The American Society of International Law ASIL Insights - Volume 12, Issue 2 http://www.asil.org/insights080229.

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Former Yugoslav
Books Kosovo's Declaration of Independence: February 29 , 2008 President Slobodan
Self-Determination, Secession and Volume 12, Issue 2 Milosevic To Be Tried in
Member Login The Hague for Crimes
Recognition
Become a Member Against Humanity and
War Crimes Allegedly
By Christopher J. Borgen Committed in Kosovo
Outlining KFOR
Accountability in
Post-Conflict Kosovo
Introduction
The Kosovo Situation and
NATO Military Action
On February 17, Kosovo's parliament
declared Kosovo's independence from Insights Archive>>
Serbia.[1] Following that declaration, the
U.S. and several European states DOCUMENTS OF NOTE
officially recognized the independence of Kosovo Declaration
Security Council
Kosovo. An examination of Security
Resolution 1244
Council Resolution 1244, which set forth Comprehensive Proposal
the international oversight of Kosovo for Kosovo Status
following the 1999 NATO intervention, Settlement (the Ahtisaari
and the international law of Plan)
U.S. Recognition of
self-determination, secession, and Kosovo as Independent
recognition demonstrates that while Kosovo's declaration of State
independence and its recognition by various states can be justified under
existing international law, it is not a clear case. Rather, Kosovo presents a ASIL EISIL>>
quintessential "tough case," demonstrating the ways in which political
ORGANIZATIONS OF NOTE
interests of states affect how the international law is given effect. How
United Nations Mission in
and whether it will be considered a unique case in international law or a Kosovo (UNMIK)
precedent for other secessionist movements may depend on how various Kosovo Force (KFOR)
states interpret the law and facts that gave rise to the declaration. The Provisional
Questions concerning Kosovo's status within international organizations Government of Kosovo
US Mission to Kosovo
and its succession to rights and obligations of Serbia remain open.
Office of the Special
Envoy for Kosovo
1. Background United Nations Security
Council
Within the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY),
Kosovo was an autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia. The
ethnic make-up of Kosovo is majority Albanian with a Serb minority.
Kosovo's special autonomy was ended by Slobodan Milosevic in 1989. In
Copyright 2008 by The
1991 and 1992, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia, four of the six American Society of
republics of the SFRY, declared independence. In 1992, the Federal International Law ASIL
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) succeeded the SFRY, and in 2003, the FRY
was succeeded by the federation of Serbia-Montenegro. In 2006, The purpose of ASIL Insights is
to provide concise and informed
Montenegro declared independence in accordance with the law of Serbia-
background for developments of
Montenegro. Serbia declared itself the successor to Serbia-Montenegro interest to the international
later that year. community. The American
Society of International Law
Throughout the 1990s, Kosovar Albanians sought restored autonomy for does not take positions on
substantive issues, including the
Kosovo or independence. In 1998, the Serb government initiated police ones discussed in this Insight.
and military actions in the province, which resulted in widespread Educational and news media
atrocities. After failed political negotiations to resolve the status of Kosovo copying is permitted with due
and the rights of the Kosovar Albanians, NATO launched an air campaign acknowledgement.
to force the Serb government to withdraw the police and military. In the
aftermath of NATO's intervention, the UN Security Council passed
Resolution 1244 (1999)[2] , which authorized the UN's administration of
Kosovo and set out a general framework for resolving the final political
and legal status of Kosovo. For the next nine years, the UN participated in

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the administration of Kosovo, while political negotiations over the final

status of the territory were largely inconclusive.

In November 2005, the Secretary General appointed Martti Ahtisaari

Special Envoy for Kosovo. After mediating negotiations between the
parties for fifteen months, Ahtisaari submitted in March 2007 the
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement ("the
Ahtisaari Plan"). The plan envisioned Kosovo becoming independent after
a period of international supervision. Serbia rejected the Plan while the
Kosovar Albanian leadership endorsed it.

In an effort to revive the mediation process, the EU, Russia, and the U.S.,
(the "Troika") oversaw negotiations between the Government of Serbia
and the Kosovar Albanians, from August to December, 2007. In a
response to the Secretary General, the Troika reported on December 10,
2007:

[T]he parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final status of

Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental
question of sovereignty over Kosovo.[3]
In the aftermath of the Troika's announcement of the collapse of
negotiations, Serbia, Russia, Romania, Moldova, and Cyprus -- countries
grappling with some type of secessionist issue in their own domestic
politics -- argued that Kosovo's secession and/or recognizing that
secession would be a breach of international law.[4] Similar concerns
were expressed at the time by Greece, Slovakia, and Spain. Kosovar
independence was supported by the U.S., the U.K., France, Italy, and
Germany, and most of the other states of the EU.

On February 17, the Parliament of Kosovo issued a statement declaring

"Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state."[5] The Parliament
pledged compliance with the process envisioned in the Ahtisaari Plan.

On February 18, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced

that the U.S. "formally recognized Kosovo as a sovereign and
independent state."[6] France, the U.K., Germany, and other EU member
states have either recognized Kosovo's independence or are in the
process of doing so.[7] At the time of this writing, seventeen states have
formally recognized Kosovo and another thirteen have begun proceedings
to do so. Eighteen countries have announced that they do not recognize
the secession, twelve states have asked for further negotiations, and
twenty-nine states have unclear positions.

2. Assessing Resolution 1244

The operative paragraphs of Resolution 1244, which the Security Council

had enacted as a framework for resolving the status of Kosovo, focus on
the cessation of military and paramilitary activities by all parties and the
commencement of demilitarization of armed groups (paragraphs 3 and
15), the establishment of an international civilian presence under UN
auspices to assist in interim administration (paragraphs 5 through 11), the
commencement of international financial assistance to Kosovo, and
setting out ongoing reporting requirements. In addition, Annex 1 to the
resolution lists "general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo
crisis" adopted by the G-8 foreign ministers in May 1999, and Annex 2
lists general principles on which there should be agreement in order "to
move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis."[8]

Serbia and Russia have argued that Resolution 1244 would not allow the
secession of Kosovo without the agreement of Serbia. In particular, they
refer to the resolution's preambular language "[r]eaffirming the
commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ."

The EU has taken the position that Resolution 1244 is not a bar to
Kosovo's independence. In a memorandum written prior to approving the
EULEX legal assistance mission to Kosovo, it found that "[a]cting to
implement the final status outcome in such a situation is more compatible
with the intentions of 1244 than continuing to work to block any outcome

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in a situation where everyone agrees that the status quo is

unsustainable."[9] Moreover, the EU contends that 1244 did not
predetermine the outcome of final status talks.

On balance, it appears that Resolution 1244 neither promotes nor

prevents Kosovo's secession. Although operative paragraph 1 of
Resolution 1244 states that a political solution shall be based on the
principles of Annexes 1 and 2, those annexes are silent as to the
governmental form of the final status. The annexes only state that an
"interim political framework" shall afford substantial self-governance for
Kosovo and take into account the territorial integrity of Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. Paragraph 11(a), states that the international civil presence
will promote "the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial
autonomy and self-government in Kosovo..."[10] The substantial
autonomy language is thus addressed to the interim status of Kosovo.
Moreover, the references to the territorial integrity of Serbia are only in the
preambular language and not in the operational language. The document
is therefore silent as to what form the final status of Kosovo takes.

3. International Law and Secession

In addition to Resolution 1244, Kosovo's independence can be assessed

under the international law of secession. Thomas Franck, one of the five
international law experts asked by the Canadian government to consider
certain issues regarding a hypothesized secession of Quebec, wrote that:

It cannot seriously be argued today that international law prohibits

secession. It cannot seriously be denied that international law permits
secession. There is a privilege of secession recognized in international
law and the law imposes no duty on any people not to secede.[11]
While international law does not foreclose on the possibility of secession,
it does provide a framework within which certain secessions are favored
or disfavored, depending on the facts. The key is to assess whether or
not Kosovo meets the criteria for the legal privilege of secession.

The legal concept of self-determination is comprised of two distinct

subsidiary parts. The default rule is "internal self-determination," which is
essentially the protection of minority rights within a state. As long as a
state provides a minority group the ability to speak their language,
practice their culture in a meaningful way, and effectively participate in the
political community, then that group is said to have internal
self-determination. Secession, or "external self-determination," is
generally disfavored. In re Secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court of
Canada found that "[a] right to external self-determination (which in this
case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral
secession) arises only in the most extreme cases and, even then, under
carefully defined circumstances?" [12]

Although issues of secession rarely receive formal adjudication, state

practice, court opinions, and other authoritative writings, point the way to
categorizing what are the "extreme cases" and "carefully defined
circumstances" under which the privilege of secession exists. Any attempt
to claim legal secession"that is, where secession trumps territorial
integrity" must at least show that:

a. the secessionists are a "people" (in the ethnographic sense);

b. the state from which they are seceding seriously violates their human
rights; and
c. there are no other effective remedies under either domestic law or
international law.[13]

(a) Are the Kosovar Albanians a "people?" As the Canadian Supreme

Court put it in the Secession of Quebec opinion, the meaning of "peoples"
is "somewhat uncertain."[14] At various points in international legal
history, the term "people" has been used to signify citizens of a nation-
state, the inhabitants in a specific territory being decolonized by a foreign
power, or an ethnic group. The commission of jurists who arbitrated the
status of the Aaland Islands in 1920-21 found that for the purposes of
self-determination one cannot treat a small fraction of people as one

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would a nation as a whole. Thus, the Swedes on the Aaland Islands, who
were only a small fraction of the totality of the Swedish "people" did not
have a strong claim for secession in comparison to, for example, Finland,
which, when it broke away from Russian rule, contained the near totality
of the Finnish people.

One may argue that the Kosovars are a "people", having inhabited
Kosovo for centuries. However, the Kosovar Albanians are more generally
perceived as an Albanian ethnic enclave, rather than a nation unto
themselves.

This definition of the word "people" as "nation" has been criticized for
being too restrictive. Consequently, it remains an open question whether
widespread support of Kosovo's independence would signal a shift in the
definition of "people" so that the term no longer represents a complete
ethnic nation but can be used to refer to a homogenous ethnic enclave
within another nation.

(b) Are there/were there serious human rights violations? The Aaland
Islands report found that there was no right to secede absent "a manifest
and continued abuse of sovereign power to the detriment of a section of
population."[15] Here, there is at least a credible argument that the Serbs
were responsible for serious human rights abuses against the Kosovars,
as Resolution 1244 notes, a "grave humanitarian situation" and a "threat
to international peace and security". It was mass human rights abuses
that led to NATO's 1999 intervention. (It should also be noted, however,
that human rights abuses have been reported to have been committed by
Kosovar Albanians as well.) To the extent the international community
considers it relevant whether human rights abuses are ongoing or historic,
the situation in Kosovo is ambiguous. In relation to this question, one may
argue that the ongoing international presence in Kosovo is legally
relevant as it is evidence of the international community's determination
that the situation in Kosovo was and is highly volatile and that it cannot be
solved completely via domestic political structures.

(c) Is secession the only solution? The political situation prior to the
declaration of independence did not appear to offer any realistic
alternatives to secession. As of December 2007, the two sides could not
seem to resolve their differences and the Troika has declared the political
negotiations a failure. It is unlikely that anything short of military
intervention could have kept Kosovo within Serbia. Thus, it appears that
most, if not all, realistic options other than separation had failed.

As should be clear from this analysis, the basic framework provided by

international law permits arguments for and against secession. This is the
quintessential "tough case." In the interest of systemic stability,
international law has a bias against secession. However, if we take as a
given that secession is not absolutely prohibited by international law, then
the case of Kosovo presents a set of facts that may be persuasive: an
ethnic group (though perhaps not a "nation"), within a region with
historically defined boundaries (Kosovo as a province), after an
international intervention to prevent a humanitarian disaster being caused
by the predecessor state, and after negotiations with the predecessor
state leading to a complete deadlock, that seeks independence via a
declaration that is coordinated with, and supported by, a significant
segment of the international community. It thus stands in contrast to other
claims of a "right" to secede, such as those of Transnistria, which due to
different material facts would fail under the same legal analysis. [16]

4. The Law and Politics of Recognizing Kosovo's Declaration

In difficult situations such as these, the issue of legality often shifts from
the question of the legality of secession, to the question of the legality of
the recognition of secession, a subtly different, but nonetheless different,
question.[17]

The EU memorandum on Resolution 1244 contends that "[g]enerally,

once an entity has emerged as a state in the sense of international law, a
political decision can be taken to recognise [sic] it." This reflects the

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general understanding that recognition itself is not a formal requirement of

statehood. Rather, recognition merely accepts a factual occurrence. Thus
recognition is "declaratory" as opposed to "constitutive." Nonetheless, no
state is required to recognize an entity claiming statehood.

To the contrary, a good argument may be made that states should not
recognize a new state if such recognition would perpetuate a breach of
international law. The treatise Oppenheim's (Ninth), Sec. 54, states that
"[r]ecognition may also be withheld where a new situation originates in an
act which is contrary to general international law."[18] Russia and Serbia
argue that, inasmuch as Serbia did not consent to an alteration of its
territory and borders, there can be no legal recognition. But, absent any
qualification, that argument cannot be legally correct. Changing the
boundaries of a sovereign state (Serbia) in and of itself would not make
Kosovar independence illegal because, as discussed above, the
international community has come to accept the legality of secession
under certain circumstances.

