Republic of the Philippines the purpose of raising the prices thereof; to

SUPREME COURT corner or hoard said products as defined in

Manila section three of this Act; . . .

EN BANC Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or

hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the meaning of
G.R. No. 17122             February 27, 1922 this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define
any basic for fixing the price.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant. of this Act or of the regulations, orders and
decrees promulgated in accordance therewith
shall be punished by a fine of not more than
Williams & Ferrier for appellant. five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee. not more than two years, or both, in the
discretion of the court: Provided, That in the
JOHNS, J.: case of companies or corporations the
manager or administrator shall be criminally
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature liable.
passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the
monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General,
and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating with the consent of the Council of State, shall
the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the consider that the public interest requires the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of application of the provisions of this Act, he
State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations shall so declare by proclamation, and any
therefor, and making an appropriation for this provisions of other laws inconsistent herewith
purpose," the material provisions of which are as shall from then on be temporarily suspended.
follows:
Upon the cessation of the reasons for which
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby such proclamation was issued, the Governor-
authorized, whenever, for any cause, General, with the consent of the Council of
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary State, shall declare the application of this Act
rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue to have likewise terminated, and all laws
and promulgate, with the consent of the temporarily suspended by virtue of the same
Council of State, temporary rules and shall again take effect, but such termination
emergency measures for carrying out the shall not prevent the prosecution of any
purpose of this Act, to wit: proceedings or cause begun prior to such
termination, nor the filing of any proceedings
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, for an offense committed during the period
and speculation in, palay, rice or corn. covered by the Governor-General's
proclamation.
(b) To establish and maintain a government
control of the distribution or sale of the August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a
commodities referred to or have such proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be
distribution or sale made by the Government sold.
itself.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the
(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of
palay rice, or corn that a company or rice at an excessive price as follows:
individual may acquire, and the maximum sale
price that the industrial or merchant may The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a
demand. violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the
Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the
(d) . . . 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the
provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No.
2868, committed as follows:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit,
prevent or in any other manner obstruct the
production or milling of palay, rice or corn for
 That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure
in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this
said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and state of facts, if the law is valid and the Governor-
criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price
rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or
which is a price greater than that fixed by without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal.
Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor- There may not have been any cause, and the price may
General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of not have been extraordinary, and there may not have
August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found
of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law. the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation,
and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and crime.
sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the
claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Constitution of the United States all powers are vested
Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty
finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to
imposing the sentence. execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the
law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or
The official records show that the Act was to take effect construe the law, the Executive has no authority to
on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no
the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the power to make or execute the law. Subject to the
1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme
on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary
itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919. only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not
constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the
Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which
The question here involves an analysis and construction rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another,
of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor- and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No.
General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative
will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor- power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all
General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the
cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative
purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto
of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to
the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature authorize the Governor-General to make rules and
does not undertake to specify or define under what regulations to carry the law into effect, then the
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation
shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act
issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and
what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor- some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law
General. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-
arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative
palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or power, is unconstitutional and void.
define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to
the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also
says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the The Supreme Court of the United States in what is
Council of State," is authorized to issue and promulgate known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183-187; 24 L. ed.,
"temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying 94), first laid down the rule:
out the purposes of this Act." It does not specify or
define what is a temporary rule or an emergency Railroad companies are engaged in a public
measure, or how long such temporary rules or employment affecting the public interest and,
emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or under the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are
when they shall take effect. That is to say, the subject to legislative control as to their rates of
Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or fare and freight unless protected by their
defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole charters.
judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to
say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to
is not "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as establish reasonable maximum rates of
 charges for the transportation of freights and The difference between the power to say what
passengers on the different railroads of the the law shall be, and the power to adopt rules
State is not void as being repugnant to the and regulations, or to investigate and
Constitution of the United States or to that of determine the facts, in order to carry into
the State. effect a law already passed, is apparent. The
true distinction is between the delegation of
It was there for the first time held in substance that a power to make the law, which necessarily
railroad was a public utility, and that, being a public involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
utility, the State had power to establish reasonable the conferring an authority or discretion to be
maximum freight and passenger rates. This was exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a similar
law, providing for, and empowering, a railroad The legislature enacts that all freights rates
commission to hear and determine what was a just and and passenger fares should be just and
reasonable rate. The constitutionality of this law was reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix
attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota these rates at whatever it deemed equal and
in a learned and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, reasonable.
in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul ry.
Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held: They have not delegated to the commission
any authority or discretion as to what the law
Regulations of railway tariffs — Conclusiveness shall be, — which would not be allowable, —
of commission's tariffs. — Under Laws 1887, c. but have merely conferred upon it an
10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad authority and discretion, to be exercised in the
and warehouse commission as to what are execution of the law, and under and in
equal and reasonable fares and rates for the pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible.
transportation of persons and property by a The legislature itself has passed upon the
railway company is conclusive, and, in expediency of the law, and what is shall be.
proceedings by mandamus to compel The commission is intrusted with no authority
compliance with the tariff of rates or discretion upon these questions. It can
recommended and published by them, no neither make nor unmake a single provision of
issue can be raised or inquiry had on that law. It is merely charged with the
question. administration of the law, and with no other
power.
Same — constitution — Delegation of power to
commission. — The authority thus given to the The delegation of legislative power was before the
commission to determine, in the exercise of Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Dowling vs. Lancoshire
their discretion and judgement, what are equal Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:
and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of
legislative power. "The true distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily
It will be noted that the law creating the railroad involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
commission expressly provides — conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in
That all charges by any common carrier for the pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
transportation of passengers and property to the latter no valid objection can be made."
shall be equal and reasonable.
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide
With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to definitely and clearly what the standard policy should
the railroad commission to investigate all the facts, to contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate. required to take the place of all others, without the
Even then that law does not make the violation of the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect
order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is a to maters involving the exercise of a legislative
civil proceeding. It was there held — discretion that could not be delegated, and without
which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act
in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were
That the legislative itself has the power to required to be issued.
regulate railroad charges is now too well
settled to require either argument or citation
of authority. The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law
must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when
it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and
nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or vital to the integrity and maintenance of the
other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in system of government ordained by the
form and substance, it is a law in all its details in Constitution."
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if
necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed If, after the passage of the act and the
fact or event. promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove
and grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in
The delegation of legislative power was before the violation of the regulations, they were making
Supreme Court in United States vs. Grimaud (220 U.S., an unlawful use of the government's property.
506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and In doing so they thereby made themselves
regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to a liable to the penalty imposed by Congress.
trespass on government land in a forest reserve were
valid constitutional. The Act there provided that the The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are
Secretary of Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and defined. The lands are set apart as a forest reserve. He is
regulations and establish such service as will insure the required to make provisions to protect them from
object of such reservations; namely, to regulate their depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized
occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon 'to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the
from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of forests from destruction.' A violation of reasonable
this act or such rules and regulations shall be rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property
punished, . . ." is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."

