The Limitations On Methods and Means of Warfare: by P.J. Cameron Colonel, Department of Defence, Canberra
The Limitations On Methods and Means of Warfare: by P.J. Cameron Colonel, Department of Defence, Canberra
That matter of fact quotation dates from the year 1910, when it was used to
introduce a discourse on the present subject. One could be forgiven for
wondering whether, despite the experiences of the intervening 70 years and the
earnestness with which we have sought to clarify the law, we have yet managed
to find ways of satisfactorily avoiding the likelihood of "disputed questions"
continuing to arise well into the foreseeable future.
War is a very ancient custom - one which, although now stripped of most of
its former legal character and respectability, we do not appear able to cast away.
In consequence, the law of armed conflict has lost none of its importance.
What follows is not intended to be a technical treatise, it is a simple account of
the nature of the law of armed conflict and a brief commentary on recent efforts
to develop and to reaffirm certain of its more significant rules.
The term "methods and means of warfare" is of fairly recent vintage. One can
sense vaguely, rather than know confidently, what it signifies. Coined along the
way and adopted during their deliberations by the drafters of Protocols I and I1
additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims
- who neglected to define its meaning with any degree of precision - the term
appears to embrace strategies and tactics, and every other measure by which,
with the use of manpower and weaponry, an armed force may carry on hostile
operations against its opponents. But one is not sure.
Let us, however, return to that problem after a brief survey of the nature and
development of the law of armed conflict - of which the rules imposing the
limitations on methods and means of warfare constitute one branch.
The law of armed conflict (in the past more usually known as the law of war) is
that part of international law which regulates the conduct of armed hostilities.
The law of armed conflict does not contemplate the legality of recourse to war,
nor does it have any bearing on the right to threaten or use farce in international
affairs. Questions surrounding those matters are the subject of other parts of the
law. The province and function of the law of armed conflict is limited and
specific. It has been described in these terms:'
"The truth is that when war enters on the scene all law that was previously
concerned with the dispute retires, and a new law steps in, directed only to
secure fair and not too inhuman fighting."
As that comment clearly indicates, the law of armed conflict comes into play
whenever war begins and it remains in force whilst ever a state of war exists. The
law of armed conflict applies not only in declared wars but in all armed conflicts,
without regard to any of the circumstances which provoke their outbreak or
justify their being waged. That a war or other situation of armed conflict arises as
the result of aggression is immaterial to the application of the law of armed
conflict.
The law of armed conflict imposes duties and confers rights. It binds all
belligerents, whether they assent or not. Its obligations and benefits apply
equally to all parties to a conflict, and impartially to its victims, without regard to
the causes that they espouse or that are attributed to them.'
Unlike most other parts of international law, the law of armed conflict binds
individuals as well as States. In particular, the law of armed conflict binds
members of armed forces, who ignore it at their peril. Members of armed forces
who are guilty of acts of commission or omission contrary to the rules of the law
of armed conflict may be tried by the authorities of their own State or, in some
circumstances, by the authorities of other States.'
It is said that three principles underlie the law of armed conflict and
continuously condition its evolution. These are, in the order in which they are
most often stated, the following:
1. the principle of necessity, by virtue of which a belligerent has the right to
apply any amount and any kind of force necessary to compel the
submission of the enemy with the minimum expenditure of time,
material and money;
2. the principle of humanity, which forbids the application of such amounts
and kinds of force as are superfluous to the purpose of overwhelming an
adversary; and
3. the principle of chivalry, which demands a certain amount of fairness
and mutual respect between adversaries.'
Derived from the second of these principles, but no less relevant, are four
subsidiary principles enumerated in the preamble to the Declaration of St
Petersburg (1868). These are:"
- that the only legitimate object . . . during war is to weaken the military
forces of the enemy;
- that, for this purpose, it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible
number of men;
- that this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which
uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death'
inevitable; and
of 1949 for the protection of war victims and certain provisions of the Protocols
of 1977 additional to them.
