PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA.

THERESA PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012

Recit-Ready Case Summary: Private complainant filed a complaint against respondent because the checks issued
by the respondent were dishonored upon presentment for payment on September 16, 1997. Respondent filed a civil
case for accounting and 5 days later, she petitioned for suspension on the ground of prejudicial question. Several
actions have taken place and respondent alleged that her criminal liability is extinguished by reason of prescription.
However, it submits that the filing of the complaint affidavit by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16
September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted running of the
prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.

General Rule of Law/Doctrine: 

● There is no more distinction between cases under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and those covered by
special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription
● Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should
not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

FACTS: Virginia Malolos file an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violations of BP 22 against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan
with the office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13
February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before
the City prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of “prejudicial question.” The matter was raised
before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend
proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22
were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.  These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31 which granted the
respondent’s motion to quash the information and to defer the issuance of warrant of arrest. Respondent alleged that
her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. Private complainant then filed a notice of appeal
which was raffled to Branch 218, and the latter reversed and set aside the order of Branch 31. Respondent filed a
petition and the CA reversed the decision of Branch 218 thereby dismissing the criminal cases for the reason that the
cases for violation of BP 22 had already prescribed. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of
such offense.

HELD: Yes. Sec. 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides— “The institution of the criminal
action shall interrupt the running period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special
laws.”

Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to B.P. 22 cases, “violations penalized by special acts
shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:... after four years for
those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years.” Under Section 2 of the same Act,
“[t]he prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited
law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the
guilty person.

Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated
on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
 ARAMBULO vs LAQUI
G.R. 138596, October 12, 2000

Recit-Ready Case Summary: A libel case was filed against the petitioner-accused. Metropolitan TC, without resolving the incident,
dismissed the case and ruled that it has no jurisdiction and forwarded the case to the RTC.  He filed a motion to quash on the
ground of prescription which was denied.  He filed motion for reconsideration which was also denied.  Petitioner-accused filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which was dismissed.  His motion for reconsideration was also denied. The court ruled
that there was an interruption of the running of prescription even if the court where the action was first filed had no jurisdiction.

RULE 110: PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES.

Interruption of Period Prescription Even If the Court is Without Juriscdiction
General Rule of Law/Doctrine: 
● The filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. (The running of the period prescription is interrupted
with the filing of the action even if the court in which the action was first filed is without jurisdiction – from RIANO)
● Libel (Punishable by PC in its min and max periods) cases shall be tried by the Regional Trial Courts having jurisdiction over
them to the exclusion of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
● The mistake of the Office of the City Prosecutor in the filing of the complaint with, and of the Metropolitan Trial Court in taking
cognizance of the case should not operate to prejudice the interest of the state to prosecute criminal offenses and, more
importantly, the right of the offended party to obtain grievance.
● The doctrine in People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 (1967), was not meant to apply solely to cases where the filing of the complaint
with the municipal trial court or the prosecutor’s office operates to interrupt the prescription period for the prosecution of a
crime.

FACTS: Private respondents filed a libel case against petitioners alleging that the latter circulated a letter containing malicious
imputations against them.
● May 18, 1994 – information was filed before Metropolitan Trial Court of QC.
After prosecution presented its evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer of Evidence. Metropolitan TC did not resolve the incident ruling
that it has no jurisdiction and that RTC has the original and exclusive jurisdiction. The case was forwarded to the RTC QC.
● Jan 3, 1997 – Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss (lack of jurisdiction and prescription of the offense of libel
● RTC – stated that the offense has not prescribed; dismissed the case but ordered the City Prosecutor to re-file the
information for libel
● April 27, 1997 – information was re-filed in the RTC.
● June 17, 1997 – petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of prescription (DENIED)
● Petitioner – filed an MR but also denied so he appealed to the CA
● CA – upheld the contention of the TC and denied the MR
Thus this petition.

ISSUE: WON there was an interruption of period of prescription even if the court is without jurisdiction 

HELD: YES. The running of the period prescription is interrupted with the filing of the action even if the court in which the action was
first filed is without jurisdiction.

In the landmark case of People vs. Olarte, this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, finally resolved the then conflicting
views as to whether or not the filing of a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary investigation suspends
the running of the prescriptive period for the crime. The Court restated the correct and prevailing doctrine, as follows: “In view of this
diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for the Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after
mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions
holding that the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on the merits. Several reasons buttress this
conclusion:
First, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription ‘shall be interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information’ without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary
examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. (No distinction of the purpose of the filing of
information)
Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. (Actuations represent initial step of
the proceeding)
Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
Moreover, the doctrine in People vs. Olarte, as applied in later cases, was not meant to apply solely to cases where the filing of the
complaint with the municipal trial court or the prosecutor’s office operates to interrupt the prescription period for the prosecution of a
crime.
 CARMENCITA G. CARIÑO, petitioner, vs. MERLIN DE CASTRO, respondent.
G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008

Recit-Ready Case Summary: Petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit for violation of BP 22 against Respondent before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Trial Court found that checks issued by the respondent were without
valuable considerations; that petitioner was not authorized to collect rental payments from respondents; and that
consequently, respondent can legally refuse to pay. Case was then dismissed. 

Aggrieved of the decision, Petitioner's persistence for motion of reconsideration reached the Court of Appeals, Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition because it was filed by a private prosecutor and not by the Office of the Solicitor
General.

General Rule of Law/Doctrine: We emphasize that the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases
before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General. Section
35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides, viz.:
"SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of lawyers. x x x It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent
the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party."
FACTS: Petitioner Carmencita G. Cariño filed a complaint-affidavit for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22)
against respondent Merlin de Castro before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. After conducting preliminary
investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Manuel B. Sta. Cruz, Jr., issued a Resolution finding prima facie evidence
and recommending respondent's indictment. Accordingly, respondent was charged with five (5) counts of violation of
BP 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13.
During arraignment, respondent manifested her intention to file a Motion for Preliminary Determination of Existence of
Probable Cause which was granted. 
In an Order dated August 30, 2004, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13 found that the checks were
issued by respondent without valuable consideration; that petitioner was not authorized to collect rental payments
from respondent; and that consequently, respondent can legally refuse payment on the ground that said checks were
issued without valuable and legal consideration. Case was then dismissed.

Thereafter, petitioner, through counsel and with the conformity of Asst. City Prosecutor, Sawadjaan Issan, filed a
petition for review before the Court of Appeals. However, in the assailed Decision dated August 18, 2006, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition because it was filed only by the private prosecutor and not by the Office of the
Solicitor General as mandated by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review due to Petitioner being
represented by a private prosecutor and not by the Office of the Solicitor General.

HELD: No, Court of Appeals were not in the wrong.

In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the
People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and
functions of the OSG was to "represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings."  
Although the petition for review before the Court of Appeals was filed with the conformity of the Assistant City
Prosecutor, such conformity is insufficient, as the rules and jurisprudence mandate that the same should be filed by
the Solicitor General.
While a private prosecutor may be allowed to intervene in criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or
the Supreme Court, his participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, hence, he cannot be permitted to
adopt a position contrary to that of the Solicitor General. To do so would be tantamount to giving the private
prosecutor the direction and control of the criminal proceeding, contrary to the provisions of law.14
In the instant case, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner had no legal standing to file the petition for review and
that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition. As such, the Assistant City Prosecutor or the private
prosecutor cannot take a contrary view.
 JACA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013

Recit-Ready Case Summary:

Accused Jaca and other, all public officers duly appointed and committing the offense in relation to office were
charged and found guilty of violating Sec 3(e) of RA 3019, for allowing Rosalinda Badana, Cashier I of Cebu City
government, to obtain cash advances accumulating to P18.5m, despite that she has previous unliquidated cash
advances. The petitioners argue that the information is fatally defective for violating their right to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against them. Court ruled that the information was valid.

General Rule of Law/Doctrine:

Only questions of law and not issues of fact may be raised. Issues raised before the Court on whether the
prosecution’s evidence proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whether the presumption of
innocence was properly accorded the accused, whether there was sufficient evidence to support a charge of
conspiracy, or whether the defense of good faith was correctly appreciated are all, in varying degrees, questions of
fact.

Pursuant to the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, the Revised Rules of Court require, inter alia, that the information state the designation of the offense given by
the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, it requires that these
acts or omissions and their attendant circumstances "be stated in ordinary and concise language" and "in such form
as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.

FACTS:
Alan C. Gaviola, Edna J. Jaca, Eustaquio B. Cesa (collectively, petitioners) and Benilda N. Bacasmas guilty of
violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The petitioners held appointed public positions in the city government of Cebu at the time of the controversy. Gaviola
was the City Administrator; Cesa was the City Treasurer; Bacasmas was the Chief Cashier of the Cash Division,
which is under the Office of the City Treasurer, and Jaca was the City Accountant.  

On March 4, 1998, City Auditor Rodolfo Ariesga created a team of auditors, with the task of conducting a surprise
audit of the cash and other accounts handled by all accountable officers assigned at the Cash Division, Office of the
City Treasurer. The Office of the City Treasurer had a process involving a “paymaster” in the disbursement of funds.
A certain Rosalina G. Badana, who was the paymaster in charge of paying the salaries of the employees in eight (8)
different departments or offices in the Cebu City government reported for work in the early morning of March 5, 1998,
she immediately left upon learning of the planned surprise audit to be conducted that day; she has not reported for
work since. The audit team reported that Badana incurred a cash shortage of P18,527,137.19.

