Florentino v.

Encarnacion petitioners-appellants filed their Reply to the Opposition reiterating their

G.R. No. L-27696, 30 September 1977 previous arguments, and also attacking the jurisdiction of the registration
FACTS: court to pass upon the validity or invalidity of the agreement Exhibit O-1,
On May 22, 1964, the petitioners-appellants and the petitioner-appellee filed alleging that such is litigable only in an ordinary action and not proper in a
with CFI an application for the registration under Act 496 of a parcel of land registration proceeding.
agricultural land located at Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The application alleged The Motion for Reconsideration and of New Trial was denied for lack of
among other things that the applicants are the common and pro-indiviso merit, but the court modified in highlighting that the donee Church has not
owners in fee simple of the said land with the improvements existing showed its clear acceptance of the donation, and is the real party of this
thereon; that to the best of the knowledge and belief; there is no mortgage, case, not the petitioners-appellants.
hen or encumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, nor any
other person having any estate or interest thereon, legal or equitable, ISSUE:
remainder, reservation at in expectancy; that said applicants had acquired Whether or Not the court erred in concluding that the stipulation is just an
the aforesaid land thru and by inheritance from their predecessors in arrangement stipulation.
interest, their aunt, Doña Encarnacion Florentino, and Angel Encarnacion
acquire their respective shares of the land thru purchase from the original RULING:
heirs, Jesus, Caridad, Lourdes and Dolores, all surnamed Singson, on one YES, the court erred in concluding that the stipulation is just an arrangement
hand and from Asuncion Florentino on the other. After due notice and stipulation. It cannot be revoked unilaterally.
publication, the Court set the application for hearing. Only the Director of The contract must bind both parties, based on the principles (1) that
Lands filed an opposition but was later withdrawn so an order of general obligation wising from contracts has the force of law between the contracting
default was issued. Upon application of the applicants, the Clerk of Court parties; and (2) that they must be mutuality between the parties band on
was commissioned and authorized to receive the evidence of the applicants their essential equality, to which is repugnant to have one party bound by the
and ordered to submit the same for the Court’s proper resolution. contract leaving the other free therefrom. The stipulation (Exhibit O-1) is part
Exhibit O-1 embodied in the deed of extrajudicial partition (Exhibit O), which of an extrajudicial partition (Exh. O) duly agreed and signed by the parties,
states that with respect to the land situated in Barrio Lubong, Dacquel, hence the same must bind the contracting parties thereto and its validity or
Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, the fruits thereof shall serve to defray the religious compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them. The said stipulation is a
expenses, was the source of contention in this case (Spanish text). Stipulation pour autrui. A stipulation pour autrui is a stipulation in favor of a
Florentino wanted to include ExhibitO-1 on the title but the Encarnacion third person conferring a clear and deliberate favor upon him, and which
supposed and subsequently withdrawn their application on their shares, stipulation is merely a part of a contract entered into by the parties, neither of
which was opposed by the former. whom acted as agent of the third person, and such third person may
The Court after hearing the motion for withdrawal and the opposition issued demand its fulfillment provided that he communicates his acceptance to the
an order and for the purpose of ascertaining and implifying that the products obligor before it is revoked.
of the land made subject matter of this land registration case had been used
in answering for the payment of expenses for the religious functions Coquia v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co.
specified in the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition which was no registered in the G.R. No. L-23276, 29 November 1968
office of the Register of Deeds from time immemorial; and that the applicants FACTS:
knew of thisarrangement and the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of August The Fieldmen’s Company (company) issued a common carrier accident
24,1947, was not signed by Angel Encarnacion or Salvador Encarnacion, insurance policy to Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc. (insured). In the policy it
Jr.-CFI: The self-imposed arrangement in favor of the Church is a simple stipulated that accident arising from a motor vehicle shall be insured with
donation, but is void since the done has not accepted the donation and respect to the death or bodily injured driver, conductor and/or inspector
Salvador Encarnacion, Jr. and Angel Encarnacion had not made any oral or riding in the motor vehicle.
