THIRD DIVISION We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man’s

promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause
of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
vs. the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
GONZALES, respondents. consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent. thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent
SYLLABUS
Court found that it was the petitioner’s "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICT; TORTS; ART. 21 OF THE
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
CIVIL CODE; CONSTRUED. — Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief
which defines a quasi-delict is limited to negligent acts or
that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent.
fraud and deception on appellant’s part that made plaintiff’s
Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa
parents agree to their daughter’s living-in with him
aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-
preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the
American or common law concept. Torts is much broader
private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished
than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence,
possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but
but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and
because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the
battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the
intentional and malicious acts. with certain exceptions, are
Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was
to. be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent
above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the
seduction. Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that
Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are
Article 21 may be applied-in a breach of promise to marry
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have
where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the
DECISION
Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the
law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
(TOLENTINO, A.M. Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 72).
Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision 1 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY;
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1989 Decision or Branch 38
RULE; RATIONALE. — The existing rule is that a breach of
(Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan
promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong
in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or
(Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960];
not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to
Estopa v. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960]) Congress
marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code
Philippines.
the provisions that would have made it so. The reason
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committee
The antecedents of this case are not complicated: virtual
on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote: "The
1aw library
elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the
promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
decided in the case of De Jesus v. Syquia (58 Phil. 866
complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the
[1933]). The history of breach of promise suits in the United
alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
States and in England has shown that no other action lends
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years
itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the
and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner,
abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits
on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the
in many of the American states . . ." This notwithstanding,
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an
the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the
1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
accepted his love on the condition that they would get
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
married; they therefore argued to get married after the end
statute books (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,
of the school semester, which was in October of that year;
83 SCRA 237 [1978]).
petitioner then visited the private respondent’s parents in
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF DAMAGES, JUSTIFIED
marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced
BECAUSE OF FRAUD AND DECEIT BEHIND IT; CASE AT BAR.
her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a
— In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21,
virgin before she began living with him; a week before the 1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
filing of the complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral
started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; damages.
as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries,
during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay 2. Condemning further the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty’s fees and
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses
her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is and to pay the costs.
already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner
to pay her damages in the amount of not less than 3. All other claims are denied." 6
P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting
to P600.00, attorney’s fees and costs, and granting her such
other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The The decision is anchored on the trial court’s findings and
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No 16503. conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose
morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and
the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, (d)
complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in
alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made
claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at
married with the private respondent; he neither sought the the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f)
his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g)
stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial
the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the court gave full credit to the private respondent’s testimony
complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and
thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and courage to come to court and expose her honor and
compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was
anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an false. 7
award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and
P25,000.00 as moral damages.
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial detailed summary of the evidence for the private respondent
court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying the stipulated in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court
facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit: as follows:

"1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, "According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at
Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian, the time and that she never had a boyfriend before,
citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, defendant started courting her just a few days after they
Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present; first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times
and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum- on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to
Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second her hometown of Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he
year medicine proper. wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married. The
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of
Luncheonette, Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, defendant with members of plaintiff’s family or with plaintiff,
1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate; were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told
plaintiff’s parents and brothers and sisters that he intended
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987,
Manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johnny Rabino and because plaintiff’s parents thought he was good and
introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986." trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry
their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they
of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later
favoring the private Respondent. The petitioner was thus returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney’s fees; the defendant’s apartment. However, in the early days of
dispositive portion of the decision reads: October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff’s hands and feet
while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4
"IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is o’clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in
defendant. relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave
her some medicine to abort the foetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of and defendant’s proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she
his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job
do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant’s
City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who
accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man
Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod of good moral character and must think so low and have so
send by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly
still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several
that he could not do so because he was already married to a years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to
girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife
parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single. in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another
woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just
Plaintiff’s father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he
defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love
he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful
preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her." 11
and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding." 8 and then concluded:

Petitioner appealed the trial court’s decision to the

respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA- "In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was
G R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial defendant-appellant’s fraudulent and deceptive protestations
court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs. him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception
on appellant’s part that made plaintiff’s parents agree to
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the their daughter’s living-in with him preparatory to their
challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court’s supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are
ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court’s palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs,
findings of fact, respondent Court made the following and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
analysis:j derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do
from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of
our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study
"First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met in one of our institutions of learning, Defendant-
defendant who was already 23 years old at the time, does Appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil
not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral
that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the
with defendant and never had a boyfriend. She is, as lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case." 12
described by the lower court, a barrio lass ‘not used and
accustomed to the trend of modern urban life’, and certainly Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant
would (sic) not have allowed ‘herself to be deflowered by the petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue
defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the
defendant to marry her.’ In fact, we agree with the lower case at bar. 13
court that plaintiff and defendant must have been
sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of
the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not It is petitioner’s thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable
have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or
public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted violated any good custom or public policy; he has not
in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E." We cannot believe, professed love or proposed marriage to the private
therefore, defendant’s pretense that plaintiff was a nobody respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes
to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff’s traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
hometown of Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs,
at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not
18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that
and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent
1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of
talked to plaintiff’s mother who told him to marry her his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code
daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and
Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in
medicine to go to plaintiff’s hometown in Banaga, Bugallon, ruling that he does not possess good moral character.
unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship Moreover, his controversial "common law wife" is now his
between them? And this special relationship must indeed legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil
have led to defendant’s insincere proposal of marriage to ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims
parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the
restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be
first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate
arguendo that he had professed his love to the private courts must be respected.
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts
would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances And now to the legal issue.
of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable.
14 The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se
is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor
Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and is set forth in the report of the Senate Committee on the
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, Proposed Civil Code, from which We
which they subsequently complied with.chanrobles.com.ph : quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
virtual law library
"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
petitioner’s arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that decided in the case of De Jesus v. Syquia. 18 The history of
questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the breach of promise suits in the United States and in England
credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
court’s findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action
court having heard the witnesses and having had the in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American
opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner states .." 19
of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked
facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision,
the result of the case. 15 Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts
or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
substance or value which could alter the result of the case. punish in the statute books. 20

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by "‘But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere
the parties before the lower court. There are, however, of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina v. Asistio, sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which
Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
exceptions: though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the
x       x       x interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code
the following rule: library : red

"(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on ‘ARTICLE 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 damage.’
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the ‘An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. norm: ‘A’ seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of ‘X.’ A
Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not
fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her
[1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her
contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the
Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 proposed article, she and her parents would have such a
SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are right of action.
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is
petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes."
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the 21
evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242
[1970])."cralaw virtua1aw library Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict
thus:
Petitioner has not endeavored to point out to Us the
existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the ". . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
Chapter." virtua1aw library enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but,
notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish also, because the court of first instance found that,
legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while complainant ‘surrendered herself’ to petitioner because,
torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is ‘overwhelmed by her love’ for him, she ‘wanted to bind’ him
much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not ‘by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had
only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as the benefit of clergy.’"
assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by In Tanjanco v. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise
the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
intentional and malicious acts. with certain exceptions, are seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were
to. be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the
Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are said case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have
been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is "The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the example set forth in the Code Commission’s memorandum
Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The
law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23 sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to
are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man’s promise which the woman has yielded (U.S. v. Buenaventura, 27 Phil.
to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of 121; U.S. v. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the ‘To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents
consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent Dig. tit. Seduction,
to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect,
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to
customs or public policy. the sexual embraces of her seducer’ (27 Phil. 123).

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the And in American Jurisprudence we find:chanrob1es virtual
petitioner’s "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love 1aw library
for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on ‘On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the
the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to
appellant’s part that made plaintiff’s parents agree to their warrant a recovery.
daughter’s living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises
her virginity, the cherished possession of every single out sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the
— the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow
earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization
criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by;
Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit.’ (47
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the Am. Jur. 662).
time of the seduction.
x       x       x
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21
may be applied-in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out
v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-
damages to the woman because: appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for own doing," 33 for:
had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and ". . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will
wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a
his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . (Annex
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would C) or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of
conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil financial assistance (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may
was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing have been offered by the petitioner." 34
the complaint." 27
These statements reveal the true character and motive of
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if
Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account
opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had of the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational background,
been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered: poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
". . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a
intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima v. Court of woman so circumstanced could not have even remotely
Appeals, L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa v. Piansay, Jr., L- occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to
14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra v. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe,
Beatriz Galang v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., L-17248, Jan. 29, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing
1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life s
marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner
because here mutual lust has intervened). . . . ." clearly violated the Filipino s concept of morality and so
1aw library brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed
as the expenses for the wedding preparations (See such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the
Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471)."red Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
persuasion: obligations.

"It is submitted that the rule in Batarra v. Marcos 30 still No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our
subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the present laws, customs and traditions.
article 31 in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled
deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the
any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of
or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms
given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
injury which can be the basis for indemnity. found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her
after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a
wilfullness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At
weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
woman under the circumstances, because an act which
would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute "Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the
deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But parties, where his transgression has been brought about by
so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, the imposition or undue influence of the party on whom the
there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
under the criminal law and there should have been an consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud." 36
acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that
reason."virtua1aw library In Mangayao v. Lasud, 37 We declared:

We are unable to agree with the petitioner’s alternative "Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault,
proposition to the effect that granting, for argument’s sake, there should be no action by one against the other (Art.
that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been
latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one
of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra v. party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not (c.f.
Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages Bough v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209)."
from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating
that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or We should stress, however, that while We find for the
damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her private respondent, let it not be said that this Court
condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting
her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in
their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the
solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their
daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of
morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged

decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, J., Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on terminal leave.