The codification of Hague Law can be traced back to 1868 when, to all
appearances, it began spontaneously. Meeting at the invitation of the Czar,
Alexander 11, the European powers agreed to prohibit the use of explosive
bullets.' This agreement, the Declaration of St Petersburg, the first of its kind,
depended upon acceptance of the view that the mere efficacy of a weapon does
not justify its use. It was less of an advance than may be thought. The explosive
bullet in question was a weapon which, although it had been developed, no State
wished either to employ, or to have employed against its forces. However, the
Declaration of St Petersburg, in setting the "technical limits at which the
necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity" did far more
than ban a bullet. It gave expression to principles which were to become a
yardstick for testing the legitimacy of other things done in war.
The Czar had promoted the negotiation of the Declaration of St Petersburg. He
was to be a moving force behind later events as well, in particular, the convening
of the conference of 1874, which adopted the Declaration of Brussels, a draft
convention purporting to state in an acceptable and agreed form what were the
laws and customs of war then in force. Thereafter, his successor, Nicholas 11,
was responsible for the convening of the First and Second Peace Conferences,
held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, respectively.
These Peace Conferences ignored, as impossible, the task of agreeing on
measures for general disarmament. Instead, they devoted their energies to the
formulation and adoption of a series of declarations and conventions, some (on
the basis of the St Petersburg principles) proscribing the use of particular
weapons and means of attack regarded as obnoxious, others codifying the rules
according to which, thereafter, warfare was to be conducted."' Arguably, the
most important achievement of the Peace Conferences was the adoption in 1907
of the fourth Hague Convention, to which are annexed the "Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land" (the Hague Rules). Despite
their title, the Hague Rules specify a number of universal principles and rules
which are relevant and applicable wherever war takes place.
Under no illusions about the predictable shortcomings of the agreements
which they had adopted, the authors of the Hague Conventions and Declarations
intended that Hague Law (including the Hague Rules) should be periodically
revised." History suggests that this was an exercise which States were not
unhappy to avoid. The only concerted effort made before the Second World War
(an attempt, in 1923, to draft rules of aerial warfare) failed. The, almost a1
fresco, adoption of the Geneva Gas Protocol in 1925 added to Hague Law but
9. Spaight, War Rights on Land, (1911). 79; also Fenwick, International Law (1965). 667-8.
10. The Peace Conference had a variety of references available to it. Apart from the text of the
Declaration of Brussels, there was the code of Instructions, drafted by the jurist Lieber and
adopted by the United States in 1863, the Oxford Manual and the Declaration of St Petersburg.
The texts are reproduced in Schindler and Toman, op cit.
1 1 . As to possible short-comings, one should take careful note of the preamble, including the
so-called de Martens clause which prefaces the fourth Hague Convention:
"On the other hand, the High Contracting Parties clearly do not intend that unforeseen cases
should, in the absence of a written undertaking, be left to the arbitrary judgement of military
commanders.
The Limitations on Methods and Means of Wagare 251
Status", consists of rules which define, with greater precision than before, those
forces and, hence, those individuals, who may lawfully engage in combat during
hostilities. They spell out the obligation of individuals to identify themselves as
combatants and lay down the circumstances in which failure to do so will deprive
an individual of his right to prisoner-of-war status upon capture.''
The articles comprising the third, and by far the largest, group appear under
the heading "Civilian Population". They prescribe a variety of rules for the
protection of civilians as individuals and the civilian population as a collective
entity. The obligations which these articles impose range from the creation of
restrictions upon the manner in which it is lawful for those who plan and execute
attacks to commence and to carry out hostile operations likely to affect civilians,
to the stipulation that authorities must take active steps to guard their own
populations from the consequences of military operations."
Which exactly were the "certain cardinal Hague Rules" revised by the
Humanitarian Law Conference? The chief of them was Article 22 which,
repeating a well-recognised rule of customary law,20provides that "the right . . .
to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited" .*I Doubtless founded on
notions of both chivalry and humanity, it must be regarded as the primary
principle of the law of armed conflict. In fact, reading the Rules seriatim, one
cannot escape the feeling that Article 22 was always so regarded. The articles
which follow it are more specific, their particularity in marked contrast with the
generality of Article 22.
