2000 Process Equipment

Abstract
This section discusses fire safety design features and techniques for preventing and
controlling fires around process equipment. Included are:
• Pumps
• Compressors
• Internal combustion engines
• Tanks
• Columns and vessels
• Fired heaters and boilers
• Heat transfer equipment
• Piping

This section supplements the detailed design information given in the Corporation
manuals for each of these subject areas.

Contents Page

2010 Pumps 2000-3

2011 Some Typical Failure Modes
2012 Fire-safe Design
2013 Pump and Driver Inspections
2014 Fire Control Design Features
2020 Compressors 2000-6
2021 Fire Protection Design Features
2022 Piping
2023 Hydraulic and Lube Oil Piping
2024 Explosion Hazards in Compressed Air Systems
2025 Shutdown and Alarm Systems
2030 Internal Combustion Engines 2000-9
2031 General Information

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2032 Types of Company IC Engines

2033 Engine Modifications for Classified Areas
2034 Fire Protection
2040 Tanks 2000-17
2050 Columns and Vessels 2000-17
2051 Fire-safe Design Features
2052 Fire-safe Design and Construction
2053 Operating Safety Features
2054 Gas Freeing Provisions
2055 External Fire Exposure Risk
2056 Supplemental Fire Protection
2057 Protection Systems for Higher Risk Processes
2058 Inspection and Maintenance
2060 Fired Heaters and Boilers 2000-23
2070 Other Heat Transfer Equipment 2000-23
2071 Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers
2072 Air-cooled Exchangers
2073 Cooling Towers
2074 Heat Transfer Liquids in Closed Systems
2080 Piping 2000-26
2081 Materials
2082 Fire-safe Valve Design
2083 Gaskets
2084 Limitations for Piping and Fittings
2085 General Fire-safe Piping Features
2086 Use of Resilient-sealed Couplings
2087 Nonmetallic and Nonmetallic Lined Steel Pipe
2090 References 2000-35

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2010 Pumps

2011 Some Typical Failure Modes

Pump seal or packing failures are recurring problems in the industry. In addition to
normal wear and tear on the seal, failure may also be caused by the following:
• Bearing failure of the driver or pump shaft. Vibration resulting from such fail-
ures will destroy the seal.
• Coupling failures will also result in vibration that will destroy seals.
• Failed bearings can also generate frictional heat, igniting packing leakage or
seal leakage.
Throat bushings and bearing cooling streams are installed to mitigate the conse-
quences of these failures. Tracking and measuring critical pump and motor vibra-
tion significantly reduces vibration failures.

2012 Fire-safe Design

Pump Cases
Pumps in petroleum facilities, chemical plants and other plants or facilities
handling flammable or hazardous materials should have steel or alloy cases suitable
for the service. Cast iron cases should be limited to nonhazardous, noncritical
service where exposure of public and adjacent facilities is very low. Cast iron
pumps must be installed in such a manner that connecting piping will not exces-
sively stress pump cases. See the Pump Manual.

Mechanical Seals and Packing

Leaks can occur at pump seals and pump shaft packing. The frequency of seal fail-
ures can be reduced by using double seals. Therefore, double seals should be
considered in services where a high degree of reliability is required. This may be
appropriate for toxic materials or to meet environmental requirements. Mechanical
seals, either single or double, are preferred over packing because of their higher reli-
ability, longer life, and lower probability of leakage.

Throat Bushings
Pump cases should have close fitting shaft bushings to prevent excessive flow if a
seal or packing fails. Throat bushings for pumps handling LPG, any stock above its
flashpoint, or toxic materials should be retained by shoulders, suitable dowel pins
or screws. Refer to the Pump Manual for details.

Seal or Packing Quench

Where serious hazard might result from gland leakage, pumps handling hot oils in
excess of 350°F should be fitted with water quench glands per the Pump Manual.

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Running Against a Closed Block Valve

Avoid prolonged running against a shutoff head. In some situations requiring a
large turndown, a minimum flow bypass may be justified.

Small Piping Connections

Small fittings on pump cases for pressure gages, sample connections, vapor vents
and drains should be seal-welded to the pump case and up to the first valve. Typical
bridge-weld construction drawings in the Piping Manual show construction of
small piping that will minimize vibration and metal fatigue failures. Where vibra-
tions may be severe, the fitting should be braced. These precautions may not be
justified in remote, onshore producing locations for low pressure, low volume
service.
For fire-safe features in piping design, see Section 2080 of this manual and the
Piping Manual.
Install steel plugs in all open ended valves when not in use. Route vents and drains
away from the pump if possible.
In clean services, install restriction orifices on root valves under pressure gage and
pressure transmitter connections to minimize the release if damage to the gage or
pressure lead occurs. See Standard Drawing GB-J1223 in the Instrumentation and
Control Manual.

Thermal Relief
Consider the use of thermal (sun) pressure relief valves for low or ambient tempera-
ture pumps that can be blocked.

Protective Instrumentation
Automatic Pump Start (APS) control instruments should be of fire resistant
construction.
For high pressure, high temperature and high capacity pumps, consider the
following protective instrumentation:
• Low suction pressure alarm
• Vibration monitoring and shutdown
• High bearing temperature alarm
• High discharge pressure alarm
• Seal failure (leakage) alarm (for double sealed pumps)
Depending on the process, these same protections can be used for initiating auto-
matic shutdowns.

2013 Pump and Driver Inspections

Pumps should be inspected at regularly scheduled intervals. A checklist should be
used so that all personnel will check all the items. The checklist also serves as a
training tool. Check the seal gland, gaskets, mechanical seal leakage, lube oil

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chamber level, and coupling for general conditions. Checklists in the Pump
Manual, Section 1000 can be adapted for this purpose.
Bearing failures are the most frequent cause of pump fires. Chevron now electroni-
cally measures and plots bearing vibration on critical pumps and drivers to deter-
mine change and predict failure. Removing a bearing from service before it fails
should greatly reduce the fire loss associated with pumps.
In addition to a vibration check, electric motor inspection should include a check
for signs of overheating or sparking, and the condition of switches, overload protec-
tion, and wiring.
To minimize fire hazards, combustion engine drivers should be checked 1) for clean-
liness of the ignition system to prevent external spark-over and 2) for the adequacy
of the exhaust system. See Section 2030 of this manual for firesafe features of
internal combustion engines.
Inspect pump cases for the following problems to prevent external leakage.
• Cracks or holes in the casing
• Failure of small piping attachments
• Thread corrosion on plugs and pipe nipples
• Inadequate thread engagement at threaded connections
• Shaft sleeves—seal or packing leaks
• Poor gasketing

2014 Fire Control Design Features

Generally, fire is controlled by isolating (shutting off) the fuel source. The
following design features help do this.

Isolation Valves at Pumps

Provide valves at pumps that can be quickly closed in case of fire. Consider remote
operation of valves for high capacity pumps handling volatile and high temperature
materials. These valves should be fail safe or fireproofed per Section 1700. Refer to
Section 1800 and the Instrumentation and Control Manual for more information on
these systems.
Manually operated isolation valves should be accessible during a fire involving the
pump and kept lubricated so they operate easily.

Water Spray
Where fire water monitors are not available or may be blocked by equipment, water
deluge should be provided over pumps handling liquids above their auto-ignition
temperature or above 600°F. Water sprays should be remotely operated from a point
at least 50 feet from the pump being protected. See Section 1600.

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Drainage — Surface and Oily Water Systems

The drainage should be designed to carry liquids away from the pump as indicated
in Section 1400.

2020 Compressors
Refer to the Compressor Manual for design guidelines related to compressors.
Refer to Section 3700 and Appendix D of this manual for information related to fire
protection of compressor stations.

2021 Fire Protection Design Features

Liquid Knockout Pots and Scrubbers on Compressor Suctions
Every reasonable precaution must be taken to prevent liquid from entering the
compressor cylinder. Liquid knockout pots and scrubbers are ordinarily provided in
suction lines for this purpose. When wet gas is being compressed, there is an even
greater potential hazard. Consequently, high level alarms and compressor shutdown
devices should be installed on knockout pots and scrubbers. See Section 2024.

Relief Valves
Adequate relief valve capacity must be provided for each cylinder or group of cylin-
ders discharging into a common header. The discharge from these valves must
extend outside any compressor enclosure and above the eave. The relief valve and
outlet piping must be braced to withstand vibration.
If the relief valves discharge to a lower pressure system, the designer must consider
the effects of back pressure on the relief valve design. See Section 1900.

