2019 Political Law and PIL - Loanzon
2019 Political Law and PIL - Loanzon
2019 Political Law and PIL - Loanzon
I.
A, B, C and D attended a high school reunion in their hometown in Dagupan, Pangasinan and forged an
agreement to serve the country.
1. A together with his three siblings and his parents migrated to the United States of America in
1980 and after of five years of residence, all members of his family became American citizens. A
was born on June 20, 1975.
2. B decided not to return to his hometown in San Fernando, La Union after he completed his
college degree in Manila. He married X and they chose to live in Sampaloc, Manila for the past
ten years.
3. C married an Australian but decided to settle in Cebu City where her husband works as Resident
Manager of Marionette Hotel.
4. D was convicted of libel in 2001 and has served his sentence.
A, B, and C sought your advice regarding their intention to run for elective positions in the 2022 elections:
1. A wants to run for the Senate.
2. A wants to run as congressional district representative of San Fernando, La Union.
3. C wants to run as Mayor of Cebu City.
4. D wants to become a nominee of Ang Buhay Party
B. What is the rationale behind the requirement of Philippine citizenship under the Philippine electoral
process?
Answer: If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total
loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. The
right to govern by virtue of a mandate from the people is not absolute. The Supreme Court has
held that the will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. (Frivaldo
v. COMELEC, 1996)
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2. An intention to remain there; and
3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.
To successfully effect a change of domicile-
1. one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence; and
3. establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
II.
Rite Education Company (“MEC”) is a stock corporation with 40% of its stocks owned by Filipino citizens,
30% of its shares of stocks are owned by Japanese nationals and the remaining 30% are owned by
Korean nationals. MEC established Rite Learning Center, a school which has been organized exclusively
for Japanese and Korean students only. MEC is presently leasing a five (5) hectare property in BGC,
Taguig. The School Principal is M who is a French national and is married to O, a diplomat of the French
Embassy.
During her tenure, M also expelled N, a student charged with cheating.
She also dismissed P, a janitor of Rite Learning Center, because he stinks for wearing the same set of
clothes every day.
E. Can MEC purchase the property it presently leases? Justify your answer.
Answer: No, MEC cannot purchase the property it presently leases because it is not qualified
since it is not considered a Filipino company since majority of its stockholders are aliens.
Section 7 of Article XII of the Constitution provides that save in cases of hereditary succession,
no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. The same article provides
that only corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by
Filipino citizens are qualified to own lands in the Philippines.
F. Enumerate the nationalist and citizenship requirement provisions under the Constitution.
Answer: The nationalist and citizenship requirement provisions under the Constitution are:
1. Section 2, paragraph 1, Article XII: The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as
may provided by law.
2. Section 2, paragraph 4, Article XII: The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the
general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country.
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3. Section 3, Article XII: Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
4. Section 7, Article XII: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.
5. Section 8, Article XII: Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
6. Section 10, Article XII: The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens,
or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The
Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
7. Section 11, Article XII: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
8. Section 14, Article XII: The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting
of Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and
skilled workers and craftsmen in all fields shall be promoted by the State. The State shall
encourage appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for the national benefit. The practice
of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed
by law.
9. Sec. 4(2), Art. XIV: Educational institutions, except those established by religious groups and
mission boards, must be owned solely by Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least
60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizen. The control and administration of all
education institutions shall be vested in Filipino citizens.
10. Section 11, Article XVI: The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and
managed by such citizens. 11. Section 11, Article XVI, Constitution: Only Filipino citizens or
corporations or associations at least seventy per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry.
III.
The Senate conducted a hearing on the Good Conduct Time Allowance Law. The Blue Ribbon
Committee of the Senate sent out invitations to different officials of the Bureau of Corrections, the
Department of Justice and the Philippine National Police.
Senator G, the Chairman of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee used abusive language during the day
when Chief PNP A testified.
Senator L asked a series of questions to Dr. B, the Medical Director of the Bureau of Corrections but Dr.
B continued to refuse to cooperate with the congressional inquiry.
Dr. B was ordered detained in the Pasay City Jail.
After the congressional inquiry, the Senate approved the bill which amended the Good Conduct Time
Allowance. Senator X was absent when the bill was approved on final and third reading. On the next
session day, she moved for the reopening of the deliberations of the amended Good Conduct Time
Allowance bill. She argued that she had very important matters which not incorporated in the amended
law. Senator Y opposed the motion of Senator X to reopen the deliberations. At this instance, Senator X
slapped Senator Y. The Senate President ruled Senator X’s conduct as out of order. The slapping
incident was referred to the Committee on Ethics which characterized that Senator X’s behavior as
disorderly. The Senate by a vote of two-thirds of all its members ordered Senator X suspended for 90
days.
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matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires
and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session. ”
C. May the Senate compel a witness to appear before it? May it cite a witness in contempt during a
congressional inquiry?
Answer: Yes, the Senate may cite a witness in contempt during a congressional inquiry. If the
subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its
process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79
S.E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)
D. May the Senate detain Dr. B for an indefinite period a person cited in contempt?
Answer: No, the Senate may not detain for an indefinite period a person cited in contempt. While
the contempt order issued against petitioner simply stated that he would be arrested and detained
until such time that he gives his true testimony, or otherwise purges himself of the contempt. It
does not provide any definite and concrete period of detention. Neither does the Senate Rules
specify a precise period of detention when a person is cited in contempt.
The Court finds that there is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of
imprisonment that may be imposed by the Senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt
during inquiries in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of
legislation, must respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein. (Balag v. Senate)
E. What instances will merit the release of a detained witness cited in contempt by the Senate?
Answer: The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by
the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the
legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked; and the Senate adjourns. (Balag v.