The next such cardinal Hague Rule was Article 23(e), providing that, in
addition to the prohibitions provided by "special Conventions", it is especially
forbidden to employ "arms, projectiles and materials calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering".'? This language is an imitation of part of the preamble to
the Declaration of St Petersburg. The "special Conventions" referred to are,
obviously, the ones concerning the use of weapons, entered into at St Petersburg
and The Hague (related to, notably, explosive bullets and dum-dum bullets).
Article 22(e) has been said to "enshrine" a principle that had been enunciated at
St Petersburg: the employment of weapons which uselessly aggravate suffering
or render death inevitable is contrary to the laws of humanity.
Intentionally or otherwise, the Humanitarian Law Conference added new
dimensions to Articles 22 and 23(e) and, into the bargain, supplemented the
result by adding a third, apparently new, rule. Thus, Article 22 underwent a
"sea-change" and emerged (as Article 35.1 of Protocol I) reading ". . . the
right . . . to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited". Article 23(e)
emerged (as Article 35.2) prohibiting the employment of "weapons, projectiles
and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superflous injury or
unnecessary suffering". The new rule, in Article 35.3, forbids the employment
of "methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment".
Modelled on the wording in the ENMOD (Environmental Modification)
Convention" this last-mentioned rule might be regarded as novel. However, on
another view, it might just as easily be seen as little more than a specific
statement of the old customary law principles and rules which proscribe
devastation and laying waste unless they serve a clearly justifiable and definite
military end. Incidentally, Article 35.3 is likely to be the subject of some
interpretative differences, especially in light of the variety of statements of
understanding about its meaning recorded during the process of negotiation.
All of that apart, the phrase "methods and means of warfare" appears first in
Article 35. It appears also in Article 36. Article 51.2, which prohibits
indiscriminate attacks, defines such attacks by reference to "a method or means
of combat". Article 51 ..5(a) refers to "bombardment by any method or means
. . .". Article 54.1 describes starvation as "a method of warfare". In one way
or another the phrase "methods and means" is well entrenched in Protocol I.
The traditional phrase "means of injuring the enemy", although admittedly
vague, had always seemed comfortable and comprehensible - even if perhaps
because of its familiarity. The meaning it had conveyed to the author of this
paper was tied to the notion of acts committed with the direct intention of visiting
physical harm (including death) on the person of any individual belonging to the
forces of the enemy. Ordinarily these acts would be committed by the use of
weapons. It was a short step from there to accepting that the enemy was also
equally susceptible to injury in a different sense 2 e.g., if his fortifications and
installations and supplies, and so forth, were damaged or destroyed by
bombardment, burning or other "means". One could not quarrel about Article
35 if it used words which did no more than convey those same notions. But, as
Article 36 suggests, there is a great deal of difference between, e.g., a means of
injuring the enemy and a method of injuring the enemy, or a means of combat
and a method of combat.
Article 36 obliges States contemplating the study, development, acquisition or
adoption of a new weapon, a new means of warfare or a new method of warfare,
to determine whether the employment, in some or all circumstances, of that new
weapon, new means or new method of warfare would be prohibited by Protocol I
or by any other rule of international law.
Such an obligation hardly seems too onerous, if the basic rules in Article 35
are valid and are to be observed in good faith. Indeed, one might even call it
redundant, because it is a natural corollary to Article 35. It does, nevertheless,
23. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, 1977, (1977) 16 ILM 88, which prohibits the use of environmental
modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other State party to the Convention.
The Limitations on Methods and Means of Wafare 255
impose upon States something much more than a mere theoretical moral
obligation. It requires all States consciously (and conscientiously) to examine the
implications of each step in their continuing efforts to develop and expand their
arsenals and the overall capacity of their forces to wage war successfully.
