Comparative Succession Law. Testamentary Formalities

COMPARATIVE SUCCESSION LAW
VOLUME I
TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES
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Comparative Succession Law
Volume I
Testamentary Formalities
Edited by
KENNETH G C REID
MARIUS J DE WAAL
and
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP
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Contents
Preface x
List of Contributors xii
List of Abbreviations xiii
1. Testamentary Formalities in Roman Law 1

Thomas Rüfner
I. Introduction 2
II. Archaic and pre-classical law 3
III. Classical law 5
IV. Post-classical law 18
V. Conclusion 25
2. Testamentary Formalities in Early Modern Europe 27
Nils Jansen
I. Introduction 27
II. Wills and codicils 33
III. The forms of will 35
IV. Internal formalities 46
V. Conclusion 49
3. Testamentary Formalities in France and Belgium 51
Walter Pintens
I. Introduction 52
II. Historical development 53
III. The modern law 55
IV. Holograph wills 57
V. Public wills 62
VI. Secret wills 64
VII. International wills 65
VIII. Registration 68
IX. Procedure after death 69
X. Conclusion 70
4. Testamentary Formalities in Spain 71
Sergio Cámara Lapuente
I. Introduction 72
II. Historical background 73
IV. Open wills 79
vi Contents
V. Closed wills 82
VI. Holograph wills 83
VII. Special wills 85
VIII. Shared features 86
IX. Internal formalities 90
X. A shift from formalism 91
XI. Concluding remarks 92
XII. Appendix: the laws of the Autonomous Communities 93
5. Testamentary Formalities in Latin America with particular reference
to Brazil 96
Jan Peter Schmidt
I. The Latin American background 97
II. Wills and will-making 98
III. Public wills 101
IV. Sealed wills 104
V. Private wills 105
VI. The fate of the holograph will 108
VII. Extraordinary wills 110
VIII. Further aspects 114
IX. Court practice and the flight from formalism 117
X. Concluding remarks 119
6. Testamentary Formalities in Italy 120
Alexandra Braun
I. Historical introduction 121
II. Wills and will-substitutes 122
III. Holograph wills 126
IV. Notarial wills 130
V. Special wills 134
VI. International wills 136
VII. Evaluation 137
VIII. Defects of form 138
IX. Conclusion 140
7. Testamentary Formalities in the Netherlands 142
Wilbert D Kolkman
I. Historical overview 143
II. Types of will 147
III. Evidence 161
IV. Special features of testamentary formalities 164
V. Adherence to formalities 170
VI. Concluding remarks 173
8. Testamentary Formalities in Germany 175
Reinhard Zimmermann
I. Introduction 176
Contents vii
II. Private wills in nineteenth-century Germany 177

III. Holograph wills: principle and exceptions 180
IV. The battle over holograph wills: travaux préparatoires of the BGB 182
V. The holograph will and the courts (1900–35) 187
VI. Another battle over holograph wills 193
VII. Holograph wills today 197
VIII. Public wills 205
IX. Extraordinary wills 212
X. The German experience: a general assessment 218
9. Testamentary Formalities in Austria 221
Christiane C Wendehorst
I. Relevant instruments and their practical significance 223
III. Modern doctrine and court practice 237
IV. Current debates and plans for reform 251
V. Summary 253
10. Testamentary Formalities in Hungary 254
Lajos Vékás
I. Introduction 255
II. Common requirements for wills 257
III. Private wills 258
IV. Public wills 265
V. Oral wills for emergency situations 265
VI. Legal consequences of formal mistakes 267
VII. Summary: relaxation of testamentary formalities 268
11. Testamentary Formalities in Poland 270
Fryderyk Zoll
I. Historical development 270
II. The modern law 272
V. Allograph wills 278
VI. Emergency wills 279
VII. Recodification 281
12. Testamentary Formalities in Islamic Law and their Reception in
the Modern Laws of Islamic Countries 282
Nadjma Yassari
I. Introduction 282
II. Classical Islamic law 284
III. Modern laws 295
IV. Conclusion 303
viii Contents
13. Testamentary Formalities in England and Wales 305

Roger Kerridge
I. Introduction 306
II. Formal wills: a history 307
III. The Wills Act 1837 312
IV. Incorporation by reference 316
V. Wills statistics 316
VI. Administration of estates 317
VII. Preparation and registration of wills 318
VIII. Forgery 321
IX. Nuncupative wills 322
X. Holograph wills 325
XI. Alterations 325
XII. Reform 326
14. Testamentary Formalities in Australia and New Zealand 329
Nicola Peart
I. Introduction 330
II. Historical overview 333
III. Wills of indigenous peoples 336
IV. Special wills 337
V. The current law 339
VI. Power to dispense with testamentary formalities 349
VII. Conclusion 355
15. Testamentary Formalities in the United States of America 357
Ronald J Scalise Jr
I. Introduction 358
II. Testamentary formalities 360
III. Incorporation by reference and alterations 376
IV. Conclusion 379
16. Testamentary Formalities in South Africa 381
Marius J de Waal
I. Introduction 382
III. The scope of the Wills Act 385
IV. The essential formalities 387
V. Procedure after death 395
VI. Condonation 395
VII. Amendment 401
VIII. Concluding remarks 402
17. Testamentary Formalities in Scotland 404
Kenneth G C Reid
I. Conveyances and testaments 405
II. Seals, signatures, and witnesses 412
Contents ix

IV. Form and formalism 429
18. Testamentary Formalities in Historical and Comparative Perspective 432
Kenneth G C Reid, Marius J de Waal, and Reinhard Zimmermann
I. Wills and will-making 433
II. Holograph wills 437
III. Witnessed wills 444
VI. Shared features 455
VII. The flight from formalities 462
VIII. Some conclusions 468
Index 473
Preface
The law of succession is out of fashion. Neglected, often, at a national level, it has
been neglected still more as a subject for comparative study. Yet it is one of the
most interesting, and certainly one of the most practically important, areas of private
law. In 2007 we assembled and edited a collection of essays under the title Exploring
the Law of Succession: Studies National, Historical and Comparative (Edinburgh
University Press). Encouraged by the reception of that book, we have now embarked
on a long-term programme to explore selected topics in the law of succession from
a historical and comparative perspective. This volume is thus the first in a projected
series on Comparative Succession Law.
In this book we consider the formalities which the law imposes for testamentary
disposals of property. Our presupposition is that every system has as its point
of departure the principle of freedom of testation; in other words, a person
has the freedom to determine the destiny of his or her assets. But for that to be
accomplished, a legal instrument or instruments must be available so that assets can
be passed on to the chosen beneficiaries. What, we ask, are the will-types available in
different legal systems? How widely are they used? What are the advantages and
disadvantages of each? How can requirements of form be explained and justified?
Where did the law come from and how did it develop? And what might the future
hold?
It has been necessary to be selective as to jurisdictions, and we have chosen to focus
on Europe, and on countries which have been influenced by the European experi-
ence. Thus, in addition to giving a detailed treatment of the law in Austria, Belgium,
England and Wales, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and
Spain, the book also explores legal developments in Australia, New Zealand, the
United States of America, and in some of the countries of Latin America, with a
particular emphasis on Brazil. Two of the mixed jurisdictions – Scotland and South
Africa – are included for their insights in an area of law where the division between
the common law and civil law seems particularly firmly entrenched. A chapter on
Islamic law acknowledges the importance in contemporary Europe of a law which
was not itself influenced by either of the European traditions. To set the scene, and in
anticipation of the accounts of national history which follow, the book opens with
chapters on Roman law and on the early modern law in Europe. It concludes with an
assessment of the overall development of the law in the countries surveyed, and with
some wider reflections on the nature and purpose of testamentary formalities.
Preface xi
Drafts of the chapters were discussed at a closed conference held in Hamburg

in July 2010 with the aim of helping contributors to see how their own national story
fitted into the wider development of the law. We hope that the resulting book gives a
more integrated and nuanced account than is often possible in a multi-authored
work.
Kenneth G C Reid, Edinburgh
Marius J de Waal, Stellenbosch
Reinhard Zimmermann, Hamburg
April 2011
List of Contributors
Alexandra Braun is Fellow and Tutor in Law at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford and CUF
lecturer, University of Oxford.
Sergio Cámara Lapuente is Professor of Private Law, University of La Rioja.
Marius J de Waal is Professor of Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Stellenbosch.
Nils Jansen is Professor of Roman Law, Legal History, German and European Private Law at
the Institute for Legal History, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster.
Roger Kerridge is Emeritus Professor of Law, University of Bristol.
Wilbert D Kolkman is Professor of Private Law and Notarial Law, University of Groningen.
Nicola Peart is Professor of Law, University of Otago.
Walter Pintens is Professor of Private Law, Catholic University, Leuven.
Kenneth G C Reid is Professor of Scots Law, University of Edinburgh.
Thomas Rüfner is Professor of Private Law and Roman Law, University of Trier, and a Judge
at the Regional Appeal Court of Koblenz.
Ronald J Scalise Jr is Professor of Civil Law, Tulane Law School, New Orleans.
Jan Peter Schmidt is Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and
International Private Law, Hamburg.
Lajos Vékás is Emeritus Professor of Private Law and Private International Law, Eötvös
Lorand University, Budapest.
Christiane C Wendehorst is Professor of Private Law, University of Vienna.
Nadjma Yassari is Senior Research Fellow and Max Planck Research Group Leader, Max
Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg.
Reinhard Zimmermann is Director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and
International Private Law, Hamburg, and Professor of Private Law, Roman Law, and Com-
parative Legal History, University of Regensburg.
Fryderyk Zoll is Professor of Private Law, Jagiellonian University in Cracow and DFG-
Mercator Professor, University of Osnabrück.
List of Abbreviations
A Atlantic Reporter (USA)

A2d Atlantic Reporter, 2nd series (USA)
AAMN Anales de la Academia Matritense del Notariado (Annals of the
Notaries’ Academy of Madrid)
ABGB Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Austrian Civil Code)
AC Appeal Cases (UK)
ACJ Acting Chief Justice
ACT Australian Capital Territory
ACTEC J American College of Trust and Estate Counsel Journal
ACTSC Supreme Court of Australian Capital Territories
AD South African Law Reports, Appellate Division
ADC Anuario de Derecho Civil (Yearbook of Civil Law, Spain)
AH anno Hegirae (the year according to the Muslim calendar)
AHDE Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español (Yearbook of Spanish His-
tory of Law)
AJ Acting Judge
AJA Acting Judge of Appeal
AJCL American Journal of Comparative Law
AJP Acting Judge President
All ER All England Law Reports
All SA All South African Law Reports
ALR Australian Law Reports
App Court of Appeal of
BayObLG Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht (Bavarian Regional Supreme
Court)
BayObLGZ Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Bayerischen Obersten Landesgerichts
in Zivilsachen (Decisions of the Bavarian Regional Supreme Court
in civil law matters)
BGB Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code)
BGBl Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette, Germany)
BGH Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court)
BGHZ Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen
(Decisions of the German Federal Supreme Court in civil law
matters)
BH Decisions of the Supreme Court of Hungary
BPIR Bankruptcy and Personal Insolvency Reports (England and Wales)
BS Brown’s Supplement, Court of Session reports (Scotland)
Bull civ Bulletin des arrêts des chambres civiles de la Cour de cassation (France)
BVerfG Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, Germany)
xiv List of Abbreviations
BVerfGE Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (decisions of the Federal

Constitutional Court)
BW Burgerlijk Wetboek (Belgian Civil Code)
BW Burgerlijk Wetboek (Dutch Civil Code)
C Cape Provincial Division (South Africa)
C. Justinian’s Codex
CA Court of Appeal (England and Wales)
cap caput, chapter
Cass Corte di Cassazione (Italy)
Cass civ Arrêt des chambres civiles de la Cour de cassation (France)
CC Constitutional Court, South Africa
CC Civil Code
CC Código civil (Civil Code)
CC/1916 Brazilian Civil Code of 1916
CC/2002 Brazilian Civil Code of 2002
C civ Code civil (French Civil Code)
C civ Codice civile (Italian Civil Code)
CCJC Cuadernos Civitas de Jurisprudencia Civil (Civitas Carnets on Private
Law Case-Law, Spain)
ch chapter
Ch Chancery Division (England and Wales)
Ch D Chancery Division (England and Wales)
CIV Civil jurisdiction of the High Court (unreported cases, New Zealand)
CJ Chief Justice
CLJ Cambridge Law Journal
CLR Commonwealth Law Reports (Australia)
Cmnd UK Command Papers
col(s) column(s)
COM European Commission documents
CMBC Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis
CSIH Court of Session Inner House (Scotland)
CSOH Court of Session Outer House (Scotland)
CTR Centraal Testamenten Register (Central Register of Wills,
Netherlands)
Curt Curteis’ Reports of Cases in the Ecclesiastical Courts (England and
Wales)
D Dunlop’s Session Cases (Scotland)
D. Justinian’s Digest
DCFR Draft Common Frame of Reference
DJ Diário da Justiça (Brazil)
DLR Dominion Law Reports (Canada)
E Eastern Cape Local Division (South Africa)
EC European Community
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
ECJ European Court of Justice
List of Abbreviations xv
EEC European Economic Community

EGBGB Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (Introductory Act to
the German Civil Code)
EH Decisions of the Kúria for Uniform Court Practice (Hungary)
EHRR European Human Rights Reports
EI Entwurf eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs für das Deutsche Reich, Erste
Lesung (First Draft of a German Civil Code)
E II Entwurf eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs für das Deutsche Reich, Zweite
Lesung (Second Draft of a German Civil Code)
ER English Reports
ERA Europäische Rechtsakademie (Academy of European Law, Trier)
ERPL European Review of Private Law
EU European Union
EWCA Court of Appeal, Civil Division (England and Wales)
EWHC High Court (England and Wales)
F Fraser’s Session Cases (Scotland)
FamErbRÄG Familien- und Erbrechts-Änderungsgesetz (Austria)
FC Faculty Collection, Court of Session (Scotland)
FCR Family Court Reports (England and Wales)
FLR Family Law Reports (England and Wales)
FIRA Fontes Iuris Romani Antejustiniani
F Supp Federal Supplement (USA)
F 2d/3d Federal Reporter, Second/Third Series (USA)
fol folio
Gai The Institutes of Gaius
GG Grundgesetz (Basic Law, Germany)
GLR Gazette Law Reports (New Zealand)
Hagg Haggard’s Reports of Cases in the Ecclesiastical Courts (England
and Wales)
HC High Court
HCA High Court of Australia
HL House of Lords (United Kingdom)
HR Hoge Raad (Supreme Court of the Netherlands)
Hume Hume’s Decisions of the Court of Session 1781–1822 (Scotland)
ICLQ International and Comparative Law Quarterly
Imp Imperator
Impp Imperatores
IR Irish Reports
J Mr Justice
J Judge
JA Judge of Appeal
J Inst The Institutes of Justinian
JB Jurisprudência Brasileira
JP Judge President
KB King’s Bench (England and Wales)
Kc Kodeks cywilny (Polish Civil Code)
xvi List of Abbreviations
KG Kammergericht (Regional Appeal Court, Berlin)

KGE Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Kammergerichts (Decisions of the
Regional Appeal Court, Berlin)
KNB Koninklijke Notariële Beroepsorganisatie (Royal Dutch Notarial
Society)
LC Lord Chancellor
LCJ Lord Chief Justice
LG Landgericht
lib liber (book)
liv livre (book)
LJ Lord Justice
LJ Law Journal
LJC Lord Justice Clerk
LJN Landelijk Jurisprudentienummer (National Case Law Number)
LJP Law Journal Reports, Probate Divorce and Admiralty (1875–1946,
England and Wales)
LP Lord President
LQR Law Quarterly Review
LR Law Reports
LR Law Review
LR 1 P&D Law Reports (First Series) Probate and Divorce Cases (1865–1875,
England and Wales)
M Macpherson’s Session Cases (Scotland)
Macq Macqueen’s House of Lords Reports (Scotland)
MLR Modern Law Review
Mo Missouri Reports
Mor Morison’s Dictionary of Decisions, Court of Session (Scotland)
MR Master of the Rolls
N Natal Provincial Division (South Africa)
NC Northern Cape Division (South Africa)
NE North Eastern Reporter (USA)
NE2d North Eastern Reporter second series (USA)
NJ Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (Journal of Dutch Case Law)
NJB Nederlands Juristenblad (Dutch Lawyers’ Journal)
NJW Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (Germany)
Nov novellae leges (Novels, Rome)
NS New Series
NSW New South Wales
NSWCA Court of Appeal of New South Wales
NSWLR New South Wales Law Reports
NSWR New South Wales Reports
NSWSC Supreme Court of New South Wales
NT Northern Territory (Australia)
NW North Western Reporter (USA)
NW2d North Western Reporter second series (USA)
List of Abbreviations xvii
NZ New Zealand
NZLR New Zealand Law Reports
O Orange Free State Provincial Division (South Africa)
OAG Oberappellationsgericht (Regional Appeal Court, Germany)
Ob Oberster Gerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Court)
ObLG
München Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht
OBW Oud Burgerlijk Wetboek (Old Dutch Civil Code)
OGH Oberster Gerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Court)
OJ Official Journal of the European Communities
OLG Oberlandesgericht (Germany)
OLGE Rechtsprechung der Oberlandesgerichte auf dem Gebiet des Zivilrechts
(Collection of Decisions of the Regional Courts of Appeal in Private
Law Matters, Germany)
OLGZ Entscheidungen der Oberlandesgerichte in Zivilsachen einschliesslich
der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit (Decisions of the Regional Courts
of Appeal in Private Law Matters, Germany)
P Probate Division Cases (1891–1971, England and Wales)
P Pacific Reporter (USA)
P2d Pacific Reporter second series (USA)
PA Probate Act (Iran)
Pat Paton’s House of Lords Cases (Scotland)
PC Privy Council
PD Probate Division Cases (1875–1890, England and Wales)
Phill Phillimore’s Reports of Cases in the Ecclesiastical Courts (England
and Wales)
PK Principal Decisions of the Supreme Court of Hungary
PrALR Preussisches Allgemeines Landrecht (Prussian Code of 1794)
QB Queen’s Bench (England and Wales)
Qd R Queensland Reports
Qld Queensland
QSC Supreme Court of Queensland
R Rettie’s Session Cases (Scotland)
RabelsZ Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht
RDN Revista de Derecho Notarial (Notarial Law Journal, Spain)
RDP Revista de Derecho Privado (Private Law Journal, Spain)
repr reprinted
REsp Recurso Especial (special procedural remedy to invoke the violation
of Federal law before the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice)
RF Revista Forense (Review of Court Decisions, Brazil)
RG Reichsgericht (Imperial Supreme Court, Germany)
RGBl Reichsgesetzblatt (Imperial Law Gazette, Germany)
RGZ Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (Col-
lection of Decisions of the German Imperial Court in Private Law
Matters)
xviii List of Abbreviations
RJCatalunya Revista Jurı́dica de Catalunya

RJN Revista Jurı́dica del Notariado (Notarial Law Journal, Spain)
Rob Ecc Robertson’s Ecclesiastical Reports (England and Wales)
RPS Records of the Parliament of Scotland to 1617
RSTJ Revista do Superior Tribunal de Justiça
RT Revista dos Tribunais
s section
S Shaw’s Session Cases (NE indicates New Edition) (Scotland)
S Ct Supreme Court; Supreme Court Reporter (USA)
SA South African Law Reports
SA South Australia
SALJ South African Law Journal
SALR Butterworth’s South African Law Review
SASC Supreme Court of South Australia
SASR South Australian State Reports
SC Reports of the Cape Supreme Court (South Africa)
SC Session Cases, Scotland
SC (HL) House of Lords cases in Session Cases
SCA Supreme Court of Appeal, South Africa
sch schedule
SCR Supreme Court Reports, Canada
SE South Eastern Reporter (USA)
SE2d South Eastern Reporter second series (USA)
SI Statutory Instrument
SLT Scots Law Times
SME small and medium-sized enterprise
SMS Short Message Service
So Southern Reporter (USA)
So2d Southern Reporter second series (USA)
SR (NSW) State Reports (New South Wales)
SS Schutzstaffeln
StGB Strafgesetzbuch (German Criminal Code)
STF Supremo Federal Tribunal (Brazilian Federal Supreme Court)
STJ Superior Tribunal de Justiça (Brazilian Superior Court of Justice)
STS Sentencia del Tribunal Supremo ( Judgment of the Spanish Supreme
Court)
STSJ Sentencia del Tribunal Superior de Justicia ( Judgment of the Superior
Court of Justice)
SW South Western Reporter (USA)
SW2d South Western Reporter second series (USA)
SW3d South Western Reporter third series (USA)
SWA South West Africa
SZ Entscheidungen des österreichischen Obersten Gerichtshofes in Zivil-
(und Justizverwaltungs-)sachen (Decisions of the Austrian Supreme
Court in Civil (and Judicial) Matters)
List of Abbreviations xix
T Transvaal Provincial Division (South Africa)

Tas Tasmania
TGI Tribunal de Grande Instance (France)
TH Reports of the Witwatersrand High Court (South Africa)
tit titulus (title)
TJSP Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo (Appeal Court of the State
of São Paulo)
Tk South African Law Reports, Transkei High Court
TLR The Times Law Reports
TPR Tijdschrift voor privaatrecht
Trib Tribunale
TS Reports of the Transvaal Supreme Court (South Africa)
UK United Kingdom
UKHL United Kingdom, House of Lords
UKSC United Kingdom Supreme Court
UN United Nations
UPC Uniform Probate Code (USA)
US United States Supreme Court Reports (USA)
USA United States of America
USC United States Code
Vic Victoria (Australia)
VLR Victorian Law Reports
VR Victorian Reports
VSC Supreme Court of Victoria
W Witwatersrand Local Division (South Africa)
W Weekblad van het Recht (Weekly Case Reports, the Netherlands)
WA Western Australia
WAR Western Australian Reports
WASC Supreme Court of Western Australia
W&S Wilson and Shaw’s House of Lords Cases (Scotland)
WLR Weekly Law Reports (England and Wales)
WN Weekly Notes
WPNR Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notarisambt en Registratie ( Journal on
Civil Law, Notarial Law and Registration, the Netherlands)
WTLR Wills and Trusts Law Reports (England and Wales)
Wwft Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme (Act
on Preventing Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism)
X Liber Extra (Decretales Gregorii IX)
ZGB Zivilgesetzbuch (Swiss Civil Code)
ZGB (DDR) Zivilgesetzbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republic (Civil Code
of the German Democratic Republic)
ZRG (GA) Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Germanistische
Abteilung)
ZRG (RA) Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische
Abteilung )
1
Testamentary Formalities in Roman Law
Thomas Rüfner
I. Introduction 2
II. Archaic and pre-classical law 3
1. Testamentum calatis comitiis 3
2. Testamentum in procinctu 3
3. Testamentum per aes et libram 4
III. Classical law 5
1. Testamentum per aes et libram and testamentum iure praetorio 5
(a) Testamentum per aes et libram in classical law 5
(b) Testamentum iure praetorio 6
2. Common requirements of civil and praetorian wills 8
(a) Witnesses 8
(b) Further general requirements 8
(c) Heredis institutio 9
(d) Limited gifts 11
(e) Manumissions 13
3. Military wills 14
4. Codicilli 15
5. Alteration of testamentary dispositions 16
6. Probate proceedings 17
IV. Post-classical law 18
1. Before Justinian 18
(a) Wills with five witnesses 18
(b) Holograph wills 19
(c) Married couples’ wills 19
2. Justinianic law 19
(a) Basic characteristics 19
(b) Wills with seven witnesses 20
(c) Military wills 21
(d) Testamentum parentum inter liberos 22
(e) Other forms 23
(f ) Codicilli 23
(g) Alteration of testamentary dispositions 24
V. Conclusion 25
2 Thomas Rüfner
I. Introduction
According to Plutarch, the Elder Cato only regretted three things in his life. One was
that he had remained intestate for an entire day.1 Even though there is some dispute
as to whether the Roman ‘horror of intestacy’ was really as deeply entrenched as this
anecdote may suggest,2 it is fair to assume that at least in the upper echelons of
society it was common practice to make testamentary dispositions and not to leave
the distribution of one’s property after death to the rules of intestacy.3 This is
evidenced – more clearly than by Cato’s famous pronouncement – by the enormous
quantity of sources dealing with wills and their construction.
The sources do not permit a definite answer to the question of why the Roman
elites were so obsessed with wills. There are, however, at least two obvious motives.
A will (testamentum) was a means to appoint a worthy heir who would continue the
family and – in a way – the personality of the decedent. A will also provided an
opportunity to pay back debts of gratitude and to reward relatives, friends, political
allies, and trusted servants for their loyalty. Since mutual services among friends were
the fuel of Roman society4 and direct monetary compensation for such services was
out of the question, this function of the will was very significant.
As a matter of course, the Roman jurists devoted great care to the formalities
required for a valid testamentary disposition. This chapter aims to trace the develop-
ment of the Roman law relating to these formal requirements from the inception of
Roman legal scholarship to the time of Justinian’s codes. This is only possible by
distinguishing between the different stages of Roman legal history. We will follow
common practice and – in particular – the model of Kaser’s encyclopaedic work5 in
dealing separately with the archaic, the classical, and the post-classical period of
Roman law. We will depart from Kaser’s model, however, in so far as archaic and
pre-classical law will be treated together.
Since it is the purpose of this chapter to provide a basis for the exposition of the
ius commune and of the modern legal systems in the following contributions, the
emphasis must be on Roman law as contained in Justinian’s legislation: this legisla-
tion, after all, provided the starting point for the succession of usus moderni iuris
Romani which are characteristic of continental legal history.
However, since Justinianic law is largely based on the achievements of the classical
period, the explanation of the classical foundations of Justinianic law will also play
a large role on the ensuing pages. The law of the archaic period and of the period
between the end of the classical era and the time of Justinian will only be dealt with
inasmuch as this is necessary to understand classical and Justinianic law.
1
Plutarch, Cato maior 9, 6.
2
David Daube, Roman Law: Linguistic, Social and Philosophical Aspects (1969) 71–5.
3
David Johnston, Roman Law in Context (1999) 51.
4
See the classical explanation by Fritz Schulz, Prinzipien des römischen Rechts (1934) 158 f.
5
Max Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht vol 1 (2nd edn, 1971) and vol 2 (2nd edn, 1975).
Testamentary Formalities in Roman Law 3
II. Archaic and pre-classical law
Already in the archaic period of Roman law, three forms of wills were known:
testamentum calatis comitiis, the testamentum in procinctu, and the testamentum per
aes et libram.6 The three forms differed not in their effects,7 but in the idea
underpinning them.
1. Testamentum calatis comitiis

A testamentum calatis comitiis could only be made on the occasion of a solemn
assembly of the Roman people (comitia calata) which was held twice a year in the
presence of the members of the priestly college of pontifices.8
The available sources are insufficient to reconstruct the necessary steps to make
a testamentum calatis comitiis in detail. However, it seems most likely that – at least at
the beginning – the making of a will required the consent of the Roman people. This
consent was given by means of a law ad personam passed by the assembly of the
people (comitia)9 – just as the adoption of a citizen who was not another man’s son in
power (arrogatio) had to be authorized by the comitia curiata.10 Whether the
assembly actually voted on the proposed will at some stage in the development of
this institution, or whether its role was always limited to accepting the will silently is
not known.11
2. Testamentum in procinctu
Since a testamentum calatis comitiis could only be made twice a year, it was obviously
unavailable when persons in fear of death wanted to make their final dispositions
more quickly. For the special case of a soldier wishing to make the necessary
dispositions before going into battle, the testamentum in procinctu was conceived.12
The testamentum in procinctu was based on the same concept as the testamentum
calatis comitiis.13 Instead of declaring his last wishes before the assembly of the
people, the testator declared them before the Roman army, standing ready in
procinctu, that is, with togas girded up. Since the army comprised the same free
citizens who were also entitled to vote in the popular assemblies, this was an obvious
6
Alan Watson, The Law of Succession in the Later Roman Republic (1971) 8–21; Mario Amelotti,
‘Testamento (dir. rom.)’, in Enciclopedia del diritto vol 44 (1992) 460–1.
7
See, however, Pasquale Voci, Diritto ereditario romano vol 1 (2nd edn, 1967) 22–3 and Kaser I (n 5)
107 on the possibility that a testamentum per aes et libram could originally only contain limited gifts
(legata), but not the appointment of an heir.
8
Gai 2, 101; Epitome Ulpiani 20, 2; Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae 15, 27, 1 and 3.
9
This is the prevailing explanation; cf Kaser I (n 5) 105 f. See, however, the dissent by Alessandro
Corbino, ‘La nozione di “comitia calata” ’ (1991) 41 Iura 145, 150.
10
Voci (n 7) 20.
11
Voci (n 7) 16.
12
Gai 2, 101; Ulpiani epitome 20, 2; Gellius (n 8) 15, 27, 1; Cicero, De natura deorum 2, 9.
13
Cf Voci (n 7) 18 on the differences between the two forms.
4 Thomas Rüfner
solution, even though the soldier making a testamentum in procinctu would actually
be heard only by his comrades standing close to him, not by the entire army.
3. Testamentum per aes et libram

The testamentum per aes et libram was fundamentally different from the first two
forms. If we can trust Gaius’ account, this form developed later than the other two
and served as an easy way to make a will in cases of imminent death.14
The testamentum per aes et libram was essentially a conveyance to a trustee: the
testator transferred all of his property to the so-called familiae emptor (purchaser of
the family estate) with instructions on how to distribute the property after his, the
testator’s, death.15 The transfer was effected by means of mancipatio.16
Mancipatio, in turn, was a ritual otherwise employed for the conveyance of
precious items of property, ie land, slaves, and farm animals. It was also used to
transfer parental power over a child. For example, a father would give his daughter to
her future husband by way of mancipatio. The ritual is usually explained as a
symbolic sale.17 The ceremony required the presence of the conveyor and the
purchaser, five witnesses, and a person responsible for the holding of the scales
(libripens). In the course of mancipatio a piece of copper was symbolically given
and weighed as the purchase price.18 After this, the purchaser declared to have
become the new owner of the transferred property by virtue of the purported sale.
While the weighing of the piece of copper was a relic of the times when coined
money was not yet in use,19 a price in money had to be paid: if the transaction
underlying the conveyance was a sale, then the actual purchase price was paid in the
context of the mancipatio ritual. If the conveyance was intended as a donation to
the purchaser, then one coin was paid as a symbolic price.20 Thus, in this latter case
(the so-called mancipatio nummo uno), there were two symbolic payments, the piece
of copper and the single coin, while there was a symbolic and an actual payment
when mancipatio was used in connection with a sale.
The conveyor remained silent and passive throughout the ritual. His role was
limited to letting the purchaser take possession of the property. It was possible,
however, for the purchaser to utter declarations (nuncupationes) accompanying
the conveyance. Such oral nuncupationes could be used to limit the right conveyed
to the purchaser.21
The last-mentioned form was used in order to make a will. The solemn words to
be spoken were slightly changed to reflect the fact that an entire estate (familia) rather
14 15
Gai 2, 102. Voci (n 7) 89.
16
Gai 2, 103. See also Watson (n 6) 11; and Pasquale Voci, Diritto ereditario romano vol 2 (2nd edn,
1963) 64.
17
Gai 1, 119: ‘imaginaria venditio’.
18
According to Gai 1, 119, the piece of copper was not actually weighed, but only used to strike the
scales.
19
Gai 1, 122.
20
Gijsbert Noordraven, Die Fiduzia im römischen Recht (1999) 154.
21
XII tab 6, 1. On nuncupationes in general, see Kaser I (n 5) 47.
than an individual piece of property figured as the object of the conveyance. It was
also declared that the testator was to retain his powers of disposition over the
property (mandatela) while he was alive, whereas the trustee acquired only a power
to look after the estate and to fulfil the testator’s wishes (custodela) upon the testator’s
death.22
The testator conveyed all of his property nummo uno to the purchaser and
used nuncupationes to instruct him how to distribute the property after his death.
The familiae emptor was then bound to proceed in accordance with these nuncupa-
tiones. Thus, the oral nuncupationes constituted the actual expression of the testator’s
last will.
III. Classical law
1. Testamentum per aes et libram and testamentum iure praetorio

(a) Testamentum per aes et libram in classical law
In classical Roman law, the old testamentary forms of testamentum calatis comitiis
and testamentum in procinctu had fallen into desuetude.23 Only the testamentum per
aes et libram retained its practical importance. However, its original character as a
conveyance to a trustee had become meaningless.24 After the testator’s death, the
dispositions in the will were followed as a matter of law. The familiae emptor (trustee)
no longer had any practical role. Like the scale holder (libripens),25 he only acted
as an additional witness to the ritual. Consequently, the trustee and the scale holder
were subject to the rules governing the capacity to witness a will.26
It became customary to lay down the testamentary dispositions in writing.27 The
oral nuncupatio was routinely reduced to a general reference to the written docu-
ment.28 The document was then usually29 sealed by the seven witnesses (including
the scale holder and the trustee) who would write their names next to their seals.30
These witnesses did not know the contents of the will. Their seals only testified that
the sealed document was the one which the testator had presented during the ritual
of mancipatio and to which he had referred in his nuncupatio.
22
Gai 2, 104. The reading of this text is, however, disputed: see Kaser I (n 5) 108, with n 26.
23
Gai 2, 103. On a potential exception, see Watson (n 6) 8, n 3.
24
Voci (n 16) 65.
25
The scale holder is expressly said to be testium numero in Gai 2, 107.
26
Ulpiani epitome 20, 7; cf Voci (n 16) 71; see also Gai 2, 105–8; Ulpian D. 28, 1, 20, pr-3 and 4–7;
J Inst 2, 10, 6.
27
Voci (n 16) 66.
28
Gai 2, 104. On this practice, see Voci (n 16) 67.
29
As expressly stated in J Inst 2, 10, 2, the seals were not necessary for the validity of a will under the
old ius civile.
30
Mario Amelotti, Il testamento romano attraverso la prassi documentale vol 1 (1966) 174.
6 Thomas Rüfner
Oral (nuncupative) wills31 that were not recorded in writing became rare in the
classical period, but they continued to exist.32 The poet Horace is said to have
made his will (appointing Emperor Augustus as his heir) orally because he did not
have the time to write down and seal a written document.33
Although nuncupative wills were rarely used, the idea that the written document
was only a record of the actual will which had been made orally retained some
importance: it provided an opportunity to overcome certain formal defects in cases
where the testator’s will was clear. When important words (like those necessary for
the appointment of an heir)34 were missing from the written text, it was assumed that
the testator had actually spoken these words and that they were only missing from the
written record (plus nuncupatum minus scriptum). Although this assumption was a
mere fiction after it had become customary to reduce the oral declaration to a
reference to the written document, it is used in classical times35 and beyond.36
Even though merely oral wills were exceptional and the old mancipatio ritual had
lost its original meaning, the classical jurists insisted on the correct observance of the
traditional form. Some emphasis seems to have been placed on the uninterrupted
performance of the ritual from beginning to end. If the testator attended to any other
business not pertaining to his will in the meantime, his will was void.37 This
requirement of unitas actus, unity of the act, had parallels in the law relating to
the contract of stipulatio.38 In changing forms, it remained characteristic of Roman
law of succession throughout its evolution.
(b) Testamentum iure praetorio

In the course of its further development, the law concerning testamentary for-
malities came to be affected by one of the most important features of Roman law:
the co-existence of two distinct layers of law. The first of these layers was the
traditional ius civile (civil law), a body of law which consisted of traditional custom-
ary norms and laws enacted by the Roman people, the senate or (later) the Emperors.
The second layer was ius honorarium, which was developed and enforced through the
jurisdiction of the praetors and other magistrates.39
The difficult relationship between these two layers has often been compared with
that between common law and equity in English law. Traditionally it is said that the
praetors helped, supplemented, and corrected the ius civile.40 This formula already
reveals that there were instances of conflict. Sometimes the praetors would refuse to
31
On nuncupative wills in the classical era, see Jose Maria Blanch Nougues, ‘Nuncupare herdem’
(2000) 47 Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 123.
32
cf eg, Ulpian D. 28, 5, 1, 2.
33
Sueton, Vita Horatii; cf Amelotti (n 30) 112; Voci (n 16) 66, n 7.
34
See 9 below.
35
Ulpian D. 28, 5, 1, 4; Ulpian D. 28, 5, 9, 2 and 5; Papinian D. 31, 67, 9.
36
C. 6, 23, 7 (Diocletian and Maximian).
37
Ulpian D. 28, 1, 21, 3; J Inst 2, 10, 3.
38
Venuleius D. 45, 1, 137 pr.
39
On the relation between ius civile and ius honoriarium in general, see Kaser I (n 5) 205.
40
See the famous definition by Papinian D. 1, 1, 7, 1.
enforce rules of the ius civile or even create rules in direct contradiction to those of
the ius civile. We need not discuss here whether the intervention on the part of the
praetors in the field of testamentary formalities constitutes an instance of supple-
menting or correcting the law. At any rate, they introduced considerable changes.
Apparently the praetors felt that the mancipatio ritual had become increasingly
meaningless and that the only element of material importance was the written
document containing the testator’s last wishes. Consequently, the praetors decided
to accept a document sealed by seven witnesses as a valid will even when there was no
proof that the mancipatio ritual had actually been performed.
However, the praetors’ powers were not unlimited. It was impossible for them to
create an heir in the full meaning of the word. The ius civile alone was relevant to
determine who has the position of heir (heres). Yet, it was within the praetor’s power
to grant the right to take possession of the estate (bonorum possessio) to a different
person, if that person deserved it more than the heir designated by the ius civile.41
Thus, the praetors granted bonorum possessio to any person who was appointed as heir
in a will sealed by seven witnesses even though this person was (possibly or actually)
not the heir in terms of the ius civile because no mancipatio had occurred, or because
the testator had not made a nuncupatio.42
By designing new remedies for the person receiving the estate, modelled
after the remedies available to an heir, and by denying to the heir the remedy
normally available under the ius civile against a third person in possession of
the estate, the praetors made the position of the bonorum possessor almost as comfort-
able as that of an heir. From the times of Antoninus Pius, such a bonorum possessor
was protected even against the heir designated by the intestacy regime of the ius
civile and even when it was certain that no mancipatio had been performed.43
In other words, the bonorum possessor was turned into an heir under the ius honorar-
ium. While the Roman jurists continued to note the difference between the two,
in practice, there is no real advantage to being an heir recognized (also) by the ius
civile.44
The practical difference between the heir designated in a will which had really
been made per aes et libram and the one named in a document sealed by the seven
witnesses had all but disappeared for practical purposes. Therefore, it can be stated
with a sufficient degree of precision that already in classical times, the basic require-
ment for a valid will was that it had to be a document bearing the seals of seven
witnesses who had sealed it in the presence of the testator.45 The mancipatio was no
41
Gai 3, 32. See Watson (n 6) 71–84; Pasquale Voci, ‘Erede e eredità’, in Enciclopedia del diritto vol 15
(1966) 176.
42 43
Gai 2, 119. Gai 1, 120.
44
This is of course true only for a bonorum possessor cum re who enjoys the praetor’s protection even
against the heir designated by the ius civile. A bonorum possessor sine re has to surrender the estate to the civil
law heir and hence has a much weaker position. Cf Kaser I (n 5) 699.
45
8 Thomas Rüfner
longer necessary, unless the testator wished to make his will orally46 or wrote it down
in a document which was not sealed by the required number of witnesses.
2. Common requirements of civil and praetorian wills