Senate)
F. May Senator X assail her 90-day suspension before the Supreme Court? Justify your answer.
Answer: Yes, Senator X may assail her 90-day suspension because the Senate imposed a penalty
longer than what is prescribed in the Constitution. Paragraph 3 of Section 16 of Article VI provides
that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member.
A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
Only the Senate can define what is disorderly behavior but it can only exercise its power of
suspension or expulsion within limits provided by law.
IV.
Congress enacted R.A. 9522 which conforms to UNCLOS III prescribing the land-based ratio, length and
contour of baselines of archipelagic states and sets the deadline for filing of application for the extended
continental shelf. A group of fishermen challenged the constitutionality of the law for shortening the
baselines of the country and classified adjacent territories of Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough
Shoal as “regimes of islands” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zone.
A. What is UNCLOS?
Answer: UNCLOS stands for the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea. It is also
known as the Law of the Sea Treaty or the Law of the Sea Convention. It is an international
agreement or treaty which establishes a regulatory framework and guidelines for using the
world’s oceans and seas so as to use and conserve marine resources and to ensure the
preservation and protection of all the living beings of the sea.
C. Is the claim of the fishermen correct that in complying with UNCLOS III, R.A. 9522 shortened the
baselines of the country which effectively reduced the territory of the Philippines?
Answer: UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement
or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States
acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not
by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to
comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial
claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general
international law.
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D. Is the claim of the fishermen that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw
the baselines and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shaol "weakens our territorial claim" over that area tenable?
Answer: The fishermen’s assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial
waters" under RA 9522 is unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing
the location of base points, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal
waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles.
F. Was there a need to enact R.A. 9522 just to comply with the provisions of UNCLOS III?
Answer: Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines
will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its
maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it
sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the
waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case
in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress
wisely avoided when it enacted R.A. 9522.
V.
The 2019 General Appropriations Act contains a provision on the funds allocated to the Pension and
Gratuity Fund of the Armed Forces of the Philippines which reads as follows:
“4. Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff of the of the AFP is authorized subject to the approval of
the President, to use the savings in the appropriations provided herein to augment the pension
fund being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System.”
The same law provided for the creation of an oversight committee composed of the members of Congress
which will review the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the requirements in order to avail of the new
schedule of pensions of retired AFP personnel.
Note: Tests for valid delegation of powers: Completeness Test and Sufficient Test
B. What is the Principle of Non-delegability of Legislative Power? What are the exceptions thereto?
Answer: As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively
exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. The only recognized
exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by
immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and (b) constitutionally-
grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or
fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government. [Belgica v
Ochoa G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013].
C. What is the general rule utilization of funds under the General Appropriations Acct?
Answer: In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still
be that the budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will
determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency. The only exception
is found in Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution, by which the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to
augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from the savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
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D. Rule on the validity of the creation of the oversight committee.
Answer: The creation of the oversight committee is not valid. Any post-enactment measures
undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and investigation; any measure
beyond that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
VI.
Congress enacted the General Appropriations Act (GAA) in 2013 which provided PDAF Article known as
the Pork Barrel Fund which allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they have the
technical capability to implement the projects. Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects,
except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that
he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the
Speaker of the House. Finally, any realignment of PDAF (Pork Barrel Fund) funds, modification and
revision of project identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case
may be.
The P24.79B PDAF Article was included in the appropriation of the Office of the President. Upon approval
of the 2013 GAA, the members of Congress individually identified the projects they wish to implement in
their congressional district and asked for the release of the funds for the said project.
A. Does the Pork Barrel System violate the Principle of Separation of Powers? Explain.
Answer: Yes, the enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is
indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive
branch of government.
At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the
projects and the authority in the areas of fund release and realignment through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations.
Any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget,
unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional. (Belgica v Ochoa G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013)
B. What is the Principle of Checks and Balances? Give an example written in our Constitution.
Answer: The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and
distinct does not mean that they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has also provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an
item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval
through a process known as "bill presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in
Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. (Belgica v Ochoa G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 &
209251, November 19, 2013)
C. How does the Pork Barrel System violate the Principle of Checks and Balances?
Answer: Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on
their own discretion. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting
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system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto.
The above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire
₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may
or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the
detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects. (Belgica v Ochoa G.R. Nos. 208566,
208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013)
D. How does the Pork Barrel System violate the Principle of Non-delegability of Legislative Power?
Answer: Insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, it
violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress (Belgica v Ochoa
G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013)
E. What is the definition of “savings”? Does the Constitution allow cross-transfer of funds?
Answer: Savings refer to the money left over from GAA-authorized items which are “authorized
was completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned”; or because the policy targets were reached
at lower cost due to increased efficiencies; or because of vacant government positions or leaves
of-absence without pay. It does not include money that are budgeted/allotted but not yet used
(unobligated allotments).
Cross-border transfers of cross-border augmentations are transfers from one office to another
office in the guise of augmentation of items. It is impermissible because Sec. 25(5) of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution authorizes only the listed officials to augment items in their respective
offices. Sec. 25(5), Article VI allows for transfer of funds provided the following requisites are
present:
1.There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions (list is exclusive) to transfer funds within their respective offices.
2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations of their respective
offices; and
3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices. Augmentation implies the existence in this Act of a program, activity, or project
with an appropriation, which upon implementation, or subsequent evaluation of needed
resources, is determined to be deficient. In no case shall a non-existent program, activity, or
project, be funded by augmentation from savings or by the use of appropriations otherwise
authorized. (Araullo v. Aquino, 2014)
VII.
U.P. executed a contract with Stern Builders Company but failed to pay the full balance due on the
contract. Stern Builders Company sued U.P. and the trial court ordered U.P. liable for damages and
ordered the garnishment of its funds.
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B. May the trial court order the garnishment of funds of U.P. to cover the balance of its obligation and the
award of damages?
Answer: The RTC had no authority to direct the immediate withdrawal of any portion of the
garnished funds from the depository banks of the UP. By eschewing utmost caution, prudence
and judiciousness in dealing with the execution and garnishment, and by authorizing the
withdrawal of the garnished funds of the UP, the RTC acted beyond its jurisdiction, and all its
orders and issuances thereon were void and of no legal effect. Such orders and issuances should
be struck down without exception.
C. What is the remedy of the party in the event government is adjudged liable for a monetary obligation?
Answer: It is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of State liability, the prosecution,
enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and
procedures laid down in P.D. No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines (Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, 701-02 1993 citing Republic vs.
Villasor, 54 SCRA 84 1973). All money claims against the Government must first be filed with the
Commission on Audit which must act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will
authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect, sue
the State thereby (P.D. 1445, Sections 49-50).
VIII.
Z recently passed the bar examinations and he is presently working with the House of Representatives.
He has been assigned to review draft bills and monitors the progress of every bill for deliberation in the
plenary.
B. What are the limitations in the passage of laws through referendum and initiative?
Answer: The limitations on local initiatives:
(a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local
legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the
proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if
they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.
Any proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the system of initiative and
referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative
body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or
repealed by the local legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths
(3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1)
year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.
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E. What is the Doctrine of Necessary Implication?
Answer: Every statute is understood by implication to contain all such provisions as may be
necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be
fairly and logically inferred from its terms.
F. May Congress provide that the law granting the rights to OFWs may only be amended or repealed by a
2/3 vote by all members of both Houses of Congress must be obtained to repeal or amend any of its
provisions?
Answer: No, because such voting requirement is not enshrined in the Constitution and directly
curtails the power of Congress to enact and repeal laws.
H. Is it possible that a bill will pass into a law without undergoing three readings on three separate days?
Answer: A bill may pass into a law without undergoing three readings on three separate days
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
IX.
Congress enacted a law which created two additional districts in the Province of Camarines Sur. Senator
A and Mayor R of Naga City challenged the constitutionality of the law arguing that Naga City has less
than 500,000 inhabitants to merit an additional district.
S, a resident of Naga City, successfully registered Ako Bicol Party List. He is 24 years old and was
nominated by Ako Bicol as its No. 1 nominee. T, U, V and W were also included in the list of nominees.
Ako Bicol won two seats.
C. May Congress delegate the power to create provinces to the Regional Assembly of ARMM?
Answer: Under the constitution, each province shall have at least one (1) representative. Thus, the
creation of a province carries with it the creation of legislative district. Only Congress can create
legislative district. Therefore, only Congress can create a province (Sema vs. COMELEC).
F. Assume that Naga City is a component city and will be upgraded into a highly-urbanized city. Will the
plebiscite be limited only to the voters of Naga City?
Answer: No, the plebiscite must include all the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur because
the upgrading of Naga City into a highly urbanized city will substantially affect the economic
situation of the entire province.
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G. Who may participate under the party list system?
Answer: The following may participate under the party list system: national political parties,
regional parties and sectoral parties or organizations. In the event, a national party will participate
under the party list system, it cannot field any candidate in the regular congressional districts.
(Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC, April 2, 2013)
H. Considering that Ako Bicol has won two seats, may T, U, V and W enter into a term sharing
agreement?
Answer: T, U, V and W cannot enter into a term sharing agreement as this is against public policy.
Under the party list system, the candidate is the party list and not the nominees. Each nominee
must finish his complete term of three years.
I. May the qualification of the party list be challenged before the HRET for being a party representing a
particular religious sect?
Answer: No, the HRET cannot resolve the challenge regarding the qualification of the party list for
being a party representing a particular religious sect. It can only resolve the issues related to the
qualifications of the nominees of the party list. The challenge as to the qualification of the party
list belongs to the COMELEC. COMELEC has jurisdiction over the accreditation and registration of
a party list member.
J. May a member of HRET be removed for being disloyal to his political party?
Answer: No, as a political party, LDP cannot remove its representative in the HRET on the ground
of disloyalty for having cast a vote against a member of a party which has an alliance with it. A
representative must serve his full term of three years. The removal of a member of the HRET is not
within the jurisdiction of the political body. It is independent tribunal. (Bondoc v. Pineda)
M. What are the grounds for substitution in the nominees under the party list system?
Answer: The party list law allows substitution only when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee
withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.
N. May COMELEC provide for another ground to allow a party list to substitute a nominee?
Answer: No, this will violate the principle on delegation of powers.
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To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be
valid:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.
The Legislature deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter
the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee
dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes
incapacitated. By providing another ground for substitution, COMELEC’s resolution allowing
another nominee to take the place of Lokin is considered ultra vires.(Lokin v. COMELEC)
O. Must the party list members be limited to the poor members of society?
Answer: No, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political
parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his
or her legislative district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. To
require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties from the party-list system. It is sufficient that the political party consists of
citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens. The nominees of the sectoral party either
must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector
represented. (Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC)
X.
A. Can Congressman Jalosjos be allowed to attend to his congressional duties after he was convicted of
the crimes of two counts of Statutory Rape and six counts of Acts of Lasciviousness?
Answer: Congressman Jalosjos cannot be allowed to attend to his congressional duties after he
was convicted of the crimes of two counts of Statutory Rape and six counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness. He must suffer the penalty imposed by the court as he is not covered by any
immunity nor is there a legal basis for granting liberty to a convicted felon. The crimes he
committed are punishable by more than six years so he cannot even invoke freedom from arrest.
(People v. Jalosjos)
B. Senator Trillanes was elected senator while he was undergoing court martial proceedings and criminal
prosecution for coup d etat. He asked the trial court to allow him to attend to his duties as a member of
the Senate outside the confines of the military barracks. He distinguished his situation from Cong.
Jalosjos who was already convicted. Will the petition of Sen. Trillanes prosper?
Answer: The petition of Senator Trillanes will not prosper. It is impractical to draw a line between
convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while
pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their
detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public. Allowing accused-appellant to
attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system. (Trillanes v. Hon. Pimentel, Sr.)
C. Mr. Antero Pobre filed an administrative complaint against Senator Miriam Santiago who in her
privilege speech called the Supreme Court as a court of idiots. Will the administrative complaint prosper?
Answer: Mr. Antero Pobre’s administrative complaint against Senator Miriam Santiago will not
prosper. While, she called the Supreme Court as a court of idiots in her privilege speech, she
protected by parliamentary immunity. Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
“A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. ”
XI.
A. Enumerate the legislative inhibitions and disqualifications for members of Congress.
Answer: The legislative inhibitions and disqualifications for members of Congress are:
1. A member of Congress may not hold any other office or employment in the government
during his term without forfeiting his seat. (Art. VI, Sec. 13) The provision refers to an
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incompatible office. Forfeiture of the seat in Congress shall be automatic upon the
member’s assumption of such office deemed incompatible.
2. A member of Congress may not be appointed to any office created or whose emoluments
were increased during the term for which he was elected. (Art. VI, Sec. 13) The provision
refers to a forbidden office. He cannot validly take the office even if he is willing to give up
his seat.
3. A member of Congress shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any
contract with, or franchise or special privilege granted by the government during his term
of office. (Art. VI, Sec. 14)
4. A member of Congress shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the
government when it is for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office. (Art. VI, Sec. 14)
5. A member of Congress cannot personally appear as counsel before any court, electoral
tribunal, quasi-judicial and administrative bodies during his term of office. (Art. VI, Sec.
14)
B. Gordon is an incumbent senator and is also the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross. A quo
warranto proceeding was filed against him to vacate his seat. Will the challenge prosper?
Answer: No, the challenge will not prosper. An incumbent Senator may be elected Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross without forfeiting his seat in the Senate because it is not a private
corporation within the contemplation of Section 14, Article XII of the Constitution. It is a sui
generis corporation. Its function is to assist the state in complying with its obligations under the
Geneva Convention. (Liban v. Gordon, 2011)
C. Incumbent Senator Cayetano was appointed Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Can he still keep his senate
seat?
Answer: No, he cannot because this is an incompatible office. An incompatible office is any office
that, if held by a member of Congress, would result to the forfeiture of his seat in Congress.
D. During her 2nd and last term, Senator Bamby sponsored and voted for the approval of a new office.
After ending her term, she was appointed to this office. Is the appointment of Senator Bamby valid?
Answer: The appointment of Senator Bamby is not valid. The Constitution prohibits that the
holding what is known as forbidden office. The prohibition includes offices which have been
created or the emoluments of which were increased while the legislator was a member of
Congress. The member of Congress cannot occupy the office even if he or she is willing to give
up his/her seat.
G. Upon convening the 17th Congress, Rep. Alvarez was elected Speaker of the House; while Reps.
Baguilat and Suarez came as second and third-placers for the speakership respectively. As the House
minority convened, they elected Rep. Suarez as the Minority Floor Leader for the 17 th Congress. Rep.
Baguilat protested arguing, among others, that there is a long-standing practice in the House of
Representatives that the second-placer in the election of the Speaker would automatically become the
Minority Floor Leader. As such, Rep. Suarez’s election as Minority Floor Leader contravenes Article VI,
Section 16(1) of the 1987 Constitution. Are Rep. Baguilat’s contentions correct?
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Answer: No, under Article VI, Section 16(1), the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be
elected by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the method and
manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole control. In the case of
Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, which involved a dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader
during the 11th Congress (1998-2001), this Court observed that “[w]hile the Constitution is explicit
on the manner of electing x x x [a Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is, however, dead
silent on the manner of selecting the other officers [of the Lower House]. All that the Charter says
is that ‘[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.’ [As such], the
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must
be prescribed by the [House of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court.” (Baguilat v Alvarez,
G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017)
XIII.
What is the Doctrine of Shifting Majority?
Answer: For each House of Congress to pass a bill, only the votes of the majority of those present
in the session, there being a quorum, is required.
Shifting Majority
Action Vote Required Senate and Basis
Override presidential veto 2/3 Separately (House where Art. VI, Sec. 27(1)
bill originated votes first)
Special Cases:
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Action Vote Required Senate and Basis
XIV.
B. May the Senate version of the General Appropriations Act prevail over that of the House of the
Representatives after reconciling conflicting provisions during a bicameral conference committee
meeting?
Answer: Yes, the Senate version of the General Appropriations Act may prevail over that of the
House of the Representatives after reconciling conflicting provisions during a bicameral
conference committee meeting. (Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance)
E. In line with the Presidential Line-Item Veto power, what characteristic/s must an item of appropriation
have?
Answer: An item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence –
meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise
known as a “line-item.” This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition
as a “specific appropriation of money” but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto
the same (Belgica v Ochoa G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013).
F. In line with the Presidential Line-Item Veto power, what characteristic/s must the special purpose and
discretionary funds have?
Answer: Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer,
or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." Meanwhile, with respect to
discretionary funds, Section 25(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said funds
“shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and
subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.” (Belgica v Ochoa G.R. Nos. 208566,
208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013).
G. What is legislative veto? Is legislative veto a form of post enactment participation on the part of
Congress?
Answer: Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which,
by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or
disapprove such regulations before they take effect. Legislative veto is a form of post enactment
participation of Congress because it violates the principle of separation of powers. From the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
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separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional (Abakada Guru Party-list vs. Purisima, G.R. No.
166715)
XV.
A. Rule on the validity of following ordinances of the City of XYZ:
1. An ordinance imposing garbage fee
2. An ordinance imposing Socialized Housing Tax
3. An ordinance imposing local tax on the terminal fees collecting by the airport authority in its jurisdiction
4. An ordinance designating areas for public parking space
5. An ordinance classifying a golf club as an amusement center
6. An ordinance requiring shopping malls not to collect parking fees
7. An ordinance requiring a private cemetery to provide 15% of its generated plots for the poor
8. An ordinance which accepted a donation of streets in a private subdivision
9. An ordinance requiring a school to provide a two-meter setback from its fence for use as parking space
10. An ordinance authorizing the Mayor to contract a loan from the Land Bank
11. An ordinance which prohibits lease of rooms of motels and other lodging facilities on a short time
basis
12. An ordinance which prescribes different schedule of fees for hotels depending on its classification
13. An ordinance requiring all constituents to submit their dogs for free anti-rabies shot
14. A curfew ordinance for all minors without any exception
15. An ordinance which mandates the clearing of all sidewalks and other public spaces
Answer:
1. An ordinance imposing garbage fee: Not valid because the collection of garbage is part of a
governmental duty.
2. An ordinance imposing Socialized Housing Tax: Valid because this conforms to the national
law on Urban Housing Development Act.
3. An ordinance imposing local tax on the terminal fees collecting by the airport authority in its
jurisdiction: Not valid because the airport authority does not derive profit out of the terminal fees.
The collection of terminals is necessary to ensure the safety of passengers and the maintenance
of the facilities of the airport.
4. An ordinance designating areas for public parking space: Valid because this is an exercise of
police power to regulate the use of public space.
5. An ordinance classifying a golf club as an amusement center: Not valid because a golf club is
not included in the enumeration of amusement centers.
6. An ordinance requiring shopping malls not to collect parking fees: Not valid because this is
tantamount to expropriation without just compensation
7. An ordinance requiring a private cemetery to provide 15% of its generated plots for the poor:
Not valid because this effectively deprives the developer of the cemetery of his property without
just compensation.
8. An ordinance which accepted a donation of streets in a private subdivision: Valid because this
is a requirement to perfect the donation.
9. An ordinance requiring a school to provide a two-meter setback from its fence for use as
parking space: Not valid because this is also taking for a public use without just compensation.
10. An ordinance authorizing the Mayor to contract a loan from the Land Bank: Valid because
when a local government contracts a loan it will have to offer as security a property of the local
government and the amortization of payment on the loan will produce a financial burden on it.
11. An ordinance which prohibits lease of rooms of motels and other lodging facilities on a short
time basis: Not valid because police power does not prohibit but only regulates.
12. An ordinance which prescribes different schedule of fees for hotels depending on its
classification: Valid because there are standards used for classification.
13. An ordinance requiring all constituents to submit their dogs for free anti-rabies shot: Valid
because this is within the scope of the general welfare clause.
14. A curfew ordinance for all minors without any exception: Not valid because there valid
grounds to provide exceptions particularly on the right of minors to study at night, to participate
and affiliate with organizations as well as the free practice of religion.
15. An ordinance which mandates the clearing of all sidewalks and other public spaces: Valid
because this will allow the constituents to use the sidewalks and other public spaces for the
original purpose for which they have been constructed
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5. it must be general consistent with public policy; and
6. it must not be unreasonable (Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10,
2013)
D. The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of Agoo, La Union passed certain resolutions to implement a
Redevelopment Plan for the Agoo Plaza. Among those resolutions authorized Mayor Eriguel to obtain a
loan from Land Bank and mortgage a portion of the Agoo Plaza lot as collateral. Mayor Eriguel obtained
two Land Bank loans which were both ratified by the SB. However, several citizens, led by Cacayuran,
complained the redevelopment as the plaza was turned into a commercial center. Cacayuran thereafter
obtained a favorable judgment in the RTC which declared the Land Bank loans void on the ground that
the resolutions approving the same were ultra vires and Plaza Lot cannot be used as collateral for being
inalienable. Should the RTC’s ruling be upheld?
Answer: Yes, a careful perusal of Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC shows that while the
authorization of the municipal mayor need not be in the form of an ordinance, the obligation which
said local executive is authorized to enter into must be made pursuant to a law or ordinance.
In the present case, the subject loans and the Redevelopment Plan itself were not approved
pursuant to any law or ordinance but through mere resolutions. While ordinances are laws and
possess a general and permanent character, resolutions are merely declarations of the sentiment
or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter and are temporary in nature. Noticeably, the
passage of the subject resolutions was also tainted with other irregularities, such as (1) the failure
to submit the subject resolutions to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union for its review
contrary to Section 56 of the LGC; and (2) the lack of publication and posting in contravention of
Section 59 of the LGC. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran, 696 SCRA 861, April 17, 2013)
Liability of Torts
Generally, a local government unit is not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting
in a proprietary capacity.
Case: Teotico v. City of Manila
F. Who are the liable officers for the COA findings of illegal expenditures by a local government unit?
Answer: As a general rule, public officials who are directly responsible for the any illegal
expenditure of public funds are personally liable therefor. The LGC states that the superior officer
directing, or the department head participating in the illegal or improper use or application or
deposit of government funds or property, shall be jointly and severally liable with the local
treasurer, accountant, budget officer, or other accountable officer for the sum or property so
illegally or improperly used, applied or deposited. (Silang v. COA, G.R. No. 213189, September 8,
2015).
G. Is non-receipt of the illegally spent funds a viable defense for the liable public officers?
Answer: No, that they did not receive any amount from the disallowed benefits does not exculpate
them from personal and solidary liability for reimbursement therefor, under the legal provisions
above-quoted, as receipt of the disallowed benefits is inconsequential, absent any showing of
good faith. The receipt or non-receipt of illegally disbursed funds is immaterial to the solidary
liability of the government officials directly responsible therefor, as in the case of Maritime
Industry Authority v. COA, where the Court held the approving officers therein who acted in bad
faith as solidarity liable to return the disallowed funds, even if they never got hold of them ( Silang
v. COA, G.R. No. 213189, September 8, 2015).
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Answer: The following rules must be observed in the settlement of boundary disputes:
1. Between and among two or more municipalities within the same province: Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
2. Between and among two or more municipalities within two different provinces: Joint
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the two provinces
3. Between two barangays in the same city: Sangguniang Panlungsod
4. Between and among two or more highly urbanized cities: all the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of the cities
Note: After efforts at settlement fail, dispute may be brought to the appropriate RTC in the said
province.
5. Between a municipality and an independent component city: Regional Trial Court at the
option of the petitioner
6. Between a municipality and a highly urbanized city: Regional Trial Court at the option of
the petitioner
Note: As a general rule, one may invoke the general jurisdiction of the RTC.
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O. Z is serving her third and final term as mayor of the Municipality of San Carlos. A bill was passed by
Congress and the same was approved by the President which upgraded the Municipality of San Carlos.
May Mayor Z run as Mayor of the newly created City of San Carlos?
Answer: No, Mayor Z can no longer run as Mayor of the newly created City of San Carlos because
technically he will be elected by the same constituents whom he had served for three
consecutive terms.
XVI.
A. What are the issues for resolution in an election protest or contest?
Answer: The issues for resolution in an election protest or contest are: election, returns and
qualifications.
C. Cite the requisites for an electoral tribunal to acquire jurisdiction over an election protest/contest.
Answer: The requisites for an electoral tribunal to acquire jurisdiction over an election
protest/contest are:
1. Valid proclamation
2. Valid Oath-taking
3. Assumption of office
E. Which court will have initial jurisdiction over exclusion and inclusion cases?
Answer: The first level court (MTC) will have initial jurisdiction over exclusion and inclusion
cases.
The appeal is with the Regional Trial Court.
G. Distinguish between the provisions of Section 68 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Answer: Under Section 68, substitution under the following circumstances is allowed:
1. Death of the candidate
2. Disqualification of the candidate
3. Withdrawal of the candidate
Note: In case of the death of a candidate, substitution may be done at 12 noon of election day
provided that the substitute has the same surname and belongs to the same political party.
Under Section 78, a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Sec. 78 for false
material representation is considered to have a CoC that is void ab initio; thus, he cannot be
validly substituted. (Talaga v. COMELEC, 2012)
Page | 18
H. Discuss the effect of filing of Certificate of Candidacy of public officers.
Answer: An elective official does not lose his position when he files his Certificate of Candidacy
while an appointive official is deemed to have resigned upon filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
XVII
A. What are the grounds for impeachment?
Answer: The grounds for impeachment are:
1. Culpable violation of the Constitution
2. Treason
3. Bribery
4. Graft and corruption
5. Other high crimes
6. Betrayal of public trust
Note: Impeachment is initiated in the following manner:
1. Through a verified complaint filed by a member of the House of Representatives;
2. Through a verified complaint of a citizen supported by a resolution of endorsement of a
member of the House of Representatives; or
3. Verified complaint filed by at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the House of
Representatives. (Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, 2011)
B. May the Solicitor General file a quo warranto proceeding against a public officer while the House of
Representatives is still determining the grounds for his/her impeachment?
Answer: Yes, the Solicitor General may file a quo warranto proceeding against a public officer
while the House of Representatives is still determining the grounds for his/her impeachment. An
act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official's
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the
subject of quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are
present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being
continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of validly appointed
and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding, but of something
else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act
or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action,
if otherwise. Moreover, the Court's quo warranto jurisdiction over impeachable officers finds basis
in Par. 7, Sec. 4, and Art. XI.VII of the Constitution which designates it as the sole judge of the
qualifications of the President and Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. With
this authority, the remedy of quo warranto was provided in the rules of the Court sitting as the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) (Republic v. Sereno, 2018).
Page | 19
(Republic v. Bakunawa, 2013)
XVIII
A. Enumerate the limitations imposed upon the President when making appointments.
Answer: The following are the limitations which have been imposed by the President when
making appointments:
1. The President may not appoint his spouse and relatives by consanguinity and affinity
within the fourth civil degree during his term as members of the Constitutional
Commissions, Office of the Ombudsman, or as secretaries, undersecretaries, chairmen, or
heads of bureaus or offices, including government owned and controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries. (Sec. 13, Art. VII)
2. The President or acting President cannot exercise the power of appointment two months
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety. (Sec. 15, Art. VII)
3. Appointment in the Judiciary shall be made upon recommendation of the Judicial and Bar
Council. Any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled up within 90 days from the date
the vacancy occurred. (Sec. 8, Art. VII)
4. Appointments extended by the Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by
the elected President within ninety days from his assumption. (Sec. 14, Art. VII)
B. May the President appoint a member of the Supreme Court during the election ban period without
violating the midnight appointment rule?
Answer: The framers of the Constitution did not extend the prohibition to appointments to the
Judiciary, because the establishment of the JBC and subjecting the nomination and screening for
judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberative prior process of the JBC ensure that there
would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. (De Castro v. Judicial and Bar
Council [JBC])
C. May the JBC limit the appointing powers of the President by resorting to clustering the nominees in the
vacancies in the Sandiganbayan?
Answer: No, the JBC may not limit the appointing powers of the President by resorting to
clustering the nominees in the vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. By resorting to cluster the
nominees, the JBC effectively impinged on the prerogative of the President to appoint the justices
of the Sandiganbayan. (Judge Aguinaldo v. President Aquino)
E. May the members of the Board of Directors of Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines invoke qualified political agency when three of its members obtained their seats through the
election of the ex-officio members conducted in a board meeting and not by the President?
Answer: This is an incorrect invocation of the qualified political agency doctrine. While some
members of the Board of Directors were indeed cabinet members, they became members of the
Board of Directors not because of their appointment but due to their designation by law. Thus,
they implemented the new organizational plan, not as alter egos of the President but as members
of the Board of Directors pursuant to law. (Manalang-Demigillo v. Trade and Investment
Development Corporation of the Philippines, 2012)
G. May the Secretary of Energy as an alter ego of the President enter into an agreement with a 100%
owned Japanese company for a technical assistance for the exploration of Tanon Strait to determine oil
deposit in the area?
Answer: No, the Secretary of Energy as an alter ego of the President cannot enter into an
agreement with a 100% owned Japanese company for a technical assistance for the exploration of
Tanon Strait to determine oil deposit in the area. The power to enter into agreements with foreign-
owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, or utilization of minerals, petroleum
and other mineral oils is reserved only in the President.
XIX
PDEA agents A and B were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area at Private Road, Barangay Hulo,
Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour, they spotted, at a distance of about 10
meters, two (2) men — later identified as C and D — with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other.
Both C and D were immediately arrested. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained
shabu. C was charged of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
A. Is “stop and frisk” search and seizure allowed in the prosecution of a crime?
Answer: Yes, this is allowed. This is found under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of Rules on Criminal a
Procedure. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
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and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. (Miclat v.
People, 2011)
B. Will the “stop and frisk” rule apply in the instant case?
Answer: No, C’s acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter
do not constitute criminal acts. These circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference
of criminal activity which would constitute a “genuine reason” for PDEA Agent B to conduct a “stop
and frisk” search on the former. In this light, the “stop and frisk” search made on C should be deemed
unlawful.
In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid “stop and frisk” search made on
Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti
of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal
liability (Comerciante v People, G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015).
B. While the police officers were patrolling Balingkit Street in Malate, Manila, they heard a man shouting
“Putang ina mo! Limang daan na ba ito?”. For purportedly violating Section 844 of the Manila City Ordinance
which punishes breaches of the peace, M was apprehended and asked to empty his pockets. In the course
thereof, the police officers were able to recover from him a transparent plastic sachet containing a substance
suspected to be shabu. PO2 S confiscated the sachet and brought M. What are the custodial rights of M?
Answer: M has the right to be silent as well as the right to competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice. If he cannot afford one, he will be provided with one. The right cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. The evidence taken from the suspect is limited
to oral testimony and begins when his liberty is restrained by the arresting officer.
C. Under what circumstance may a warrantless search be justified after a warrantless arrest?
Answer: A valid warrantless arrest which justifies a subsequent search requires that the apprehending
officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto.
Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.
The determination of probable cause must be performed wisely and cautiously, applying the exacting
standards of a reasonably discreet and prudent man. Surely, as constitutionally guaranteed rights lie at
the fore, the duty to determine probable cause should be clothed with utmost conscientiousness, as
well as impelled by a higher sense of public accountability (Martinez v People, GR No. 198694, February
13, 2013).
.
D. P03 D of the PNP Mobile Patrol Group was waiting to get a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor when two
(2) persons entered and declared a hold-up. P03 D identified himself as a police officer and exchanged gun
shots with the two suspects. After the shootout, one of the suspects boarded a motorcycle, while the other
boarded a red Toyota Corolla. After the incident, P03 D received word where to find the suspects.
The police officers conducted a “hot pursuit” operation one day after the robbery incident where they set up a
police checkpoint. The police officers successfully arrested the suspects and a search was conducted on the
vehicle of the suspects. Was the search of the vehicle at the checkpoint valid?
Answer: No, a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. In this case, the police officers had already
conducted a thorough investigation and verification proceedings, which yielded, among others: (a) the
identities of the robbery suspects; (b) the place where they reside; and (c) the ownership of the
getaway vehicles used in the robbery. These pieces of information were already enough for said police
officers to secure the necessary warrants to accost the robbery suspects. Consequently, there was no
longer any exigent circumstance that would have justified the necessity of setting up the checkpoint in
this case for the purpose of searching the subject vehicle. (People v Manago, G.R. No. 212340, August
17, 2016)
E. Senator JPE was charged with the crime of plunder which is a non-bailable crime. He filed with the
Sandiganbayan to be released on bail. It was denied. Can he file a Petition for Certiorari?
Answer: Yes, the action will prosper. The general rule is that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent. An exception is when the contrary is proved. In our
jurisdiction, the presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail; and further binds the court to wait
until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused. (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, 2015)
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G. Would an Ordinance imposing curfew time for minors violate the Constitutional freedom of movement?
Answer: No, specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence
provides that this right is not absolute. As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may
impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the
minor’s movement and activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate
vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming
victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e.,
that the limitation “be provided by law,” our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the
State’s duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610, as amended, RA 9775, RA 9262,
RA 9851, RA 9344, RA 10364, RA 9211, RA 8980, RA 9288, and Presidential Decree (PD) 603, as
amended.
As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors’ exercise of
their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote, the right to execute contracts, and
the right to engage in gainful employment. In Bellotti, the US Supreme Court identified three (3)
justifications for the differential treatment of the minors’ constitutional rights. These are: first, the
peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed
and mature manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing (SPARK v
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017).
XX
A. Distinguish between amendment and revision of the Philippine Constitution.
Answer: Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
shifting from unitary to federal form of government, altering the principle of separation of powers
or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
Constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
(Lambino v. COMELEC, 2006)
B. What are the tests to determine if the change in the Constitution is an amendment or revision?
Answer: The two tests are the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The qualitative test asks
whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions." On the other hand, the quantitative test examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of the change. (Lambino v. COMELEC, 2006)
XXI
A. What are the Commander-in-Chief Powers of the President?
Answer: The Commander-in-Chief Powers of the President are:
(1) calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence, invasion or rebellion;
(2) the power to suspend writ of habeas corpus for a limited period of sixty (60) days; and
(3) the power to declare martial law (Section 18, Art. VI).
B. How does Congress exercise its check on the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers?
Answer: Within forty-eight hours after such suspension or proclamation, the President shall
personally or in writing report his action to the Congress. It may then, by majority votes of all its
members voting jointly, revoke his action. The revocation may not set aside by the President.
By the same vote and in the same manner, the Congress may, upon initiative of the President,
extend his suspension or proclamation for a period to be determined by the Congress if the
invasion or rebellion shall continue and the public safety requires extension.
C. How does the Supreme Court exercise its check on the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers?
Answer: The action of the President and the Congress shall be subject to review by the Supreme
Court which shall have the authority to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of such
action. This matter is no longer considered a political question and may be raised in an
appropriate proceeding by any citizen. Moreover, the Supreme Court must decide the challenge
within thirty days from the time it is filed.
D. Is a Petition for Certiorari an appropriate action to assail the proclamation of Martial Law?
Answer: No, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may review,
in an appropriate proceeding, filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The phrase “in any appropriate proceeding” refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the
purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive’s emergency powers. This action could be denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a
matter to be resolved by the Court. However, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
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of Court is not the proper mode of review. (Lagman v. Medialdea, 2017)
F. Is a cadet enrolled at the Philippine Military Academy under the control of the President in his capacity
as Commander-in-Chief?
Answer: A cadet enrolled at the Philippine Military Academy under the control of the President in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. (Cudia v. PMA Superintendent)
G. May PMA through its Honor Code Committee impose discipline to include the dismissal of a cadet?
Answer: Yes, in the exercise of its academic freedom, PMA through its Honor Code Committee
impose discipline to include the dismissal of a cadet. (Cudia v. PMA Superintendent)
H. Is Cudia entitled to counsel during the administrative proceedings before the PMA’s Honor Code
Committee?
Answer: While desirable, Cudia is not entitled to counsel during the administrative proceedings
before the PMA’s Honor Code Committee. The right to counsel is available as a constitutional
right only in criminal proceedings.
XXII.
A. What are the forms of executive clemency?
Answer: The President may exercise the following forms of executive clemency: reprieve,
commutation, pardons which may be absolute or conditional, remission of fines, forfeitures and
amnesty.
Note: The President may also exercise pardon in administrative cases. (Llamas v. Orbos)
XXIII
A. What are the requisites for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan?
Answer: The following requisites must be present to avail of this extraordinary remedy:
(1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology;
(2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity; and
(3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
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Answer: Precautionary Principle states that when an activity causes some threat or harm to the
public or the environment, general precautionary measures should be taken. When a scientific
investigation proves that there is a possible risk in doing some activity, then this principle should
be applied.
C. International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications moved for dismissal of case filed
by the Green Peace Southeast Asia arguing, among others, that: (a) the case should have been
dismissed for mootness in view of the completion and termination of the Bt talong field trials and the
expiration of the Biosafety Permits; (b) the Court should not have ruled on the validity of DAO 08-2002 as
it was not raised as an issue; and (c) the Court erred in relying on the studies cited in the December 8,
2015 Decision which were not offered in evidence and involved Bt corn, not Bt talong. Is the action
tenable?
Answer: Yes, the case is proper because there is no justiciable issue involved. As a rule, the
Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The requirement of the existence of a
"case’ or an "actual controversy" is mandatory for the proper exercise of the power of judicial
review. Accordingly, the Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing
in issue in the case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. An
action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy. There is nothing
for the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
are involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review. (International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v.
Green Peace)
D. USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. It sailed to the
Philippines with the permission of the government in order to comply with an obligation under the Visiting
Forces Agreement. It ran aground the Tubbataha Reef and damaged the corals in the area. Concerned
citizens filed an action against the commander of the USS Guardian to demand damages. Will the case
prosper?
Answer: The action instituted by the concerned citizens will not prosper. The precept that a State
cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international
law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent,
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint
could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself.
E. Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya,
making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. They prayed for the
issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents including President Arroyo to desist from violating
Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security.
Rule of the Petition.
Answer: Under the doctrine of command responsibility, the President can be made respondent.
The key element is that the petitioner must successfully prove the President had personal
knowledge of the participation of government and its agents.
The petition should be partially granted. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they
are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or unexplained
disappearances.
XXIV
A. What is the doctrine of suspended allegiance?
Answer: Under international law, the successful takeover of a state by foreign forces will
necessitate the people of the subdued state to have temporary allegiance to the conquering state.
A government is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory
of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force.
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D. What is extradition?
Answer: Extradition is the surrender of an individual accused or convicted of a crime by a State
within whose territory he is found and his delivery to the State where he allegedly committed
crime or was convicted of a crime.
M. What are the crimes under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court?
Answer: The following are the crimes cognizable by the International Criminal Court: genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.
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have previously agreed, to submit to the ruling of the court; and advisory opinions, which provide
reasoned, but non-binding, rulings on properly submitted questions of international law, usually
at the request of the United Nations General Assembly. Advisory opinions do not have to concern
particular controversies between states.
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