But that is not the real issue! The real issue is this: What do expressions such
as "methods and means of warfare" signify? The author of this paper put that
very question bluntly to Committee I11 of the Humanitarian Law Conference. He
received no answers, only bland assurances that the adoption of these words
would increase the protections given by Humanitarian Law. When he asked
"how", there was no answer at all! No-one else took up the issue; the phrase
"methods and means" passed into law - undefined. As a term it remains
undefined bv Protocol I.?'
This is n o b ~ a c eto describe the possible origins of the phrase. However, it was
probably in correspondence circulated by the ICRC before the Humanitarian Law
Conference. Picked up unconsciously by individuals and accepted as seemingly
very satisfactory, the term probably obtained acceptance through frequent use.
At least, this writer so suspects. His notes on the subject, as prepared and used
during the Humanitarian Law Conference, are attached for consideration by any
reader who wishes to pursue the subject.
In view of the variety of contexts into which, in Protocol I, the words
"methods" and "means" have been adopted and, in view of the clear desire of
the overwhelming majority of States at t h e Humanitarian Law Conference to
expand the protections afforded by the law, one has to conclude that the term
"methods and means of warfare" must have a very wide meaning: a meaning
such as that suggested at the outset in this paper -something like: "all strategies
and tactics and every other measure which, by the use of manpower and weapons
systems, an armed force may employ". Whether the adoption of such an
interpretation will help relieve human suffering hereafter remains to be seen.
Assuming that the law has been widened in this way, let us examine two areas
- rights proscribing the use of particular weapons and rules governing the
conduct of combatants.
Efforts to ban weapons have rarely been very successful or, if successful,
useful.?' For example, the Declaration of St Petersburg, in effect, proscribed one
anti-personnel weapon. This was a relatively minor explosive device which
no-one really welcomed. But the Declaration left open the right to use more
powerful explosive projectiles which they all wanted - shells - and did not
prevent the continuing use of anti-personnel hand-grenades. Dum-dum bullets
(proscribed at The Hague in 1899) cause wounds no more horrifying than do
modern high-velocity small-arms ammunition. In any event, dum-dum bullets
(under the less emotive names of "expanding" or "soft-nosed" bullets) are in
common use in metropolitan police forces - because they are said to be more
effective agents for disabling an individual without risk to others! The
24. The subject of "methods and means of warfare", including this author's questions as to the
meaning of that expression, is the subject of analysis and comment by Professor Kalshoven
(1978) 9 Neth. YB of Int Law, pp 146 et seq. (Although this author would not accept Professor
Kalshoven's criticisms of what this author said at the Humanitarian Law Conference, this is not
an appropriate forum to discuss that issue.)
25. For a brief account of the failures, see Fenwick, op cit, 667-72.
256 Australian Year Book of International Law
prohibition of the use of projectiles solely to diffuse harmful gases was ignored in
the First World War. The temporary prohibition of the dropping of explosives
and projectiles (i.e., bombs) from balloons was never extended, and aerial
bombing is a common practice in most wars.
It is easy enough to make the cynical comment that States will never agree to
forego the use of weapons unless those weapons are militarily useless anyhow, or
else have become obsolete or ineffectual. It is to be hoped that the recently
adopted international agreement for limitations on the use of certain conventional
weapons - it owes its existence to efforts which began at the Humanitarian Law
Conference - will succeed. The parties to that agreement have covenanted to
ban fragmenting weapons which inflict wounds with particles that are not
detectable by X-rays, to limit the use of air delivered incendiary weapons, and to
regulate the circumstances under which mines and booby-traps may be laid.'"f
this multi-tiered agreement finds acceptance and general observance, it, with the
Geneva Gas Protocol will be of unique value to humanity. Whatever its defects,
at least the prohibition on the use of gas has been observed (with, until recently,
only two confirmed but relatively minor exceptions). But, whether this has been
out of respect for law, or as the result of a balance of terror, is by no means
clear."
Current allegations regarding the use of chemical agents and, perhaps, gas, in
the Middle East raise doubts about the future observance of the Geneva Gas
Protocol. Moreover, whilst many States interpret the Geneva Gas Protocol as
prohibiting the use of agents such as tear-gas in war, those same States use tear
gas often enough in case of riot and disorder in their domestic affairs. It is by no
means easy to predict the future of weaponry limitations or even to find logic in
their nature.
It seems apt to refer again to Lawrence, with whose words I prefaced this
paper. His comment was as follows:2x
"The attempts which have been made to forbid the introduction of new
inventions into warfare, or prevent the use of instruments that cause
destruction on a large scale, are doomed to failure. Man always has
improved his weapons, and always will as long as he has need for them at
all. But we can hope for a general recognition of the inutility as well as the
cruelty of adding torture to disablement. Suffering there must be, as long as
there is war. But unnecessary suffering ought to be, and can be, abolished."
If Articles 35 and 36 do no more than bring that last thought closer to fruition,
the formulation of Protocol I will not be wasted. However, neither of those
26. The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 1980.
Adopted simultaneously were three Protocols. The first on "Non-Detectable Fragments", the
second on "Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices",
the third on "Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons". The Conference
also adopted a resolution which appeals to governments to exercise care in developing
"small-calibre weapon systems" in order to avoid increasing the injurious effects of such
weapons.
27. Gas was used by Italy against Ethiopia in 1935-1936. Although the Nazis used gas for the
genocide of civilians during the Second World War, it was not used in battle - see, eg,
Greenspan, The Modern Law of Armed Conflict (1959).
28. Lawrence, op cit, 533.
The Limitations on Methods and Means of Warfare 257
articles will pievent war, nor will they persuade States to disarm or to abandon
efforts to increase the efficiency and economy of their arsenals.
If it is assumed, as this paper assumes, that war will be a continuing feature of
international affairs, it becomes material to consider the way in which other
Hague Rules which have now been "refurbished" by Protocol I will affect us in
the future.
Article 23 of the Hague Rules, apart from its reference to arms, projectiles and
materials, forbids killing or wounding treacherously and killing or wounding
those who have abandoned their arms or have surrendered. Further, it forbids
declaring that no quarter will be given and prohibits the improper use of flags of
truce and enemy flags, uniforms and insignia. Article 24 of the Hague Rules
states that the use of ruses for gaining intelligence is allowable. Later articles
create a code to regulate both the conduct of espionage on the battlefield and the
treatment of captured spies.
All of these provisions were considered by the Humanitarian Law Conference
and, in a sense, rewritten. In overall terms the new version of the law is more
specific than the old but has much the same effect. However, whilst some old
uncertainties may have disappeared, one cannot be sure that new ones have not
appeared to take their places. For example, the old concept of "treachery" has
not been replaced. It remains unaltered but is supplemented by a new concept in
a new rule, a rule (Article 37.1) which prohibits killing, wounding or capturing
"by resort to perfidy". Perfidy is an old term but one which really defies
definition. In an endeavour to avoid this problem, Article 37.1 suggests that an
individual has the right to trust his enemy to observe the rules of armed conflict.
Although the old adage that "all is fair in love and war" was never more than
half true, the pressures of armed conflict and the desire for victory can lead even
a worthy individual to twist the rules in order to outdo an adversary. Confidence
in the enemy? Soldiers will laugh at that notion. They will always, indeed, will
usually be trained to, believe that, even if he does not ignore the rules, the enemy
can never be trusted. Article 37.1 of Protocol I is inadequate and unrealistic. It is
bound to have a cool reception, more especially since it is modified by Article
44.3 in favour of irregular combatants.
If anything, articles like Article 37 heighten uncertainty. The Hague Rules
dealt with treachery (the cousin of perfidy) in one place and ruses and
intelligence gathering in another place. Protocol I deals with them together.
Article 37.1 forbids perfidy. Article 37.2 acclaims that ruses are not prohibited.