On March 13, 1998, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman) a
complaint against Badana for malversation of public funds and for violation of RA Nos. 3019 and 6713. The complaint
resulted in administrative and criminal investigations. The complaint resulted in administrative and criminal
investigations which also involved the petitioners.

The Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative aspect of the case, finding Jaca and Cesa guilty of simple
neglect of duty and imposed on them the penalty of suspension for six (6) months. The case against petitioner
Gaviola was dismissed for being moot and academic. On Cesa’s appeal, the Court of Appeals and, eventually, this
Court sustained the Ombudsman’s ruling.

The Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision finding the petitioners and Bacasmas guilty as charged. The
Sandiganbayan held the petitioners solidarily liable to the Cebu City government for the amount of P18,527,137.19.
The petitioners used these for their defense: 

a. good faith in affixing their signatures to the disbursement vouchers, and

b. that there was a defect in the information for violating their right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against them. The prosecution could not have validly alleged that the petitioners committed the offense
"with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and with gross inexcusable negligence" since these
several modes of committing the crime are inconsistent with each other; the violation is more so when one considers
the prosecution’s allegation of conspiracy, which presupposes intent and the absence of negligence. Because of this
serious flaw in the information, the information effectively charged no offense for which they can be convicted.
c. The petitioners argue that the prosecution witnesses were incompetent to testify.
d. Proof beyond reasonable doubt and the elements of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 were not established since
the petitioners received no prior notice of disallowance from the auditors of the COA at the time material to the
controversy, then the petitioners could not have been charged with knowledge of Badana’s previous unliquidated
cash advances. This lack of knowledge negates the element of "giving unwarranted benefits or causing undue injury."

The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) prays for the denial of the petitions on the ground that they are factual in
nature and, hence, not covered by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitions raised by the petitioners are questions of law covered by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
HELD: 
No, the petitions are not covered by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We deny the petitions.

At the outset, we emphasize that, as a rule, the Court does not review factual questions under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. In appeals from the Sandiganbayan, only questions of law and not issues of fact may be raised. Issues raised
before the Court on whether the prosecution’s evidence proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
whether the presumption of innocence was properly accorded the accused, whether there was sufficient evidence to
support a charge of conspiracy, or whether the defense of good faith was correctly appreciated are all, in varying
degrees, questions of fact. As a rule, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive on this Court, subject
to limited exceptions. We find none of these exceptions in the present case.

The information is valid

Pursuant to the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, the Revised Rules of Court require, inter alia, that the information state the designation of the offense given by
the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, it requires that these
acts or omissions and their attendant circumstances "be stated in ordinary and concise language" and "in such form
as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment." As long as the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity and reasonable certainty that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged, then the information is
considered sufficient. In particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the
material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as
defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense. 
 HERMES E. FRIAS, SR.,, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR 171437, Oct 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 654

Recit Ready Summary: Petitioner being a mayor was sued for failing to render accounts of his cash advances but in
his defense argued that he was not liable since he did not benefited  from them. He pleaded not guilty during
arraignment and was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan. His petition for reconsideration was denied, thus this
petition. See highlighted part to see his contentions

General Rule of Law/Doctrine: The right to question the sufficiency of an Information is not absolute; An accused is
deemed to have waived this right if he fails to object upon his arraignment.

FACTS: Petitioner being then the Municipal Mayor of Capas, Tarlac, after being required by the COA to settle his
disallowed cash advances, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to render accounts for a period
of two months after such accounts should have been rendered, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
afforested amounts. Petitioner argued that he was
not liable for the cash advances because he did not derive any benefit from them

● Petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment. After pre-trial, trial on the merits followed.
● Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty as charged

According to the Sandiganbayan, in spite of the fact that Panganiban alone benefited from the disallowed
cash advances, petitioner, as municipal mayor, was responsible and accountable for it.22 Moreover, petitioner was
liable to return the proceeds to the Government in view of his failure to account for the cash advances.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.

Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of due process because the Information against him failed to identify his acts
or omissions which constituted a violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.25 Moreover, the Sandiganbayan
failed to establish that he, a municipal mayor, was an accountable officer and to identify the particular law or
regulation which required him to render an account. Lastly, he assailed the restitution of P1,000,000 to the
Government for lack of legal basis.

ISSUE: WON petitioner was deprived of due process because the Information against him failed to identify his acts or
omissions and identify him as an accountable officer?

HELD:  NO, the accused was not deprived of due process. An accused is deemed to have waived this right if he fails
to object upon his arraignment or during trial.  Evidence presented during trial can cure the defect in the Information.
In this case, petitioner waived his right to assail the sufficiency of the Information when he voluntarily entered a plea
when arraigned and participated in the trial. The Information adequately informed petitioner of the charges against
him. It clearly stated the elements which constituted the violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
 PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-
Appellants.
G.R. No. 175602 February 13, 2013

Recit-Ready Case Summary: Co-accused Eduardo and Edwin were charged and convicted with murder. Upon final
appeal, the CA downgraded the crimes committed by Eduardo from three counts of murder to three counts of
homicide, and consequently prescribed lighter penalties in the form of indeterminate sentences. However, the
decision did not directly apply to Edwin since he withdrew from the final appeal. In this case, Edwin pleads for the
application of the downgraded judgement promulgated in favor of Eduardo. The Court grants his plea by virtue of
Sec. 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.

General Rule of Law/Doctrine: The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are
mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.

FACTS: The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in
Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them as charged. The two accused then came to
the CA on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted
on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated. On January 18, 2012, the Court
promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of homicide,
instead of three counts of murder. Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a self-explanatory letter dated
March 12, 2012, where he pleaded for the application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on
the ground that the judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused.

ISSUE: Whether Edwin Valdez should be granted application of the judgement promulgated by the Court of
Appeals, finding his co-accused, Eduardo Valdez, guilty of homicide instead of murder?

HELD: YES. The Court granted Edwin’s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which
relevantly provides:

Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more of several
accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter.

In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals that the benefits of this provision extended to
all the accused, regardless of whether they appealed or not. In the other cases decided by the Court, all the accused
appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final and
executory. Nevertheless, the Court still applied to them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused. 

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the application to him of the judgment
promulgated on January 18, 2012 finding P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty of three counts of homicide, and
sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, the late
Moises Sayson, Jr., and the late Joselito Sayson the amounts of₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages for each count.
 People vs. Olivia Cristobal
GR No. 158450 | March 30, 2011 | Bersamin

Recit-Ready Case Summary: Cristobal was found guilty of Qualified Theft by the RTC and the CA. She brought the
case to the SC saying that such conviction was based on an insufficient Information because the Information said she
committed the crime on January 2, 1996 but the evidence provide that she could not have done on the said date. SC
held that the information was sufficient because it stated the approximate time of the commission of the offense.

Doctrines: Criminal Procedure; Information; The information was sufficient because it stated the approximate time of
the commission of the offense through the words “on or about the 2nd of January, 1996.”—The information was
sufficient because it stated the approximate time of the commission of the offense through the words “on or about the
2nd of January, 1996,” and the accused could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which she was
charged from a reading of its contents as well as gather by such reading whatever she needed to know about the
charge to enable her to prepare her defense.

FACTS: An Information was filed against Olivia Aleth Garcia Cristobal for Qualified Theft, stating that she stole and
carried away cash money amounting to $10,000 belonging to Prudential Bank. She was convicted by the RTC and
CA. She brought the case to the SC, saying that the erred in affirming her conviction on the basis of an information of
qualified theft that charges the accused to have taken the money on January 2, 1996 when the evidence on record
based on various admissions of the prosecution's witnesses reveal that the accused did not and cannot take away
the money on January 2, 1996.

ISSUE: Whether the information filed against Cristobal was fatally defective?

RULING: No, the information was sufficient and valid. As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the time or date of the
commission of the offense, Section 6 and Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rules applicable,
provide:

“Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.—A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of

the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place
wherein the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
(5a)

Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense.—It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the
precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act
may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as
the information or complaint will permit.” 

Conformably with these rules, the information was sufficient because it stated the approximate time of the
commission of the offense through the words “on or about the 2nd of January, 1996,”and the accused could
reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which she was charged from a reading of its contents as well as
gather by such reading whatever she needed to know about the charge to enable her to prepare her defense. The
information herein did not have to state the precise date when the offense was committed, considering that the date
was not a material ingredient of the offense
 PEOPLE v. BUCA
GR 209587, Sept. 23, 2015

Recit-Ready Case Summary: Anjoy Buca was charged with rape in an information that stated that such took place
"sometime in the months prior to Dec. 2002." He argues that the statement in the Information that the rape occurred
sometime before December 24, 2002 despite the fact that the prosecution established that the crime was committed
on December 24, 2002 violates Section 11, 18 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.
Court held NO, because the assailed information sufficiently alleges the date of the comission of the offense.

General Rule of Law/Doctrine: The date or time of the commission of the rape is not a material ingredient of the
crime and need not be stated with absolute accuracy. What is material is that the occurrence of rape is established.

FACTS: On January 7, 2003, BBB executed an Affidavit-Complaint. Three (3) Informations were filed against
accused-appellant Anjoy. One of the three accusatory portions of the three (3) Informations state:

I. In Criminal Case No. 52,260-2003:

"That sometime in the months prior to December 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned [accused], by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, had carnal knowledge of the child
AAA, seven (7) years old, by forcibly inserting his penis into her vagina.

CONTRARY TO LAW";

Accused-appellant argues that the statement in the Information that the rape occurred sometime before December
24, 2002 despite the fact that the prosecution established that the crime was committed on December 24, 2002
violates Section 11, 18 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, on the requirement of
stating the date of the commission of the offense and the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.

ISSUE: Whether the Information as worded sufficiently alleged the date of the commission of the offense

HELD: YES. The information charging accused-appellant of rape sometime before December 24, 2002 when the
crime was committed exactly on December 24, 2002 is sufficiently compliant with said Section 11. In addition, as
correctly pointed out by the CA, the Information is valid as under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, an information is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. 

It is evident in this case that accused-appellant was able to testify about the incident on December 24, 2002 because
the date alleged was not vague or covering an unreasonable period as to deprive him the opportunity to prepare his
defense which is the essence of the right allegedly violated. It is worthy to note that the records are bereft of any
objection by the accused-appellant about the date of the commission of the crime at the time of arraignment, during
the formal offer of exhibits and at the time the prosecution put AAA on the witness stand to establish the rape
committed on December 24, 2002. In People v. Gianan, the Court held that an accused-appellant's failure to raise a
timely objection that the time difference alleged in the information covered a broad period constitutes a waiver of his
right to object. We further observe that accused-appellant did not even disavow knowledge of the incident on that
date but, in fact, admitted that he spoke with AAA at their house on December 24, 2002 and even entered AAA's
house. The testimony of accused-appellant leads us to conclude that the allegation was sufficient to inform him of the
date the crime charged occurred which enabled him to prepare his defense. Thus, we find the allegations in the
Information and the subsequent conviction of accused-appellant by the lower courts valid and lawful under the
circumstances. 
 PEOPLE VS DELFIN
G.R. 201572, July 9, 2014

Recit-Ready Case Summary: An information was filed against Delfin for the murder of Emilio on September 27, 2000. On said
information, the date written was November 27, 2000. It was established during the trial that the murder happened on September
27. Delfin assailed the validity of the the information filed because of the discrepancy of the date. The court ruled that under Sec 6 
and Sec 11 of Rule 110 of the rules of court provides that the date of the commission of the crime is not a material element and the
purpose of which is to properly inform the accused that the date of commission be approximated.

RULE 110: PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

Date of the Commission of the Crime
General Rule of Law/Doctrine: 
● Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the allegation in an information of a
date of commission different from the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be
considered as an error fatal to prosecution.
● Variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence
becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the information and the
evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the same offense
FACTS: On September 27, 2000, Emilio Enriquez was killed after being gunned down at a store across his home. Delfin was
formally charged with the murder of Emilio before the RTC Malabon. The information reads: 
“That on or about the 27th day of November 2000, in Navotas, Metro Manila ……..”
● RTC – accused was GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
● CA – Affirmed
In his appeal to the SC, Delfin assailed the validity of the information under which he was tried and convicted. He specifically points
out the discrepancy between the two dates (Nov 27 – from the information; Sept 27 – established during trial). Delfin protests that
the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of the commission of the murder violated his right to be properly informed
of the charged against him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense thereon.

ISSUE: WON the discrepancy on the date of the murder would render the information against Delfin invalid.

HELD: NO. Variance in the date of the commission of the murder asa alleged in the information and as established during the trial
does not invalidate the information. The court sustained the validity of the information under which the appellant was tried, and
convicted, notwithstanding the variance in the date of the commission of the crime as alleged in the information and as established
during the trial.
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute
specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court (Section 6 and Section 11 of Rule 110) merely requires, for the sake of
properly informing an accused, that the date of commission be approximated:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.—A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense.—It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
date the offense was committed except  when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be
alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.

Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the allegation in an information of a date of commission
different from the one eventually established during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to prosecution. In
such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during the trial or may
even be corrected by a formal amendment of the information

Variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when
such discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to one and
the same offense. In this event, the defective allegation in the information is not deemed supplanted by the evidence nor can it be
amended but must be struck down for being violative of the right of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him.
Such was this Court’s ruling in the case of People v. Opemia, 98 Phil. 698 (1956)
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARNEL NOCUM, REY JOHNNY RAMOS, CARLOS JUN
POSADAS, PANDAO POLING PANGANDAG (all at large), Accused, REYNALDO MALLARI, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013

Recit-Ready Case Summary: An Information was filed charging Mallari and several co-accused with violation of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659.

The prosecution’s lone witness was Chris Mahilac (Mahilac), a self-confessed member of "FX gang," a syndicate
notorious for carjacking Toyota FX vehicles. The modus operandi of the gang is to carnap Toyota FX vehicles,
transport them to Mindanao, and have them registered and sold to prospective buyers there. Together with Mallari
and several others, Mahilac was previously charged with carnapping before the RTC of Parañaque City but was later
on discharged to be a state witness.
Accused Reynaldo Mallari was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of CARNAPPING WITH
HOMICIDE and is hereby sentenced to die by lethal injection. Court of Appeals modified the death penalty to
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act 9346.
General Rule of Law/Doctrine: 
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that for qualifying and aggravating
circumstances to be appreciated, it must be alleged in the complaint or information.

Article 63(2) of the RPC, Provides that in the absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
offense, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

FACTS: 
Accused Reynaldo Mallari was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of CARNAPPING WITH
HOMICIDE and is hereby sentenced to die by lethal injection. Court of Appeals modified the death penalty to
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act 9346.
Mallari appeals.
The culpability of Mallari for the complex crime of carnapping with homicide is duly established by the confluence of
circumstantial evidence. Mahilac testified that he was present when Mallari and his co-accused, all members of the
"FX Gang," gathered in Muntinlupa City to plan and conspire to steal vehicles and sell them to unscrupulous buyers
in Mindanao. 
In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as
one of the perpetrators of the crime, were all proved beyond reasonable doubt. The foregoing circumstances
inevitably lead to the lone, fair and reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in stealing the FX taxi driven by
Medel and in killing him.
Mallari’s defense of alibi deserves no credence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in sentencing Mallari the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua even if
aggravating circumstances were not raised in the information but was well established in the facts.

HELD: Yes, Plaintiff’s failure to allege in the information aggravating circumstances cannot be cured by the fact that it
was well established in the facts of the case. 

Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 as amended by Section 20 of RA 7659, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner or driver of the vehicle is killed in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. In this case, the trial court considered as aggravating circumstance the
commission of the offense by a member of an organized or syndicated crime group under Article 62 of the RPC as
amended by RA 7659 and, hence, imposed upon Mallari the death penalty.
However, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, all aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be
alleged in the Information. This new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, but applies retroactively to pending cases
since it is favorable to the appellant. Here, there is no allegation in the Information that Mallari was a member of a
syndicate or that he and his companions "had formed part of a group organized for the general purpose of committing
crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group." Hence, the same cannot be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against Mallari. Thus, in consonance with Article 63(2) of the RPC,
which provides that in the absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the lesser
penalty shall be applied. Mallari must, therefore, suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
 People vs Ubiña
G.R. No. 176349, July 10, 2007

Recit-Ready Case Summary: 

AAA a 15-year-old minor was raped by her uncle. The prosecutor failed to allege the victim’s minority in the filing of
information. There exists the twin circumstances of minority and relation.

General Rule of Law/Doctrine: 

As special qualifying circumstances they must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information.

FACTS:
AAA a 15-year-old minor was raped by her uncle Orlando Ubiña. in the morning of October 9, 2000 when the
appellant went to the Tabang Elementary School in Tabang, Sto. Niño, Cagayan (where AAA was a student) to
inform her that her grandfather ("lolo") was in a hospital and needed her there. AAA went with the appellant but was
told while at Tuguegarao that her lolo was in a different hospital. The appellant then brought her to Allacapan,
Cagayan "in a house where the accused stayed when they were still young."
In a room at that house, the appellant removed AAA’s pants and thereafter inserted his penis into her vagina while
AAA was lying down. AAA resisted when she was made to lie down and cried as the appellant removed her pants.
The appellant sexually abused [her] five (5) times in the seven (7) days they stayed in Allacapan.
From Allacapan, the appellant brought AAA in the afternoon of October 16, 2000 to her grandfather’s house located
in a rice field in Campo, Sto. Niño, Cagayan. He molested [her] twice at that location that same afternoon. Again,
AAA cried as the appellant removed her shorts and panty.
After three (3) days, AAA’s grandfather brought her home to San Manuel. With the appellant’s warning not to tell
anyone what transpired between them, AAA did not mention a word regarding the incident to either her grandfather at
Sto. Niño, or to [her] father upon her arrival at home at San Manuel. It was only on the following day that she told her
father about her ordeal. AAA’s father reported the matter to the police the next day.
After initial police investigation, AAA was brought to the Cagayan Valley Medical Center where Dr. Jeliza Alcantara
medically examined her. The examination disclosed several hymenal lacerations in her genitalia, indicating that she
was no longer a virgin.

During the filing of the information of rape the undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Officer-In-Charge
failed to allege the minority of the victim in the information but was proved during testimony during trial.

The Trial court found the accused Orlando A. Ubiña guilty for the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code has been established beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences the said
accused Orlando A. Ubiña to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) years of Reclusion Perpetua. He is further sentenced
to indemnify the private complainant AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11, in Criminal Case No. 895-T,
finding the appellant guilty of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION with respect to penalty and the
awarded damages. The appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the complainant
₱50,000.00 as moral damages and, as awarded by the trial court, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

ISSUE:
Whether the appellate court failed to appreciate the qualifying circumstances of minority and relation.

HELD: 
Qualified.

As a rule, special qualifying circumstances must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the information
because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty.

The information in the instant case only mentioned appellant as AAA’s uncle, without specifically stating that he is a
relative within the third civil degree, either by affinity or consanguinity. Even granting that during trial it was proved
that the relationship was within the third civil degree either of consanguinity or affinity, still such proof cannot be
appreciated because appellant would thereby be denied of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Appellant cannot be charged with committing the crime of rape in its simple form and then be
tried and convicted of rape in its qualified form. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly disregarded the qualifying
circumstance of relationship.

However, the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the minority of AAA because such was properly alleged in the
Information and was proven during trial by the presentation of a certification of AAA’s record of birth duly issued by
the office of the municipal civil registrar of Sto. Niño, Cagayan. Conformably with the Esperanza case, when either
one of the twin special qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or lacking, that which is
pleaded in the information and proved by the evidence may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. As such,
complainant’s minority may be considered as an aggravating circumstance. However, it may not serve to raise the
penalty in the instant case because in simple rape, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua which is single and
indivisible.

Orlando A. Ubiña is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim AAA, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as civil
indemnity ex delicto, and another Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages, the decision of CA is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant is further ordered to pay the victim Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
 People vs. Chingh
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARMANDO CHINGH y PARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011

Recit-Ready Case Summary: Accused Armando Chingh was convicted of Statutory Rape defined and penalized
under Art. 266-A, par. 1(d) of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353. Upon appeal, the CA rendered a Decision finding
Armando not only guilty of Statutory Rape, but also of Rape through Sexual Assault. In this case, the Court declares
that Although two offenses were charged (which is a violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the RRPC), Section 3, Rule
120 of the same Rules also states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information
but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and
proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each
offense."

General Rule of Law/Doctrine: Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also states that
"[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense."

FACTS: On March 19, 2005, an Information for Rape was filed against Armando for inserting his fingers and
afterwards his penis into the private part of his minor victim, VVV. On April 29, 2005, the RTC, rendered a Decision
convicting Armando of Statutory Rape. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and considering that
the appeal opened the entire case for judicial review, the CA also found Armando guilty of the crime of Rape Through
Sexual Assault. The CA opined that since the Information charged Armando with two counts of rape: (1) by inserting
his finger in the victim’s vagina, which is classified as Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and (2) for inserting his penis in the private part of his victim, which is
Statutory Rape, and considering that Armando failed to object thereto through a motion to quash before entering his
plea, Armando could be convicted of as many offenses as are charged and proved.

ISSUE: Whether the accused can be convicted with two counts of rape: one for statutory rape, and another,
for rape through sexual assault?

HELD: YES. The Information has sufficiently informed accused-appellant that he is being charged with two counts of
rape. Although two offenses were charged, which is a violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which states that "[a] complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the
law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses." Nonetheless, Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure also states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but
the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and
proved, and impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each
offense." Consequently, since Armando failed to file a motion to quash the Information, he can be convicted with two
counts of rape.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated December 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01119 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A, Armando Chingh y
Parcia is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and for Rape Through Sexual Assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months
and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay VVV the total of ₱80,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱80,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱60,000.00 as exemplary damages.
 Bonifacio, et al. vs. RTC Makati and Gimenez
GR No. 184800 | May 5, 2010 | Carpio-Morales

Recit-Ready Case Summary: A libel case was filed against petitioners, who then filed a Motion to Quash because
the Information is want of jurisdiction. The RTC then accepted an Amended Information so the petitioners filed
another Motion to Quash but was then denied. They raised their case to the SC saying that the RTC erred in
admitting the Amended Information. SC held that RTC Makati committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioners’ motion to quash the Amended Information.

Doctrines:
● Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not
only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle acquires even
greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venue
for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
● Venue of libel cases where the complaint is a private individual is limited to only either of two places,
namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where
the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
● If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as
basis for the venue in criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory
article was printed and first published, as evidence or supported by, for instance, the address of their
editorial or business offices in the case of newspaper, magazines or serial publications.

FACTS: Jessie John Gimenez (on behalf of the Yuchengco Family) filed a libel case against petitioners Wonina
Bonifacio, et al. who are officers and trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc., (PEPCI).

PEPCI bought plans from PPI (a subsidiary under Yuchengco Group of Companies) but they were unable to collect
the benefits after PPI filed for corporate rehabilitation. Disgruntled, PEPCI formed a forum by which the could seek
redress for their loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under the address of
www.peopcoalition.com

Gimenez alleged that there were articles/entries containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations
against the Yuchengco Family and YGC.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed by Gimenez. One of the grounds is that the information is
insufficient because failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC. Petitioners said that the Information failed to allege
a particular place within the RTC’s jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the
offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published.

The RTC then accepted an Amended Information. Petitioners once again filed a Motion to Quash on the same
ground but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC Makati erred in admitting an amended information?

RULING: YES. RTC Makati committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to quash the
Amended Information.

Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. It is clear that the venue of libel cases where
the complainant is a private individual is limited to only two places:

1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense, and
2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.

The amended information in the present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. RA 4363 amended Art
360 of the RPC which sets the venue for the filing of an information for a libel case. The old rule allows the filing of an
action for libel in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated. Clearly, the evil sought to be
prevented by the amendment was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated
or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused.

To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioner’s website in Makati
with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Art 360 of the RPC sought to
discourage and prevent.

For the Court to hold that the amended information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply
because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other
locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.
 YALONG vs PEOPLE
G.R. 187174, August 28, 2013

Recit-Ready Case Summary: Cruz was charged before the Manila RTC. Offended party failed to reserve the right to
file a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense. TC acquitted Cruz but ordered to return the parcel of land
to the surviving heirs. Cruz filed an MR assailing that Manila RTC has no jurisdiction over the parcel of land in
Bulacan.

RULE 110: PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

Venue of Selected Offenses

General Rule of Law/Doctrine: 

● Notice of Appeal; Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that appeals to the Court of Appeals
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing
a notice of appeal with the latter court.The well-settled rule is that a motion which fails to comply with
Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 is a useless piece of paper; If filed, such motion is not entitled to judicial
cognizance and does not stop the running of the reglementary period for filing the requisite pleading.
● Appeals; The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional
and non-compliance with such requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment
final and executory.
● Venue;The court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes
the other.
● Violations of BP 22 are categorized as transitory of continuing crimes. A suit on the check
can be filed in any of the places where any of its elements of the offense occurred, that is,
where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored.

FACTS: A complaint was filed by Lucila Ylagan before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Batangas (MTCC)
charging Yalong with a crime of violation of BP 22.
● Arraignment – Yalong pleaded not guilty
During Trial, Ylagan testified that the check for the payment of the amount Yalong borrowed was dishonored and
returned. After verbal and written demands to pay, Ylagan resorted to filing a criminal case. Yalong asserted that she
paid but did not ask for a receipt. Yalong also claimed that the check was her husband’s but knew of the insufficiency
of the funds. The check was already signed by him when she handed the same to Ylagan. (Her defense was she was
not the owner of the account and she did not issue the check)
● MTCC – Yalong was guilty beyond reasonable doubt; all elements have been duly established.
● Yalong:
● Supplemental MR and Recall the Warrant of Arrest (DENIED)
● Notice of Appeal was denied also because of unjustified absence (DENIED)
● Petition for Relief form Order and Denial of Appeal was denied because she lost the remedies
available for her (DENIED)
● Moved for reconsideration (DENIED)
● Petition for Certiorari with Petition for Bail to the RTC of Batangas
● RTC – Denied; and MR was also denied
● CA – dismissed the petition on the ground that the RTC exercised its original jurisdiction where appeal (by
filing a notice of appeal with the RTC) and not a petition for review is the proper remedy.

Thus this petition.

ISSUE: WON MTCC properly acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case. 

HELD: YES. The MTCC had acquired proper jurisdiction over the criminal case. 

It is well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the
acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the
court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the
case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the
offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of
the places where any of its elements occurred — in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered,
or dishonored.

In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject was drawn, issued and delivered in Manila, records reveal that
Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its
dishonor. As such, the MTCC correctly took cognizance of the Criminal Case No. 45414 as it had the territorial
jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this lgiht, the denial of the present petition remains warranted. As the Court
finds the above-stated reasons already sufficient to deny the present petition, it is unnecessary to delve on the other
ancillary issues in this case.
 Pacoy vs Cajigal, PP & Escueta
G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007

Recit-Ready Case Summary: 

A mistake in the filing of information for homicide then murder is being questioned by petitioner as violative of his
rights against double jeopardy claiming that the Trial Court judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he
ordered the re-arraignment of the accused.

General Rule of Law/Doctrine: 

A strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate
courts do not involve factual but legal questions.
A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave... of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:

SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes manifest at any time
before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted
of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there
appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense
and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.

FACTS:
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his
armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which
caused his instantaneous death.

With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.

On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference and trial on October 8, 2002.
 
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another Order, likewise dated
September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as
having qualified the crime to Murder.

Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide" and instead
wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion
remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the
victim’s name from "Escuita" to "Escueta." 

On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the
crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy,
considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the
case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered
for him a plea of not guilty.

On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending the Resolution
of the Instant Motion on the ground of double jeopardy.

The respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for
Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary,
capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of
the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the judge committed grave abuse of discretion and 
2) there was double jeopardy.

HELD: 
1)No. We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in the Information for Homicide.
The argument of petitioner is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or
substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court to Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:

SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes manifest at any
time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the accused cannot
be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not
be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused
to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.

2)No. Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
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(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may prosper, to wit:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.
Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first.

Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the amendment
of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original information
that was amended by merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and writing the word "Murder," instead, which showed
that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.