BSI Standards Publication
BSI Standards Publication
BSI Standards Publication
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Contents Page
Foreword iii
Introduction 1
1 Scope 2
2 Normative references 2
3 Terms and definitions 4
4 General 5
5 Fire survival times 5
Table 1 — Recommended cable categories based on application 5
6 Power supplies 7
6.1 General 7
Figure 1 — Example of dual supply — Mains with standby LV generation 9
6.2 Primary supply 10
6.3 Secondary supply 11
Table 2 — Fuel storage capacity (based on BS EN 12101-10:2005) 11
7 Dual circuits/diverse routes 12
7.1 General 12
7.2 HV power supplies 12
7.3 LV power supplies 12
8 Fire-resisting building fabric enclosures 13
9 Automatic changeover devices 13
10 Motor control panels 14
11 Cable selection 14
12 Cable protective systems 15
12.1 General 15
12.2 Performance criteria 16
12.3 Installation criteria 16
Figure 2 — Wall detail — cable enclosure 17
12.4 Cable transits, fire stopping, wall terminations and linear expansion 17
13 Effects of fire temperature on cable size 17
14 Use of circuit protective conductors (CPCs) 18
15 Cable installation practice 18
16 Cable support systems 19
17 Junction boxes and joints 20
17.1 Power cables 20
17.2 Control cables 21
18 Fire-resistant busbar systems 21
19 Areas of special fire risk 21
20 Life safety and fire-fighting applications 22
20.1 Sprinkler and wet riser pumps 22
20.2 Smoke control systems 23
20.3 Car park smoke control systems 23
20.4 Firefighters and evacuation lifts
24
Annex A (informative) Selection and specification of UPS/battery inverter systems to serve as the
secondary source of supply to life safety, fire-fighting and other critical systems 25
Annex B (informative) Typical high voltage (HV) circuit in a building 27
Annex C (informative) Performance criteria for cable protective systems 27
Figure C.1 — Example of test arrangement for horizontal service ducts (fire exposure from
outside), adapted from BS EN 1366-5:2003 28
Annex D (normative) Testing of Category 3 cables of core sizes up to and including 4 mm2 cross-
sectional area 29
Annex E (normative) Determining the cross-sectional area of drop rods 30
Figure E.1 — Typical thread detail identifying the major and minor diameters 31
Figure E.2 — Elements of the cable support system 32
Table E.1 — Maximum allowable stress of steel drop rods in fire conditions 32
Table E.2 — Typical metric thread details (assumed to be coarse pitch) 33
Annex F (informative) Example voltage drop calculations for cables in a fire 33
Annex G (informative) Fire-resistant cables under fire and fault conditions 36
Table G.1 — Temperature correction factors for copper 36
Annex H (informative) Cable protective systems to BS EN 1366‑11 37
Annex I (informative) Guidance on calculating the mechanical loading on the drop rods 37
Figure I.1 — Example of mechanical loading on the drop rods 38
Annex J (informative) Variation from the recommendations of BS 8519:2020 38
Figure J.1 — Model completion certificate — Design — Declaration of conformity 39
Bibliography 40
Summary of pages
This document comprises a front cover, and inside front cover, pages i to iv, pages 1 to 40, an inside back cover and
a back cover.
Foreword
Publishing information
This British Standard is published by BSI Standards Limited, under licence from The British
Standards Institution, and came into effect on 30 June 2020. It was prepared by Technical Committee
FSH/1, Fire safety cables. A list of organizations represented on this committee can be obtained on
request to the committee manager.
Supersession
This British Standard supersedes BS 8519:2010, which is withdrawn.
• new Clause 20 added providing recommendations for life safety and fire-fighting
applications; and
• new informative Annex A on selection and specification of uninterruptable power
supplies (UPS).
This publication can be withdrawn, revised, partially superseded or superseded. Information
regarding the status of this publication can be found in the Standards Catalogue on the BSI website at
bsigroup.com/standards, or by contacting the Customer Services team.
Where websites and webpages have been cited, they are provided for ease of reference and are
correct at the time of publication. The location of a webpage or website, or its contents, cannot
be guaranteed.
Presentational conventions
The provisions of this standard are presented in roman (i.e. upright) type. Its recommendations are
expressed in sentences in which the principal auxiliary verb is “should”.
Commentary, explanation and general informative material is presented in smaller italic type, and does
not constitute a normative element.
The word “should” is used to express recommendations of this standard. The word “may” is used in
the text to express permissibility, e.g. as an alternative to the primary recommendation of the clause.
The word “can” is used to express possibility, e.g. a consequence of an action or an event.
Notes and commentaries are provided throughout the text of this standard. Notes give references
and additional information that are important but do not form part of the recommendations.
Commentaries give background information.
Where words have alternative spellings, the preferred spelling of the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary is used (e.g. “organization” rather than “organisation”).
Introduction
Buildings continue to develop in terms of increased size and height, and complexity of active fire
protection. This has led to solutions being developed which require a high level of performance from
the building services components, including the electrical supplies. This British Standard is primarily
intended for designers, contractors, fire engineers, regulators and enforcers, including building
control bodies, fire authorities and health and safety inspectors.
It is primarily concerned with cables which need to maintain their circuit integrity during a fire for
life safety and fire-fighting purposes. However, the recommendations of this British Standard can also
be used for cables which need to maintain their circuit integrity during a fire because the function
they support is critical for business continuity, property protection or environmental protection.
The presence of potential hazards, including fire, mechanical and water damage, are referred to
throughout this British Standard.
This British Standard identifies electrical loads defined as life safety and fire-fighting. It identifies
the factors to be accounted for by the engineer when selecting and specifying the performance
requirements of the electrical distribution system needed to maintain circuit integrity under defined
fire conditions for a specified period, referred to as the fire survival time.
It makes reference to the recommendations of BS 9999 and BS 9991, with regard to the design and
installation of the electrical distribution systems for life safety and fire-fighting equipment.
This British Standard also makes reference to three categories of circuits required to maintain their
circuit integrity under defined fire conditions for varying fire survival times of 30 min, 60 min and
120 min. Appropriate cable tests are identified for each cable category derived from applicable
British Standards assessing cable performance under conditions of fire as might be expected in an
actual fire incident.
This British Standard aims to ensure that the level of circuit fire integrity is not compromised by
other components of the whole electrical distribution system, including cable glands, terminations,
joints and cable support systems.
It also identifies the need for dual redundant electrical supplies run via diverse cable routes, installed
within separate compartments, and the need to incorporate automatic changeover devices located
within the same compartment as the life safety, fire-fighting or other critical equipment.