Article 37.2 really tells us that acts which do not infringe international law, and
are not perfidious, are lawful. One would have thought that was self-evident.
Ruses may possibly be regarded as "methods of warfare", even "methods of
combat" but, without a definition, who knows?
The new rules regarding sieges and bombardments, and that is what the rules
grouped under the heading "Civilian Population" are about, very largely repeat
what all right-minded people believe should be the state of the law.
There is now a "basic rule" (spelt out in Article 48) that, during operations,
armed forces must actively distinguish between civilian populations and
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and, according-
ly, may direct their use of violence only against proper military targets. Not
really new, but a salutary warning to all armed forces, this provision does not
258 Australian Year Book of International Law
give directly the right to use violence. That right, where it exists, depends on
other rules of international law. Hague Law, Geneva Law, and Humanitarian
Law merelv indicate the limitations and conditions which must be observed when
States do resort to violence.
As a consequence of these limitations and conditions, indiscriminate attacks
not directed against specific military targets are wholly unlawful. The
employment alike of "methods or means of combat" which cannot be directed at
specific military targets or of "methods or means of combat", the effects of
which cannot be limited, is prohibited. That is to say, there can be no
indiscriminate bombing or shelling without regard to the effect it will have upon
civilians and their property. Moreover, attacks which will lead to disproportion-
ate and excessive casualties amongst civilians or which will cause unjustified
loss and damage to civilian objects are also u n l a ~ f u l . ' ~
There is nothing especially surprising in the adoption of these rules. However,
their being stipulated in detail in an instrument acceptable to the majority of
members of the international community, holds the promise that, even if we
cannot avoid wars, we can at least limit their effects.
The prohibition of attacks directed against "civilian objects" and specific
objects of a cultural or religious character, the prohibition of the use of starvation
of civilians and the rules for the protection of food producing areas, the natural
environment and of hydroelectric and nuclear installations have two facets. They
tend to preserve the world's shrinking assets. They also serve to insulate civilians
from the effects of war.
There is one other comment to be made. Neither Hague Law nor Humanitarian
Law is designed to control nuclear warfare or the use of nuclear weapons.
Rightly or wrongly, Protocol I seems to have been negotiated on that
understanding, even despite the recognised urgency of the need for agreements
on nuclear disarmament and for the prohibition of the development and use of
other weapons of mass destruction, e.g., chemical and biological weapons. A
recent work describing the achievements of the Humanitarian Law Conference
makes this point a n d explains the position in some detail."
There are two schools of thought regarding the legality of nuclear weapons.
The one school maintains that their use would be unlawful as contrary to
fundamental principles of law (such as those in Protocol I which we have been
considering). The other school maintains that notwithstanding these principles
nuclear weapons and their use remains lawful, since they are not the subject of
the specific proscriptions necessary to outlaw the use of any weapon.
Perhaps, if nuclear war erupts, it will be fought according to rules which are in
fact an adapted version of the law of armed conflict. That issue, already the
subject of speculation, demands attention."
In conclusion - this has to be said:"
29. Articles 48-60 of Protocol 1 really constitute a code for the conduct of operations which imposes
duties on States, military authorities at several levels, civil authorities and individuals. This code
supplements existing protective rules rather than making up a new regime.
30. Bothe, Partsch and Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts (1982). 188-92.
31. For a general examination of this subject from the United States viewpoint see Builder and
Graubard, The International Laws of Armed Conflict: Implicutions for the Concept of Assured
Destruction ( 1982).
32. Bothe, Partsch and Solf, op cit, 184.
The Limitations on Methods and Means of Warfare 259
"War is the means to an end, not an end in itself. The object of war is not to
destroy the enemy but is to overcome him by force and, having done so, to
restore peace. Centuries of human experience have led to the conclusion
that the use in war of excessive violence leading to the destruction of life
and property to an extent exceeding that minimum which is necessary to
deprive the enemy of his capacity and will to resist is not only wasteful, but
even amoral. "
In order to overcome the enemy and to compel his submission it is necessary to
weaken his powers to resist. These powers are vested in his armed forces and the
installations, equipment and material at the disposal of those forces, all of which
may be attacked, destroyed or captured. Troops may be killed or disabled, they
may be taken captive or have their morale weakened. Supplies and sources of
supply may be destroyed or seized. The law of armed conflict and, in particular,
the rules which impose limitations on methods and means of warfare govern such
matters. To be effective, those rules must be universally agreed, uniformly
interpreted and invariably observed.
If we agree that war is only a means to an end, we should have in mind Sir
Keith Hancock's remark, concerning Ghandi's technique of non-violence:
Ghandi had discovered that "As your means are, so will your ends be a l ~ o . " ~If'
we desire to continue civilization, let our conduct of war be governed by the
constraints of civilization.
33. Hancock, Four Studies of War and Peace in this Century (1961), 59-60.
260 Australian Year Book of International Law
1. This brief survey examines the ICRC documentation beginning with that
presented to the first Experts' Conference of 1971. Although the ideas, and
perhaps the language, of the present ICRC draft clearly received an airing and
may have been given full approval at an earlier stage (including at the meeting of
Red Cross Experts at The Hague, 1971) it is probably irrelevant for present
purposes to investigate in detail all the events which took place before 1971.
2. However, it is to be noted that, with a memorandum dated 19 May 1969
addressed to parties to the Geneva Conventions seeking views on ways of
obtaining better protection for victims of armed conflicts and development of the
law, the ICRC enclosed an Annex which made reference to "weapons and
methods" (see documents entitled "VIII-Annexes" CE18b p 69 presented by the
ICRC to the Experts' Conference, 1971). The agenda for the Experts'
Conference, 1971 (ibid p 85) also contained an item "Reaffirmation and
determination of the rules . . . prohibiting certain methods of warfare". The
agenda for the Red Cross Experts' 197 1 meeting at The Hague, 197 1 contained
an identical item (ibid p 90).
3. In the document entitled "IV-Rules Relevant to Behaviour of Combatants"
(CE 4b) also presented by the ICRC to the Experts' Conference, 1971, after
reproducing Article 23(e) of the Hague Regulations, the ICRC commented, inter
alia, that whilst that rule required combatants to "forego the use of certain
weapons and certain methods of warfare", the rule evidently "leaves a rather
broad latitude for evaluation". The ICRC concluded (p 6) that "it appears . . .
the Hague Rule should be retained. But since it covers explicitly only arms,
projectiles or material, might it not be given a more general scope by extending it
to take in all means or methods calculated to cause unnecessary suffering?"
(emphasis added). The document does not appear elsewhere to mention the word
"methods".
4. The Report of the Experts' Conference, 1971 contains several incidental
references to "methods", the word being used in a variety of contexts. For
example, the heading of Chapter IV of the summation of debate in Commission
11 on "Rules Applicable in Guerilla Warfare" (p 70) is "Methods of Warfare"
but the paras under this heading contain no reference to weaponry.
5. Additionally, the Report of Commission 111, Part I entitled "Protection of
Civilian Population Against Dangers of Hostilities" at p 74 (para 420) mentions,
as a matter of substance debated by the Commission, "illicit methods,
concerning weapons, famine and terrorisation". In introducing debate on
bombardments the ICRC expert also referred to "illicit means and methods" (p
82 para 473), and at least 3 proposals CEICOM 111133 (Brazil), CEICOM 111136
(Spain) and CEICOM 111144 (Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab
Republic and The Netherlands( - refer pp 94, 95 and 98 respect~vely- contain
varying uses of the words "method" or "methods". However, the Report does
not appear to contain any reference to discussion of, or agreement upon, the
meaning then ascribed to this expression.
6. Article 30 of the draft Protocol presented by the ICRC to the Experts'
Conference, 1972 (see the Report Vol I1 p 5) contained provisions equivalent to
The Limirurions on Methods and Means of Watjkre 261