THE PREVENTION OF FOOTBALL HOOLIGANISM: A

TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE*
Ramón Spaaij
Amsterdam School for Social Science Research
University of Amsterdam
E-mail: [email protected]

Introduction

Three decades after football hooliganism first began to arouse major international concern, the
so-called ‘English disease’ continues to generate official and public anxiety. In spite of all the
efforts made and resources invested over the past decades, it seems that football hooliganism
remains, to varying extents, a disturbing social problem.1 However, important variations exist in
the level and nature of football hooliganism in different localities. Although international
structures and concerted responses are required, prevention strategies should ultimately be based
on local practices and designed to fit local needs. The prevention of football hooliganism requires
the continuous and long-term commitment of a variety of institutions and agents, including local
clubs and fan communities. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to provide some
insight into the main cross-national and cross-local resemblances and dissimilarities in the
patterns and forms of football hooliganism. Second, the paper attempts to stimulate the
transnational exchange and dissemination of prevention strategies by discussing some of the
‘good practices’ carried out in different countries and at different clubs.

Football hooliganism: a conceptual analysis

There is no precise definition of ‘football hooliganism’. It lacks legal definition, precise

demarcation of membership and is used to cover a variety of actions which take place in more or
less directly football-related contexts.2 To account for some of the phenomenon’s main features, a
distinction should be drawn between spontaneous, relatively isolated incidents of spectator
violence and the behaviour of socially organized or institutionalized fan (hooligan) groups which
engage in competitive violence, principally with other hooligan groups.3 This distinction is
historically observable through a shift from a pattern in which attacks on match officials and
opposing players predominated over attacks on rival fans, to a pattern in which inter-fan group
fighting and fighting between fans and the police became the predominant form of spectator
disorderliness.4 This shift has taken place in various European countries, but at different times.
Regretfully, the ideal typal distinction cannot account for the complexity and versatility of
the phenomenon with regard to the nature of the violence as well as the degree of organization
involved. At least five conceptual dilemmas can be identified. First, while football hooliganism
primarily consists of competitive violence between rival fan groups their violent behaviour is not
restricted to inter-group fighting, but may include missile throwing, vandalism, attacks on the
police and regular fans, or racial abuse. Second, the violent behaviour of hooligan groups takes
places not only at or in the immediate vicinity of football grounds, but also in other contexts, for
example city centres, pubs, clubs or railway stations.5 Third, football hooliganism involves a
great deal of symbolic opposition and ritualized aggression which is easily confused with ‘real’
violence.6 For many fans identifying with football hooliganism, violence ‘is not as central to their
association as is sometimes assumed and rather the result of the “game” of confrontation and
their willingness occasionally to turn symbolic opposition into physical encounter’.7 Fourth, even
if self-declared hooligans are committed to the use of violence, their behaviour is often triggered
by more spontaneous elements, for instance aggressive policing or an unfortunate match result.
The term ‘organized’ is, in this sense, misleading. A popular approach to collective violence, for
instance within journalist and police circles, is to stress the degree of formal organization
involved. This view projects hooligan groups as paramilitary organizations in which ‘ring
leaders’, ‘generals’ or ‘lieutenants’ initiate and coordinate riots. In reality, the degree of
organization involved in football hooliganism appears to vary across cultures and localities. In
fact, even within British football the degree of organization involved in football hooliganism
tends to vary significantly, as is suggested by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS):

The amount and quality of this organization varies greatly between groups, from a highly
disciplined, hierarchical criminal group that associates continuously throughout the week
to a more casual grouping that comes on the occasion of a football match with the
intention of committing violent acts.8

Fifth, transnational dissimilarities complicate the conceptualization of football hooliganism. Self-

declared hooligan groups have equivalent counterparts throughout Northern and Central Europe.
Quite distinctive fan subcultures exist in more southern and eastern parts of Europe and in Latin
America. In countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and the south of France, ultras are militant
fan groups but their violent proclivities vary substantially.9 Ultra groups usually feature a
comparatively high degree of formal organization including official membership and recruitment
campaigns.10 Their basic function is to provide expressive and colourful support to the team.
Therefore they are not necessarily concerned with defeating or humilitating their cultural peers
through intimidation or violence.11 Although militant fan groups in Latin America (‘barras
bravas’) resemble in some respects European hooligan groups, there are also important
differences. The barras bravas engage in political activity and, in addition, they orchestrate
violent confrontations with rival groups.12 Configured like paramilitary task groups, the barras
bravas ‘carry out illegitimate tasks by means of violence and compulsion, and are used by
sporting and political leaders for that purpose’.13

Patterns of cultural resemblance and dissimilarity in football hooliganism

Football hooliganism transgresses national boundaries. The transnational subcultures surrounding

football hooliganism historically evolved around British terrace culture. On the continent, the
British subcultures underwent a process of cultural creolisation as indigenous fan groups merged
the adopted patterns with their own distinctive cultural forms.14 The transnational diffusion of
cultural practices also occurred in a reverse direction, as for example the introduction into British
fan culture of continental designer clothing styles in the early 1980s. The ultra subcultures
dominant in countries such as Italy, Spain, and parts of France have come to influence supporter
groups in Northern and Eastern Europe, with similar fan groups being formed, to varying extents,
in countries such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, the former Yugoslavia and parts of
Scandinavia. British fan cultures of the late 1990s have also started to experiment with aspects of
the south European model, through the use of Latin chant patterns and musical bands.15

2
 Notwithstanding the apparent transnational dimensions of football culture and
hooliganism, I would argue that most academic studies underplay important cross-national and
cross-local dissimilarities in the patterns and forms of football hooliganism.16 The intensity and
rapidity of today’s global cultural flows contribute to the misleading belief that the world is
becoming a more singular place.17 The technologies of mobility have changed and a growing
range of media reach across borders. More specifically, recent changes in the football industry,
for example the expansion of the Champions League, are believed to enhance the
homogeinization of football cultures. However, transnational cultural flows have not affected
different countries to similar extents.18 Football is one of the social spheres in which the dynamic
intertwinement of the local and the global can be observed par excellence. The fan cultures of
particular clubs share ritual elements, but at the same time each fan culture exhibits distinct forms
of prescribed formal ritual behaviour and symbolism.19 Local historical and cultural traditions
and legacies continue to exert a strong influence over patterns of behaviour. Variations in the
level and forms of football hooliganism need to be understood in terms of the way hooligan
subcultures ‘are nested within the ritual and collective symbolism of each fan culture’.20 We
should therefore take into account not only variations in football hooliganism between cultures,
but also dissimilarities within countries, regions, cities or fan communities.
Within this local context we should also examine the interactional dynamics of football
hooliganism. Local patterns and forms of football hooliganism evolve through the continuous
interactions between authorities, club, fan community, and ‘hooligans’. One way of approaching
these inter-group dynamics is to focus on the effects of official attempts to curb football
hooliganism. Murphy and his associates argue that:

as the controls imposed by central government, the football authorities and the police have
grown more all-embracing, tighter and sophisticated, so the football hooligans in their
turn have tended to become more organized and to use more sophisticated strategies and
plans in an attempt to evade the controls. At the same time, football hooligan fighting has
tended to become displaced from an immediate football context and to take place at times
and in situations where the controls are, or are perceived to be, weak or non-existent.21

Approaches of this kind tend to highlight the large number of measures designed to curb football
hooliganism: the segregation of home and away fans, fencing, closed-circuit television (CCTV),
conversion to all-seater stadia, identity card schemes, intelligence gathering, and so on. In recent
years social psychologists have developed a more dynamic approach to the interactions between
police officers and football fans. Where most scholars tend to concentrate on explaining football
hooliganism in terms of the macro-social origins of conflictual norms, these authors emphasize
more the ways in which understandings and behaviours develop in context, such that even those
who initially and ordinarily eschew violence may come to act violently.22 I would argue that
while cross-national differences in policing in Western Europe appear to have diminished,23
police/supporter interactions still vary considerably across localities, depending, among others,
on police professionality and culture, and fans’ perceptions of the police. Analysis of cross-
national and cross-local variations in football hooliganism should also include other forms of
interaction, notably the relations between hooligans and clubs, and fan-based activities and
initiatives. The former type implies, for example, that important dissimilarities exist with regard
to the extent to which, and the forms in which, football clubs engage in the prevention of football
hooliganism.

3
Levels and forms of prevention: some ‘good practices’

Over the past decades a large number of international, national and local initiatives have been
carried out to advance the prevention of football hooliganism. Regretfully, lack of space prevents
me from examining in depth a substantial number of these strategies. Instead, I will briefly
outline some good practices developed at national or local levels. These practices reveal that
successful prevention depends on the efforts of a variety of institutions and agents. They also
highlight the importance of continuous, locally grounded commitment to the prevention of
football hooliganism.

A. Police forces

Police are regularly criticized for their aggressive style of policing at football matches. Certain
police forces in particular, notably those in parts of Eastern and Southern Europe and Latin
America, hold a reputation for their indiscriminate use of violence. Policing football matches
often seems to amount to nothing more than reacting to problems as they arise.24 On the other
hand, the last decade has witnessed the growing popularity of proactive and intelligence-led
policing. National police units increasingly cooperate in the coordination and dissemination of
football intelligence in preparing for European Cup matches or international tournaments.25 It is
likely that in the near future international cooperation will be reinforced due to the expansion of
the European Union and international football competitions. In this process the British, Dutch,
German and Belgian experiences can function as role models for other European countries. These
countries’ intelligence operations are comparatively advanced, with national and local football
intelligence officers closely monitoring the activities of hooligan groups. This style of policing
appears to have been, to some extent, a successful strategy in the containment of football
hooliganism. Nevertheless, significant variations exist in the investments made in intelligence-led
policing in different countries and in different localities. These variations can be strikingly large,
depending, among others, on political priorities, police cultures and personell skills.26

Good practice: intelligence-led policing in British football

From the mid-1980s the British authorities have been investing considerably in safety and
security management at football grounds. All-seater stadia have replaced the anonymous crowds
of the legendary youth ends. The movement of supporters is closely monitored by closed-circuit
television (CCTV), safety officers, stewards and police. This has made it substantially easier to
identify those engaging in violent behaviour inside football grounds. British intelligence
operations have advanced through trial an error, as for example the largely failed court cases
against alleged hooligan leaders in the mid-1980s, when dozens of hooligans were acquitted due
to unreliable police evidence. In the aftermath of these cases the British police began to
concentrate more explicitly on the documentation of intelligence and the protection of sources.
The police now uses a variety of inter-connected databases and the cooperation between the
various institutions (police units; clubs; Football Banning Order Authority) has improved
significantly. On the street level, spotters and intelligence officers monitor the activities of groups
of football hooligans, gathering information on their membership, whereabouts and intentions.
Surveillance and the use of technology have meant that committed football hooligans
have had to go greater lengths to fulfil their desire for violent confrontation.27 Occasionally they
succeed in circumventing police surveillance by confronting their rivals at unusual locations or

4
times. These violent encounters usually take place away from football grounds and are difficult to
prevent. Responding to the increasingly sophisticated strategies of football hooligans, the British
police have invested in the collection of evidence. Intelligence is now recorded on paper and
sources are coded to enable the use of pieces of intelligence in court. The police also uses camera
recordings at train stations or in city centres as evidence. The Home Office facilitates extra
fundings for the investigation of unsolved cases. Based on new evidence, dozens of hooligans
were recently convicted for crimes committed in the late 1990s.
In some respects the uses of football intelligence are limited. First, intelligence gathering
concentrates almost exclusively on known hooligans and organized hooligan groups while much
spectator violence at football matches appears to be relatively unorganized and not the product of
hooligan groups.28 Intelligence-led policing largely fails to prevent this type of violence. Second,
although national intelligence practices have advanced, important variations exist with regard to
regional and local investments and successes. Such variations also occur within police districts,
as illustrated by the varying degrees of proactivity of police units within the Metropolitan Police
Service.29

B. Cooperation between local governments and football clubs: fan projects

A belief prevails in parts of Europe that the prevention of football hooliganism requires the
promotion of consciousness among kids and the strenghtening of their ties with football clubs.
Football, in this sense, is viewed as an important site for socialization and a means for crime
prevention. In Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and parts of Scandinavia this belief is
reflected in structured and institutionalized efforts to prevent football hooliganism through fan
projects.30 The local interpretation and emphasis of the fan projects vary substantially. The
Fanprojekte in German football attempt, among others, to prevent football hooliganism by
improving the relations between fans, clubs and police.31 Belgian fan coaching mainly
concentrates on the prevention of violent confrontation and offering young hooligans alternative
means for self-development.32 In the Netherlands, fan projects aim to improve the relations
between clubs and militant fan groups, and the social skills and career opportunities of convicted
hooligans.33 In the late 1980s, local fan coordinators were installed to contact (potential)
hooligans, organize fan activities and provide services to young supporters. At the same time
police began to invest in the deployment of ‘supporter attendants’ – plain-clothes officers
engaging in community policing among football fans in order to establish social control and to
gather intelligence.
Fan projects are commonly praised for their contribution to the prevention of football
hooliganism; yet, at the same time, they are also criticized for their ‘soft’ approach. The main
dilemma surrounding the projects is, arguably, the difficulty of assessing their preventative
effects. Evidence suggests that certain projects have improved the relationship between
hooligans, clubs, youth workers and the police, and have prevented young fans from identifying
with football hooliganism.34 It is unclear, however, to what extent fan projects can exert influence
on committed hooligans. The more organized hooligan groups increasingly distance themselves
from ‘regular’ fans and relocate their activities to other sites. For some hooligan groups, violent
confrontation has become an end in itself and their ties with fan communities have loosened.
They have developed an ‘elite self conception’ based on physical prowess and style. This
development obstructs the fan projects’ ability to build a fruitful relationship with these groups.

Good practice: fan projects at FC Groningen and Cambuur Leeuwarden

5
In the north of the Netherlands two distinctive local fan projects are being implemented. The first
project, at FC Groningen, incorporates the local government, youth workers, club, police and the
Public Prosecutor. The project concentrates on measures to prevent violence and criminal activity
among (potential) hooligans and on improving the atmosphere and safety at home matches. A
distinctive method is the deployment of former hooligans in order to influence the behaviour of
risk supporters. Furthermore, the project offers banned supporters alternative activities and the
opportunity to report themselves to the police. By reporting to the police on a weekly basis their
banning orders are curtailed. An evaluation of the Groningen fan project suggests that it
improves fan behaviour and decreases the number of police officers required at home matches.
The interventions of fan coaches appear to have a positive influence on some (potential)
hooligans.35 Despite these positive results, it is difficult to assess to what extent the fan project
alone can explain changes in fan behaviour or if other factors should be taken into account.
The second fan project, at Cambuur Leeuwarden, also incorporates a variety of
institutions but instead it concentrates explicitly on three different levels of prevention. First, the
project aims to improve local youth prevention policies by organizing guidance campaigns at
elementary schools. Second, project members accompany banned football hooligans in order to
prevent recividism and to improve their career opportunities. The fan coach attempts to develop a
fruitful relationship with risk supporters. Third, the project aims at developing a safe and pleasant
atmosphere at home matches. A distinctive feature of the Leeuwarden fan project is that it
provides banned hooligans the opportunity to apply for the ‘buddy-mentor’ programme, designed
to improve the fans’ career opportunities. Participation in the programme is awarded the
curtailment of the banning order. The Leeuwarden project appears to prevent (potential)
hooligans’ recidivism.36 The number of violent confrontations involving Cambuur fans has
decreased significantly over the last few years. None of nineteen banned supporters participating
in the project have yet relapsed into crime. In 2002, the fan project won the Hein Roethof award
for the most successful crime prevention initiative in the Netherlands.

C. Football clubs

Football clubs are often criticized for their lack of commitment to the prevention of football
hooliganism. Southern European and Latin American clubs in particular have been enduring such
criticism. In certain countries, football clubs have long been providing favours to militant fan
groups: exclusive territory within the stadium; free tickets; travel arrangements; and an office or
storage room within the premises of the stadium. These favours have contributed to the
expansion of the groups, enabling them to attract new members through the exhibition of
spectacular displays and by offering them reduced prices or free tickets.37 Few clubs have taken
action to prevent football hooliganism, partly because they fear reprisals of hooligans.

Good practice: zero tolerance at FC Barcelona

FC Barcelona suffers from the violent behaviour of a minority of its fans. In recent years,
members of radical fan group Boixos Nois – most notably the subgroup Casuals FCB – have
assaulted rival fans, other Barça fans, journalists, police officers and bystanders. Football
hooliganism at the club is closely intertwined with other forms of criminal behaviour such as
drug trafficking, extortion and violent robbery. At the heart of the problem lies the club’s
historical lack of interest in preventing or reducing football hooliganism. The club long supported

6
the violent elements within Boixos Nois by facilitating free tickets and travel arrangements. Club
directors also employed notorious hooligans in their private businesses, for example as security
staff. The relationship between club and hooligans has produced a situation in which criminal
elements flourished and few external controls were imposed.
Joan Laporta’s victory in the 2003 club elections caused a seachange in the club’s security
policies. The club applies a zero tolerance strategy which intends to eradicate all violent elements
from the Camp Nou stadium. FC Barcelona is, at present, the only Spanish club that actively
combats football hooliganism, although others – for instance Real Madrid – have gone to some
length to prevent the growth of radical fan groups. Since the start of the campaign Laporta has
received numerous death threats and attempts have been made to assault the chairman. The club
nevertheless continues to impede the violent elements within Barça’s fan community. Local and
national media have reinforced the campaign’s public profile by emphasizing the urgency of the
problem.38
Despite FC Barcelona’s pioneering campaign, the zero tolerance strategy exhibits some
flaws. At the start of the campaign Laporta emphasized that the club would distinguish between
violent and non-violent fans within Boixos Nois. In reality, the club’s commitment to eradicating
football hooliganism appears to affect all members of the fan group. Other fan groups, notably
Almogàvers and Sang Culé, have also suffered from stringent security policies. Members of these
groups have regularly been threatened and assaulted by Boixos Nois section Casuals FCB. The
fan groups claim that the club misjudges their passionate, non-violent approach to football
fandom. The club has made no effort to draw leaders of these groups into the conversation on the
prevention of football hooliganism and the future of youth support at FC Barcelona, thereby
failing to appreciate the groups’ positive social functions within Barça’s fan community.

D. Football fans

Football fans are potentially powerful agents in the prevention of football hooliganism.
Numerous national supporters’ organizations have rallied against violence and racial abuse at
football matches. Initiatives have also been conducted at a local level, for example by fan groups
in the south of Europe. Their overt condemnation of violence and racism enables constructive
collaboration between fans, clubs and governing bodies. Various ultra groups contribute to
conferences, debates or educational programmes promoting the positive social functions of sport.
The constructive fan model advocated by certain ultra groups has become an important point of
reference for many young football fans and is comparatively accessible to women and ethnic
minorities.

Good practice: the Curva Jove at RCD Espanyol

The Curva Jove project unites a number of larger and smaller fan groups supporting RCD
Espanyol de Barcelona. The main functions of the project are to unite and stimulate the club’s
youth support and to provide unconditional (yet critical!) and expressive support to the team. The
Curva Jove opposes to the violent behaviour of the ultra group Brigadas Blanquiazules. Spatially,
the two factions occupy different sections of the ground, mainly to prevent inter-group conflict.
One of the ultra groups participating in the project, Eternos, mainly consisting of ex-members of
Brigadas Blanquiazules, was founded to promote a non-violent and non-political fan culture:
‘We’ve been there, it’s now time to move away from violence and politics towards a model with

7
which young fans can identify.’39 The ultra group refuses to allow politics to overshadow football
and to transform individual political beliefs into a collective symbol of identity.

Within the Curva there are a lot of people who would love to use political symbols, but
the problem is that it would offend the rest of the home crowd. So you have a choice: you
either use such symbols and evoke resentment, or you leave your banners at home. We
choose the latter option. Our aim is to cooperate with the rest of the fan community and
not to isolate ourselves.40

The Curva Jove has gradually grown from 200 to over 2,000 affiliates, among which a substantial
number of women – around 20 per cent – and young boys. Additionally, the projects appears to
‘convert’ a section of Brigadas Blanquiazules that is now willing to abandon its violent and
political proclivities. Nevertheless, the Curva Jove fails to incorporate Brigadas’ most violent
core. Intimidation and physical conflict between the two factions are, in fact, a regular
occurrence.

Conclusion

The good practices highlighted in this paper indicate that the prevention of football hooliganism
depends on the efforts of a variety of institutions and agents. The prevention of football
hooliganism requires a concerted and continuous response. Cross-national and cross-local
dissimilarities in the patterns and forms of football hooliganism reveal that, despite important
transnational resemblances, football hooliganism is nested within particular (local) fan cultures.
Prevention strategies should therefore be designed to fit local needs. The good practices
discussed in this paper may help to promote a more profound understanding of possible strategies
for the prevention of football hooliganism. To advance such an understanding, the transnational
exchange and dissemination of local knowledge and practices are required.

Notes

* Part of the research carried out for this paper was funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research
(NWO).
1
Comeron, Manuel: The prevention of violence in sport, Strasbourg, 2002, p.11.
2
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3
Giulianotti, Richard: “A different kind of carnival”, in: Perryman, Mark (ed.): Hooligan wars. Causes and effects of
football violence, Edinburgh and London, 2001, 141-154, p.141; Stokvis, Ruud: De sportwereld. Een sociologische
inleiding, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1989, pp.148-152.
4
Dunning, Eric: “The social roots of football hooliganism: a reply to the critics of the ‘Leicester school’”, in:
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1994, 128-157, p.136.
5
Dunning: “Understanding”, p.142.
6
Marsh, Peter: Aggro: the illusion of violence, London, 1978.
7
Armstrong, Gary & Harris, Rosemary: “Football hooligans: theory and evidence”, in: 39 Sociological Review 3
(1991), 427-458, p.434.
8
Private correspondence, December 2002.
9
Giulianotti: “Kind”, p.142; Spaaij, Ramón & Viñas, Carles: “Passion, politics and violence: a socio-historical
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8
10
De Biasi, Rocco: “The policing of hooliganism in Italy”, in: Della Porta, Donatella & Reiter, Herbert (eds.):
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11
Giulianotti: “Kind”, p.142; Mignon, Patrick: “Le Francais feel-good factor”, in: Perryman, Mark (ed.): Hooligan
wars. Causes and effects of football violence, Edinburgh and London, 2001, 165-178, p.173.
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Sociological Review (1996), 272-293, pp.286-289.
13
Alabarces, Pablo: “‘Aguante’ and repression: football, politics and violence in Argentina”, in: Dunning, Eric,
Murphy, Patrick, Waddington, Ivan & Astrinakis, Antonios (eds.): Fighting fans. Football hooliganism as a world
phenomenon, Dublin, 2002, 23-36, p.34.
14
Dunning, Eric, Murphy, Patrick & Waddington, Ivan: “Towards a global programme of research into fighting and
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Football hooliganism as a world phenomenon, Dublin, 2002, 218-224, p.223; Giulianotti: “Kind”, p.143.
15
Giulianotti, Richard: Football: a sociology of the global game, Cambridge, 1999, pp.63-64.
16
This argument is elaborated in: Spaaij, Ramón: Fan cultures and football hooliganism. A study of three Western
European countries, Amsterdam, forthcoming.
17
Featherstone, Mike: “Global culture: an introduction”, in: Featherstone, Mike (ed.): Global culture. Nationalism,
globalization and modernity, London, 1990, 1-14, pp.1-2.
18
Hannerz, Ulf: Transnational connections. Culture, people, places, London, 1996, p.6.
19
Back, Les, Crabbe, Tim & Solomos, John: The changing face of football. Racism, identity and multiculture in the
English game, Oxford and New York, 2001, p.43.
20
Back et al.: Face, p.43; Robson, Garry: ‘No one likes us, we don’t care’ The myth and reality of Millwall fandom,
Oxford and New York, 2000.
21
Murphy, Patrick, Williams, John & Dunning, Eric: Football on trial. Spectator violence and development in the
football world, London, 1990, pp.89-90.
22
Stott, Clifford & Reicher, Steve: “How conflict escalates: the inter-group dynamics of collective football crowd
‘violence’”, in: 32 Sociology 2 (1998), 353-377.
23
Della Porta, Donatella & Reiter, Herbert: “Introduction: the policing of protest in Western democracies”, in: Della
Porta, Donatella & Reiter, Herbert (eds.): Policing protest. The control of mass demonstrations in Western
democracies, Minneapolis and London, 1998, 1-32, p.6.
24
Frosdick, Steve, Holford, Mike & Sidney, John: “Playing away in Europe”, in: Frosdick, Steve & Walley, Lynne
(eds.): Sport and safety management, Oxford, 1999, 221-238, p.237.
25
Centraal Informatiepunt Voetbalvandalisme: Jaarverslag 2003 – 2004, Utrecht, 2004, p.6; Adang, Otto &
Cuvelier, Christine: Policing Euro 2000, Ubbergen, 2001, pp.37-70.
26
Spaaij, Ramón: “Het succes van de Britse voetbalwet: kanttekeningen en best practices”, in: 67 Tijdschrift voor de
Politie 1 (2005), 4-8, p.4; and Spaaij, Ramón: “Het informatieproces rond voetbalwedstrijden: structuur, knelpunten,
kansen”, in: 64 Tijdschrift voor de Politie 11 (2002), 26-31, p.31.
27
Garland, Jon & Rowe, Michael: “The hooligan’s fear of the penalty”, in: 1 Soccer and Society 1 (2000), 144-157,
p.155.
28
Garland and Rowe: “Fear”, p.155.
29
Spaaij: “Succes”, p.4; Metropolitan Police: End of season 2002-2003 report, London, 2003, pp.7-8.
30
Comeron: Prevention, p.19.
31
Schneider, Thomas: “Fan-Projekte – Erfahrungen, Anforderungen”, in: 5 Schriftenreihe der Polizei-
Führungsakademie, 3 (1991), 104-113; Ek, Ralf: Hooligans: Fakten, Hintergründe, Analysen, Worms, 1996.
32
Limbergen, Kris van: “Sport als bijzondere methodiek ter preventie van delinquentie: het fan coachingproject te
Antwerpen als voorbeeld”, in: Revue van de Rijkswacht 120 (1991), 24-31.
33
Dijk, Andre van: Eindrapportage experimenten voetbalvandalisme en jeugdwelzijn, Rijswijk, 1991, pp.1-2;
Ferwerda, Henk: Werken in de luwte. Over supporterscoördinatoren en de sociaal-preventieve aanpak van
voetbalvandalisme, Arnhem, 1999.
34
See for example: Bieleman, Bert, Jong, Annemieke de, Naayer, Harm & Nijboer, Jan: Evaluatie supportersproject
Groningen, Groningen, 2004; Willems, Raf: Kan voetbal de wereld redden? Pleidooi voor ambiance & solidariteit,
Antwerpen, 2004, pp.159-195; “Dubbel scoren tegen voetbalgeweld”, in: 17 SEC 6 (2003), pp.24-25; Welzenis,
Ingrid van & Walgrave, Lode: Een methodische eindevaluatie van het fan coachingproject te Antwerpen, Leuven,
1990.
35
Bieleman et al.: Evaluatie, pp.48-51.

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36
Bies, Goos: “Leeuwarder project dringt voetbalvandalisme terug”, Friesch Dagblad, 26 October 2002.
37
Spaaij & Viñas: “Passion”, pp.85-86; Durán González, Javier: “Hinchadas radicales en el fútbol”, in: 14 Temas
para el debate 1 (1996), 37-40.
38
For example: Gimeno, Francesc: “En marcha la operación antiviolencia”, Sport, 31 October 2003, p.16;
Bautista Martínez, Juan: “El club no regatea en seguridad”, La Vanguardia, 23 October 2003.
39
Interview with a leader of Eternos, April 2004.
40
Interview with a leader of the Curva Jove, March 2004.

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