Furthermore, the self-determination analysis is very fact specific, such

that absolute arguments of illegality become difficult. And, state practice
evinces that, absent a clear indication of illegality, in matters of state
recognition there is considerable deference to the political prerogatives of
outside states to decide whether or not to recognize an aspirant state. For
an example of the international community indicating illegality, the Security
Council issued a resolution condemning the recognition of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus. There is no such resolution here, but rather
a growing momentum to accept Kosovo's declaration. This does not, in
and of itself, make Kosovo's secession legal. But it does show that, in
cases of secession, law and politics are especially tightly intertwined.

5. Is Kosovo Unique? Implications for Other Secessionist Claims

Given the ambiguity of the claim of a legal privilege of secession and the
fairly broad leeway that states have to recognize Kosovo, should they
choose to do so, is the example of Kosovo of legal relevance to other
separatist conflicts, such as those in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-
Karabakh, and Transnistria? Or is Kosovo sui generis and of no
precedential weight? In announcing the recognition of Kosovo by the
United States, Secretary of State Rice explained:

The unusual combination of factors found in the Kosovo situation -

including the context of Yugoslavia's breakup, the history of ethnic
cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period
of UN administration - are not found elsewhere and therefore make
Kosovo a special case. Kosovo cannot be seen as precedent for any
other situation in the world today.[19]

By contrast, the Russian Duma issued a statement that read, in part:

The right of nations to self-determination cannot justify recognition of

Kosovo's independence along with the simultaneous refusal to discuss
similar acts by other self-proclaimed states, which have obtained de facto
independence exclusively by themselves.[20]

Moreover, Bosnian Serbs had earlier stated that, should Kosovo declare
independence, they would seek independence for "Republika Srpska,"
the self-proclaimed Bosnian Serb ethnic enclave within Bosnia.[21] (The
Badinter Commission had previously rejected such a claim as a matter of
international law.)

It can be argued that Kosovo is different from other secessionist claims

because Kosovo has been under international administration as the
international community considered the situation so volatile. Reintegrating
such a territory is different from assessing a claim by a separatist group
that, on its own, is seeking to overturn the authority of the pre-existing
state and unilaterally secede. While secessions are primarily an issue of
domestic law, Resolution 1244 internationalized the problem. It also
moved Kosovo from being solely under Serbian sovereignty into the grey
zone of international administration.

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This is a highly controversial position. Various reactions to the

"uniqueness" argument include that such a contention is "absurd" or that it
is an esoteric legal point that will be forgotten in the rush of politics.

It may, however, be possible to argue that Kosovo is both unique and a

source of precedent at the same time. Two reasons are cited for Kosovo's
uniqueness: (1) Kosovo has been under international administration since
1999; and (2) the Kosovar Albanians are an ethnically homogenous
enclave, physically separate and ethnically different from the Serbs.

Let us assume that the first point, international administration, is

persuasive and makes Kosovo a special case. Nonetheless, Kosovo can
still be cited by other separatists as precedent for the specific issue of
how the international community defines a "people" for the purpose of
self-determination. And it would be irrelevant whether or not Kosovo had
been under international administration. As mentioned above, the term
has been difficult to define, but modern state practice has tended to treat
a "people" as a complete ethnic nation (not just a fragment of a larger
ethnic group that exists elsewhere). However, those arguing that
secession is legal in the Kosovo case seem to be defining people as a
homogenous ethnic enclave. In other words, unless those recognizing
Kosovo's declaration claim that the Kosovar Albanians are an ethnicity
unto themselves, as opposed to just part of the Albanian ethnic group,
then they may well be changing what had been the most common
definition as to who may claim the privilege of secession.

If that is the case, then the international community may be creating

precedent that we will see cited by other ethnic enclaves seeking
separation, be they Russians in Abkhazia or Krajina Serbs. Previously,
neither of these groups was viewed as having a strong claim for the
privilege of secession, as neither of these groups is a "nation" in the
ethnographic sense, but rather fragments of Russian or Serb ethnic
groups. But their arguments may be strengthened, and one of the
bulwarks of international law against facile secessions may be weakened,
if the facts of the Kosovo claim are not carefully and narrowly construed.

Despite the declarations and best intentions, just saying something is

"unique" may not be enough. States and commentators may need to ask
why one claim of independence is purportedly unique and then consider
its downstream political and legal effects. In the end, we need to keep in
mind that sometimes the most effective law in politically-charged
situations may be the law of unintended consequences.

About the Author

Christopher J. Borgen, an ASIL Member and former Director of Research
and Outreach of the ASIL, is an Associate Professor of Law at St. John's
University School of Law. He is a co-founder of the weblog Opinio Juris,
www.opiniojuris.org. From 2004 -2006 he served on a legal
assessment mission concerning the attempted secession of Transnistria
from Moldova.

Footnotes

[1] Full text: Kosovo declaration, BBC News (Feb 17, 2008)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7249677.stm

[2] S.C.Res 1244 (10 June 1999) available at http://www.nato.int

/Kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm.

[3] Report of the EU/ U.S./ Russia Troika on Kosovo, para. 1 (Dec 4,
2007) available athttp://www.ico-kos.org
/pdf/Report%20of%20the%20EU-
US-Russia%20Troika%20on%20Kosovo.pdf

[4] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said concerning a potential

Kosovar secession:

We are speaking here about the subversion of all the foundations of

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international law, about the subversion of those principles which, at huge

effort, and at the cost of Europe's pain, sacrifice and bloodletting have
been earned and laid down as a basis of its existence
Paul Reynolds, Legal furore over Kosovo recognition, BBC News (Feb
16, 2008) available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7244538.stm

The Romanian Defense Minister said that such a declaration "is not in
keeping with international law." Romania not to recognize unilateral
Kosovo independence, says minister, ChinaView.cn, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-12/12/content_7231934.htm

The Cypriot Foreign Minister warned against the EU "breaking

international law." Harry de Quetteville and Bruno Waterfield, EU-US
showdown with Russia over Kosovo, The Daily Telegraph Online (Dec.
12, 2007) available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk
/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/12/11/wkosovo111.xml.

[5] Declaration, supra note 1.

[6] U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State, statement of

Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, Washington DC (Feb, 18 2008)
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm.

[7] Nicholas Kulish and C.J. Chivers, Kosovo Is Recognized but Rebuked
by Others, NY TIMES (Feb 19, 2008) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/world/europe
/19kosovo.html?pagewanted=2&hp.

[8] The Annex 1 list is as follows:

Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;

Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security
presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of
guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by
the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political
framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles
of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization
of the KLA;
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization
of the crisis region.
Annex 2 states, in part:
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards
a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:
...
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the
international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be
decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The interim
administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing
institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all
inhabitants in Kosovo.

[9] Reynolds, supra note 44.

[10] Emphasis added.

[11] Thomas Franck, as quoted in SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING

BOUNDARIES IN A CONFLICTED WORLD: THE ROLE OF UIT
POSSIDETIS 209 (2002) (emphasis in original).

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[12] Reference re: Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 217 at para. 123

(1998).

[13] This framework is covered at greater length in a report (of which I am

the principle author) on the international legal issues concerning the
secessionist conflict in Moldova. See, Special Committee on European
Affairs, Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis
in Moldova, 61 REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK (2006), available at http://www.abcny.org/Publications
/record/vol_61_2.pdf.

[14] Secession of Quebec, supra note 13, at para 123

[15] Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the

Council of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory
Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League
of Nations Off. J., Spec. Supp, No. 3, at 5-10 (1920).

[16] See, generally, Moldova Report supra note 14; see also Chris
Borgen, Assessing the Legal Issues of the Moldovan Separatist Conflict,
Opinio Juris (Aug. 2, 2006) available at http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts
/1154547799.shtml.

[17] As Daniel Thurer put it (perhaps overstating the case) in his 1998
addendum to the entry on "Self-Determination" in the Encyclopedia on
Public International Law,

Rather than formally recognizing a right of secession, the international

community seems to have regarded all these processes of transition as
being factual rearrangements of power, taking place outside the formal
structures of international law: international law only became
subsequently relevant within the context of recognition.
Daniel Thurer, Self-Determination, 1998 Addendum, in 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 364, 367 (R.
Bernhardt, ed. 2000).

[18] 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (9th ed.1992) (Robert

Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds) at §54, p. 183.

[19] U.S. Recognition Statement, supra note 6. Moreover, In a statement

to the UN Security Council following Kosovo's declaration, British
Ambassador John Sawers said that

the unique circumstances of the violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia

and the unprecedented UN administration of Kosovo make this a sui
generis case, which creates no wider precedent, as all EU member States
today agreed.
Ban Ki-moon urges restraint by all sides after Kosovo declares
independence, UN News Centre (Feb. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25659&
Cr=Kosovo&Cr1..

[20] Nicholas Kulish and C.J. Chivers, supra note 7.

[21] Bosnian Serb nationalists threaten secession, Southeast Europe

Times (Feb. 15, 2008) available at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon
/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2008/02
/15/feature-01.

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