written grant at all so the court allowed the religious expenses to be made Carlito Coquia met an accident while driving resulting in his death. The
and entered on the undivided shares, interests and participations of all the insured asked the company for the insurance of Carlito. The company
applicants in this case, except that of Salvador Encarnacion, Sr., Salvador refused to give insurance to the said insured, the paaboutts of Carlito filed a
Encarnacion, Jr. and Angel Encarnacion.”-the complaint about a sum of money for the insurance of their dead child. The
company contends that parents had no contractual relation with the the form of a deed of absolute sale, and that appellant’s action was, in effect,
company, thus they are not the proper parties in the said case. one for specific performance. That one of the parties to a contract is entitled
ISSUE: to bring an action for its enforcement or to prevent its breach is too clear to
Whether or not the policy in question belong to such class of contracts pour need any extensive discussion. Upon the other hand, that the contract
autrui. involved contained a stipulation pour autrui amplifies this settled rule only in
the sense that the third person for whose benefit the contract was entered
RULING: into
Yes.Pursuant to these stipulations, the Company “will indemnify any
authorized Driver  who is driving the Motor Vehicle” of the Insured and, in the may also demand its fulfillment provided he had communicated his
event of death of said driver, the Company shall, likewise, “indemnify his acceptance thereof to the obligor before the stipulation in his favor is
personal representatives.” In fact, the Company “may, at its option, make revoked.
indemnity payable directly  to the claimants or heirs of claimants … it being It appears that the amended complaint submitted by appellant to the lower
the true intention of this Policy to protect … the liabilities of the court impleaded the beneficiary under the contract as a party co-plaintiff, it
Insured towards the passengers of the Motor Vehicle and the Public” — in seems clear that the three parties concerned therewith would, as a result, be
other words, third parties. before the court and the latter’s adjudication would be complete and binding
Thus, the policy under consideration is typical of contracts  pour autrui, this upon them.
character being made more manifest by the fact that the deceased driver
paid fifty per cent (50%) of the corresponding premiums, which were Daywalt v. Corp.
deducted from his weekly commissions. Under these conditions, it is clear G.R. No. L-13505, 4 February 1919
that the Coquias — who, admittedly, are the sole heirs of the deceased — FACTS:
have a direct cause of action against the Company, and, since they could Teoderica Endencia obligated herself to convey to Geo W. Daywalt a tract of
have maintained this action by themselves, without the assistance of the land. The deed should be executed as soon as the tittle of the land is
Insured, it goes without saying that they could and did properly join the latter perfected. There was a decree recognizing Teoderica as the owner of land
in filing the complaint herein. but the Torrens certificate was not issued until later. The parties met
immediately upon the entering of the decree and made a new contract.
Constantino v. Espiritu There was a development of Teoderica’s land as the Torrens title was issued
G.R. No. L-22404, 31 May 1971 and in view of this development she became reluctant to transfer the whole
FACTS: tract of land asserting that she never intended to sell the large amount of
The deed of absolute sale as the binding contract between appellant and land and that she was misinformed by the area of the land.
appellee conveyed the two storey house in favor of the appellee. The After the Torrens title was issued to Teoderica she gave it to the defendant
appellee is entrusted of the properties of the appellant’s illegitimate son. The company for safekeeping in which the defendant did so. As Teodorica still
appellee mortgaged the said property to Republic Savings Bank for the retained possession of said property Father Sanz entered into an
payment of the appellee’s loan and thereafter the appellee offered them for arrangement with her whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the
sale. The appellant then prayed for the issuance of a writ of execution defendant corporation were pastured upon said land.
restraining the appellee and her agents to further alienate or disposed of the
said property. The appellant wanted to execute a deed of absolute sale in ISSUE:
favor of his son who is the beneficiary. Whether a person who is not a party to a contract for the sale of land makes
himself liable for damages to the vendee, beyond the value of the use and
ISSUE: occupation, by colluding with the vendor and maintaining him in the effort to
Whether or not the contract between appellant and appellee was a contract resist an action for specific performance. 
pour autrui.
RULING:
RULING: The Supreme Court held that the members of the defendant’s corporation, in
Yes. It appears then that, upon the facts alleged by appellant, the contract advising and prompting Teodorica Endencia not to comply with the contract
between him and appellee was a contract pour autrui, although couched in of sale, were actuated by improper and malicious motives.
In a fair conclusion on this feature of the case is that father Juan Labarga RULING:
and his associates believed in good faith that the contract could not be Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages
enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was, therefore, One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion
prompted by no mean or improper motive. of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other
In the case at bar, as Teodorica Endencia was the party directly bound by has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment
the contract, it is obvious that the liability of the defendant corporation, even interfered with, (b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendants conduct is a
admitting that it has made itself coparticipant in the breach of the contract, legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional and
can in no even exceed hers. unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence
This leads us to consider at this point the extent of the liability of Teodorica rules.