Ignition Systems for Engine-driven Compressors

Low-tension magneto systems with a coil at each spark plug should be used.
Provide protective boots or covers over all high-tension connections. For automo-
tive-type engines, replace “standard equipment” high-tension wire with high
temperature silicon rubber ignition wire. Because insulation on the latter wire is
higher quality, there is less risk of arcing to ground.
Use stranded or resistance-type wire such as those having fiberglass filaments with
acrylic coating. Do not use wound copper conductor, impregnated linen core
(carbon-filled) resistance wire; the conductor is easily broken by bending the wire,
making it more susceptible to arcing. Wires should be inspected regularly and main-
tained in good condition. Wires should be replaced at each tune-up.
Shielded ignition wire is not required. The safety value of shielded wiring is ques-
tionable, and shielding presents some hazard of its own. Periodic inspections and
annual replacement are generally required for shielded wire systems, and they make
engine testing and maintenance difficult. Because of these problems shielding has
been removed or left off in some locations. Experience from the fire-safety point of
view has been satisfactory with nonshielded systems, as long as they are properly

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protected against mechanical damage and are securely connected to the spark plug.
Therefore, when nonshielded wiring is used, a maintenance program of frequent
inspection and regular replacement must be followed. Note that shielding may be
mandatory in some locations (e.g., Alberta).

Air Intake and Exhaust Systems

Combustion air for all internal combustion compressor drivers should come from
outside the compressor house through filtered air intakes. Engine exhausts should
extend above the eaves a minimum of two feet. Air intake and exhaust should both
be located on the opposite side of the building from the gas headers.
It is important to check exhaust piping and mufflers for potential leaks that could
produce open flame at points normally considered free of ignition sources.

Packing Area Ventilation

Ventilation of the packing area must be designed so that flammable gases are not
forced into the crankcase. This would pose a serious explosion risk. Vents should be
extended outside and above the eaves of any enclosure.

Preventing Air Leakage

Air leaks into a compressor or residual air left after a shutdown may create an
explosive hazard. To minimize this hazard:
• Eliminate unnecessary vents on suction lines.
• Minimize bypass lines and valves connecting discharge and suction lines.
• Provide facilities to purge the compressor system with gas before startup.
Purging is necessary any time the equipment is opened to the atmosphere.

Preventing Vibration
Pulsation Dampeners. Provide pulsation dampeners on reciprocating compressors.
Where pulsating discharge from reciprocating compressors results in pipe vibration
so serious that piping and equipment may fail, installation of additional pulsation
dampeners may be warranted. The Compressor Manual describes methods to inves-
tigate the effects of pressure pulsation.
Stress Mitigation. Use long-radius pipe ells to minimize stresses in piping at
changes in direction. Short radius ells and mitered joints should be avoided.

2022 Piping
Piping Connections
Avoid using small pipe fitting connections (less than 1 inch) to compressors and
piping. They are very susceptible to vibration that can result in metal fatigue and
brittle failure. Appropriate welded heavy wall fittings and short nipples with bridge

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weld construction to the first valve can minimize this failure risk. Small piping runs
should be well supported and braced to control vibration.

Isolation Valves
Block valves for isolating the compressor should be placed well away from the
compressor so that they will be accessible during a leak or fire emergency. Such
valves may warrant automatic operators, especially at unmanned facilities. An
exception to this are remote, single-well producing applications where the conse-
quences of a compressor failure are minimal.
Design of remote isolation valves is discussed in Section 1800 of this manual and
in the Instrumentation and Control Manual, Section 1300.
Potential Leak Points for Routine Inspection
• Small piping, such as vent lines, sample points and gage fittings
• Threaded connections, such as plugs and nipples
• Inadequate thread engagement
• Shaft sleeves
• Poor or damaged gaskets
• Packing and seals

2023 Hydraulic and Lube Oil Piping

Rubber, neoprene, plastic, aluminum, brass and other low melting point materials
should not be used for hydraulic or lube oil piping or other components around
compressors. A small fire near these materials will cause them to fail quickly with
the potential to release large volumes of oil into the fire. Piping and components
made of these materials should be replaced with steel components or Pyrex fire-
resistant glass for level controllers. Where fire-resistant replacement components
are not available, a fire stop valve such as the Kenco Fire Stop Valve or equivalent
can be installed on both sides of the component to stop the flow of oil in case of a
fire near the component.

2024 Explosion Hazards in Compressed Air Systems

Large internal combustion engines are usually started with air. This air is provided
by a compressor—ordinarily a conventionally lubricated reciprocating machine—
and piped to an air distributor on the engine. The distributor, cam driven by the
engine, allows air to be injected into the individual cylinders through check valves.
There have been explosions in these compressed air systems. The fuel is combus-
tible lubricant that has entered the air system from the air compressor or from the
air distribution system on the engine. Although maintenance of the check valves
will minimize this hazard, the valve can stick open from scale or other causes that
can affect a recently serviced valve as readily as an old one.

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These explosions can be avoided by replacing the combustible lubricants with

noncombustible lubricants, as follows:
1. The air starting system must be cleaned of all combustible lubricant before
applying the fire resistant lubricant.
2. Make certain the starting air distributors on the engine are designed so that
lubricants from the engine cannot enter the starting air system.
3. Fire-resistant synthetic lubricants must not be contaminated with hydrocarbons
or varnish-like materials.
4. Stauffer Chemical Company's Fyrquel 555 fire-resistant synthetic lubricant for
starting air compressors is recommended.
Fire-resistant synthetic lubricants are required for all internal combustion engine
starting air systems. For other air services where a direct source of ignition does not
exist, fire-resistant lubricants should be used, as a minimum, when discharge
temperatures exceed 300°F and pressures exceed 300 psig. When using fire-resis-
tant lubricants, ensure that the seals are of a compatible material. See the
Compressor Manual and the General Machinery Manual for more details.

2025 Shutdown and Alarm Systems

Manual Shutdown
Compressors should be provided with shutdown stations at expected personnel
access points and at a safe distance from the equipment so that, in the event of a
hazardous occurrence, the engines and compressors can be controlled and shut
down without endangering personnel.
Process alarms and automatic shutdowns for compressors and drivers are discussed
in the Compressor Manual and the Driver Manual. Design of these systems is
discussed in the Instrumentation and Control Manual. Fireproofing of critical
controls is discussed in Section 1700 of this manual.

2030 Internal Combustion Engines

This section discusses ways to modify large stationary engines, highway vehicles,
and industrial trucks, for limited use in classified areas.

2031 General Information

Internal combustion (IC) engines have many applications in both stationary and
mobile equipment throughout the Company. They can be a source of ignition when
exposed to a flammable mixture of hydrocarbon vapor. The design and purchase of
IC engines is covered in detail in the Driver Manual. This section discusses those
aspects of design related to fire protection.

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This section gives suggestions for modifying IC engines to allow their limited use
in classified areas. A modified IC engine is less likely to be an ignition source than
is an ordinary IC engine. When special operating conditions justify modifying and
maintaining this equipment, the recommendations of this section should be consid-
ered.
Generally, the fire loss risk should be evaluated on the basis of:
• Probability of a hydrocarbon vapor release near the engine
• Design characteristics of the engine, (e.g., type of fuel system and ignition
system)
• Existing fire protection facilities (e.g., equipment spacing, fire walls, detection
and extinguishing systems, etc.).

2032 Types of Company IC Engines

Size, type, and function of Company IC engines may be categorized as follows:
• Large stationary engines—commonly used as gas-fueled drivers of large
compressors or pumps
• Intermediate size stationary engines—fueled by gas, gasoline, diesel, or LPG
and used to drive pumps, compressors, generators, mixers, etc.
• Mobile engines—small to intermediate size, fueled by gasoline, diesel, or LPG
and used to drive mobile equipment including cars, trucks, cranes, forklifts,
pumps, generators, front-end loaders, etc.

Large Stationary Engines

Fire protection recommendations for stationary gas-fueled, IC engines used for
compressor drivers are presented in a checklist in Appendix D of this manual, “Fire
Protection Design Checklist for Reciprocating Gas Compressor Stations.” The
checklist should be used in conjunction with the recommendations in Sections 1100
to 2000 of this manual. Much of the information contained there also can be
applied to other types of IC engines.

Highway Vehicles
Because of the difficulty in regulating the use of motorized vehicles and portable IC
engines in areas where flammable vapor may be present, it is recommended that
guidelines set forth in Section 1300, and this section be followed.
Cars, trucks, and other motorized vehicles normally used for highway transporta-
tion should not be permitted to enter process units, tank batteries, and similar
restricted locations except as follows: the area first must be thoroughly checked
with a combustible gas indicator to ensure that concentrations of flammable vapors
do not exceed 25% of the lower flammable limit (LFL).

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Industrial Trucks
IC engine-powered industrial vehicles are subject to OSHA Standard 1910.78 and
NFPA 505. Vehicles with designations DS or DY (diesel); GS (Gasoline); LPS (LP
Gas); ES, EE, and EX (electric powered) can generally be operated in Class I, Divi-
sion 2 areas. Only electrically powered vehicles conforming to the requirements for
an EX designation as specified in NFPA 505 are permitted to operate in Class I,
Division 1 areas.
Testing standards for industrial trucks are:
ANSI/UL 558 Safety Standard for Internal Combustion Engine Powered
Industrial Trucks
ANSI/UL 583 Safety Standard for Electric Battery Powered Industrial Trucks

An approved vehicle meeting these standards is one so labeled by Underwriters

Laboratories or Factory Mutual Engineering Corporation for the area classification
in which it will be used. The UL or FM designation (e.g., GS, ES, etc.) must be on
the manufacturer's nameplate.

2033 Engine Modifications for Classified Areas

There are no currently available standards that can assure completely safe
operation of IC engines in flammable atmospheres.
However, IC engines modified as discussed in this section are less likely to be an
ignition source if they are driven or operated in a cloud of flammable vapor than is
an ordinary engine. A thorough maintenance program is necessary to ensure integ-
rity of the modification.
It must be emphasized that these modifications do not make a vehicle “safe” to
operate in a flammable atmosphere. Permits to enter a restricted area where there is
a potential for the release of flammable material would be the same with or without
these modifications. Use of modified vehicles does decrease the risk of ignition so
that there is more time to shut down the vehicle in the event of a flammable vapor
release.
These modifications would be considered for vehicles used in areas where a flam-
mable release is unlikely but not impossible. Such vehicles include:
• Transportation used in marine terminals
• Gager's vehicles used in large tank fields handling flammable materials
• Maintenance vehicles used in restricted areas

Starter Motor
The starter system should be either an electrical type meeting the applicable area
classification (e.g., Class I, Division 2 Group D) requirements or one of the
following non-electric types: pneumatic (commonly used in Producing locations),
hydraulic, spring recoil or inertia.

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It may be acceptable to use an electric starter motor that does not meet the area clas-
sification requirements if proper entry permits are used and one of the following
criteria is satisfied.
1. A lockable switch is provided so that the electric starter motor can be locked
out to prevent its use in a classified area.
2. The starting battery is kept outside the classified area and the engine is started
there.
3. The starter, the starter motor switch, and the solenoid are inspected to be sure
they are not an open device:
– The starter motor should have a tight fitting cover band with a gasket
installed to shield commutator arcing.
– The starter motor switch should have a tight fitting cover or the switch
cover to the solenoid should be epoxy-sealed. An enclosed switch solenoid
remote from the starter is acceptable.
– If the starter solenoid is located on the starter motor, it should be gasketed
to the starter housing. If not, seal with epoxy.
– Cover the terminals with protective boots or other material to avoid acci-
dental shorting.

Generator, Voltage Regulator, Switches, Lighting, and Auxiliary Systems

The generator system should be either approved for the classified area (e.g., Class I,
Division 2 Group D) or the engine should be equipped with an enclosed marine-
type alternator and voltage regulator.
The horn button should be replaced with a vapor-tight microswitch. Other switches
are normally enclosed in a metal or bakelite body and are acceptable because they
have lower risk of being an ignition source.
Provide protective boots or covers on exposed electrical terminals and battery termi-
nals to protect against accidental shorting.
Electrical auxiliary equipment should be effectively grounded to the main frame. A
lockable switch that disconnects all electrical systems not meeting Class I, Division
2 requirements should be provided.
“Jumping” a dead battery will always produce sparks and must never be permitted
in a Class I, Division 2 area, unless a hot work permit system has been issued.

Ignition Systems
Provide protective boots or comparable covers over all high voltage (high-tension)
connections. For automotive-type engines, replace “Standard Equipment” high-
tension wire with high-temperature silicon rubber ignition wire. This provision
minimizes arcing to ground through insulation leaks.
Use stranded or resistance-type wires as recommended by the engine manufacturer;
however, do not use wound copper conductor, impregnated linen core (carbon-
filled), resistance wire because the conductor is easily broken by bending the wire,

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making it more susceptible to arcing. Wires should be inspected regularly and main-
tained in good condition. Wires should be replaced at regular intervals or when they
are obviously deteriorated. The use of shielded ignition wire is not required in most
areas, but the use of a protective jacket (metallic or nonmetallic) is recommended to
minimize physical damage.
Ignition systems now in use that have given satisfactory service are manufactured
by:
1. Filko Mag-Core by
F & B Manufacturing Company
Filko Automotive Product Division
5480 North Northwest Highway
Chicago, Illinois
2. B. G. Flash-Tite Lead Assembly by
B. G. Service Co. Inc.
1400 Alabama Avenue
P.O. Box 2259
Palm Beach, Florida 33402-2259
3. The CSA approved ignition system for large industrial applications by Reagan
Equipment Company
2230 Peters Rd.
Harvey, LA 70058
(504) 367-1870
Several manufacturers, including B. G. Service, also market an integral coil
assembly with the coil mating directly to the plug, so the high tension lead is short.
The low voltage (primary) lead to the coil is less likely to arc to ground than the
high tension lead since it operates on low voltage.
It may be desirable to modify the distributor to reduce the chance of flame escaping
from the distributor if hydrocarbon vapor is ignited inside the distributor. There is
no one simple, universal, solution, but the following modifications should be consid-
ered:
• A new distributor cap will reduce the chance of external arcing.
• A clamp can be provided that will securely hold the distributor cap in place if
there is an ignition of vapor inside the distributor.
• Removal of the vacuum advance unit. Install a metal cover and seal it with
epoxy.
• A flame arrestor vent installed in the distributor body can minimize the
chances of propagating an explosion or flame to the outside.
Replacement of the mechanical contact points with a solid-state ignition system is
recommended for stationary engines. These systems will reduce ignition system
maintenance and will improve spark plug life.

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Exhaust System Discharge of Sparks or Flames

The exhaust system for stationary engines with higher risk exposures should be
leak-tight so flames from a backfire cannot escape, and they should be equipped
with a spark-arresting type of muffler. Equipment of the following types is available.
• Dry cyclone type (lowest maintenance)
• Labyrinth type
• Gas conditioner box (water bath type)
• Multiple plate type
Intake or Induction System
If necessary, modify the air cleaner and filter cartridge to reduce the chance of
flame escaping from the air cleaner if the engine backfires through the air intake
system. The air cleaner assembly should include the following:
• The body should be all metal with a gasketed cover to body joint.
• There should be a gasket between the air cleaner and the carburetor.
• The air cleaner should be securely held or fastened to the carburetor.
• The air filter element should be a good quality dry cartridge consisting of a
treated, fire-resistant pleated paper or cellulose filter medium with a metal
screen on the inside and outside and a resilient sealing surface top and bottom
to seal tightly against the air cleaner body and cover. Most name brand air filter
replacement cartridges will meet this requirement.
For stationary engines with higher risk exposures, equip the intake system with a
U.S. Coast Guard approved flame-arresting-type air cleaner or an approved flame
arrestor downstream of the air cleaner. The flame arrestor should have corrosion
resistant internals and be easily dismantled for cleaning and inspection. An accept-
able alternate is to locate the air intake in a safe area. The system should be leak-
tight so that flames from a backfire cannot escape.
Air intakes on diesel engines shall be equipped with an airtight shutoff valve actu-
ated by one of the following:
• A speed sensor having a mechanical linkage to the valve
• Differential pressure across the valve in the intake system providing a closing
force which can overcome the force exerted by the valve spring
• The injection of carbon dioxide gas activated by a speed sensor
It is desirable to include a provision for manually closing the valve with any auto-
matic system used.
For equipment that is closely attended, the above systems may be replaced by a
manually operated airtight shutoff valve in the air intake. When any valve is
installed in the intake system, it should be tested to ensure that it will not inadvert-
ently close during any operating condition.

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Excessive Temperature or Exhaust Gases and Surface Temperature of

Exhaust System
As the volume of cooling air passing over the engine increases, the formation of
static pockets of vapor/air mixtures exposed to hot surfaces decreases.
Therefore, hydrocarbon vapors should not auto-ignite because they are mixed with
engine cooling air and dispersed. Vapor is not normally in contact with hot engine
parts long enough to auto-ignite.
During operation, the surface temperature of the engine or the exhaust system is
normally hot enough to ignite oily rags or other combustible material left on the
engine but not hot enough to ignite liquid hydrocarbon that might be spilled on
exposed surfaces.
The exhaust from stationary engines should be routed to a safe location maintaining
at least 6 inches clearance from combustible material. Avoid use of insulation on
exhaust piping where liquid hydrocarbon may spray or leak onto the line and
soak into the insulation. This will significantly increase the risk of auto-ignition.
If personnel protection is required, use expanded metal shielding. See the Safety in
Designs Manual.
If the line passes vertically through a roof, combustible material must be protected
by a ventilated metal thimble that extends 9 inches above and below the roof and is
6 inches larger in diameter than the exhaust pipe. If the line passes horizontally
through a wall, combustible wall material must be protected by a ventilated metal
thimble that extends 6 inches past the sides of the wall, and is 6 inches larger in
diameter than the exhaust pipe. There should be at least 3 inches of fireproof insula-
tion between the thimble and combustible material.

Fuel Systems
Fuel lines should be of steel tubing or piping with flexible steel or steel-braided
tubing sections where necessary to absorb pipe vibration. They should be located
with at least 2 inches clearance from exhaust and electrical systems.
Fuel lines, valves, fittings and vents should be located so that leakage will not drip
on electrical or exhaust systems.
Steel shutoff valves located for access in time of fire should be provided in main
fuel lines.
Electrically operated fuel pumps should conform to the requirements of Under-
writers Laboratories Standard No. 558 which covers fuel pump endurance and oper-
ation without overheating.
LPG fuel systems should conform to the Standard for the Storage and Handling of
LPG, NFPA No. 58 (ANSI Z 106.1).

Marking of Equipment and Vehicles

Labels. Equipment and motor vehicles modified according to this section shall be
clearly labeled. A label should be installed on the vehicle which reads as follows:

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Restricted Area Vehicle

Restrictions: Vehicle Entry Permit
Required. This equipment cannot be
operated in a known flammable
atmosphere.
Label wording such as “sparkproof” or “explosionproof” is not recommended. If
you use equipment labeled that way, you may mistakenly circumvent the require-
ment for specific approval prior to entering a classified area.
Equipment Certification. Modified equipment should be provided with a certificate
with a record showing:
• The name of the Company representative who certified that the vehicle or
engine has been modified to reduce the risk of ignition when operated in a
Class I, Division 2 area in accordance with this section
• The name of the contractor performing the modification
• The date of the last maintenance inspection
• The date the next maintenance inspection is due
• Annual recertification by a qualified mechanic

2034 Fire Protection

Spacing of Equipment
Adequate spacing between adjacent pieces of equipment driven by IC engines
should be provided to minimize the possibility of ignition of flammable vapors and
the spread of fire. Spacing considerations are outlined in Section 1300.
Where operating conditions necessitate locating adjacent pieces of equipment
closer than desirable from a fire protection standpoint, such as often found on
offshore platforms, additional fire protection measures should be considered. A
review of fire protection facilities should be made of individual installations where
IC engines must be located near high value or critical equipment handling flam-
mable liquids such as gasoline, naphthas, LPG, crude oil, etc.
The installation of fire walls to separate adjacent equipment in congested areas or to
isolate critical IC engine-driven equipment from the driver will minimize the
chance of ignition should a leak occur, and will reduce fire exposure and flame
spread hazard. This is especially important where several engine-driven pumps or
other machines are in the same service, such as at a pipeline pumping station. Care
should be exercised to maintain adequate ventilation (See API RP 500A and NFPA
30) and not to inadvertently create an area warranting a Class I, Division 1 classifi-
cation.

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Ventilation
Where it is not practical or economical to modify a permanently installed IC engine
as outlined in Section 2033, an acceptable alternate is to provide adequate ventila-
tion to prevent accumulation of hydrocarbon vapor in concentrations above 25% of
the lower flammable limit. The engine may be enclosed in a pressurized area to
exclude vapor or ventilated with an air sweep that will ensure vapor concentration
will never reach the flammable range. Automatic shutdown shall be provided in the
event of a ventilation system failure.

Extinguishing Systems
Fixed fire control systems such as fire water monitors or water sprays over critical
or high-risk equipment or carbon dioxide flooding of enclosures should also be
considered. Except for combustion gas turbine enclosures, situations warranting
such protection are not common. Therefore, the advice of a Fire Protection Engi-
neer should be sought when considering these systems.

Detection System
The same detection and control systems recommended for larger stationary gas-
fueled engines driving reciprocating compressors, as presented in Appendix D,
should be considered for other critical or high risk equipment. Fire and combustible
gas detectors should be employed to sound alarms or shut down operating equip-
ment, shut off fuel supply, activate motor-operated valves to close all intake and
discharge lines, relieve pressure to a vent stack, or activate fixed extinguishing
systems. These detection systems are recommended for all critical unattended or
not-regularly-attended facilities.
For enclosed IC engine facilities the detection system should alarm and activate any
emergency ventilation systems to keep air in the facility below 20% of the lower
flammable limit. If the combustible levels continued to rise up to 60% of LFL, the
detection system should activate further protections (e.g., shutting down the ventila-
tion and shutting down the engine). Another consideration should be the location of
ventilation exhausts with respect to outside ignition sources.

2040 Tanks
Fire protection design considerations such as tank selection, location, spacing,
drainage and impounding, fire protection systems, and static electricity and light-
ning protection, are included in almost all aspects of tank design, and are discussed
in detail in the Tank Manual.
Section 140 of the Tank Manual contains a comprehensive list and short abstracts
of the commonly used industry codes and standards related to tank design.

2050 Columns and Vessels

Refer to the Pressure Vessel Manual for more information on pressure vessel design
and repairs.

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2051 Fire-safe Design Features

Overpressure Protection
Pressure safety valve (PSV) protection shall be provided per Section 1900. PSVs
shall be tested and maintained in a safe operating condition in accordance with the
test and maintenance intervals given in API 510, Pressure Vessel Inspection Code,
Section 6. A 5-year interval is common, but shorter intervals may be required, such
as the one-year interval for boilers and offshore pressure vessels. Overpressure may
result from loss of electrical power, steam, cooling water, etc.

Reflux Vessels
Reflux streams are used to control temperatures and pressures in the columns and
vessels. The reflux stream is generally a side stream that has been cooled to give the
operator control of temperature as well as product purity. When reflux is pumped
into the column, it vaporizes, absorbing heat and cooling the column. Reflux
vessels generally have large liquid inventories and, therefore, must be protected
against fire exposure. Water sprays are often used if the vessel is not insulated or
protected by adjacent monitors. Reflux stream control valves may be fireproofed
and have protected instrument leads to allow the operator a means of providing
optimum cooling during fires and other emergencies. Reflux vessels should have
independent high and low level alarms. They should also have double valves on the
water draw connection.

Feed Control
Mishaps involving columns and vessels generally require immediate control of the
feed and reflux streams. Board-operated control valves are needed for high pressure
and high volume critical streams. Manually operated field valves may be acceptable
for isolating some equipment units; however, the valves must be available in antici-
pated emergencies.

Heat Control
Heat control should be provided by the installation of appropriate valves and
remote instrumentation that can be operated from the control room. These systems
include:
• Furnace firing and other heat input controls
• Cooling systems for rapid heat removal, including reflux streams, cooling
water systems and fin fan coolers

Fixed External Cooling

Deluge systems, fire monitors, and other fire control systems may be needed to
prevent an external fire from causing additional leakage from flanges or connec-
tions, as well as a vessel rupture. In general, nonfireproofed vessels with liquid
holdup of 1000 gallons or more should be provided with water cooling by one of
the aforementioned methods. Remote locations where a fire does not pose a signifi-
cant risk to people or equipment may be an exception.

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Fail-safe Control Valves

Control valves on inlet, outlet and reflux streams are crucial for overpressure protec-
tion during plant problems involving loss of utilities such as steam, electrical power
and instrument air. Close consideration must be given to the choice of fail-safe
features. Normally, feed valves should fail closed, and outlet and reflux valves
should fail open. However, there are exceptions, and each situation must be individ-
ually evaluated during the process hazards analysis, (PHA). Keep in mind that a
valve that fails open may allow needed cooling to one piece of equipment while
starving others.
Valves that are not fail safe should be fireproofed as discussed in Sections 1700 and
1800.

Low Temperature Operation

Consideration must be given to the proper design materials for columns and vessels
handling low-boiling-point liquids that may cause auto-refrigeration during emer-
gency venting. Propane boils at about -43°C (-44°F) and ethane at near -85°C (-
120°F). Ordinary carbon steels become brittle at temperatures below -40°C (-40°F).
De-ethanizers, depropanizers and vessels containing similar liquefied gases may
require special low-temperature steels to withstand auto-refrigeration temperatures
associated with emergency venting. Designers must consider this contingency
during the design phase.
Refer to the Pressure Vessel Manual for more information on minimum pressur-
izing temperature (MPT).
Equipment in cryogenic service and with heat-sensitive insulation should be
protected with fireproofing insulation to keep heat-sensitive insulation below degra-
dation temperature. Directional water spray at a density of 0.25 gpm/sq ft (10
L/min/square meter) may also be used in this case.

2052 Fire-safe Design and Construction

Small Pipe Connections
Limit the number of small pipe connections. Threaded gage connections, sample
points, level control nozzles, etc., are subject to mechanical damage, vibration
fatigue and corrosion. The potential failure points are minimized by:
• Installing only those connections actually needed.
• Making the appendages as short as possible.
• Using extra heavy pipe nipples and 3/4-inch minimum diameter to the first
valve off the vessel.
• Using socket-weld and bridge-weld construction and appropriate weld fittings,
especially between the vessel and the first valve.
• Selecting materials for the stress and corrosion anticipated for the process.

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Material Selection
It is imperative to select fire-safe materials—materials that are resistant to fire, acid,
erosion and corrosion, and materials compatible with the process conditions.

Fireproofing
Fireproofing of columns and vessel supports is discussed in Section 1700.
Generally, fireproofing is only warranted on vessel and column skirts and not on the
vessels themselves. However, fireproofing should be considered on the vessel when
all the following conditions exist:
• High pressure systems are involved.
• Failure of the vessel could result in very large releases of flammable liquids or
gases.
• Liquid inventory is high and time for controlled depressuring and emptying is
significant.
• Equipment in the area is critical because of its cost and replacement time.
• Line or vessel is normally not flowing or not liquid-full so that there is no
internal cooling.
• Fuel source for an external fire is viable, for instance, a nearby hot, high pres-
sure pump.
• A source of ignition is present, such as a furnace, or there is potential for auto-
ignition.
• Adequate water cooling is not available and vessel needs to be protected
against rupture or boiling liquid, expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) from
flame impingement. Piping, flanges, other vessels, pumps, etc., can be a source
of impingement flame.
If a vessel or column requires insulation for other reasons, cost effective fire-
proofing can often be accomplished by using stainless steel weatherjacketing over
the insulation, provided the insulation is suitable for the fire temperature. See
Section 1700 and the Insulation and Refractory Manual for more information.

Water Spray or Deluge Systems

Water spray or deluge systems can replace fireproofing for vessel protection and
should be provided when vessel contents are reactive. These are discussed in
Section 1600.

2053 Operating Safety Features

The following operating features may be necessary to warn of conditions that, if not
monitored and controlled could lead to spills, vapor releases and possible fires:
• Level alarms (LAL and LAH)

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• Temperature alarms (TAL and TAH)

• Pressure alarms
• pH indicators
• H2S detectors
• Fire alarms and gas detectors for pumps and compressors associated with LPG
columns

2054 Gas Freeing Provisions

Design provisions should be made for venting, draining, steam-out, purging and
liquid pump out. Steam-out and purging are required for clean-up before entry for
inspection and repairs. Also, inerting is used to reduce fire and explosion potential.
Internal weirs, trays and downcomers should have holes provided for draining
liquids from the column during cleanup.

2055 External Fire Exposure Risk

Drainage
Drainage should be designed so that flow is away from columns and vessels. See
Section 1400.

Spacing
See Section 1300 for equipment spacing.

Isolation
Valves must be accessible to isolate the vessel from mechanical equipment (e.g.,
pumps, compressors) during a fire involving that equipment. In some cases, these
valves may have to be remotely operated and fire safe.

2056 Supplemental Fire Protection

The following fire protection equipment is detailed in Section 1600.
• First aid fire hose reels
• Fire water monitors
• Fixed water sprays and deluge systems
• Sprinkler systems
• Portable and fixed dry chemical equipment
• Fire detectors
• Combustible gas detectors

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2057 Protection Systems for Higher Risk Processes

For more information on protection systems for vessels used in higher risk
processes, see NFPA 68 and NFPA 69. Protection can include explosion suppres-
sion systems and rupture discs.

2058 Inspection and Maintenance

Periodic inspection by a competent inspection team can provide a basis for a well
planned and effective maintenance program. An organized inspection and mainte-
nance program should include the following:
• Inspections to monitor the physical conditions of the vessels and columns, the
type, rate and cause of corrosion, erosion, hydrogen blistering, stress cracking
or other deterioration.
• Internal corrosion coupons and gage points installed as check points for the
inspector.
• Corrosion inhibitors used judiciously because when used at incorrect rates,
they can accelerate corrosion.
• Detailed records of corrosion rates, mechanisms of corrosion, locations of
corrosion, and inhibitors used.
• Records of equipment failures, maintenance or repair methods.
• Inspection and maintenance records of the pressure relief valves and other pres-
sure relieving devices.
• Periodic inspection of fireproofing systems.
With this information, appropriate maintenance and operating action can be taken
to maintain the equipment's integrity. Refer to the Corrosion Prevention Manual for
more information on corrosion.

Operator Inspections
Operators play a key role in the fire safety of columns and vessels:
• At least once a day, all connections and manways should be checked for
leakage. Flange leakage and oil-soaked insulation is a serious fire hazard.
• All fire protection equipment must be checked routinely. (See Section 1600
and Appendix E.)
• Corrosion inhibitor systems must be monitored closely.
• All alarms, shutdowns, and emergency isolation valves should be tested at least
once a month.

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2060 Fired Heaters and Boilers

Fired heaters and boilers are a major cause of large fire losses and lost production.
The Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual discusses the magnitude and
causes of these losses and gives recommendations in the areas listed below. It
should be used as the primary Company reference for fired heater safety.
• Fired heater selection
• Location and spacing considerations
• Access recommendations
• Safe firing procedures
• Inspection procedures
• Protective instrumentation
• Firebox design
• Fuel system design
• Burner design
• Furnace tube selection
The Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual also contains the following
industry standards related to fired heater safety.
• API RP 530, “Calculation of Heater Tube Thickness in Petroleum Refineries.”
• API RP 550, “Manual on Installation of Refinery Instruments and Control
Systems,” Part III, Fired Heaters and Inert Gas Generators.
• API Standard 560, Fired Heaters for General Refinery Service
• API Guide for Inspection of Refinery Equipment, Chapter IX, Fired Heaters
and Stacks.
• NFPA 85C, "Prevention of Furnace Explosions/Implosions in Multiple Burner
Boiler - Furnaces" is another applicable industry standard.

2070 Other Heat Transfer Equipment

The design of shell and tube exchangers, air coolers, and cooling towers are all
covered in the Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual.

2071 Shell and Tube Heat Exchangers

Leaks
Fires involving heat exchangers usually occur as a result of leaks. Problem areas
are:
Tube Failures in Coolers. This may allow flammable gases to enter the water
stream and from there the cooling tower, where the gases are released. In one five-
year period, Chevron plants experienced 12 cooling tower fires or explosions due to
releases from process plants through the cooling water system to the tower. One

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design feature used to prevent this is to maintain differential pressures so that

process pressure is lower than water pressure. Each service should be carefully
monitored to assure adequate differential, and tubes should be inspected often
enough to eliminate tube failures.
Leaks at Flanges in Shell and Tube Exchangers. These leaks can result from
process upsets or from corrosion or damage to flange surfaces. Extra thick flanges,
oversized bolts, and added gasket loading safety factor address this risk. The Heat
Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual, Section 500 addresses body flange design
and insulation recommendations in detail. Process controls may also reduce the risk
by minimizing rapid temperature changes that cause bolt expansion and flange loos-
ening.
Fires have also occurred at shell drain valves because of flammable liquids leaking
from valves that were not plugged.

