G.R. No. 156117             May 26, 2005 and ARP No.

and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also
issued in 1994;9 and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. (g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents. Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements
thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000.
DECISION Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.10

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an
Opposition to the respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the
of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- Subject Lots required by law; (2) Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine and
G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,1 which affirmed the Judgment of the did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,2 granting Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the
the application for land registration of the respondents. Republic and were not subject to private appropriation.11

Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.12 All owners of the
filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.13 A copy
parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject
(Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they Lots, as well as on the bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu,
purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June where the Subject Lots were located.14 Finally, the Notice was also published in the
1976.3 Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the Official Gazette on 02 August 199915 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December
following set of documents: 1999.16

(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special
and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David;4 Default,17 with only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the
Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark
documentary evidence to prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5
Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to the
MTC after 30 days.
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots;6
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring
certificates of title covering the Subject Lots;7 its Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, final and executory, and directing the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office for the Subject Lots.18
(CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and
disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court
1963;8 of Appeals.19 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed
the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No.
941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994;
 In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and
has been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be
1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of
provides that "All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of imperfect title.
prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its
subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription" and Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the
that "Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential
of good faith." Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended,
that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant;
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While
acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when the subject parcels
1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are
coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it co-owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the authority of the courts
is undisputed that herein appellees or their predecessors-in-interest had to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is
occupied and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since
adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees' the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for land registration under the
possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter
subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
the argument of the appellant does not hold water.
I
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by
CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus Jurisdiction
susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees
are, with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction
Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any manner to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but for
provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of appelless should reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic.
only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands
alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels of land in
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the
open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when
MTC to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration.
they filed the instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As
such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.20
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though
they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the
individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of
hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Court's
owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of
pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,22 to wit:
the Subject Lots prior to 25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance
with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also alleges . . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the
that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive prescription period, had above-cited sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the
overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,21 where this Court declared that Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the
 manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application
mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby rendering all proceedings for registration was still pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner
utterly null and void. Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance
of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural
lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated
proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots. by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as
a land registration court.
The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and expressly allows the following
situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as they Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not
are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered;24 and (2) the filing of a single affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court,
application for registration of several parcels of land provided that the same are located nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing,
within the same province.25 The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the which bars the MTC from assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents'
present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of land, application for registration.
but are seeking the separate and individual registration of the parcels of land in their
respective names. A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,28 and jurisdiction in rem cannot be
acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this of notice.29
Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of
the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of
as not inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2)
and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the
and convenient." following manner:

Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the 1. By publication. –
Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint
application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
of causes of action and parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration, Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed separate published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land
court to hear and proceed with the case.26 They are not even accepted grounds for involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may
dismissal thereof.27 Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court
and parties involve an implied admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall
power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative, not be granted.
to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately
(in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party and the Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property
severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be
separately (in case of misjoinder of parties). sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its
declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals 30 that publication in a newspaper of
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and
corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property
Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication, No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000,
mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA
publication of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void
imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.
on the reason behind the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation, thus – II

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be Period of Possession
deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the
Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots
complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.
the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspaper and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and
not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may
proceed with respondents' application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it
not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real
necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring
estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
title to public land.
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective
of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a
mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.31 Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title
to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots
by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03
June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in
September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950.32
Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was
published in The Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and
circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves,
only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing. the Subject Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC
Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-
1063, dated June 25, 1963. Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would
Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992."33 The
already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The
Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and
Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process
disposable as of 25 June 1963.
for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial
hearing to oppose respondents' application for registration, and to present his claim and
evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant- As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private
oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government;34 and it is
default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents' application for indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was
registration and even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.35
the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State.36 It
circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the
Subject Lots and to acquire jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration (1) For homestead settlement;
thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots (2) By sale;
 (3) By lease; Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled
to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles; 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires
adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the
(a) By judicial legalization; or Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of
possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).37
of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had
been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public shall not apply thereto.41 It is very apparent then that respondents could not have
Land Act because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
mode.38 Since respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,39 then it can be as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be
reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their judicially confirmed or legalized.
imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on the
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the
144 hectares,40 may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads – 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals
to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents,
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed their application,
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.42
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit: The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073]. exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the
presumption always is that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.43 As established by this Court in the
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for
provisions of this chapter. judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property
Registration Decree, for Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads –
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public right, claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter,
domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona must in every case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance,
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a
granted in subsection (b) hereof.
 certificate of title be issued to them under the provisions of the Land Registration
Act.44

Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied
with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the
procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree.

Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights
apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands
of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a
special law45 that must take precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an
established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law,
the special law prevails – Generalia specialibus non derogant.46

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is
REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75,
dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL
AND VOID. Respondents' application for registration is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 170724             January 29, 2007 During the initial hearing, the respondent corporation, through counsel, offered in
evidence the following documents to prove or establish the jurisdictional facts of the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, case, to wit:
vs.
SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. Exhibit "A" - The Petition for Registration containing seven (7)
pages and mandatory annexes designated as A-1 to A-
DECISION 3;
Exhibit "A-1" - Lot Plan No. Ccn-07000094 of Lot 1 comprising Cad.
GARCIA, J.: Lot Nos. 3151, 3152, 3158, 3159, 3160 and 3161;
Exhibit "A-2" - Technical Description of Lot No. 1;
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Exhibit "A-3" - Certification of Non-requirement of Surveyor's
Philippines seeks the reversal and setting aside of the Decision1 dated May 23, 2005 of Certificate;
the Court of Appeals (CA)-Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV No. 73996, as reiterated in its Exhibit "B" - Order resetting date of Initial Hearing to September 23,
Resolution2 of December 7, 2005, dismissing the Republic's appeal from an earlier 1998;
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Danao City, which ordered the Exhibit "B-1" - Newspaper Clipping;
registration of title in the name of herein respondent San Lorenzo Development Exhibit "C" - Affidavit of Publication issued by Banat News;
Corporation over a 64,909-square meter parcel of land in Barangay Maslog, City of
Exhibit "D" - Certificate of Publication issued by the Land
Danao, Province of Cebu.
Registration Authority;
Exhibit "E" - Certificate of Posting issued by the Court Sheriff;
The facts:
Exhibit "F" - Certificate of Publication issued by the NPO;
Exhibit "F-1" - Copy of Notice of Initial Hearing;
On November 13, 1997, respondent San Lorenzo Development Corporation filed with the
MTCC of Danao City an application for registration of title to a parcel of land, described Exhibit "G" - Copy of the Indorsement addressed to the Clerk of
as Lot 1 of the Consolidation-Subdivision Plan, Ccn-07-000094, being a portion of Lots Court, MTCC, Danao City, from Salvador Oriel, Chief,
3151, 3152, 3158, 3159, 3160 and 3161, Cad. 681-D, Danao Cadastre, situated in Docket Division, Land Registration Authority, dated
Barangay Maslog, City of Danao, Province of Cebu, with a total area of 64,909 square July 7, 1998; and
meters, more or less. The application was docketed in the MTCC as LRC No. 100. Exhibit "H" - Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.

On November 14, 1997, the MTCC issued an Order setting the application for initial Thereafter, the case was called aloud in open court to determine whether there were
hearing on March 5, 1998. The Order required that a copy thereof be furnished the other oppositors aside from the Republic. There being none, the court issued an Order of
Commissioner, Land Registration Authority, for notice and for the necessary publication General Default on September 23, 1998.
to be made.
Respondent corporation, to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been in
On December 11, 1997, the Solicitor General entered his appearance as counsel for possession of the land applied for in the concept of an owner peacefully, continuously,
petitioner Republic and deputized the City Prosecutor of Danao City to appear in the adversely and notoriously for a period required under the law, presented six (6)
case. On the same date, the Republic filed its opposition to the application. witnesses. The six, who were predecessors-in-interest of composite portions of the
subject parcel of land, provided testimonies to the effect that they had been in
On February 24, 1998, another Order was issued by the MTCC resetting the initial possession of the land, and had subsequently sold their respective parcels thereof to the
hearing of the application to June 15, 1998. This was followed by an Order of May 15, respondent. Their testimonies were supported by tax declarations and deeds of sale.
1998, resetting anew the initial hearing to September 23, 1998.
On October 12, 2001, the trial court rendered its decision3 granting the respondent’s
application for registration of title, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the Pursuant to Section 23, P.D. 1529, the initial hearing of the case must have to be not
issuance of title to Lot 1 of the Consolidation-Subdivision of Plan Ccn-07-000094, being earlier than forty-five (45) days and not later than ninety (90) days from the date of the
a portion of Lot 3152, 3151, 3158, 3159, 3160 and 3161, Cad. 681-D, Danao Cadastre, order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing. The Order having been issued on
situated in the Barangay of Maslog, Danao City, Province of Cebu, Island of Cebu, May 15, 1998, the initial hearing should have been set not earlier than June 29, 1998 (45
containing an area of SIXTY FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINE (64,909) days from May 15, 1998 and not later than August 13, 1998 (90 days from May 15,
square meters, for and in the name of San Lorenzo Development Corporation, with 1998). Unfortunately, the initial hearing was scheduled and actually held on September
principal office address at Ground Floor, Stanford Tower Condominium, 1870 M.H. Del 23, 1998, some forty-one (41) days later than the prescribed period.
Pilar Street, Malate, Metro Manila.
Even if counted from June 8, 1998 (date of notice of hearing), still the hearing on
Upon finality of this Decision, let a corresponding decree of registration be issued in favor September 23, 1998 is seventeen (17) days late than the prescribed period of ninety (90)
of applicant in accordance with Sec. 39 of PD 1529. days, the last day of which fell on September 6, 1998.