1 Scope
This British Standard gives recommendations and guidance on the selection and installation of
fire-resistant power and control cable systems which need to maintain their circuit integrity for life
safety and fire-fighting. It also gives specific recommendations for electrical system design for such
applications, and for fire survival times.
This British Standard is primarily intended for use in buildings which, due to their size, height, form
or use, require the installation of life safety and fire-fighting systems, e.g. sprinkler pumps, wet riser
pumps, smoke control systems, fire-fighting and evacuation lifts or other systems as required by the
fire engineered strategy.
It covers:
• the source of supply;
• the distribution voltage [high voltage (HV) or low voltage (LV)]; and
• the appropriate location of the main intake rooms, HV switchrooms, LV switchrooms,
transformer rooms, generator rooms, risers, fire life safety equipment plant rooms and
fire‑fighting/evacuation lift motor rooms/shafts.
The British Standard can also be used for systems which need to maintain their circuit integrity
during a fire because the function they support is critical for business continuity, property protection
or environmental protection reasons.
This British Standard does not give recommendations for those installations covered in BS 5839‑1,
BS 5839‑8, BS 5839‑9 and BS 5266‑1, but makes reference to these standards.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their
content constitutes provisions of this document.1) For dated references, only the edition cited
applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any
amendments) applies.
BS 3643‑1, ISO metric screw threads — Part 1: Principles and basic data
BS 3643‑2, ISO metric screw threads — Part 2: Specification for selected limits of size2)
BS 5266‑1, Emergency lighting — Part 1: Code of practice for the emergency lighting of premises
BS 5306‑1, Code of practice for fire extinguishing installations and equipment on premises —
Part 1: Hose reels and foam inlets
BS 5839‑1, Fire detection and fire alarm systems for buildings — Part 1: Code of practice for design,
installation, commissioning and maintenance of systems in non-domestic premises
BS 5839‑8, Fire detection and fire alarm systems for buildings — Part 8: Code of practice for the design,
installation, commissioning and maintenance of voice alarm systems
BS 5839‑9, Fire detection and alarm systems for buildings — Part 9: Code of practice for the design,
installation, commissioning and maintenance of emergency voice communication systems
BS 7273‑4, Code of practice for the operation of fire protection measures — Part 4: Actuation of release
mechanisms for doors
BS 7346 (all parts), Components for smoke and heat control systems
1)
Documents that are referred to solely in an informative manner are listed in the Bibliography.
2)
This British Standard also gives an informative reference to BS 3643-2:2007.
3)
This British Standard also gives an informative reference to BS 7671:2018+A1:2020.
4)
This British Standard also gives an informative reference to BS EN 12101-10:2005.
3.8 substation
switch room of an electricity transmission and distribution system where voltage is transformed from
high to low voltage or the reverse using transformers
4 General
The electrical system should be designed, installed and verified by a skilled person suitably
competent to comply with BS 7671 and to install switchgear and controlgear conforming to
BS EN 60947.
The type of electrical distribution system selected during the design phase should be derived from a
detailed process of consultation with the relevant authorities having jurisdiction over the project in
question, taking account of the overall fire strategy. The design should be agreed at the earliest stage.
NOTE Specifically with reference to other critical systems, the appropriate levels of fire survival time are agreed
in consultation between all interested parties.
Table 1 (continued)
Table 1 (continued)
A)
Refer to these standards for further information on the relevant system or application.
B)
The categories given in parentheses are approximately equivalent to the cable performance recommendations
given in the related standards, and are included here for information. The actual cable performance
recommendations for these applications are given in the related standards.
C)
See Clause 19 for information on areas of special fire risk.
D)
Use minimum Category 2 or 3 depending on the type of system (60 min or 120 min).
E)
Use minimum Category 2 for automatic system activation, or Category 3 for firefighters’ manual override.
F)
Use minimum Category 1 for automatic system activation, or Category 2 for firefighters’ manual override.
G)
Use minimum Category 3 control cables and provide mechanical protection where necessary.
6 Power supplies
6.1 General
Where electrical services in the building are essential to maintain the operation of the life safety,
fire‑fighting or other critical systems, a secondary power supply should be provided independent of
the primary supply, typically an automatically started standby generator (see Figure 1).
The secondary power supply should be of sufficient capacity and resilience to maintain the life safety,
fire-fighting and other critical systems in operation for at least the fire survival time identified in
Clause 5 for the appropriate systems and be capable of operating safely in fire conditions for the
appropriate period of time.
The components of the primary supply should be separated from the components of the secondary
supply so that a failure of a cable or equipment in either supply does not affect the other supply.
The secondary supply should preferably be an automatic starting standby generator.
NOTE 1 The designer may incorporate alternatives, provided that the integrity and independent nature of supply
can be guaranteed.
NOTE 2 If the secondary supply is an alternative HV supply from a utility primary network, refer to BS 7671:2018,
regulation 560.6.5: “Separate independent feeders from a distributors network shall not serve as electrical sources
for safety services unless assurance can be obtained that the two supplies are unlikely to fail concurrently”.
Dual independent incoming low voltage utility supplies should not be considered to be sufficiently
independent and resilient to be suitable for dual independent electrical supplies to life safety and
fire-fighting equipment unless designed in accordance with the recommendations for primary and
secondary power supplies in BS 9999:2017, 37.2.3.3.
Where the installation of UPS equipment/battery inverter systems are proposed, their performance,
rating and suitability for the intended purpose should be evaluated by the specifier/designer. The
advice of the specialist manufacturer should be sought to ensure the UPS equipment provides the
appropriate level of resilience, capacity and endurance as that offered by a life safety generator
serving as the secondary means of supply.
NOTE 3 Refer to Annex A for technical guidance on the selection and specification of UPS/battery inverter systems
intended to provide the secondary source of supply to life safety, fire-fighting and other critical systems.
NOTE 4 Figure 1 is an example of the typical distribution arrangement recommended by this British Standard to
feed life safety and fire-fighting equipment. It does not preclude alternative arrangements that ensure fire integrity
and availability of both the primary and secondary supplies.
NOTE 5 HV switchgear, LV switchgear and transformers may be installed within the same 120 min fire-resistant
building fabric enclosure. Generators and their associated distribution equipment may also be installed within the
same 120 min fire-resistant building fabric enclosure, but separate from the primary supply equipment, provided
the equipment is suitable for the environment in which it is to be installed and system resilience is maintained.
NOTE 6 In Figure 1, 120 min fire resistance for the building fabric enclosure is recommended even for life safety
or other critical systems requiring 30 min or 60 min fire survival time. This is because fire test standards for cables
and structural elements are fundamentally different. If justified by a fire engineering analysis in accordance with
BS 7974, an alternative building fabric fire-resisting period may be selected instead of 120 min.