Relief Protection
Because of the potential of overpressure caused by blocking in one side of a heat
transfer system, it is important that both sides of the system have overpressure
protection. Refer to Section 1900. The Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower
Manual, Section 500, gives the criteria for pressure relief and thermal relief of heat
exchangers.

2072 Air-cooled Exchangers

Overhead air coolers are susceptible to severe fire damage because the draft created
by the fan pulls heat from fires up to sensitive air cooler components. This risk can
be reduced by locating equipment with high potential fire risk (e.g., pumps,
compressors) away from overhead air coolers. See Section 1300.
Fan failure can cause extreme vibration resulting in line flange leaks. Also, failed
fan blades can damage piping and endanger personnel. Vibration switches that can
be set to shut the fan down before vibration reaches a destructive level are recom-
mended for all air coolers. Also, limiting the maximum tip speed to 10,000 fpm
will decrease the vibration and noise levels of the air cooler.
Exposed air coolers, when mounted in fire hazardous areas over pipe racks or struc-
tures, should have three-hour-rated fireproofing per the UL 1709 high-rise fire test
on their supporting structure up to the point of load. See Section 1700 for additional
fireproofing comments.

2073 Cooling Towers

Like other utilities, the cooling tower is essential to safe plant operation. Cooling
tower failure or loss of the cooling water flow can lead to emergency shutdowns
and potential hydrocarbon leaks and fires. Consequently, cooling water pumps
should be spared and the drivers should use a very reliable power supply or steam.
Cooling towers may contain flammable vapors and combustible liquids that enter
the water stream from leaking exchanger tubes. Explosions and fires have occurred

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due to this hydrocarbon leakage. As a result, the following precautions should be

taken in cooling tower designs:
• Cooling towers are electrically classified. Fan motors, pump motors and other
electrical apparatus must meet Class I, Division 2 requirements.
• If possible, design coolers so that the water side is at a higher pressure than the
process side.
• Where the process pressures in exchangers are higher than the cooling water
side, disengaging standpipes or chambers are installed on the water return line
to the cooling tower to release gases before the water reaches the tower water
distribution system.
• Cooling towers are generally located away from process equipment and
furnaces. See Section 1300.
• Water pumps and their switchgear should be located at least 10 feet from the
base of the cooling tower.
• Structural requirements and fill characteristics result in an installation that is
largely combustible. Sheathing the exterior with noncombustible material or
using low-flame-spread plastics can give a degree of fire resistance from
external exposures.
• Two manual shutoff switches for fans should be installed at the cooling tower,
one at grade and one at the top deck. Vibration cut-out switches are recom-
mended for all fans. (See the Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual for
details.)
• Hydrants with monitors should be spaced such that any area of the cooling
tower can be covered by streams from at least two directions.
• First aid fire hose reels should be spaced at 100-foot (30-meter) intervals on
the top deck, but in any arrangement there should be at least two hose stations
located at opposite ends. In cold climates, the hose stations should be on a dry
standpipe, arranged to be supplied by hose from a hydrant. The hand hose
should be 1-1/2 inches, preferably hard type on live reel, with a combination
shutoff nozzle.
If the cooling tower will not be used, an automatic sprinkler system should be
provided. See Section 1600 for more detail.

2074 Heat Transfer Liquids in Closed Systems

Salts, special high flash point liquid and hot oils are used as heat transfer media in
the petroleum industry.
Fires involving these liquids can occur in spite of the high flash point. If the liquid
temperature is raised above the auto-ignition temperature in the presence of air, and
an ignition source is available, vapors flashing off can be ignited. Generally,
process controls are set to operate at temperatures below the auto-ignition point

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when possible. Other design considerations include keeping the heat transfer
medium from entering preheated tubes and preventing loss of heat transfer media
flow.

2080 Piping
This section discusses the fire safety aspects of piping design. For detailed design
and material selection information, refer to the Piping Manual.

2081 Materials
Steel Pipe
Seamless steel pipe affords maximum fire safety. Butt-welded seams (e.g., EFW,
ERW) are more susceptible to leakage and should not be used in facilities where
sources of ignition or exposure of facilities to the public exist. Pipe of butt-welded
seam construction used in oil or gas service should be fusion welded (EFW).
Steel piping offers strength, flexibility, ductility, and weldability making it a
designer's choice. However, steel may not be practical for some acids, chemicals, or
for use at high temperatures.
Steel valves, flanges, and fittings are superior to cast iron, nodular iron, and
malleable cast iron. Welded joints in steel and steel alloys are more likely to remain
tight through a fire than any other type. In large-size pipes, welded joints cost less
than screwed or flanged joints and should be used in all cases except where flanged
valves and the installation of slip blinds makes flanged joints mandatory.
Steel valves, flanges, and fittings, because of their superior ability to tolerate
thermal shock, bending loads, and hydraulic and mechanical shock, should be used
on all tanks and lines carrying petroleum products in or close to operating units or
high value equipment. Steel should also be used in lines carrying water or steam
where failure at times of fire could interfere with fire fighting activities.

Alloys
Alloy materials are often chosen for severe temperature or corrosion services. Use
of the correct alloy is often critical to plant safety. Non alloy steel has been installed
in some locations by error and there have been cases where the factory pipe mark-
ings were in error. Positive identification of alloy materials, by instruments such as
the Texas Nuclear gage is recommended during initial construction and replace-
ment.

Pipe Class Transition

Special care should be taken in areas where the pipe class changes. Each of these
locations should be reviewed in the Process Hazards Analysis. Premature failures of
piping can occur if pipe class transitions to less severe service piping are located
too near the more severe service. For example, a transition from high temperature
to low temperature rated pipe was located adjacent to the normally closed isolation

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valve on the high temperature line. Normal temperature migration through the steel
isolation valve caused the low temperature pipe to heat up to temperatures higher
than its rating, leading to an unexpected pipe rupture and fire.

Cast Iron Pipe

Cast iron pipe is undesirable in oil or gas service because of its brittleness. If heated
by fire exposure and then quenched, it can fail. Also, cast iron valves in a steel line
can fail due to stresses in the line because of fire exposure. Therefore, cast iron
should not be used in services where fire exposure might cause it to fail and add to
the fire problem or contribute fuel to the fire. Section 2084 discusses the use and
limitations of cast iron valves.

Brass, Copper, and Aluminum Piping

Piping made of these materials is sometimes used for special purposes. The
designer should keep in mind their relatively low melting points (e.g., aluminum
melts at 1220°F and will fail at much lower temperatures) and potential for failure
if the piping is exposed to fire.

2082 Fire-safe Valve Design

Refer to the Piping Manual for a detailed discussion on the different types of valves
and their applications.
Valves used in hydrocarbon liquid service should be designed to not trap liquids in
their bodies. The liquid could expand during a fire and overpressure the valve body.
Standard gate valves are normally not a problem because excessive pressure can be
relieved by minor leakage past the valve seat. However, valves such as the “double-
block and bleed” type will trap liquid. When these valves are used in liquid service,
body relief valves shall be provided. Plug cocks have been known to trap liquid
inside the plug and bonnet area and cause potentially serious releases during mainte-
nance. Safety precautions must be exercised when dismantling such valves.
WKM “pressure seal” valves have been a problem in liquid, light hydrocarbon (C5s
or lighter) service. These valves should no longer be purchased, and existing valves
in liquid, light hydrocarbon service in fire hazardous locations should be replaced
or retrofitted with bolted bonnet valves. See the CRTC Valve Specialist or the Fire
& Process Safety team for more information.

Flangeless Valves
Only lugged-body (single-flange), fire-resistant butterfly valves approved by the
Company are acceptable for use in liquid and gas hydrocarbon, LPG, and H2S
service. A lugged-body valve is one with a body that extends over and covers the
flange studs, preventing flame impingement on the stud. Drilled-through lugs are
preferred to permit use of standard flange studs. Refer to the Piping Manual,
Section 270 for additional information. Purchasing maintains a list of approved
valves.

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Other flangeless valves with exposed bolts, wafer-type bodies, including control
valves and some check valves, should not be used in fire hazardous areas of
refinery process plants, chemical plants, producing gas plants, offshore platforms,
marketing terminals and other high value facilities in liquid and gas hydrocarbon,
LPG or H2S service. In a fire, exposed studs quickly get hot, expand and allow the
flange connection to leak, ultimately causing total failure of the connection.
In existing facilities where flangeless valves have been used, flame impingement
shields should be installed as shown in Figure 2000-1 (see Standard Drawing GB-
L1110, in the Piping Manual) if all of the following conditions exist:
• The valve is in liquid or gas hydrocarbon, LPG, or H2S service.
• The valve has 3 inches or more of exposed studs between the flanges or is an 8-
inch valve or larger.
• The valve is located such that it could be exposed to direct flame impingement
from a hydrocarbon fire other than one caused from its own leaking
• The valve is in service so that its failure would result in the release of signifi-
cant amounts of hydrocarbon or would cause the fire to spread.

Fig. 2000-1 Installation of Flame Impingement Shields

Flame impingement shields should not be allowed for flangeless valves used in new
facilities. This shield only extends the time of failure of the connection from about
5 minutes to about 20 minutes. It is still a weak point in the piping that should be
avoided.

Valve Seat Material

When exposed to fire, rubber-like or Teflon materials used for sealing valve seats
will fail much faster than the valve metal. Therefore, all ball valves, plug valves,
and valves that depend on O-ring stem seals in liquid hydrocarbon service should

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be designed so that failure of the seat material will not cause more than minor
leakage past the ball, plug, or stem. API Standard 607, “Fire Test for Soft-Seated
Quarter-Turn Valves” provides specification data for fire-safe valves.

2083 Gaskets
For the majority of moderate-temperature services, composition gaskets on raised
face flanges are acceptable. At flanged joints where additional reliability is desired
or for higher temperatures, spiral-wound gaskets on raised face flanges should be
used instead of composition ring gaskets. For services with special temperature,
pressure, or chemical hazard problems, a ring-type joint or equivalent should be
considered. For details see the Piping Manual.

2084 Limitations for Piping and Fittings

Threaded Piping
Threaded piping systems have the following weaknesses and should not be used in
sizes larger than 2 inches, or smaller than 3/4 inch, in hydrocarbon or critical utility
service. Exceptions are low-temperature or low-pressure services in low risk areas,
i.e., utility water, yard air, small producing facilities, etc.).
• Weakness resulting from the notch effect at the root of the thread, which is a
point of stress concentration.
• A decrease in effective wall thickness where the threads are cut.
• Susceptibility to thread disengagement by expansion when exposed to fire.
• Susceptibility to vibration and fatigue failure.
Small piping that is socket welded or screwed-and-seal-welded (weld covering all
threads) is considered equivalent in fire safety to butt-welded or flanged joints.

Use of Cast Iron Valves and Fittings in Hydrocarbon Service

Cast iron valves are less expensive and in some cases more corrosion resistant than
steel valves. However, they are not as fire resistant as steel valves. Cast iron valves
are more susceptible to cracking due to thermal shock than steel valves. Although
malleable iron and ductile (nodular) iron is slightly less brittle than cast iron, the
difference in fire resistance is negliable. All types of iron valves can be expected to
perform poorly in a fire.
Steel valves are required in flammable and combustible services (flash point below
200°F or temperature is within 30°F of the flash point) with the following excep-
tions:
1. A cast iron, malleable iron or ductile iron valve may be used as the first valve
off a tank if all of the following are met:
– Tank has a storage capacity of 3,000 barrels or less

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– Tank is located in a producing facility

– Tank is in an isolated or rural (excluding offshore) location
2. Tanks that are in Class III-B liquid service (flash point at or over 200°F),
outdoors, and not within a diked area or a drainage path of a tank storing a
Class I, II or III-A liquid (flash under 200°F), may have cast iron, malleable or
ductile iron, brass, or other similar metal valves.
3. In piping other than that described in exceptions 1 or 2 above, cast iron,
malleable or ductile iron valves and fittings are acceptable under ground, above
ground or inside a building if the valve meets one of the following:
– It is suitably protected against fire exposure
– It is located where any leakage resulting from the failure would not unduly
expose persons, important equipment or structures, and environmentally
important areas
– It is located where leakage can readily be controlled by operation of an
accessible remotely located valve(s)

2085 General Fire-safe Piping Features

Thermal Expansion
The need to provide for thermal expansion of hot process lines is obvious; and even
in lines expected to operate at normal temperatures it is desirable to provide suffi-
cient flexibility for expansion and contraction caused by changes in atmospheric
temperature, possible fire exposure, steam-out, pump-out, settlement, etc.
Flexible couplings with combustible seals such as Dresser or Victaulic may fail
rapidly under fire exposure and should be avoided wherever possible in systems
handling hydrocarbons. Couplings such as Dresser that can come apart if subjected
to line stresses should not be used if their failure will result in a release which will
expand the fire. Obtaining needed flexibility through offsets in the welded piping is
much safer. See Section 2086 for more detail.

Thermal Relief
Provision should be made to relieve excess pressure developed in lines due to the
thermal expansion resulting from temperature changes. Relief valves should be
installed on all lines that can be blocked and where no valve leakage is expected,
and on lines confined by valves where leakage past the valve can be expected, but
where there is more than 200 feet of pipe per valve. Refer to the Instrumentation
and Control Manual, Section 1200.

Self-closing Valves
The use of self-closing valves is justified only in congested locations where failure
to close valves manually might permit flow of oil or gas into areas where a serious
fire may result. The types of installation for which self-closing valves should be
considered include water and chemical draws, vents, bleeders, drains, level cocks,
sample cocks, and tank truck and barrel filling and emptying systems. For require-

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ments in LPG systems, see this manual, Section 3500 and the Piping Manual,
Section 1100.
For facilities under the jurisdiction of the Uniform Fire Code, self-closing valves
are not allowed for emptying of drums holding Class I or II liquids (UFC 79.802).

Vents and Drains

Where it is frequently necessary to empty piping systems for blending, cleaning,
inspection, and repair or alteration, etc., adequate vents and drain connections
should be provided. Where the established procedure requires that lines be steamed
out or displaced with air or water, suitable connections should be provided for this
purpose. Small connections should be made with welding bosses and extra heavy
nipples.

Pipeline Isolation
To avoid the necessity of shutting down complete pipeline systems in the event that
portions are exposed to fire or other damage, block valves should be installed at
points where major branches take off from mains. When continuity of service is
important, looped systems with block valves that will permit isolating certain
portions and leaving the remainder in operation can be installed.

Hydrostatic Testing
To ensure against failure resulting from defective material and workmanship, all
new piping, and all old piping, after alterations or repairs or after a prolonged shut-
down, should be given a hydrostatic test at least to the pressure specified in the
applicable Code.

Insulation
As far as practicable, pipe insulation should be noncombustible to eliminate it as a
possible means of fire spreading from one area to another. Where hot piping insula-
tion can be exposed to hydrocarbon leaks, it should be provided with metal weather
jacketing, as oil soaked into the insulation can auto-ignite even with line tempera-
tures as low as 350°F.

Pipeways
Piping systems within process units should be installed on aboveground pipeways
whenever possible. Grade level or belowgrade pipeways should be avoided. They
are fire hazards because they are difficult to keep clean, they obstruct free access,
and the piping is more difficult to monitor for external corrosion and leaks.

Sample Connections
Sample connections in flammable service should be the three-way recirculation
type as shown on PIM-EF-403. An alternative is the Faulkner Continuous Flow-
through sampler. These types of sample systems minimize leakage and hazards to
personnel.

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2000 Process Equipment Fire Protection Manual

2086 Use of Resilient-sealed Couplings

Victaulic Couplings
For New Construction and Major Modifications in ANSI Class 150 Service
In production facilities located in rural or remote areas where there is limited expo-
sure risk to adjacent properties and the potential loss to the Company is minimal,
Victaulic couplings with a fire-resistant gasket can be used based on economics.
However, if the facility, even though remotely located, has critical business impor-
tance, has more than 3000 barrels storage capacity, or has potential fire exposure
from adjacent plants, the use of coupled connections should be minimized.
Even though the test data indicate that the integrity, in a fire situation, of the
Victaulic coupling with a fire resistant gasket is comparable to that of an ANSI
Class 150 flange connection, we do not feel it should be used interchangeably with
all flanged connections until we have field experience with it. We do, however, feel
the risk is acceptable for use in the above limited application. As we gain field expe-
rience, we will continue to evaluate potential applications for it.
For H2S service, the Piping Manual, Section 1000, “Piping and Equipment for H2S
Service” should be followed. The recommendations for the use of Victaulic fire-
resistant gaskets and couplings are as follows:
• For low H2S service, (containing less than 1% H2S by volume for gas or 0.1
psia H2S partial pressure for liquids): Couplings can be used in place of
flanged, threaded, or welded connections.
• For moderate H2S service (containing 1% to 24% H2S by volume for gas or
0.1 to 4.0 psia H2S partial pressure liquids): Couplings can be used in place of
flanged connections. However, all connections must be kept to a minimum, and
couplings cannot be used in place of welded connections.
• For high H2S service (containing over 24% H 2S by volume for gas or over 4.0
psia H2S partial pressure for liquids): Couplings cannot be used in this service.
Contact the local Safety Engineer or the Fire Protection Staff for guidance on use of
Victaulic couplings in areas other than those described here.

For Maintenance and Repair Work

A fire-resistant gasket should be the only type used for maintenance and repair
replacements. No existing standard gasket should be reinstalled.

For Existing Facilities

Victaulic couplings now in service do not need to be replaced with welded pipe and
flanges. However, the standard gaskets should be replaced with fire-resistant
gaskets on a programmed basis in the following selected locations:
• Where leakage resulting from its failure could spread a spill or fire and unduly
expose adjacent properties, important buildings, or environmentally important
areas

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Fire Protection Manual 2000 Process Equipment

• Inside the diked area or drainage path of a tank storing Class I or II liquids
(flash point under 140°F)
• Within 50 feet of fire hazardous equipment, such as pumps and fired heaters
handling hydrocarbons, or vessels containing more than 1000 gallons of Class
I or II liquids
Gaskets need not be changed to the fire-resistant type (except for routine mainte-
nance) if one of the following applies:
• Low pressure natural or produced gas
• Water service or nonflammable liquid service, provided that hydrocarbon
liquids will not spill after the contents have drained from a failed coupling.
(For example, couplings must be changed out on a water line when the
coupling is between a three-phase separator and the first block valve, because
the failed coupling would uncontrollably dump oil after the water has drained
out.)
• In production facilities in rural or remote locations that are small and of low
value and where there is limited exposure or risk to adjacent properties

Dresser Couplings
Dresser couplings should not be installed in liquid hydrocarbon service. They
can be installed in hydrocarbon vapor service at or near atmospheric pressure
provided their failure during a fire will not cause the fire to spread. They should not
be installed in produced water service if their failure during a fire would allow
hydrocarbon liquid to feed the fire after the water has drained out.
There are two major weaknesses with Dresser couplings:
1. They have resilient seals that will fail quickly when exposed to fire.
2. A Dresser coupling is placed over the two facing ends of pipe. When the pipe
is exposed to fire, bending stresses in the pipe, caused by uneven heating of the
pipe, become very high and can pull the coupling apart, resulting in a cata-
strophic failure. There have been catastrophic failures of Dresser couplings due
to hydraulic shock without any fire exposure.
Existing Installations. If any one of the following conditions exists, the Dresser
coupling, if in liquid hydrocarbon service, should be replaced at the first available
opportunity:
1. Located so that any leakage resulting from its failure would unduly expose
persons, important buildings, equipment or structures, or environmentally
important areas
2. Located where leakage cannot be readily controlled by operation of an acces-
sible remotely located valve or valves

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2000 Process Equipment Fire Protection Manual

3. Located inside fire hazardous areas which include:

a. The diked area or drainage path of a tank storing Class I or Class II liquids
(flash point under 140°F), or
b. The area within 50 feet of fire hazardous equipment such as fired heaters,
furnaces, pumps, compressors, LACT units or vessels containing more
than 1000 gallons of Class I or Class II liquids, or
c. The on-plot area in an oil, gas or chemical facility.
If the Dresser coupling is in flammable liquid service (flash point below 100°F)
with the potential of fire exposure and is not included in one of the above catego-
ries, it should be replaced at the most convenient maintenance turnaround or next
shutdown. In the meantime, the Dresser coupling should be protected in the
following manner:
1. Insulate it with a fire-resistant cover that can be easily removed to inspect for
leakage or corrosion under it. This cover can be stainless steel weatherjack-
eting over calcium silicate, ceramic fiber, or mineral wool insulation; or a
prefabricated fire-resistant blanket such as that available from Darchem Engi-
neering, Inc. in Pasadena, CA (818-449-3222). Covers should extend at least
12 inches to 18 inches beyond the ends of the coupling.
2. Raise the grade under the coupling as high as feasible (up to 3 feet) for at least
5 feet horizontally around the coupling. This will keep a spill fire from burning
directly under it.
If the Dresser coupling is in any of the following services, it doesn't need to be
replaced:
1. Gas or vapor at less than 50 psi, provided its failure during a fire will not
expose other equipment
2. Water or nonflammable liquid service, providing hydrocarbon liquid will not
spill after the contents have drained from the failed coupling
3. Located in remote producing areas and not falling in any of the above catego-
ries (i.e., fire exposure is unlikely)
The best way to avoid the use of Dresser couplings is to design and arrange the
piping in a way that adequate piping flexibility is inherently provided with welded
connections, or use welded expansion loops. Other alternatives are flexible metal
hose of steel or stainless steel (without rubber), steel bellows expansion joints, Van
Stone flanges (rotational), or ball joints with metal-to-metal seals. Refer to Section
650 of the Tank Manual and Section 330 of the Piping Manual for additional infor-
mation on piping flexibility.

Grayloc Connectors
Although Grayloc Connectors have not been tested to the API standard fire test for
piping connectors, they have been fire tested to 920°F at 1500 psi for 96 hours with
negligible leakage. They are a 100% steel clamped connector with a steel seal ring.

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Fire Protection Manual 2000 Process Equipment

They are considered to be fire safe and are approved from a fire protection stand-
point for use in hydrocarbon service.

Unibolt Connectors
Unibolt Connectors have not been fire tested. They are available with either steel or
bronze seal rings. Although it is not recommended that they be removed from
existing service, it is recommended that they not be installed in any critical hydro-
carbon service until they have proven to be fire resistant via the API standard fire
test for piping connectors.

2087 Nonmetallic and Nonmetallic Lined Steel Pipe

The uses and limitations of nonmetallic pipe are discussed in the Piping Manual,
Section 400.

2090 References
American Petroleum Institute (API)
API 500 Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations
in Petroleum Facilities
API 510 Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: Inspection, Rating,
Repair, and Alteration
API 530 Calculation of Heater Tube Thickness in Petroleum
Refineries
API 550 Manual on Installation of Refinery Instruments and
Control Systems
API 560 Fired Heaters for General Refinery Service
API 607 Fire Test for Soft-Seated Quarter-Turn Valves
API 2510 Design and Construction of LPG Installations

Guide for Inspection of Refinery Equipment, Chapter X

API Guide for Inspection of Refinery Equipment, Chapter X, Pumps, Compressors,
and Blowers, and Their Drivers.
API Guide for Inspection of Refinery Equipment, Chapter IX, Fired Heaters and
Stacks

Chevron References
Compressor Manual
Corrosion Prevention Manual
Driver Manual
Fired Heater and Waste Heat Recovery Manual

Chevron Corporation 2000-35 December 1994

2000 Process Equipment Fire Protection Manual

General Machinery Manual

Heat Exchanger and Cooling Tower Manual
Instrumentation and Control Manual
Insulation and Refractory Manual
Piping Manual
Pressure Vessel Manual
Pump Manual
Tank Manual

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquid Code
NFPA 37 Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines
NFPA 58 Storage and Handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases (ANSI Z106.1)
NFPA 68 Venting of Deflagrations
NFPA 69 Explosion Prevention Systems
NFPA 70 National Electrical Code
NFPA 78 Lightning Protection Code
NFPA 214 Water Cooling Towers
NFPA 493 Intrinsically Safe Apparatus in Division Hazardous Areas
NFPA 496 Purged and Pressurized Enclosures for Electrical Equipment
NFPA 505 Powered Industrial Trucks Including Type Designations, Areas of
Use, Maintenance and Operations

Occupation Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

OSHA Standard 1910.78

Underwriters' Laboratories (UL)

UL 558 Safety Standard for Internal Combustion Engine Powered Industrial
Trucks
UL 1709 Safety Standard for Electric Battery Powered Industrial Trucks

December 1994 2000-36 Chevron Corporation