CD Caneza vs. Court of Appeals 268 SCRA 640

DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
(B) The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to
questions on the extrinsic validity of the will such that the probate court will only determine the will’s
formal validity and due execution. This rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. It is not beyond
the probate court’s jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will when so warranted by
exceptional circumstances. When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue.
THE INCOMPETENT, CARMEN CAÑIZA, REPRESENTED BY HER LEGAL GUARDIAN, AMPARO

EVANGELISTA, Petitioner, -versus - COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO
ESTRADA and HIS WIFE, LEONORA ESTRADA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 110427, THIRD DIVISION, February 24, 1997, NARVASA, J.
A will is essentially ambulatory. At any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked
and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law
being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed
in accordance with the Rules of Court". An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons
possessing property by his tolerance is not inconsistent with the former's taking back of possession in
the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. In the case at bar, there was sufficient cause for the
owner's resumption of possession. She needed to generate income from the house on account of the
physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
FACTS:
Being then 94 years of age, Carmen Cañiza was declared incompetent by judgment of the RTC in a
guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. The latter was appointed as
the legal guardian of her person and estate.
Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City. In relation thereto, she through her
Evangelista commenced a suit to eject spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. In the
complaint, it was alleged that Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question and that out
of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free. In the
answer, the respondents declared that in consideration of their faithful service, they had been
considered by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will where
she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
The MTC ruled in favor of Cañiza. The RTC, however, reversed this decision. The CA upheld the RTC
decision. In so ruling, it said that while said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper
court, could not be the basis of respondents' claim to the property, it is indicative of intent and desire
on the part of Cañiza that respondents are to continue in their occupancy and possession so much so
that Cañiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested in her guardian the right or
authority to drive the respondents out. To this, Caniza alleges error on the part of the CA for relying
on a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will which is irrelevant to this case.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in taking into consideration the alleged will of Cañiza in deciding the issue.
(YES)
91
DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW
RULING:
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that
they remain in possession thereof and legally incapacitated Evangelista from evicting them
therefrom since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will. This must fail.
A will is essentially ambulatory. At any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever. No right can be claimed thereunder,
the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved
and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court". An owner's intention to confer title in the future
to persons possessing property by his tolerance is not inconsistent with the former's taking back of
possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. In the case at bar, there was sufficient
cause for the owner's resumption of possession. She needed to generate income from the house on
account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
IN RE OF DOLORES CORONEL, DECEASED. LORENZO PECSON, Appellee, -versus - AGUSTIN

CORONEL, ET AL., Appellants
G.R. No. L-20374, EN BANC, October 11, 1923, ROMUALDEZ, J.
The liberty to dispose of one’s estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the
Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889. It is so provided article 763 in the following terms: Any
person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any
persons qualified to acquire it. In the case at bar, the Court finds nothing strange in the preterition
made by Dolores of her blood relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary.
Furthermore, although the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the most usual and
customary, still this would not be null per se contrary to what the responsents’ claim.
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance probated the will of Dolores Coronel who named as her sole heir Lorenzo
Pecson, the husband of her niece, in consideration of the good services which the latter has rendered.
The relatives of Dolores by consanguinity questioned the genuineness of the will on the following
grounds: (a) that the proof does not show that it contains the last will of Dolores, and (b) that the
attestation clause is not in accordance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645. They argue that it was improbable and exceptional that
Dolores should dispose of her estate without considering her blood relatives. Extraneous illegal
influence must have been exerted against her as there is no sufficient motive for such exclusion
inasmuch as until her death, she maintained very cordial relations with the aforesaid relatives. It
appears, however, that Dolores suspects some of her nephews as having been accomplices in a
robbery of which she had been a victim.
ISSUE:
Whether the decedent can exclude her blood relatives in the disposition of her estate. (YES)
92

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CD Caneza vs. Court of Appeals 268 SCRA 640

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DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW

THE INCOMPETENT, CARMEN CAÑIZA, REPRESENTED BY HER LEGAL GUARDIAN, AMPARO

IN RE OF DOLORES CORONEL, DECEASED. LORENZO PECSON, Appellee, -versus - AGUSTIN

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