Each connection at the power supply source should be via an isolating protective device reserved
solely for the individual items of life safety and fire-fighting equipment and independent of any other
main or sub-main circuit. Such isolating protective devices should be clearly labelled and identified as
to their purpose and should be secured against unauthorized operation.
The primary and secondary power sources, electrical distribution boards, cables and control
equipment supplying power to the life safety and fire-fighting equipment (see Figure 1) should be
protected against fire and water damage for a period of at least the fire survival time identified in
Clause 5 for the appropriate systems.
NOTE 7 Typically, the transformers and main LV switchgear enclosures are specified as a minimum of IP31 in
accordance with BS EN 60529:1992+A2:2013. Therefore it is for the designer to identify the appropriate location
and type of construction for the switchroom enclosures to minimize the risk of water ingress.
The fire-resisting building fabric enclosure for the equipment should have a minimum fire
resistance of 120 min.
The electrical distribution system supplying the life safety and fire-fighting equipment should be
designed in such a way as to ensure that power is available at all times. To achieve this, dual supplies
should be provided to each of the critical items of equipment; the supplies being via an automatic
changeover device installed within the same fire compartment formed by the switchroom or plant
room enclosure, minimizing the cable length between the ATS and the critical equipment.
NOTE 8 The primary supply is generally derived from the mains or utility supply, whilst the secondary supply is
derived from a standby generator.
NOTE 2 For cables installed within an enclosure of passive fire protection material, no ratings have been published
but a derating factor of 50% is generally considered appropriate and may be used unless the manufacturer of the
protective system advises a different derating factor for their particular system.
Where two independent utility supplies are to be installed, the two supply cable routes should be
adequately separated from each other to avoid a single fault affecting both supplies.
engineered strategy.
The designer should provide fuel polishing equipment, where recommended by the generator
specialist, to maintain the quality of the fuel due to the likelihood of the fuel remaining in the storage
tank for an extended period.
NOTE 1 Increased biofuel content of the diesel increases the risk of the engine performance being adversely
affected by the degradation of the fuel quality over time.
The generator-starting electrical supply should also be independent of the primary source of supply
(i.e. it should incorporate a battery automatic starting system).
The rating of the generator should be selected in accordance with BS 7698‑12, ISO 8528‑12 as
either prime or standby rated; for the standby set the variable average power output should
not exceed 70%.
The electrical output in terms of voltage and frequency stability should be classified as G2 or better
in order to provide the quality of supply equivalent to the primary mains supply. The designer should
identify the effects of transient voltage conditions under starting and fault events.
NOTE 2 For generator performance, refer to IEC 60364‑5‑56 and BS ISO 8528‑5.
The standby generator should be capable of providing the supply to the critical life safety and
fire-fighting load within 15 s of the failure of the primary supply in accordance with BS 9999 and
BS EN 12845.
Visual indication should be provided at the main fire alarm panel of the fire control room, giving the
operational state of the standby generator, including mains healthy, generator running and generator
fault. A voltmeter and ammeter should also be provided to indicate the total load on the generator, in
accordance with BS EN 12101‑10.
The standby generator should be installed within a 120 min fire-resisting building fabric enclosure
rated 120 min EI in accordance with BS EN 13501‑2:2016 (except for doors which should be
120 min ESa) unless it is installed outside of the building, either at ground floor or roof level. The
roof slab supporting the equipment should provide 120 min fire separation (REI in accordance with
BS EN 13501‑2:2016).
Where both the primary and secondary supplies are located on the ground floor or roof level, the
designer should ensure that they are suitably protected such that the risk of a fire affecting both
supplies is minimized as far as practicable. This should be achieved by enclosing each within a
120 min fire-resisting enclosure (REI, EI or ESa in accordance with BS EN 13501‑2:2016) or by
separation if it can be shown by a fire safety engineering analysis by a suitably qualified fire safety
engineer that fire or smoke will not spread from one to the other.
A 120 min fire compartmentation (EI or ESa as appropriate) should also be provided to physically
separate the generator from any adjacent fire risks either at ground floor or roof level.
NOTE 3 If justified by a fire engineering analysis in accordance with BS 7974, an alternative building fabric
fire‑resisting period may be selected instead of 120 min.
A local fuel service tank should be provided within the generator building fabric enclosure large
enough for at least 120 min of operation at rated power, including the appropriate bunding to protect
against the risk of a fuel leak.
Whichever secondary power source is provided, the distribution should be organized such that the
secondary supply remains live when the remainder of the supplies in the building are isolated in
an emergency.
The designer should carry out a design risk assessment for the specific application to identify the
impact of the loss of service, for example, during planned maintenance. It should identify whether
there are alternative management activities that could be put in place that would overcome the need
for the bypass. It should also be strictly in accordance with the specific maintenance requirements for
the switching device, recommended by the manufacturer.
The ATS should be selected and specified by the designer with a utilization category of either AC33A
or AC33B (i.e. motor loads or mixed loads including motors, resistive loads and 30% incandescent
lamp loads as recommended by BS EN 60947‑6‑1).
The ATS device should meet the PC classification conforming to BS EN 60947‑6‑1 in terms of its short
circuit capability, being capable of making and withstanding, but not breaking, short-circuit currents.
The appropriate protective devices should be provided upstream of the ATS for both the primary and
secondary supplies for protection coordination.
The ATS should give a clear indication of the “Normal”, “Off” (where provided) and “Alternative”
switch positions. The operating mechanism should be interlocked to prevent simultaneous
connection to both primary and secondary supplies. Remote indication should also be provided of the
ATS status to the main fire alarm panel or the fire control room.
The ATS should monitor the voltage and frequency of both the primary and secondary supplies,
transferring from primary to secondary automatically in the event of primary mains supply failure.
The status/condition of the primary and secondary supplies should also be monitored remotely.
NOTE 2 When power to the primary supply has been restored, return to the primary supply can be manual
or automatic.
Category 3 fire-resistant control cables should be installed from each ATS to the generator to
provide the start signal and status indication in the event of the loss of supply to an individual ATS.
Unprotected fire-resistant control cables should be further protected in areas where mechanical
damage is likely (e.g. armoured cable or cable tray with lid).
If a fire control room is provided, it should contain monitoring facilities to show, as far as
is reasonably practicable, that power is available to the life safety, fire-fighting and other
critical equipment.
NOTE 2 The regulatory authorities usually require exact details of all switchboard, automatic transfer switches
and standby generator enclosures (including oil storage) associated with life safety systems to be submitted for
approval, including location, ratings, operation, fire rating proposals and protection afforded.