The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says: The above are leading cases in the United States on the
question of delegating legislative power. It will be noted
In refusing permits to use a forest reservation that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a railroad
for stock grazing, except upon stated terms or company was a public corporation, and that a railroad
in stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture was a public utility, and that, for such reasons, the
merely assert and enforces the proprietary legislature had the power to fix and determine just and
right of the United States over land which it reasonable rates for freight and passengers.
owns. The regulation of the Secretary,
therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were
even of administrative, power; but is an just and reasonable, the legislature could delegate the
ordinary and legitimate refusal of the power to ascertain the facts and determine from the
landowner's authorized agent to allow person facts what were just and reasonable rates,. and that in
having no right in the land to use it as they vesting the commission with such power was not a
will. The right of proprietary control is delegation of legislative power.
altogether different from governmental
authority.
The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a
"Wisconsin standard policy of fire insurance," and the
The opinion says: court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should
From the beginning of the government, contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy
various acts have been passed conferring upon required to take the place of all others, without the
executive officers power to make rules and determination of the insurance commissioner in respect
regulations, — not for the government of their to matters involving the exercise of a legislative
departments, but for administering the laws discretion that could not be delegated."
which did govern. None of these statutes could
confer legislative power. But when Congress The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra
had legislated power. But when Congress had dealt with rules and regulations which were
legislated and indicated its will, it could give to promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for
those who were to act under such general Government land in the forest reserve.
provisions "power to fill up the details" by the
establishment of administrative rules and
regulations, the violation of which could be These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact
punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by a law, and that it cannot delegate it legislative authority.
Congress, or by penalties fixed by Congress, or
measured by the injury done. The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a
delegation of legislative power is pointed out and
That "Congress cannot delegate legislative clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
power is a principle universally recognized as says:
 That no part of the legislative power can be promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice
delegated by the legislature to any other could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and
department of the government, executive or that he would not commit a crime, because there would
judicial, is a fundamental principle in be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any
constitutional law, essential to the integrity price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence
and maintenance of the system of government of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any
established by the constitution. price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the Governor-
Where an act is clothed with all the forms of General issued the proclamation. There was no act of
law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any
provided that it shall become operative only price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any
upon some certain act or event, or, in like price was to a crime.
manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The Executive order2 provides:
The legislature cannot delegate its power to
make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a (5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or
power to determine some fact or state of corn is hereby fixed, for the time being as
things upon which the law makes, or intends follows:
to make, its own action to depend.
In Manila —
The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which
provides: Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 29
centavos per ganta.
All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11
o'clock P.M. each day and remain closed until 5 Rice at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63
o'clock on the following morning, unless by centavos per ganta.
special permission of the president.
Corn at P8 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 34
Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the centavos per ganta.
Supreme Court of that State says:
In the provinces producing palay, rice and
We regard the ordinance as void for two corn, the maximum price shall be the Manila
reasons; First, because it attempts to confer price less the cost of transportation from the
arbitrary power upon an executive officer, and source of supply and necessary handling
allows him, in executing the ordinance, to expenses to the place of sale, to be determined
make unjust and groundless discriminations by the provincial treasurers or their deputies.
among persons similarly situated; second,
because the power to regulate saloons is a
law-making power vested in the village board, In provinces, obtaining their supplies from
which cannot be delegated. A legislative body Manila or other producing provinces, the
cannot delegate to a mere administrative maximum price shall be the authorized price
officer power to make a law, but it can make a at the place of supply or the Manila price as
law with provisions that it shall go into effect the case may be, plus the transportation cost,
or be suspended in its operations upon the from the place of supply and the necessary
ascertainment of a fact or state of facts by an handling expenses, to the place of sale, to be
administrative officer or board. In the present determined by the provincial treasurers or
case the ordinance by its terms gives power to their deputies.
the president to decide arbitrary, and in the
exercise of his own discretion, when a saloon (6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies
shall close. This is an attempt to vest are hereby directed to communicate with, and
legislative discretion in him, and cannot be execute all instructions emanating from the
sustained. Director of Commerce and Industry, for the
most effective and proper enforcement of the
The legal principle involved there is squarely in point above regulations in their respective localities.
here.
The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the
It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant
2868, and before any rules and regulations were may demand." The law is a general law and not a local
or special law.
The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-
Manila and other and different prices in other and General to say what was and what was not "any cause"
different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not
delegates the power to determine the other and "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
different prices to provincial treasurers and their corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix the
deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of price at which rice should be sold, without regard to
legislative power to the Governor-General, and a grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation
delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the
and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced,
communicate with, and execute all instructions and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature
emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, did not specify or define what was "any cause," or what
for the most effective and proper enforcement of the was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or
above regulations in their respective localities." The corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions
issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the
was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, absence of the proclamation no crime was committed.
and was even a sub delegation of that power. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the
Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or
Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law proclamation does not say anything about the different
and does not authorize the Governor-General to fix one grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged
price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty
purports to authorize him to fix the price of rice in the centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed
Philippine Islands under a law, which is General and by Executive order No. 53."
uniform, and not local or special. Under the terms of the
law, the price of rice fixed in the proclamation must be We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No.
the same all over the Islands. There cannot be one price 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the
at Manila and another at Iloilo. Again, it is a mater of Governor-General in his discretion to issue a
common knowledge, and of which this court will take proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the
judicial notice, that there are many kinds of rice with sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make
different and corresponding market values, and that the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime,
there is a wide range in the price, which varies with the is unconstitutional and void.
grade and quality. Act No. 2868 makes no distinction in
price for the grade or quality of the rice, and the It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in
proclamation, upon which the defendant was tried and the price of rice and profiteering, which worked a
convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that an
per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is emergency existed, but the question here presented is
uniform as to all grades of rice, and says nothing about the constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute,
grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law is and none of such matters is an argument for, or against,
confined to palay, rice and corn. They are products of its constitutionality.
the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut,
chickens, eggs, and many other things are also products.
Any law which single out palay, rice or corn from the The Constitution is something solid, permanent an
numerous other products of the Islands is not general substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and
or uniform, but is a local or special law. If such a law is property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that
valid, then by the same principle, the Governor-General protection ought not to change with the wind or any
could be authorized by proclamation to fix the price of emergency condition. The fundamental question
meat, eggs, chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any involved in this case is the right of the people of the
other product of the Islands. In the very nature of Philippine Islands to be and live under a republican
things, all of that class of laws should be general and form of government. We make the broad statement that
uniform. Otherwise, there would be an unjust no state or nation, living under republican form of
discrimination of property rights, which, under the law, government, under the terms and conditions specified
must be equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law delegating the
than a floating law, which, in the discretion and by a power to any one, to fix the price at which rice should
proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a be sold. That power can never be delegated under a
floating crime to sell rice at a price in excess of the republican form of government.
proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.
In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the sell his rice, the law was not dealing with government
proclamation of the Governor-General which property. It was dealing with private property and
constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was private rights, which are sacred under the Constitution.
no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the If this law should be sustained, upon the same principle
and for the same reason, the Legislature could authorize
the Governor-General to fix the price of every product Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
or commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.
him to make it a crime to sell any product at any other
or different price.