In classical law, the testamentum per aes et libram, which alone was available for the
appointment of an heir according to the ius civile, and the testamentum iure praetorio
factum, the will bearing seven seals but created without mancipatio, co-existed as
related, yet distinct types.47 However, due to the common origins of the two forms,
there are many common features which can conveniently be dealt with for both types
at the same time.
(a) Witnesses
The witnesses (as well as the scale holder and the familiae emptor) had to be male
Roman citizens who had reached the age of puberty.48 As already mentioned above,
their task was not to witness the contents of the will, but only to guarantee (with their
seals) that the document opened after the testator’s death was the same he had
designated as containing his last will. It is therefore not surprising that the emperors
and jurists did not require the witnesses to know the Latin language.49 There were,
however, some requirements regarding the qualification of witnesses which had to
be respected. In particular, no person who was under the parental power of either
the testator or the familiae emptor was qualified to serve as witness.50 As far as this
rule concerned the sons in power of the familiae emptor it was a reminiscence of
archaic law.51
(b) Further general requirements

Apart from the requirement that the will be sealed by the witnesses, there were few
general provisions regarding its form: the document did not have to be signed or
sealed by the testator himself. Nor did the testator have to write it down himself.
He could use one of his children or slaves,52 or even the slave of another,53 or enlist
the services of a professional will writer (testamentarius) instead.54
However, it was only possible to make a will concerning one’s own estate; no
one was allowed to make another man’s will. The only exception to this rule was
pupillaris substitutio. The testator was allowed to appoint a substitute heir for a child
46
On the continuing occurrence of nuncupative wills, see above.
47
Kaser I (n 5) 680, n 21; for a somewhat different view, see Amelotti (n 30) 191–215.
48
This was the rule for mancipatio in general: Gai 1, 119.
49
Ulpian D. 28, 1, 20, 9 (quoting a rescriptum by the Emperor Marcus Aurelius); Pauli sententiae 3,
4a, 13; cf Andreas Wacke, ‘Gallisch, Punisch, Syrisch oder Griechisch statt Latein? Zur schrittweisen
Gleichberechtigung der Geschäftssprachen im römischen Reich’ (1993) 110 ZRG (RA) 14, 42–4.
50
Gai 2, 105; see also above n 26.
51
This is expressly admitted by Gai 2, 105.
52
Marcianus D. 48, 10, 1, 7.
53
Modestinus D. 28, 1, 28.
54
Cf Ulpian D. 29, 6, 1 pr. The text deals with an attempt by the beneficiaries of an existing will to
prevent the testamentarius from entering the testator’s house and helping the testator to change his will.
under the age of puberty in case the child should decease before he or she was able to
make a will for him- or herself. This was closely related to the appointment of a
substitute heir (substitio vulgaris, see below), but there was a fundamental difference
in that, technically, the testator appointed an heir not for himself, but for the child.55
It was not strictly required that the date of the making of the will had to be
given,56 but, apparently, this was routinely done.57 As far as the writing material
is concerned, wax tablets which were bound together with a linen cord were
customary.58 However, the jurists expressly authorized the use of other materials
like papyrus.59
In addition to these general requirements, there were special provisions pertaining
to the ‘inner form’ of certain clauses within the will. For most clauses, the use of
certain words was compulsory and any departure from the traditional language could
lead to the disposition being void.
(c) Heredis institutio

Every Roman will had to contain a heredis institutio. The testator had to appoint an
heir (heres) or several heirs.60 An heir is a person who receives the entire estate as
opposed to a person who only receives certain items, or a certain sum of money,
under the will. If there are several heirs, every one of them is entitled to a certain
quota. The heir is treated as the successor of the deceased in all respects. He is thus
also liable for the deceased’s debts.
A will containing no appointment of an heir but only limited gifts (legata,
fideicommissa, etc) was invalid.61 The will also became invalid when the person
appointed was unable or unwilling to accept the inheritance. In order to prevent
the will from failing in such cases, it was possible to appoint a substitute heir who was
to receive the estate in case the primary heir did not accept the inheritance.62
While it was possible to allot shares of different sizes to the several heirs,
the testator had to appoint heirs for his entire estate. It was impossible to give
one half of the estate to a testamentary heir and to leave the distribution of the rest
to the rules of intestacy. Such a will was in conflict with the rule nemo pro parte
testatus pro parte intestatus decedere potest.63 Disregard of this rule did not, however,
55
On the additional formalities required in the case of substitio pupllaris, see Gai 2, 181. Note also that
according to Modestinus D. 28, 6, 1, 3, the will on behalf of the minor was only valid if the father’s own
will was valid; cf Giovanni Finazzi, La sostituzione pupillare (1997) 205.
56
Cf Modestinus, Ex libris regularum et differentiarum fragmenta, nr 1 (FIRA II, 450).
57
Cf Ulpian D. 29, 3, 2, 6; Iohannes Chrysostomus, ‘In illud: Vidi dominum’, in J-P Migne,
Patrologiae Cursas Completas, Series Graeca vol 56 (1859) cols 110 f (serm 2, para 3).
58
If wax tablets were used, the formalities prescribed in the Senatus consultum Neronianum had to be
observed: see Pauli sententiae 5, 25, 6; and Sueton, Nero 17.
59
Ulpian D. 37, 11, 1 pr and 4.
60
On the prime importance of the appointment of an heir, see, extensively, Maurizio D’Orta, Saggio
sulla ‘heredis institutio’ (1996) 3–9 and passim.
61
Gai 2, 229.
62
Gai 2, 174; cf Kaser I (n 5) 688 f.
63
This famous wording is admittedly of post-classical origin, while the idea can already be found, eg,
in Pomponius 3 ad Sab D. 50, 17, 7: ‘Ius nostrum non patitur eundem in paganis et testato et intestato
10 Thomas Rüfner
result in the will being invalid. Rather, the jurists construed the will so as to distribute
the entire estate.64 If only one half of the estate was disposed of, it was assumed
that the testator had meant to give the entire estate to the person instituted for
the one half.65 Cases in which the testator made a specific gift to a person, but
incorrectly designated that person not as recipient of a limited gift (a legatum or a
fideicommissum), but as heres, were resolved in a similar manner.66 This general
inclination in favour of the validity of a will and of the testator’s last will is known
as favor testamenti.67
The testator was not free in his choice of words regarding the heredis institutio.
He had to use words expressing a direct command (verba imperativa et directa).
The standard formula was Titius heres esto, Titius shall be heir.68 The words had to be
in Latin.69
Originally, the testator had to name the heir(s) before making any other testa-
mentary provision.70 Later, exceptions to this rule were accepted.71 However,
classical law maintained the position that no limited gift in the form of a legatum
could be made before the heir, who would have to execute the legatum, had been
appointed.72
Due to the importance of the heir, Roman jurists stressed the necessity to avoid
any kind of uncertainty regarding the person to be appointed. If the heir was not
designated by his proper name, he had to be unequivocally identified in another
way.73 It was possible to make the appointment of an heir dependent on a condition
even though this implied that it would be uncertain who was to receive the estate
while the condition was pending.74 However, the testator could not leave the
appointment of the heir to a third person.75
decessisse: earumque rerum naturaliter inter se pugna est “testatus” et “intestatus” ’. See Kaser I (n 5) 677,
n 3, with further references.
64
Voci (n 16) 142–60.
65
J Inst 2, 14, 5; Ulpian D. 28, 5, 13. For a detailed account of the solutions developed for various
cases of partial intestacy, see Maurici Pérez Simeón, Nemo pro parte testatus pro parte intetestatus decedere
potest (2001) 55–153.
66
See, eg, Ulpian D. 28, 5, 1, 4; on institutio ex re certa, see, in particular, Pérez Simeón (n 65)
155–214.
67
See, concerning this concept, Hans Josef Wieling, Testamentsauslegung im römischen Recht
(1972) 82.
68
Acceptable wordings are listed in Gai 2, 117; see also Watson (n 6) 61; Amelotti (n 30) 118.
69
Since the Roman jurists stress that bequests can only be made in Latin (Gai 2, 281; Ulpiani epitome
25, 9) and since a later imperial constitution recounts that it has only recently been permitted to make wills
in Greek (Novellae Theodosiani 16, 8), it is reasonably certain that the heredis institutio had to be in Latin.
Cf Wacke (1993) 110 ZRG (RA) 41. The Gnomon idiologi (which, however, is no law, but only a set of
instructions for an imperial officer in Egypt) generally provides that Roman wills cannot be made in
Greek; cf Amelotti (n 30) 113.
70
Gai 2, 229 f.
71
According to the Proculian school, a tutor could be appointed before the appointment of the
heir (Gai 2, 231). A fideicommissum before the appointment of the heir is valid according to Ulpiani
epitome 25, 8.
72 73
Cf Pauli sententiae 3, 6, 2. Ulpian D. 28, 5, 9, 8 and 9.
74 75
Ulpian D. 28, 5, 9, 10 and 11. Gaius D. 28, 5, 32 pr.
In addition to the appointment of one or more heirs, the validity of a will also
presupposed that certain close relatives who were not to become heirs had been
explicitly mentioned and disinherited.76 This rule applied particularly strictly to sons
who were under the testator’s power at the time of the making of the will. If such a
son was not named as heir or as a disinherited child, the will was void.77 For
daughters and grandchildren, the rule was somewhat more lax: according to the ius
civile, they did not have to be mentioned by name. It was sufficient if the will
contained a provision that ‘all others’ should be disinherited.78 While the omission
of a son in his father’s power traditionally made the entire will void, omission of a
daughter, a male grandchild, or an emancipated male descendant did not invalidate
the will, but the omitted descendant received a share in the estate notwithstanding
the dispositions of the will.79
The original rule was tightened in several respects by the ius honorarium. The
praetors required that all male descendants including grandchildren and children of
grandchildren who were no longer under the testator’s power at the time of the
making of the will be named and explicitly disinherited. Only for females, a general
clause remained sufficient.80
Moreover, violation of the rule not only entailed the subtraction of a share
for the omitted persons. Rather, the praetors disregarded the appointment of heirs
in the will altogether and granted bonorum possessio contra tabulas to those eligible
under the rules of intestacy.81 However, the praetors did not ignore the will
completely. Provided that the person not mentioned was not a son in power,
other dispositions in the will – like those concerning bequests to certain family
members – were upheld.82
(d) Limited gifts

There were also formal requirements for limited gifts of property. Roman law
developed several types of limited gifts, and the formalities that had to be respected
depended on the type the testator intended to use.
The oldest type of a limited gift was a bequest (legatum83) in the form of legatum
per vindicationem. It had the effect that ownership in the object concerned vested
76
On the origins of this rule, see Cicero, De oratore 1, 38, 175; Valerius Maximus 7, 7, 1; Andrea
Sanguinetti, ‘ “Considerazioni sull” origine del principio “sui heredes instituendi sunt aut exheredandi” ’
(1993) 59 Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris 259, 278.
77
Gai 2, 123; Gaius D. 28, 2, 30; Papinian D. 28, 3, 1; Paulus D. 28, 2, 7; see Pérez Simeón (n 65)
244 ff; for what follows see also Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Compulsory Heirship in Roman Law’, in
Kenneth G C Reid, Marius J de Waal, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Exploring the Law of Succession:
Studies National, Historical and Comparative (2007) 27, 30–4.
78
Gai 2, 128; on this, see Pérez Simeón (n 65) 252–8.
79
Gai 2, 124; Ulpiani epitome 22, 17.
80
Gai 2, 135.
81
Gai 2, 135.
82
Ulpian D. 37, 5, 1 pr.
83
On the various types of legata, see Watson (n 6) 122–7; Giuseppe Grosso, I legati nel diritto romano,
Parte generale (2nd edn, 1962) 69–81.
12 Thomas Rüfner
directly in the beneficiary84 when the will took effect.85 No transfer was necessary.
Therefore, the beneficiary, being the legal owner of the property in question, could
avail himself of rei vindicatio in order to recover possession of the property from
the heir or any third person. For a legatum per vindicationem, the words do lego –
‘I convey and I bequeath’ were customary.86 According to Gaius, do alone was also
sufficient.87
Alternatively, the testator had the option to create a legatum per damnationem.
This second type of bequest did not immediately make the beneficiary the legal
owner of the property he was supposed to receive. Rather, he received a claim against
the heir. The heir was obliged to convey the property to the beneficiary.88 For a
legatum per damnationem, the formula was Titius Seio decem dare damnas esto –
‘Titius [the heir] shall be obliged to pay the sum of ten’.89
Apart from these two types, which had the greatest practical importance, there
were several other types of bequests, each associated with certain words to be used for
their creation (legatum sinendi modo, legatum per praeceptionem, legatum optionis, and
legatum partitionis).90
Since the use of the pertinent formula was necessary, all types of legata had to be
made in Latin.91
Instead of choosing one of the traditional types of legata, the testator also had the
option of creating a fideicommissum, a limited gift subject to formal requirements
that were less strict.92 A fideicommissum was a request by the testator to a beneficiary
under the will to turn over all or part of what he received to a third person. While,
originally, the fideicommissum was unenforceable, it was recognized as legally binding
in the early principate.93
In its classical form, the fideicommissum resembles the legatum per damnationem.
However, only an heir could be the debtor under a legatum per damnationem, while
every person receiving anything upon the decedent’s death could be burdened with a
fideicommissum. Thus, the decedent could request an heir, the recipient of a bequest,
or even the beneficiary of another fideicommissum to fulfil a fideicommissum.94
It is important to note that, in classical law, legata and fideicommissa differed
greatly with regard to the remedy granted to the beneficiary. The recipient of
a legatum was entitled to the actio ex testamento, under which proceedings in the
84
Gai 2, 194.
85
The will becomes effective immediately upon the testator’s death if the appointed heir belongs to the
testator’s house, ie if he had been under the testator’s power until the latter’s death. If the heir is a stranger
(heres extraneus), he has to enter upon the inheritance formally in order to give effect to the will.
86
Cf Amelotti (n 30) 131.
87
Gai 2, 193; cf Grosso (n 83) 74; Voci (n 16) 223.
88
Gai 2, 204.
89
Gai 2, 201; cf Grosso (n 83) 80–1; Amelotti (n 30) 131; Voci (n 16) 223–4.
90
On these, see Grosso (n 83) 81–92; Voci (n 16) 223–4; Kaser I (n 5) 744–5.
91
Gai 2, 281; Ulpiani epitome 25, 9.
92
See Grosso (n 83) 112–26; and, in great detail, David Johnston, The Roman Law of Trusts (1988).
93
J Inst 2, 23, 1. On the (early) history of fideicommissa, see Johnston (n 92) 29–40; Watson (n 6)
35–9.
94
Gai 2, 260 and 271.
ordinary courts could be brought and which was governed by the rules of formulary
procedure. Fideicommisa belonged to the jurisdiction of the consuls, or of a special
praetor fideicommisarius. The procedure used was that of cognitio extra ordinem.95
The fideicommissum was a very flexible instrument. It was not restricted to gifts of
certain pieces of property or sums of money. It was also possible to make the entire
estate the object of a so-called fideicommissum hereditatis. Such a fideicommissum
would oblige the heir to hand over the entire estate to a third person. Usually, such a
fideicommissum was made to depend upon a condition. In this way, it was not used to
make the appointment of the heir completely meaningless, but to put a temporal
limit to the heir’s position. After some time, he would have to cede his place to the
beneficiary under the fideicommissum.96
As fideicommissa had evolved from informal requests to friends of the deceased, no
traditional formal requirements existed. They did not even have to be contained in
the will, but could be made in a letter, or by an oral declaration, or even by a nod.97
No particular words had to be used. Fideicommisa could be created in Greek or any
other convenient language.98
However, the jurists developed some rules in order to determine whether a
certain utterance of the deceased should be treated as a fideicommissum. While even
expressions implying only a polite wish were accepted,99 the limit was reached when
it was altogether unclear what the deceased wanted to be given to the beneficiary or
when it was left to the unfettered discretion of the heir or legatee whether they
wanted to comply with the deceased’s request.100
The fact that no special form existed for fideicommissa opened an avenue to saving
gifts that would have failed as legata because the testator had not used the appropriate
words. Such a bequest could be upheld as a fideicommissum. However, this avenue
seems to have been used by the classical jurists only in cases where the testator had
expressly provided that the gift should eventually be regarded as a fideicommissum.101
(e) Manumissions
Besides gifts of property, the manumission of slaves played an important role in
Rome. This is hardly surprising in a society that depended so much on slave labour
and on keeping the slave population in check by means of an elaborate policy of
carrot and stick. A testator could simply order his slave to be free. This operated in a
similar way as a legatum per vindicationem: the slave became a free man by operation
95
Actually, the decision to grant a remedy based upon a fideicommissum was one of the reasons why
the cognitio procedure was introduced; cf Johnston (n 92) 223–7; Max Kaser and Karl Hackl, Das Römische
Zivilprozeßrecht (2nd edn, 1996) 452 f.
96
Gai 2, 184 and 277.
97
Paulus D. 32, 21 pr; Ulpiani epitome 20, 3; C. 6, 42, 22 (Diocletian and Maximian); cf Grosso
(n 83) 112.
98
See the sources cited in n 91 and Ulpian D. 32, 11 pr; cf Wacke (1993) 110 ZRG (RA) 41 f.
99
Examples of accepted wordings can be found in Gai 2, 249. Cf Grosso (n 83) 112–13; Johnston
(n 92) 155–69.
100
Cf Ulpian D. 32, 11, 7; and the sources quoted by Grosso (n 83) 116.
101
Cf Scaevola D. 34, 328, 2; and the sources listed by Grosso (n 83) 118.
14 Thomas Rüfner
of law as soon as the will came into effect. Like a legatum, the direct manumission
required the use of certain words.102
Alternatively, the testator could effect the manumission by means of a fideicom-
missum.103 The testator would ask the heir or another beneficiary of his estate to free
a slave by manumissio inter vivos. Like fideicommissa employed to make gifts of
property, fideicommissa for the manumission of slaves were not subject to strict
formal requirements.
As far as their effects were concerned, the difference between direct manumissions
and manumissions by fideicommissum was small. However, if a fideicommissum was
used, the person asked to free the slave came to enjoy the privileges that a former
owner had vis-à-vis his former slave. In the case of a direct testamentary manumis-
sion, the slave had no former owner still alive to whom he would owe a debt of
gratitude and respect.104
3. Military wills
Classical Roman law contained special provisions for wills by soldiers, so-called
testamenta militaria or testamenta militis.105 Apparently, there is no direct link
between these provisions and the testamentum in procinctu of the earlier law.106
The old testamentum in procinctu allowed a Roman citizen to make his will in a
situation where he was in danger of death and did not have the time to comply with
the ordinary formalities. In contrast, the provisions regarding wills by soldiers in
classical law, introduced for the first time under Julius Caesar,107 were intended to
permit the creation of a last will for soldiers with non-Roman origin who would
therefore be unable to produce a document in conformity with all the formal and
substantive requirements of a valid will in classical times.108
That the special provisions regarding military wills were not only intended
for situations of immediate danger is clearly proven by the fact that soldiers
were authorized to resort to these special provisions throughout the period of their
service, even in times of peace.109 Only after their discharge the general provisions
became applicable once again. In the case of an honourable discharge, a will made
during the time of service, although not in accordance with the norms of general
application, remained valid for some time after the end of the testator’s service.110
102
Gai 2, 267.
103
J Inst 2, 24, 2. Cf also Rolf Knütel, ‘Rechtsfragen zu den Freilassungsfideikommissen’, in Thomas
Finkenauer (ed), Sklaverei und Freilassung im römischen Recht: Symposium für Hans Josef Wieling (2006)
133 ff.
104
Gai 2, 266.
105
Gai 2, 109; J Inst 2, 11; D. 29, 1. See Voci (n 16) 99–101; Kaser I (n 5) 680.
106
See also Watson (n 6) 10.
107
Ulpian D. 29, 1, 1 pr.
108
On the motives for the introduction of the military will, see Vincenzo Scarano Ussani, ‘Il
“Testamentum militis” nell’età di Nerva e Traiano’, in Sodalitas: Scritti in onore di Antonio Guarino vol
3 (1984) 1383–95; Kaser I (n 5) 681.
109
Kaser I (n 5) 681.
110
Africanus D. 29, 1, 21; J Inst 2, 11, 3.
In accordance with its purpose, the law of military wills dispensed with the two
fundamental formalities of Roman law. First, the will did not have to be sealed by
witnesses. Any written or even oral statement of the testator’s last will was suffi-
cient.111 Secondly, soldiers were also released from the formalities regarding the
appointment of heirs. The rule nemo pro parte testatus pro parte intestatus decedere
potest did not apply.112 The provisions regarding the use of the Latin language were
also relaxed.113
Since soldiers were exempt from most formal requirements, it became difficult to
distinguish between testamentary dispositions and mere drafts. While some texts
suggest that even a document which had not been finalized by the testator before his
death could be upheld as a military will,114 a text ascribed to the late classical jurist
Paul stresses the necessity to establish that the soldier actually intended an unfinished
draft to obtain legal force as his will.115
4. Codicilli
In addition to testamenta, a second class of documents intended to lay down
a person’s last will was accepted by the Roman jurists. Codicilli were written
documents that could either supplement an existing will116 or exist independently.
However, in the latter case, they could only contain fideicommissa.
Codicilli were subject to less stringent formal requirements than wills. They did
not have to be sealed by witnesses. Nor did they have to contain a heredis institutio.
On the contrary, it was not permissible to create an heir by way of a codicil.117 It was
possible, though, to state in the will that the name of the person who was to become
heir would be revealed in a will by using the formula Quem heredem codicillis fecero,
heres esto.118
Otherwise, a codicil could contain any provision that could be contained in a
will – but only if the codicil, in turn, was expressly mentioned in the will. In order to
be able to amend his testamentary dispositions by way of a codicil, the testator had to
confirm the codicil in his will, be it in anticipation of the codicil to be prepared later,
or be it in retrospect. Such a codicil was legally regarded as a part of the will.119
Therefore, it could contain bequests, fideicommissa, manumissions, and dispositions
111
Ulpian D. 29, 1, 1 pr; Kaser I (n 5) 681; Amelotti (n 30) 89–90.
112
Ulpian D. 29, 1, 6; J Inst 2, 14, 15; cf Pérez Simeón (n 65) 215–42.
113
Wacke (1993) 110 ZRG (RA) 46.
114
Ulpian D. 29, 1, 3; Ulpian D. 29, 1, 35.
115
Paulus D. 29, 1, 40 pr. The limitation of the general rule that a mere draft can be considered as a
valid military will is contained in the final words of the text. According to Voci (n 16) 979, n 109, these
final words are the result of an interpolation. However, it seems likely that the classical jurist Paul himself
took a cautious approach towards the rule. Voci’s suspicion is based on formal indicia only and is therefore
not convincing.
116
See Kaser I (n 5) 694.
117
Gai 2, 273.
118
‘The person whom I will have appointed as heir in my codicil shall be heir’; Papinian D. 28, 5, 77.
119
Cf Gaius D. 29, 3, 11; Scaevola D. 29, 7, 14 pr. See Kaser I (n 5) 694.
16 Thomas Rüfner
on guardianship.120 Of course, the use of certain words was as obligatory as in the

will itself.
If the codicil lacked such confirmation, it was not invalid, but only fideicommissa
or fideicommissary manumissions could be created.121 This is logical, because
fideicommisa were not subject to strict formalities and could even be created orally.
Bequests, direct manumissions, and dispositions on guardianship could not be made
in a codicil lacking confirmation. Since a fideicommissum could be contained in a
codicil and could therefore exist independently of a will appointing an heir, it was
also possible to burden the recipients of the estate under the rules of intestacy with a
fideicommissum.122
The possibility to create valid fideicommissa in a codicil even if the latter was not
confirmed by a will, or where there was no valid will, opened a way to save certain
dispositions in a will which was invalid due to some formal or substantive defect.
If the testator included a clause in his will to the effect that it should be upheld as a
codicil if it were invalid as a will (codicillary clause), the defective will could be
treated as an unconfirmed codicil.123 As such, it could not contain the institution of
an heir. The estate would therefore go to the heirs according to the intestacy rules.
However, it was possible to burden these heirs ab intestato with fideicommissa. Thus,
the appointment of an heir in an invalid will containing the codicillary clause made it
possible to uphold the institution as a fideicommissum hereditatis by means of which
the heir ab intestato was obliged to hand over the entire estate to the person whose
institution as heir was invalid. Similarly, bequests could be upheld as fideicommisa
regarding specific pieces of property.124
When the testator had died before he was able to complete his will, the Roman
jurists refused to uphold the will as an unconfirmed codicil: even fideicommissa
contained in the unfinished document were ineffective.125
5. Alteration of testamentary dispositions

Had the Romans continued to pay attention to the legal construction underlying the
traditional testamentum per aes et libram, they should have been troubled by the issue
of later changes of the testator’s will. Since the testamentum per aes et libram entailed a
transfer of title in the testator’s estate to the familiae emptor, any new disposition on
the part of the testator should have been impossible unless the familiae emptor had
first conveyed the property back to the testator. However, if such doubts ever existed,
our sources conserve no trace of them.
In classical Roman law, a will could be revoked by a new, valid will.126 It was
impossible, though, to make a new will with partial amendments only. If there was a
new will, all provisions of the prior will lost their binding force. If the testator wanted
120 121
Kaser I (n 5) 694. Gai 2, 270a. See also Kaser I (n 5) 694.
122
See Johnston (n 92) 117–54.
123 124
Ulpian D. 29, 1, 3; Iulian D. 29, 7, 2, 4; Kaser I (n 5) 694. See 13 above.
125
Paulus D. 28, 1, 29 pr; Ulpian D. 32, 11, 1; cf Voci (n 16) 82.
126
Kaser I (n 5) 691.
to keep some of the provisions from the earlier will, he had to repeat them in the new
document.
If there were conflicting provisions within one and the same will, it had to
be determined which of these provisions was to prevail. Since a codicil was techni-
cally part of the will by which it was confirmed, the same question arose when a
codicil contained dispositions contradicting the words of the will. Under such
circumstances, the Roman jurists gave effect to the provision which was the last in
temporal order. Thus, it became possible to change individual testamentary disposi-
tions in a codicil made subsequently – provided the will contained a clause confirm-
ing a future codicil.127
Other acts, apart from a new will, which might be construed as showing that
the testator had changed his mind and no longer wanted to uphold the dispositions
expressed in his will were, in principle, insufficient to deprive the will of its
legal existence and validity. Even the physical destruction of the document did
not terminate its legal effects.128 After all, the written document was – at least in
theory – only evidence of the last will pronounced orally by the testator.129
Yet, this is another point where the praetors disregarded the traditional rule. They
were not prepared to enforce a will that had been destroyed or otherwise clearly
disavowed by the testator. In such a case, the praetor would give the bonorum possessio
to the heir ab intestato.130
Similarly, the praetors refused to enforce individual provisions of a will if the
testator had subsequently clearly changed his mind and did not want a certain gift to
go to the beneficiary named in the will.131
6. Probate proceedings
Originally, Roman law knew no special judicial procedure to confirm the validity of
a will. If there were doubts regarding the authenticity or legality of a will, the parties
had to resort to civil actions (between a person claiming the inheritance under the
rules of intestacy and the heir or heirs appointed in the will) such as hereditatis petitio
or querela inofficiosi testamenti.
In classical law, a statute by the Emperor Augustus (for tax purposes) and the
praetor’s edict regulated the procedure to be followed when a will had to be
opened.132 According to these provisions, the will had to be officially opened within
a few days after the testator’s death. A remedy was provided which made it possible
for interested parties to force a third party in possession of the will to deliver it into
the praetor’s court.133 Before the will was opened, the witnesses who had sealed the
will were called to confirm the authenticity of their seals.134
In addition to these provisions for the official opening of wills, the praetors
developed a procedure to grant bonorum possessio to the heir or heirs. Bonorum
127 128
Ulpiani epitome 2, 12; J Inst 2, 21 pr. Gai 2, 151; Kaser I (n 5) 692.
129
See, however, Paulus D. 34, 4, 16.
130
Ulpian D. 28, 1, 22, 3 and D. 37, 11, 1, 10; Ulpian D. 38, 6, 1, 8. See Kaser I (n 5) 692.
131
See, eg, Ulpian D. 34, 9, 9; Papinian D. 34, 9, 16, 3.
132 133 134
Cf Kaser I (n 5) 692–3. Ulpian D. 43, 5, 1 pr. Ulpian D. 29, 3, 4.
18 Thomas Rüfner
possessio was granted by the praetor (or a provincial governor) at the instance of the
person wishing to get it. The proceedings did not follow the rules of the formulary
procedure: the praetor decided by himself without the interference of a iudex
privatus.135 If an acceptable will was presented, the praetor would grant bonorum
possessio secundum tabulas to the heir(s) appointed therein. Otherwise, he might give
bonorum possessio contra tabulas to a child not mentioned in the father’s will.136
The core of these procedural institutions survives in Justinian’s codes.
IV. Post-classical law
In the long period between the end of the classical era of Roman law (around the
middle of the third century AD) and the age of Justinian’s legislation (sixth century
AD), many changes in the law relating to testamentary formalities occurred. We will
briefly consider a few of them which did not make it into Justinian’s legislation and
therefore could not have had a direct impact on the tradition of the ius commune. All
of the changes of the post-classical era taken over by Justinian will be discussed
together with Justinian’s own innovations in order to give a complete and coherent
account of the law of testamentary formalities under Justinian.
1. Before Justinian
(a) Wills with five witnesses
For a considerable time, the notion survived that the testamentum per aes et libram
required only five witnesses if the mancipatio ritual had been performed. Thus in
classical law, there were apparently wills with seven witnesses, recognized by
the praetor without proof of the mancipatio, and there were wills with the seals of
only five witnesses, which were valid (at least in theory) only if the mancipatio
had actually occurred.137
In post-classical law, any difference between the positions of an heir who was
instituted in conformity with the requirements of the ius civile, and a bonorum
possessor who only enjoyed some degree of protection by means of the praetor’s
jurisdiction, had disappeared.138 At the same time, the mancipatio ritual went into
complete disuse.139 Even wills bearing only five seals were now accepted without
proof of the mancipatio. This led to the rather absurd situation that, in legal practice,
two forms of wills existed side by side. One required five seals, the other seven, but
there were no discernible differences between the two.140
135 136
Kaser I (n 5) 672–6. See 11 above.
137
See Kaser II (n 5) 478, but cf Amelotti (n 30) 111.
138
Kaser II (n 5) 479.
139
It is said to have been fully abolished under Constantine the Great; cf Eusebius, Vita Constantini 4,
26. See also Kaser II (n 5) 478.
140
Kaser II (n 5) 479.
(b) Holograph wills

In addition to these two forms, an imperial constitution by Valentinian III dating
from the fifth century AD introduced the holograph will – a will that could be made
without the presence of witnesses and that was valid if it was written in its entirety by
the testator in his own hand (holographa manu).141 If the testator complied with this
simple requirement, no further formalities were necessary. No seals had to be applied
and the testator did not even have to sign the document.142
Why the new form was introduced remains unclear. Apparently, Val-
entinian recognized it at the instance of an heir who had been appointed in a
holograph will because the required number of witnesses was not available
when the testatrix had made her will. However, it seems likely that more general
considerations – like the conviction that the traditional formalities had lost their
justification in the context of the post-classical vulgarization of Roman law – lay
behind the measure.143
This was, of course, an important step forward in the evolution of the testamen-
tary forms. At the time, however, it was of little consequence. The constitution was
only valid in the western part of the empire, and it did not make it into Justinian’s
codes.144 No example of a will from the late Roman period made in accordance with
the requirements of Valentinian’s law survives,145 which suggests that the newly
introduced form was rarely used. Thus, the invention of the holograph will remained
an episode in the history of Roman law. However, the holograph will found its way
into several Germanic law codes of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages.146
Therefore, it may have had an influence beyond ancient Roman law.
(c) Married couples’ wills

Valentinian III also authorized married couples to make a joint will in which each
spouse appointed the other as heir.147 This form, too, was not accepted in the eastern
part of the empire and consequently was not included in Justinian’s codes, which,
instead, reiterate the old rule against such mutual appointments.148
2. Justinianic law
(a) Basic characteristics
Justinian returned to the classical rules on many issues while in some areas he
retained the results of the long development that had taken place between the end
of the classical period and his own time.
141
Novellae Valentiniani 21, 2 with the pertinent interpretatio. See Voci (n 16) 79; Kaser II (n 5) 481.
142
Monika Beutgen, Die Geschichte der Form des eigenhändigen Testaments (1992) 12–14.
143 144
Beutgen (n 142) 15 f. Kaser II (n 5) 481.
145
On this fact and one possible exception, see Beutgen (n 142) 16.
146 147
Cf Beutgen (n 142) 17–24. Novellae Valentiniani 21, 1, 1.
148
Papinian D. 28, 5, 71; Paulus D. 28, 5, 72.
20 Thomas Rüfner
Most importantly, Justinian formally abolished the distinction between the

two layers of law.149 Those who in classical law enjoyed only some level of protection
by means of the praetor’s jurisdiction, but were not heredes according to the
traditional ius civile, were now regarded as heirs in the full sense. Consequently,
the mancipatio ritual which had long lost all practical importance in the context of
the making of wills as well as elsewhere was deleted from the texts used for Justinian’s
compilation.150
In another fundamental departure from tradition, Justinian abolished the distinc-
tion between the different forms of legata,151 and between legata and fideicom-
missa.152 Thus, there was only one form of testamentary gift. The beneficiary of
such gift was entitled to a remedy in rem, like the beneficiary of a legatum per
vindicationem, and a remedy in personam like the recipient of a legatum per damna-
tionem. The distinction between the remedy of a legatee and that to which the
beneficiary of a fideicommissum was entitled was also abolished.153 Furthermore, the
abrogation of the difference between legata and informal fideicommissa implied that
the solemn words necessary to create a valid legatum were no longer needed.154
(b) Wills with seven witnesses

Justinian finally abolished the co-existence of a will with seven witnesses and one
with five witnesses.155 By incorporating in his Code a constitution of AD 439,
promulgated by the Emperors Theodosius II and Valentinian III, Justinian con-
firmed that the witnesses had to sign and to seal the will and that, additionally, the
testator himself had to sign.156 In the case of a testator being unable to write his
name, an eighth witness was needed.157 Similar provisions were made by Justinian’s
immediate predecessor Justinus for wills made by a blind testator.158 This, too, was
upheld by Justinian.
With regard to the qualification of witnesses, Justinian abolished the disqualifica-
tion of sons in power of the familiae emptor which had already been obsolete
in classical times.159 Instead, Justinian provided that the appointed heir and his
relatives were not allowed to witness the will. Beneficiaries of legata and fideicommissa
were, however, able to serve as witnesses.160
The old requirement of unitas actus, unity of the act,161 was confirmed by
Justinian. Since the mancipatio ritual had fallen into disuse, the principle was now
applied to the formal completion of the written will. While it was acceptable for the
149 150 151

Kaser II (n 5) 25. Kaser II (n 5) 50. C. 6, 43, 1, 1.
152
C. 6, 43, 2, 1. See also Ulpian D. 30, 1; cf Grosso (n 83) 129; Kaser II (n 5) 489.
153
C. 6, 43, 1 (Justinian); J Inst 2, 20, 2 and 3. See also Grosso (n 83) 34.
154
This was expressly provided in a constitution by the Emperor Constantine, C. 6, 37, 21, and
repeated by Justinian in C. 6, 43, 2 pr-1.
155
J Inst 2, 10, 1 and 2.
156
C. 6, 23, 21 pr (Theodosius and Valentinian); Kaser II (n 5) 479.
157
C. 6, 23, 21, 1 (Theodosius and Valentinian).
158 159
C. 6, 22, 8 (Iustinus). See n 51 above.
160
Cf J Inst 2, 10, 9–11; Ulpian D. 28, 1, 20 pr.
161
See 6 above.
testator (or his writer) to prepare the will in advance, unitas actus was required for the
sealing and signing by the witnesses. All of the witnesses had to sign and seal the will
on the same day and at the same time after the testator had confirmed that the
document constituted his last will and signed himself.162
The classical rule that every will had to contain the appointment of an heir was
formally upheld, although many exceptions limited its practical impact.163 The
requirement that the appointment of the heir had to be the first clause of the will
and that everything written before it was without legal effect was formally
abolished.164
Justinian did not abandon, however, the rule that certain relatives had to be
explicitly mentioned in the will if they were to be disinherited. The rule was included
in the Justinianic codification in the (complex) form which it had been given by the
jurisdiction of the praetors.165 Additionally, a Justinianic enactment required the
testator to state the reasons for the disinheritance.166
By incorporating in his Code a fourth-century statute, probably by Constantine,
Justinian abolished the necessity of using specific words to express the appointment
of an heir.167 The words to be used for different types of legata had become obsolete
as a result of the merger of all forms of legata with fideicommissa, which had never
been subject to any requirement to use specific words for their creation.
The provisions requiring the use of the Latin language for the appointment of
heirs and the creation of legata were also dropped: Justinian incorporated an inter-
polated version of a fifth-century constitution stating that the use of Greek was
generally permissible.168 Other languages were not mentioned.
(c) Military wills

As outlined above, Justinian abolished some of the formal requirements for regular
wills. In addition to that, by Justinian’s times the importance of non-Roman, local
legal traditions among soldiers in the army must have played a much smaller role
than during the classical period.169 These were probably the reasons for Justinian
significantly restricting the scope of the special provisions for military wills.
Under Justinian’s law, the special provisions only applied during a military
campaign.170 Otherwise, soldiers were bound by the general rules. With this change,
162
C. 6, 23, 21 pr (Theodosius and Valentinian); C. 6, 23, 28 pr (with some relaxations in }} 1–5,
Justinian).
163
Kaser II (n 5) 490.
164
C. 6, 23, 24 (Justinian); J Inst 2, 20, 34. Both texts also imply that heredis institutio is still necessary
for a will to be valid.
165
D. 28, 2; J Inst 2, 13; C. 6, 28 and 29.
166
Nov 115, 3.
167
C. 6, 23, 15 pr (Constantius according to the inscription; in fact, however, this is probably a
constitution of Constantine I); see also Kaser II (n 5) 489.
168
C. 6, 23, 21, 6 (Theodosius and Valentinian); see Wacke (1993) 110 ZRG (RA) 46–50; Pasquale
Voci, ‘Il diritto ereditario romano nell’età del tardo impero: II V secolo’ (1982) 48 Studia et documenta
historiae et iuris 1, 17.
169
Cf Amelotti (n 30) 102–3.
170
C. 6, 21, 17 (Justinian). See also Amelotti (n 6) 470.
22 Thomas Rüfner
the law regarding the wills of soldiers came closer in character to the old institution of
testamentum in procinctu. Like this archaic form, the military will was now a way for
soldiers in action quickly to make a valid will without having to respect the time-
consuming formalities prescribed by the general law. It was no longer a general
privilege for members of the armed forces.171
(d) Testamentum parentum inter liberos

Justinian did not accept the holograph will as it had been introduced by Valentinian
III in the fifth century. However, a form coming close to the holograph will, but
applicable only in a special constellation, was preserved in his codes. According to
Justinian’s Novel 107,1 from AD 541, a will made by a father or mother was valid
even though the usual requirements had not been met, provided that it gave the
estate to the decedent’s children and that at least the names of the children, the
quotas they were to receive, and the testator’s name were written by the testator
himself.172
The origins of this testamentum parentum inter liberos are obscure and inextricably
confused with those of divisio parentum inter liberos.173 The difference between the
two is that divisio parentum inter liberos is only concerned with the distribution of
property among the children in their capacity as heirs under the rules of intestacy,
while the testamentum parentum inter liberos is an outright will which may contain
provisions going beyond the scope of a mere divisio.174
Under Justinianic law, a testamentum parentum inter liberos may contain the
appointment of children in power, or of emancipated children, as heirs. Apparently,
the testator was able to disinherit some of the children, but the silence of the
sources renders a definitive statement on this point impossible.175 Limited
gifts (legata and fideicommissa) could be made in a testamentum inter liberos,
but if they were intended for recipients who were not children of the testator,
additional formal requirements were to be observed: the will had to be signed
(but not sealed like a standard will) by witnesses. Their number is not given in
Justinian’s law, so it is not clear whether seven, five, or even fewer witnesses were
required.176
171
Amelotti (n 30) 106.
172
On the testamentum parentum inter liberos, see generally Voci (n 16) 101–2; Kaser II (n 5) 483;
Pasquale Voci, ‘Il diritto ereditario romano nell’età del tardo impero: I Il IV secolo’ (1978) 29 Iura 17,
37–9; Maria Luz Blanco Rodriguez, Testamentum parentum inter liberos (1991).
173
Justinian’s legislation on this related, but separate, institution is contained in Nov 18, 7 and
Nov 107, 3; cf Kaser II (n 5) 483; Blanco Rodriguez (n 172) 151 ff.
174
The first relevant sources for dispositions regarding the distribution of property between the
decedent’s children are Ulpian D. 10, 2, 20, 3 and C. 3, 28, 8 (Alexander Severus), but it is likely that
only Constantine (C. 3, 36, 26) introduced privileges for such dispositions by parents, while they were
subject to the same regime as similar provisions by other decedents before; cf Blanco Rodriguez (n 172)
47–67.
175
Blanco Rodriguez (n 172) 119–22.
176
Blanco Rodriguez (n 172) 103–7.
(e) Other forms

By the time of Justinian a number of special forms of will existed side by side with the
ones just mentioned.
In the fifth century, it became customary to deposit a will in the archives of the
provincial governor, of a municipality, or even of the emperor himself. Such a will
was recognized as valid without the seals of witnesses. Justinian’s codes confirm the
viability of this alternative to the will with seven witnesses.177 The authenticity of
such a testamentum apud acta conditum, or testamentum principi oblatum, was
guaranteed by the public authority that had received the document from the testator
and had preserved it until the time of his death. This was a seminal innovation for
future development.
As for wills in favour of the testator’s children, the formalities normally required
were also relaxed for wills in favour of the church, or for charitable purposes: a
constitution of AD 470 which was included in Justinian’s Code ordained that gifts to
the church should be valid in whatever form they had been made.178 Another
constitution, from AD 455, prescribed that a gift to the poor should be valid omnibus
modis.179
In order to provide for testators in rural areas who might have difficulties to find
seven witnesses capable of writing their name, Justinian allowed the reduction of the
number of witnesses to five, and the use of witnesses who were not required to sign
their name (testamentum ruri conditum).180 In another sign of his readiness to make
testamentary dispositions possible where the requirement of seven witnesses was
difficult to comply with, Justinian included a constitution by Diocletian in his Code
which provided for wills made during times of pestilence. The exact meaning of this
constitution, however, remains unclear.181
Finally, oral wills remained possible. Like the written will in its ordinary form, this
nuncupative will required the presence of seven witnesses.182
(f) Codicilli
With the relaxation of some of the formal requirements relating to wills, the
distinction between wills and codicils had become slim. It was maintained, however,
and entrenched in the Justinianic law books. Thus, it was still necessary for a testator
to make a proper will if he wished to appoint an heir. All other provisions could
conveniently be made by way of a codicil. Since Justinian had done away with the
distinction between legata and fideicommissa, the distinction between codicils con-
firmed in the will, which could contain all kinds of dispositions (except for the
177
C. 6, 23, 19, 1 (Honorius and Theodosius); cf Voci (n 16) 80; idem (1982) 48 Studia et documenta
historiae et iuris 11 f.
178
C. 1, 2, 14, 1 (Leo and Anthemius).
179
C. 1, 3, 24 (Valentinian and Marcian).
180
C. 6, 23, 21 (Justinian); cf Voci (n 16) 102–3.
181
C. 6, 21, 8 (Diocletian and Maximian); cf Voci (n 16) 101.
182
C. 6, 11, 2, 1 (Gordian III); C. 6, 23, 21, 4 (Theodosius and Valentinian).
24 Thomas Rüfner
institution of an heir), and codicils not so confirmed which could contain only
fideicommissa had lost most of its practical relevance.183
Following similar dispositions in earlier legislation, Justinian introduced new
formalities for codicils. He required the presence of five witnesses.184 There was
thus little difference between the formalities for a will and for a codicil. Since a
codicil could replace a will for most purposes, this was a logical step.
With these changes, it was more convenient than ever to uphold an invalid will as
a valid codicil. This was done whenever the will contained a provision to that effect.
The possibility to convert an invalid will into a valid codicil even in the absence of
such a clause, however, was not yet accepted.185
(g) Alteration of testamentary dispositions

The abolition of the old distinction between the effects of ius civile and ius honorar-
ium had repercussions also for the law concerning changes subsequently made to
an existing will. While in earlier times the making of a new will186 was the only
way of depriving a valid will of its effects under the ius civile, now all of the
acts recognized only by the jurisdiction of the praetors as affecting the binding
force of an existing will were effective for all purposes. The (partial or complete)
physical destruction of a will was now a generally recognized way of revoking
a will.187
The revocation of an existing will was also facilitated by other provisions in
Justinian’s legislation. In keeping with his inclination to relax formalities for gifts
to those who would also have benefited under the rules of intestacy, as manifested by
the admission of the testamentum parentum inter liberos,188 Justinian allowed the
mere revocation of an existing will to result in the application of the rules of
intestacy, without any necessity to comply with the formalities required for making
a new will. A declaration under oath in front of five witnesses was sufficient, or even a
declaration in front of three witnesses, provided that ten years had lapsed after the
will had been made.189
183
Some minor differences persisted; thus, a clause ordering the direct manumission of a slave (above,
13f) was valid only if it was contained in a will or in a codicil confirmed by a will.
184
C. 6, 36, 8, 3 (Theodosius; interpolated by Justinian); cf Blanco Rodriguez (n 172) 65. The
wording of this source suggests that it was applicable to all codicils. However, it was often understood, in
later times, not to refer to codicilli testamento confirmati which were thought not to require any form
at all in view of the fact that they were deemed to be part of the will: see ch 2 below at 45, and ch 8 below at
182, n 50.
185
Kaser II (n 5) 497.
186
Still provided for by Justinian in C. 6, 23, 27, 1.
187
C. 6, 23, 30 (Justinian); cf Kaser II (n 5) 495.
188
See 22 above.
189
C. 6, 23, 27, 2 (Justinian). The three witnesses were not necessary if the testator’s declaration was
placed in the archives of a local court.
V. Conclusion
It is difficult to sum up the evolution of the Roman law relating to testamentary

formalities in a few sentences. Obviously, the special attention devoted by Roman
jurists to all aspects of the law of succession did not result in the latter being
particularly clear and systematic. The law relating to testamentary formalities
contained many complex and unclear provisions which were destined to become
the object of heated debates among the jurists of the ius commune.
It is notable that the development of the formalities was quite dynamic. The
old forms of testamentum calatis comitiis and testamentum in procinctu had become
obsolete before the development of Roman law reached its apex in the classical era.
The central element of the testamentum per aes et libram, the mancipatio ritual,
became meaningless during that classical era. The post-classical period brought
into being a host of alternative forms. However, three basic features remained
stable. First, a certain number of witnesses was required for a valid will. Second,
a will in the full sense of the word had to contain the appointment of an heir.
Third, the rule that certain close relatives had to be explicitly mentioned in the
will and either appointed as heirs or expressly disinherited was a stable feature of
the Roman system.
The importance of witnesses (rather than written documents alone) to ensure the
procedural integrity of testamentary succession is in line with the general inclination
of the Romans towards oral forms. Otherwise, the idiosyncratic mix of stable and
dynamic features may be tentatively explained by taking into consideration the
motives for the Roman obsession with wills.
If wills were a means of ensuring the continuity of the family, it is clear that the
appointment of an heir had to be the foundation of any proper will. Any disposition
mortis causa which did not name an heir failed to fulfil the most important function
of a Roman will. This function of the will also explains why the Roman jurists took
great care to prevent the testator from leaving out a close relative without sufficient
consideration. This may help to understand the insistence on the rule sui heredes
instituendi sunt aut exheredandi.
The flexibility and the dynamic evolution of the Roman law relating to other
formal requirements may be explained by the importance of gifts mortis causa for the
texture of Roman society. The jurists were ready to relax formal requirements in
order to prevent these well-deserved gifts from failing.
If – as our conclusions suggest – the Roman law of testamentary formalities was
particularly closely linked to structural characteristics of Roman society, it seems
plausible that this area of the law was more directly affected by the collapse of that
society in late antiquity than many others. This may account for the chaotic state in
which the law of testamentary formalities has come down to us in the legislation of
Justinian: as a product of republican and early imperial Roman society, the law of
26 Thomas Rüfner
testamentary formalities appears to have been ill-fitted either to be taken over in its
classical form, or to be thoroughly reformed by Justinian or his predecessors in the
fourth and fifth centuries. This may be the reason why the law of testamentary
formalities, although its sources contain many monuments to the individual genius
of Roman jurists, does not commend itself for the virtues of logical structure and
systematic coherence otherwise ascribed to Roman law.
2
in Early Modern Europe
Nils Jansen
I. Introduction 27
II. Wills and codicils 33
III. The forms of will 35
1. Private and public wills 37
2. Formal privileges and modifications 41
3. Holograph and written wills 42
IV. Internal formalities 46
1. Ultima voluntas non debet ex alieno arbitrio pendere 47
2. The rights of close relatives 49
V. Conclusion 49
I. Introduction
It is general knowledge today that the Roman law of succession was ‘highly compli-
cated and to a large extent perplexedly entangled’, and that classical lawyers had done
‘little to simplify it’.1 This observation holds true especially for the form of wills.2
This part of the law was the result of complex historical developments that had
resulted not only in different forms of testamentary disposition (the codicil as well as
the genuine will (testamentum) containing the institution of an heir), but, moreover,
in a wide range of different forms of will. True, Constantine’s and Justinian’s jurists
1
Fritz Schulz, Classical Roman Law (1951) 203; see also Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Compulsory
Heirship in Roman Law’, in Kenneth G C Reid, Marius J de Waal, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds),
Exploring the Law of Succession: Studies National, Historical and Comparative (2007) 27, 47.
2
See ch 1 above at 5 ff, 25 f.
28 Nils Jansen
had abolished many earlier internal formal requirements3 such as the rule that the
will had to be started by the institution of an heir,4 or the necessity of using specific
words for instituting an heir,5 or disinheriting a suus.6 Still, the Corpus Juris Civilis
presents a highly complex picture.
First, there were two ‘normal’ private forms for genuine wills, namely the written7
and the oral, ‘nuncupative’8 will. For both of them, apart from other requirements,
the presence of seven witnesses was required. The holograph will which had been
introduced by Valentinianus III for the western part of the Roman Empire9 was not
recognized in Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis. Second, there was the possibility of
making a ‘public will’ before a judge or the princeps (testamentum principi oblatum),10
which had been acknowledged from the third century onwards.11 The picture was
completed by a wide range of privileges and special rules for soldiers,12 blind persons
and persons incapable of writing,13 the rural population unable to sign documents,14
times of contagious disease (testamentum tempore pestis conditum),15 and especially
for parents distributing their property among their descendants (testamentum par-
entum inter liberos).16 Yet, even other rules applied for codicils: last wills that did not
contain the institution of an heir17 and therefore were deemed to be of lesser
3
For further details, see Max Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht. Zweiter Abschnitt: Die nachklassischen
Entwicklungen (2nd edn, 1975) 468, 489 ff. These developments began early, probably already by the time
of Sabinus; cf Klaus Peter Müller-Eiselt, Divus Pius Constituit: Kaiserliches Erbrecht (1982) 30 ff.
4
Ulpian D. 28, 5, 1 pr; Gai 2, 229–31. See Martin Avenarius, ‘Formularpraxis römischer Urkun-
denschreiber und ordo scripturae im Spiegel testamentsrechtlicher Dogmatik’, in Martin Avenarius, Rudolf
Meyer-Pritzl, and Cosima Möller (eds), Festschrift für Okko Behrends (2009) 13, 25 ff.
5
Schulz (n 1) 249 f.
6
See Gai 2, 127; C. 6, 23, 15 (Constantin).
7
C. 6, 23, 21 pr (Theodosius and Valentinian). See also J Inst 2, 10, 3–13 (testamentum tripertitum):
the testator had to confirm and sign the written document in the presence of the witnesses; and the
witnesses had to sign and seal the will on the same day. If the testator was able to do so, he had to write the
heir’s name personally (otherwise further complexities arose: C. 6, 23, 29 (Justinian)). It was not necessary,
however, that the witnesses knew about the content of the testator’s will; the document could be contained
and sealed in an envelope.
8
C. 6, 23, 21, 4 (Theodosius and Valentinian). See also J Inst 2, 10, 14.
9
Novellae Valentiniani XXI, 2, 1 (446), in Paulus M Meyer, Leges Novellae ad Theodosianum
pertinentes (2nd edn, 1954); cf Kaser, Privatrecht II (n 3) 481.
10
C. 6, 23, 21, 4 (Honorius and Theodosius).
11
Kaser, Privatrecht II (n 3) 481 f.
12
J Inst 2, 11; C. 6, 21, 17 (Justinian). From early on, soldiers had been granted the privilege to make a
will without any formal requirements; see Max Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht. Erster Abschnitt: Das
altrömische, das vorklassische und das klassische Recht (2nd edn, 1971) 680 ff, also for further privileges.
Originally, the underlying idea had been to privilege foreign soldiers; later, the privileges were limited to
times of war.
13
C. 6, 23, 21, 1 (Theodosius and Valentinian); C. 6, 22, 8 (Iustinus); cf also J Inst 2, 12, 4. In such a
case, eight witnesses were necessary.
14
C. 6, 23, 31 (Justinianus).
15
16
C. 3, 36, 26 (Constantin); C. 6, 23, 21, 3 (Diocletian and Maximian); Nov 107. See Kaser II (n 3)
483 f.
17
Paulus D. 29, 7, 20: ‘Iulianus ait, tabulas testamenti non intellegi, quibus heres scriptus non est, et
magis codicilli quam testamentum existimandae sint’; likewise C. 6, 23, 14 (Diocletian and Maximian).
Testamentary Formalities in Early Modern Europe 29
importance. Here, five witnesses were regarded as sufficient.18 As a result, it became

common practice to insert codicillary clauses into wills, according to which the
written document should be taken as a codicil if it did not meet the requirements of a
will (testamentum).19 Thereby, it was hoped, invalid wills could be saved at least to
some extent.
While all those formal requirements served purposes similar to those of modern
law,20 ie to make sure that the testator’s last will was well considered and expressed as
plainly as possible, and that the testator, therefore, was normally advised by a lawyer
when making his will,21 other formalities served totally different interests, namely
the interests of the testator’s family adequately to participate in the inheritance. The
modern functional equivalent to those requirements is the right to a compulsory
portion (Pflichtteilsrecht).22 The testator had to disinherit his sui expressly by naming
the disinherited individuals; otherwise the will was normally23 invalid (formelles
Noterbrecht).24 Later, this rule was complemented and modified by, and often
mixed up with, the querela inofficiosi testamenti by means of which the sui could
claim that the testator had violated principles of public morality (the officium pietatis)
by not leaving them an adequate portion of his property (materielles Noterbrecht).25
These complexities alone would have been sufficient for making the law of
testamentary formalities a hard topic.26 The lawyers of the usus modernus, however,
were confronted with additional difficulties.27 In his Novels, Justinian had intro-
duced far-reaching reforms of the law of succession, which had, of course, not been
contemplated in the earlier texts contained in the Institutes, the Digest, and the Codex.
Yet, those pieces of later legislation obviously presupposed the Roman law as laid
down in these central parts of the Corpus Juris. Until the nineteenth century, the
relation of the Novels’ ‘modern law’ to the ‘old law’ of the other sources continued to
be a constant source of debate. Other difficulties concerned the early modern
lawyers’ reading of the Roman sources: often, the ideas and policies underlying the
Roman rules on testamentary formalities were difficult to understand for early
18
C. 6, 36, 8, 3 (Theodosius – the original wording of this legislation was, however, interpolated at a
later stage, probably by Justinian’s compilers: Kaser II (n 3) 497). On codicils that had been confirmed in
a will (codicilli testamento confirmati), see below, at nn 180 ff.
19
See Ulpian D. 29, 1, 3; Julian D. 29, 7, 2, 4.
20
Cf Sebastian Herrler, ‘Wills’, in Jürgen Basedow, Klaus J Hopt, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds),
Max Planck Encyclopedia of European Private Law (Max EuP ) (in preparation for 2011); Gottfried von
Schmitt, Begründung des Entwurfes eines Rechtes der Erbfolge für das Deutsche Reich (Berlin, 1879) 399 f,
reproduced in Werner Schubert (ed), Die Vorlagen der Redaktoren für die erste Kommission zur Ausarbeitung
des Entwurfs eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches: Erbrecht 1 (1984) 95, 515 f.
21
Schulz (n 1) 248 f.
22
Schulz (n 1) 269.
23
Exceptionally, it could be modified in favour of sui that had been passed over in silence; for details,
see Kaser I (n 12) 703 ff, 707 f; Kaser II (n 3) 512 ff; Schulz (n 1) 266 ff.
24
J Inst 2, 13. Originally, only sons had to be named expressly; Justinian, however, extended this rule
to the testator’s daughters: C. 6, 28, 4; J Inst 2, 13, 5.
25
D. 5, 2; see Kaser I (n 12) 709 ff; Kaser II (n 3) 512 ff.
26
Cf Schulz (n 1) 204.
27
On what follows, see Helmut Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht vol I: Älteres Gemeines Recht (1500 bis
1800) (1985) 559–61.
30 Nils Jansen
modern lawyers. Thus, the prohibition of entrusting the selection of one’s heir(s) to a
third person28 had been a doctrinal consequence of the specifically formal thinking
of Roman lawyers. The effects of a will could only be brought about by observing
the ritual’s formalities correctly, and a vital part of that was that the institution of an
heir had to be a part of a will.29 In contrast, early modern lawyers, when they
explained this rule, referred to the ethical maxim that the last will of a man should
not depend on the arbitrary decision of someone else.30 Yet, this explanation was
difficult to reconcile with rules contained in the Digest allowing such determination
of the recipients by a third person in cases of a fideicommissum or legacy.31 Hence, it
was a matter of controversy whether the alleged ethical maxim really expressed a
fundamental principle of natural law and should therefore also be taken into
consideration in the context of fideicommissa and legacies,32 or whether it was a
Roman peculiarity that had either not been received33 or should be interpreted
narrowly. In many parts of Europe, lawyers accepted an electio haeredis incerti ex
certis.34 Similar difficulties arose in the context of the Roman privilege allowing
soldiers to make their last will without any formality. Whereas this privilege had been
based on the wish of the Roman Emperors to favour foreigners in their armies who
did not know much about Roman law and language,35 usus modernus lawyers
explained it with the dangers to which soldiers were exposed. Hence, they had
to limit the privilege to the times when the soldiers were really in danger or in the
field,36 and they had to extend it to other persons in similar danger such as doctors
and women accompanying the army.37
28
Gaius D. 28, 5, 32 pr.
29
For a more detailed discussion, see Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Quos Titius voluerit’ – Höchstpersönliche
Willensentscheidung des Erblassers oder ‘power of appointment’? (1991) 9 ff.
30
Johannes Brunnemann, Commentarius in Quinquaginta Libros Pandectarum (4th edn, Frankfurt/
Main, 1692) ad D. 28, 5, 32: ‘ . . . ultima voluntas non debet ex alieno arbitrio pendere’. For discussion, see
Christian Friedrich von Glück, Ausführliche Erläuterung der Pandekten nach Hellfeld: Ein Commentar vols
33–35 (Erlangen, 1829–32) vol 33, 444–76; Gerhard Immel, Die höchstpersönliche Willensentscheidung des
Erblassers (1965) 77 ff.
31
J Inst 2, 25, 20; Gaius D. 34, 5, 7, 1; cf also Ulpian D. 30, 75 pr. See Zimmermann (n 29) 11 ff.
32
This had been the opinion of some humanist and later German writers: Immel (n 30) 89 ff, 110 ff;
Zimmermann (n 29) 18 ff. See also Jean Domat, Les loix civiles dans leur ordre naturel, le droit public et
legum delectus (Paris, 1777) part II, liv III, tit I, sect I, } 8. The argument can also be found in the older ius
commune; cf Diego de Covarrubias y Leyva, De Testamentis, in idem, Opera Omnia vol I (Frankfurt/Main,
1608) 1–113, cap XIII, paras 10 ff.
33
For such an argument, see Johann Schilter, Praxis Juris Romani in Foro Germanico Juxta Ordinem . . .
Pandectarum (4th edn, Frankfurt/Main, 1733) exercitatio XXXVIII, } LXXXIII, quaestio II.
34
Covarrubias (n 32) cap XIII, para 14, accepting the – apparently common – clause: ‘melioro unum
de filiis meis, quem mea uxor elegerit’. See also Brunnemann (n 30) ad D. 28, 5, 32, para 1.
35
See above n 12.
36
Cf Kaysers Maximiliani I Ordnung zur Underrichtung der offen Notarien, wie die ihre Aempter üben
sollen, reproduced in Heinrich Christian von Senckenberg (ed), Neue und vollständigere Sammlung der
Reichs-Abschiede vol II (Frankfurt/Main, 1747) 151 ff, I, } 2; cf Ludwig Julius Friedrich Höpfner,
Theoretisch-practischer Commentar über die Heineccischen Institutionen (4th edn, Frankfurt/Main, 1793)
410, 417 (}} 453, 459).
37
Höpfner (n 36) 415 (} 456).
Other problems were the result of social and legal change. In medieval times, new
legal institutions and principles had been developed that were quite different from
those acknowledged by the Roman lawyers. Examples are the concepts of mutual
wills38 and testamentary contracts,39 of an executor,40 or the idea of acquisition upon
death of individual parts of an estate,41 such as a feudal tenure or the Saxon Gerade
(parts of the household that were regarded as the property of women and exclusively
transferred to women),42 rather than the Roman principle of an en bloc succession
into the rights and duties of the deceased (‘universal succession’).43 Furthermore,
already before the reception of Roman law, the Roman Church had initiated
fundamental reforms of the law of succession that had not only been received into
the local laws of many towns and early states in continental Europe,44 but also into
the law of England, where the law of succession was administered by the ecclesiastical
courts.45 These reforms were of particular importance within the context of wills.
While testamentary succession had been exceptional in early medieval societies,46 the
Church had from early on encouraged testamentary dispositions pro salute animae
which became an important aspect of the sacramental medieval spirituality.47 It was a
natural consequence that the Church had formulated detailed rules for this part of
the law. Yet, wills serving piae causae looked quite different from Roman wills and,
therefore, had to be governed by different rules. Mostly, they did not contain the
appointment of an heir, but only legacies of individual objects to a clerical institution
or charity. While the complex formal requirements of Roman law relating to wills
38 39 40
Coing (n 27) 585–7. Coing (n 27) 587–93. Coing (n 27) 597–601.
41
Werner Ogris, ‘Testament’, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte vol V (1998), cols 152,
156 f.
42
See Karin Gottschalk, Eigentum, Geschlecht, Gerechtigkeit: Haushalten und Erben im frühneuzeitli-
chen Leipzig (2003) 39 ff and passim.
43
On this principle, and the later terminology, see Schulz (n 1) 211 f.
44
See the reports on different countries by Peter Weimar, Andreas Wacke, J Röhrkasten, H Ehrhard,
and G Vismara, ‘Testament’, in Lexikon des Mittelalters vol VIII (1997) cols 563 ff.
45
Cf ch 13 below at 308 ff, 313. For a detailed discussion, see Richard H Helmholz, The Oxford History
of the Laws of England vol I: The Canon Law and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s (2004) 387
ff; idem, ‘Der Usus Modernus Pandectarum und die Ursprünge des eigenhändigen Testaments in England’
(1995) 13 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 769. For reasons that are difficult to reconstruct today, the
probate jurisdiction did not cover immovable property. In the context of chattels, however, English Canon
lawyers not only relied on the Canon-law authorities, but also on the Roman sources of the usus modernus.
Occasionally, this led to solutions that deviated both from the Church’s legislation and from the Corpus
Juris Civilis; a telling example was the holograph will, which was acknowledged on the basis of usus modernus
arguments, although both Roman and Canon law authorities had clearly rejected such wills.
46
See Martin Lipp, ‘Erbfolgeordnung’, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte vol I (2nd
edn, 2008) cols 1361 ff; Ogris (n 41) cols 153 ff; Peter Landau, ‘Die Testierfreiheit in der Geschichte des
Deutschen Rechts im späten Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit’ (1997) 114 ZRG (GA) 56 ff. For
Saxon law, see Gottschalk (n 42) 38. For a different perspective, see Otto Stobbe, Handbuch des Deutschen
Privatrechts vol V (Berlin, 1885) 170 ff, 195 ff; Ulrike Seif, ‘Römisch-kanonisches Erbrecht in den
mittelalterlichen Rechtsaufzeichnungen’ (2005) 122 ZRG (GA) 87–112. Both authors emphasize that
functional equivalents for the Roman institutions allowing the making of a will can be found in medieval
law even before Canon-law influence and the later reception of Roman law. Hence, it may be said that
medieval legal systems were quite ready to accept the Roman- and Canon-law wills.
47
See Henri Auffroy, Évolution du Testament en France: Des origines au XIIIe Siècle (Paris, 1899) 373:
‘accessoire d’un Sacrement’.
32 Nils Jansen
had set strong incentives for enlisting a professional writer’s legal advice in the
process of making a will,48 Canon law had to be designed so as to ease the making
of wills even in the last hours of a sinner’s life and so as to further dispositions ad pias
causas. Thus, Pope Alexander III decreed that – apart from the presence of a priest
and two or three witnesses – no formal requirements were necessary for the making
of a valid will;49 and whereas under Roman law a testator had been unable to entrust
the selection of his heir(s) to another,50 Pope Innocent III had acknowledged also
such dispositions as valid parts of a will.51
The Church, however, was not the only actor introducing new legislation in the
law of succession, and especially in the field of testamentary formalities. Towns and
emerging states modified the Roman- or Canon-law requirements; they even intro-
duced new instruments and new forms52 such as the will before a notary or the
holograph will. Difference and divergence rather than uniformity and the existence
of common principles were what first impressed observers of the European law of
succession.53 The required number of, and qualifications for, witnesses for a private
will varied from town to town.54 France was different from the rest of Europe. In the
northern parts, the holograph will had long been acknowledged;55 and whereas the
nuncupative will before a notary and witnesses was a common practice in most parts
of Europe,56 and had authoritatively been recognized by Emperor Maximilian I in
his Reichsnotariatsordnung (Imperial Regulation on Notaries, 1512),57 it was pro-
hibited in a French Ordonnance of 1735.58 In Prussia, private wills were altogether
abolished as a regular form of making a will.59
As a result of all these developments, the early modern law of succession
presented an irritatingly complex and even perplexing picture that was, however,
48
Schulz (n 1) 248 f; Avenarius (n 4) 16 ff. See the report by Scaevola D. 39, 88, 17, where the
ineffectiveness of a will appears to be the regular consequence of its being made without legal advice.
49
Corpus Juris Canonici X 3, 26, 10; for dispositions ad pias causas only two witnesses were needed:
X 3, 26, 11.
50
Above at nn 28 f.
51
Corpus Juris Canonici X 3, 26, 13.
52
Höpfner (n 36) 408 (} 450); Coing (n 27) 571 f.
53
See the comparative observations in von Schmitt (n 20). At the end of the nineteenth century, the
diversity within the law of testamentary formalities was far greater than today.
54
Samuel Stryk, Specimen usus moderni Pandectarum vol III (Halle/Magdeburg, 1713) lib XXVIII, tit
I, } 2; von Schmitt (n 20) 401; Paul Roth, Bayerisches Civilrecht vol III (Tübingen, 1875) 257 ff (}} 303 f).
Thus, women were normally regarded as being unable to testify, but this rule was often modified.
55
See III.3 below.
56
See below at nn 134 ff.
57
I } 5 Reichsnotariatsordnung (n 36). In the context of wills, most provisions of this Imperial
regulation were treated as authoritative and effective, at least within the confines of the Reich.
58
Art 1, first sentence, Ordonnance concernant les testaments (August 1735), in Isambert, Decrusy, and
Taillandier (eds), Recueil général des anciennes lois Françaises, depuis l’an 420 jusqu’a la révolution de 1789
vol 21 (Paris, 1830) 386 ff: ‘Déclarons nulles toutes celles qui ne seroient faites que verbalement, et
défendons d’en admettre la preuve par témoins, même sous prétexte de la modicité de la somme dont il
auroit été disposé.’ The Ordonnance did, however, maintain in its Arts 4 ff the ius commune forms of the
testament nuncupative écrit and the testament mystique for those regions of the droit écrit where it had long
been a common practice.
59
See I 12 }} 66 ff PrALR.
highly characteristic for the ius commune.60 Such a state of law was satisfactory only
from the legal practitioners’ economic perspective.61 The law applicable in a specific
situation could never be gauged from the Roman Corpus Juris alone. Rather, the
lawyers of the usus modernus had to reconcile, or integrate, the divergent or even
colliding rules, principles, and legal institutions and turn them into workable legal
systems. Hence, drawing a complete historical picture of early modern law would
ideally require an in-depth analysis not only of the relevant statutory legislation and
the learned literature that was intellectually related to the Roman sources, but also of
reported cases. Clearly, such an analysis of early modern law in Europe62 is not
possible. Fortunately, it is also not necessary. From the seventeenth century onwards,
the learned authors increasingly included the analysis of statutory legislation and the
courts’ practice in their ius-commune textbooks. Thus, the characteristic interplay
between Roman law, Canon law, and local law can be reconstructed from the learned
literature, on which the following discussion is primarily based.
II. Wills and codicils
The distinction between wills (testamenta) and codicils had been fundamental within
the Roman law of succession; it had been maintained by Justinian63 and became a
fundamental element of the ius commune.64 Thus, the institution of an heir remained
the basic internal formal requirement for wills. Although there was no such require-
ment and no distinction between wills and codicils in Canon law, the requirement of
a heredis institutio was never doubted in the context of the ius commune.65 As early
as 1512, it had been legally acknowledged as a matter of principle by Emperor
Maximilian I;66 it remained good law under the Bavarian Codex Maximilianeus
60
Coing (n 27) 561: ‘Insofern zeigt das Erbrecht vielleicht nur in schärferer Form die allgemeinen
Züge des Ius Commune’. On the concept of the ius commune and the plural structure of early modern law,
see Nils Jansen, ‘Ius commune’, in Max EuP (n 20).
61
Samuel Stryk, Tractatus de cautelis testamentorum . . . (4th edn, Halle/Magdeburg, 1726) cap I, }} 1 f:
‘non raro contigit, ut maxima patrimonii pars, ob jurgia institutorum substitutorumque, ut & legit-
imorum heredum, super voluntate defuncti oriunda, Advocatorum praeda fiat.’
62
See by way of example (Saxon law, especially in seventeenth-century Leipzig), Gottschalk (n 42) 34
ff, 51 ff and passim.
63
See n 17 above.
64
Johann Gottlieb Heineccius, Elementa iuris civilis secundum ordinem Institutionum (Giessen, 1784)
} 676; Höpfner (n 36) 569 f (}} 618, 622); Glück (n 30) vol 33, 324; idem vol 34, 14 f; Arnold Vinnius, In
Quatuor Libros Institutionum Imperialium Commentarius (3rd edn, Amsterdam, 1659) lib II, tit XXV, } 2,
para 1; Johannes Voet, Commentarius in Pandectas (Paris, 1829) lib XXIX, tit VII, }} 1, 3. See also Domat
(n 32) part II, liv III, tit I, sect I; liv IV, tit I, sect I.
65
Stryk, De cautelis (n 61) cap XVI, } 1: ‘substantia testamenti’; Brunnemann (n 30) ad D. 29, 7,
before lex 1; idem, Commentarius in Codicem Justinianeum (Leipzig, 1699) ad C. 6, 23, 8; Höpfner (n 36)
366 ff (}} 441 n 2, 442); Ulrich Huber, Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt (5th edn, transl into English by
Percival Gane as The Jurisprudence of My Time (1939)) book II, ch 12, }} 5 f; ch 14, 16; Bernhard
Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol III (7th edn, Frankfurt/Main, 1891) 25 (} 538).
66
According to I } 2 Reichsnotariatsordnung (n 36), the formal requirements of the ius commune
applied: seven witnesses were required for ordinary private wills and five for codicils.
34 Nils Jansen
Bavaricus Civilis (CMBC) of 1756;67 and as late as 1811, the distinction between
wills and codicils became a legislative doctrine in Austria.68 In the ius commune of
San Marino, it is still, apparently, good law today;69 and it survived – albeit with
little practical relevance – also in the Netherlands.70
Nevertheless, in some regions, such as the Netherlands71 and Germany,72 it was a
common practice to uphold invalid wills as codicils,73 wherever possible, even if the
will contained no codicillary clause. Thus, the invalid institution of an heir could
stand as a fideicommissum binding the intestate heirs. The distinction between wills
and codicils had lost its practical relevance, where the formal requirements for wills
had been modified in accordance with the principles of Canon law,74 or where
statutory legislation or professional practice had altogether abolished the require-
ment of a heredis institutio.75 Already the Reichsnotariatsordnung had equated the
requirements for rural wills, made by farmers in the countryside, with those of a
codicil.76 Similarly, at the end of the seventeenth century, Saxon custom apparently
allowed such wills to be made in the Canon-law form.77 Thus, even less strict
formalities (a priest and two witnesses) were required than had been necessary,
according to Roman law, for a codicil (five qualified witnesses). Under sixteenth-
century Spanish law78 and seventeenth-century Roman-Dutch law,79 the formal
67
CMBC III 3, }} 1, 9; III 5, }} 1 ff. The Munich edition of 1759 has been used.
68
} 553 ABGB: ‘Wird in einer letzten Anordnung ein Erbe eingesetzt, so heißt sie Testament; enthält
sie aber nur andere Verfügungen; so heißt sie Codicill’; cf ch 9 below at 223.
69
Michaela Reinkenhof, Die Anwendung von ius commune in der Republik San Marino (1997) 164 f,
189 ff.
70
See ch 7 below at 145, 157 ff.
71
Huber (n 65) book II, ch 14, }} 12 f. On codicillary clauses in Roman law, see above at n 19.
72
Modestinus Simon Pistoris, Consiliorum sive responsorum volumen I (Leipzig, 1587) consilium I,
paras 21 f; Stryk (n 61) cap XXIII, } 29, reporting a case of Frankfurt’s law faculty from 1683. Stryk and
other German writers, however, doubted whether such an intention could always be presumed: see Stryk
(n 61) cap XXIII, }} 31 ff; Höpfner (n 36) 575 (} 628). Thus, in 1699 the law faculty of Halle refused such
an interpretation in a case where the testator had twice declared his last will a ‘testament’; hence it was
argued that no animus codicillandi could be presumed: see Stryk (n 61) cap XXIII, } 38. The clause was also
recommended by legislators; cf CMBC III 3, } 23.
73
For criticism of this practice, see Antonio Perez, Praelectiones in duodecim libros Codicis Justiniani
(Amsterdam, 1671) lib VI, tit XXIII, para 19.
74
75
Cf, for French and Dutch cities, Vinnius (n 64) lib II, tit XIV, } 12, para 1. For the Netherlands, see
Simon van Groenewegen, Tractatus de legibus abrogatis et inusitatis in Hollandia vicinisque regionibus (3rd
edn, Amsterdam, 1669) ad Inst 2, 17, 7, para 5, ad Inst 2, 20, 34, and ad 2, 25, 3. Similar rules applied in
Aragon and in some German cities: see the references in Coing (n 27) 573. In the French pays de droit écrit,
by contrast, the Roman principles had apparently been abolished by some coutumes, but were subsequently
re-introduced, either by later legislation or by the courts’ practice: see Paul Ourliac and J de Malafosse,
Histoire du droit privé vol III (1968) 471.
76
I } 2 Reichsnotariatsordnung (n 36): ‘ . . . auf dem Gau, wo Bauersleuthe Testament machen, und
mehr Zeugen nicht zu bekommen wären . . . ’. See Höpfner (n 36) 421 f (} 462) with a discussion of some
problems concerning the privilege.
77
Stryk (n 54) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 3; for a detailed argument, see idem (n 61) cap XIII, }} 19, 25 ff,
28 ff.
78
Covarrubias (n 32) cap X, paras 4 f.
79
Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 13; lib XXIX, tit VII, }} 1, 5. Similarly Hugo Grotius, Inleiding tot de
Hollandsche Rechtsgeleertheyd (ed and transl into English by R W Lee as The Jurisprudence of Holland
requirements for wills had generally been reduced to the five witnesses that were
necessary for making a codicil. During the nineteenth century, the same rule applied
in Saxony.80 In France, many coutumes had altogether abolished the distinction
between wills and codicils;81 and the Austrian Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
(ABGB) ultimately undermined its doctrinal distinction of codicils and wills by
applying the same rules to both instruments.82 In many parts of Europe, it could be
said that there was no longer any distinction between wills and codicils.83
This is not to say, however, that the idea underlying the Roman distinction was
forgotten. Although the Code civil and other codifications had abolished the formal
distinction between wills and codicils altogether and although, in some parts of
Europe, the word ‘codicil’ did not indicate a specific form of will, but was rather used
as a synonym for legacies,84 the basic idea remained alive in Germany. I 12, } 161 of
the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht (PrALR) allowed legacies for no more than 5 per
cent of the estate to be made without witnesses, in holograph form; and similar rules
could be found also in other nineteenth-century codifications.85 Thus, the idea that
wills of lesser importance could be made in a less solemn form remained alive. Only
towards the end of the nineteenth century, it was generally accepted that this
distinction no longer made much sense, because legacies and fideicommissa were
not necessarily of less economic importance than the institution of an heir.
III. The forms of will
It was a matter of course for continental Europe’s succession lawyers (as well as for
those in Scotland86 and England87) to explain testamentary formalities on the basis
of the Roman sources and, thus, on the basis of the Roman categories of private and
public, and of written and nuncupative, wills. Yet, apart from the forms provided by
the Roman ius commune there were many other forms of will that had been
introduced by custom or statutory law: ‘nihil . . . obstat, quo minus princeps in suo
territorio aliam testandi rationem constitutere possit, qua facta testamenta secundum
(1926)) boeck II, deel XVII, }} 17 f; boeck II, deel XXV, } 3; Groenewegen (n 75), ad Inst 2, 10, 11, para
7, and ad Inst 2, 10, 5, paras 1 f, both, however, on the basis of different formalities: two members of the
court and one secretary, or one notary and two witnesses.
80
} 2100 Saxonian BGB.
81
Cf Art XCIV, 2 of the Coustumes du bailliage de Bar 1579, in A Bourdot de Richebourg, Nouveau
coutumier general ou corps de coutumes generales et particulieres de France vol II (Paris, 1724) 1019 ff: ‘Et n’y
a difference entre testament & codicil’. In most coutumes ‘testaments and codicils’ were treated as
equivalents; cf also Robert Joseph Pothier, Traité des donations testamentaires, in idem, Œuvres vol VIII
ed M Bugnet (Paris, 1845) 225–346, para 2.
82
Cf ch 9 below at 223.
83
van Groenewegen (n 75) ad Inst 2, 25, 3: ‘hodie testamenta et codicilli non differunt’; for Italy, cf
Enrico Besta, Le successioni nella storia del diritto italiano (1961) 212.
84
I 12, }} 3, 5 PrALR; cf also } 553 ABGB.
85
G Binding, ‘Ueber die Hauptgrundlagen des künftigen Erbrechts’ (1875) 58 Archiv für die
civilistische Praxis 153, 203 ff.
86 87
See ch 17 below at 407 ff. Helmholz (n 45) 399 ff.
36 Nils Jansen
illam condita aeque valebunt, ac si secundum formam a jure Romano praescriptam