11 Cable selection
The cables selected for life safety, fire-fighting or other critical systems should be either:
a) high voltage: standard HV cables, having supplementary protection as described in 7.2; or
NOTE 1 These cables conform to BS 7835.
b) low voltage: fire-resistant cables meeting the minimum fire survival time categories for the
appropriate application as shown in Table 1.
NOTE 2 These cables conform to BS 7629‑1, BS 7846 or BS EN 60702‑1.
NOTE 3 The categories given in Table 1 are defined as follows, based on the fire survival time required of the cable
(i.e. 30 min, 60 min or 120 min).
1) Category 1: means of escape (30 min fire survival time); category 1 cables should be one of
the following:
• power cables meeting the 30 min survival time when tested in accordance with BS 8491; or
• control cables having a fire survival time of 30 min when tested in accordance with
BS EN 50200:2015, and the 30 min survival time when tested in accordance with
BS EN 50200:2015, Annex E (core sizes up to and including 4 mm2 cross-sectional area),
excluding 3-phase power circuits.
2) Category 2: means of escape (60 min fire survival time); category 2 cables should be one of
the following:
• power cables meeting the 60 min survival time when tested in accordance with BS 8491; or
• control cables having a fire survival time of 60 min when tested in accordance with
BS EN 50200:2015, and the 120 min survival time when tested in accordance with
BS 8434‑2 (core sizes up to and including 4 mm2 cross-sectional area), excluding 3-phase
power circuits.
3) Category 3: fire-fighting (120 min fire survival time); category 3 cables should be one of
the following:
• power cables meeting the 120 min survival time when tested in accordance
with BS 8491; or
• control cables having a fire survival time of 120 min when tested in accordance with
BS EN 50200:2015, and the 120 min survival time when tested in accordance with
BS 8434‑2 (core sizes up to and including 4 mm2 cross-sectional area) and Annex D (core
sizes up to and including 4 mm2 cross-sectional area), excluding 3-phase power circuits.
When a Category 3 control cable is used as a single-phase small power cable, then a
mechanically‑protected (e.g. armoured) cable should be used or additional mechanical protection
should be provided.
NOTE 4 Power cables of overall diameter less than 20 mm may be used if they can be demonstrated to give the
same level of fire resistance as in BS 8491, which identifies test criteria for cables over 20 mm in overall diameter.
NOTE 5 An application list is provided in the third column of Table 1, allowing the appropriate cable category for
each application to be determined by the system designer/installer. Where a relevant application document exists, it
is noted in the second column for reference.
12.1 General
The cable protective systems should be four-sided, fully enclosing the cables to be protected. Two
and three-sided systems installed against the building structure should not be used, as the interface
between the two represents a significant risk to the fire integrity of the cable protective system
because it is impossible to assess the quality and fire performance upon completion of the site
installation. The cable protective systems should provide the required thermal, mechanical and water
protection for a minimum fire survival time of 120 min. The fire-resistant cable protective system
should be a factory-built assembly, designed to minimize reliance on the quality and workmanship
on site, to ensure quality control and fire integrity performance is maintained throughout the
installation.
The fixings or suspension system for the cable protective system should be capable of supporting the
load of the cable protective system and its contents so that the circuit integrity of the cables therein is
not compromised for a minimum fire survival time of 120 min.
The cable protective system should not contain any other services, other than the cable(s) to be
protected and the primary and secondary supply cables should not be installed within the same cable
protective system.
Warning labels should be applied to and visible on each section of a cable protective system stating
that the installation should not be dismantled or altered in any way or used to support any other
service. The label should identify life safety services and HV cables contained within the relevant
section of the cable protective system.
If mild steel drop rods are to form the suspension element of the support system, their cross-sectional
area should be determined in accordance with Annex E.
Figure 2 — Wall detail — cable enclosure
In selecting mild steel threaded rod support mechanisms, the maximum stress for fire exposure times
of 120 min should not exceed 6 N/mm2 within vertically-orientated support components.
NOTE Proprietary alternatives to threaded rod suspensions may be used if it can be verified that these have been
furnace tested in accordance with the BS EN 1363‑1 fire curve and shown to be able to withstand the proposed
imposed loads for the fire survival time of 120 min.
The physical integrity of the cable protective enclosures should not be compromised by any non-fire
rated services that might fail prematurely. The enclosures should be installed above or beyond the
influence of any non-fire rated services.
12.4 Cable transits, fire stopping, wall terminations and linear expansion
Although correctly tested systems prevent fire break-in (as proven by fire outside or type A fire
test exposure), fire stopping internally within the cable protective system should be provided. The
expansion of cable protective systems under fire conditions and their reaction with the building
structure should also form part of the design process to ensure that the protection to both the
enclosed cables and the fire compartmentation is maintained.
A number of factors can affect any necessary “de-rating” such as length of cable exposed in the fire,
actual temperature of the cable in the fire, heat flux exposure of the cable to the fire, and actual current
to be carried under fire conditions. Assumptions therefore have to be made in assessing the effects on
cable sizing.
Cables for circuits covered by this standard are most likely to be sized on the basis of voltage drop,
although other factors could apply in certain applications.
The voltage drop at typical fire temperatures is higher than at normal maximum operating temperature
and this can be significant for certain types of load. Assuming a worst case of the total length of cable
run in the fire, it would be necessary to increase the conductor size by approximately two sizes.
It is possible to calculate the voltage drop for cables involved in a fire by assuming the cable temperature
in a fire and the cable length affected. Examples of the calculation are given in Annex F.
Information on the effects of fault currents on cables operating under fire conditions is given in Annex G.
The process of cable sizing and selection for fire-resistant cable should take account of the effects
on the cable performance from the increased operating temperature above its normal maximum
ambient temperature likely to be experienced under fire conditions.
NOTE In practice, for this standard this temperature is taken as 842 °C in accordance with BS 8491.
Where provided, any guidance given in the applicable Wiring Regulations (BS 7671) or specific advice
from the cable manufacturer should be taken into account in selecting the appropriate cable for the
load being fed under the fire conditions specified.
In the absence of any such guidance and where specific detailed calculations are not possible,
there should be an increase of the conductor size by two sizes (compared with that selected for
normal operation) in order to alleviate the effect of increased temperature on voltage drop and
current rating.
b) Where fire-resistant cables require additional mechanical protection, they should be enclosed in
or carried upon cable management or support systems. Such systems should provide adequate
support and maintain necessary mechanical protection in the presence of the potential hazards.
The supports should be sized to cater for the reduction in the strength of steel when exposed to
the effects of fire or it should be determined that the supports can withstand the proposed loads
for the time duration required by the BS EN 1363‑1 fire curve.
c) Cable management or support systems that are not used as a primary means of support or to
provide necessary mechanical protection should not compromise the defined performance of the
cables in the presence of the potential hazards.
d) Any glands used in the termination of fire-resistant cables into equipment should not
compromise the defined performance of the cables in the presence of the potential hazards.
e) Cable joints should be avoided where possible and minimized in their use. Where conditions
require that a joint be used, it should be of a type that has similar performance to the cable in the
presence of the potential hazards.
f) The cable fixing should be in accordance with the cable manufacturer’s recommendations and
preclude the use of non-metallic cable clips, cable ties and cable trunking as the sole means of
support for the cables, for example, plastic, nylon and aluminium cable cleats would not normally
be deemed suitable.
g) The cable fixing centres should be within the cable manufacturer’s recommended maximum
spacings for both the vertical and horizontal runs. The adverse effects of expansion, contraction
and vibration should also be in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations.
h) Cables should, wherever practicable, be installed upon the dedicated cable support system.
Where this is impractical due to the nature of the installation, the cable fixing should be carefully
selected to achieve the fire performance required of the cables to be supported.
i) Cables installed within vertical risers and cable enclosures with straight runs over 32 m should
incorporate an offset of two cable diameters to provide strain relief from the vertical weight
of the cable.
j) Designers and installers should follow the installation practices recommended by the material
suppliers and equipment manufacturers when designing and installing the cables and their
associated support systems, as under fire conditions, cables and the associated support systems
can collapse and block the means of escape.
If mild steel drop rods are to form the suspension element of the support system, their cross-sectional
area should be determined in accordance with Annex E.
NOTE 2 This British Standard does not preclude the use of alternative support systems to threaded rod and steel
bearers, such as wire suspension systems or direct fixings to the structure or custom-fabricated supports, where it
can be clearly demonstrated by appropriate testing that they offer the required fire survival performance.
The selection of the fixing anchors should be treated as equally as important as the design of the
cable support system.
Where practicable, the fire-resistant route should be arranged to be one of the upper tiers of the
coordinated high-level services.
NOTE 3 When coordinating the route for the fire-resistant cables, it needs to be recognized that some of the other
services, such as pipes, ducts, busbars and other cable routes, are unlikely to be designed to maintain their fire
integrity (for the same duration) under fire conditions and could collapse during a fire. The result of the collapse
could be the overloading of the fire-resistant cable support system, which itself could then fail.
To maximize the fire integrity of the fire-resistant cable system, fire-resistant and non-fire-resistant
cable support systems should be separate and, if following the same route, the fire-resistant
cable support system should, where practicable, be installed above the non-fire-resistant cable
support system.
The electrical continuity of the two lengths of cable and the terminations should be monitored
throughout the test for their circuit integrity in accordance with BS 8491.
The sample should be evenly heated via the standard horizontally-mounted ribbon burner to a
temperature of 842 °C for a period of 120 min.
The mechanical impact device should be in accordance with BS 8491 with the impact applied directly
to the sample junction box or joint under test. The impact should be applied every 10 min throughout
the test duration.
The water jet should be applied 5 min from the end of the test duration, comprising 5 s bursts every
60 s for the last 5 min of the test, in accordance with BS 8491.
A complete junction box assembly should maintain an IP rating of IP56 and a completed joint
assembly should have a type approval in accordance with BS EN 50393.
NOTE 2 It is not the intention of this recommendation that the IP test forms an integral part of the fire integrity
test for the junction box assembly.
A detailed test report should be provided at the conclusion of the test, in accordance with BS 8491,
including a detailed description of all of the components of the test sample and how they have been
assembled, including cables, junction box or joint, terminals, cable glands, shrouds and gaskets.
The selected terminals should be suitable for the fire test temperatures likely to be experienced;
typically, ceramic terminals are used to maintain circuit integrity under fire conditions. Where
internal equipment such as power supplies, fire alarm interface modules and relays, have a maximum
operating condition, this should be monitored and recorded as part of the test protocol and, where
necessary, the appropriate additional thermal protection provided.
The maximum permitted internal operating temperature and the associated temperature rise above
ambient should be determined based on the specific temperature limits of the equipment to be
accommodated within the junction box and should be as defined by the equipment manufacturer.
should be Category 3 cables as defined in Clause 11 and should be additionally protected and
designed for the specific risk identified. Protective systems may be used, but the designer should take
account of the revised thermal conditions into which the cable is to be installed and the resulting
impact on the cable’s installed rating (IZ) when installed in an insulated enclosure. Fixings should
have suitable protection, appropriate for the anticipated maximum temperatures.
The designer should coordinate the upstream protective device (fuse) to match the motor starter fuse
to ensure that it cannot operate before the motor starter fuse.
NOTE Full selectivity is not deemed necessary where the protective device feeds a single sprinkler or
wet riser pump.
The cable feeding the fire pumps should then be sized, based on the upstream protective device.
The components for multi-zoned smoke ventilation systems using smoke detector operated smoke/
fire dampers should be protected against fire throughout the system.
a) to assist firefighters to clear smoke from a car park during and after a fire;
b) to provide relatively smoke-free access for firefighters to a point close to the seat of the fire; and/or
The main car park extract fan control panel should be located in the same fire-resisting building
fabric enclosure as the run and standby extract fans, fed by an ATS located in the same building fabric
enclosure. The ATS should be fed by diversely routed primary and secondary sources of supply,
utilizing Category 3 cables, which should, where practicable, be routed away from the car park area
served by the smoke clearance system.
Where impulse/jet fans are installed as part of the smoke clearance system, their source of supply
should originate from the same protective building fabric enclosure as the smoke extract fans and
may be fed by a common ATS provided it is rated accordingly.
The impulse/jet fan supply cables should be selected to be Category 3 as they are likely to be exposed
to the elevated temperatures in a fire condition in the car park.
NOTE 2 It is not considered necessary to provide a separate ATS local to each of the impulse/jet fans.
Evacuation lifts are utilized to provide an organized and controlled movement of persons from a
dangerous place to a safe place; they should be provided with a primary source of supply from a
dedicated sub-main circuit to the evacuation lift.
NOTE 2 Other lifts in the same well may be fed from the same primary supply, provided it is rated accordingly and a
fault on another lift cannot affect the operation of the evacuation lift.
Evacuation lifts should be designed, installed and operated in accordance with BS 9999:2017,
Annex G and BS 9991 to maintain their operation during a fire condition, as well as for the evacuation
of people who find other evacuation routes difficult in the event of a fire.
NOTE 3 BS 9999:2017, G.2.2 allows, subject to risk assessment taking account of a number of factors, the provision
of two protected and diverse power supply circuits to the lifts from a single supply intake to the building, unless a
secondary supply is provided for other life safety reasons (e.g. to power firefighters lifts or smoke control fans), in
which case it is preferred that the evacuation lifts be connected to both these supplies.