SO ORDERED. It is noteworthy that both parties invoke the decision of the Court in Republic v. Manna
Properties, Inc.,[7] decided January 31, 2005, albeit each cites different portions thereof,
On November 7, 2001, petitioner Republic filed a Notice of Appeal, therein making and for different purposes. The common reliance on said case is well-placed as it is,
known that it was elevating the case to the CA. In the CA, the Republic’s appellate indeed, of a similar factual setting. Furthermore, that case tackles the same two (2)
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 73996. issues presently raised: compliance with the jurisdictional requirements for original
registration, and proof of possession for the requisite period.
In the herein assailed decision4 of May 23, 2005, the CA-Cebu City dismissed the
Republic’s appeal. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court A careful reading of Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc. will support a finding in favor of
in its equally assailed resolution5 of December 7, 2005, the Republic is now before this the respondent but only as regards the issue of jurisdiction. Speaking on that issue, the
Court via the instant petition raising the following issues: Court in Manna Properties, Inc., wrote:

1. Whether or not the defective and/or want of notice by publication of the initial The duty and the power to set the hearing date lie with the land registration court. After
hearing(s) of the case a quo vested the trial court with jurisdiction to take an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the issuance of a court order
cognizance thereof; and setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court document. The
notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the
2. Whether or not deeds of sale and tax declarations/clearances constitute the clerk of court to the LRA [Land Registration Authority]. This involves a process to which
"well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse the party applicant absolutely has no participation.
occupation under C.A. No. 141.
Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases, the applicant must strictly comply with
In the matter of jurisdiction, petitioner Republic maintains that the MCTC never acquired the jurisdictional requirements. In this case, the applicant complied with the jurisdictional
jurisdiction over the case on account of its failure to conduct the initial hearing thereof requirements.
within the period fixed in Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, which mandates that the date and hour of initial hearing shall not be The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing date was set
earlier than 45 days nor later than 90 days from the date of the Order. In the Republic’s beyond the 90-day maximum period. x x x.
own words:6
We have held that "a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk
After a series of postponements, the trial court finally set the initial hearing of the case on of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of
September 23, 1998 in an order issued on May 15, 1998 xxx. The notice of initial such official in the performance of his duties."8 A party cannot intervene in matters within
hearing, however, was issued only on June 6, 1998. the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court
errs on matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or
omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the Here, in support of its application for registration, the respondent corporation submitted a
applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law. certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
that the parcel of land sought to be registered forms part of the general area classified as
Moreover, it is evident in Manner Properties, Inc. that what is more important than the alienable and disposable public land under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-467
date on which the initial hearing is set is the giving of sufficient notice of the registration dated June 7, 1938. It also submitted tax declarations and/or clearances, the earliest of
proceedings via publication. In fact, in its memorandum,9 petitioner Republic "concedes which is in the year 1964 for Lots 3150 and 3160; 1963 for Lot 3151; and 1948 for Lots
(a) that respondent should not be faulted if the initial hearing that was conducted on 3152, 3159 and 3161.
September 23, 1995 was outside the 90-day period set forth under Section 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, and (b) that respondent might have substantially complied The respondent's application was granted by the two (2) courts below on the premise
with the requirement thereunder relating to the registration of the subject land."10 Hence, that, reckoned to date, possession of the subject parcel of land since the declaration of
on the issue of jurisdiction, we find for the respondent, in that its application for alienability and disposability on June 7, 1938 was more than fifty (50) years already.
registration was rightfully given due course by the MTCC. Adverse possession for at least thirty (30) years had long been completed. This
reasoning was fraught with errors.
However, on the more important issue of lack of evidence of possession on the part of
the respondent for the period required by law, the balance must tilt in favor of the First, the law, as mentioned earlier, requires that the possession of lands of the public
petitioner. domain must be from at least June 12, 1945 for the same to be acquired through judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. Through the years, Section 48(b), supra, of the Public
Very evident from Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc. is that the reckoning date under the Land Act has been amended several times. The case of Republic v. Doldol[12] provides
Public Land Act11 for the acquisition of ownership of public lands is June 12, 1945 or a summary of these amendments:
earlier, and that evidence of possession from that date or earlier is essential for a grant
of an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Section 48(b) of the Public x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, provides: of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No.
1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has already been
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural amended by Presidential Decree 1073, approved on January 25, 1977. As amended,
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since Section 48(b) now reads:
June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
(Emphasis supplied) June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
Similarly, Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 – the Property Registration Decree – provides, conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
inter alia, as follows: grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by PD No. 1073, presently requires,
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their for judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title, the possession and
duly authorized representatives: occupation of the piece of land by the applicants, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, since 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total
1. Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in conformity with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree heretofore cited.
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier; (Emphasis supplied)
As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is not On the whole, we find merit in the petition.
sufficient. It must be shown, too, that possession and occupation had started on June 12,
1945 or earlier. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision dated May
23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals-Cebu City in CA-G.R. CV No. 73996, as reiterated in its
Second, the acceptance by the courts a quo of the CENRO certificate of alienability and resolution of December 7, 2005, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the application for
disposability as evidence of possession since the date of said certificate is patently registration filed by respondent San Lorenzo Development Corporation is DENIED.
erroneous. According to the CENRO certification, the subject land was alienable and
disposable public land since June 7, 1938. This certification does not in any way indicate No costs.
that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
property as far back as 1938. SO ORDERED

The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove two things, to wit:

1. That the land is alienable public land; and

2. That his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in
the Public Land Act.13

All that the CENRO certificate evidences is the alienability of the land involved, not the
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof by the
respondent or its predecessors-in-interest for the period prescribed by law.

As in Manna Properties, Inc., while the Court acknowledges tax declarations as sufficient

basis for inferring possession, the tax declarations presented by the respondent in this
case do not serve to prove their cause:

The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12 June 1945, is
material to this case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12 June 1945 or earlier. x x x
Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the reckoning
date in CA 141 cannot be established.14

Here, the earliest of the tax declarations presented by the respondent was in the
year 1948 for Lots 3152, 3159 and 3161; 1963 for Lot 3151; and 1964 for Lots 3150 and
3160. At best, the respondent corporation can only prove possession since said dates.
This does not constitute the evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse
occupation under CA 141, as amended.

Lastly, while it is true that the issue of whether or not the respondent corporation has
presented sufficient proof or the required possession raises a question of fact, which
ordinarily cannot be entertained in a petition under Rule 45, one of the exceptions to that
rule is when, as here, the evidence on record does not support the conclusions of both
the trial and the appellate courts.
G.R. No. L-31749 February 21, 1980 of the heirs of Francisco Daño, residents of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental,
and 30 days after this decision shall have become final, let the
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, corresponding decree be issued to the aforesaid heirs of Francisco Daño,
vs. namely: Faye Daño, Ida Daño, Emma Tolentino, Francis Daño and Leo
IDA L. DAÑO, representing the heirs of FRANCISCO P. DAÑO, and THE COURT OF Daño, all of legal age, Filipinos and residents of Jimenez, Misamis
FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, respondents. Occidental.

SO ORDERED.  3

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Not in accord with the ruling of respondent Court, petitioner moved for reconsideration on
November 14, 1969 on the ground that applicant-respondent failed to prove a
Petitioner seeks from us, by way of Certiorari, the annulment of the Decision of registerable title. And, for the first time, petitioner argued that respondent filed her
respondent Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, dated October 23, 1969, application for registration only on January 8, 1969, which was beyond the period fixed
decreeing the registration of a parcel of land in the name of the heirs of Francisco P. by Sections 45 and 47 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
Daño in Land Registration Case No. N-60, LRC Record No. 36486, as well as its Orders 2061, which was "not to extend beyond December 31, 1968."
denying petitioner's two Motions for Reconsideration.
In denying the aforementioned Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Court, in its
The records of the case disclose the following antecedents: On January 8, 1969, Order dated December 6, 1969, invoked Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court to the
respondent Ida L. Daño, representing the heirs of the deceased Francisco P. Daño, filed effect that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a Motion to Dismiss or in the
with respondent Court an application for registration of a parcel of land containing an Answer are deemed waived, and cited previous rulings of the Supreme Court, among
area of 5,518 square meters, situated at Sinonoc, Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental, with them, Vicente vs. Lucas, et al., (95 Phil. 716 [1954]), which held that "where the
the prayer that "in case the land may not be registered as private land, she requests that defendants never pleaded the statute of limitations they are deemed to have waived it
her imperfect or incomplete title to the property be confirmed in the names of the heirs of and it is error for the lower Court to dismiss the proceeding on that ground." 4

Francisco P. Daño."  1

Petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration alleging mainly that the issue
The Director of Lands, through the Assistant Provincial Fiscal, filed an Opposition involved being jurisdictional, it can be raised at any stage of the proceeding, and cannot
contending that the land sought to be registered by the applicant is a foreshore land be waived; that there is no waiver to a non-existing right nor to one contrary to law; and
forming part of the public domain and cannot be the subject of private ownership.  2 that an officer of the Government cannot waive the right of the State.

On August 12, 1969, the occupants-oppositors, through their counsel, also filed their Again, the Second Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Court on
written Opposition reiterating the public character of the land sought to be registered. January 8, 1970, premised on the following considerations:
This Opposition was dismissed, however, by the trial Court on the ground that since by
oppositors' own admission the land is public, they are bereft of personality with which to The Court maintains that Sections 45 and 47 of public Land Act No. 141
interpose any objection. as amended by Republic Act No. 2061 is not jurisdictional but clearly a
limitation to file application. A reading of said sections will readily show
After due hearing, the Court a quo rendered its Decision on October 23, 1969, decreeing that a time it was fixed for the filing of applications under that Chapter
the registration of subject property in the name of the heirs of Francisco P. Daño, thus: which shall not extend beyond December 31, 1968.

It having been duly proved by the evidence present by the petitioner that The contention of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal that the Court of First
the land was acquired and occupied by her predecessor-in-interest and Instance is of limited jurisdiction when it acuse as a land Court is not in
was possessed, which possession dates back more than 30 years, it is point. what is to Be determined is the context of Sections 45 and 47 of
hereby decreed that the property be adjudged and registered in the name
 Public Act 141 as amended by Republic Act 2061. Indeed, tile Provincial agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
fiscal admitted that the same section it legal limitation. claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty (30)
years immediately preceding the filing of the application
It being, therefore, a limitation, the same is a defense or objection to the for confirmation of title except when prevented by was or
application which, as previously ruled by this Court is subject to the force majeure, there shall be conclusively presumed to
provisions of Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rule of Court.  5 have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
Petitioner elevated the case to this Court on appeal. however, considering that only a title under the provisions of this Chapter.
question of law is involved and that Republic Act No. 5440 is applicable, we required the
filing of a Petition for Review in our Resolution dated March 16, 1970. We agree with respondent Court that the period fixed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act CA 141), as amended, is not jurisdictional but is more of a time limitation. As such, it
The sole issue raised is the determination of whether or not respondent Court had is a defense or objection which should have been set up either in a Motion to Dismiss or
jurisdiction to entertain this application for registration of land filed after December 31, in an Answer.   Inasmuch as petitioner had never pleaded the statue of limitations, he is
6

1968, the Headline set in Republic Act No. 2061 for filing applications for the judicial deemed to have waived the same.  7

confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to land.

The rule is that where the defendants never pleaded the statute of
Section 47 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by republic Act No. 2061, limitations the are deemed to have waived it and it is error for the lower
approved on June 13,1958, provides: court to dismiss the proceeding on that ground. 8

SEC. 47. The persons specified in the next fol ' lowing section are hereby The defense of prescription cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial or on appeal.
granted time not to extend beyond December thirty-one, nineteen Petitioner raised that issue for the first time only in his Motion for Reconsideration filed on
hundred and sixty-eight within which to take advantage of the benefit of November 14, 1969. This cannot be sanctioned.
this chapter: Provided, That the several periods of time designated by the
President in accordance with section forty-five of this Act shall apply also The claim of prescription cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,
to the lands comprised in the provisions of this chapter, but this section and much less in a motion for reconsideration like in the instant case. ...
shall not be construed as prohibiting an of saici persons from acting Petitioners having failed to plead in their answer the defense of
under this chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President. prescription, the same cannot now be raised for the first time. 9

The "next following section" referred to is section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as But even bearing in mind that prescription does not run against the State (Art 1108 (4),
amended by Republic Act No. 1942, which reads as follows: Civil Code) and that the rights of the State may not be waived by mistakes of officers
entrusted with the exercise of such rights (Lewin vs. Galang, 109 Phil. 1041 [1960]), yet,
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying the intendment of the lawmaker to record as much leeway as possible to applicants for
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles is evident from the statutory history
therein, But those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply of section 47 of the Public Land Act. In the original text, the time limitation was not to
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for extend beyond December 31, 1938. An amendment introduced by Commonwealth Act
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title 292, section 2, approved on June 9, 1938, extended the expiry date to December 31,
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: 1941. Subsequently, section 1 of Republic Act No. 1011, approved on June 2, 1947,
further extended the time limit to December 31, 1957. Republic Act No. 2061, approved
on June 13, 1958, again prolonged the period to December 31, 1968. Still later, by virtue
xxx xxx xxx
of Republic Act No. 6236, approved on June 19, 1971, the nine prescribed was extended
to December 31, 1967. Again, only quite recently, on January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073
(b) Those who by themselves or through their lengthened the cut-off date to December 31, 1987.
predecessors-in- interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
Considering the obvious intent of the law as shown by the several extensions granted, it
should be held that the extension granted by RA No. 6236 up to December 31, 1967
retroacted to and covered the application filed by private respondent on January 8, 1969,
or during the intervening period from January 1, 1969 up to December 31, 1976.

As we held in Director of Lands vs. Abarro, et als. (90 SCRA 422 [(979]), speaking
through Mr. Justice Felix V. Makasiar, and the facts of which are almost on all fours with
the case at bar:

Respect should be given to the obvious intention of the lawmaker in

extending the period for filing such applications time and time again, to
give full opportunity to those who are qualified under the law to own
disposable lands of the public domain and thus reduce the number of
landless among the citizenry.

Premised upon the foregoing considerations, the jurisdiction of respondent Court in

entertaining the instant application for registration and resolving the same, must be
upheld.

Petitioner has raised no issue on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is dismissed, and the challenged Decision, dated
October 23, 1969, and Orders, respectively dated December 6, 1969 and January 8,
1970, issued by respondent Court, are hereby declared valid for hang been within the
jurisdictional competence of respondent court to promulgate.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 151910               October 15, 2007 (1) That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto (Sec. 48[b], C.A. 141 as amended
vs. by P.D. 1073).
LUDOLFO V. MUÑOZ, Respondent.
(2) That the muniment/s of title and/or the tax payment/s receipt/s of
DECISION application/s, if any, attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands
AZCUNA, J.: acquired for or his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.
Said muniment/s of title as well as the title do not appear to be genuine and that
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
the tax declaration/s and/or tax payment receipt/s indicate the pretended
of Civil Procedure, seeking to set aside the August 29, 2001 Decision1 of the Court of
possession of application to be of recent vintage.
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58170, as well as its January 29, 2002 Resolution,
which affirmed the October 3, 1997 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao,
Albay, Branch 13, granting the application for land registration of respondent Ludolfo V. (3) That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant
Muñoz. can no longer be availed of by the applicant who has failed to file an appropriate
application for registration within the period of six (6) months from February 16,
1976 as required by P.D. No. 892. From the records, it appears that the instant
The following facts prompted the present controversy.
application was recently filed.
On June 14, 1996, respondent filed an Application for Registration of Title of a parcel of
(4) That the parcel applied for is part of the public domain belonging to the
residential land before the RTC of Ligao, Albay containing an area of 1,986 square
Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
meters situated, bounded, and described as follows:
(5) That this application was filed beyond December 31, 1987, the period set
A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot No. 2276 of the Cadastral Survey of Ligao) with the building
forth under Sec. 2, P.D. No. 1073 and therefore, is filed out of time.4
and improvements thereon, situated in the Barrio of Bagonbayan, Municipality of Ligao,
Province of Albay. Bounded on the S., along line 1-2, by Lot No. 2277, Ligao Cadastre;
on the W., along Line 2-3, by Mabini Street; on the N., and E., along lines 3-4-5-6-4-7, by In respondent’s Answer to Opposition, he professed that the land in question is a
Lot 2284; and on the S., along line 7-8, by Lot 2281; and along line 8-1, by Lot 2278 – all residential lot originally owned and possessed by Paulino Pulvinar and Geronimo
of Ligao Cadastre, containing an area of ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY Lozada. Sometime in April 1917, Pulvinar sold his share of the unregistered land to the
SIX (1,986) square meters.3 spouses Muñoz and Vitero, respondent’s parents. In June 1920, Lozada likewise sold his
remaining part to the parents of respondent. Thereafter, the ownership and possession
of the property were consolidated by the spouses and declared for taxation purposes in
In his application for registration, respondent averred that no mortgage or encumbrance
the name of Muñoz in 1920. Furthermore, it was stated that during the cadastral survey
of any kind affects his property and that no other person has an interest, legal or
conducted in Ligao, Albay in 1928, the land was designated as Lot No. 2276, as per
equitable, on the subject lot. Respondent further declared that the property was acquired
Survey Notification Card issued to Muñoz dated October 2, 1928. Finally, respondent
by donation inter vivos, executed by the spouses Apolonio R. Muñoz and Anastacia
contended that from 1920 up to 1996, the time of application, the land taxes for the
Vitero on November 18, 1956, and that the spouses and their predecessors-in-interest
property had been fully paid.
have been in possession thereof since time immemorial for more than 70 years.
On February 6, 1997, an Order of General Default5 was entered by the trial court against
On November 7, 1996, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the
the whole world except for the government and a certain Alex Vasquez, who appeared
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application on the following grounds:
during the scheduled initial hearing stating that he would file an opposition to the
application.
In the Opposition6 filed by Vasquez dated February 19, 1997, he declared that he owns Conformably with the above findings, as prayed for by the Director, Department of
parcels of land, Lot Nos. 2284-A-2 and 2275, adjoining that of the subject matter of the Registration, Land Registration Authority in his Report dated March 6, 1997, the
application. He added that certain portions of his lands are included in the application as application, if any, in Cad. Case No. 53, Cadastral Record No. 1404 is hereby ordered
respondent’s concrete fence is found within the area of his lots. dismissed.

Respondent, in his answer to the opposition,7 alleged that his property, Lot No. 2276, is The opposition of Alex Vasquez for lack of merit is hereby ordered dismissed. 1âwphi1

covered by a technical description, duly certified correct by the Bureau of Lands and
approved for registration by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), which specified the Let copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General, Provincial
exact areas and boundaries of Lot No. 2276. Granting that there is an encroachment to Prosecutor of Albay, Oppositor Alez Vasquez and Petitioner.
the oppositor’s adjoining land, respondent reasoned that it is not for the court a quo,
sitting as a Land Registration Court, to entertain the opposition because the case should SO ORDERED.15
be ventilated in a separate proceeding as an ordinary civil case.
On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
During the trial, respondent was presented as the sole witness. Respondent, who was 81 subject lot because: (1) the notice of initial hearing was not timely filed; (2) the applicant
years old at that time, testified that he acquired the property in 1956 when his parents failed to present the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be registered
donated the same to him.8 He presented as Exhibit "H"9 Tax Declaration No. 048-0267, during the trial; and (3) the applicant failed to present evidence that the land is alienable
evidencing the payment of realty taxes for Lot No. 2276 in 1997. A Certification from the and disposable.
Office of the Municipal Treasurer10 was likewise introduced by the respondent showing
the payment of real estate taxes from 1956 up to the year 1997. He further declared that
Subsequently, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo. The appellate court
the property is a residential land with improvements such as a house made of solid
explained that there was conclusive proof that the jurisdictional requirement of due notice
materials and fruit-bearing trees. In 1957, respondent told the court that he constructed a
had been complied with as mandated under Section 24 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
concrete wall surrounding the entire property. Respondent also narrated that he grew up
Furthermore, the failure to present in evidence the tracing cloth plan of the subject
on the subject lot and spent his childhood days in the area.11
property did not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to act on the application in
question. Lastly, the CA ruled that respondent need not adduce documentary proof that
On cross-examination, respondent claimed that he has six brothers and sisters, none of the disputed property had been declared alienable and disposable for the simple reason
whom are claiming any interest over the property.12 that the lot had once been covered by free patent application; hence, this alone is
conclusive evidence that the property was already declared by the government as open
On June 16, 1997, the trial court noted13 a Report14 submitted by the Director of Lands, for public disposition.
which informed the court that as per records of the Land Management Bureau in Manila,
Lot No. 2276, CAD-239 is covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 of Anastacia The petitioner, through the OSG, raises the following grounds for the petition:
Vitero.
I.
The RTC rendered a Decision dated October 3, 1997 granting the application for
registration. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered finding the petitioner entitled to registration.
Accordingly, after the finality of this decision, let a decree and, thereafter the
II.
corresponding certificate of title over Lot No. 2276 of the Ligao Cadastre as delimited by
the Technical Description, Annex A-2 of the application, together with the improvements
thereon, issue in the name of LUDOLFO Y. MUÑOZ, of legal age, Filipino citizen, PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NOT PROVEN BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE
married to JOSEFINA PALENCIA, of Mabini Street, Barangay Tinago, Municipality of THAT THE PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE PROPERTY OF
Ligao, Province of Albay. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.16
Anent the first issue, petitioner maintains that the failure to present the original tracing x x x.23
cloth plan is a fatal omission which necessarily affected the trial court’s jurisdiction to
proceed with the case. Moreover, if the survey plan is approved by the Director of Lands and its correctness has
not been overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, the presentation of the
It bears stressing that the "constructive seizure of land accomplished by posting of tracing cloth plan may be dispensed with.24 All the evidence on record sufficiently
notices and processes upon all persons mentioned in notices by means of publication identified the property as the one applied for by respondent, and containing the
and sending copies to said persons by registered mail in effect gives the court corresponding metes and bounds as well as area. Consequently, the original tracing
jurisdiction over the lands sought to be registered."17 cloth plan need not be presented in evidence.25