essent ordinata.’88 Those new forms of will did not easily fit into the Roman
categories. Usually, they were made before one or two more or less official persons,
such as a notary, a priest, a judge, or members of the council, and a small number of
witnesses.
Whereas such questions of categorization could be resolved pragmatically,
the problem of the consequences of violations of formal requirements appeared
more difficult. Here, the Roman formalities had a constitutive character. Under
the old Roman law, it had been the performance of the formal ritual, rather than
the parties’ intention, that brought about the legal effect of a will.89 The lawyers of
the usus modernus, accordingly, regarded the Roman formalities as solemnities
(solemnitates) that were necessary for making a valid will. Hence, as a matter of
principle, violations of formal requirements resulted in the will being void.90 Yet, by
the time of the usus modernus this understanding of formalities as solemnitates no
longer fitted in well with the general conception of private law. The effects of private
acts were based not on formal rituals, but rather on the intention of the parties; in
principle, this understanding also applied to wills.91 Accordingly, in the context of
Canon-law wills, the prevailing opinion held that the required witnesses were not
constitutive for a will’s validity;92 the same was true for other forms of public wills.93
Indeed, under Canon law, the witnesses had been required not for the solemnity
of the act, but as a means of evidence that could be replaced, in principle, by other
means.94
What is more, the Roman rule could obviously lead to harsh results as it was often
quite unclear what the exact formal requirements were for making a will.95 Thus, the
88
Stryk (n 54) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 2.
89
See above at nn 28 f.
90
Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 28; Domat (n 32) part II, liv III, tit I, sect III, } 22; Covarrubias
(n 32) cap X, paras 12 ff making this argument even with regard to the ecclesiastical forum internum.
91
Cf Samuel Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium libri octo (cum integris commentariis Io. Nic.
Hertii atque Io. Barbeyraci) (Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1759) lib IV, cap X, }} 2 ff; Johann Gottlieb
Heineccius, Elementa iuris naturae et gentium (Halle, 1738) }} 286 ff and especially }} 291 f; Wigulaeus
Xaverius A Freyherr von Kreittmayr, Anmerkungen über den Codicem Maximilianeum Bavaricum Civilem
vol III (Munich, 1763) 931 f (ad III 2, }} 2 f, para 1). Even intestate succession was explained from the
point of view of the deceased’s presumed will; Pufendorf cap XI, }} 1 and ff; Heineccius }} 294 ff. The only
function of formal requirements was seen in preventing error and fraud: Pufendorf, cap X, } 7; Heineccius,
} 287.
92
Stryk (n 61) cap XII, }} 3, 5 f; Georg Adam Struve, Syntagma Juris Civilis Secundum Ordinem
Pandectarum, Cum Additionibus Petri Mülleri, vol II (3rd edn, Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1738) exercitatio
XXXII, } 23; Höpfner (n 36) 423 (} 463); Covarrubias (n 32) cap XI, para 12; Justus Henning Böhmer,
Ius Ecclesiasticum Protestantium vol II (3rd edn, Halle/Magdeburg, 1732) lib III, tit XXVI, }} 21 f. But cf
Andreas Fachinaeus, Controversiarum iuris libri decem (Venice, 1609) lib IV, cap III; Wolfgang Adam
Lauterbach, Collegii theoretico-practici . . . pars secunda (2nd edn, Tübingen, 1713) lib XXIX, tit I, } 50.
93
Vinnius (n 64) lib II, tit X pr in fine.
94
See Coing (n 27) 571 (on the legislation of Pope Alexander III). However, the Canon-law
conception was not accepted by all writers of the usus modernus; see the references in n 92.
95
Cf also ch 3 below at 53 f; ch 4 below at 76 f; ch 9 below at 229 f.
requirements concerning the number and personal qualities of witnesses were usually
disputed;96 statutory legislation could easily be forgotten; and, even where it was not,
it was often uncertain and inconsistently applied.97 According to Voet,98 a basic
question such as whether a will could be made before the Court of Holland was
disputed; and Voet continues to report that different rules applied within the
different provinces of the Netherlands. And the question of whether wills could be
made, according to Canon law, before a priest, was nowhere answered consistently.99
Dealing with such difficulties, the usus modernus lawyers remedied the harsh
Roman rules by invoking a principle according to which a document containing a
will was in case of doubt to be taken as effective, and according to which there was a
presumption that the necessary formalities had been complied with (in dubio pro
testamento).100 In actual practice, this principle made it possible to deal flexibly with
the ambiguities of the actual formal requirements. Thus, referring to form require-
ments as ‘solemnities’ appears in retrospect to have been more of a doctrinal façade
symbolizing the legal system’s commitment to the Roman sources rather than a
statement of doctrinal relevance; this becomes apparent from the many cases re-
ported by the academic writers of this time. For example, in 1705, the law faculty of
Halle had to decide a case where a testator had declared his will in a written
document which had then been fetched from his house – in accordance with the
practice prevailing in Görlitz – by the town’s secretary, a notary, and witnesses.101
Although this was not fully in accordance with a privilege of 1496 requiring the will
to be taken by two members of the town’s council and a notary, the will was
nevertheless held to be effective. The faculty found that the procedure adopted had
been in conformity with the privilege’s normative intention and that a later privilege
of 1579 allowed such an interpretation of the former privilege; moreover, the
decision was justified on the basis of the ius commune principle favouring wills.
Clearly, these arguments were not really compelling, but they obviously paved the
way towards an adequate answer to the extraordinary legal uncertainty.
1. Private and public wills

Under Roman law, private wills were the regular form of will-making. That the
Roman principles had been received into contemporary law was beyond doubt in
96
See, for Austria, Gunter Wesener, Geschichte des Erbrechts in Österreich seit der Rezeption (1957) 131
ff; for the Netherlands, Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, }} 22 f: different rules for different provinces.
97
Cf Bernhard Diestelkamp, ‘Das Verhältnis von Gesetz und Gewohnheitsrecht im 16. Jahrhundert –
aufgezeigt am Beispiel der Oberhessischen Erbgewohnheiten von 1572’, in Festschrift für Hans Thieme
(1977) 1.
98
Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 21.
99
100
For this principle, see Andreas Gail, Practicarum observationum, tam ad Processum Judiciarium . . .
libri duo (1668) lib II, observatio CXVIII, para 19: ‘ . . . in dubio tenenda illa opinio quae favet
testamentis . . . ’. See also Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 28; Höpfner (n 36) 399 (} 443): ‘praesumptio
solemnitatis’. For a more detailed discussion, see Augustinus Leyser, Meditationes ad Pandectas vol VII (3rd
edn, Leipzig and Wolfsburg, 1741) specimen D, }} 12 ff. But see, for France, Domat (n 32) part II, liv III,
tit I, sect III, } 22: formal requirements would be pointless if not taken seriously.
101
Reported by Stryk (n 54) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 2.
38 Nils Jansen
view of the fact that Emperor Maximilian I had confirmed them in part I (De
testamentis) of his Reichsnotariatsordnung.102 Nevertheless, the learned literature
usually directly referred to the Roman texts; and the requirements of both Roman
law and the Emperor’s legislation were often modified by local statute or custom – an
example being the Dutch rule requiring only five witnesses.103
According to Justinian’s Corpus Juris, there were two forms of ordinary private
wills: the written and the nuncupative ones. Whereas in the first case the testator had
laid down his last will in a document (not necessarily written by himself), and the
witnesses confirmed that the document did in fact represent the testator’s will, the
witnesses, in the latter case, confirmed the last will itself which had to be declared to
them by the testator.104 Typically, however, documents were produced also for
nuncupative wills; hence, written and nuncupative wills were not always easy to
distinguish from each other.105 What is more, if a written will was invalid for some
formal reason (written wills requiring many more solemnities than nuncupative
ones),106 it might stand as a nuncupative will;107 and in the case of a testamentum
mysticum, where the testator delivered his will in a closed envelope and the witnesses
merely confirmed the testator having declared that the envelope contained his
will,108 it was even unclear whether such a will was to be regarded as a written or
nuncupative one.109
A central point of discussion concerned the necessary qualifications of the wit-
nesses.110 Not everybody could testify, be it because of a family relationship with the
testator or because he was named a beneficiary under the will,111 because of specific
age requirements,112 because witnesses had to be able to sign a document, or because
infamous persons and women were in many parts of Europe thought to be unable to
102
Above n 66; cf Stryk (n 61) cap II, } 1.
103
104
Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, }} 5 ff (written will), } 10 (nuncupative will).
105
Glück (n 30) vol 33, 329 ff.
106
See IV below.
107
Glück (n 30) vol 33, 330 f: testamentum mixtum; vol 35, 29 ff; Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 10.
Contra, eg Perez (n 73) lib VI, tit XXIII, para 19.
108
C. 6, 23, 21 (Theodosius and Valentinian); I } 7 Reichsnotariatsordnung (n 36); CMBC III 3 } 5.
Such wills were commonly called testamenta mystica: see Stryk (n 61) cap XVI, }} 22, 25; Carl Friedrich
Walch, Introductio in Controversias Iuris Civilis Recentiores Inter Iurisconsultos Agitatas (3rd edn, Jena,
1791) sect II, cap IV, membrum III, } 17; Pothier (n 81) para 39; cf also Domat (n 32) part II, liv III, tit I,
sect III, } 17: ‘testament clos & secret’. This form was regularly used by notaries; see Voet (n 64) lib
XXVIII, tit I, } 23.
109
Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, }} 23, 26; cf also Art 4 of the Ordonnance concernant les testaments
(n 58): ‘testaments nuncupatifs écrits’. It was disputed, though, whether a testamentum mysticum could be
made in a purely nuncupative form, ie only with witnesses, without a notary’s protocol; cf Walch (n 108)
sect II, cap IV, membrum III, } 17. Often, the possibility of making a testamentum mysticum was not
granted for illiterate persons as it was feared that this would have been conducive to fraudulent misbehav-
iour: Domat (n 32) part II, liv III, tit I, sect III, } 17; see also Wesener (n 96) 138 f.
110
Cf I } 6 Reichsnotariatsordnung (n 36); Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, }} 6 ff; Glück (n 30) vol 34,
310–75; Domat (n 32) part II, liv III, tit I, sect III, }} 2 ff.
111
Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, }} 8 f (family relationship).
112
Cf Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 22, for the practice in the Netherlands, which was anything but
uniform. In many places witnesses had to be more mature than required by Roman law.
perform the role of a witness required for a solemn act.113 It was never quite clear
whether the witnesses had to be especially summoned; in any event, they had to be
aware of the formality required for the act for which they had been employed.114
Alongside these two Roman forms of private wills, there were many alternative
regular will forms. In some cities, such as Bologna, Siena,115 Bamberg, Cologne,
Trier, Parchim,116 or Schleswig, as well as in some regions, Canon-law wills were
said to be accepted by statute or custom,117 but often it was not entirely clear whether
this was really the case. The Canon-law will was generally (that is, not only for piae
causae)118 acknowledged by statute, and regularly applied, in Belgium;119 and
according to Voet, the same was true for the Netherlands because of the Catholic
doctrines having been established by public authority.120 Yet, we do not read
anything of this in the works of other Dutch authors such as Grotius,121 Vinnius,122
or Van Groenewegen.123 In Bavaria, the CMBC presupposed the practice of Canon-
law wills,124 and with regard to Saxony and Thuringia, leading authorities argued
that the Canon-law form had been accepted for rural wills,125 but we do not find this
opinion confirmed by many other authors.126 However, when the Bavarian legislator
had abolished the Canon-law form in the nineteenth century, this legislation was
constantly ignored by the courts.127 Although the Canon-law form was equated with
the ius gentium,128 or natural law,129 the general principle was, in theory, that
Roman- rather than Canon-law rules applied in matters of succession law.130
Canon law was only given priority if not applying the Corpus Juris Canonici would
113
Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, }} 6, 22.
114
I } 3 Reichsnotariatsordnung (n 36); cf Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, }} 6, 22; Stryk (n 61) cap XV,
}} 16 ff. Stryk proposed a presumption that the witnesses had been especially summoned, but also
recommended to add a clause to the will confirming that the witnesses had in fact been summoned.
115
Pier Silvio Leicht, Storia del diritto italiano: Il diritto privato vol II: Diritti reali e di successione
(1960) 244 f.
116
OAG Rostock (14 February 1848) 17 Seuffert’s Archiv für Entscheidungen der obersten Gerichte in
den deutschen Staaten 244 f (n 149), referring to a decision of the law faculty of Rostock of 1604.
117
For a thorough report on German statutory law, see von Schmitt (n 20) 404 f; cf also Glück (n 30)
vol 33, 186; Coing (n 27) 571.
118
On this privilege, see below at n 143. According to Covarrubias (n 32) cap XI, para 2, this form
could be used for wills ad pias causas, even if such a will contained some secular dispositions.
119
Perez (n 73) lib VI, tit XXIII, para 23, referring to statutory legislation of 1611.
120
121
Cf Grotius (n 79) boeck II, deel XVII, }} 17 f; boeck II, deel XXV, } 3.
122
Cf Vinnius (n 64) lib II, tit X, } 14, para 4. However, relying on late scholastic authorities such as
Molina and Vazquez, Vinnius acknowledged a restitutio in the forum internum, if a will was void because of
a neglect of formalities but clearly expressed the testator’s will: } 3, para 8.
123
Cf van Groenewegen (n 75) ad Inst 2, 10, 5, paras 1 f.
124
Cf CMBC III 2 } 13; cf also von Kreittmayr (n 91) 955 (ad III 2, } 16, para 2).
125
Stryk (n 54) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 3 (Saxony); Lauterbach (n 92) lib XXIX, tit I, } 47 (Thuringia and
Saxony).
126
Höpfner (n 36) 408 (} 450); Glück (n 30) vol 33, 19 f, 185 f, both emphasizing that this form
was not generally accepted in Catholic countries.
127
von Schmitt (n 20) 405 with references.
128
Cf Perez (n 73) lib VI, tit XXIII, para 23.
129
Cf Vinnius (n 64) lib II, tit X, } 3, para 8.
130
See Covarrubias (n 32) cap X, XI.
40 Nils Jansen
have amounted to a sin (peccatum). In the context of formalities, however, this

was obviously not the case.131 What is more, within the confines of the Reich,
however uncertain they were, the Notariatsordnung of Maximilian I had confirmed
the Roman formalities and thus was often interpreted as having rejected the Canon-
law will.132
It was never quite clear whether Canon-law wills were to be categorized as private
or public wills.133 The same was true of the many variants of nuncupative or written
wills before a notary and one, two, or more witnesses. This latter, apparently
modelled after the Canon-law will,134 had been introduced as a standard form of
will by the Reichsnotariatsordnung;135 similar rules could be found in many parts of
Europe.136 In legal literature, it was usually treated in parallel with the many
different forms of public wills such as the testamentum iudici oblatum.137 In Holland,
according to Voet, wills could be made either before one notary and two witnesses, or
before a registrar and two judges (Schepenen); in Friesland, there were apparently no
special rules, while in Utrecht even other forms were used.138 Although different
principles applied to public and private wills – especially, no solemnities were
required for public wills – there was, in effect, a sliding scale between more private
and more public forms,139 such as wills made before a judge or members of
131
Udo Wolter, Ius Canonicum in Iure Civili: Studien zur Rechtsquellenlehre in der neueren Privat-
rechtsgeschichte (1975) 16 ff, 99.
132
See, for this argument, Stryk (n 54) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 3; Stryk (n 61) cap II, } 1; Glück (n 30)
vol 33, 185 f.
133
Whereas Stryk discussed the Canon-law form as a modification of the Roman requirements for
private wills ((n 54) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 3), Voet described it in the context of public wills without however
categorizing it: (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 21. Later German authors often classified it as a public will: Glück
(n 30) vol 33, 180 ff; Roth (n 54) 247 f (} 301).
134
Ourliac and de Malafosse (n 75) 470; Coing (n 27) 572.
135
I } 6 Reichsnotariatsordnung (n 36).
136
For an overview, see Coing (n 27) 572. For nineteenth-century Germany (usually based on older
statutory law), see von Schmitt (n 20) 407 ff. Under the law of Lübeck, two members of the council were
sufficient for a nuncupative will: Ius Lubecense pars II, tit I, art II. For the Netherlands, see Vinnius (n 64)
lib II, tit X, } 14, para 4; Groenewegen (n 75) ad Inst 2, 10, 5, paras 1 f: one notary, two witnesses (but
where a child was disinherited, a public will had to be used). The same form was also used in Belgium
(Perez (n 73) lib VI, tit XXIII, para 23) and Spain (Covarrubias (n 32) cap X, paras 1 ff: notary and two or
three witnesses). In the French pays de droit écrit, written wills before a notary (testament nuncupative écrit
and testamentum mystique) had been introduced at an early stage and were regularly used until the
nineteenth century: Ourliac and de Malafosse (n 75) 470 f; Arts 4 ff of the French Ordonnance concernant
les testaments (n 58); for details, see Pothier (n 81) paras 17 ff, para 38. Similarly, many coutumes accepted
this type of will besides other forms, such as holograph wills; see the references below at n 164. Similar,
although not always very clear, rules applied in Austria and Italy: see Wesener (n 96) 131 ff; Besta (n 83)
208 f.
137
Glück (n 30) vol 33, 188–218. In some regions, this was the most common form of will.
138
Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, }} 20 f.
139
Cf Höpfner (n 36) 398 ff (} 443). Thus, Voet applies most Roman rules on witnesses to public wills
before a notary: see Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 22. During the nineteenth century, when the state
monopolized the power of creating public documents, the question became particularly important.
a city council, or the testamentum principi oblatum: a written will which was delivered
to the prince or government.140
2. Formal privileges and modifications

It is neither possible nor appropriate, for the purposes of the present chapter, to give
a detailed account of the extensive discussions among the early modern lawyers and
draftsmen of legislation concerning formal privileges and modifications.141 No
solemnities were normally required for military wills (they had been privileged by
Roman law) and for wills ad pias causas,142 for which the Canon-law form was widely
acknowledged.143 The details and the range of such privileges were notoriously
unclear. The form for military wills might also apply for ambassadors;144 and in
the context of wills ad pias causas, the doctrinal function of witnesses was dis-
puted.145 The formal solemnities were relaxed for parental wills inter liberos,146 for
rural wills (here, it was disputed whether the privilege also applied to noblemen
living in the countryside, or persons from a city who became ill while staying in the
countryside),147 and for wills made in situations of prevailing contagious diseases
(here, both the exact requirements of the privilege and the necessary form were
disputed).148 Analogous rules and principles were sometimes taken to apply for wills
made by travelling merchants,149 and especially for wills made on board a ship.150
Some authors also granted privileges for parents re-instituting formerly disinherited
relatives;151 and according to the opinion of Cornelis van Bynkershoek, not appar-
ently shared by others, no formalities at all were needed if the testator did not have
140
See Stryk (n 61) cap VII, }} 1 ff; Glück (n 30) vol 33, 178 f. Statute law often required the presence
of witnesses; cf CMBC III 4, } 2.
141
Cf CMBC III 4, }} 4 ff.
142
On this concept, see Helmholz (n 45) 417 ff; Coing (n 27) 593 ff.
143
Covarrubias (n 32) cap X, paras 6 ff; Höpfner (n 36) 422 f (} 463). The privilege was disputed by
Voet who, however, accepted this form as regular: (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, }} 19, 21. The rule was also
recognized in the French pays de droit écrit, although learned writers disputed it as a matter of principle: see
Domat (n 32) part II, liv III, tit I, sect III, } 22; liv IV, tit II, sect VI, } 7.
144
145
Covarrubias (n 32) cap XI; see also the references above at n 92.
146
See III.3 below.
147
Höpfner (n 36) 421 f (} 462); Stryk (n 61) cap XIII, }} 4 ff with further details and references.
148
Leyser (n 100) vols V and VI, specimen CCCLXVIII: two witnesses; Höpfner (n 36) 420 f (} 461):
unitas actus not necessary, two or five witnesses; similarly Domat (n 32) part II, liv III, tit I, sect III, } 16,
requiring the usual number of witnesses (later, French law became more liberal, allowing different forms,
among them even the Canon-law form: Pothier (n 81) para 52); Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 12: two
witnesses or Canon-law form, but only for movables; cf also }} 597 ff ABGB.
149
Two or three witnesses: see David Mevius, Commentarii in Jus Lubecense Libri Quinque . . . (4th
edn, Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1700) pars II, tit I, art II, paras 59 ff; Stryk (n 61) cap XIV; more reluctantly
Struve (n 92) exercitatio XXXII, } 22: only if, in case of necessity, no more witnesses were available. The
basic idea was usually traced back to Angelus de Ubaldis, the argument being that the law should not
require solemnities that were impossible to perform. It is doubtful, however, whether this was really the
decisive motive; in effect the travellers’ will was a merchants’ privilege.
150
See } 597 ABGB.
151
Höpfner (n 36) 422 (} 463): only five witnesses required.
42 Nils Jansen
to consider the interests of intestate heirs.152 Conversely, stricter formalities applied

for blind, illiterate, or otherwise handicapped, persons; here additional requirements
such as witnesses signing on behalf of the testator were imposed.153 Very specific
rules applied, of course, for the wills of absolutist kings and princes.154 And all of
these special privileges and rules could collide, for example, if a blind testator wished
to make a parental will;155 moreover, most of these rules found a counterpart in the
law of codicils.156
3. Holograph and written wills

More important than those special privileges was the rule privileging testamenta
parentum inter liberos in that they could be made with a small number of witnesses,
or alternatively in an alleviated holograph form (the testator had to write the date, the
names of the children, and their shares – in letters, not in merely digits – him- or
herself).157 This rule was acknowledged throughout Europe.158 Apparently, even
this alleviated requirement of writing only parts of the document with one’s own
hand was further relaxed. Most authors assumed that a signature could be suffi-
cient.159 Indeed, as holograph documents were not a Roman concept, the learned
authors of the ius commune did not develop a clear idea of a holograph will, as
distinct from a mere written document.
In the present context, the parental will is of particular significance in view of the
widely held opinion that holograph, or written, wills were, for a long time, excep-
tional in character.160 The basic assumption is that wills had to be attested. However,
this view, while true from a learned lawyer’s perspective,161 is called into question by
the fact that holograph wills (strictu sensu) were already a common practice in many
152
Cornelis van Bynkershoek, Observationum iuris Romani quatuor libri priores (2nd edn, Frankfurt
and Leipzig, 1739) lib II, cap II.
153
Stryk (n 54) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 7; Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, }} 36 f.
154
See the discussion in Stryk (n 61) cap V, membrum II.
155
Cf Glück (n 30) vol 33, 44 ff.
156
For an overview, see Justus Henning Böhmer, Exercitationes ad Pandectas vol V (Hanover and
Göttingen, 1762) exercitatio LXXVII, cap II: De codicillis ab intestato sine testibus validis.
157
Nov 107, cap I.
158
Voet (n 64) lib XXII, tit IV, } 2; lib XXVIII, tit I, }} 15 ff; Covarrubias (n 32) cap XI, paras 3, 6;
Pothier (n 81) para 44; CMBC III 4, } 8; Stryk (n 61) cap X; Höpfner (n 36) 417 ff (} 460); Mevius
(n 149) pars II, tit I, II, paras 14 ff. While the requirement of two witnesses in I } 2 Reichsnotariatsordnung
(n 36) was apparently ignored, the possibility of making a nuncupative will in a privileged form (no
solemnities, two witnesses) was disputed.
159
Cf Grotius (n 79) boeck II, deel XVII, } 28; Mevius (n 149) pars II, tit I, art II, para 15; Stryk (n 61)
cap X, } 20; Höpfner (n 36) 417, 419 (} 460). According to other authors, however, (two) witnesses were
necessary to confirm the will if the testator had not written it out in his own hand: see Voet (n 64) lib
XXVIII, tit I, } 15. For the same reason, Stryk strongly recommended the holograph form for such wills:
De cautelis (n 61) } 19; otherwise it could be difficult to presume the document to be the testator’s will.
160
Cf Peter Breitschmid, Formvorschriften im Testamentsrecht de lege lata – rechtsvergleichend – de lege
ferenda, dargestellt insbesondere am Beispiel des eigenhändigen Testaments (1982) 12 ff; Helmholz (n 45)
770 f.
161
This was the basic assumption even in the homeland of the holograph will; cf Domat (n 32) part II,
liv III, tit I, sect I, before } 1.
countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.162 In the French pays du droit
coutumier, where, however, wills were of limited significance as the testator could
only dispose of rather small parts of his property (the quotité disponible),163 it could
be found since the sixteenth century;164 in 1735, it was generally acknowledged by
the French state in an Ordonnance165 and finally in Articles 969 f of the Code civil.166
Similar rules could later be found in Italy, where it was sometimes required, however,
that the will was deposited in a public archive,167 and in Austria, where the testator was
not restricted to a quotité disponible. Here, the holograph will was supported by
custom168 and apparently also by natural law ideas;169 ultimately, it was acknowledged
by } 578 ABGB. Also in Scotland, holograph wills became a standard form for will-
making;170 even English courts accepted holograph wills, and it is remarkable that they
did so on the basis of arguments derived from the ius commune.171 Only in
regions where the principles of Roman law exerted a dominant influence, this form
was long rejected; this was particularly true for Germany172 and, especially, for the
nineteenth-century pandectists.173 Indeed, when the PrALR and some other early
codifications allowed ‘codicils’ for not more than 5 per cent of the estate’s value to be
162
See generally Eduard Maurits Meijers, ‘Testaments olographes’, in idem, R Feenstra, and H F W D
Fischer (eds), Etudes d’histoire du droit vol I (1956) 246, 248 ff.
163
Below at n 230. Cf Domat (n 32) part II, liv III, tit I pr arguing that wills, properly speaking, were
not acknowledged in the droit coutumier; rather testators could only make codicils.
164
Art XCVII of the Coutumes generals de la prevosté et vicomté de Paris 1510; Art CCLXXXIX of the
revised Coutumes de . . . Paris 1580, both in Bourdot de Richebourg (n 81) vol III, 1 ff, 29 ff. In both
provisions the holograph will was acknowledged as one possibility among many; similarly Art XCIV of the
Coustumes du bailliage de Bar 1579 (n 81). Detailed rules on the necessary formalities can be found in Art
LVIII of the first Ordonnances de la ville et cité de Metz et pays messin, and in tit VIII, Art II of the revised
Coutumes generales de . . . Metz 1613, both in Bourdot de Richebourg (n 81) vol II, 372 ff, 395 ff; also here
the holograph will was one among other optional forms. Similar rules can be found in many other
coutumes. For further references, also on older coutumes, see Meijers (n 162) 249 f.
165
Art 1, 1st sentence, Ordonnance concernant les testaments (n 58): ‘Toutes dispositions testamentaires
ou à cause de mort, de quelque nature qu’elles soient, seront faites par écrit’. In the pays de droit écrit,
however, the traditional Roman forms of will had been upheld: see above, n 58. For details, see Pothier
(n 81) paras 8 ff.
166
Cf Breitschmid (n 160) 12 ff.
167
Cf Besta (n 83) 208 f; Leicht (n 115) 244.
168
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, holograph wills were acknowledged in the central parts
of Austria (Österreich ob der Enns and unter der Enns, Vienna, in the Steiermark): Wesener (n 96) 129 ff;
cf also ch 9 below at 231 f.
169
Cf Leopold Pfaff and Franz Hofmann, Commentar zum österreichischen allgemeinen Bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuch vol II (Vienna, 1877) } 578, para II. In the legislative discussions, however, pragmatic aspects
such as the danger of fraud were an important issue; cf Franz Edler von Zeiller, Commentar über das
allgemeine bürgerliche Gesetzbuch . . . vol II (Wien/Triest, 1812) } 452, para 1; Pfaff and Hoffmann } 578,
para III.
170
See ch 17 below at 415 ff.
171
Helmholz (n 45) 769, 772 ff.
172
Cf Eduard Siebenhaar, Commentar zu dem bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche für das Königreich Sachsen vol
III (Leipzig, 1869) 268 f. In this codification, the holograph will was only accepted for parental wills: see
}} 2015 f.
173
See ch 8 below at 178 ff, 182 ff.
44 Nils Jansen
in writing, without witnesses (I 12, } 161 ALR), even this innovation remained
disputed.174
The possibility of making parental wills in writing puts another bold question
mark behind the thesis of the holograph (or written) form’s exceptional character.
Indeed, this ‘exception’ covered most private wills as it was not limited to wills in
which parents made dispositions concerning the distribution of their property
among their offspring. According to influential authorities, it could also be used to
disinherit one or more children;175 and according to some courts and authors, such
wills could even be used for making legacies and fideicommissa in favour of husbands
or wives, or even other persons.176 Although the latter opinion was never predomin-
ant,177 most authors held such wills to be valid if they were confirmed before two
evidentiary witnesses only;178 as long as other persons were not to become heirs,179
the usual solemnities were not necessary. Thus, there was apparently an understand-
ing among the growing, literate part of society that a holograph, or even a signed,
document could be regarded as a normal form of will; only for extraordinary
dispositions solemnities were required.
This impression is confirmed by the institution of codicilli testamento confirmati.
According to Roman law, it was possible for testators to insert a clause into their will
according to which written documents (called codicils) not actually constituting part
of the will were to be valid as if they were part of it.180 Such a clause could refer both
174
Thus, it was rejected by von Schmitt in his draft for the law of succession of the BGB (Erbfolge
(n 20), 403, 444 f). The holograph will was adopted neither by the First nor by the Second Commission
drafting the BGB; cf ch 8 below at 182 ff.
175
Covarrubias (n 32) cap XVI, } I, paras 3, 5 f; Pistoris (n 72) consilium XLIV; Stryk (n 61) cap X,
} 18; Höpfner (n 36) 418 (} 460); Lauterbach (n 92) tit XXIX, tit I, } 31 (admitting, however, that this rule
was not applied everywhere). This opinion, however, was never undisputed: see Struve (n 92) exercitatio
XXXII, } 19; Walch (n 108) sect II, cap IV, membrum III, }} 33 f. Stryk (n 61) therefore recommended
making such dispositions in a solemn form. Of course, children could not be disinherited without a
legitimate reason; the discussion concerned only the question of form.
176
Schilter (n 33) exercitatio XXXVIII, } CXXV; Voet (n 64) lib XXII, tit IV, } 2; lib XXVIII, tit I,
} 16; Perez (n 73) lib VI, tit XXIII, paras 27 f; Covarrubias (n 32) cap XI, para 3. According to Stryk,
legacies in favour of one’s wife were valid if they did not amount to new dispositions, but rather confirmed
pre-existing duties such as the duty to restitute the wife’s dos: De cautelis (n 61) cap X, } 22. In
Württemberg, such dispositions were generally regarded as valid, according to Lauterbach, if they favoured
the surviving spouse or were made ad pias causas: Collegii theoretico-practici (n 92) tit XXIX, tit I, } 30.
According to a similar opinion, two witnesses were necessary in such cases (only) for preventing fraud. As
those witnesses had a purely evidentiary function and were not regarded as a solemnity, it was possible to
prove the testator’s last will otherwise, ie on the basis of a holograph document: see Struve (n 92)
exercitatio XXXII, } 19; cf also Stryk (n 61) cap X, } 22.
177
CMBC III 4, } 8; Stryk (n 61) cap X, } 22; cf also Mevius (n 149) pars II, tit I, art II, paras 32 f;
Friedrich Esaias von Pufendorf, Observationes iuris universi quibus praecipue res iudicatae summi tribunalis
regii et electoralis continentur vol II (2nd edn, Hanover, 1779) observatio XXXI, }} 3 f; Walch (n 108) sect
II, cap IV, membrum III, } 35. In France, this form could only be used for the distribution of property
among descendants: Pothier (n 81) para 44.
178
Stryk (n 61) cap X, } 24; Mevius (n 149), pars II, tit I, art II, para 34; Höpfner (n 36) 418, 420
(} 460); Covarrubias (n 32) cap XI, paras 3, 6 f.
179
Stryk (n 61) cap X, } 23.
180
J Inst 2, 25 pr; Gaius D. 29, 3, 11: ‘ . . . codicilli pars intelleguntur testamenti, ita secundae tabulae
principalium tabularum partem optinere videntur’. See also Iulian D. 29, 7, 2, 2.
to codicils already existing and to ones to be written after the making of the will.181
Yet, such codicils required no formality to be observed, solemnities only being
necessary for ‘freestanding’ codicils that were not confirmed by a will.182 During
the time of the usus modernus, these rules were regarded as good law by most learned
lawyers;183 and it followed that such a clause made it possible for the testator to
obtain the power of making future dispositions in a written document. True, such
codicils could only be used for making legacies and fideicommissa; the institution of
an heir was not possible. Yet, the testator could use these legacies and fideicommissa
for making dispositions of any kind and without any limitation as to their value. As is
apparent from the sources, such a clausula reservatoria was regularly inserted into
notarial wills.184
Clearly, this practice did not fit in well with the spirit of the Roman principle
requiring a solemn form for a will to be valid and it endangered the security of wills.
Nevertheless, it was opposed only by few authors, who either argued that such a
clause should not be recognized,185 or that the five witnesses necessary for ‘freestand-
ing’ codicils were also required for codicilli testamento confirmati.186 However, such
arguments never gained the upper hand.187 Prevailing practice, apparently, wel-
comed this device of making codicils in writing as it was a convenient way to
181
See J Inst 2, 25, 1; Paulus D. 29, 7, 8 pr; Pomponius D. 50, 16, 123; Cels D. 29, 7, 18. Cf also
Ulpian D. 28, 5, 36; D. 28, 7, 10; Papinian D. 28, 5, 78 (77). Even dispositions such as ‘let the person,
whom I institute in a codicil as an heir, be heir’ were accepted (see D. 28, 5, 7, 78 (77)), because the
institution could be traced back to the will.
182
In view of the general wording of C. 6, 36, 8, 3 (Theodosius), by the time of Justinian five witnesses
may have been required for all codicils, whether or not confirmed in a will: see ch 1 above at 24. The
lawyers of the usus modernus, however, understood C. 6, 36, 8, 3 to apply to ‘freestanding’ codicils only;
reference was usually made to J Inst 2, 25, 3 in this context: ‘ . . . et nullam sollemnitatem ordinationis
desiderant’.
183
Höpfner (n 36) 571 (} 623); for a detailed discussion, see Böhmer (n 156) exercitatio LXXVII,
cap I: ‘De codicillis ad testamentum factis sine testibus validis.’
184
This is especially true for the Netherlands: see Cornelis van Bynkershoek, Quaestionum iuris private
libri quatuor (Lyon, 1744) lib III, cap IV f, reporting the learned discussion and the courts’ practice in the
Netherlands; Simon van Leeuwen, Censura Forensis theoretico-practica . . . vol I (1685) pars I, lib III, cap XI,
paras 10 f; Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 29. In Utrecht such clauses were used as early as 1349: see C P
Joubert, ‘Clausula reservatoria’ (1958) 21 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 27 and 116, 38.
Cf also Meijers (n 162) 254 ff arguing that this was a specifically Dutch discussion. Yet, even the technical
term clausula reservatoria was known elsewhere (cf Stryk (n 61) cap II, } 12), and the practice was
less problematic where the difference between codicils and wills was still made (cf above at II).
For a comprehensive historical report, see Joubert (this footnote) 34 ff, arguing that the clausula
reservatoria should not be equated with the institution of codicilli testamento confirmati. Yet – as Joubert
acknowledges – most authors did not draw a distinction between these two devices and justified the
possibility of a clausula reservatoria on the basis of the Roman texts on codicils.
185
Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 29; cf later Binding (n 85) 201 f. See also Voet (n 64) lib XXIX,
tit VII, } 1, where he discusses the required solemnities without making a distinction between codicilli
confirmati and a freestanding codicil.
186
Domat (n 32) part II, liv IV, tit I, sect II, } 1; Struve (n 92) exercitatio XXXIV, } 58: witnesses
necessary for preventing fraud, not as solemnities.
187
Vinnius (n 64) lib II, tit XXV, } 3, para 2; Stryk (n 61) cap II, } 12; Böhmer (n 156) exercitatio
LXXVIII, cap I, }} 29 ff, 32 ff (reporting a case decided by the law faculty of Halle in 1705); for further
references, see Walch (n 108) sect II, cap IV, membrum III, } 40.
46 Nils Jansen
overcome the bothersome formal requirements of the Roman sources;188 hence, it

was also acknowledged, for example, by the Bavarian legislator.189
IV. Internal formalities
Apart from the institution of an heir,190 early modern private laws prescribed
relatively few (in comparison with classical Roman law) internal formal requirements
for wills. This is true not only for Canon law, but also for the Roman ius commune
and statutory legislation. No special expression was required for the institution of an
heir, or for disinheriting close relatives; and the dispositions in a will required no
specific order. While all of these rules applied to nuncupative wills,191 written wills
did require further solemnities. According to the Roman sources, they had to be
signed (not written) in the presence of witnesses192 who, in turn, had to sign and seal
the document.193 Whether a will could stand if shares of the inheritance were
expressed in numerals remained a matter of dispute.194 Yet, it was not necessary –
according to a disputed opinion not even in a holograph testamentum parentum inter
liberos195 which only required an alleviated holograph form – that the testator wrote
the names of the heirs himself. This requirement, which could be found in the
Institutes and in the Codex,196 had apparently been abrogated in the Novels.197
In addition to these Roman requirements, statutory law often prescribed further
formalities to be observed for public documents that were drafted by public officials
or notaries.198 Thus, according to the Reichsnotariatsordnung, notaries had to pro-
duce a protocol when making private wills.199 Yet, such formalities could be inter-
preted from a ius commune perspective;200 and from such a perspective, additional
formal requirements were not constitutive for a will to be valid.201 More import-
antly, however, internal formalities became a key topic as far as holograph, and
comparable, wills202 were concerned. Here, it was necessary to develop criteria for
188
See for this motive, Stryk (n 61) cap II, } 12.
189
CMBC III 5, } 8, recommending, however, confirmation by two witnesses.
190
Above at II.
191
Perez (n 73) lib VI, tit XXIII, paras 14 f; Stryk (n 61) cap XV, }} 43 ff.
192
Otherwise, an additional witness was required: C. 6, 23, 21, 1 (Theodosius and Valentinian);
cf also C. 6, 23, 28, 1 (Justinian); see Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 5; Höpfner (n 36) 402 (} 445).
193
Perez (n 73) lib VI, tit XXIII, paras 5 f; Stryk (n 61) cap XV, } 5.
194
Stryk (n 61) cap XV, } 6. The eighteenth-century practice did not, apparently, object.
195
Pufendorf (n 177) vol III (3rd edn, Hanover, 1782) V, } 2.
196
J Inst 2, 10, 4; C. 6, 23, 29 (Justinian).
197
Nov 119, cap IX; see Höpfner (n 36) 402 (} 445); Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 5.
198
Cf CMBC III 4, } 2; Voet (n 64) lib XXII, tit IV, } 2; lib XXVIII, tit I, } 25.
199
I } 5 Reichsnotariatsordnung (n 36); cf Stryk (n 61) cap XV, } 44.
200
Cf Nov 44, cap II, Nov 47.
201
See Stryk (n 61) cap XV, }} 46 f, reporting a decision of the law faculty of Frankfurt from 1689.
202
For the clausula reservatoria, cf Joubert (n 184) 116 f, 122.
distinguishing drafts and personal notes from genuine wills and for making sure that
a will was not misunderstood after the testator’s death; already Justinian had made
rather detailed provisions for holograph parental wills.203 Thus, questions arose,
such as whether the testator had to write and sign the document himself, or whether
he had to insert a precise date.204
1. Ultima voluntas non debet ex alieno arbitrio pendere

Under the later ius commune, the main purpose of such formalities was to protect the
testator against his will not being based on his own free decision,205 to prevent fraud,
and to make sure that the testator’s last will could be determined after his death.206
Hence, the declaration of the will had to be based on the serious intention of making
a will,207 it had to be sufficiently clear for it to be possible to determine the testator’s
intention,208 and for the same reason, the early modern authors insisted on the
nuncupative will being declared without significant interruption (unitas actus).209
Another aspect of this general policy was that the testator had to express the details of
his last will personally. In most regions, representation was not possible;210 and when
making a nuncupative will, it was not sufficient to answer questions merely with ‘yes’
or to affirm a document which had previously been drafted by another person.211
This, it was feared, would have provided too many opportunities for undue influence
and even for fraudulent misbehaviour. Likewise, a will could not be upheld if the
testator had signed a blank document.212 Similarly, although contemporary practice
203
See Nov 107, cap I requiring the testator to put down the date with his signature and to write
the children’s names with his hand indicating their shares by writing them out in full without using
numerals.
204
See Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 17; Höpfner (n 36) 417 f (} 460), both for testamenta parentum
inter liberos (cf n 203). For the Prussian codicils for less than 5% of the heritage, see I 12, } 162 PrALR
(exact date to be inserted). For Austria, see } 578 ABGB: document personally written and signed by the
testator; addition of date and place recommended (‘räthlich’). For France, see Art XCVII/Art CCLXXXIX
of the Coutumes de Paris 1510/1580, and especially tit VIII, Art II of the Coutumes generales de Metz 1613
(both n 164 above); Arts 2 f, 16 Ordonnance concernant les testaments (n 58); Art 970 Code civil: document
personally written and signed by the testator, addition of date necessary.
205
Immel (n 30) 77 ff; Zimmermann (n 29) 18 f.
206
See CMBC III 2 } 3; cf also the subsequent following provisions, and von Kreittmayr (n 91) 934 ff
(ad III 2, }} 4 ff).
207
Cf Höpfner (n 36) 414 (} 455); Glück (n 30) vol 33, 327. According to Coing (n 27) 566, this was
the only internal formality required under the ius commune.
208
Cf Stryk (n 61) cap XVI, }} 16, 20; Glück (n 30) vol 33, 328; } 565 ABGB; CMBC III 2, } 8.
209
C. 6, 23, 28 pr (Justinian); cf CMBC III 3, } 6; Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 4; Perez (n 73) lib
VI, tit XXIII, para 7; Höpfner (n 36) 401 f (} 444). Cf also } 2100 Saxonian BGB.
210
Coing (n 27) 567; cf CMBC III 2, } 6. Representation was acknowledged, however, in a few
Spanish regions: see ch 4 below at 77.
211
Cf } 565 ABGB: ‘Der Wille des Erblassers muß bestimmt, nicht durch bloße Bejahung eines ihm
gemachten Vorschlages . . . erkläret werden’; CMBC III 2, } 9; III 3 } 6. Similarly Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII,
tit I, } 11 with many references to Dutch authorities. But see Vinnius (n 64) lib II, tit X, } 14, para 4;
according to Vinnius, it was a common practice for notaries to read out a previously written document and
have it then confirmed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses.
212
Stryk (n 54) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 16. But see Covarrubias (n 32) cap XIII, paras 6 f, accepting the
declaration that the testator had made his last will in a document that was in the possession of an absent
person.
48 Nils Jansen
was prepared to relax the required formalities for wills made in times of epidemics or
by testators suffering from a contagious disease,213 it was clearly insufficient for the
witnesses to hear the testator making his will through a door or window.214 Again,
the reason was that there could be no procedure ‘more . . . conducive to falsity than
when witnesses were not stationed in view of the testator’.215 For the same reason, it
was strongly disputed whether a testator making a public will could employ a
procurator for sending his declaration to the public authority.216 And the criticism
of the institution of codicilli testamento confirmati217 was similarly based on
the feeling that it should not be possible for testators to free themselves of all
formalities – and the protection associated with them – for the future.218
Finally, the old prohibition of an institutio captatoria (disposition mortis causa in
favour of another person in order to be instituted as heir by that other person),219
which caused problems in the context of conjugal wills,220 and the requirement that
the testator had to determine the heir(s) himself221 were interpreted from such a
perspective.222 These requirements were commonly seen as being based on the
maxim that the last will of a man should not depend on the arbitrary decision of
another person.223 This understanding was beyond doubt,224 although it was debat-
able whether it was based on natural law.225 After all, Canon law had taken the
opposite view;226 and according to the Digest, a different rule applied for legacies and
fideicommissa.227 Nevertheless, it remained axiomatic that the testator had to be
protected by the law against the dangers associated with not determining his will
himself, even if this principle required strongly paternalistic rules.
213
See above at n 148.
214
Perez (n 73) lib VI, tit XXIII, para 16.
215
This question was often and extensively discussed: see Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 12; Höpfner
(n 36) 401, 403 f (} 443 n 4, } 445). Likewise, wills made during the night, without light, were held to be
invalid: Glück (n 30) vol 33, 308 f.
216
Most legislators (cf CMBC III 4, }} 2 f) and authors did not allow this. See the references in Stryk
(n 61) cap VIII, } 2, citing authorities from Lübeck (Mevius) to Spain (Vazquez) for this position. Stryk
cautiously defended this possibility, but nevertheless recommended the safer course of making the will
personally. For the subsequent discussion, see Leyser (n 100) vols V and VI, specimen CCCLIV, } 4
(cautiously defending such a possibility); Höpfner (n 36) 400 (} 443 n 2) (strongly opposing it: ‘such a will
lacks a clear intention . . . everything depends on one person . . . who is a witness in his own affairs’), both
with further references.
217
See above at n 180 ff.
218
219
See Coing (n 27) 567.
220
Stryk (n 61) cap XVI, } 28 with further references.
221
See above at nn 28 ff.
222
See Immel (n 30) 77 ff; Zimmermann (n 29) 18 f.
223
Brunnemann (n 30) ad D. 28, 5, 32: ‘ . . . ultima voluntas non debet ex alieno arbitrio pendere’. For
an extensive discussion, see Covarrubias (n 32) cap XIII; Glück (n 30) vol 33, 44 ff.
224
See Stryk (n 61) cap XVI, }} 26 f.
225
See Schilter (n 33) exercitatio XXXVIII, } LXXXIII, quaestio II.
226
Corpus Juris Canonici, X, 3, 26, 13; cf Stryk (n 61) cap XVI, } 27; Covarrubias (n 32) cap XIII, para
15: although the rule was interpreted as being based on the simplicitas juris naturae, it was commonly
restricted to dispositions ad pias causas and occasionally to the institution of pauperes.
227
See above at n 31.
2. The rights of close relatives

A more problematic solemnitas interna, from the usus modernus perspective, were the
Roman rules concerning the rights of the testator’s closest relatives to be explicitly
considered in a will (formelles Noterbrecht).228 Children, including those born after
the will had been made, and also parents, could not be disinherited simply by passing
them over. Rather, they had to be expressly named; and according to the Novels, a
good reason had to be given.229 Otherwise, the will was invalid. Already in the
Corpus Juris Civilis, these rules were mixed up with other rules securing a certain part
of the inheritance (portio legitima) for those who would, but for the will, have been
intestate heirs (materielles Noterbrecht). Later, these rules were complemented, mod-
ified, or superseded by other ideas, such as that the testator could only dispose of a
small part of his property (Seelquote/quotité disponible/legitim).230 As a result of these
developments, the question of whether descendants and other relatives had to be
considered in a will was not answered uniformly. The Roman rules did not make
sense and hence were not received in France,231 where the right to make testamentary
dispositions was severely restricted. In Castile, however, both approaches were
apparently combined.232 The Roman rules were questioned, on the basis of the ius
commune, by Dutch authorities (although not by all of them).233 In Germany, by
contrast, the Roman rules remained good law, but their details were never clear.234
Thus, it was disputed whether legacies contained in a will that was invalid for not
considering, or unjustifiedly disinheriting, a close relative could be upheld.235
V. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion has demonstrated the over-complexity of the law relating to
testamentary formalities in early modern law. Further difficulties arose in the context
of the revocation of a will; here, different rules applied for different types and
forms of will.236 Parental wills, for instance, could only be revoked, or changed, by
a subsequent will that complied with the ordinary solemnities and that contained an
228
Glück (n 30) vol 33, 150.
229
Nov 115, cap IV f (with a numerus clausus of legitimate reasons). See at nn 20 ff above;
Zimmermann (n 1) 30 ff.
230
See Domat (n 32) part II, liv I, preface, }} 6 ff; Ignacio Jordan de Asso y del Rı́o, Instituciones del
derecho civil de Castilla (5th edn, Madrid, 1792) lib II, tit III, cap III; further references in Coing (n 27)
576 f, 611 ff, 615 f. For England, see Helmholz (n 45) 425 f, 430.
231
Domat (n 32) part II, liv III, tit II, before sect I.
232
According to Coing (n 27) 577, the Roman rules had not been received. They were presented as
good law, however, by Covarrubias (n 32) cap XVI, and also by de Asso y del Rio, combining both ideas:
(n 230) lib II, tit III, cap II, } 3: ‘Sobre el modo con que el testador debe disponer de sus bienes es principio
intestable en Castilla, que si tuviere hijos, nietos etc. los debe instituir heredoros forzosamente, y sólo
puede disponer en favor de extraños del remanente del quinto de sus bienes’. See also cap III on the Roman
rules concerning the disinheritance of descendants.
233
Cf Grotius (n 79) boeck II, deel XVIII, } 9 (and ff); Groenewegen (n 75) ad Inst 2, 13 pr, paras 3 f;
van Leeuwen (n 184) lib III, cap 4, para 4; Voet (n 64) lib V, tit II, } 66.
234
Stryk (n 61) cap XVI, } 2; cap XIX. 235
Stryk (n 61) cap XIX, } XLVII.
236
See Stryk (n 61) cap XXIV; Covarrubias (n 32) rubrica, pars II.
50 Nils Jansen
express clausula derogatoria;237 and it was never quite clear whether a testamentum
iudici oblatum could be presumed to have been revoked when it had been reclaimed
from the court,238 whether the breaking of the seals of a will should be interpreted as
a revocation,239 or whether it was possible to revoke a solemn will by making an
informal testamentum parentum inter liberos.240 According to Domat, a will favour-
ing relatives which had been made in the presence of five witnesses could be taken as
a valid revocation of earlier dispositions even if it could not stand as a will in its own
right.241 All in all, this part of the law presented itself as even more ‘perplexedly
entangled’ than the original Roman law.
This state of affairs was criticized by the lawyers of the usus modernus. Samuel Stryk,
one of the leading lawyers of his time, deplored it in the opening paragraph of his
Tractatus de cautelis testamentorum, which was to become the most influential work on
testamentary formalities for the following century: ‘Quanta litium forensium farrago
ex ultimis defunctorum elogiis nascatur, vulgo notum est’. Stryk recommended a two-
track strategy to cope with this unfortunate state: ‘ . . . duplex via remanet, vel ut
testamento tollamus penitus, vel otiosae illae subtilitates, quibus Romani delectabantur,
resecentur, & ita res ad simplicitatem juris gentium reducatur’.242 For the time being,
citizens had to draft their wills wisely, and Stryk’s Tractatus is full of such advice. Yet,
the law’s complexities had to be cut down as far as possible: this was the task of courts
and academics. Remarkably, a contrary policy – taking the form requirements seri-
ously and allowing for no exceptions – was favoured by French authors, who were
more confident in view of a strong state’s legislation.243
Outside France, however, it was impossible to adopt such a point of view.
When Stryk wrote his Tractatus, the learned lawyers had long been engaged in the
policy suggested by him, of cutting down formalities. A first element was the pre-
sumption of testamentary documents being valid;244 a second was the principle that
wills which had been duly made in one place were also to be held valid in other
places.245 A third element – not, however, explicitly acknowledged – was to favour
holograph or written wills as the normal form for literate persons. As long as the estate
was left to persons belonging to the testator’s family, holograph, or written, wills were
already a well-established practice in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.246
237
Nov 107, cap 2; Stryk, De cautelis (n 61) cap XXIV, } 19; Perez (n 73) VI, tit XXIII, para 28.
238
Cf Stryk (n 61) cap XXIV, }} 38 f; Glück (n 30) vol 33, 218 ff.
239 240
Perez (n 73) VI, tit XXIII, 20 f. III.3 above; Pistoris (n 72) consilium XLIV.
241
Domat (n 32) part II, liv III, tit I, sect V, } 5.
242
Stryk (n 61) cap I, } 2 in fine; cf also von Kreittmayr (n 91) 934 (ad III 2, }} 2 f, para 3).
243
Domat (n 32) part II, liv III, tit I, sect III, } 22; cf Pothier (n 81). Pothier constantly referred to the
Ordonnance concernant les testaments (n 58) where most ius commune questions had found a clear answer.
244
Above at nn 100 f.
245
See Ius Lubecense pars II, tit I, art XVI; Domat (n 32) part II, liv III, tit I, sect III, } 1; Vinnius (n 64)
lib II, tit X, } 14, para 5; Voet (n 64) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 27; Huber (n 65) book II, ch 12, }} 62 ff; Gail
(n 100) lib II, observatio CXXIII, para 2; Stryk (n 54) lib XXVIII, tit I, } 2 in fine; idem (n 61) cap XVI,
} 1. As so often, details were unclear or disputed. Usually, the principle was limited to bona fide testators,
who did not take recourse to the law of a different place in order to avoid their local rules; and usually, it
was argued that this principle applied only to the formalities, but not to other requirements, eg the one
concerning personal capacity; cf Stryk (n 54) cap XV, } 15, reporting a decision of the law faculty of Halle
from 1686; Mevius (n 149), pars II, tit I, art XVI, paras 1 ff; Perez (n 73) lib VI, tit XXIII, para 24; von
Kreittmayr (n 91) 933 (ad III 2, }} 2 f, para 3).
246
III.3 above.
3
in France and Belgium
Walter Pintens
I. Introduction 52
1. France 53
2. The Southern Low Countries 54
3. The French Revolution and the Code Napoléon 54
1. Types of will 55
2. Validity as a will of a different type 56
3. Incidence of wills 57
IV. Holograph wills 57
1. The text 57
2. The date 59
3. The signature 60
4. Evaluation 61
V. Public wills 62
1. Notaries and witnesses 62
2. The procedure 62
3. Further formalities 63
4. Evaluation 63
VI. Secret wills 64
VII. International wills 65
1. The will 65
2. Declaration and notarial certificate 65
3. Nullity and probative force 68
4. Evaluation 68
VIII. Registration 68
IX. Procedure after death 69
X. Conclusion 70
52 Walter Pintens
I. Introduction
Both French and Belgian law belong to the Romanist tradition. They are inter-
related, with French law being regarded as the original mother law from which the
law of its daughter, Belgium, has been derived and developed. Both legal
systems thus share a common body of ideas and maxims. The French Code civil,
which was introduced both in France and in what is now Belgium in 1804, serves as a
common legal foundation in both jurisdictions. That commonality is still apparent
today in some fields of private law, particularly the law of contract and torts.
However, in other fields, especially family and succession law, reforms carried out
in both legal systems have resulted in a substantial diminution in commonality
and in the emergence of major differences. Nevertheless, broad similarities can
still be detected in succession law, albeit that the systems are drifting apart in
respect of several subareas such as the statutory portion of the surviving spouse. By
contrast, testate succession and especially testamentary formalities show similarities
since the civil codes of both jurisdictions still contain a significant number of
identical articles.
A person wishing to deviate from intestate succession rules must dispose of his or
her assets according to the available legal instruments. Although mechanisms such as
donations, insurance contracts, and company law techniques have gained in import-
ance, the will remains the primary instrument for succession planning in the French
and Belgian legal traditions. This is due to the prohibition of succession agreements
and donations mortis causa.1 To the former, however, the Code Napoléon already
admitted exceptions with, for example, the contractual institution of the surviving
spouse as an heir (institution contractuelle). In recent years the exceptions have
expanded. Since 2003, Belgium has allowed spouses to exclude certain succession
rights by marriage agreement where one or both of them have children from a former
relationship.2 And while in its major succession law reform of 2006 France con-
firmed the prohibition, it also allowed a renunciation of the right to recover legacies
in violation of the compulsory portion, a change which opens up wide possibilities
for succession planning.3 Despite these changes, however, the will retains its domin-
ant position.
1
Arts 893 and 1130. Articles mentioned without further reference are articles identical in the Belgian
and French Civil Codes. Otherwise ‘BW’ (Burgerlijk Wetboek/Code civil) is used for the Belgian Civil Code
and C civ (Code civil) for the French Civil Code.
2
Art 1388 para 2 BW.
3
Arts 929 to 930–5 C civ.
Testamentary Formalities in France and Belgium 53
II. Historical development
1. France
Differences between the north and south of France are strongly apparent in the law
on wills.4 In the north, les pays de droit coutumier, the will appeared in the twelfth
century, replacing donation mortis causa. Particularly during the Crusades, the need
for a revocable will instead of an irrevocable donation mortis causa increased, because
a long journey overseas could provoke a change of mind.5 By the thirteenth century,
all coutumiers were familiar with the will, but only Philippe de Beaumanoir in his
Coutumes de Beauvaisis treated the topic in depth.6 Not all of the testamentary forms
of Roman law were adopted and the detailed rules were largely discarded. There was
no secret will. Instead, a kind of oral will inspired by Canon law was the most
common form. The number of witnesses – which, depending on the kind of will and
the period, had been five or seven in Roman law – was reduced to two. The testator
and witnesses had to seal the will. If the testator had no seal, the seal of an authority,
such as the bailiff or official, was used. In this sense, the will was a predecessor of the
public will, which appeared at the end of the fourteenth century. That will was
received by a court and later, when the notarial profession was established, by a
notary.7 A second form was the written will sealed by the bailiff or the official.8 The
irrevocable character of wills was not fully accepted and the will was still close to
donation mortis causa. Often revocation was submitted to the advice of the executors,
thereby granting them a kind of domestic jurisdiction, or was expressly excluded in
the will itself.9
From the fourteenth century onwards, testators formed a habit of signing as well
as sealing wills, and, later, the signature came to replace the seal. This practice
resulted in the development of the holograph will which, by the sixteenth century,
had become the most typical testamentary form of les pays de droit coutumier.10
Wills did not have the same social importance as in the south. Although custom-
ary laws sometimes offered the possibility of deviating from intestate succession, this
was not often done in practice. Wills did not designate an heir or, where they did,
4
See H Auffroy, Evolution du testament en France des origines au XIIIe siècle (Thesis, Paris, 1899);
Olivier Descamps, ‘Les formes testamentaires de l’époque médiévale jusqu’à la période présente en France’,
in Mathias Schmoeckel and Gerhard Otte (eds), Europäische Testamentsformen (2011) 46 ff; Paul Ourliac
and J de Malafosse, Histoire du droit privé vol III: Le droit familial (1968) 468 ff.
5
Ourliac and de Malafosse (n 4) 473.
6
Beaumanoir no 426. See P Lamaignerie, Les testaments dans le coutumier de Beaumanoir (1943).
7
Ourliac and de Malafosse (n 4) 474 ff.
8
Michel Petitjean, ‘L’acte à cause de mort dans la France coutumière du Moyen Age à l’époque
moderne’, in Actes à cause de mort II: Europe médiévale et moderne (Recueils Société Jean Bodin vol LX,
1983) 102.
9
10
Jean Bourdel, Etude sur les formes du testament (1913) 29 ff.
54 Walter Pintens
designated no heir other than the customary one. For the most part, however, wills
contained only bequests and the nomination of testamentary executors.11 Many
customs, such as those of Anjou and Paris, even forbade the nomination of an heir or,
as the old coutumier of Poitou of 1417 stated: ‘Institution d’héritier n’a point lieu’.12
In the south, les pays de droit écrit, the principles of Roman law remained
prominent.13 Wills replaced donation mortis causa in the thirteenth century. An
heir was always instituted, and the form was strongly influenced by Roman law.
Although known, the secret will was seldom used. Only a few Mediterranean statutes
accepted holograph wills. Oral wills were allowed where pronounced in the presence
of seven witnesses. The will was reconstituted as a written document and, in time,
developed into a public will received by a notary.14 Under the influence of Canon
law, the number of witnesses was reduced to two for the written as well as for the
oral will.
In the sixteenth century, north and south came closer together due to the laiciza-
tion of wills, but differences remained. In the south, holograph wills were
only admitted in favour of children. After the abolition of oral wills by the
Royal Ordinance of Chancellor d’Aguessau in 1735, three types of will remained –
holograph, secret, and public – but the first of these was largely excluded in the pays
de droit écrit and the second in les pays de droit coutumier.15
2. The Southern Low Countries

From the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, the Southern Low Countries dis-
played considerable variety in respect of testamentary formality. The forms of
Roman law were not respected and, under the influence of Canon law, oral wills
in the presence of two witnesses predominated. Often a priest sealed the will.16 The
secret will dates from the sixteenth century. In 1611, the Perpetual Edict of Arch-
duke Albert attempted to make the rules uniform.17 In those regions where customs
were embedded, they became obligatory; elsewhere wills had to be drawn up before a
priest or a notary.
3. The French Revolution and the Code Napoléon

After the French Revolution in 1789, the question of freedom of testation divided
the north and south of the country. By a decree of 7 March 1793 the Convention
abolished freedom of testation, but later decrees restored this freedom to a limited
11
12
No 548.
13
14
Ourliac and de Malafosse (n 4) 469 ff; Jacques Poumarède, ‘Le testament en France dans les pays de
droit écrit du Moyen Age à l’époque moderne’, in Actes à cause de mort II (n 8) 145.
15
Ourliac and de Malafosse (n 4) 515 ff; Petitjean (n 8) 115.
16
Philippe Godding, Le droit privé dans les Pays-Bas méridionaux du 12e au 18e siècle (1987) 380.
17
Godding (n 16) 387.
extent and created a new order of (intestate) succession.18 Testamentary formalities

as such were not discussed.
When codification came for all of France, and modern-day Belgium, in 1804,
Article 969 of the Code Napoléon provided for three types of will: holograph, public,
and secret. Seen as the easiest instrument of testation, the holograph will was retained
because it was not abused in practice. The model of public will chosen was a
compromise between north and south. And the secret will was thought to provide
an ideal instrument for those unable to write or wishing to hide the content of their
will.19 With the exception of some privileged wills for the military, sailors, or persons
suffering from infectious diseases, all other forms of will were abolished.
III. The modern law
1. Types of will
To the three wills introduced by the Code Napoléon, as just mentioned – the
holograph will, the public will, and the secret will20 – France in 1994 added the
international will,21 which is based on an initiative by Unidroit, the Convention of
Washington of 26 October 1973 providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an
International Will.22 In Belgium the position is the same except that the inter-
national will, introduced in 1983, replaced the secret will.23 Both jurisdictions also
have privileged wills – for example, military wills, maritime wills, and wills made in a
place isolated due to an epidemic24 – but these have fallen into disuse and are not
discussed further here.25
Obviously, a will must correspond to one of the authorized forms. Those drawn
up in any other form are voidable, and even alterations to an existing will can only be
made by means of a new will. Thus, an oral will or an electronic will, for example, is
voidable and would at most be seen as a natural obligation which the heirs are free to
18
Decrees of 12 brumaire and 17 nivôse year II. Freedom of testation was further extended by the Act
of 4 germinal year VIII. See Gustave Aron, ‘Etude sur les lois successorales de la révolution depuis 1789
jusqu’à la Promulgation du Code civil’ [1901] Nouvelle Revue Historique 444 ff and 585 ff; Descamps (n 4)
55 ff.
19
See the discussions and reports in P A Fenet, Recueil complet des travaux préparatoires du Code civil
vol XII (Paris, 1836) 378 ff, 553 ff, and 603 ff.
20
In the languages used in France and Belgium, these are, respectively, the testament olographe,
eigenhandig testament,or eigenhändiges Testament; the testament public, openbaar testament, or öffentliches
Testament; and the testament mystique.
21
Testament international, international testament, or internationales Testament.
22
Decree of 8 November 1994, Journal Officiel 16 November 1994.
23
Act of 11 January 1983, Moniteur belge 11 October 1983 (ratification); Act of 2 February 1983,
Moniteur belge 11 October 1983 (introduction of the Uniform Law into the Civil Code).
24
Arts 981–8 C civ; Arts 981–1001 BW.
25
For a discussion of the equivalent wills in Italian law, which owe their inspiration to the Code
Napoléon, see ch 6 below at 124.
56 Walter Pintens
fulfil, or not.26 All forms of will have a personal character and representation is
excluded. Another person cannot sign on behalf of the testator. On the other hand,
there are no internal formalities so that, unlike in Roman law, it is not necessary to
nominate an heir.
Testamentary formalities must be respected under penalty of nullity.27 The will is
a solemn act, and formalities are prescribed for validity as well as for proof. Although
only private interests are at stake, the nullity is absolute unless the heirs choose to
confirm the will after the testator’s death.28
Joint wills, even between spouses, are forbidden.29 For many writers the reason lies
in the personal character of the will and its revocability.30 However, the main reason
is that the legislator wanted freedom of testation to prevail.31 Joint wills are invalid
for both testators including the one who wrote, dated, and signed the will.32 Two
separate wills on the same piece of paper are, however, valid,33 as are identical wills or
mutual wills referring to each other or inspired by each other.34
2. Validity as a will of a different type

A will which fails in the category for which it was intended may yet be valid as a will
of a different type. So a public will which omits the place of signing or a full
description of witnesses may nonetheless succeed as an international will.35 Or a
failed secret will, even if named as such, may be a perfectly good holograph will.36
Or again if a witness in an international will does not fulfil the legal requirements, the
will is still valid as a holograph will if it was handwritten, dated, and signed by the
testator.37
26
Cass fr 22 June 2004, Dalloz 2004, 2953, note Marc Nicod; Court of Appeal Ghent 29 October
1955, Rechtskundig Weekblad 1955–6, 1770; Véronique Mikalef-Toudic, JurisClasseur Civil Arts 967–9
no 21; W Pintens, Ch Declerck, J Du Mongh, and K Vanwinckelen, Familiaal vermogensrecht (2nd edn,
2010) 903.
27
Art 1001.
28
Art 1340; Cass fr 9 July 1873, Dalloz Périodique 1874, I, 219.
29
Art 968.
30
François Terré and Yves Lequette, Les successions. Les libéralités (3rd edn, 1997) 296–7.
31
Philippe Malaurie, Les successions. Les libéralités (3rd edn, 2008) 253.
32
Pintens et al (n 26) 844.
33
Cass fr 21 July 1851, Sirey 1851, I, 570.
34
See further Pintens et al (n 26) 844. The position is different where a clause proves that the wills are
so tied to each other that they violate the rule of revocability or that they have to be treated as a succession
contract, which is forbidden according to Art 1130 para 2.
35
Tribunal Nivelles 13 February 1996, Journal des Tribunaux 1998, 867. See Jean-Emmanuel
Beernaert and Walter Pintens, ‘La renaissance du testament à forme internationale’ Journal des Tribunaux
[1999] 129 ff; Court of Appeal Antwerp 29 January 2001, Rechtskundig Weekblad 2002–03, 299, note.
36
Art 979 para 2 C civ.
37
Uniform Law Art 1 para 2; Walter Pintens, Nan Torfs, and Rik Torfs, Internationaal testament
(1985) 62; M Revillard, ‘Une nouvelle forme de testament: le testament international’ Répertoire du
Notariat Defrénois [1995] 295.
3. Incidence of wills
Recent statistics are not available. In France, the number of testate successions is
estimated at between 10 and 15 per cent.38 A study carried out in Belgium in 1991
found that 16.1 per cent of estates were testate.39 Today these numbers will be higher
due to a general increase in wealth, the growing number of single persons without
children, and the promotion of wills by charity organizations. The Belgian study
shows no difference between male and female testators. The most important reasons
for a will are the family situation of the testator in combination with the testator’s age
and property. Above the age of sixty-five, 30 per cent of deceased persons who were
married but without children had a will, while of those who were married with
children only 6 per cent had a will. Among the unmarried over the age of sixty-five,
only 8 per cent of those with children left a will, compared with 51 per cent of those
without children.40
The study further estimates the percentage of holograph and notarial wills at
around 50 per cent each. International wills were very exceptional and in any case less
than 1 per cent.41 Today there is a clear increase in notarial wills as people become
more aware of the complexity of succession law and therefore of the desirability of
legal advice. The number of international wills has also increased because they are an
excellent instrument for technical, detailed, and extensive testamentary dispositions.
IV. Holograph wills
1. The text
A holograph will is one which is entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of
the testator.42 This enables the testator to be identified and affords a guarantee
against possible forgery. For that reason, handwriting excludes the use of mechanical
or electronic instruments such as typewriters or computers.43 The requirement of
handwriting is not always well known. One of the most respected chancellors of the
University of Louvain, who died in 1971, made a will in favour of his university.
When the will was opened, the university was pleased with the content, but not with
the form: the will was not handwritten, but typed.
38
Information received from Prof Fr Ferrand, Lyon.
39
Jean van Houtte, Ann Duysters, Marc Keuleneer, and Katelijne van den Brande, Erven en laten
erven: een rechtssociologische studie naar samenstelling en toebedeling van de nalatenschappen (1991) 66. The
study was based on an examination of inheritance tax declarations for the year 1985 and interviews with
notaries.
40
van Houtte et al (n 39) 72.
41
van Houtte et al (n 39) 68 ff.
42
Art 970.
43
Cass fr 18 May 1936, Dalloz Hebdomadaire 1936, 345; Cass fr 1 March 1961, Juris-Classeur
Périodique 1961 II, no 12271, note M Tarabeux; Cass fr 23 October 1984, Juris-Classeur Périodique
1985 IV, 8.
58 Walter Pintens
A will need not be written in the testator’s usual language as long as the testator
understands the meaning of the words.44 The will has to be readable: illegible text is a
nullity and, where it is essential and constitutes an indivisible unity with the
remainder of the will, the entire will is void.45
Wills written with the help of another are not automatically void. A person can
give advice or practical assistance so long as the will remains the testator’s own
spontaneous and well-considered work.46 There is no reason why a testator should
not be inspired by, or even copy out, a text made by someone else except where he
or she was forced to do so or copied the text without understanding.47 Even a will
written over a pre-written text is valid provided the testator understood it and made
the text his own by forming the letters himself.48 Again, material guidance of the
hand is accepted as long as the testator is actually forming the letters.49 But illiterate
testators cannot make holograph wills because they could only copy a pre-written
text. Further, a will is void when the testator, due to ignorance or physical or mental
decline, was not able to check what he or she wrote, or when another person’s
influence was such that he put himself in place of the testator or distorted the
testator’s free will.50 The fact that another person’s signature was put at the bottom
of, and thus separate from, an otherwise valid will does not in itself cause the will’s
nullity.51
Cancellations, additions, and modifications are presumed to have been made by
the testator during the will’s preparation, subject to evidence in rebuttal, and so do
not affect the validity of the will,52 and even when made later, an addition need not
be signed and dated by the testator if its purpose is merely to clarify.53 But additions
must fulfil the formal requirements of a new will if they constitute a separate
stipulation.54 Even after the signing, a person other than the testator can make
technical changes, such as the correction of spelling errors or the addition of an
address.55 Substantive changes are void, but the will survives if the changes were
made after it was drafted and without the testator’s consent.56 Where the testator did
44
Cass fr 8 July 1957, Dalloz 1957, 668.
45
Court of Appeal Ghent 18 December 2003, Tijdschrift voor Gentse Rechtspraak 2004, 202.
46
Cass b 5 November 1965, Pasicrisie 1966, I, 305, note AC.
47
Court of Appeal Ghent 8 June 2006, Tijdschrift voor Notarissen 2008, 36, erratum 219.
48
Cass b 5 November 1965 (n 46).
49
See Louis Coupet, JurisClasseur Civil art 970 nos 43 ff.
50
Cass fr 8 April 1986, Bull civ 1986, I, no 86. See Louis Coupet, JurisClasseur Civil art 970 nos 42 ff.
51
Cass fr 5 October 1959, Dalloz 1959, 507, note G Holleaux. The result is the same if a legatee or
witness confirms the will with a signature unless this is found to show a restriction in free will or in
irrevocability: see Pintens et al (n 26) 923.
52
Cass b 5 September 2003, Jurisprudence Liège, Mons et Bruxelles 2004, 1177, note Jean Sace. This
also applies to tearing and pasting as a result of which a passage is removed. The removed part ceases to
have effect; the remainder of the will is valid. See Court of Appeal Liège 20 December 2004, Revue du
notariat belge 2005, 459.
53
See IV.3 below.
54
See IV.2 and IV.3 below.
55
Cass b 26 November 1936, Pasicrisie 1936, I, 430.
56
Cass fr 14 April 1874, Dalloz Périodique 1875, V, 423; Cass fr 14 April 1874, Dalloz Périodique
1875, V, 423; Pintens et al (n 26) 924.
consent, one cannot but conclude that the will is void, since it is no longer the
spontaneous and well-considered work of the testator.57
A reference to another will is both permitted and valid, regardless of whether this
is a public, holograph, or international will. Nothing prevents a testator from making
a supplementary will or wills. Another document can be counted as part of the
will provided it is referred to in the will and is handwritten by the testator.58 For
example, one can refer to an inventory of property or to a list of company shares.
2. The date
The will must be dated in the testator’s handwriting.59 The importance of the date is
obvious. Where several wills exist, it allows chronology to be ascertained. It fixes the
time at which the testator must have testamentary capacity. And it indicates the
moment from which the testator considers the will as finalized and from which he or
she wishes it to take effect.
The positioning of the date does not matter so long as it refers to the instrument as
a whole. In principle, the date consists of the year, month, and day, but not the
hour.60 Case law and doctrine, however, demonstrate a degree of leniency. A date
comprising sufficient elements to determine the exact day is valid, for example
‘Christmas 2010’ or ‘my sixteenth birthday’. Further, a date can be completed
by recourse both to intrinsic factors, such as the will’s phrasing or the type of
instrument used to write it,61 as well as to related extrinsic factors.62 For instance,
courts in Belgium have accepted that a different (and invalid) will with identical
content can figure as an extrinsic factor capable of completing the date in a contested
will.63 Increasingly, the date is seen as an additional validity guarantee rather
than a formal requirement in its own right.64 In modern law, the precise day has
to be proved only if there is a problem concerning capacity or chronology, and
the will is only void when, due to an incomplete date, it is impossible to determine
if the will was written when the testator had capacity or to chart the order of
competing wills.65
57
R Dillemans, Testamenten (2nd edn, 1977) 152.
58
59
Art 970.
60
The drafters of the Code civil wanted to perpetuate Art 38 of the Royal Ordinance of 1735: see
Emmanuel de Wilde d’Estmael, Christine Thomasset, and Alain-Charles Van Gysel, ‘Les testaments
(Forme)’, in Répertoire notarial II-VIII (2006) 89.
61
S Devos, ‘Commentaar bij artikel 970 BW’, in M Coene, W Pintens, and J Vastersavendts (eds),
Erfenissen, schenkingen en testamenten. Artikelsgewijze commentaar met overzicht van rechtspraak en rechtsleer
(2005) 22.
62
63
Court of Appeal Brussels 26 November 1969, Rechtskundig Weekblad 1969–70, 1239.
64
Court of Appeal Antwerp 7 October 1986, Rechtskundig Weekblad 1986–87, 1618, note W Pintens
and N Torfs.
65
Cass fr 9 March 1983, Bull civ 1983, I, no 95; Cass b 15 November 1991, Pasicrisie 1992, I,
204. See Michel Grimaldi, ‘La jurisprudence et la date du testament olographe’ [1984] Dalloz
Chronique 253.
60 Walter Pintens
When the date is not merely incomplete but entirely absent, Belgian law tradi-
tionally holds the will to be void.66 Proof of the date is not accepted because the date
is seen as having the additional function of indicating that the will is finished. Yet this
argument cannot be decisive because the signature also fulfils that function.67 The
French Cour de Cassation is more flexible, accepting a will without a date when, on
the basis of extrinsic evidence confirmed by intrinsic evidence, it can be demon-
strated that the will dates from a particular period.68 This tendency is the logical
consequence of an evolution from an absolute formal requirement to an additional
guarantee of validity. And when the date is not needed to guarantee validity, because
there are no problems concerning capacity or competing wills, it does not make sense
to insist on its presence. Recently, a Belgian court followed this tendency.69
In principle, the date of a will is the day on which the testator dated it and thus
turned the draft into a finalized document. Nevertheless, nothing prevents the
testator from giving the will a different date, and ante-dating is allowed as well as
post-dating.70 But ante-dating to overcome a problem of current incapacity results in
invalidity, for a false date is no better than a missing date unless the will contains
elements allowing the real date to be recovered.71 In post-dating, the testator must
take account of the risks of supervening death or incapacity. In case of death, the will
is not taken into account since it is presumed that the testator wished it to have effect
only from the stipulated date. Similarly, the will is made void by supervening
incapacity, for capacity is needed both on the date the will is made as well as on
the stipulated date.72
A will with several dates is not void, but the precise date has then to be proved by
means of intrinsic and related extrinsic elements. If a will is written over a period of
time, one date suffices so long as the different parts constitute a unity and do not
amount to separate wills. Additions made on a later date do not have to be dated
separately provided their purpose is only explanation or greater precision.73
3. The signature
Like every private instrument, a holograph will requires a signature to demonstrate
its authenticity and provenance.74 By signing the testator confirms that the will is
66
Court of Appeal Mons 19 June 2006, Jurisprudence de Liège, Mons et Bruxelles 2007, 525, note Jean
Sace. When, however, the date has disappeared due to force majeure, it can be determined on the basis of
testimony or presumptions: see de Wilde d’Estmael et al (n 60) 97.
67
68
Cass fr 10 May 2007, Répertoire du Notariat Defrénois 2007, 1432, note Marcel Beaubrun. It is
different if it can be shown that the testator was incapable of making a will at that time or had made
competing wills.
69
Tribunal Dinant 3 March 2010, Journal des Tribunaux 2010, 409, Revue du notariat belge 2010,
316.
70
Cass b 17 March 1994, Rechtspraak van het Hof van Cassatie 1994, 243, note Mieke Puelinckx-
Coene, Revue du notariat belge 1994, 240.
71
Cass fr 11 February 2003, Bull civ 2003, I, no 46.
72 73
Cass b 17 March 1994 (n 70). Pintens et al (n 26) 927.
74
Dillemans (n 57) 156.
complete. Hence a proper signature is required; the mentioning of surname and first
name in the text of the will does not suffice.75
In recent decades, the requirements concerning signature have been eased. At one
time the Belgian Supreme Court insisted on the testator’s usual signature,76 and a
signature by reference to family function, such as mother or grandmother, was
insufficient.77 In 1986, however, the Supreme Court changed its position and agreed
to accept a signature other than the usual one provided the judge on the facts was
satisfied that the testator intended to sign the will.78 This decision is in line with
French case law.79 Since then the Brussels Court of Appeal has accepted a will signed
‘papa’.80 French law is untroubled by a signature by first name or initials.81
There is no requirement concerning the place of the signature provided there is a
clear relationship between the signature and the will. A signature on an envelope
containing a will is accepted.82 Nor is it necessary to sign every page as long as there is
a factual or intellectual link between them.83 A factual link is present when pages are
attached to each other or placed in the same envelope, an intellectual link exists when
the text continues from page to page or when the pages are numbered. Later
additions must be signed separately if they contain new material independent of
the will’s existing content,84 but, in the absence of contrary evidence, additions are
taken to have been written at the time of the making of the will.85
4. Evaluation
Although both secret and cheap, holograph wills suffer from some potential dis-
advantages. Typically made without legal advice, they may be void due to a violation
of either the formalities or the substantive rules. Interpretation problems often arise.
There is a risk of loss or destruction unless precautions are taken, such as conserva-
tion by a notary. Finally, they lack the probative force of public wills, so that if the
(intestate) heirs challenge the handwriting or signature, the burden of proof is on the
beneficiaries to prove authenticity.86
75
Cass fr 14 January 2003, Bull civ 2003, I, no 14.
76
Cass b 10 June 1983, Tijdschrift voor Notarissen 1986, 309, note M Coene.
77
Cass b 7 January 1955, Annales du notariat 1955, 305, advisory opinion Attorney General Hayoit de
Termicourt, note E De Smet, Pasicrisie 1955, I, 456, note.
78
Cass b 13 June 1986, Pasicrisie 1986, I, 1269. Also Court of Appeal Ghent 8 June 2006, Tijdschrift
voor Notarissen 2008, 36.
79
Cass fr 22 June 2004, Dalloz 2004, 2953, note M Nicod.
80
Court of Appeal Brussels 8 November 1999, Algemeen Juridisch Tijdschrift 2000–01, 141, Journal
des Tribunaux 2004, 578.
81
See Malaurie (n 31) 258 ff.
82
Court of Appeal Brussels 7 November 1973, Tijdschrift voor Notarissen 1975, 72; Court of Appeal
Brussels 27 February 1974, Tijdschrift voor Notarissen 1976, 176, note.
83
Court of Appeal Brussels 27 February 1974 (n 83); Court of Appeal Antwerp 13 January 1988,
Revue du notariat belge 1989, 249.
84
Court of Appeal Liège 20 December 2004, Revue du notariat belge 2005, 459.
85
Cass b 9 May 1968, Pasicrisie 1968, I, 105, Rechtskundig Weekblad 1968–69, 125.
86
Art 1323 para 2.
62 Walter Pintens
V. Public wills
1. Notaries and witnesses

A public will is one authenticated by a notary in the presence of two witnesses or by
two notaries without witnesses.87 In France, notaries have jurisdiction throughout
the whole country,88 whereas jurisdiction in Belgium is restricted to the judicial
district in which the notary in question was nominated.89 Notaries cannot act where
a spouse or relative is either the testator or a beneficiary.90
In France, witnesses must understand French,91 be of full age, know how to sign,
and have the enjoyment of their civil rights.92 Witnesses in Belgium must be at least
eighteen years old and know how to sign,93 and, while there is no requirement to
speak or understand the testator’s language,94 it is plainly advisable that there is
sufficient knowledge to follow the dictation of the will.95 Both jurisdictions agree in
preventing husbands and wives from attesting the same will.96 Legatees, certain
relatives by blood or affinity, and the notary’s clerks are barred from acting as
witnesses.97
2. The procedure
The process begins with the testator dictating the will to the notary in the presence of
the witnesses.98 This is to ensure that the spontaneous and freely expressed will is
accurately reproduced. The dictation can rely on notes or on a draft prepared by a
third person or even by the notary, but notes or draft cannot replace the dictation.
It is necessary that the testator be familiar with any draft and makes it his or her own.
While the notary may ask questions for clarification, he may not influence the
testator’s mind,99 and a will consisting of answers to the notary’s questions would
be void.100 In Belgium, the dictation is taken by the notary by hand or since recently
by electronic means, in France, by the notary or someone else either by hand or by
87
Art 871.
88
Decree no 86–728 of 29 April 1986.
89
Art 5, paras 1 and 2 Act of 25 ventôse year XI (16 March 1803) (hereinafter ‘Act on Notaries’). But
the notary can act outside his district if the testator lives in a different district and declares that he is unable
to move.
90
France: Art 2 Decree 26 November 1971; Belgium: Art 8 Act on Notaries (n 89).
91
The Act of 23 June 2006 abolished the requirement of French nationality.
92
Art 980 C civ.
93
Art 10 Act on Notaries (n 89). In addition, they must not have been deprived of their right to
testify: see Arts 31–4 Penal Code.
94
Cass b 21 June 1928, Pasicrisie 1928, I, 200.
95
W Pintens, ‘Vormvereisten en nietigheden van het openbaar testament’ [2009] Tijdschrift voor
Estate Planning 208.
96
France: Art 890 C civ; Belgium: Art 10 para 4 Act on Notaries (n 89).
97
Art 975 C civ; Art 10 Act on Notaries (n 89).
98
Art 972.
99
Cass b 24 April 1967, Pasicrisie 1967, I, 999.
100
Tribunal Ghent 8 November 1955, Tijdschrift voor Notarissen 1945, 172.
computer or other mechanical means.101 Literal transcription is not required, but

while the notary may use a better word or formulate a sentence more accurately, he
must faithfully reproduce the content of the dictation. The will is then read over to
the testator,102 Belgian law expressly requiring that this is done in the presence of the
witnesses.103 The will narrates the various formalities104 and usually adds, although
without being required to do so, that the testator confirmed the writing as
corresponding to the dictation.
The testator then signs the will in the presence of the notary and witnesses.105 The
signature identifies the testator and confirms his or her dictation. The witnesses and
notary must also sign.106 As the notary authenticates the testator’s signature, it will
not usually matter if it is deformed or unusual,107 although such a signature may
possibly be evidence that the testator was trying to escape from pressure to make a
will.108 Signature is excused altogether by a declaration that the testator does not
know how to sign or is unable to do so. The former means that the testator cannot
physically sign (for example, because of a paralysed hand or a broken arm), the latter
that the testator is illiterate. The declaration is mentioned in the will as well as the
cause which prevents the signing.109 Thus, in one single session the testator makes
his dictation, the notary transcribes his words, and everyone signs the will.
3. Further formalities
Besides the specific formalities for wills, there are further formalities common to all
notarial instruments, some prescribed under penalty of nullity, others leading only to
disciplinary measures. In Belgium, for example, the place and date of the will, and
the name, usual forename, and domicile of the witnesses, are mandatory on pain of
nullity.110 Normally, alterations are made in the margins and signed or initialled
by the testator, witnesses, and notary, although lengthy alterations can be put at the
end of the will when they should not only be signed or initialled, but also expressly
approved by the testator. Alterations which do not comply with these rules are
void.111 On the other hand, nullity does not result if, for example, there is incom-
plete identification of the notary or testator.
4. Evaluation
The public will is without disadvantage. It is relatively cheap, usually between €150
and €300, and, since the notary has a high degree of specialization in succession law,
the risk of violation of formalities or substantive law is minimal. Interpretation
101
France: Art 972 paras 2 and 3 C civ; Belgium: Art 972 paras 2 and 3 BW. In Belgium Art 31 Act of
6 May 2009, in force since 10 January 2011, allows the use of mechanical means: see Pintens et al
(n 26) 912.
102 103
Art 972 para 3 C civ; Art 972 para 3 BW. Art 972 para 3 BW.
104 105 106
Art 972 para 4. Art 973. Art 974.
107
108
Court of Appeal Ghent 25 October 2007, Tijdschrift voor Notarissen 2008, 460.
109 110
Art 973. Art 114 Act on Notaries (n 89).
111
Art 15 Act on Notaries (n 89).
64 Walter Pintens
problems are rare. Its probative force is much stronger than in the case of a holograph
will. Thus, the facts and legal acts established by the notary – the date of the will, for
example, or the testator’s signature or dictation – are certified by the notary as
authentic and can only be contested in the case of forgery.112 And while other aspects
of the will can be challenged – for example, a statement as to the mental capacity of
the testator – they have probative force unless or until the contrary is proved.113
Public wills are further safeguarded and their execution guaranteed due to registra-
tion in a central register.114 Falsification is thus almost impossible except in the most
unusual circumstances. An example from the 1950s concerns a notary in Flanders
who was called to a hospital to draft a will for a dying person. On coming to sign, one
of the witnesses dropped the pen and it tumbled under the bed. When the notary
took the bedspread away to look for the pen, he discovered a body. The patient was
already dead and a family member had taken his place to dictate a will in favour of
the family.
VI. Secret wills
Today only France has the secret will. In Belgium it was replaced by the international
will. As the secret will is little used in practice, it may be described quite briefly.115
The main rules are set out in Article 976 of the Code civil. First, the testator
prepares a will on his or her own, or with the help of someone else, and signs it.116
The will need not be written by hand. Next, the will, or an envelope containing the
will, is closed, stamped, and sealed up.117 It is then presented to a notary and two
witnesses, in whose presence the testator declares that the contents are his will, signed
by him, and written by him or by another.118 The notary then endorses on the will or
envelope an instrument of superscription giving the date and place where this was
done, describing the cover and imprint of the seal, and narrating the various
formalities. The instrument is signed by the notary, testator, and witnesses. The
notarial process must be carried out without interruption and without attending
to other instruments. A person who cannot read is unable to make a secret will.119
Secret wills have the advantage of not needing to be written by the testator.
Equally, they can be made by a mute testator who is able to write. They also have
a certain utility when the will is long and complicated. A disadvantage is that,
although the intervention of a notary is obligatory, there is no obligation to seek
his advice. Secret wills may thus be vulnerable to invalidity due to violation of
formalities or an illegal or unclear stipulation.
112
Art 1319. See Court of Appeal Brussels 19 December 2001, Tijdschift voor Notarissen 2002, 174.
113
de Wilde d’Estmael et al (n 60) 165.
114
For registration, see VIII below.
115
For the comparable institution in Italian law, see ch 6 below at 133.
116
As to the procedure when the testator cannot sign, see Art 977 C civ.
117
Alternatively, this can be done in the presence of the notary and witnesses.
118
Art 979 C civ contains a special procedure for where the testator can write but not speak.
119
Art 978 C civ.
VII. International wills
The Washington Convention on the Form of an International Will (1973) is the

only attempt to unify substantive law in this field by means of a uniform law.120 The
resulting international will is a compromise between the secret will of the civil law
and the witnessed will of the common law. It consists of two documents: a private
will provided by the testator and a certificate drawn up by an ‘authorized person’
who, in France and Belgium, is always a notary.
1. The will
The will is a private document which can be prepared either by the testator or by
someone else, including a notary, on the testator’s behalf.121 This opens up possi-
bilities for a person who is blind or paralysed. The will may be written by hand or by
any other means, including typing or braille.122 Any language may be used, includ-
ing a language the testator does not understand, in which case assistance can
be requested from a trustworthy source.123 This rule offers the possibility of using
the language of the place where the will is made or where it has to be executed.
The Uniform Law does not contain any other rules concerning the form of the
document.
2. Declaration and notarial certificate

Once the will is drafted, the testator hands the document to a notary and declares
that it contains his will and that he knows its contents. The declaration has to be
made in the presence of two witnesses and, unlike the public will, they cannot be
replaced by a second notary.124 The law of the notary governs the conditions
required to act as a witness.125 This means that French or Belgian law applies and
that witnesses have to comply with all of the rules of incompatibility prescribed by
the Civil Code and the Act on Notaries. For that reason, the Belgian Supreme Court
120
The Convention is in force in Belgium, Canada (for Manitoba, Newfoundland, Ontario, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia), Cyprus, Ecuador, France, Italy,
Libya, Niger, Portugal, and Slovenia. The United Kingdom has not ratified the Convention and, while it
was incorporated into UK law by s 27 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982, the provision has not
been brought into force. See for Belgium: Philippe De Page, ‘Le testament international et sa mystique’
[1984] Revue du notariat belge 7 ff; Pintens et al (n 37); for France: Revillard [1995] Répertoire du Notariat
Defrénois art 36021; more generally: K H Nadelman, ‘Formal Validity of Wills and the Washington
Convention 1973 providing the Form of an International Will’ (1974) 22 AJCL 365.
121
The rules for wills are set out in Art 3 of the Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will.
122
Philippe Malaurie, ‘Sur les testaments rédigés par un aveugle en écriture braille’ [2001] Répertoire
du Notariat Defrénois no 37317, 352.
123
Pintens et al (n 37) 26 ff.
124
Art 4 para 1 Uniform Law.
125
Art V Washington Convention.
66 Walter Pintens
overturned a judgment of the Antwerp Court of Appeal which had converted a

public will, void because a witness was a relative in a forbidden degree, into an
international will.126 The Court of Appeal had overlooked the Convention provision
which makes the witnessing rules the same as in national law.127
In principle, the testator’s declaration is an oral one. However, legislation in
Belgium has supplemented the Uniform Law with a special rule for mute testa-
tors.128 Instead of speaking, the testator can write at the foot of the document and in
the presence of the notary and witnesses that the document contains his or her will.
The notary then adds to the document that the testator wrote those words in his
presence and in the presence of the witnesses. If the testator can neither speak nor
write, the international will cannot be used.129
Unlike the secret will, an international will is presented to the notary in an open
form, but this does not mean that the testator must inform the notary or witnesses of
the contents.130 On the contrary, the testator can cover the text and so keep the
contents secret. The will is signed in the presence of the notary and witnesses or, if
already signed, the testator acknowledges the signature.131 The Uniform Law does
not provide a form of acknowledgement, and an oral declaration suffices. Signature
by initials is acceptable.132 When the testator is unable to sign, the notary notes the
reason on the will.133 If the will consists of several sheets, each is signed by the
testator and the sheets are individually numbered.134 The notary and witnesses then
attest the will by signing in the testator’s presence.135 All signatures are placed at the
end of the document. The date of the will is the date of its signature by the notary as
indicated at the end of the will.136 Only this date is taken into account in assessing
the validity of the will, and a date given by the testator at an earlier stage is treated as
of no significance.
Finally, the notary prepares a certificate and attaches it to the will.137 While its
form is prescribed by Article 10 of the Uniform Law, national law can opt for a
different form provided it is ‘substantially similar’. In the event, the Belgian and
French legislation keep to the model contained in Article 10. This is as follows:
126
Cass b 24 January 2008, Notarieel en Fiscaal Maandblad 2008, 170, note Aloı̈s Van Den Bossche,
Pasicrisie 2008, 228, Revue trimestrielle de droit familial 2008, 604.
127
See Pintens et al (n 26) 934.
128
Art 18 Act of 2 February 1983 introducing a will in the international form and modifying certain
provisions concerning the will (hereinafter ‘Act of 1983’).
129
Pintens et al (n 37) 20 ff.
130
131
132
J-P Plantard, ‘Explanatory Report on the Convention providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an
International Will’ (1974) I Uniform Law Review 90.
133
Art 5 para 2 Uniform Law. The Uniform Law provides that, when the testator is unable to sign,
another person can sign on his behalf (Art 6 para 2). This, however, is only intended for jurisdictions
having such a rule, which does not include either Belgium or France.
134
Art 6 Uniform Law. If the testator cannot sign, the notary does so instead.
135 136 137
Art 5 para 3 Uniform Law. Art 7 Uniform Law. Art 9 Uniform Law.
Certificate
1. I, (name, address and capacity), a person authorized to
act in connection with international wills
2. Certify that on (date) at (place)
3. (testator) (name, address, date and place of birth) in
my presence and that of the witnesses
4. (a) (name, address, date and place of birth)
(b) (name, address, date and place of birth)
has declared that the attached document is his will and that he knows the
contents thereof.
5. I furthermore certify that:
6. (a) in my presence and in that of the witnesses
(1) the testator has signed the will or has acknowledged his signature previously
affixed.
*(2) following a declaration of the testator stating that he was unable to sign his
will for the following reason
– I have mentioned this declaration on the will
* – the signature has been affixed by (name, address)
7. (b) the witnesses and I have signed the will;
8. *(c) each page of the will has been signed by and
numbered;
9. (d) I have satisfied myself as to the identity of the testator and of the witnesses as
designated above;
10. (e) the witnesses met the conditions requisite to act as such according to the law
under which I am acting;
11. *(f ) the testator has requested me to include the following statement concerning
the safekeeping of his will:
12. PLACE
13. DATE
14. SIGNATURE and, if necessary, SEAL
* To be completed if appropriate
Although views have differed, it seems that the certificate has to be drawn up in
notarial form.138 As well as attaching it to the will, the notary keeps a copy of the
certificate and gives another to the testator, meaning that a certificate in triplicate
may be necessary.139 On the other hand, if the notary retains the will, he already has
that copy of the certificate and so a certificate in duplicate suffices.
The Belgian legislation has added some rules on preservation of the will. The will has
to be put in an envelope which is sealed by the testator and the witnesses. The envelope
is attached to the certificate and both are kept in the records of the notary.140
138
Some take the view that the international will has an autonomous character and so is not subject to
any notarial requirement, but the better view is that a notary can only use the notarial form prescribed by
his national law. See De Page [1984] Revue du notariat belge 18; Pintens et al (n 37) 41 ff. Cf Revillard
[1995] Répertoire du Notariat Defrénois 295.
139
Art 11 Uniform Law; Revillard [1995] Répertoire du Notariat Defrénois 295.
140
Arts 9 and 17 Act of 1983 (n 128).
68 Walter Pintens
3. Nullity and probative force

Under the Uniform Law, the sanction of nullity only attaches to the core require-
ments set out in Articles 2 to 5.141 As one might expect, these include the testator’s
declaration to the notary and witnesses, and the signing of the will by the testator,
notary, and witnesses. Not included are, for example, the signing of every sheet, the
placing of signatures at the end, the noting of the date, or even the preparation and
attachment of the certificate itself.142 However, non-compliance reduces the value of
the international will as well as giving rise to problems in practice. For example, if the
date is missing and a problem then arises of the testator’s incapacity or of competing
of wills, then the will may be void.143
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the certificate proves the formal validity
of the will.144 But evidence to the contrary has to be interpreted in conformity with
national law and, since the certificate has notarial form and therefore an authentic
character, matters which have been authenticated by the notary can only be contested
in the case of forgery. If there is no certificate, or the certificate is defective, the
burden of proof is reversed and it is for the beneficiary to prove that the will was
drawn up in conformity with the required formalities.145
4. Evaluation
The international will has many advantages.146 As it may be typed, it is the ideal
instrument if the will is too long to dictate or write in handwriting or if the testator is
weak. A further advantage is that nullity is restricted to the formalities contained in
Articles 2 to 5 of the Uniform Law. Finally, the certificate attached to the will is
recognized in all of the contracting states, with the result that probate procedures are
wholly or largely avoided. This makes the international will of particular value if the
testator has property in another contracting state. An international connection, however,
is unnecessary and the will can be used even where all of the property is in the testator’s
own country.147 The disadvantage of the international will lies in its complex formal-
ities, although most are not prescribed under penalty of nullity. The matter is especially
complicated in Belgium, since the legislator has added many formalities to the Uniform
Law, completely disregarding the principles governing uniform laws.
VIII. Registration
Both Belgium and France have ratified the Basle Convention of 16 May 1972 on
the Establishment of a Scheme of Registration of Wills.148 As Article 1 makes clear,
141 142 143

Art 1 Uniform Law. Art 13 Uniform Law. Pintens et al (n 26) 935.
144 145
Art 12 Uniform Law. Pintens et al (n 26) 937.
146 147
Pintens et al (n 26) 933. Plantard (1974) I Uniform Law Review 93 ff.
148
The Convention has been ratified by Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Italy, Lithuania, Luxem-
burg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. In the United Kingdom s 24 of the Administration
the Convention does not establish an international register as such, but only a
scheme of registration of wills with a view to facilitating the discovery of the will
after a testator’s death. Each contracting state has to follow the scheme and appoint a
national body responsible for registration and for answering requests for information
after the testator’s death. As registration is not subject to conditions of nationality or
residence of the testator, a will can be registered in any state which is party to the
Convention.
Both jurisdictions have established an electronic Central Register of Wills admin-
istered by the notaries and in which, in the case of Belgium, all notarial,
international, and holograph wills prepared by or lodged with a notary have to
be registered. In France, registration is not obligatory. Belgium and France are
members of the European Network of the Registers of Wills Association, and the
registers of both jurisdictions are interconnected.
IX. Procedure after death
Before it can take effect, a holograph or a secret will must be deposited in

the hands of a notary. Where it is sealed, the will is opened, and the notary
draws up a memorandum describing the opening and the condition of the
will, as well as specifying the circumstances of the deposit. Both will and memoran-
dum take their place in the notary’s records. Within a month, the notary must
send copies of the will and memorandum to the chief clerk of the competent
court.149
In France, execution of the will depends on the position of the legatee.
Where there are heirs to whom a portion of property is reserved by law, those
heirs are automatically seized of all the property on the testator’s death, and a
universal legatee is compelled to request them to deliver the property which is
included in the will.150 If there are no such heirs, a universal legatee is him- or
herself seized of the property.151 But where the will is holograph or secret, a universal
legatee must apply to court to be vested with possession.152 Other legatees must
request delivery from the heirs to whom a portion of property is reserved by law
or, failing them, from the heirs on intestacy.153 Comparable rules can be found
in Belgian law.154
of Justice Act 1982 contains provisions for a registry of wills, with a view to ratification, but the provisions
have not been brought into force.
149
Art 1007 C civ; Art 976 para 1 BW. Belgian law has also specific regulations for the international
will: Art 976 para 2 BW.
150 151 152
Art 1004 C civ. Art 1006 C civ. Art 1008 C civ.
153 154
Arts 1011 and 1014 C civ. Arts 1004, 1008, 1011, and 1014 para 2 BW.
70 Walter Pintens
X. Conclusion
Historically, a desire to protect the free will of the testator led to a solemnization
of testamentary writings. Extreme respect for formalities was the result. A certain
leniency has come about only during the last decades of the twentieth century. This
tendency concerns holograph wills in particular.155 Only one formality, that of
handwriting, remains strict. For the other two, date and signature, case law applies
a liberal interpretation, and the date, especially, has increasingly become an addi-
tional requirement rather than a strict formality. Another example of this approach is
the international will, where the Washington Convention applies the penalty of
nullity to a highly restricted range of formalities. Developments in French and
Belgian law thus suggest a movement in the direction of the Germanic legal family,
where the formalities have traditionally been less exacting.
155
Louis Josserand, ‘La désolemnisation du testament’ [1932] Dalloz Hebdomadaire, Chronique 73.
4
Testamentary Formalities in Spain
Sergio Cámara Lapuente
I. Introduction 72
1. Will-making 72
2. The laws of the seven Autonomous Communities 73
1. Third to eighth centuries 74
2. Eighth to thirteenth centuries 75
3. Thirteenth to nineteenth centuries 76
1. The Civil Code of 1889 77
2. Law in the Autonomous Communities: special forms
of will 78
IV. Open wills 79
1. Ordinary notarial wills 79
2. Notarial wills by disabled people 80
3. Wills in a language with which the notary is unfamiliar 81
4. Emergency wills 81
V. Closed wills 82
VI. Holograph wills 83
1. The Civil Code provisions 83
2. Some regional variations 84
3. Evaluation 84
4. The per relationem will 85
VII. Special wills 85
VIII. Shared features 86
1. Identification of the testator 86
2. Witnesses 87
(a) The retreat from witnessing 87
(b) Qualification and disqualification 88
3. Signature 89
IX. Internal formalities 90
X. A shift from formalism 91
XI. Concluding remarks 92
XII. Appendix: the laws of the Autonomous Communities 93
72 Sergio Cámara Lapuente
I. Introduction
1. Will-making
In Spain, almost half of the estates of deceased persons are governed by wills or, in
the few territories that allow them, by succession agreements. This puts Spain
well ahead of countries in the European Union such as Belgium (between 10 and
15 per cent), France (10 per cent), Germany (20 per cent), or England and Wales
(33 per cent).1 It is also indicative of a growing trend towards will-making within
Spain itself.2 In Spain, 570,044 wills were drawn up before a notary in 2008,
compared with only 91,901 intestacies recorded in the same year.3
One explanation for this preference for testate succession is a tradition which,
since the Middle Ages, has regarded the making of a will as a moral and religious
duty. Another is a desire to bypass the rules for intestate distribution or to alter the
system of forced heirship (legı́timas), the aim being usually to strengthen the position
of the spouse or partner at the expense of children or ascendants. This does not mean
that the system of forced heirship can be avoided by making a will, but its impact can
be somewhat softened. Three common types of testamentary provision may be
mentioned in this context. First, there is the so-called cautela socini, by which
descendants are given the chance of inheriting more than would otherwise be their
entitlement under the system of forced heirship provided they accept an initial
encumbrance on their inheritance, typically a usufruct in favour of the testator’s
spouse.4 Admitted in some of the Autonomous Communities5 and implicitly
allowed by the Spanish Supreme Court,6 this device is used in most wills made by
married people with children. Secondly, it is a common practice to make wills in
favour of long-term partners.7 Thirdly, married couples, as well as those living in an
1
Andrea Zoppini, Le successioni in diritto comparato, in Rodolfo Sacco (ed), Trattato di diritto
comparato (2002) 125 ff.
2
According to data that Jesús Delgado Echeverrı́a has gathered, wills are used 58% more today in
Spain than 20 years ago, increasing, eg, from 370,161 notarial wills in 1984 to 584,848 in 2002. See ‘Una
propuesta de polı́tica del Derecho en materia de sucesiones por causa de muerte. Segunda parte: objetivos
de una reforma del derecho de sucesiones’, in Asociación de Profesores de Derecho Civil, Derecho de
sucesiones. Presente y Futuro. XII Jornadas de la APDC (2006) 103–15.
3
Anuario de la Dirección General de los Registros y el Notariado 2008 vol III (2010) 508 ff. The data,
although revealing, are incomplete. For example, holograph wills are not recorded in the Registro General
de Actos de Última Voluntad.
4
The core entitlement of descendants is to one-third of the estate. A typical cautela socini will leave the
whole estate to the testator’s children, but subject to a usufruct to their surviving parent. If the children
reject this arrangement, they will receive an unencumbered title but only to the one-third of the estate that
is their legal entitlement. The cautela socini is named after Mario Socino, a jurist of the sixteenth century.
5
Art 49 Legislative Decree 79 of 1990 (Balearic Islands); Art 49 Law 10 of 2008 (Catalonia); Art 500
Legislative Decree 1 of 2011 (Aragon). More straightforwardly, other regions allow a universal usufruct for
the surviving spouse, either at the testator’s behest (Galicia and parts of the Basque Country) or by
mandatory law (Navarre and Aragon).
6
eg, STS 10 July 2003.
7
In a recent survey of around 400 practising notaries in territories where the Spanish Civil Code is
applied, between 88% and 100% of those surveyed responded affirmatively to the question of whether or
Testamentary Formalities in Spain 73
unmarried state with a partner, often ask notaries to draft identical wills containing
reciprocal benefits for them and their children. This practice is reminiscent of the
joint will, which today is prohibited by Article 669 of the Civil Code.
2. The laws of the seven Autonomous Communities

The succession provisions in the Civil Code apply in only eleven of the seventeen
Autonomous Communities (plus Ceuta and Melilla) into which Spain is divided. In
a phenomenon which stems from the so-called Derecho foral (Local Law), the
remaining Autonomous Communities have their own laws which, revised several
times, combine a respect for historical tradition with a desire to modernize. In their
most recent versions, these laws exist in Navarre (1973), the Balearic Islands (1990),
the Basque Country (1992 and 1999), Galicia (2006), Catalonia (2008), and Aragon
(1999 and 2011).8 As far as testamentary formalities are concerned, all regions9 allow
the Civil Code to be applied as supplementary or subsidiary law regarding those
issues which are not covered in the regional provisions.10 Further information on
regional laws can be found in an appendix to this chapter.11
II. Historical background
A brief review of the evolution of the main testamentary forms and formalities may
help to clarify the origins and foundation of the existing legislative diversity.12
not they had noticed that people with steady partners show a greater interest in making wills. A similar
response was obtained regarding the desire to favour the spouse beyond what is permitted by the share of
an estate that passes to descendants or ascendants. See Ángel Luis Rebolledo Varela, ‘La actualización del
Derecho sucesorio español ante los cambios sociológicos y jurı́dicos’, in idem (ed), La familia en el Derecho
de sucesiones (2010) 30 ff.
8
In Navarre – Law 1 of 1973 (amended by Law 5 of 1987); in the Balearic Islands – Legislative Decree
79 of 1990 (which consolidates the text of Law 5 of 1961); in the Basque Country – Law 3 of 1992
(amended by Law 3 of 1999 and formerly Law 47 of 1959 and Law 6 of 1988); in Galicia – Law 2 of 2006
(formerly Law 4 of 1995 and before that Law 147 of 1963); in Catalonia – Law 10 of 2008 (formerly Law 40
of 1991 and before that Laws 13 of 1984 and 40 of 1960); in Aragon – Legislative Decree 1 of 2011
(formerly Law 1 of 1999 and before that Law 15 of 1967, as amended by Law 3 of 1985).
9
However, Catalonia plans to establish a comprehensive system of succession law, but it is uncertain
whether it will be possible to prevent the full supplementary application of the Spanish Civil Code (see eg
n 118 below). For the current position see Art III-2 Law 29 of 2002. This comprehensive system was
formerly contemplated in the Preamble (} I.3) of the (now repealed) Law 40 of 1991, and in Catalan case
law (judgments of the Superior Court of Justice of 9 June 1997 and 18 December 1997).
10
This supplementary character of the Spanish Civil Code as regards those elements which are not
covered in the Autonomous laws (see Art 149.3 of the Spanish Constitution) is provided for either in a
general way or, in the laws of some regions, with express reference to testamentary formalities.
11
See XII below.
12
On this topic see Marı́a Angustias Martos Calabrús, Aproximación histórica a las solemnidades del
testamento público (1998) 1–85; Juan José Rivas Martı́nez, Derecho de sucesiones. Común y foral vol I (2009)
192 ff; Juan B Vallet de Goytisolo, Panorama del Derecho de sucesiones vol I (1982) 961 ff. For detailed
historical studies on certain testamentary forms or periods, see, especially, Mariano Alonso y Lambán, ‘Las
formas testamentarias en la Alta Edad Media de Aragón’ (1954) 5 RDN 7–196, (1955) 9 RDN 241–398;
Fernando de Arvizu y Galarraga, La disposición mortis causa en el Derecho español de la Alta Edad Media
(1977); Sergio Cámara Lapuente, La fiducia sucesoria secreta (1996) 33–484; Alfonso Garcı́a Gallo, ‘El
problema de la sucesión mortis causa en la Alta Edad Media española’ (1959) 10 AAMN 249–76; idem,
1. Third to eighth centuries

When in AD 415 the Goths occupied Hispania, Gothic law was superimposed on the
existing Roman vulgar law. The main written sources of Gothic law were the Code of
Eurico (or Lex Antiqua Visigothorum) from the second half of the fifth century, the
Breviary of Alaric from 506 (also called Lex Romana Visigothorum, Liber Legum, or
Lex Theodosii due to the influence of the Codex Theodosianus), and the Liber Iudicum
or Liber Iudiciorum (or Lex Visigothorum), which, in 654, replaced the Code of
Eurico as the official law. One result was a blurring of the Roman peculiarities of
mortis causa mechanisms and the gradual decline of the pure Roman will. This was
replaced by simpler forms such as post obitum and reservato usufructo donations. The
former had been spreading since the third century and was considered as equivalent
to a will by the fifth century.13 In the compilation of Roman law brought about by
the Lex Romana Visigothorum, the distinction between civil and praetorian wills
was maintained; five witnesses were required for the written civil will, but seven
for both the iure pretorio will (which was presented to the witnesses already drafted
and sealed) and the nuncupative will.14 The oral will gained ground on the written,
especially in cases of emergency, to the point where, in the fifth century, it came to
challenge it for supremacy. In the Liber Iudicum, witnesses (probably two or three
in number)15 declared an oral will before a judge or priest within six months of the
testator’s death; afterwards it had to be ratified by the king.16 This testamentary
form represented a continuation of the nuncupative will, but with the addition of
an intermediary or executor.17 In practice, it was also acceptable that the will was
drawn up by a third party.18 Later, this Gothic law had considerable influence in
Leon and Toledo, as well as in Aragon, Navarre, and Catalonia,19 but not in the
rest of Spain.
‘Del testamento romano al testamento medieval. Las lı́neas de su evolución en España’ (1977) 47 AHDE
426–97; José Luis Murga, Donaciones y testamentos in bonum animae en el Derecho romano tardı́o (1968);
Álvaro Núñez Iglesias, El testamento por comisario (1991); Manuel Marı́a Pérez de Benavides, El testamento
visigótico. Una contribución al estudio del Derecho romano vulgar (1975); Francisco Samper Polo, ‘La
disposición mortis causa en el Derecho romano vulgar’ (1968) 38 AHDE 87–227.
13
This is how it is recorded in the oldest Goth Code: Garcı́a Gallo (1977) 47 AHDE 448. It was later
governed by Chindasuinth in the Liber Iudicum 5, 2, 6.
14
Interpretatio ad Codex Theodosianus 4, 4, 3, in Gustav Haenel (ed), Lex Romana Visigothorum
(Leipzig, 1849). See also Interpretatio ad Novellae Theodosii 9, 1, 6. Among the other types of disposition
which existed were the epistola hereditatis, and the delivery of a written will to a commendatarius.
15
Álvaro D’Ors, El Código de Eurico. Edición, palingenesia, ı́ndices (1960) 236.
16
Liber Iudicum 2, 5, 12 (Erv), in Karl Zeumer (ed), Monumenta Germaniae Historica vol I (1902).
17
M Paolo Mêrea, Sôbre as origens do executor testamentário (1940) 15.
18
Formula Visigothica 21, in Karl Zeumer (ed), Monumenta Germaniae Historica vol V (Hanover,
1882).
19
Jean Bastier, ‘Le testament en Catalogne du siècle IX au XII: une survivance wisigothique’ (1973) 3
Revue Historique de Droit Français et Etranger 373 ff; Eduardo de Hinojosa y Naveros, ‘Das germanische
Element im spanischen Recht’ (1910) 21 ZRG (GA) 28 ff.
2. Eighth to thirteenth centuries

During the early Middle Ages, the will based on the Roman system was preserved
only in the Gothic regions (ie principally Catalonia and Septimania);20 elsewhere
mortis causa dispositions in writing were done by means of various types of donation.
Oral wills were also retained. It has been suggested that the ‘degradation’ of the
Roman will began during this period,21 for, although the names and formalities of
the Roman testamentum were preserved in the Gothic formulas – in both the vulgar
language and in ecclesiastical Latin – they began to take on meanings which diverged
from the Roman model.22 In Castille, the fueros made only sporadic reference to
oral wills, normally when dealing with executors,23 and the will in its written form
was hardly ever mentioned. Only in the twelfth century, in laws that were influenced
by the reception of Roman law, does one see the establishment of written forms
modelled on the Liber Iudicum.
According to the Fuero de Soria (} 305) and the Fuero Real (3.5.1), there were four
ways to execute a written will: before a public scribe (publicus notarius); with the seal
of the testator; with a recognized and reputable seal; and before witnesses. Interest-
ingly, the public will formalized before a notary did not appear until the end of the
twelfth century.24
In Aragon and Navarre, different types of disposal upon death existed, with some
flexibility in the formalities required.25 The local laws contained few formalities
regarding written wills, although there had to be at least two witnesses.26 The rules
often made reference to witnesses and executors (common in oral wills), as well as to
the functions as witnesses of the executors themselves, whose presence was necessary
for the making of a valid will.27
In Catalonia the late Gothic law contained in the Liber remained in force until the
thirteenth century, but shaped in accordance with practical usage with the conse-
quence that the reception of Justinianic law was somewhat different from that of
other regions. Oral wills were typically confined to cases of emergency, such as
illness, shipwreck, pilgrimage, or departure for war, while written wills were reserved
20
Martos Calabrús (n 12) 37. The Goths occupied Roman Hispania between 415 and 711. Apart from
Catalonia and Septimania (in modern-day terms, southern France and the Spanish part of the Pyrenees),
other regions subject to at least some Gothic influence were Asturias, Galicia, and León.
21
Arvizu y Galarraga (n 12) 129 ff.
22
Garcı́a Gallo (1959) 10 AAMN 265 ff.
23
Fuero de Cuenca 9, 9; Fuero de Alcaraz 3, 69; Fuero de Alarcón } 165; Fuero de Baeza } 176. In later
fueros (twelfth century) it is specially mentioned as a testamentary form made before ‘buenas testimonias’
(‘good witnesses’): see Fuero de Soria } 305 and Fuero Real 3, 5, 1. See also Cámara Lapuente (n 12) 145 ff.
24
Martos Calabrús (n 12) 44, 52.
25
Alonso y Lambán (1954) 5 RDN 87 ff.
26
Fuero de Jaca }} 55–8; Compilación de Huesca } 232; Fuero General de Navarra 3, 20.
27
In Navarre: Fuero de Jaca }} 55–8; Fuero de Estella } 11; Fuero de Tudela } 31. Even clearer was the
separation of functions in the Fuero de Viguera y Val de Funes }} 480–5 and Fuero de la Novenera }} 85–6
(which also referred to wills executed in the presence of a chaplain).
for healthy people and, according to sources from the end of the twelfth century and
beginning of the thirteenth, were formalized before two or three witnesses.28
3. Thirteenth to nineteenth centuries

From the twelfth century onwards, the influence of both Justinianic law and Canon
law began to be felt. In the second half of the thirteenth century, the Partidas of
Alfonso X in Castille took over the testamentary formalities of post-classical Roman
law practically in their entirety. Both oral and written wills were allowed29 and, as a
carry-over of the requirements for the praetorian testamentum per aes et libram, seven
witnesses appointed by the testator (rogati or petitioned) were required for both. The
number of witnesses was reduced in the case of special wills, such as the codicil (five
witnesses) or the testamentum parentum inter liberos (a holograph will without
witnesses, valid only until 1505). Written wills, formalized before a scribe or notary,
could be open or closed (secret). By this time, notaries were no longer merely scribes,
and their intervention conferred authentic value on the document. As far as internal
formalities were concerned, the Partidas required the identification of an heir,
acceptance of the inheritance, and the transfer of the whole estate.30 Secret trusts
(tacita fideicommissa) were permitted.31
Later the Ordenamiento de Alcalá (1348) removed from the Partidas the require-
ment to appoint an heir or summon witnesses.32 The number of witnesses was also
reduced so that it became possible to make a will: (a) in the presence of a notary and
three ‘neighbours’ (ie those living in the same village or town as the testator); (b) in
the presence of five neighbours, without a notary; and (c) in the presence of three
neighbours when more could not be found and there was no notary in the town.33
A fourth possibility, added in 1566, was for a will before seven witnesses who were
not neighbours and notwithstanding the presence of a notary in the town. These
forms were accepted in the Novı́sima Recopilación, a compilation of laws in
the nineteenth century, and remained valid until the enactment of the Civil Code
in 1889.34 Meanwhile, the Leyes de Toro (1505) had put the formalities of the
testamentum parentum inter liberos and the codicil on a par with those of the open
notarial will (a kind of tacit derogation of these forms), and seven witnesses as well
as a notary were required for the closed notarial will.35
Outside Castille the position was often different. For example, open notarial wills
in Barcelona needed only two witnesses from as early as the thirteenth century
28
Usatges de Barcelona (the customary law rules of Barcelona) } 89.
29
Partidas (Seville, 1471, repr 1989) 6, 1, 1.
30
Partidas 6, 3.
31
Partidas 6, 7, 13 (and see also 6, 5, 14 and 6, 10, 1).
32
Also in a part of Catalonia the same change was admitted by the Costums de Tortosa 6, 4, 2 (thirteenth
century), in Código de las costumbres escritas de Tortosa (1912).
33
Joachim Ibarra (ed), Ordenamiento de Alcalá (Madrid, 1774, repr 1983) tit XIX.
34
Rivas Martı́nez (n 12) 195.
35
Antonio Gómez (ed), Leyes de Toro (repr 1981) 3.
onwards.36 The position was the same in Aragon and Navarre, territories which
showed the most resistance to Roman law.37 Texts from the Digest and the Codex
regulated codicils in Catalonia.38
Canon law was influential during this period, especially in respect of the reduction
in the number of witnesses. Two texts in particular had a noticeable effect in certain
Spanish territories. The Cum esses decree of Alexander III (1170),39 which permitted
the ex iure canonico will, formalized before a parish priest and two or three witnesses,
affected both law and practice in Aragon, Navarre, and Catalonia.40 And the Cum
tibi decree of Innocent III (1202),41 which recognized the validity of dispositions
entrusted to the judgment of a third party, later became part of the compilation of
the decrees of Gregor IX and so supported various manifestations of the testamentary
trust which would be consolidated in the following centuries throughout Spain until
its prohibition, under French influence, in the Civil Code of 1889.42
These complex historical developments culminated, in the second half of the
nineteenth century, with the preparation of a Civil Code. The draft Code of 1851
distinguished between oral wills, sealed wills, and holograph wills, the last of these
being based on the French Civil Code, and it also added a number of provisions on
emergency wills. The draft Bill of 1882 to 1888 repeated these forms. However,
attempts to introduce a single Civil Code for the whole of Spain ended in failure.
One result was acceptance of the competence of the six Autonomous Communities
to legislate separately on the law of succession.
III. The modern law
1. The Civil Code of 1889

The forms of will accepted by the Civil Code of 1889 are, in principle, applicable in
all of Spain. However, these forms may be subject to variation in the six Autonomous
Communities which have their own civil laws, for example, in respect of matters such
as witnesses, language, or the consequences arising from the absence of a date.43
Furthermore, some of these Autonomous Communities recognize additional forms
of will, such as joint wills or codicils.44 The exposition in this chapter is based on the
36
Recognoverunt Proceres (1927) chs 25 and 26. See Jesús Lalinde Abadı́a, ‘El Derecho sucesorio en el
Recognoverunt Proceres’ (1963) LXII RJCatalunya 651 ff.
37
Compilación de Huesca (1247, ed Antonio Pérez Martı́n, 1999) } 232; Observantiae Regni Aragonum
(Zaragoza, 1476) 11 De testamentis and 26 De generalibus privilegiis.
38
Martos Calabrús (n 12) 57.
39
X 3, 26, 10, in Aemilius Friedberg (ed), Corpus iuris canonici (1888 repr 1959).
40
See III.2 below.
41
Cum tibi decree ch 13, X de testam (lib III, tit 26), in J Mans Puigarnau (ed), Decretales de Gregorio
IX (1942): ‘Cum tibi de benignitate: In secunda questione dicimus, quod qui in extremam voluntatem in
alterius dispositionem commitit, non videtur decedere intestatus’.
42
The prohibition did not affect the regional territories.
43
See XII below for the laws of the Autonomous Communities.
44
See III.2 below and, for codicils, IX below.
Spanish Civil Code, but takes some account of the position in the Autonomous
Communities.
Today the classification of the forms of will is not based on the Roman summa
divisio between written and oral wills, but on the Civil Code’s distinction between
‘common’ and ‘special’ wills.45 ‘Common’ wills are open wills, closed wills, and
holograph wills, while the ‘special’ wills are ‘the military, the maritime and the
foreign will that is executed abroad’.46 Oddly, this initial classification omits entirely
certain other types of will found later in the Code, such as wills drafted in imminent
danger of death or during an epidemic.47 It has often been criticized and various
alternatives proposed, always bearing in mind that the Code contains a numerus
clausus of testamentary forms.48 The classification used in this chapter is: (a) open
wills; (b) closed wills; (c) holograph wills; and (d) special wills, and each is treated in
some detail in the pages which follow.49 Of the four, the most commonly used in
practice are open wills and holograph wills – that is to say, the public will certified by
a notary and the private will.50
2. Law in the Autonomous Communities: special forms of will

As already mentioned, some forms of will are recognized in the Autonomous
Communities, but not in the Civil Code itself. An example of historical interest is
the so-called ‘will before a parish priest’. Its origins go back to the time of the
medieval reception of Canon law and the Cum esses decree of Alexander III (1170).51
Today it survives only in Navarre, and then only in cases of imminent danger of
death and where a notary cannot be obtained.52 It is executed before two witnesses
and the parish priest of the relevant location or another available priest.53 The
arguments for and against this form of will are eloquently expressed in the preambles
to the laws which, elsewhere, enacted its repeal. In Catalonia the will executed before
a parish priest survived the reforms of 1991 on account of its long history, its
continued use in certain districts of Lleida and Tarragona (amounting to 3,821
wills between 1972 and 1986), and the fact that it facilitated will-making in rural
areas where a local notary was lacking. These points, set out in the preamble to Act
40 of 1991 (the Succession Code of Catalonia), were buttressed with the claim that
this type of will ‘is not considered the privilege of any church or of any religion, but a
service to the public’. The reprieve, however, was short-lived: the will before a priest
45
Art 676 CC: ‘El testamento puede ser común o especial’.
46
Arts 676 and 677 CC.
47
For which see IV.4 below.
48
49
See IV–VII below.
50
See Luis Roca-Sastre Muncunill, Derecho de sucesiones vol I (1995) 97 ff.
51
See II.3 above.
52
Art 189 Law 1 of 1973.
53
Art 191 stipulates the following requirements: the date, month, and year must be indicated; the
testator and the persons intervening must sign the document; the priest or the witnesses must store it; and
within a year and a day of the testator’s death the will must be presented for legal certification.
was repealed in 2008 due to its ‘very limited practical application’.54 In Aragon,
where it was a valid form of will until 1999, the preamble to the Aragon Act 1 of
1999 (and confirmed in the Legislative Decree 1 of 2011) explains that ‘its usefulness
in present times is very limited, it causes problems of legal certainty, and it would be
very difficult, if not impossible, to support it fully in respect of the constitutional
principle of non-discrimination on religious grounds’.55
IV. Open wills
1. Ordinary notarial wills

Usually, an open will is executed before a notary authorized to officiate at the place in
question56 and who has been freely selected by the testator. The need for witnesses
was dropped in 1991, except that two must still be present if the testator is unable to
read or write or if the testator or notary so requests.57 A number of distinct stages can
be identified.58 First, the testator declares his last will to the notary, either orally or
in writing. A written declaration can be prepared in consultation with a lawyer and,
at the testator’s option, communicated to the notary by the lawyer.59 The notary
then drafts the will, and reads it aloud to the testator in person, who must confirm
that it is a faithful expression of his wishes. The courts have been flexible in their
interpretation of the confirmation requirement, even accepting the use of gestures.60
The testator and other persons attending then sign the will.61 Where the testator
is unable to sign, this is done for him by one of the witnesses.62 Blind testators can
sign for themselves, without the need for witnesses, so long as they can hear and
understand the notary’s reading of the will.63 Finally, the notary states the place,
year, month, and day of the document’s execution, and certifies that he knows the
testator or has identified him64 and that, in his judgment, the testator has the legal
capacity necessary to execute the will. While, however, cases on the Civil Code have
54
Act 10 of 2008. The ‘sacramental’ will had been abolished in the earlier Catalan reform of 1991.
This was an oral will stated under oath by witnesses (rather than the testator), and exclusively for residents
of Barcelona and in a certain Barcelona church.
55
Not everyone agrees with these objections: see, eg Fernando Zubiri de Salinas, ‘Instrumentos de
ordenación de la sucesión por causa de muerte’, in idem (ed), Reflexiones sobre materias de Derecho sucesorio
(2009) 180.
56
Art 694 CC.
57
Art 697 CC. For witnesses more generally, see VIII.2 below.
58
Art 695 CC.
59
STS 24 November 2004.
60
See, eg, STS 24 November 2004 (the testator could neither speak nor write and his gestures were
considered sufficient for the purpose of communication with the notary); STS 21 March 2006 (the
expression of agreement need not be excessively formal).
61
For the method of signing, see VIII.3 below.
62
See VIII.2 below.
63
STS 11 December 2009.
64
For identification of the testator, see VIII.1 below.
been strict regarding the recording of the date and the time, the laws of some of the
Autonomous Communities have relaxed the consequences of non-compliance.65
A rule derived from Roman law is that of ‘continuity of the act’.66 This means that
all of the formal requirements must be completed in an uninterrupted, continuous
act, allowing only for a pause ‘due to a passing accident’.67 The reasons are to impute
importance and seriousness to will-making and to prevent outside influence.68 The
courts have, however, softened this requirement – as now confirmed in the Civil
Code69 – by deciding that the prohibition against interruption only begins at the
stage of the reading of the will.70
The open notarial will accounts for 95 per cent of all notarial wills71 and it is,
moreover, the most popular form of will in general. Its advantages are numerous. It
offers the benefit of technical assistance by a notary; it is filed in the notary’s office,
providing a guarantee of safe custody and location; it possesses the qualified proba-
tive force typical of certified acts, so that no further judicial or administrative
procedure is required on death, it being sufficient for the notary to issue a copy of
the will; it is the only type of will possible for those who cannot read or write; and, at
around 40 euros, it is cheap. These advantages far outweigh any possible disadvan-
tages, such as that the testator must reveal his testamentary intentions to a notary
(and in some cases to witnesses, doctors, or interpreters as well). The requirements of
professional secrecy mean that problems have rarely arisen in this regard. Another
possible concern, namely the risk of annulment due to non-compliance with the
numerous mandatory formalities,72 has turned out to be largely unfounded, and
annulments are rare indeed.73
2. Notarial wills by disabled people

Additional formalities may be needed for physically disabled people. If a testator is
both deaf and unable to read, the witnesses read the will instead, in the presence of the
notary and, if satisfied, declare that it is in accordance with the wishes expressed by the
testator.74 Much more difficult is the case of those who are deaf mute if, in addition,
they are unable to read or write. Holograph wills or closed wills are clearly out of the
question,75 but some authorities support the use of an open notarial will executed
before two witnesses and with the testator’s wishes mediated by interpreters.76
65
In the context of the Civil Code it is sufficient to indicate the time of concluding the execution of the
will, without the need to refer to the time of its initiation: see STS 14 November 1987.
66
See ch 18 below at 459–60.
67
Art 699 CC. This is also stated expressly in Art 421-12 of Catalan Law 10 of 2008.
68
José Luis Lacruz Berdejo, Elementos de Derecho Civil. V. Sucesiones (2009) 178; Manuel Albaladejo
Garcı́a, Curso de Derecho Civil. V. Derecho de sucesiones (2009) 219.
69
Art 699 CC.
70
STS 10 April 1987, 13 October 1990, and 30 November 1991. In contrast, Albaladejo Garcı́a
(n 68) 219–20 considers it inconsistent not to include the testator’s declaration to the notary.
71 72 73
Rivas Martı́nez (n 12) 191. Art 743 CC. Rivas Martı́nez (n 12) 191.
74 75
Art 697.2 CC. Art 708 CC.
76
In this regard, see Resolution of the General Directorate for Registries and Public Notaries of 23
September 1987.
3. Wills in a language with which the notary is unfamiliar

Another variant of the open will is where the testator speaks a language with which
the notary is unfamiliar.77 In that case the testator must provide an interpreter to
translate the testamentary provisions into the official language of the place of
execution, and the will is then written in both languages, with an indication of
which one is spoken by the testator. Moreover, the interpreter must attend the entire
act of execution and sign the will. In view of the fact that in different parts of Spain
there are different official languages, special regulations exist in the Autonomous
Communities which confirm the testator’s right to choose any of the official
languages of the territory in question and which make provision as appropriate for
interpreters.78
4. Emergency wills
In two cases of emergency, an open will can be executed before witnesses and without
a notary. These are where death is imminent and in the event of an epidemic. In the
first case, five witnesses over the age of eighteen are needed, in the second, three
witnesses over the age of sixteen.79 With three exceptions, these provisions of the
Civil Code are also applicable in the Autonomous Communities.80 Whenever
possible, such wills must be reduced to writing; and the document must be pro-
duced, or the witnesses appear, before a judge within three months of the death or, if
the testator survives, within two months of his escaping the danger of death or of the
epidemic having ceased.81 This procedure serves to corroborate the existence and
exact contents of the will,82 it makes the will a public document, and it ensures that
the will is archived in the notary’s files.83 Although the Civil Code does not say so
explicitly, the Supreme Court has taken the view, in the case of a will where death is
imminent, that the failure to use a notary must be attributable to the gravity of the
testator’s illness, but it also avoids excessive strictness in this regard.84 The courts are,
77
Art 684.1 CC.
78
Art 192 Law 1 of 1973 (Navarre), which requires two interpreters, differs from the others which
require only one: see Art 15 Law 3 of 1992 (Basque Country); Art 183.2 Law 2 of 2006 (Galicia); Art 421-
12 Law 10 of 2008 (Catalonia); Art 412 Legislative Decree 1 of 2011 (Aragon). The Balearic Islands do
not have an express provision. For a comprehensive account of the practical problems facing notaries with
regard to the language issue, see Rivas Martı́nez (n 12) 293. In terms of Art 3 of the Spanish Constitution,
notaries are only obliged to speak Spanish.
79
80
The exceptions are Catalonia (Art 421-5.3 Law 10 of 2008), which does not accept wills executed
before witnesses, Navarre (Arts 190–1 Law 1 of 1973), and Biscay (Art 31 Law 3 of 1992), where the so-
called il-buruco will (executed before three witnesses) is expressly regulated.
81
Arts 702–4 CC.
82
Arts 1943–55 Law of 1882 on Civil Procedure (in force in terms of Law 1 of 2000).
83
Art 704 CC; Art 1955 Civil Procedure Act 1881.
84
STS 2 July 1977, 22 March 1983, 27 June 2000, and 10 June 2005.
however, strict in requiring that the witnesses be fully aware of the testamentary
wishes of the testator.85
The provision governing wills executed in the case of an epidemic86 has been
rightly criticized as anachronistic and unduly narrow. By contrast, equivalent wills
in other countries cover public accidents and misfortunes (Italy and Portugal) or
natural catastrophes (the Netherlands).87 Some authors therefore propose a broad
interpretation of the provision to allow it to cover other catastrophes, such as nuclear
disasters or bacteriological war.88
V. Closed wills
In a closed (or secret) will, ‘the testator, without revealing his or her final wishes,
declares that these are contained within the envelope presented to the persons who
shall authorize it’,89 ‘persons’ here essentially meaning a notary or a diplomatic or
Spanish consular agent.90 This type of will has all but disappeared in practice.91 Even
considering its main advantage, namely the secrecy of its contents, testators continue
to prefer alternatives such as the holograph will (which is secret but cheaper) or the
open will (which, since the 1991 reform, does not usually require witnesses, thus
improving its level of secrecy). Moreover, the closed will not only requires more
formalities than the other types of will, but it also involves further procedures and
costs related to its opening and custody after the testator’s death, including compul-
sory presentation to a court for verification.
The closed will, which is always in writing, is executed in two stages. First, the
testator writes out the will by hand or by mechanical means, or directs someone else
to do so on his behalf.92 Then the testator appears before the notary to present
the will inside an envelope, which is sealed and stamped so that the will cannot be
extracted without breaking the envelope. The testator declares to the notary that
the envelope contains his will, and states whether he signed it himself or whether he
directed someone else to do so. Once the notary has established the testator’s identity
and capacity, he states the facts regarding the execution of the will on the envelope.
This is signed by the testator, notary and, where either the testator or notary so
request, by two witnesses, and a note is made of the place, time, day, month, and year
85
86
Art 701 CC.
87
Ch 6 below at 135; ch 7 below at 159; ch 18 below at 452.
88
See, eg, Eduardo Gutiérrez-Solar, Testamentos especiales (1996) 77. But for authority against such a
liberal interpretation, see STS 10 July 1944.
89
Art 680 CC.
90
Or certain military officials (Art 717) and parties responsible for a ship (Art 722). The account here
focuses only on notaries.
91
Xavier Roca Ferrer, ‘Tı́tulos sucesorios (El testamento y la sucesión testada)’, in Juan Francisco
Delgado and Martı́n Garrido (eds), Instituciones de Derecho privado V: Sucesiones (2005) 114; Roca-Sastre
Muncunill (n 50) 149.
92
Art 706 CC. If someone else writes out the will, the testator must then sign all of its pages.
of the execution.93 Once the closed will is authorized the notary delivers it to the
testator, after having made a copy of the act of execution for his files.94 The testator
may keep the will, entrust it to another, or store it with the notary.95 On becoming
aware of the testator’s death, a custodian must present the will to a judge.96
There are regional variations. Seven witnesses are needed in Navarre, a distant
echo of the Roman in scriptis will.97 In Catalonia, closed wills, having almost
disappeared in practice, have recently been modernized and revitalized.98 A will
can now be ‘in electronic form (that) must be signed with a recognized electronic
signature’ by the testator or another person at the testator’s request. And, instead of
the court procedure for opening and archiving the will required by the Civil Code, a
simplified regime conducted by the notary is now provided which not only saves
time and money, but also ensures the safe-keeping of the will.
VI. Holograph wills
1. The Civil Code provisions

According to Article 688 of the Civil Code, a holograph will must be entirely
handwritten by the testator and signed by him, stating the year, month, and day of
execution.99 This brief provision practically covers all of the formalities that are
needed, although further provisions regulate the presentation of the will before a
judge and the form in which the latter must confirm the will’s authenticity and
proceed with its filing in a notary’s office.100 The will only takes effect once all of this
has been done.
It has been accepted by the courts that holograph wills can be written on any type
of paper, including letters or cards, as long as they bear the testator’s animus testandi.
In a famous case the testator wrote her will in a blank space in the first of her love
letters, sent forty years earlier, to her husband and heir. The will was accepted as
valid, despite being signed by the testator’s first name only (‘Matilde’).101 Although
there is reluctance to go beyond paper, some commentators accept a will written on
any material capable of bearing distinctive handwriting. However, recourse to
exceptional material in ordinary circumstances could throw doubt on the seriousness
of the intention to make a will.102 Mechanical and electronic means of writing are
93 94 95
Art 707 CC. Art 710 CC. Art 711 CC.
96 97
Arts 712 and 714 CC. Art 188 Law 1 of 1973.
98
Arts 421-14 to 421-16 Law 10 of 2008.
99
Art 688 CC.
100
Arts 689–93 CC.
101
STS 8 June 1918. In STS 19 December 2006 the holograph will was sent by urgent mail on a
visiting card from Paris, where the testator had gone for medical treatment. Again the will was accepted as
valid.
102
Lacruz Berdejo (n 68) 188; Albaladejo Garcı́a (n 68) 229 (eg a wall). STS 5 January 1924 only
accepts materials that can be stored in notarial archives. Aurelia Marı́a Romero Coloma, El testamento
ológrafo: estudio doctrinal y jurisprudencial (2006) 83 considers a photograph sufficient if taken under the
direction of the notary.
not accepted,103 although some support has been expressed for allowing electronic
signatures or voice recordings.104 One commentator has gone so far as to argue for
the acceptance of electronic and audio-visual wills, including not only wills written
with a digital pencil on a screen, but those which are merely typed on a computer
with an e-signature and then stored on a CD.105 But these are minority views.
The Civil Code does not require a statement of the time (hour) and place of
execution. The signature must belong to the testator and be the regularly used form.
A fingerprint is insufficient.106 The signature need not include a ‘paraph’.107
Whereas other types of will can be executed by anyone over the age of fourteen
years, the holograph will is restricted to those who are aged eighteen or above.108
This difference is normally explained on the basis of the older testator’s maturity and
ability to resist undue influence or coercion, and the argument that those under
eighteen may not yet have an established handwriting that allows for identification of
the author of the will.109
2. Some regional variations

The law in Catalonia contains specific regulations on holograph wills.110 For
example, the requirement regarding the indication of the place of execution has
been retained (despite criticism),111 and wills must be presented to a judge within
four years of the testator’s death (as opposed to the five years of the Civil Code). As
far as other regions are concerned, it can be mentioned that Aragon is the only
territory which accepts the joint holograph will.112
3. Evaluation
There has been much debate over the advantages and disadvantages of holograph
wills.113 Their advantages are generally considered to be: secrecy, which guarantees
total testamentary freedom; simplicity, making them ideal for the ill who are unable
103
104
Zubiri de Salinas (n 55) 178; Romero Coloma (n 102) 156.
105
Agustı́n Romero Pareja, ‘Testamentos electrónicos’ (2009) 7151 La Ley 1. No convincing
reasons are given for this view.
106
107
STS 28 June 1929. A ‘paraph’ is a flourish made after or beneath a signature and was originally
designed to prevent forgery. On signatures more generally, see VIII.3 below.
108
Arts 662, 663, and 688 CC. Catalonia is an exception: see Art 421-17.1 Law 10 of 2008.
109
Teodora Torres Garcı́a, El testamento ológrafo (1977) 189; Enrique Ruiz Vadillo, ‘El testa-
mento ológrafo’ (1972) 56 RDP 627.
110
Arts 421-17–421-19 Law 10 of 2008.
111
Sergio Cámara Lapuente, ‘Las formalidades del testamento ológrafo en Derecho catalán: apunte
sobre un desacierto legislativo’ (2000) 4 La Notarı́a 113 ff. STSJ 23 April 1998 decided (with reference to
the need for flexibility in the face of excessive formalism) that the absence of any mention of the place of
execution in the holograph will of a patient who died in a hospital could be obviated by the information
provided in the heading of the hospital paper he used. However, the 2008 reform has retained the
requirement that the place of execution must be mentioned.
112
Art 411 Legislative Decree 1 of 2011.
113
Torres Garcı́a (n 109); Romero Coloma (n 102).
to attend a notary’s office, for the indecisive who prefer to re-read and re-draft their
testamentary declarations, and for foreigners; and cheapness, with no costs being
incurred at the time of execution. On the other hand, the authentication and
notarization needed after the testator’s death can be costly. Unlike notarial wills,
which are registered in the General Register of Wills, holograph wills can languish
undiscovered after the testator’s death and may only emerge (if at all) when the estate
has already been distributed in terms of a prior will or according to the rules of
intestate succession. Finally, simplicity carries risks. It is easy to lose, steal, or falsify a
holograph will, or for it just to disappear. There is no protection against undue
influence. There may be no direct evidence as to testamentary capacity. And provi-
sions which are home-made may fail for technical reasons or pose problems when it
comes to interpretation. Nevertheless, judged by frequent references to holograph
wills in court judgments, they remain a popular form of will in Spain.
4. The per relationem will

Roman law allowed testators to refer to statements preceding or following the will
made without formalities (testamentum misticum), and the device was well developed
by the lawyers of the ius commune, especially after Bartolus, who renamed it
testamentum per relationem. It allowed the testator to express his testamentary
intention based on a relatio ad schedulam, that is, a reference to informal documents.
It was in essence a written codicil, made without formalities, which was expressly
confirmed in the will. In the Middle Ages this informal mechanism was in wide-
spread use in Spain to avoid revealing the name of the heirs to the witnesses.
However, with the inclusion of holograph wills in the Civil Code of 1889, it was
logical to restrict the use of such an informal type of will.114 Accordingly, Article 672
provides that any appointment of an heir or institution of a legacy made by reference
to private papers appearing at or outside the testator’s home after his death will be
void if these documents do not meet the requirements for a holograph will. The
effect is for these schedulae to be treated as holograph wills, with the peculiarity that
(given their nature as mere supplements to other wills) the rule on implicit revoca-
tion, whereby a later will repeals an earlier one, does not apply.115
VII. Special wills
As ‘special’ wills are executed in exceptional circumstances, they do not require the
intervention of a notary. Unlike in many other countries, emergency wills – those
made in an epidemic or where death is imminent – are not classified by the Civil
114
Manuel Albaladejo, ‘Comentarios al art. 672 CC’, in idem (ed), Comentarios al Código civil y
Compilaciones forales vol IX-1 (1990) 172 ff. But as to the recognition of this type of will, see STS 29
September 1956 and 3 February 1966. For further details, see Marı́a Dolores Dı́az-Ambrona, El negocio
jurı́dico ‘per relationem’ en el Código civil (1994); Ángela Fernández Arévalo, Testamento ‘per relationem’ en
el Derecho civil común (1998).
115
Lacruz Berdejo (n 68) 194.
Code as special wills.116 The main special wills are the military will and the maritime
will,117 and they are available even to those who normally reside (hold ‘legal
residence’ or vecindad civil) in the Autonomous Communities that have their own
succession laws (other than Catalonia).118
Compared with the position before the Civil Code of 1889, military wills are
no longer so ‘special’ in the sense that they are now open, not only to soldiers, but to
civil employees of the army, volunteers, prisoners, and those who are linked to
military operations. In terms of Article 716 this type of will may only be executed ‘in
time of war’ and during a ‘military campaign’, but it is regarded as sufficient if there
is military action even in the absence of a formal declaration of war.119 This broad
interpretation may even result in the acceptance of this kind of will in army missions
for humanitarian assistance.120 The military will may be executed in an open form,
that is, before an official or other person recognized by law and two witnesses;121 in a
closed form, that is, in writing in a closed envelope before an official and two
witnesses;122 or, in an emergency, orally before only two witnesses.123
Available to all passengers at sea, the maritime will can be executed in both open
and closed forms before a ship’s captain and two witnesses.124
VIII. Shared features
This section considers some features which are common to more than one type
of will.
1. Identification of the testator