It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for
such reason the provision of the Constitution should be
suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all Separate Opinions
times the judicial power was in full force and effect, and
that while that power was in force and effect, such a MALCOLM, J., concurring:
provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not,
suspended even in times of war. It may be claimed that I concur in the result for reasons which reach both the
during the war, the United States Government facts and the law. In the first place, as to the facts, — one
undertook to, and did, fix the price at which wheat and cannot be convicted ex post facto  of a violation of a law
flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. There, and of an executive order issued pursuant to the law,
the United States had declared war, and at the time was when the alleged violation thereof occurred on August
at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but 6, 1919, while the Act of the Legislature in question was
it is also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same not published until August 13, 1919, and the order was
act, the United States commandeered all the wheat and not published until August 20, 1919. In the second
flour, and took possession of it, either actual or place, as to the law, — one cannot be convicted of a
constructive, and the government itself became the violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the
owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be law when both the law and the order fail to set up an
paid for it. That is not this case. Here the rice sold was ascertainable standard of guilt. (U.S. vs. Cohen Grocery
the personal and private property of the defendant, who Company [1921], 255 U.S., 81, holding section 4 of the
sold it to one of his customers. The government had not Federal Food Control Act of August 10, 1917, as
bought and did not claim to own the rice, or have any amended, invalid.)
interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was
the personal, private property of the defendant. It may
be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, In order that there may not be any misunderstanding of
but the members of this court have taken on solemn our position, I would respectfully invite attention to the
oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought decision of the United States Supreme Court in German
not to be construed to meet the changing winds or Alliance Ins. Co. vs. Lewis ([1914, 233 U.S., 389),
emergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or concerning the legislative regulation of the prices
nation under a republican form of government ever charged by business affected with a public interest, and
enacted a law authorizing any executive, under the to another decision of the United States Supreme Court,
conditions states, to fix the price at which a price person that of Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark ([1892], 143 U.S.,
would sell his own rice, and make the broad statement 649), which adopts as its own the principles laid down
that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy, in the case of Locke's Appeal ([1873], 72 Pa. St., 491),
will ever be found which sustains the constitutionality namely; "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to
of the particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only determine some fact or state of things upon which the
to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend.
enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine government. There are many things upon which wise
Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority and useful legislation must depend which cannot be
of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at known to the law-making power, and must, therefore,
which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the
power in violation of the organic law. halls of legislation."

This opinion is confined to the particular question here Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
involved, which is the right of the Governor-General,
upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix Footnotes
the price of rice and make it a crime to sell it at a higher
price, and which holds that portions of the Act 1
Village of Little Chute vs. Van Camp.
unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to
construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining 2
Executive Order No. 53, series of 1919.
portions of the Act.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the

defendant discharged. So ordered.