Malecdan vs.

Baldo
A.C. No. 12121, June 27, 2018

Facts:
Celestino Malecdan, the complainant, filed an administrative complaint against
Atty. Simspon Baldo, the respondent, for his alleged violation of Section 9 of P.D. 1508
otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law which prohibits lawyers in
participating in the proceedings before the Lupon.

Complainant had earlier filed a complaint for estafa, breach of contracts and
damages against spouses James and Josephine Baldo at the Lupon of Barangay Pico,
La Trinidad, Benguet. The respondent later appeared as counsel of spouses Baldo
during the hearing.

Complainant proceeded to file a complaint before the IBP-Benguet chapter. The

investigating commissioner recommended that the respondent be given a warning,
However, the IBP Board of Governors reverse the recommendation and recommended
that the respondent be reprimanded.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Baldo be reprimanded.

Facts:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governi=ors, as the language of P.D. 1508 is mandatory in barring lawyers from
appearing before the Lupon. In this case, Atty. Baldo admitted that he appeared and
participated in the proceedings before the Punong Barangay. This constitutes a violation
of such law, therefore, the respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
Thus, the court found Atty. Baldo liable and was reprimanded with sstern warning
that a repetition of the same would be dealt more severely.
CA-G.R. CV NO. 96282 v. ATTY. CLARO JORDAN M. SANTAMARIA
AC. No. 11173, Jun 11, 2018

Facts:
A civil action of nullity of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage which was counseled by Atty.
Villanueva was dismissed by the RTC.
Atty. Villanueva filed an appeal before the CA on November 25, 2010. The CA required
the appellant to submit Appellant’s Brief on March, 25, 2011. However, on April 27,
2011, Atty. Villanueva withdraw his appearance and subsequently filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief carried with the conformity of Honnie M.
Partoza, the appellant’s attorney-in-fact.
Thereafter, Respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria submitted an appellant brief
dated July 4, 2011. The CA issued a resolution dated August 4, 2011 requiring the
respondent shall submit a Formal Entry of Appearance.
On March 20, 2012, the CA issued a resolution for the respondent to show cause why
he should cited be in contempt for his failure to comply with the CA’s former resolution.
Again, in September 5, 2012, the CA, in another resolution, directed the respondent for
the last time to comply with their solution dated March 20, 2012 in order that the
appellant’s brief should not be expunged in rollo of the case and appeal be dismissed.
However, all directives of the CA were ignored by the respondent.
Thus, in a resolution dated October 25, 2012, the CA dismissed the appeal and directed
the respondent to explain why he should not be suspended from the practice of law for
willful disobedience to the orders of the court. The CA referred the acts of the
respondent to the IBP for investigation. The Investigating Commissioner found the
respondent liable for willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the CA and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six months. The act of
respondent in not filing any of the compliances required of him in the 4 August 2011, 20
March 2012, 5 September 2012, and 25 October 2012 Resolutions of the [CA] despite
due notice, emphasized his contempt and total disregard of the legal proceedings, for
which he should be held liable. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and
approve the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is administratively liable.
Ruling:
Yes.
There is no dispute that respondent did not comply with five Resolutions of the CA. His
actions were definitely contumacious. By his repeated failure, refusal or inability to
comply with the CA Resolutions, respondent displayed not only reprehensible conduct
but showed utter lack of respect for the court and its orders. Court orders are not mere
requests that may be complied with partially or selectively.
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of
justice, any act of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts or impeded the administration of
justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.
Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. In particular,
Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that it "is the duty of an attorney
[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers."
CORTEZ vs. CORTES
A.C. No. 9119

FACTS:

Eugenio E. Cortez engaged the services of Atty. Cortes as his counsel in an

illegal dismissal case against Philippine Explosives Corporation (PEC). He further
alleged that he and Atty. Cortes had a handshake agreement on a 12% contingency fee
as and by way of attorney’s fees. The case was decided in favor of complainant. PEC
was ordered to pay complainant the total amount of One million One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱1, 100,000) in three staggered payments. PEC then issued checks
all payable in the name of complainant, as payment.
Atty. Cortes however, claimed that 50% of the total awarded claims belongs to him as
attorney’s fees. Complainant then offered to pay ₱200,000, and when Atty. Cortes
rejected it, he offered the third check amounting to ₱275,000, but Atty. Cortes still
insisted on the 50% of the total award.

A complaint was filed by Eugenio against respondent Atty. Cortes for grave misconduct,
and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code for Professional Responsibility.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the six-month suspension of Atty.
Cortes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acts complained of constitute misconduct on the part of Atty.
Cortes, which would subject him to disciplinary action.

RULING:

Yes. The court held that a contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction.
It is generally recognized as valid and binding, but must be laid down in, an express
contract. The case of Rayos v. Atty. Hernandez discussed the same succinctly, thus: A
contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as
valid and binding but must be laid down in an express contract. The amount of
contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will
be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers.

In this case, the parties did not have an express contract as regards the payment of
fees.
Complainant alleges that the contingency fee was fixed at 12% via a handshake
agreement, while Atty. Cortes counters that the agreement was 50%. The IBP
Commission on Discipline pointed out that since what respondent handled was merely a
labor case, his attorney’s foes should not exceed 10%, the rate allowed under Article
111 of the Labor Code. Although we agree that the 50% contingency fee was
excessive, We do not agree that the 10% limitation
as provided in Article 111 is automatically applicable.
Generally, the amount of attorney’s fees due is that stipulated in the retainer Agreement
which inconclusive as to the amount of the lawyer’s compensation. In the absence
thereof, the amount of attorney’s fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the
reasonable worth of the attorney’s services. Courts may ascertain also if the attorney’s
fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. In no
case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is reasonable,
pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “A lawyer shall charge
only fair and reasonable fees.” Rule 20.01 of the same canon enumerates the following
factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered
case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
Chapter to which he
belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;
(h) The contingency or’ certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j)The professional standing of the lawyer.

The court believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed by Atty.
Cortes was, under the facts obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and
unconscionable.
Respondent Atty. Hernando P. Cortes is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 20 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) months, (considering that Atty. Cortes is nearing ninety years old and
that there was no question that Atty. Cortes was able to get a favorable outcome) and is
ordered to return to complainant Eugenio E. Cortez the amount he received in excess of
the 12% allowable attorney’s fees.