The primary and secondary fire-resistant (Category 2) supply cables should be:
a) diversely routed through areas of low fire risk; and
b) physically protected against damage.
Isolators and protective devices feeding the evacuation lift should be labelled accordingly.
NOTE 4 Battery inverter supplies are not normally acceptable as the alternative secondary source of supply.
The switchrooms providing the source of supply and the lift machine rooms should be fire-resistant
building fabric enclosures.
Annex A (informative)
Selection and specification of UPS/battery inverter systems
to serve as the secondary source of supply to life safety,
fire-fighting and other critical systems
A.1 General
UPS/battery inverter systems may be considered as an alternative secondary source of supply
to a conventional standby generator, feeding life safety and fire-fighting systems, based on the
recommendations of BS 9991 for residential buildings.
The selection and specification of the equipment is important in order that the UPS is capable of
supplying the critical load characteristics, for both steady-state and transient conditions, for the
required period or fire survival time.
equipment generating power flow back into the UPS equipment under certain conditions. The UPS
selection is required to take account of this by dissipating the back-fed energy, preventing damage to
the UPS equipment.
The UPS and battery equipment requires ongoing maintenance, consisting of:
• complex power electronics;
• DC power installation; and
• supplementary cooling equipment.
By comparison, the maintenance requirements for a life safety generator consist of engine and
alternator general mechanical, and electrical maintenance activities.
Annex B (informative)
Typical high voltage (HV) circuit in a building
The example shown in this annex is for a circuit with the following characteristics: 11 kV a.c. 3 phase,
1 000 kVA and a 1 s fault of 14 kA using a 3-core copper conductor cable conforming to BS 7835
installed in a cable protective enclosure.
Amperes per phase can be determined using the parameters taken from the example
[kVA = 1 000, VL = 11 000 (phase to phase voltage)] using the following equations.
1 × VL × 3
kVA= (B.1)
1 000
kVA × 1 000
= I (B.2)
V× 3
1 000 × 1 000
= 52.5 A (B.3)
11 000 × 3
Frequently, when HV circuits have a relatively low current requirement, sizing of the cable is
determined by the short circuit limits.
The minimum conductor size that can safely carry a 14 kA fault for 1 s is 120 mm2, which has a fault
rating of 17.2 kA for 1 s.
A 120 mm2 conductor has a sustained current rating, at 25 °C ambient temperature, of 390 A when
installed in free air. When installed in a thermally rated fire trunking system, the in free air rating is
corrected by 0.5, so its rating is 390 × 0.5 = 195 A. This is more than adequate for the circuit.
Dependent on the earthing arrangements, the armour might also be required to carry a 14 kA fault
for 1 s. The minimum size cable that has sufficient armour to carry the fault current is a 3-core
185 mm2 cable that can carry 14.2 kA for 1 s. The rating of this cable when installed in a thermally
rated fire-resistant cable protective system is 505 × 0.5 = 252 A, which again is more than adequate
for this circuit.
The sizing of the cable for any circuit is determined by several factors; current rating is only one of
them and, as in the example given, not the determining one.
Current rating of cables in air and 1 s fault ratings can be found in cable manufacturers’ data sheets.
Annex C (informative)
Performance criteria for cable protective systems
The performance of the system is assessed in accordance with the general methodology described
within BS EN 1366‑5 for fire integrity and thermal insulation under furnace exposure conditions for
fire outside of the cable protective enclosure. The protective system performance criteria after 120
min is given in BS EN 1366‑5.
NOTE Further information on the cable protective systems in BS EN 1366‑11 is given in Annex H.
The 2003 edition of BS EN 1366‑5 was updated and revised in 2010, which included revisions to
Figure G.1, relating to the required location of the T3 thermocouples. For this reason, a copy of the
original 2003 version of Figure C.1 has been included within this annex to ensure that they are
located midway along the test sample, on the internal face of the cable protective system, as indicated.
The location of the thermocouples do not coincide with the joints in the cable enclosure.
The cable protective systems are designed and constructed so that after testing they resist the
ingression of water, possibly from firefighters’ hose streams or sprinkler activation. Cable protective
systems constructed from non-permeable materials such as steel, which can contain internal
insulation materials, are not adversely affected by water impingement from sprinkler or fire
hose activities.
In addition, for a judgement to be made on the potential adverse effects on the cables enclosed within
the duct or shaft, the surface temperature recorded by the thermocouples located inside the cable
protective system (T3) does not exceed 180 °C above the initial mean temperature.
Also, loadbearing capacity (stability) is assessed as the ability of the enclosure within the furnace to
fulfil its intended function for the specified time. Failure of the stability criteria is deemed to have
occurred when the suspension or fixing devices can no longer retain the duct or shaft in its intended
position, when sections of the duct or shaft collapse or when cracks, holes or other openings through
which flames pass are evident.
Figure C.1 — Example of test arrangement for horizontal service ducts (fire exposure from outside), adapted from
BS EN 1366-5:2003
Dimensions in millimetres
Key
a) Optional fan and extract hood d) Interior thermocouples positioned as for the large duct
b) Suspension devices e) Furnace walls
c) Furnace f) Furnace roof
Annex D (normative)
Testing of Category 3 cables of core sizes up to and
including 4 mm2 cross-sectional area
COMMENTARY ON ANNEX D
This annex recommends a method of test to be used for small cables where the requirements of
+40
BS EN 50200 are modified to use a flame temperature of (930 ) °C and the application of
0
water spray.
Annex E (normative)
Determining the cross-sectional area of drop rods
COMMENTARY ON ANNEX E
This annex is based on the guidance in BS EN 1366‑5. The purpose of this annex is to measure the ability
of ductwork systems to resist the spread of fire from one fire compartment to another without the aid of
dampers. This annex refers to a complete ductwork installation and therefore includes joints, supports
and the fire stopping through the furnace wall.
The support elements for ductwork systems are similar to those used to support cable support systems,
i.e. anchors, drop rods, horizontal channel bearers, nuts and washers, and have therefore been used as a
basis for the recommendations given in this annex.
This annex assumes that the mechanical load is evenly distributed on the support system bearers and the
two suspension threaded drop rods on each bearer are equally loaded. This might not be the case for the
cable support system or the cable protective system and this is to be accounted for, either by stipulating
that the cables installed on the support system be installed in such a way as to ensure even loading of the
bearers or an additional safety factor included to account for the uneven load distribution.
NOTE 1 Further guidance on the calculation of the mechanical loading applied to the drop rod and bearer
assemblies is given in Annex I.
The cable systems should contain a spare capacity allowance for future system extension in the
region of additional 20% to 30%; this should be confirmed in the relevant project requirements and
taken into account when analysing the support system loadbearing ability in fire.
Furthermore, the recognized practice of installing double nuts on the threaded rods should also
be incorporated to reduce the risk of premature collapse due to the failure of a single nut under
fire conditions.
NOTE 2 This annex does not preclude the use and installation of other suspension systems, such as wire suspension
systems and pre-manufactured channel support systems, provided that they can be clearly demonstrated to have
appropriate fire survival characteristics.
The cross-sectional area of the drop rods should be calculated using the following formula (E.1):
(W × Lh + WT × Lh + Wb × Lb + 2Wr × h) × 9.81
A= (E.1)
2 × ς max
where:
A is the cross-sectional area of the drop rod, in square millimetres (mm2);
NOTE If the drop rod is a threaded rod then A is based on the minor diameter (see Figure E.1).
h is the height of drop rod, in metres (m);
Lb is the length of bearer, in metres (m);
Lh is the distance between hanger supports, in metres (m);
W is the weight of cables per metre, in kilograms per metre (kg/m);
Wb is the weight of bearers per metre, in kilograms per metre (kg/m);
Wr is the weight of drop rods per metre, in kilograms per metre (kg/m);
WT is the weight of the cable protective system, cable tray or ladder rack per metre, in kilograms
per metre (kg/m);
ςmax is the maximum allowable stress, in newtons per square millimetre (N/mm2).
NOTE 3 Any additional loading to the support system, for example, from other services on combined services
bracketry or multi-service modules, is also to be taken into account when calculating the total load on the drop rods.
NOTE 4 The elements of the cable support system are shown in Figure E.1 and Figure E.2.
Figure E.1 — Typical thread detail identifying the major and minor diameters
Key
1 Drop rod 3 Cable tray or ladder
2 Cable 4 Bearer
Using information published by manufacturers of fire-rated ductwork, unprotected drop rods and
bearers made of mild steel should be sized such that the calculated stresses do not exceed the values
given in Table E.1.
Table E.1 — Maximum allowable stress of steel drop rods in fire conditions
H N/mm2
0.5 9
1 9
2 6
The threaded rod should satisfy the parameters set out in BS 3643‑1 and BS 3643‑2.
The details included in Table E.2 are intended to be indicative, and the designer should identify the
specific type of threaded rod to be installed and the relevant performance data.
Rod Minor diameter Nominal area Max. static vertical load/kg /drop rod
designation (External) mm2 30 min 60 min 120 min
BS 3643‑2:2007 (9 N/mm2) (9 N/mm2) (6 N/mm2)
M8 6.200 30.2 27.70 27.70 18.47
M10 7.858 48.5 44.49 44.49 29.66
M12 9.516 71.1 65.25 65.25 43.50
M16 13.181 136.5 125.19 125.19 83.46
M20 16.529 214.6 196.86 196.86 131.24
NOTE In practice the drop rods are generally installed in pairs, such as when used with a steel channel bearer,
therefore the potential load capacity will be double for a cable support system, provided the load is evenly
distributed on the bearer.
Annex F (informative)
Example voltage drop calculations for cables in a fire
COMMENTARY ON ANNEX F
As a rule of thumb, increasing the required cable conductor size by two sizes (as in the example of
Annex F) is considered to provide adequate protection.
In order to calculate the voltage drop of a cable in a fire, the following factors need to be
known or assumed:
a) total cable length;
b) current to be carried;
c) voltage drop per amp per metre of cable at 90 °C;
d) correction factor for voltage drop from 90 °C to cable temperature in the fire;
e) temperature of that part of the cable that is in the fire; and
f) length of that part of the cable that is in the fire.
The following correction factors are based on a copper conductor with a temperature coefficient of
0.003 93 °C:
• 90 °C to 650 °C = 2.726 0;
• 90 °C to 750 °C = 3.034 2;
• 90 °C to 850 °C = 3.342 4;
• 90 °C to 950 °C = 3.650 6.
For example, the first factor is calculated by:
1 + 0.003 93( 650 − 20 )
= 2.726 0
1 + 0.003 93( 90 − 20 )
The process of calculating the voltage drop of a cable under given operating conditions is normally
straightforward. The manufacturer’s tabulated values of voltage drop per amp per metre are
multiplied by the length of run and current to be carried, to give the expected voltage drop.
The manufacturer’s tabulated values assume that the cable conductor temperature is at its maximum
permitted operating temperature.
If the cable is involved in a fire, the conductor temperature and hence the resistance is higher,
therefore the voltage drop would be higher.
The problem in determining the voltage drop for a run of cable in a fire is not knowing the conductor
temperature at each point along its length. Therefore assumptions have to be made in calculating
what the voltage drop would be.
To illustrate the effect of assuming different lengths of cable being involved in a fire, two sets of
examples are given, one based on 5 A and the other based on 200 A load.
a) Example 1.0
Assume a 2-core 2.5 mm2 cable conforming to BS 7846, carrying 5 A over 50 m.
In normal operation the voltage drop would be:
19 × 0.001 × 5 × 50 = 4.75 V.
The voltage drop per amp per metre for this cable is 19 mV.
b) Example 1.1
Assume a 2-core 2.5 mm2 cable conforming to BS 7846, carrying 5 A over 50 m. Assume 2 m are at
750 °C and the rest of the cable is at 90 °C.
The voltage drop would be:
(19 × 0.001 × 5 × 48) + (19 × 0.001 × 3.034 2 × 5 × 2) = 5.14 V.
The voltage drop per amp per metre for this cable is 19 mV.
The correction factor from 90 °C to 750 °C for copper (Cu) is 3.034 2.
c) Example 1.2
Assume a 2-core 2.5 mm2 cable conforming to BS 7846, carrying 5 A over 50 m. Assume all 50 m
are at 750 °C.
The voltage drop would be:
19 × 0.001 × 3.034 2 × 5 × 50 = 14.41 V. The voltage drop per amp per metre for this
cable is 19 mV.
The correction factor from 90 °C to 750 °C for copper (Cu) is 3.034 2.
d) Example 2.0
Assume a 2-core 120 mm2 cable conforming to BS 7846, carrying 200 A over 50 m.
In normal operation the voltage drop would be:
0.42 × 0.001 × 200 × 50 = 4.2 V.
The voltage drop per amp per metre for this cable is 0.42 mV.
e) Example 2.1
Assume a 2-core 120 mm2 cable conforming to BS 7846, carrying 200 A over 50 m. Assume 2 m are at
750 °C and the rest of the cable is at 90 °C.
The voltage drop would be:
(0.42 × 0.001 × 200 × 48) + (0.42 × 0.001 × 3.034 2 × 200 × 2) = 4.54 V.
The voltage drop per amp per metre for this cable is 0.42 mV.
Annex G (informative)
Fire-resistant cables under fire and fault conditions
The melting temperature of copper is 1 083 °C. Therefore, if a copper conductor in any cable reaches
1 083 °C, it will melt and no longer function.
As an example, cables conforming to BS 7846 operating under normal conditions are designed to
have a maximum continuous conductor temperature of 90 °C, which is the combination of ambient
temperature and temperature rise due to carrying current. These cables are suitable for a normal
overload temperature of 250 °C based on their reuse and the fact that they have thermosetting
insulation (e.g. XLPE). The temperature rise of 160 °C (90 °C to 250 °C) is based on the conductor
carrying 143 A/mm2 for 1 s. This current is based on the standard ohms law:
V
If =
Z e + R1 + R 2
where:
If is the fault current, in amps (A);
Ze is the input impedance of the system, in ohms (Ω);
R1 is the resistance of the line conductor at average fault temperature, in ohms (Ω);
R2 is the resistance of the earth fault path at average fault temperature, in ohms (Ω).
During a fire, the fault current obtained is lower than under normal operating conditions, as both R1
and R2 are greatly increased due to their resistance being based on a much higher temperature.
Temperature correction factors for copper are shown in Table G.1.
Table G.1 — Temperature correction factors for copper
°C
20 1.0
90 1.275
170 1.590
250 1.904
650 3.476
750 3.869
800 4.065
850 4.262
900 4.458
It is extremely difficult to calculate the potential fault current of a cable when it is in a fire because
much of the information required is not known exactly, such as the temperature of the cable at the
fire, the length of cable involved in the fire, and the temperature of the cable not involved in the fire.
However, the temperature rise, due to a fault because R1 and R2 are higher than normal, will not
exceed 160 °C and quite possibly be significantly lower.
Therefore, taking into account copper’s melting temperature of 1 083 °C, and assuming a maximum
rise due to a fault of 160 °C, providing the temperature of the copper conductor before fault is less
than approximately 900 °C, the copper conductor is not expected to be at its melting temperature.
NOTE In most circumstances, increasing the required cable conductor size by two sizes (as in the example of
Annex F) is considered to provide adequate protection.
Annex H (informative)
Cable protective systems to BS EN 1366‑11
The content of BS EN 1366‑11 is unsuitable for complying with the recommendations of BS 8519
to provide fire protection to the primary and secondary power supply cables to the life safety,
fire‑fighting and other critical loads.
BS EN 1366‑11 permits and encourages the use of two and three‑sided cable protective systems,
installed against the building's structural elements, such as walls and soffits, where the joint
interface with the building structure forms a critical element of the cable protective system. Two and
three‑sided cable protective systems are not permitted by BS 8519 for this reason.
BS EN 1366‑11 is based on cable protective systems that are fabricated on site from fire-resistant
material, being custom-built for each installation. BS 8519 calls for the cable protective system to be
assembled from factory-manufactured components, utilizing simple standard components where the
joints are less dependent on the workmanship of the installer on site.
Other differences between BS EN 1366‑11 and BS 8519 include the following.
a) BS EN 1366‑11 makes no reference to the need for the cable protection system to maintain
the fire integrity in the presence of water from either sprinklers or a fireman's hose, as
recommended by BS 8519.
b) BS EN 1366‑11 makes reference to ventilators and venting of the enclosure, which are not
recognized by BS 8519.
Annex I (informative)
Guidance on calculating the mechanical loading on
the drop rods
Where the loads on a simple trapeze bracket are not evenly distributed, the load share experienced
by each drop rod can be calculated using the following method.
The load on drop rod B can be calculated using the following formula (I.1):
( L1 × d1 ) + ( L2 × d 2 ) + ( Ln × d n )
Load at B = (I.1)
distance between supports
where:
Ln is total weight of the service per metre (kg/m) multiplied by the distance between each
bracket; and
dn is distance of the load from drop rod A, in metres (m)
Therefore:
(52 × 0.15) + (7 × 0.55)
Load at B = = 14.6 kg
0.8
The point loads in Figure I.1 represent the centre line of the electrical cables on the bearer/
containment assembly. Where the ladders or trays themselves are unequally loaded, Formula (I.1) can
be used with the weights and distances of individual cables, remembering to add in the weights of the
ladder/tray/basket and the allowance for any additional spare capacity.
Figure I.1 — Example of mechanical loading on the drop rods
Annex J (informative)
Variation from the recommendations of BS 8519:2020
BS 8519 is a code of practice; its contents take the form of recommendations, rather than
requirements. The recommendations are primarily based on recognized good practice in the design
and installation of the power supplies serving life safety, fire-fighting and other critical systems.
There are, however, applications in which the recommendations would be difficult or impossible
to implement.
In these circumstances, variations from the recommendations might be necessary, even though,
in general, the user, purchaser, enforcing authority or insurer requires strict compliance with
the standard.
This does not imply that the designer or installer has freedom to ignore the recommendations of this
standard under the circumstances in which a user, purchaser, enforcing authority or insurer seeks
compliance with it. Variations need to be the subject of specific agreement amongst all interested
parties and need to be identified in all relevant system documentation (see Figure J.1).
Bibliography
For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
Standards publications
BS 7629‑1, Electric cables — Specification for 300/500 V fire resistant, screened, fixed
installation cables having low emission of smoke and corrosive gases when affected by fire —
Part 1: Multicore cables
BS 7846, Electric cables — Thermosetting insulated, armoured, fire-resistant cables of rated voltage
600/1000 V for fixed installations, having low emission of smoke and corrosive gases when affected by
fire — Specification
BS 7974, Application of fire safety engineering principles to the design of buildings — Code of practice
BS EN 1366‑5, Fire resistance tests for service installations — Part 5: Service ducts and shafts
BS EN 1366‑11, Fire resistance tests for service installations — Part 11: Fire protective systems for
cable systems and associated components
BS EN 60529:1992+A2:2013, Degrees of protection provided by enclosures (IP code)
BS EN 60702‑1, Mineral insulated cables and their terminations with a rated voltage not exceeding
750 V — Part 1: Cables
BS EN 60896‑21, Stationary lead-acid batteries — Part 21: Valve regulated types — Methods of test
BS EN 60896‑22, Stationary lead-acid batteries — Part 22: Valve regulated types — Requirements
BS ISO 8528‑5, Reciprocating internal combustion engine driven alternating current generating sets —
Part 5: Generating sets
IEC 60364‑5‑56, Low-voltage electrical installations — Part 5-56: Selection and erection of electrical
equipment — Safety services
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