While petitioner correctly contends that the submission in evidence of the original tracing Anent the second issue, petitioner stresses that in proving the alienable and disposable
cloth plan is a mandatory and even a jurisdictional requirement, this Court has nature of the property, there has to be a certification from the Department of Environment
recognized instances of substantial compliance with this rule.18 It is true that the best and Natural Resources and Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth (CENRO).
plan from the Bureau of Lands, but blueprint copies and other evidence could also
provide sufficient identification.19 In the present application for registration, respondent The CA is of the opinion that respondent need not adduce documentary proofs that the
submitted, among other things, the following supporting documents: (1) a blueprint copy disputed property has been declared alienable and disposable because of the fact that it
of the survey plan20 approved by the Bureau of Lands; and (2) the technical had once been covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-2-664 in the name of
descriptions21 duly verified and approved by the Director of Lands. respondent’s mother, which was unfortunately not acted upon by the proper authorities.
The CA declares that this is proof enough that the property was declared by the
The Court held in Recto v. Republic22 that the blueprint copy of the cloth plan together government as open for public disposition. This contention was adopted by the
with the lot’s technical description duly certified as to their correctness by the Bureau of respondent both in his Comment and Memorandum filed before the Court.
Lands are adequate to identify the land applied for registration, thus –
Notwithstanding all the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument of respondent
On the first challenge, the petitioner invokes the case of Director of Lands v. Reyes, that the subject property was already declared alienable and disposable land.
where it was held that "the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for which must
be approved by the Director of Lands was "a statutory requirement of mandatory Petitioner is correct when it remarked that it was erroneous for the appellate court to
character" for the identification of the land sought to be registered. As what was assume that the property in question is alienable and disposable based only on the
submitted was not the tracing cloth plan but only the blueprint copy of the survey plan, Report dated May 21, 1997 of the Director of Lands indicating that the "land involved in
the respondent court should have rejected the same as insufficient. said case described as Lot 2276, CAD-239 is covered by Free Patent Application No. 10-
2-664 of Anastacia Vitero."
We disagree with this contention. The Court of Appeals was correct when it observed
that in that case the applicant in effect "had not submitted anything at all to identify the It must be pointed out that in its Report26 dated March 6, 1997, the LRA stated that:
subject property" because the blueprint presented lacked the approval of the Director of
Lands. By contrast – 3. This Authority is not in a position to verify whether or not the parcel of land
subject of registration is already covered by land patent, previously approved
In the present case, there was considerable compliance with the requirement of the law isolated survey and is within forest zone.
as the subject property was sufficiently identified with the presentation of blueprint copy
of Plan AS-06-000002 (San Pedro v. Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 65332-R, May 28, WHEREFORE, to avoid duplication in the issuance of titles covering the same parcel of
1981). It should be noted in this connection that the Bureau of Lands has certified to the land and the issuance of titles for lands within the forest zone which have not been
correctness of the blueprint copy of the plan including the technical description that go released and classified as alienable, the foregoing is respectfully submitted to the
with it. Hence, we cannot ignore the fact, absent in the Reyes case, that applicant has Honorable Court with the recommendation that the Lands Management Bureau,
provided ample evidence to establish the identity of the subject property. (Emphasis Manila, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Lands
supplied) Management Sector and Forest Management Bureau, all in Legazpi City, be
ordered to submit a report to the Court on the status of the land applied for, to In the present case, respondent failed to submit a certification from the proper
determine whether or not said land or any portion thereof, is already covered by government agency to prove that the land subject for registration is indeed alienable and
land patent, previously approved isolated survey and is within the forest zone and disposable. A CENRO certificate, which respondent failed to secure, could have
that should the instant application be given due course, the application in Cad. Case No. evidenced the alienability of the land involved.
53, Cadastral Record No. 1404 with respect to Lot 2276 be dismissed.27
Considering that respondent has failed to convince this Court of the alienable and
Noteworthy is the fact that neither the Director of Lands nor the LRA attested that the disposable character of the land applied for, the Court cannot approve the application for
land subject of this proceeding is alienable or disposable. registration.

For clarity, applications for confirmation of imperfect title must be able to prove the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the decision dated August
following: (1) that the land forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural lands of 29, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58170, as reiterated in its resolution
the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and of January 29, 2002, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the application for registration
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership filed by respondent Ludolfo V. Muñoz is DENIED.
either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.28
No costs.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, remains to this day
the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the SO ORDERED.
public domain, other than timber and mineral lands.29 Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers
the President to classify lands of the public domain into "alienable and disposable" lands
of the public domain, which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to "declare what
lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the
government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands that are "officially
delimited and classified."

Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.
Therefore, all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the alienable public domain.30

As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private

persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it
is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title
was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.31 To
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.32 The applicant may also
secure a certification from the Government that the land applied for is alienable and
disposable.33
G.R. No. 91189 November 27, 1992 A certain Charles Hankins, an American who was married to Laura Crescini and who
resided in Canduyong, Odiongan, Romblon, died on 31 May 1937 leaving a will (Exhibit
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, "N"). He was survived by his widow; his son Alexander and William; and his
vs. grandchildren Ismael Samuel and Edgar, all surnamed Buyco, who are the legitimate
SAMUEL BUYCO and EDGAR BUYCO, represented by their attorney-in-fact, issues of his deceased daughter Lilia and her husband Marcelino Buyco. The will was
RIEVEN H. BUYCO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. submitted for probate before the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Romblon. Charles Hankins' son Alexander was appointed administrator of the estate
in Special Proceedings No. 796.

DAVIDE, JR., J.: Laura Crescini died on 22 December 1941.

In its Decision of 5 February 1985,   Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at
1 It appears that in a Project of Partition dated 25 June 1947 (Exhibit "O") and submitted to
Odiongan, Romblon granted the application of the private respondents, who are the probate court in the aforesaid Special Proceedings No. 796, one of the properties of
American citizens, to bring within the operation of the Land Registration Act a parcel of Charles Hankins described as "a parcel of pastureland, riceland and coconut land
land with an area of 3,194,788 square meters (319.4788 hectares) which spreads across containing an area of about 250 hectares, 21 ares and 63 untares . . . assessed at for
the barangays of Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol in the municipality of Odiongan, P6,950.00 as per Tax Declaration No. 15853," was partitioned among his heirs as
Province of Romblon, and to confirm their title thereto. follows:

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals; he alleged therein that the trial xxx xxx xxx
court erred (a) in not declaring the private respondents barred by the Constitution from
applying for registration because they are American citizens and are thus disqualified TO LAURA C. HANKINS, . . .
from acquiring lands in the Philippines, (b) in holding that private respondents had
established proprietary rights over the land even before acquiring American citizenship (a) 157 acres . . . comprised in what is known as Carabao
through naturalization, and (c) independently of the issue of alienage, in not dismissing Pastureland and Milk-Cow Pasture. (This land is a portion
the application for registration on the basis of the private respondents failure to of the land described in tax declaration N0. 15853 . . .)
overthrow, by conclusive or well-nigh incontrovertible proof, the presumption that the
land applied for is public land belonging to the State. 
2
xxx xxx xxx

In its Decision of 21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824,   public respondent

3
TO ALEXANDER HANKINS, . . .
dismissed the appeal "for lack of merit."4

(a) 80 acres of land (pasture) which is a portion of the

Petitioner consequently filed this petition on 11 January 1990 under Rule 45 of the Rules land described in Tax declaration No. 15853 . . . .
of Court. Reiterating the issues he raised before the respondent Court, he seeks a
review and reversal of the latter's decision. 
5
xxx xxx xxx

In the Resolution of 11 July 1990, this Court gave due course to the petition after the TO LILIA HANKINS, . . .
filing by the private respondents of their Comment to the same and by the petitioner of
his reply thereto.  On 17 April 1991, the parties were required to file their respective
6

(a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in the barrio of

Memoranda.  7

Canduyong and which is a portion of the entire parcel

described in tax declaration No. 15853 . . . .
The records disclose the following material operative facts and procedural antecedents:
 (b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in the barrio of Rita Fiedacan and Alexander Hankins; on the Northeast, by Canduyong
Canduyong and which is a portion of the entire parcel River and property of Alexander Hankins; on the East, by properties of
described in tax declaration No. 15853. Andres Cuasay, Escolastica Feruelo, Candido Mendoza, Raymundo
Goray, Pedro Goray, Manuel Yap, Feliza Fedri and Silverio Mierculecio;
xxx xxx xxx on the Southeast, by properties of Candido Mendoza, the Heirs of Benita
Formilleza Silverio Mierculecio, Zosimo Llorca, Lot 2, and properties of
TO WILLIAM B. HANKINS, . . . Beatrice Hankins and Zosimo Llorca; on the West, by properties of Maria
Llorca and Miguel Llorca; and on the Northwest, by property of Catalino
Fabio. Point "I" is S. 33 deg. 24"., 4075.50 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Odiongan,
(a) 100 acres of pastureland situated in the barrio of
Romblon. Area THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY FOUR
Canduyong and which is a portion of the entire parcel
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT (3,194,788) SQUARE
described in tax declaration No. 15853 . . . .
METERS, more or less as Exhibit "C".  9

(b) 25 acres of pasture land situated in barrio Anajao and

which they claim to own in fee simple as they acquired the same by inheritance and
which is a portion of the entire parcel described in tax
donation inter vivos. However, they allege in paragraph 9 of the application that should
declaration No. 15853 . . . . 8
the Land Registration Act be inapplicable, the benefits provided for under C.A. No. 141,
The total area so adjudicated is 487 acres, or 197.086 hectares (1 hectare = 2.471 acres)
as amended, be made to extend to them since both they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession thereof since time immemorial. The application was
docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-48 LRC Record No. N-51706.
On 30 July 1948, Laura's share in the estate of her husband Charles was partitioned
among her children. Alexander and William, and her grandchildren, Ismael, Samuel and
Edgar who were represented by their father Marcelino Buyco (Exhibit "P"). Thereafter, on The above description is based on a survey plan prepared by private land surveyor
the same date, William sold his hereditary shares in the estate of his parents to Santiago Español in 1950 (Exhibit "C") and subsequently approved by the Director of
Marcelino Buyco (Exhibit "R"). Lands. While in their application, private respondents invoked the provisions of the Land
Registration Act,  they eventually sought for a confirmation of imperfect title pursuant to
10

paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public Land Act  , as further amended by P.D. No.
11

On 20 August 1962, Marcelino Buyco donated to his children the property acquired from
1073.
William together with other properties (Exhibit "S").
While only the herein petitioner filed an opposition thereto, the Development Bank of the
On 8 September 1970, the Buyco brothers partitioned among themselves the properties
Philippines (DBP) manifested that the portion of the property pertaining to Samuel Buyco
acquired by inheritance from their grandparents and by donation from their father (Exhibit
is covered by a mortgage in its favor. After the jurisdictional facts had been established
"T"). However, Ismael waived his right to his share therein in favor of Samuel, one of the
during the initial hearing and a general order of default entered against all other parties,
private respondents in this case.
the lower court designated the Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Odiongan as
commissioner to receive the evidence for the parties. Samuel Buyco, William Hankins,
Edgar and Samuel Buyco became naturalized American citizens on 29 January 1972 Manuel Firmalo and Jacinta Gomez Gabay (who was 83 years old when she took the
and 12 September 1975, respectively. witness stand in October 1979) testified for the applicants. The first two (2) recounted the
history of the tract of land up to the time of the abovementioned partitions and the
On 14 October 1967, Edgar and Samuel, through their attorney-in-fact, Rieven H. Buyco, alleged possession of the entire area by the applicants (private respondents herein).
filed before the then Court of First Instance of Romblon an application for the registration
of a parcel of land, described as follows: On 5 February 1985, the land registration court handed down a Decision   the dispositive
12

portion of which reads:

A parcel of land (Lot I, under surveyed for the heirs of Lilia Hankins
situated in the barrios of Canduyong, Anahao and Ferrol, Municipality of PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby orders the registration of
Odiongan, province of Romblon, Tablas Island under PSU 127238) LRC title to the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1 Psu-127238 and its
Record No. ________: Bounded on the North by properties of the heirs of
 technical description together with all the improvements thereon, in the owners ever made a claim over any portion of the lot shown in said Psu-
name of the herein applicants, recognizing the interest of the 127238.
Development Bank of the Philippines to be annotated on the certificate of
title to be issued as mortgagee for the amount of P200,000.00 with The land in question has been primarily devoted to cattle grazing (sic)
respect to the share of applicants (sic) Samuel H. Buyco. and to the cultivation of rice and coconut and it was (sic) the applicants
and their predecessors-in-interest have (sic) been reaping the fruits
Upon the decision become (sic) final let the corresponding decree and thereof.
certificate of title be issued accordingly.
The evidence further show (sic) that applicants can rightfully and did
The favorable decision is based on the court's conclusion that: validly acquire title and ownership over the land in question because they
were then Filipino citizens, their father Marcelino Buyco being a Filipino
The oral and documentary evidence indubitably show applicants and their citizen himself (please see personal circumstances of Marcelino Buyco in
predecessors-in-interest — their grandparents Charles Hankins and Exhs. "P" and "R") and their modes of acquisition — by inheritance,
Laura Crescini, to their uncle Alexander Hankins, to them thru their intestate succession, and donation inter-vivos — are all legally
administrators Gregorio Gabay and later Manuel Firmalo — have recognized modes to transfer ownership to them from their predecessors-
possessed the property herein sought to be registered in the concept of in-interest.
owners thereof, and such possession has been continuous,
uninterrupted, adverse, open and public for a period of more than eighty Since time immemorial, applicants and their predecessors-in-interest
years. And their right over the property is duly recognized by the have exercised all the attributes of dominion and absolute ownership over
adjoining owners in their individual affidavits marked as Exhibits "V", "V- the land in question, and have therefore established their vested
1" to "V-21", inclusive. Moreover, none of the adjoining owners filed any proprietary rights and registrable (sic) title over the land in question, rights
opposition to the herein land registration case, thereby indubitably which they have acquired long before they became citizens of the United
showing their recognition of the correctness of the boundary (sic) States (Edgar Buyco became a U.S. citizen only on January 29, 1972;
between their individual lots and that of applicants land subject of this while Samuel H. Buyco, only on September 12, 1975. As a matter of fact,
registration. applicant Samuel H. Buyco mortgaged in favor of the Development Bank
of the Philippines (Exhs. "U", "U-1" and "U-2") the portion belonging to
The late Charles Hankins declared said land for taxation purposes under him in Lot 1, Psu-127238.
Tax Declaration No. 15853 (please see description of lot in Exh. "N") and
thereafter in the name of applicants and/or their father Marcelino Buyco From the foregoing evidence it has been satisfactorily established that
since 1949 up to the present time (Exhs. "W", "W-1" to "W-19"). the applicants have acquired an imperfect and incomplete title over the
parcel of land subject of this registration proceedings in their own right as
Applicants have also paid the real estate taxes thereon since 1948 up to citizens of the Philippines so as to entitle them to a confirmation and
the present time (Exhs. "X", "X-1" to "X-194"). registration of said lot in their names. Consequently Section II, Article
XVII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to this case, neither (sic)
In 1950, the land of applicants was surveyed by Private Surveyor does this case fall under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 713.  13

Santiago Español and its exact metes and bounds were determined with
accuracy in his survey plan PSU-127238 (Exh. "C"). This survey More specifically, the conclusion regarding possession is based on the testimonies of
corrected the impreciseness of the land area as mentioned in the several Manuel Firmalo, William Hankins and Jacinta Gomez Gabay which, as summarized by
instruments –– the will, project of partition, deed of partition, deed of sale the court, are as follows:
(Exhs. "N", "O", "P", and "R") — under which applicants acquired the land
in question. The correctness of this survey is further shown by the fact xxx xxx xxx
that none of the other heirs, like Alexander Hankins nor (sic) the adjoining
Witness Manuel Firmalo testified that from 1970 to 1978 he was the owners in possession of the property subject of this registration
administrator, of the property of applicants; that the said property is proceedings are applicants Samuel Buyco and Edgar Buyco; that the
located in the Barrios of Anahao, Canduyong, and Tubigon (now forming said land is devoted to cattle grazing and planted with coconuts and rice.
part of the municipality of Ferrol) and the same is shown in the survey
may marked as Exh. "C" (Psu-127238); that said lot is separated from the xxx xxx xxx
adjacent properties by concrete monuments, big tress and some barb
(sic) wire fence (sic); that previous to his administration thereof, the same Jacinta Gomez Gabay, 83 years (as of October, 1979) . . . testified that
property was administered by his father-in-law, Gregorio Gabay; . . . that she knew the spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini because
during his administration, a large part of the land was devoted to cattle since the time she can remember, she stayed with said spouses up to the
grazing and a little portion, to coconut (sic) which are now fruit bearing; (sic) their death (sic); that having stayed with the Hankins couple, she
that when he took over the administration of the ranch, there was a total knew of their properties because she lived with them in Canduyong
of 120 heads of cattle and at the time of termination of his administration where the property was situated; that the property is a big tract of land; . .
there were 300 heads; that from time to time, some cattle in the ranch . that when she was living with the Hankins spouses, said spouses
were sold by him and he rendered an accounting to the applicants, the already owned and were in possession of this big tract of land, and this
owners of the ranch; that he employed cowhands to help him ran (sic) the land was fenced off with barbed wires, and that said big tract of land has
ranch of applicants and the salaries of said cowhands were paid out of been used for grazing purposes since she reached the age of reason up
the funds of applicant Samuel Buyco from the sale of the cattle; that the to the present time; that during all the time that she has been with said
proceeds of the coconuts harvested, the money was (sic) deposited with Hankins spouses, nobody ever claimed any portion thereof; that this
the bank and a portion was used for the payment of the real estate taxes property extended from barrio Canduyong up to barrio Anahao; that after
on the land; that during his administration no third person ever claimed Charles Hankins died, his property was divided among his children
ownership over applicants land; that he was the one who procured the Alexander Hankins, William Hankins and Lilia Hankins and the latter's
execution of the affidavits of adjoining owners (Exhs. "V", "V-1" to "V-21") share was received by her children named Ismael, Samuel and Edgar all
which were used to support the real estate mortgage with the DBP over surnamed Buyco; that before Charles Hankins' estate was partitioned it
said land; that from the proceeds of the sale of the copra harvested from was placed under the administration of Alexander Hankins (one of the
the land of applicants,. he paid the real estate taxes thereon specifically heirs); that after the partition, the portion (sic) that went to the Buyco
the taxes covered by Exhs. "X-83" to "X-144"; . . . that his administration children (as heirs of Lilia Hankins) were administered by her husband
over said land was adverse, open continuous and public. Gregorio Gabay; that her husband's administration over said property
started 3 or 4 years after the war which (sic) lasted 25 years or until
William Hankins, then 72 years old and resident (sic) of Odiongan, Gregorio Gabay died; that his son-in-law Manuel Firmalo took over the
Romblon, testified . . .; that ever since he was still a small kid, he know administration of applicants' property; that the land she was referring to is
(sic) that the big tract of land subject of their partition was already owned utilized as a pasture land and it has been a pasture since the time it was
by his father (Charles Hankins); that the possession of his father was in it was owned by spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini up to the
the concept of owner, continuous, adverse, public, and open, up to his present time; that Edgar, Samuel and Ismael, all surnamed Buyco have
(Charles Hankins) death; that after receiving his hereditary share from the been receiving the fruits of the portion that went to Lilia Hankins; that
estates of his father and mother, he sold his said shares to Marcelino Charles Hankins' possession of that big tract of land was in the concept
Buyco, father of applicants by executing a Deed of Sale (Exh. "R") dated of owner, continuous, adverse, open and public; that a portion of this big
July 30, 1948; that during the lifetime of Charles Hankins; the big tract of tract of land went to Edgar H. Buyco, Samuel H. Buyco and Ismael H.
land was devoted primarily to cattle grazing and to coconut and rice; that Buyco as the heirs of Lilia Hankins; that the possession of the said heirs
after he sold his hereditary share of (sic) Marcelino Buyco, the latter took of the late Lilia Hankins over the portion that went to them was in the
possession of his said portion; that after Marcelino Buyco died, the concept of owner, continuous, adverse, open and public up to the present
property of Marcelino Buyco (including his share (sic) hereditary share time; that as far as she can remember the Hankins family possessed said
sold under Ex. (sic) "R") was transmitted to his children, namely: Edgar property for more than eighty (80) years.  14

H. Buyco, Ismael Buyco and Samuel H. Buyco (Samuel and Edgar

Buyco, the (sic) applicants herein); that he known that at present the
The land registration court also summarized the testimony of private respondent Samuel grandparents, the spouses Hankins, including the property donated by
H. Buyco as to possession in this wise: their father, Marcelino Buyco, in an instrument dated September 8, 1970
(Exh. "T"). In this partition, the share of Ismael H. Buyco went to
Applicant Samuel H. Buyco testified that he was 51 years of age, . . .; that applicant-appellee Samuel H. Buyco (Exh. "T-1").
prior to the death of his grandfather Charles Hankins, that big parcel of
pastureland was about 500 to 550 hectares, the boundaries of which From the records extant in this case, it is Our considered view that from
were marked off by concrete monuments, some big trees, some big almost (sic) time immemorial or a period of eighty (80) years, applicant-
stones until it was partitioned in 1948, and to fix the actual boundaries, appellees through their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
the land was surveyed by private surveyor Español (Exh. "D"); that during continuous, and peaceful possession of the property in question so that
the lifetime of their grandfather Charles Hankins this big land was the inescapable conclusion is that all along it is private land and had been
primarily used as a ranch and it was fenced off by barb (sic) wires to segregated from the dominion (sic) of the State. Thus, We sustain the
prevent the cattle from getting out; that after the death of his grandfather conclusion reached by the court a quo that the latter (applicants-
Charles Hankins, the property was administered by his uncle Alexander appellees) thru their predecessors-in-interest have acquired title by
Hankins, and such administration was terminated when there was a acquisitive prescription over the same. . . . 
16

partition in 1948 in accordance with the will of his grandfather; that during
the administration of the property by Alexander Hankins, this property As to the issue of the private respondents citizenship, public respondent held that:
was used as a cattle ranch, even during the Japanese time; that after
receiving their share form the partition of the estate, they initially planted . . . it is beyond per adventure (sic) of doubt that applicants-appellees
rice and coconut and later on they reverted to cattle ranch operation (sic); were still Filipinos when they acquired their title thereto. From the death
that after he and his brother Edgar became the possessor (sic) of said of their grandfather Charles Hankins on May 31, 1937, applicants-
land, they were the one (sic) who have been harvesting the fruits of the appellees right of succession was already vested. Moreover, as early as
land; that they did not personally managed (sic) the land but hired in 1949 the year 1962, their father Marcelino Buyco transferred his title thereto by
the services of Mr. Gregorio Gabay to administer the estate for them until donation inter-vivos so that on September 8, 1970, when the Buyco
1970 when the latter died, and Manuel Firmalo was hired to take over the brothers partitioned the property in question, among themselves, they
administration until 1977 when applicant took over active management of could validly register the same as they already possess the necessary
the property because he obtained a loan of P200,000.00 from the qualifications to have their title perfected under the Torrens system of
Development Bank of the Philippines; . . . that the land was declared in registration.  17

their name (sic) for taxation purposes by their administrator Gregorio

Gabay in 1949 (Exhs. "W", "W-1" to "W-19", inclusive) and that the taxes
The petition is meritorious.
thereon were paid out of their own money since 1948 up to the present
(Exhs. "X", "X-1" to "X-194", inclusive); that applicants' possession in the
concept of owner over the property sought to be registered has been As could be gleaned from the evidence adduce, the private respondents do not rely
open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse and on fee simple ownership base on a Spanish grant or possessory information title under
public. 
15 Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private respondents did not present any
proof that they or their predecessors-in-interest derived title from an old Spanish grant
such as (a) the "titulo real" or royal; (b) the "concession especial" or special grant; (c)
As earlier adverted to petitioner's appeal from the said decision was dismissed by the
the "composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de compra" or title
public respondent for lack of merit. As to the private respondents' title to the land subject
of purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or possessory information title, which
of the application, public respondent makes the following findings:
could become a "titulo gratuito" or gratuitous title.  The primary basis of their claim is
18

possession, by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.

Undisputably, applicant-appellees anchored their title to the land in The land registration court and the public respondent are of the opinion, and so held, that
question by means of hereditary succession as well as donation from the private respondents had this in their favor. Thus, both courts declared that the land
their own father, Marcelino Buyco, who purchased the entire hereditary applied for had been segregated from the public domain and had become private land.
share of William Hankins (Exhs. "R"). Subsequently, applicants-appellees
and their brother, Ismael, partitioned their hereditary share from their
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in possession since time possessor, personally or through his predecessor-in-interest, openly,
immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be upheld for, as this Court stated in Oh continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years
Cho vs. Director of Lands;  19
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is covered to private property
by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is
rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept abovestated, must be either
occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and Susi, or for the period prescribe in
such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos vs. Court of
been part of the public domain even before the Spanish conquest. Appeals,   adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate
27

(Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. ed., 594.)  The 20
Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., now a distinguished member of this Court, that an
applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession applicant for registration under Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a
of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880. certification from the Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as
owner for more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of the
This exception was reiterated in Susi vs. Razon,   where the first possessor was in
21 applicant to prove its positive averments.
possession was in possession for an undetermined period of time prior to 1880. We
stated therein: In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the
property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable parcel of land of the
. . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et public domain. On the contrary, based on their own evidence, the entire property which is
de jure established, in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. alleged to have originally belonged to Charles Hankins was pasture land. According to
2874,   amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a
22 witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay, this land has been pasture land, utilized for grazing
grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual purposes, since the time it was "owned" by the spouses Charles Hankins and Laura
and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an Crescini up to the present time (i.e., up to the date she testified). In Director of Lands
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively vs. Rivas,   this Court ruled:
28

and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said
land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. . . . If by a legal Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under section 1, Article
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the XIII of the 1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become the 1973 Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural
private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the lands (disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable).
control of the Director of Lands.
The instant application was filed, heard and decided under the regime of the 1973
Although this additional pronouncement was rippled by the ruling Manila Electric Constitution.
Co. vs. Castro-Bartolome  , to the effect that land would cease to be public only upon
23

the issuance of a certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under Section 48 (b) As to the second matter to be proved, the applicant must present evidence of an
of the Public Land Act,   and that a piece of land over which an imperfect title is sought to
24
imperfect title such as those derived from the old Spanish grants. He may also show that
be confirmed remains public, this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice, now he has been in continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, in Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership and for the
Court,   reiterated the Cariño and Susi doctrine, thus:
25
period prescribed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.   Simply put, a person who
29

seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of possession by himself and
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing evidence; he
the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer should not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the
deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the oppositors.   This rule is certainly not new. In the 1913 case of Maloles vs. Director of
30

line of cases already referred to,   is that alienable public land held by a
26
Lands,   this Court already held that in order that a petitioner may be entitled to have a
31
parcel of land registered under the Torrens system, he has to show that he is the real There is as well, no evidence on record to show that Charles Hankins cultivated, had
and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the said land; moreover, it is the duty of the court, control over or used the whole or even a greater portion of the big tract of land for
even in the absence of any oppositor, to require the petitioner to show, by a grazing purposes. None of the witnesses testified as to the number of heads of cattle
preponderance of the evidence and by positive and absolute proof, so far as it is which were bought by Charles into the land. There is likewise no competent proof that he
possible, that he is the owner in fee simple of the land in question. declared the land in his name for taxation purposes or that he had paid the taxes
thereon. Although his will (Exhibit "N") made mention of Tax Declaration No. 15853,
In Santiago vs. de los Santos,   this rule was to find anchorage in policy considerations
32 neither the said declaration nor any tax receipt was presented in evidence. Because of
based no less on one of the fundamental objectives of the Constitution, namely the such non-production, it cannot be determined when Charles initially declared his alleged
conservation and utilization of our natural resources. We held in the said case that there land for taxation purpose and what exactly were its natural boundaries, if any. It is clear
would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care that the non-production of this tax declaration accounted for the obvious inability of the
applications to private ownership of real estate. This Court then set the quantum of witnesses to testify with certainty as to the extent of the area of the property. As correctly
evidence needed to be established by the applicant, to wit: well-nigh incontrovertible observed by the petitioner, none of the private respondents' witnesses could give the
evidence. court a definite idea thereon. Thus, Samuel Buyco declared:

In the instant case, private respondents evidence miserably failed to establish their I really don't know the exact area, but it is between 500 to 550 hectares.  37

imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of possession since time
immemorial, which was conceded by the land registration court and the public while William Hankins admitted:
respondent, is patently baseless. There is an evident failure to comprehend the meaning
and import of the term immemorial. As defined, immemorial simply means beyond the I cannot exactly tell because that is a very big estate.  38

reach of memory,   beyond human memory, or time out of mind.   When referring to
33 34

possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of which no man On the other hand, witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay averred:
living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he has learned form his
elders.   Such possession was never present in the case of the private respondents. The
35

I could not exactly tell but I have heard that it was a big tract of land
trial court and the public respondent based the finding of the more than eighty (80) years
because we were staying there.  39

of possession by the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest on the sole

testimony of Mrs. Gabay who was eighty-three (83) years old when she testified in
October of 1979. Thus, she must have been born in 1896. If the asserted possession In any event, even if Charles had indeed declared the property for taxation purposes and
lasted for a period of more than eighty (80) years at the time she testified the same must actually paid taxes, such facts are still insufficient to justify possession thereof, much less
have commenced sometime in 1899, or at the time that she was barely three (3) years a claim of ownership thereon. This Court has repeatedly held that the declaration of
old. It is quite impossible that she could fully grasp, before coming to the age of reason, ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient to
the concept of possession of such a big tract of land and testify on the same some eight prove ownership.  40

(8) decades later. In short, therefore, she cannot be relied upon to prove the possession
by Charles Hankins of the said property from 1899. To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that Charles Hankins had
possessed the property — allegedly covered by Tax Declaration No. 15853 and made
Charles Hankins was an American citizen. There is no evidence to show the date of his the subject of both his last will and testament and the project of partition of his estate
birth, his arrival in the Philippines — particularly in Odiongan, Romblon — or his among his heirs — in such a manner as to remove the same from the public domain
acquisition of the big tract of land; neither is there any evidence to prove the manner of under the Cariño and Susi doctrines. Thus, when he died on 31 May 1937, he
his acquisition thereof. Thus, there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property, to his heirs. This being
that the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land for the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of the private respondents for the
more than eighty (80) years, much less since time immemorial. In Oh Cho vs. Director of latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the alternative ground
Lands,   possession which began in 1880 was not considered as possession "since time
36 relied upon in their application. It would have been entirely different if the possession of
immemorial." Charles was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and under a bona fide claim of
ownership as provided under Section 48 of the Public Land Act. Even if he were an
American citizen at that time, he would have had the same civil rights as Filipino citizens
pursuant to the original ordinance appended to the 1935 Constitution. the pertinent Buyco on 20 August 1962 (Exhibit "S"). However, there is no competent evidence as to
portion of said ordinance reads: the respective boundaries and areas of the properties constituting the said share of
William Hankins; neither are there reliable descriptions of the other alleged properties
(17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the belonging to Marcelino Buyco. Be that as it may, when the survey was conducted by
Commonwealth of the Philippines all the civil rights of the citizens and Español, private respondents and their brother Ismael did not immediately acquire the
corporations, respectively, thereof. portion originating from William Hankins and the other alleged properties of Marcelino
Buyco; hence, there was no valid basis for the inclusion of said properties in the survey.
The import of said paragraph (17) was confirmed and reinforced the originally by Section And even if both William's share and Marcelino Buyco's properties were included there
44 of Act No. 2874 and Section 127 of C.A. No. 141 (The Public Land Act of 1936); the would still be nothing to support the application for the entire 319,4788 hectares
latter provided that: considering that as per the Project of Partition, the share pertaining to William consisted
only of 50.59 hectares. There was, moreover, no evidence to show the extent of the
alleged "other properties" of Marcelino Buyco. Given such circumstances, it would be
Sec. 127. During the existence and continuance of the
reasonable to presume that what was surveyed in 1950 was the entire pasture land
Commonwealth and before the Republic of the Philippines is
alleged to form part of the estate of Charles Hankins, covered by Tax Declaration No.
established, citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy the
15853, and which necessarily included the share of Alexander Hankins. Significantly, per
same rights granted to citizens and corporations of the Philippines under
Exhibit "O" the latter's share is specified as part of the property covered by Tax
this Act.
Declaration No. 15853. The inclusion then of Alexander's share in the survey and the
plan may provide the clue to this unusual increase in the area covered by the survey
This right, however, vanished with the advent of the Philippine Republic on 4 July 1946.  41
plan.

Verily, private respondents had to rely exclusively on their own possession. under the Nevertheless, even if We are to assume for argument's sake that there was nothing
applicable law at the time, it was incumbent upon them to prove that they had been in irregular in the inclusion in the survey plan of the share of William Hankins and the other
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land properties of Marcelino Buyco, the fact remains that the "ownership" thereof could have
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty been acquired by the private respondents and Ismael Buyco only on 20 August 1962
(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, upon the execution of the deed of donation in their favor. To be thus benefited by the
except when prevented by war or force majeure.  42
possession of William or Marcelino for purposes of Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act,
there should be proof that said predecessors had been in open, continuous, exclusive
By their own evidence, private respondents admitted that they were never in actual and notorious possession and occupation thereof. Unfortunately, no such proof was
possession of the property prior to the filing of their application. During the pendency of offered.
Special Proceedings No. 796, the estate of Charles Hankins appeared to have been
administered by his son Alexander. This administration was terminated in 1948 upon the It is palpably obvious then that at the time Land Registration Case No. N-48 was filed in
execution of the Project of Partition. Private respondents and their brother Ismael did not the Regional Trial Court of Romblon on 14 October 1976, private respondents did not
take possession of the share which pertained to their mother, Lilia; instead; they have in their favor an imperfect title over that which they claimed to have inherited, by
allegedly hired Gregorio Gabay to administer the same. There is, however, no competent representation, from the estate of Charles Hankins. With greater force does this
evidence to show the extent of such administration. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact conclusion likewise apply with respect to the properties donated to them in 1962 by their
that Gregorio had the property declared for taxation purposes, the correct area and father Marcelino Buyco. This is because they were not able to prove open, continuous,
boundaries of the same have not been proven. As evidenced by the Project of Partition, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of
the share of Lilia was only 125 acres or 50.59 hectares, which is clearly not the portion acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of
applied for. The area applied for consists of 319.4788 hectares of land based on a the application,   or from 12 June 1945. 
43 44

survey plan prepared by private land surveyor Español on the basis of a survey
conducted in 1950. Obviously, therefore, the plan was not prepared to determine Lilia's
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before such filing, it
share alone for, as admitted by the private respondents themselves, this plan includes
goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right, consisting of an imperfect
William Hankins' share which was sold to Marcelino Buyco, private respondents father,
title over to property before they lost their Philippine citizenship.
and the other properties which the latter donated to the private respondents and Ismael
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the public
respondent of 21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824 is hereby SET ASIDE and
the Decision of 5 February 1985 of Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in
Land Registration Case No. N-48, LRC Record No. N-51706 is REVERSED.

Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 181284 On March 20, 2004, petitioners Macapayag and Brazil filed their Answer, alleging that
respondents have no cause of action against them. On March 23, 2004, the rest of the
LOLOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO PACANA, NESTOR petitioners filed their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO DOGIA, JIMMY TALINO, ERMELITO ANGEL, PETOY case. Petitioners alleged that with the advent of Republic Act No. (RA) 8371, otherwise
BESTO, VICTORINO ANGEL, RUEL BOLING, JERMY ANGEL, BERTING SULOD, known as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA), they, together with the rest of the
RIO BESTO, BENDIJO SIMBALAN, and MARK BRAZIL, Petitioners tribe members, assisted the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in the
vs. processing, validation, and delineation of their Ancestral Domain claim in May 2003. On
RAMON ABERASTURI, CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR LOPEZ JR., DIONISIO A. July 25, 2003, Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) No. R-10-TAL-0703-0010
LOPEZ, MERCEDES L. GASTON, AGNES H. LOPEZ, EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ, JOSE was issued by virtue of NCIP En Banc Resolution No. 08-02003 to the Talaandig tribe
MARIA S. LOPEZ, ANTON B. ABERASTURI, MA. RAISSA A. VELEZ, ZOILO over its ancestral domain in Talakag, Bukidnon, containing an area of 11,105.5657
ANTONIO A. VELEZ, CRISTINA ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ JR., ROSARIO S. hectares. On October 30, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo awarded the said
LOPEZ, JUAN S. LOPEZ, CESAR ANTHONY R. LOPEZ, VENANCIO L. GASTON, CADT to the Talaandig tribe. As awardees of a CADT, petitioners argued that NCIP has
ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY A. ASUNCION, NICOLO ABERASTURI, LISA A. exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case, as the subject matter concerns a dispute
ASUNCION, INEZ A. VERAY, HERNAN A. ASUNCION, ASUNCION LOPEZ, THOMAS and controversy over an ancestral land/domain of Indigenous Cultural Communities
A. VELEZ, LUIS ENRIQUE VELEZ, ANTONIO H. LOPEZ, CHARLES H. LOPEZ, ANA (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).
L. ZAYCO, PILAR L. QUIROS, CRISTINA L. PICAZO, RENATO SANTOS,
GERALDINE AGUIRRE, MARIA CARMENCITA T. LOPEZ, and as represented by On July 1, 2004, the NCIP through Atty. Melanie Pimentel, filed a Motion to Refer the
attorney-in-fact RAMON ABERASTURI, Respondents Case to the Regional Hearing Office-National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO-
NCIP), alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
DECISION
On July 5, 2004, respondents filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint from
PERALTA, J.: Accion Reivindicatoria to one for "Injunction, Damages, and Other Relief," with the
attached Amended and Supplemental Complaint  (amended complaint for injunction). On
5

This is a petition for review on certiorari  assailing the Decision  dated August 17, 2006 of
1 2 July 30, 2004, petitioners filed an Opposition thereto.
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, and the Resolution  dated July
3

4, 2007, which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. On August 1, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
Petitioners, except for Mark Brazil and Nestor Macapayag, are members of the and to issue a writ of injunction therein.
Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig Tribal Association (MILALITTRA), or Talaandig
tribe, who claimed to have been living since birth on the land located at Barangay On August 10, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Amend and
Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon, Mindanao, which they inherited from their forefathers. Supplement Complaint, and declared petitioners’ Motion to Refer the Case to the RHO-
NCIP and Motion to Dismiss moot and academic as a consequence of the grant of the
On the other hand, respondents, represented by attorney-in-fact Ramon Aberasturi, said motion to amend and supplement complaint.
claimed to be the lawful owners and possessor of an unregistered parcel of agricultural
land (Lot No. 7367 Cad 630-D), with an area of 105.7361 hectares, which appears to be On August 17, 2004, petitioners filed a Manifestation praying for an ocular inspection of
located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe. the disputed land to determine the last, actual, peaceable, uncontested status of the
area.
On March 3, 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with On August 25, 2004, petitioners filed another Motion to Refer the Case to the RHO-NCIP
Damages  (original complaint for accion reivindicatoria) against petitioners before the
4 and Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.
Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon (RTC). Docketed as Civil Case No. 04-
03-01, the petition was raffled off to Branch 11.
On September 14, 2004, respondents filed their Opposition and Motion for Judgment by The CA ruled that the RTC correctly granted the amendment of the complaint and
Default. properly refused to refer the case to the RHO-NCIP. Based on the allegations of both
original complaint [accion reivindicatoria] and amended complaint [injunction], the CA
On February 14, 2005, the RTC issued an Order  resolving all pending incidents before
6 found that the subject matter of both complaints is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
it, the dispositive portion of which reads: The CA noted that the only substantial amendment made was with regard to the nature
of the action which originally was one of accion reivindicatoria and then changed to one
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's [herein petitioners’] motion to refer the for damages. And except for some amendments as to petitioners' alleged violent acts
case to the RHO-NCIP and its manifestation for an ocular inspection are hereby denied and the prayer for declaration of their title to the subject property, the rest of the
for being bereft of merit. Further, defendants [petitioners], except Macapayag and Brazil, amended complaint was basically the same as the original one, including the reliefs
are hereby declared in default for their failure to file their Answer to the Amended prayed for by respondents. Anent the writ of preliminary injunction, the CA held that the
Complaint. Accordingly, let this case, as against defendants Macapayag and Brazil, be RTC's assailed February 14, 2005 Order is self-explanatory as to why the issuance of
called for pre-trial and ex-parte presentation of evidence as against the rest of the same was proper considering the circumstances of the case.
defendants [petitioners] on May 2, 2005 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. Furthermore,
the injunctive writ prayed for by the plaintiffs is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its August 17,
Accordingly, defendants [petitioners], their agents and privies, or any other or all persons 2006 Decision.
acting for and in their behalves, are hereby ordered to observe, maintain and preserve
the status quo subject of the action and/or the relation between the parties in order to Hence, this appeal on certiorari raising the following issues:
protect the rights of the plaintiffs while the case is pending in court and to cease and
desist from performing any acts that in one way or another contravene the tenor of this I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
order, while awaiting final determination of the instant suit or until further orders of this COURT A QUO OVER A COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION INVOLVING AN
court. Furthermore, to answer for whatever damage that defendants [petitioners] may ANCESTRAL DOMAIN OF THE TALAANDIGS.
sustain by reason of this injunction order if the court should finally decide that plaintiffs
[respondents] are not entitled to the relief it prayed for, plaintiffs [respondents] are hereby II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION OF THE
directed to put up a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS COURT A QUO ALLOWING THE AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT, THE SOLE
(₱100,000.00) executed in favor of the party enjoined. PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON THE LOWER COURT.

SO ORDERED. 7
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RESOLVING THAT EVIDENCE MUST BE
PRESENTED BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHEN IN THE ORIGINAL
On April 12, 2005, petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition ACTION FOR SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE IT, THE COURT A
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Issuance of a QUO HAS ADMITTED THAT A CADT WAS ISSUED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS. 9

Temporary Restraining Order.

On the first issue, petitioners contend that the RTC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case
On August 17, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC's February 14, 2005 No. 04-03-0 for Injunction, Damages and other Relief, because the 105.7361-hectare
Order, which in turn denied the referral of the case to the NCIP, the dispositive portion of land claimed by respondents is undisputedly within the ancestral domain of the
which states: Talaandig tribe over which a CADT has already been issued. Petitioners insist that, even
granting that the case is purely a personal action, the NCIP has exclusive and original
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby partly GRANTED. The jurisdiction over it as it concerns a claim and dispute involving rights of ICCs/IPs over
assailed Order dated February 14, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that their ancestral domain.
the order of default against petitioners, except Macapayag and Brazil, is hereby LIFTED.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the amendment of the complaint from accion
SO ORDERED. 8
reivindicatoria to injunction with damages was clearly meant to oust the NCIP of its
jurisdiction over the case and confer it on the RTC by concealing the real issue in the
case, which is the parties' conflicting claims over the 105.7361-hectare land in Miarayon,
Talakag Bukidnon. According to petitioners, the cause of action in the complaint On the procedural issue raised by respondents, the Court disagrees with their contention
for accion reivindicatoria is the claim of ownership and recovery of possession of the said that petitioners do not have legal capacity or standing and locus standi to file the petition,
land which is undisputedly found within the Talaandig tribe's ancestral domain covered for failure to show that they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that they are authorized to
by CADT No. R10-TAL-0703-0010; hence, a claim within the exclusive and original represent the Talaandig tribe.
jurisdiction of the NCIP. Petitioners contend that respondents amended the complaint to
one for injunction to downplay the real issue which is the dispute over a land that is Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.
within the Talaandig tribe's ancestral domain, and mainly capitalized on the acts In private suits, standing is governed by the "real parties in interest" rule found in Section
complained of, such as harassment, threats, acts of terrorism, among others, supposedly 2,  Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Such concept of real party-in-interest is adapted in
10