Endencia to the plaintiff by reason of her failure to surrender the certificate of The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2)
title and to place the plaintiff in possession. knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract; and
(3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.
So Ping Bun v. CA In the case before us, petitioners Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to
G.R. No. 120554, 21 September 1999 execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result, petitioner deprived the
FACTS: respondent corporation of the latters property right. Clearly, the three
Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the instant
into four (4) lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. case.
(DCCSI) subject to a one-year term and with the condition that should the As a general rule, a justification for interfering with the business relations of
lessee continue to occupy the premises after the term, the lease shall be on another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such justification
a month-to-month basis. When the contracts expired, the parties did not does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other. Some
renew the contracts, but Tek Hua continued to occupy the premises. In authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferers interest
1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved but later on formed Tek Hua outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual
Enterprising Corp. So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis,
in 1986. So Pek Gioks grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied the such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-
warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing. protection. Moreover, a justification for protecting one’s financial position
Lessor DCCSI sent letters to Tek Hua Enterprises stating their intention in should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in
increasing the rent and enclosed therein were new lease contracts for the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his
signing. DCCSI warned that failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives
shall be deemed a lack of interest on the lessees part and agreement to the Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse
termination of the lease. Private respondents did not answer any of these behind ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in
letters. Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded. Private respondent wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged
Tiong sent a letter to petitioner advising to vacate all the stocks in Tek Hua interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it
Enterprising Corp. Warehouse and giving them 14 days to vacate the cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler. In the instant
premises but still petitioner refused to vacate. Petitioner requested formal case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease
contracts of the lease with DCCSI in favor of Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of the respondent
Bun claimed that after the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, he had corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property of the respondent
been occupying the premises for his textile business and religiously paid corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate
rent. DCCSI acceded to petitioners request. The lease contracts in favor of wrongful motives or malice on him.
Trendsetter were executed. Now private respondents pressed for the Section 1314 of the Civil Code categorically provides also that, Any third
nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and petitioner. person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party. Petitioner argues that damage is an
ISSUE: essential element of tort interference, and since the trial court and the
Whether or not So Ping Bun is guilty of tortous interference of a contract. appellate court ruled that private respondents were not entitled to actual,
moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he ought to be absolved of any interfering with private respondents leasehold rights as there was no lease
liability, including attorneys fees. contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his personal
It is true that the lower courts did not award damages, but this was only investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on the subject
because the extent of damages was not quantifiable. While we do not lots
encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into
existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the
conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an
obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business ISSUE:
desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Whether or not the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, during the
Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve supposed existence of the private respondent’s lease contract with the late
petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing a breach Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which Lagon should be
of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the held liable for damages.
permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI
and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved RULING:
the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioners No, the interference of Lagon was with a legal justification (in furtherance of
interference. a personal financial interest) and without bad faith
The elements of Tortuous Interference with contractual relation are: (1)
Jose Lagon v. CA and Lapuz Existence of a valid contract; (2) Knowledge on the part of the third person of
G.R. No. 119107, 18 March 2005 the existence of the contract; (3) Interference of the third person without
FACTS: legal justification or excuse.
Petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi, through As regard to the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly
an intestate court, two parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. established. In the given case the Court ruled that the notarized copy of
A few months after the sale, private respondent Menandro Lapuz filed a lease contract presented in court appeared to be an incontestable proof that
complaint for torts and damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Bai Tonin Sepi and private respondent renewed their contract.  The second
Court (RTC) of Sultan Kudarat. element on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on the part of
Private respondent claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the the interferer that the contract exists. In this case, Lagon had no knowledge
late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over three parcels of land (the of the lease contract as he even conducted his own personal investigation
property) in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning 1964. One of the and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have
provisions agreed upon was for private respondent to put up commercial made a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim
buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be over the property; that an examination of the entire property title bore no
paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private respondent was indication of the leasehold interest of private respondent and that even the
obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. The lease contract registry of property had no record of the same. As to the third element, a
ended but since the construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be party may be held liable only when there was no legal justification or excuse
completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed. for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive. To
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to sustain a case for tortuous interference, the other party must have acted with
the court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator malice or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the
advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he other. In the case, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove
constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he
owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in
filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing the heirs purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was
of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold never established.
rights over it.
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that he induced the heirs of
Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the heirs were in dire
need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied