Westbrook Chapter 1
Westbrook Chapter 1
Westbrook Chapter 1
Introduction
Status of CBT
1
Basic Theory, Development and Current
In this chapter we want to introduce you to some of the essential background to cognitive
behaviour therapy (CBT), including the basic theory and the development of the approach.
We start here because CBT is sometimes criticised for being a rather simple-minded ‘cook-
book’ approach to therapy: if the client has this problem then use that technique. However,
the approach we take in this book is based not on the mechanical application of techniques
but on understanding: understanding your patient, understanding CBT theory, and bring-
ing the two together in a formulation (see Chapter 4). You should already have some ideas
about understanding people, based on your clinical and personal experience. This chapter
will start you on the road to understanding CBT theory.
One further clarification. Talking about CBT as if it were a single therapy is misleading.
Modern CBT is not a monolithic structure, but a broad movement that is still developing,
and full of controversies. The approach we take in this book is based on the ‘Beckian’
model, first formulated by A.T. Beck in the 1960s and 1970s (Beck, 1963, 1964; Beck et al.,
1979). This model has been dominant in the UK for the past 25 years, and we would there-
fore see ourselves as being in the mainstream of CBT in this country. However, other CBT
theorists and clinicians might differ, in major or minor ways, with some of the approaches
expounded here. We should also say that although we think that some of the newer ideas
in CBT, such as the ‘Third Wave’ therapies (Hayes, 2004), are exciting developments that
have the potential to enrich CBT greatly, our aim here is primarily to provide a foundation
for ‘basic’ CBT. We therefore restrict our consideration of those developments to a separate
chapter (Chapter 17).
therapy approach developed by A.T. Beck, beginning in the 1960s but becoming far more
influential with the ‘cognitive revolution’ of the 1970s.
Behaviour therapy (BT) arose as a reaction against the Freudian psychodynamic para-
digm that had dominated psychotherapy from the nineteenth century onwards. In the
1950s, Freudian psychoanalysis was questioned by scientific psychology because of the lack
of empirical evidence to support either its theory or its effectiveness (Eysenck, 1952). BT
was strongly influenced by the behaviourist movement in academic psychology, which took
the view that what went on inside a person’s mind was not directly observable and there-
fore not amenable to scientific study. Instead behaviourists looked for reproducible associ-
ations between observable events, particularly between stimuli (features or events in the
environment) and responses (observable and measurable reactions from the people or
animals being studied). Learning theory, a major model in psychology at that time, looked
for general principles to explain how organisms learn new associations between stimuli and
responses.
In this spirit, BT avoided speculations about unconscious processes, hidden motivations
and unobservable structures of the mind, and instead used the principles of learning the-
ory to modify unwanted behaviour and emotional reactions. For instance, instead of try-
ing to probe the unconscious roots of an animal phobia, as Freud famously did with ‘Little
Hans’ (a boy who had a fear of horses: Freud, 1909), behaviour therapists constructed pro-
cedures, based on learning theory, that they believed would help people learn new ways of
responding. The BT view was that someone like Little Hans had learned an association
between the stimulus of a horse and a fear response, and the task of therapy was therefore
to establish a new, non-fearful, response to that stimulus. The resulting treatment for anx-
iety disorders, known as systematic desensitization, asked clients to repeatedly imagine the
feared stimulus whilst practising relaxation, so that the fearful response would be replaced
by a relaxed response. Later developments often replaced imaginal exposure (e.g. thinking
about a mental picture of the horse) with in vivo exposure (approaching a real horse).
BT rapidly became successful, especially with anxiety disorders such as phobias and obses-
sive-compulsive disorder, for two main reasons. First, in keeping with its roots in scientific
psychology, BT had always taken an empirical approach, which soon allowed it to provide
solid evidence that it was effective in relieving anxiety problems. Second, BT was a far more
economical treatment than traditional psychotherapy, typically taking 6 to 12 sessions.
Despite this early success, there was some dissatisfaction with the limitations of a purely
behavioural approach. Mental processes such as thoughts, beliefs, interpretations, imagery and
so on, are such an obvious part of life that it began to seem absurd for psychology not to deal
with them. During the 1970s this dissatisfaction developed into what became known as the
‘cognitive revolution’, wherein ways were sought to bring cognitive phenomena into psychol-
ogy and therapy, whilst still trying to maintain an empirical approach that would avoid
ungrounded speculation. Beck and others had in fact begun to develop ideas about cognitive
therapy (CT) during the 1950s and early 1960s, but their ideas became increasingly influen-
tial. The publication of Beck’s book on cognitive therapy for depression (Beck et al., 1979), and
research trials showing that CT was as effective a treatment for depression as anti-depressant
medication (e.g. Rush et al., 1977), fuelled the revolution. Over the succeeding years, BT and
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CT grew together and influenced each other to such an extent that the resulting amalgam is
now most commonly known as cognitive behaviour therapy – CBT.
• ‘I can’t think of anything to say to her, she’ll think I’m really boring and stupid’ (Leading to
anxiety)
• ‘Nobody would ever want to talk to me anyway, no one seems to like me’ (Depression)
• ‘She’s got a nerve being so snooty, I’ve not done anything wrong’ (Anger)
• ‘She’s probably still hung over from that party last night!’ (Amusement)
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This illustrates the fundamental cognitive principle, that different cognitions give rise to
different emotions. It also shows the association between certain kinds of cognition and
corresponding emotional states: for instance that thoughts about others being unfair, or
breaking rules that we hold dear, are likely to be associated with anger. We shall have more
to say about this idea later.
There is of course nothing new about the idea that meaning is important. The ancient
Greek stoic philosopher Epictetus said over 1,800 years ago that ‘Men are disturbed, not
by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things.’ Yet as we
shall see in the rest of this book, the ramifications and elaborations of this simple idea
have led to the development of a powerful approach to helping people in distress. By
helping people to change their cognitions, we may be able to help them change the way
they feel.
than being some freakish oddity; and (b) that CBT theory applies to therapists as much as
to clients.
• Cognition
• Affect, or emotion
• Behaviour
• Physiology
These systems interact with each other in complex feedback processes, and also interact
with the environment – where ‘environment’ is to be understood in the widest possible
sense, including not just the obvious physical environment but also the social, family, cul-
tural and economic environment. Figure 1.2, based on the ‘hot cross bun’ model (Padesky
& Greenberger, 1995), illustrates these interactions.
This kind of analysis helps us to describe problems in more detail, to target specific
aspects of a problem, and also to consider times when one or more systems are not corre-
lated with the others. For example, ‘courage’ could be said to describe a state where a
person’s behaviour is not correlated with her emotional state: although she is feeling fear-
ful, her behaviour is not fearful.
nt
me
ir on Pers
E nv on
Cognition
Thoughts,
beliefs etc.
Behaviour Affect
What one Emotional
does or says states
Physiology
Bodily states
Summary
These then are we what we would take as the basic principles at the heart of CBT. To
summarise:
• The cognitive principle: it is interpretations of events, not events themselves, which are
crucial.
• The behavioural principle: what we do has a powerful influence on our thoughts and
emotions.
• The continuum principle: mental health problems are best conceptualised as exaggera-
tions of normal processes.
• The here and now principle: it is usually more fruitful to focus on current processes rather
than the past.
• The interacting systems principle: it is helpful to look at problems as interactions between
thoughts, emotions, behaviour and physiology, and the environment in which the person
operates.
• The empirical principle: it is important to evaluate both out theories and our therapy
empirically.
‘Levels’ of cognition
So far we have talked about ‘cognition’ as if it were a single concept. In fact CBT usually dis-
tinguishes between different kinds or ‘levels’ of cognition. The following account of levels
of cognition is based on what has been found clinically useful; a later section will briefly
consider the scientific evidence for some of these ideas. Note that different CBT practi-
tioners might categorise cognitions differently, and although the following classification is
commonly used, it is not the only one.
• As the name suggests, one does not have to try to think NATs – they just happen, auto-
matically and without effort (although it may take effort to pay attention to them and
notice them).
• stereotyped, particularly in chronic problems, they may also vary a great deal from time to
time and situation to situation.
• They are, or can easily become, conscious. Most people are either aware of this kind of
thought, or can soon learn to be aware of them with some practice in monitoring
them.
• They may be so brief and frequent, and so habitual, that they are not ‘heard’. They are so
much a part of our ordinary mental environment that unless we focus on them we may
not notice them, any more than we notice breathing most of the time.
• They are often plausible and taken as obviously true, especially when emotions are strong.
Most of the time we do not question them, but simply swallow them whole. If I think ‘I am
useless’ when I am feeling fed up about something’s having gone wrong, it seems a simple
statement of the truth. One of the crucial steps in therapy is to help clients stop swallow-
ing their NATs in this way, so that they can step back and consider their accuracy. As a com-
mon CBT motto has it,‘Thoughts are opinions not facts’ – and like all opinions they may or
may not be accurate.
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• Although we usually talk about NATs as if they were verbal constructs – e.g.‘I am useless’ –
it is important to be aware that they may also take the form of images. For example, in
social phobia, rather than thinking in words ‘Other people think I’m peculiar’, a person may
get a mental image of himself looking red-faced, sweaty and incoherent.
• Because of their immediate effect on emotional states, and their accessibility, NATs are usu-
ally tackled early on in therapy.
Core beliefs
At the other end of the scale from NATs, core beliefs represent a person’s ‘bottom line’, their
fundamental beliefs about themselves, other people, or the world in general. Characteristics
of core beliefs are:
• Most of the time they are not immediately accessible to consciousness. They may have to
be inferred by observation of one’s characteristic thoughts and behaviours in many differ-
ent situations.
• They manifest as general and absolute statements, e.g. ‘I am bad’, or ‘Others are not to be
trusted’. Unlike NATs they do not typically vary much across times or situations, but are
seen by the person as fundamental truths that apply in all situations.
• They are usually learned early on in life as a result of childhood experiences, but they may
sometimes develop or change later in life, e.g. as a result of severe trauma.
• They are generally not tackled directly in short-term therapy for focal problems such as
anxiety disorders or major depression (although they may change anyway).Tackling them
directly may be more important in therapy for chronic problems like personality disorders
(see Chapter 17).
Dysfunctional assumptions
Dysfunctional assumptions (DAs) can be considered as bridging the gap between core
beliefs and NATs. They provide the ‘soil’ from which NATs sprout. DAs can be thought of
as ‘rules for living’, more specific in their applicability than core beliefs, but more general
than NATs. They often take the form of conditional ‘If… then…’ propositions, or are
framed as ‘Should’ or ‘Must’ statements. They often represent attempts to live with negative
core beliefs. For example, if I believe that I am fundamentally unlovable, I may develop the
assumption ‘If I always try to please other people then they will tolerate me, but if I stand
up for my own needs I will be rejected’ or ‘I must always put other’s needs first, otherwise
they will reject me’. Such a DA offers me a guide to how to live my life so as to overcome
some of the effects of the core belief, but it is always a fragile truce: if I fail to please some-
one, then I am in trouble. When one of my DAs is violated, then NATs and strong emotions
are likely to be triggered. Characteristics of DAs are:
• Like core beliefs, they are not as obvious as NATs, and may not be easily verbalised. They
often have to be inferred from actions or from patterns of common NATs.
• They are usually conditional statements, taking the form of ‘If . . . then . . .’, or ‘Should/must . . .
otherwise . . .’ statements.
• Some may be culturally reinforced: for example, beliefs about putting others first, or the
importance of success, may be approved of in some cultures.
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Dysfunctional assumptions
“If people get to know me, then they
will Þnd out how useless I am and
reject me; I must be good at
everything I do, otherwise my
uselessness will be revealed”
• What makes them dysfunctional is that they are too rigid and over-generalised, not flexi-
ble enough to cope with the inevitable complications and setbacks of life.
• They are usually tackled later on in therapy, after the client has developed some ability to
work with challenging NATs. It is thought that modifying DAs may be helpful in making
clients more resistant to future relapse (Beck et al., 1979).
Figure 1.3 illustrates these levels of cognitions for one kind of belief, and also shows some
of the dimensions along which the levels vary.
It is easy to assume that core beliefs are ‘at the root’ of the problem, or are the ‘underly-
ing’ cause, and that therefore they must be tackled directly for therapy to be effective. We
would question this assumption. Core beliefs are certainly more general than NATs, but that
does not necessarily mean they are more important. Most successful CBT research to date
targets NATs, but that does not make the therapy ineffective or short-lived. This is proba-
bly because people with common mental health problems such as anxiety or depression
have a range of core beliefs, not just negative and unhelpful ones. Through the process of
therapy they can bring their more positive beliefs back into operation. Although there is
not yet much research evidence, working with core beliefs may be more important in life-
long problems such as personality disorders, where clients may never have formed much in
the way of positive beliefs.
content of cognitions and the process of cognition. If we take depression as an example, then
the thoughts of depressed people are likely to contain characteristic contents, e.g. negative
thoughts about themselves or others. Depressed people are also likely to show characteristic
general biases in the way that they think, e.g. towards perceiving and remembering negative
events more than positive ones; or tending to see anything that goes wrong as being their
fault; or over-generalising from one small negative event to a broad negative conclusion. Here
we briefly consider some examples. (See also later chapters on specific problems.)
Depression
As first described by Beck, the characteristic cognitions in depression are the negative cog-
nitive triad, namely negatively biased views of oneself, of the world in general and of the
future. In other words, the typical depressed view is that I am bad (useless, unlovable,
incompetent, worthless, a failure, etc.); the world is bad (nothing good happens, life is just
a series of trials); and the future is also bad (not only are myself and the world bad, but it
will always be like this and nothing I can do will make any difference).
Anxiety
The general process here is a bias towards the over-estimation of threat, i.e. perceiving a
high risk of some unwanted outcome. The exact nature of the threat, and therefore the con-
tent of cognitions, is different in different disorders. For example:
Anger
In anger, the thoughts are usually about others’ behaviour being unfair, breaking some
implicit or explicit rule, or having hostile intent: ‘They ought not to do that, it’s not fair,
they’re trying to put me down.’
Experience
Critical incident/
Beliefs & assumptions
precipitating events
Cognition
The problem(s) Thoughts,
beliefs etc.
Behaviour Affect
What one Emotional
does or says states
Physiology
Bodily states
reasonably well most of the time. Even quite dysfunctional beliefs may not cause any
particular problems for many years. However if we encounter an event or series of events
that violates a core belief or assumption and cannot be handled by our more positive beliefs
(sometimes called a critical incident), then dysfunctional assumptions become more active,
negative thoughts are evoked, and unpleasant emotional states such as anxiety or depres-
sion result. Interactions between negative thoughts, emotions, behaviour and physiological
changes may then result in persisting dysfunctional patterns and we get locked into vicious
cycles or feedback loops that serve to maintain the problem.
Cognitive/
behaviour Interpersonal Family Psychodynamic
therapies therapy interventions psychotherapy
Depression ❍ ?
Panic / agoraphobia ❍ ❍ ❍
Generalised
anxiety disorder ❍ ❍ ❍
Specific phobias ❍ ❍ ❍
Social phobia ❍ ❍ ❍
Obsessive-compulsive
disorder ❍ ❍ ❍
Post-traumatic stress
disorder ❍ ❍ ?
Anorexia ? ❍ ? ?
BulimSia ❍ ❍
(Some) personality
disorders ❍ ❍
Schizophrenia ? ❍ ❍
Bipolar disorder ? ❍ ❍ ❍
Key to summary:
= Clear evidence of efficacy
? = Some limited support for efficacy
❍ = Not currently well validated (NB this indicates a lack of sufficient evidence to support
efficacy; it does not necessarily imply that there is good evidence of ineffectiveness)
Figure 1.5 Summary by the current authors, adapted from Roth &
Fonagy (2005), Chapter 17
evidence for the effectiveness of different treatments and making recommendations about
which treatments ought therefore to be made available in the National Health Service. In
the past three years NICE has produced guidelines on several major mental health prob-
lems, which include the following recommendations:
In summary then, at the time of writing, CBT is the psychological therapy with the most
solid and wide evidence base for efficacy and effectiveness.
• There is an increase in negative thinking about oneself, the future and (less clearly) the world.
• There is a reduction in positive thinking about the self, but this change is less marked and
may be less specific to depression (in other words, the same thing also happens in other
problems).
• There is a specific increase in thoughts and beliefs about loss and failure (more so than
people who suffer from anxiety problems).
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Regarding the proposed causal role of negative thoughts, i.e. the suggestion that negative
thinking can provoke low mood, they conclude that there is some experimental evidence
that negative self-referent thinking can indeed induce subjective, behavioural, motivational
and physiological features similar to mild-moderate depression. If we experimentally pro-
voke negative thoughts about themselves in non-depressed people, we can produce tem-
porary states quite similar to depression.
There is also some evidence that the proposed cognitive processing biases can be identi-
fied in experiments, with evidence that in depressed people there is:
• A bias towards processing negative information relevant to themselves (but no such bias
for neutral or impersonal information).
• Enhanced recall of negative events, and increased negative beliefs.
Furthermore there is evidence that these changes in processing can occur at an automatic,
pre-conscious level.
The least well-supported part of the theory is the suggestion that people are vulnerable
to depression because of negative beliefs that are still present in ‘latent’ form even when
they are not depressed. Clark et al. suggest that there is a little supportive evidence for this
idea, but that it has proved difficult to get clear evidence (perhaps not surprisingly, when
one considers the difficulties of identifying such ‘latent’ beliefs experimentally).
A similar picture is found for specific CBT models for other disorders: in some areas
there is good solid research support and in others the evidence is equivocal. Overall then
the evidence is
(a) that CBT is undoubtedly an effective treatment for many problems; and
(b) that there is support for CBT theory but that there is still room for exploring and develop-
ing this approach further in some areas.
Note
1. Note that there can also be positive automatic thoughts, or indeed neutral ones; but clients do
not tend to want help with those, so we will not consider them further here.