committed against respondents. Section 2,  Rule VI of the 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the NCIP. That
11

petitioners are the real parties in interest can be gleaned from the Entry of Appearance
On the third issue, petitioners fault the CA in ruling that whether the complaint is one for with
Injunction or Accion Reivindicatoria, the RTC has jurisdiction because nowhere in
respondents' original and amended complaints is it stated that petitioners were members Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing Office of the NCIP  filed by the NCIP
12

of the ICCs or IPs and that the disputed property was part of their ancestral domain. Special Transition Team-Quick Response Unit (STRAT-QRU). The STRAT-QRU
Petitioners take exception to the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is counsels alleged therein that the respondents' complaint for recovery of ownership
determined by the allegations of the complaint, as strict adherence thereto would open (accion reinvidicatoria) sought to recover an unregistered real property situated in
the floodgates to the unscrupulous practice of litigants divesting the NCIP of jurisdiction Miarayon, Bukidnon, from petitioners, all of whom are, with the exception of Nestor
by crafting their complaints in such a way as would confer jurisdiction on their court of Macapayag and Mark Brazil, member-beneficiaries of CADT No. R10-TAL-0703-0010
choice. Petitioners contend that the literal averments of the complaint are not issued by the NCIP in the name of the Talaandig Indigenous Peoples, located at
determinative of the jurisdiction over the subject matter where the actual issues are Talakag, Province of Bukidnon. In support of their allegation, petitioners presented a
evidenced by subsequent pleadings; in certain cases, the real nature and character of certification  that the disputed land is within the area covered by the same CADT, and
13

the pleadings and issues are not merely found in the complaint, but also in the the NCIP List of Beneficiaries of Talaandig Ancestral Domain of Miarayon, Lirongan,
subsequent pleadings submitted by both parties. Petitioners stress that although the Lapok, San Miguel, Talakag, Bukidnon.  In contrast, respondents failed to submit any
14

complaint banners the subject matter as one for injunction, the pleadings of respondents evidence to dispute petitioners' claim that they are members of the Talaandig Tribe.
show that the subject matter is the conflicting ownership claims over the land. In fact, Hence, respondents' contention that petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition,
petitioners point out that the records of the case show that various pieces of evidence is without merit.
have been presented to prove that the dispute involves conflicting claims over a land
covered by a CADT. In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction
over the respondents' amended complaint, foremost in the Court's mind is the principle in
For their part, respondents contend that petitioners do not have legal capacity or "that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
standing and locus standi to file this petition, since they failed to make prima the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
facie showing that they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that they were authorized to constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court
represent the Talaandig tribe. Respondents insist that based on the allegations in their or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
amended complaint for injunction and damages, the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
subject matter which is a purely personal action and incapable of pecuniary estimation. upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
Respondents assert that the real issue is whether or not petitioners are guilty of wrongful character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the
acts of violence, terrorism, destruction, intimidation, harassment, etc., to justify a allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or
permanent injunction and hold the latter liable for damages. Respondents also point out not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein."15

that petitioners cannot invoke protection under the IPRA 8731, because the conflict does
not involve an ancestral domain and they (respondents) are not IPs so the condition Under Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the
precedent before bringing a dispute before the NCIP cannot be satisfied, i.e., exhaustion RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of
of remedies under customary laws by the parties. the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and in all civil actions which involve
title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein where the assessed value of
The petition has no merit. the property or interest therein exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer (RHO):
(₱50,000.00).
a. Cases involving disputes, controversies over ancestral lands/domains of
On the other hand, the NCIP's jurisdiction is defined under Section 66 of the IPRA as ICCs/IPs;
follows:
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have ICC/IPs;
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided,
however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the
attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
16

e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

On the matter of NCIP's jurisdiction and of procedures for enforcement of rights, NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, 1998, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (NCIP-IRR)
(2) Original jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
of the IPRA, Rule IX, Section 1 states:
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. - All conflicts related to the ancestral domain and
settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled
lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to the conflicting claims and boundary
under customary laws; and
disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the application of customary
laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371;
All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the parties is
non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law (3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings,
Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter. a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of
Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired
All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to the Court by, and issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of
of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or Decision. 17 R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of
registration.
In line with Section 69 of the IPRA on the NCIP's quasi-judicial power to promulgate rules
and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it, the NCIP Anent the condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP under Section 66 of
issued Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on the IPRA, Sections 13 and 14, Rule IV of the NCIP Rules pertinently provide:
Pleadings, Practice and Procedure (NCIP Rules), which reiterates its jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and enumerates the actions that may be Section 13. Certification to File Action. - Upon the request of the proper party, members
brought before it. Section 5, Rule III, of the NCIP Rules provides for the jurisdiction of the of the indigenous dispute settlement group or council of elders shall likewise issue a
NCIP-RHO: certification to file action before the NCIP. In giving due regard to customary laws, the
certification may be in any form so long as it states in substance the failure of settlement
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall notwithstanding the efforts made under customary law or traditional practices.
exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all
cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of the IPRA Section 14. Exceptions. - The certification shall not be required in the following cases:
8371, including but not limited to the following:
a. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership, In their amended complaint for injunction and damages, on the other hand, respondents
association or juridical person or a public officer or employee and the dispute is in further alleged that sometime in November 2003, petitioners harassed, intimidated,
connection with the performance of his official functions; threatened, and fired high-powered rifles upon respondents' farm workers to drive them
away from the land, without legal or justifiable reason. They added that, despite having
b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC hired private security guards to secure and protect their property, these violent incidents
Community, except when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Council were followed by more acts of violence, lawlessness, harassment, terrorism to drive
of Elders/Leaders; away respondents from the land which they claim to lawfully own and possess.

c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any grave, Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following reliefs: (1) to order petitioners and
imminent and irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted upon immediately; their representatives, to stop and refrain from committing acts of violence, destruction,
and assault and other forms of lawlessness and terrorism against respondents, and to
maintain the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the 105-hectare land by respondents
d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary certification as an attribute of ownership; (2) to declare petitioners to have committed acts of
without justifiable reasons.
18 violence, harassment, intimidation, destruction, assault and other forms of lawlessness
against respondents, and to permanently order petitioners to stop and refrain from
committing similar acts; and (3) to hold petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay
Having spelled out the jurisdictions conferred by law to the RTC and the NCIP over the
respondents actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
subject matters of their respective cases, the Court now examines the allegations in the
litigation expenses and treble costs.
original and amended complaints to find out which tribunal may properly exercise
jurisdiction over this case.
After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both original and amended complaints,
the Court notes that respondents neither alleged therein that the parties are members of
In their original complaint for accion reivindicatoria, respondents traced the provenance
ICCs/IPs nor that the case involves a dispute or controversy over ancestral
of their title over said land to one Mamerto Decano, a Chieftain of Talaandig tribe, by
lands/domains of ICC/IPs. Rather, the allegations in respondents' original complaint
virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on July 27, 1957. They averred that, together with their
make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an interest in a real
predecessor-in-interest, they have religiously paid the real estate taxes thereon since
property with an assessed value of P683,760.00, while the allegations in their amended
1957 and that they have been in physical, actual, open, prior, notorious, continuous,
complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil action which is incapable of pecuniary
public and adverse possession of said land in the concept of owners for more than 50
estimation. The Court therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of
years, even prior to June 12, 1945. They alleged that said land was declared alienable
the amended complaint based on allegations therein was within the jurisdiction of the
and disposable since August 3, 1927 per certification of the Department of Environment
RTC.
and Natural Resources. They claimed that by means of fraud, stealth and surreptitious
means, petitioners entered the said land, without permission and against the consent of
the landowners, caused damages therein and harassed respondents by indiscriminately Meanwhile, contrary to petitioners' contention, the mere fact that this case involves
firing upon their farm workers. They added that petitioners continue such harassment by members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under the
means of armed men frequenting the campsite and firing M-16 rifles at them during jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, to wit:
nighttime, causing great fear and threat.
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have
Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following reliefs, among others: (1) to cause jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however,
the preliminary injunction to be made permanent for the respondents to enjoy possession That no such dispute shall be
of their property, free from threats of physical harm, harassment and undue obstruction
caused by petitioners; (2) to order petitioners to respect and not to harass, intimidate and brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their
cause trouble to the prior possession of respondents as the owners by virtue of right of customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
title; (3) to order petitioners to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has
appearance fees and costs of suit; and (4) to declare respondents' title as having not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
become a vested right, and as such entitled to all right and incident of an absolute owner. petition with the NCIP.
A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims There are, however, exceptional cases where the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP,
belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from the qualifying provision that "no viz.:
such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be 1. Cases under Sections 52 and 62 of the IPRA which contemplate a situation where a
issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute over an ancestral domain involving parties who do not belong to the same, but to
dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition different ICCs/IPs, to wit:
precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP."
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. — The identification and delineation of ancestral
The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures:
before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the
parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by the xxxx
Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition of the rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own
commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building
h) Endorsement to NCIP. — Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the
processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices within their respective
inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP
communities, as may be compatible with the national legal system and with
endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof.
internationally recognized human rights. 19

However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require
the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall
Section 3 (f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and
rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office
and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive definition, it can be gleaned shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds
that it is only when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the abovesaid for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in
two conditions can be complied with. If the parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral
which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws and domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet
Council of Elders/Leaders, they will fail to meet the abovesaid two conditions. The same and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without
holds true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below.
customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed, it
would be violative of the principles of fair play and due process for those parties who do
xxxx
not belong to the same ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws and Council of
Elders/Leaders.
SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. — In cases of conflicting interest, where there are
adverse claims within the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which
Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over
can not be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the proper
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among
parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains:
parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise between or
Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the
among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different
traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process
ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the
shall be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most
carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That any decision, order, award or
of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same
ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the
ICC/IP. Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be
application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought
located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC
for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
which shall have the power to hear, try and decide this case.
copy thereof.20
2. Cases under Section 54 of the IPRA over fraudulent claims by parties who are not
members of the same ICC/IP, to wit:

SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims. — The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written
request from the ICCs/IPs, review existing claims which have been fraudulently acquired
by any person or community. Any claim found to be fraudulently acquired by, and
issued to, any person or community may be cancelled by the NCIP after due notice
and hearing of all parties concerned. 21

Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the
IPRA covers only disputes and claims between and among members of the same
ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the IPRA, as well as the basic administrative law
principle that an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict the
provisions of the enabling law,  the Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR ,
22 23

Rule III, Section 5  and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules  as null and
24 25

void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to
include such disputes where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP. As the Court
held in Paduran v. DARAB,  "[j]urisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the
26

Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated,
jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law.  Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts
27

and administrative agencies; rules of procedure cannot.  In the abovesaid exceptional
28

cases where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the same ICC/IP,
however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules validly dispenses with the requirement
of certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the failed
attempt to settle the dispute according to the customary laws of the concerned ICC/IP.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision dated August
17, 2006, and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, in CAG.R. SP No. 00204-MIN,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED