Philippine National Bank v. Court of First Instance of Rizal
Philippine National Bank v. Court of First Instance of Rizal
Philippine National Bank v. Court of First Instance of Rizal
ISSUE:
Whether or not the corporate life of PBM was extended by the continuance of the lease and subsequent
registration of the title to the improvements under its name.
RULINGS:
Section 11 of Corporation Code provides that a corporation shall exist for a period not exceeding fifty (50)
years from the date of incorporation unless sooner dissolved or unless said period is extended. Upon the expiration
of the period fixed in the articles of incorporation in the absence of compliance with the legal requisites for the
extension of the period, the corporation ceases to exist and is dissolved ipso facto.
When the period of corporate life expires, the corporation ceases to be a body corporate for the purpose of
continuing the business for which it was organized. But it shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for
three years after the time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits
by or against it and enabling it gradually to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to
divide its assets (Sec. 122, Corporation Code).
There is no need for the institution of a proceeding for quo warranto to determine the time or date of the
dissolution of a corporation because the period of corporate existence is provided in the articles of incorporation.
When such period expires and without any extension having been made pursuant to law, the corporation is dissolved
automatically insofar as the continuation of its business is concerned.
The quo warranto proceeding under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, as amended, may be instituted by the
Solicitor General only for the involuntary dissolution of a corporation on the following grounds: a) when the
corporation has offended against a provision of an Act for its creation or renewal; b) when it has forfeited its
privileges and franchises by non-user; c) when it has committed or omitted an act which amounts to a surrender of
its corporate rights, privileges or franchises; d) when it has mis-used a right, privilege or franchise conferred upon it
by law, or when it has exercised a right, privilege or franchise in contravention of law.
Hence, there is no need for the SEC to make an involuntary dissolution of a corporation whose corporate
term had ended because its articles of incorporation had in effect expired by its own limitation. Considering the
foregoing in relation to the contract of lease between the parties herein, when PBM's corporate life ended on January
19, 1977 and its 3-year period for winding up and liquidation expired on January 19, 1980, the option of extending
the lease was likewise terminated on January 19, 1977 because PBM failed to renew or extend its corporate life in
accordance with law. From then on, the respondents can exercise their right to terminate the lease pursuant to the
stipulations in the contract.