even the Supreme Court at that time was not free. This is an
undeniable fact that we can not just blink away. Insisting on the contrary would only make our sincerity
suspect and even provoke scorn for what can only be described as our incredible credulity. 

But what appears to be a more compelling reason for their acquittal is the violation of the accused's basic
constitutional right to due process. "Respect for the Constitution", to borrow once again Mr. Justice Cruz's
words, "is more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the
accused." While going over the records, we were struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in
the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. Tabuena and Peralta may not have
raised this as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for us to consider such matter as additional
basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it
becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed
from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not. 

This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his
mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides.  But
not only should his examination be limited to asking "clarificatory" questions,  the right should be sparingly
and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither
interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial. Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in
fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had
taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the Justices
cross-examined the witnesses, their cross- examinations supplementing those made by Prosecutor Viernes
and far exceeding the latter's questions in length. The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of
due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed
the dual role of magistrate and advocate. In this connection, the observation made in the Dissenting
Opinion to the effect that the majority of this Court was "unduly disturbed" with the number of court
questions alone, is quite inaccurate. A substantial portion of the TSN was incorporated in the majority
opinion not to focus on "numbers" alone, but more importantly to show that the court questions were in
the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from that common standard of fairness and
impartiality. In fact, it is very difficult to be, upon review of the records, confronted with "numbers" without
necessarily realizing the partiality of the Court. In "US v. De Sisto" (2 Cir., 1961, 289 F 2d 833), for example, a
new trial was required because the trial judge, as in this case, indulged in extensive questioning of
defendant and his witnesses, and the reviewing court also had to amplify on "numbers" to bolster this. It
was pointed out in the "De Sisto" case that the judge asked 3,115 questions of all witnesses, the prosecutor
asked but 1,381, defense counsel 3,330. The judge's questions to the defendant De Sisto totalled 306, the
prosecutor's 347, and the defense counsel's, 201. After referring to these figures, the court stated: . . . It is
indeed an impressive proportion, but no such mathematical computation is of itself determinative.
However, taking all this in conjunction with the long and vigorous examination of the defendant himself by
the judge, and the repeated belittling by the judge of defendant's efforts to establish the time that Fine left
the pier, we fear that in its zeal for arriving at the facts the court here conveyed to the jury too strong an
impression of the court's belief in the defendant's probable guilt to permit the jury freely to perform its own
function of independent determination of the facts. . . .
The majority believes that the interference by the Sandiganbayan Justices was just too excessive that it
cannot be justified under the norm applied to a jury trial, or even under the standard employed in a non-
jury trial where the judge is admittedly given more leeway in propounding questions to clarify points and to
elicit additional relevant evidence. At the risk of being repetitious, we will amplify on this via some specific
examples. Based on the evidence on record, and on the admission of Tabuena himself, the P55 million was
delivered to the President's Office thru Mrs. Gimenez, in obedience to the Presidential directive.

A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to create the impression that he is
allied with the prosecution.

We doubt not that the sole motive of the learned judge was to ascertain the truth of the transaction, but it
is never proper for a judge to discharge the duties of a prosecuting attorney. However anxious a judge may
be for the enforcement of the law, he should always remember that he is as much judge in behalf of the
defendant accused of crime, and whose liberty is in jeopardy, as he is judge in behalf of the state, for the
purpose of safeguarding the interests of society. 

Ordinarily it is not good practice for the presiding judge himself to examine witnesses at length. The
circumstances may be such in a given case as to justify the court in so doing. . . . This court, however, has
more than once said that the examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and the
instances are rare and the conditions exceptional which will justify the presiding judge in conducting an
extensive examination. It is always embarrassing for counsel to object to what he may deem improper
questions by the court. Then, in conducting a lengthy examination, it would be almost impossible for the
judge to preserve a judicial attitude. While he is not a mere figurehead or umpire in a trial, and it is his duty
to see that justice is done, he will usually not find it necessary to conduct such examinations. The extent to
which this shall be done must largely be a matter of discretion, to be determined by the circumstances of
each particular case, but in so doing he must not forget the function of the judge and assume that of an
advocate. . . 

While it is true that the manner in which a witness shall be examined is largely in the discretion of the trial
judge, it must be understood that we have not adopted in this country the practice of making the presiding
judge the chief inquisitor. It is better to observe our time-honored custom of orderly judicial procedure,
even at the expense of occasional delays. . . . The judge is an important figure in the trial of a cause, and
while he has the right, and it is often his duty, to question witnesses to the end that justice shall prevail, we
can conceive of no other reason, for him to take the trial of the cause out of the hands of counsel. 

The examination of witnesses is the more appropriate function of counsel, and it is believed the instances
are rare and the conditions exceptional in a high degree which will justify the presiding judge in entering
upon and conducting an extended examination of a witness, and that the exercise of a sound discretion will
seldom deem such action necessary or advisable. 

He [the judge] may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and prevent unnecessary
waste of time, or to clear up some obscurity, but he should bear in mind that his undue interference,
impatience, or participation in, the examination of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward
witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial, may tend to
prevent the proper presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto. 

The impartiality of the judge — his avoidance of the appearance of becoming the advocate of either one
side or the other of the pending controversy is a fundamental and essential rule of special importance in
criminal cases. . . 

Our courts, while never unmindful of their primary duty to administer justice, without fear or favor, and to
dispose of these cases speedily and in as inexpensive a manner as is possible for the court and the parties,
should refrain from showing any semblance of one-sided or more or less partial attitude in order not to
create any false impression in the minds of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it is the bounden duty of all to
strive for the preservation of the people's faith in our courts.

Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. Bolstering this requirement, we have added that the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The
parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process. 

We are well aware of the fear entertained by some that this decision may set a dangerous precedent in that
those guilty of enriching themselves at the expense of the public would be able to escape criminal liability
by the mere expedient of invoking "good faith". It must never be forgotten, however, that we render justice
on a case to case basis, always in consideration of the evidence that is presented. Thus, where the evidence
warrants an acquittal, as in this case, we are mandated not only by the dictates of law but likewise of
conscience to grant the same. On the other hand, it does not follow that all those similarly accused will
necessarily be acquitted upon reliance on this case as a precedent. For the decision in this case to be a
precedent, the peculiar circumstances and the evidence that led to the petitioner's acquittal must also be
present in subsequent cases.
Furthermore, as between a mere apprehension of a "dangerous precedent" and an actual violation of
constitutionally enshrined rights, it is definitely the latter that merits our immediate attention. For the most
dangerous precedent arises when we allow ourselves to be carried away by such fears so that it becomes
lawful to sacrifice the rights of an accused to calm the fearful. In our eagerness to bring to justice the
malefactors of the Marcos regime, we must not succumb to the temptation to commit the greatest injustice
of visiting the sins of the wrongdoers upon an innocent.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, herein petitioners Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Sandiganbayan Decision of October 12, 1990 and the Resolution dated December 20, 1991 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.