In a public will the notary (or other person authorized to certify the will) must verify
the testator’s identity. Four methods are available.125 The first, and most obvious, is
when the notary knows the testator personally. However, according to academic
opinion and the most recent case law, this does not necessarily mean that they
must see each other regularly, be friends, or even have mutual knowledge of one
another.126 Should this first method not be possible, two further options are readily
available: reliance on a document issued by a public authority and containing
116
See ch 18 below at 451. For emergency wills, see IV.4 above.
117
Art 677 CC which also lists wills made in a foreign country (for which see Arts 732–6).
118
Catalan scholars tend to deny the application in Catalonia of the rules governing military and
maritime wills: see Pedro del Pozo, Esteve Bosch, and Antoni Vaquer, Derecho civil de Cataluña. Derecho
de sucesiones (2009) 69. However, other Spanish authors disagree: see José Manuel Fernández Hierro, Los
testamentos (2000) 349; Rivas Martı́nez (n 12) 546.
119
Eg Lacruz Berdejo (n 68) 194; Gutiérrez-Solar (n 88) 89–90. See also n 120 below.
120
Rivas Martı́nez (n 12) 454; Juan Luis Martı́nez Caldevilla and Ramón Ferrer Barquero, ‘Normativa
testamentaria aplicable a las fuerzas armadas españolas en misiones extranjeras’ (2002) 43 RJN 147–58.
121
Art 716 CC. For open wills generally, see IV above.
122
Art 721 CC. For closed wills generally, see V above.
123
Art 720 CC.
124 125
Art 731 CC. Arts 685 and 686 CC; Art 23 of the Notary Law of 1862.
126
However, STS 2 December 1998 gave an interpretation which implies that personal dealings
must take place regularly.
a photograph and signature of the testator, typically a national identity card or

passport; and recourse to ‘witnesses by knowledge’ (testigos de conocimiento), that is,
to two witnesses who know the testator and who are at the same time known by the
notary.127 Finally, if the testator cannot be identified by any of these methods, a
system which is subsidiary to the last is also accepted. This entails the notary listing
the documents presented by the testator and providing a description of these
documents.
The Supreme Court regards identification as an essential formality for the avoid-
ance of forgery; in its absence a will is considered to be invalid.128 In practice, the
method most commonly employed is identification by official document. And if, as
occasionally happens, the document turns out to have expired, both academic
opinion and the courts are inclined to regard the will as valid on the basis that, in
substance, the testator was properly identified.129
2. Witnesses
(a) The retreat from witnessing
For notarial wills the witnessing requirement was watered down gradually through
the years, culminating in its virtual abolition in 1991.130 It survives only in the three
cases mentioned below, and even there the number of witnesses is reduced to two.
Yet further relaxations concerned the function of witnesses and the qualifications so
to act. As indicated in the preamble to the 1991 legislation, the motivation was to
provide ‘a higher level of due discretion for such an intimate act’, the underlying
assumption being that the presence of a notary more than sufficiently covered the
ritual role that was previously fulfilled by witnesses. Before this reform the Supreme
Court had been inflexible regarding the witness requirement, routinely declaring
void any will that lacked the required witnesses or where a witness was not properly
qualified.131
This reform to the Civil Code was anticipated by Aragon (1985) and the Balearic
Islands (1990),132 and subsequently followed in Catalonia (1991), in Biscay (Basque
Country) (1992), and in Galicia (1995).133 Only Navarre has remained faithful to
the Roman tradition, requiring two witnesses for open wills and seven for closed.134
Moreover, these witnesses must be suitable and formally requested to act in that
127
This requirement has been criticized, because a notary who can identify a testator by way of a
national identity card ought to be able to do the same with regard to the witnesses: see Rivas Martı́nez
(n 12) 151. For the opposite view, see Marı́a Angustias Martos Calabrús, Las solemnidades del testamento
abierto notarial (2000) 144.
128
STS 20 February 1893, 25 April 1896, and 25 April 1991. For the opposite interpretation,
see STS 27 June 1917.
129
See Rivas Martı́nez (n 12) 150. Regarding Catalan cases, see STSJ 4 September 2006.
130
Act 30 of 1991. For a comparable development in Germany, see ch 8 below at 207.
131
STS 19 June 1958, 10 June 1966, 6 February 1969, and 8 March 1975. In respect of Catalan wills a
more flexible approach was adopted: see STS 10 December 1932; STSJ 7 January 1992.
132
Art 90 Law 3 of 1985 (Aragon); Art 52 Legislative Decree 8 of 1990 (Balearic Islands).
133
Art 107 Law 40 of 1991 (Catalonia).
134
Art 188 Law 1 of 1973 (Navarre).
capacity (idonei et rogati),135 a requirement not retained in any other Spanish

legislation.136
The cases where witnesses are still needed under the Civil Code are: (a) when the
testator declares that he does not know how to sign the will, or he is unable to sign it;
(b) when the testator is blind or declares that he cannot or is unable to read the will
for himself; and (c) when the testator or the notary requires it.137 The civil laws of the
Autonomous Communities largely reflect these instances,138 but the Balearic Islands
add the case when the notary does not know the testator – in practice a common
occurrence.139 Even when a will is witnessed, however, the task of identifying the
testator and guaranteeing his capacity falls to the notary and not (as before the 1991
reform) to the witnesses.140
(b) Qualification and disqualification

In terms of Article 681 of the Civil Code, the following cannot act as witnesses to a
will: those who are underage, blind, insane, completely deaf or mute; those who do
not understand the testator’s language; and the notary’s spouse, or someone who is
related to the notary within a certain degree or who has a work relationship with the
notary. Also excluded, in the case of an open will, are heirs and legatees and their
spouses, as well as those related to them within a certain degree.141 The 1991 reform
removed two further grounds for disqualification, namely those of not residing in the
place of the will’s execution,142 and a conviction for forgery or for giving false
testimony.143 The civil laws of the Autonomous Communities contain similar
grounds for disqualification, except that in Aragon and Catalonia mute people are
allowed to act as witnesses provided they can write.144
The exclusion of the notary’s employees has been the subject of harsh criticism,
and has given rise to litigation and different interpretations of the meaning of having
‘a work relationship’.145 In order to avoid problems such as these, a work
135
Art 185 Law 1 of 1973 (Navarre).
136
D. 28, 1, 21, 2; D. 28, 1, 27. The rogati character of witnesses was revoked by the Constitution of
Theodosius in 424 (Codex Theodosianus 4, 4, 7, 2). In Aragon (Art 414 Legislative Decree 1 of 2011) and
Catalonia (Art 421-11 Law 10 of 2008), the legislation expressly states that it is not necessary that the
witnesses be invited by the testator.
137
Art 697 CC.
138
With only minor variations: see Art 184 Law 2 of 2006 (Galicia); Art 421-10 Law 10 of 2008
(Catalonia); Art 413 Legislative Decree 1 of 2011 (Aragon). Art 30 of Law 3 of 1992 (Basque Country,
Biscay) requires witnesses in even fewer circumstances than the Civil Code (ie only when the testator or the
notary requires it).
139
Art 52 Legislative Decree 79 of 1990.
140
See the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 6 May 1993 (in relation to the Balearic Islands).
141
Art 682 CC.
142
See also Art 421-11 Law 10 of 2008 (Catalonia); Art 414.2 Legislative Decree 1 of 2011 (Aragon).
143
However, this disqualification has been maintained in Catalonia (Art 421-11.2 Law 10 of 2008)
and has been praised by some authors: see Fernández Hierro (n 118) 186.
144
Art 421-11 Law 10 of 2008 (Catalonia); Art 415 Legislative Decree 1 of 2011 (Aragon). It has been
suggested that this might be a future reform to the Civil Code: see Rivas Martı́nez (n 12) 165, 517,
and 562.
145
For the position after the 1991 reform, see, eg STS 25 April 1991 and 10 March 1993.
relationship is expressly permitted in the Balearic Islands, Catalonia, and Navarre,

and implicitly in Galicia and Aragon.146
3. Signature
Except in the case of emergency wills, which can be oral,147 all wills are required to be
signed.148 A signature at the end is usually sufficient,149 but where a closed will is
typed or handwritten by another, the testator signs on each page.150 While with
holograph wills the testator must sign personally, in the case of notarial wills a
witness may sign on his behalf if the testator declares that he ‘does not know how or
is unable to sign’.151 Any risk of fraud is regarded as countered by the presence of the
notary (or a notary-substitute, such as a military officer or ship’s captain) and
witnesses. Some notaries add a fingerprint of the testator’s index finger if he is unable
to sign, but this is not a mandatory requirement.152 The reason for not signing must
be stated by the notary in the will: without this, the court may declare the will
invalid, and the Supreme Court has shown itself to be very rigorous in such cases.153
The fate of a will where the testator’s declaration was false has been a contentious
issue, and courts have tended to adopt an overly literal view of the distinction
between a testator who ‘does not know’ how to sign (in the sense of not having
the general ability to do so) and one who ‘is unable to sign’ for the moment (perhaps
because of an injury). A notarial statement of the former when the true position was
the latter may invalidate the will. So in a well-known and much-criticized decision of
the Supreme Court, a will executed in 1941 under declaration that the testator did
not know how to sign was found to be invalid because the testator’s son, who
challenged the will, could demonstrate that the testator had signed three public
documents twenty years earlier.154 Decisions like this seem based on the idea that a
false declaration shows a wish not to be bound by the will at all, thus overlooking the
many other possible explanations for the testator’s conduct, such as having lost the
ability to sign with the passage of time, or being ashamed of the deterioration of his
146
Art 52 Legislative Decree 79 of 1990 (Balearic Islands); Art 421-11 Law 10 of 2008 (Catalonia);
Art 186 Law 1 of 1973 (Navarre); Art 185 Law 2 of 2006 (Galicia); Arts 414 and 415 Legislative Decree 1
of 2011 (Aragon).
147
See IV.4 above. Such wills are not invalid on the ground that they lack an explanation for the
absence of a signature: see STS 30 September 1907, 1 May 1909, 15 March 1913, and 3 February 1951.
148
Arts 688, 695, and 706 CC.
149
The Civil Code is silent on this, but see Art 196 of the Notary Regulations of 1944.
150
Art 706 CC.
151
Art 695 CC (‘Si el testador declara que no sabe o no puede firmar, lo hará por él y a su ruego uno de
los testigos’). See also Art 722 CC. Note that this refers to an ability to sign rather than write more
generally.
152
Art 191 Notary Regulations of 1944; STS 19 January 1928.
153
STS 27 September 1968 and 16 May 1974.
154
STS 4 January 1952. See also STS 16 June 1997. For commentary, compare José Castán Tobeñas,
Derecho civil español común y foral vol VI-2 (1976) 96 ff; Ramón Marı́a Roca Sastre, ‘Firma del testador’
[1953] Revista de Derecho Notarial 1, 354 ff.
signature caused by illness (such as Parkinson’s disease). Recent cases have been more
forbearing. In 1999, the Supreme Court accepted that a testator afflicted with
arteriosclerosis did not know how to sign even though several years earlier he had
managed to sign his passport and national identity card,155 and a later case has
warned against the danger of insisting on a ‘senseless formality’.156 In the meantime,
the response of notarial practice has been to encourage testators to sign whenever
possible and, when it is not possible, to distinguish carefully between not knowing
how to sign and being unable to sign.157
IX. Internal formalities
Except for the requirement of express disinheritance,158 virtually all traces of the
internal testamentary formalities of Roman law have disappeared from the Spanish
Civil Code. It is true that the need to appoint an heir – a requirement that was
dispensed with in vulgar western Roman law but remained in the Corpus Iuris of
Justinian159 from where it became part of the ius commune – was incorporated into
the Castilian Law of the Partidas, but with the Ordenamiento de Alcalá of 1348 this
difference between wills and codicils was completely eliminated.160 Today, with only
the occasional regional exception, it is possible to distribute all of one’s assets by way
of legacies,161 or for an estate to be partly testate and partly intestate.162 Nor, if an heir
is appointed, are special words (such as ‘heir’) needed, provided that the testator’s
intention is clearly expressed.163 Contrary to the Roman rule of semel heres, semper
heres, the appointment can be subject to a suspensive or resolutive condition.164
Although codicils are not mentioned in the Civil Code, they have survived in
those few Autonomous Communities, such as in Catalonia, and Majorca and
155 156
STS 29 April 1999. STS 21 March 2006.
157
Manuel González Enrı́quez, ‘Comentario a la STS de 3 de enero de 1952’ (1952) 5 ADC 391 ff;
Martos Calabrús (n 127) 200; Rivas Martı́nez (n 12) 223. For discussion of the most recent cases, see Joan
Marsal Guillamet, ‘Comentario a la STS 16 junio 1997’ (1997) 45 CCJC 1141 ff; idem, ‘Comentario a la
STS 29 April 1999’ (1999) 51 CCJC 1167 ff.
158
Art 849 CC. See Roca-Sastre Muncunill (n 50) 19 ff; Vallet de Goytisolo (n 12) 59 ff; César
Hornero and Bernardo Periñán, ‘La presencia del testamento romano en el sistema sucesorio español (una
reflexión desde la revocación testamentaria tácita ex art. 739.1 CC)’, IV Congreso Iberoamericano de Derecho
Romano (1999) 29 ff. For the Roman formalities, see ch 1 at 8 ff.
159
D. 28, 5, 1; J Inst 2, 20, 34 and 2, 23, 2.
160
Partidas 6, 3, 1; Ordenamiento de Alcalá (n 33) 19,1. See II.3 above. This was later confirmed:
see Nueva Recopilación (repr 1982) 5.4 and Novı́sima Recopilación (ed Boletı́n Oficial del Estado, 1993)
10, 18.
161
Art 891 CC; Art 215 Law 1 of 1973 (Navarre); Arts 465 and 468 Legislative Decree 1 of 2011
(Aragon). Regarding the inclusion in a will of atypical clauses or even the lack of express patrimonial
content, see Lourdes Fernández del Moral, Autonomı́a privada y testamento en Derecho común: contribución
al estudio de las disposiciones testamentarias atı́picas (1996).
162
Arts 658, 764, and 912.2 CC. A comparable rule can be found in the laws of Navarre, Aragon,
Galicia, and the Basque Country.
163
Arts 668.2 and 768 CC, following a trend originating in the thirteenth century in the Partidas
6, 3, 6.
164
Menorca, in which the institution of an heir has continued to be necessary.165 In

those systems the codicil is a unilateral mortis causa act of disposal which (unlike in
Roman law)166 must comply with the same formalities as a will, but in which the
contents are more restricted. Thus, it is not possible to appoint an heir by codicil or
to make further arrangements regarding heirs such as revocation, heir substitutions,
or the disinheritance of forced heirs.
X. A shift from formalism
Such movement away from formalism as has occurred in Spanish law has been led by
the courts and not by the legislature. As far as the Civil Code is concerned, the only
example of this nature has been the reduction of the witnessing requirements for
notarial wills in 1991.167 In the Autonomous Communities, by contrast, legislative
reforms have often followed liberalizing trends.
Article 687 of the Civil Code provides as a general point of departure that, if
formalities are not complied with, a will is void,168 and in many cases wills have
indeed been annulled even when there was no doubt regarding the true intention of
the testator.169 Occasionally the courts have used a distinction between absolute and
relative nullity170 in order to save wills which were formally defective. At other times
they have distinguished between ‘form’ (leading to unqualified nullity) and ‘formal-
ity’ (leading to possible validation in certain circumstances).171 One frequently used
ground for validation is that the person now challenging the will had previously
relied on its validity, for example, by admitting its validity, taking benefit from it, or
refraining from making a challenge.172
Holograph wills are treated strictly, so as to prevent forgery (which the absence
of witnesses might tend to promote), and to ensure that the will is a genuine
expression of the testator’s testamentary intention and not a mere draft.173 So the
Supreme Court has consistently declared wills void when they did not comply with
165
Art 421-20 Law 10 of 2008 (Catalonia); Art 17 Legislative Decree 79 of 1990 (Balearic Islands).
Codicils are also allowed in Navarre (Arts 194–5 Law 1 of 1973), although the internal formality no longer
exists.
166
In Roman law the formalities were reduced: see ch 1 above at 15 and 23.
167
See VIII.2 above.
168
See also Art 743 CC (‘Wills shall become void and testamentary dispositions shall be ineffective, in
whole or in part, only in the cases expressly provided in this Code’).
169
See, eg, STS 24 May 1927, 5 June 1925, 10 July 1944, 8 March 1975, 21 June 1986, 9 May 1990,
25 April 1991, 30 October 1996, and 29 April 1999. Other judgments stress the difference with formal
freedom in contracts: see, eg STS 16 June 1997.
170
Or a tertium genus: see Francisco Capilla Roncero, ‘Nulidad e impugnabilidad del testamento’
(1987) 40 ADC 7 ff.
171
eg, STS 11 December 2009.
172
STS 26 November 1901, 28 February 1906, 15 March 1951, 9 July 1986, 28 July 1986, and 26
April 1995.
173
Particularly significant is STS 11 December 2009. And see ch 18 below at 442.
the requirements for handwriting,174 date,175 or signature,176 and this is true even
for jurisdictions, such as Catalonia, where the courts have otherwise been more
flexible regarding testamentary formalities.177 Notarial wills, on the other hand,
receive more lenient treatment, for example in respect of the manner of the testator’s
declaration,178 the requirement of ‘continuity of the act’,179 the testator’s expression
of satisfaction with what has been written or read,180 and, as previously mentioned,
the treatment of inaccurate statements as to whether the testator knows how to
sign.181 But the courts remain rigorous with regard to the requirements of the
date,182 the signature of the testator, or when witnesses need to be present.
XI. Concluding remarks
As explained at the outset, the will as a device for regulating succession upon death is
popular in Spain, at least as compared with most other countries in the European
Union. Due to their inherent advantages, open notarial wills are particularly popular,
and are rarely the subject of a successful challenge on the ground of non-compliance
with formal requirements. Although no reliable figures are available, holograph wills
are also quite widely used.
The great diversity of testamentary forms can only be properly understood if
viewed from a historical perspective, traced back to the early Middle Ages. For the
modern law reflects the competing historical influences of Roman law, Germanic
law, and the customs and rules of the different regions. One consequence is that
the Spanish law of succession offers an excellent opportunity for a comparative
law exercise within a single national system.183 In recent decades, however, the
interaction between the different territorial regimes has led to some convergence,
arising from common testamentary practices and shared trends in case law.
174
STS 20 December 1913 (only partly hand-written by the testator); STS 4 December 2009 (written
on a computer as a draft).
175
STS 3 April 1945 and 4 November 1947. See also STSJ 8 June 1998, 25 January 2001, and 31
February 2005 (intentionally false date). And see del Pozo (n 118) 71. As to the special value of dates
in holograph wills (as opposed to notarial wills), see STS 10 February 1994.
176
STS 4 January 1952, 31 January 1964, and 10 November 1973. On the requirements
for holograph wills in general, see VI.1 above.
177
STSJ regarded as drafts, not holograph wills, the documents examined in the judgments of 7
January 1993, 8 June 1998, and 16 September 2002. On the flexibility of any requirement, such as
stating the place, see STSJ 23 March 1998.
178
STS 9 October 1956, 20 November 1991, 24 November 2004, and 21 March 2006.
179
STS 10 April 1987, 13 October 1990, and 30 November 1991.
180
STS 24 November 2004, 21 March 2006, and 11 December 2009.
181
See VIII.3 above and, for the general requirements for notarial wills, IV.1 and V above.
182
STS 21 June 1986.
183
Sergio Cámara Lapuente, ‘New Developments in the Spanish Law of Succession’ [2007] Indret 1 ff;
idem, ‘Freedom of Testation, Legal Inheritance Rights and Public Order under Spanish Law’, in Miriam
Anderson and Esther Arroyo (eds), The Law of Succession: Testamentary Freedom. European Perspectives
(2011) 271 ff.
Even today the Civil Code reflects a principle of strict testamentary formalities.
But within the six Autonomous Communities, legislative reforms in the course of the
twentieth century have relaxed some of the rules. Case law in the whole of Spain also
reflects a greater flexibility with regard to some formal requirements, especially for
the notarial will. In the context of the holograph, oral, and emergency wills, however,
courts have remained strict in their application of the rules, properly vigilant in the
protection of free testamentary expression in circumstances where official monitor-
ing of the will-making process is entirely absent.
XII. Appendix: the laws of the Autonomous Communities
Table 4.1 below shows which testamentary institutions are recognized in the Spanish
Civil Code and in the laws of the individual Autonomous Communities. A white
box indicates that the institution is allowed, a dark grey box that it is not. In the case
of the Autonomous Communities, article numbers refer to the law of that Commu-
nity mentioned at the head of the column; where no articles are mentioned, the
position is regulated by the Spanish Civil Code (and hence by the article numbers in
the first column). In the case of three institutions, light grey boxes are used to
indicate that the institution is allowed, but with certain restrictions or with a link to
other institutions.
For historical reasons, there are similarities between some systems. For example,
the laws of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands are deeply rooted in Roman law,
whereas in Aragon and Navarre there has been greater Germanic influence. Many of
the rules are based on local custom and practice; some were in force throughout
Spain until abolished by the Civil Code in 1889.184 Roman law, as received in the
Hispanic territory, provides the basis for numerous similarities between the Civil
Code and the rules of the Autonomous Communities. In the latter, however, there is
greater freedom of testation because of the recognition of additional will types such
as joint wills (Aragon, Navarre, Galicia, and part of the Basque Country), codicils
(Catalonia, Balearic Islands, and Navarre),185 succession agreements (all six Autono-
mous Communities), donations mortis causa (all six Autonomous Communities),
and wills formalized before a priest (Navarre and, until 1999 and 2008 respectively,
Aragon and Catalonia).186
184
eg, the codicil, the joint will, the will made by an agent with a power of appointment, and the secret
testamentary trust. Regarding the last of these, see in general Cámara Lapuente (n 12) 345 ff.
185
See IX above.
186
See III.2 above.
Table 4.1 Succession laws in Spain
Spanish Catalonia Galicia Aragon Basque Country Balearic Islands Navarre
Civil Code Law 10/2008 Law 2/2006 LD 1/2011 Law 3/1992 LD 79/1990 Law 1/1973
Reference to Spanish CC as 1.3 1.2 and 29 52.3, 70, 2nd Final 193, 149.2
subsidiary law Preamble Disposition
Open will 694–705 421-13 421-7/ 183–6 406.2, 409.1, 30 52 (65, 70) 188
12 412–15
Closed/sealed will 706–15 421-14/16 406.2, 409.1 30 52 188
421-7/12 412–15 (65,70)
Holograph will 688–93 421-5.3 406.2, 408.2, 193
421-17/19 409.1, 411
Oral will in imminent danger of death 700, 702–4 421-5.3 406.2, 409.1 31 190–1
186
Oral will in epidemic 701, 702–4 421-5.3 406.2, 409.1 193
Military will 716–21 406.2, 409.1 193
Maritime will 722–31 406.2, 409.1 193
Will in foreign country 732–6, 506.2, 409.1 193
9.8, 11
Joint will 669, 733 421-1 186–95 406.3, 409–11, 49–52, 172 199–205
417–22
Testamentary note (schedulae) 672 421-21/22 196–8
422-4
Codicil 687 421-20/22 17 194–5
422-4
Will in the presence of a 687 3rd Transitory 406, Preamble 186, 189,
priest Disposition 191
Succession agreements 658, 1271 411-7 181.3 377–404 74–83 8–13, 50–1, 72–7 155, 172–83
(pacta successoria) 431-1/30 209–27 179–88
Mortis causa donations 620 432-1/5 383 74, 76–7, 134 8 150, 163,
165–71
Will made by agent 670 421-1 407.1 32–48
(power of appointment)
Delegation of faculties of No, but 424-1/10 196–202 407.1 164 18–23, 71 151, 236,
election/distribution 671, 831 439–63 281–8
Secret (and half-secret) 785.4 424–11/15 442 151, 289–95
trusts
Post mortem powers 671, 1732 151.2
5
Testamentary Formalities in Latin America
with particular reference to Brazil
Jan Peter Schmidt
I. The Latin American background 97

II. Wills and will-making 98
1. Wills 98
2. Will-making 100
III. Public wills 101
1. Formal requirements 101
2. The declaration 102
3. The signature 102
4. Unity of the act 103
5. Evaluation 103
IV. Sealed wills 104
V. Private wills 105
1. Formal requirements 105
2. Evaluation 106
VI. The fate of the holograph will 108
1. Brazil 108
2. Elsewhere in Latin America 109
VII. Extraordinary wills 110
1. Introduction 110
2. Wills made on ships or aircraft 112
3. Soldiers’ wills 112
4. Wills made in ‘exceptional circumstances’ 113
VIII. Further aspects 114
1. Disabled testators 114
2. Witnesses 115
3. Codicils 116
IX. Court practice and the flight from formalism 117
X. Concluding remarks 119
Testamentary Formalities in Latin America with particular reference to Brazil 97
I. The Latin American background
Latin American private law is deeply rooted in the European ius commune,1 and the
rules on testamentary formalities are no exception. The foundations of the Latin
American legal tradition were laid by colonial powers, Spain and Portugal,2 the
private law of which had itself been distinctively shaped by Roman sources.3 After
the colonies fought successfully for independence in the early nineteenth century,
they were eager to emancipate themselves from the Iberian legacy4 and stressed their
sovereignty by the enactment of civil codes.5 However, as regards the law of wills
(and the law of succession in general), they not only continued the existing regime,
but to a certain extent did so even more faithfully than the mother countries
themselves: while Spain, for instance, adopted holograph wills in the nineteenth
century,6 mainly under French influence, Argentina was virtually the only Latin
American country to do so at that time.7
Due to these common historical roots, but also because Latin American civil codes
have greatly influenced each other,8 the law of testamentary formalities in Latin
America has always been distinctly homogenous. It is easy to point out common
characteristics. First, a clear distinction is made between ordinary and extraordinary
1
For a general overview, see Jan Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Comparative Law in Latin America’, in Mathias
Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2006) 261 ff;
Thilo Scholl, Die Rezeption des kontinental-europäischen Privatrechts in Lateinamerika am Beispiel
der allgemeinen Vertragslehre in Costa Rica (1999) 34 ff.
2
No relevant part, on the other hand, was played by the customary law of the indigenous population.
Some recent Latin American constitutions, however, grant indigenous tribes a certain legal autonomy,
including in matters of family law and the law of succession. For the case of Bolivia, see Lorena Ossio
Bustillos, ‘Los derechos indı́genas en Bolivia’, in Sabrina Lanni (ed), I diritti dei popoli indigeni in America
Latina (forthcoming 2011).
3
For the reception of Roman law in Spain, see Friedrich W von Rauchhaupt, Geschichte der spanischen
Gesetzesquellen von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (1923) 105 ff. In Portugal, despite being only of
subsidiary application, Roman law was often invoked even in preference to local statutes and customs:
see Jan Peter Schmidt, Zivilrechtskodifikation in Brasilien: Strukturfragen und Regelungsprobleme in histor-
isch-vergleichender Perspektive (2009) 8 ff.
4
An exception was Cuba which, after gaining its independence in 1898, left the Spanish Civil Code of
1889 in force. It was not until 1987 that a new Civil Code was enacted by the socialist regime. As regards
testamentary formalities, it did not bring the great changes one might have expected: by Art 483 the
ordinary types of will are the notarial will, the holograph will, and the consular will.
5
For the creation of civil codes in nineteenth-century Latin America, see Scholl (n 1) 39 ff.
6
The provision in the Civil Code of 1889 was anticipated by Garcia Goyena’s draft of 1851: see ch 4
above at 77, and also Teodora F Torres, El testamento ológrafo (1977) 110 ff.
7
In its Code of 1869, even before Spain: see VI.2 below. The Civil Codes of Haiti (1825) and of the
Dominican Republic (1845 and 1884) also recognized holograph wills, but one can hardly speak of a
conscious decision in this respect as the codes were more or less exact copies of the French Code civil.
8
By far the most influential civil code was the Chilean Code of 1855, drafted by Andrés Bello. It was
taken over to a large extent by Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Venezuela, and served as
an important source of inspiration for numerous other Latin American codes: see Alejandro Guzmán
Brito, La Codificación Civil en Iberoamerica: Siglos XIX y XX (2000) 374 ff. In the law of testamentary
formalities these connections are still very much visible today.
98 Jan Peter Schmidt
types of will. Second, ordinary wills must be made in writing, either before a notary9
and witnesses or before witnesses alone. Holograph wills are rather the exception.10
Third, the law of testamentary formalities is notably stable: since codification in the
nineteenth century, very few changes have taken place, and mainly on points of
detail. Fourth, at least from a Continental-European perspective, the law of testa-
mentary formalities appears rather formalistic. At the same time, one can observe a
slow but steady trend towards greater flexibility.
This chapter focuses on the law of Brazil, although reference is also made to other
Latin American countries. Brazil indeed has some claim to be representative of the
Latin American systems as a whole, and it displays the general features mentioned
above in a particularly clear-cut manner. One must of course concede that Brazil was
the only colony in South America to inherit the Portuguese and not the Spanish legal
tradition. But while this difference is important for most other areas of private law, in
the field of testamentary formalities it carries less weight as, due to common roots11
in Roman and Visigothic law,12 Spanish and Portuguese law have for many centuries
been very similar.
II. Wills and will-making
1. Wills
The Brazilian law on testamentary formalities shows remarkable continuity. The
three ordinary types of wills that are recognized in the new Civil Code, enacted in
2002, are exactly the same as those recognized not only in the first Code of 1916, but
also under Portuguese law from colonial times,13 and have thus prevailed over more
than five centuries.14 The wills in question are the public will (testamento público),
the sealed will (testamento cerrado), and the private will (testamento particular).
9
Following the Continental-European tradition, the Latin American notary is a trained, independent
official who has the duty to explain the contents of a transaction to a party and to instruct him or her as to
the legal consequences. For a historical and comparative overview, see Manfred Wenckstern, ‘Notary
Public’, in Jürgen Basedow, Klaus J Hopt, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Max Planck Encyclopedia of
European Private Law (forthcoming 2011).
10
Mexico introduced the holograph will in 1928, Panama in 1916, and Peru in 1936. For further
details, see VI.2 below.
11
Portugal became independent only in 1139, when it broke away from the kingdom of Castile and
León.
12
Especially the Lex romana visigothorum (506). For the text, see Gustav Haenel, Lex Romana
Visigothorum (1849, repr 1962); for its creation and content, see Rauchhaupt (n 3) 22 ff; for a systematic
exposition of the Lex romana visigothorum in a German translation, see Max Conrat (Cohn), Breviarum
Alaricianum: Römisches Recht im Fränkischen Reich in systematischer Darstellung (1903).
13
The most important source of Portuguese law during the colonial regime was the Ordenações
Filipinas of 1603, a rather unsystematic and incomplete compilation of statutes and customs. For further
details and references, see Schmidt (n 3) 5 ff.
14
Portugal took possession of the Brazilian territory in 1500.
In turn these are practically identical to the wills allowed by Chilean law and in the
numerous Latin American countries influenced by that law.15
Other types of ordinary will have hardly been discussed. Although wills by
recorded sound were advocated as early as 1896,16 the idea of such ‘audiograph’
wills seems rapidly to have fallen into oblivion. Holograph wills fared no better.17 It
was only with joint or mutual wills that a break in tradition occurred: while
Portuguese law had admitted these, at least between spouses, the Brazilian Code of
1916 prohibited them completely.18
The regime of testamentary formalities established by the 1916 Code remained
unaltered throughout the twentieth century,19 and when the drafting commission
for the new Code took up its task at the end of the 1960s,20 it too adopted a rather
conservative approach, trying ‘to simplify the act of testation, without surrendering
the values of certainty and security’.21 The spirit of an earlier draft for a new Code,
by Orlando Gomes,22 had been exactly the same.23 The wish to reconcile progress
and tradition is clearly visible in the 2002 Code. It is best illustrated by the rules for
witnesses. As in most other Latin American countries,24 their participation is still
strictly necessary for all types of ordinary wills (and also for all but one of the
extraordinary wills), but their number has been reduced from five to two (or three
in the case of private wills). The five witnesses required by the 1916 Code for
ordinary wills, taken over from Portuguese law, had long been regarded as too
burdensome. One writer commented that: ‘The lack of time, the fight for survival,
especially in the big cities, does not facilitate the reunion of five persons around the
testator, in order to assist a ceremony that sometimes takes various hours’.25 Legal
15
Their categorization is somewhat different, though (see Art 1008 Chilean CC): The open, nuncu-
pative, or public will is made before either a notary and witnesses, or witnesses alone, and thus corresponds
to both the public and the private wills of Brazilian law. The sealed or secret will requires the participation
of witnesses and a notary and corresponds to the sealed will of Brazilian law. All ordinary types of will
require writing (Art 1011 CC) so that the alternative denomination of the public will as ‘nuncupative’ is
misleading. However, Chilean law recognizes the genuine nuncupative will as an extraordinary will: see n
137 below.
16
By Adolfo Cirne, who was inspired by a Spanish work, Heredia y Larrea’s El testamento fonografico
(1895): see Clovis Bevilaqua, Direito das Sucessões (2nd edn, 1932) 250, n 1.
17
For the fate of holograph wills, see VI.1 below.
18
The present law can be found in Art 1863 CC/2002. For a historical overview, see Zeno Veloso,
Testamentos de acordo com a Constituição de 1988 (2nd edn, 1993) 91 ff.
19
Compare the rules on intestate succession, where fundamental changes occurred during the twenti-
eth century, especially regarding the position of the spouse and illegitimate children.
20
For the genesis of the 2002 Code, see Schmidt (n 3) 57 ff.
21
See the explanation of its coordinator, Miguel Reale, in his O Projeto do novo Código Civil (2nd edn,
1999) 94.
22
For the background to this draft, see Schmidt (n 3) 62 ff.
23
Orlando Gomes, Código Civil – Projeto Orlando Gomes (1985) 90 f.
24
See, eg, Chile – three witnesses and a notary (escribano) or five witnesses for public wills (Art 1014
CC), and three witnesses and a notary for sealed wills (Art 1021 CC); Colombia – notary and three
witnesses or five witnesses for public wills (Art 1071 f CC), and notary and five witnesses for sealed wills
(Art 1078 CC); Peru – notary and two witnesses for both public and sealed wills (Arts 696, 699 CC).
Venezuelan law, on the other hand, no longer requires witnesses for public wills declared before a notary
(Arts 852 ff CC).
25
Veloso (n 18) 368.
academia has thus embraced the relaxation of testamentary formalities carried out in
the new Code,26 but also argued that in some respects the reforms have not gone
far enough.27 The witness requirement may be put into perspective by noting that
it is rather unusual in other types of juridical acts in the Brazilian legal order.28
2. Will-making
The habit of will-making has altered since colonial times. While in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries it seems to have been the rule rather than the exception,
during the twentieth century the practice of will-making has constantly receded.29
Today, according to one estimate, only between 6 and 8 per cent of Brazilians die
testate.30 It is supposed that people are usually content with the rules of intestate
succession and thus feel little or no need to modify them,31 and as family ties in
Brazil, and in Latin America in general, are quite strong, this view is certainly
plausible. Cultural reasons may also play a part. Brazilians are said to be reluctant
to reflect on the end of their lives and take measures related to it, such as buying life
insurance or giving directions as to their funeral.32 An additional reason for the low
number of wills may be that freedom of testation has traditionally been rather
limited. Under Portuguese law, a testator with descendants or ascendants could
26
Caio Mário da Silva Pereira, Instituições de Direito Civil vol 6: Direito das Sucessões (15th edn by
Carlos Roberto Barbosa Moreira, 2005) 226 ff.
27
Especially as regards private wills, for which see V below.
28
The act of marriage is the only other example: see Art 1534 CC/2002 (two witnesses, in some
instances four). Other important legal transactions, such as the sale of immovable property, only require
the intervention of a notary: see Art 108 CC/2002. In practice, however, contracts are often signed by two
witnesses as this allows direct execution (Art 585 II Civil Procedure Code).
29
Eduardo de Oliveira Leite, in Sálvio de Figueiredo Teixeira (ed), Comentários ao novo Código Civil
vol XXI (4th edn, 2009) 377 ff, quoting from a historical study on everyday life in colonial Brazil.
30
Arnaldo Rizzardo, Direito das Sucessões vol 1 (1996) 198. See also Zeno Veloso, ‘Testamentos –
Noções Gerais, Formas ordinárias’, in Domingos Franciulli Netto, Gilmar Ferreira Mendes, and Ives G da
Silva Martins Filho (eds), O novo Código Civil: Estudos em Homenagem ao Prof Miguel Reale (2003) 1384,
1394; Francisco J Cahali and Giselda M F Novaes Hironaka, Curso avançado de Direito Civil vol 6: Direito
das Sucessões (2nd edn, 2003) 263; Washington de Barros Monteiro, Curso de Direito Civil vol 6: Direito
das Sucessões (35th edn by Ana C de Barros Monteiro França, 2003) 123. Unfortunately, figures are
unavailable for other Latin American countries, although, judging by conversations with jurists from these
jurisdictions, testacy rates also seem to be rather low.
31
Veloso (n 18) 12; Cahali and Hironaka (n 30) 264. See ch 8 below at 184 for the use of this
argument during the drafting of the BGB in order to question the necessity of making a will. Leite (n 29)
377 ff even establishes a direct causal link between the detailed regulation of intestate succession in the first
Brazilian Civil Code of 1916 and the decline in will-making which set in soon after. The code provided
that the heirs of the first degree were the descendants, the heirs of the second degree the ascendants, and the
heir of the third degree the spouse (Art 1603). The spouse, however, usually participated in the deceased’s
property according to the rules of family law, as the statutory marital regime was community of property
(Art 258). After various reforms during the second half of the twentieth century, the 2002 Code finally
elevated the spouse to an heir of the first degree, next to the descendants (Art 1829). The partner of a stable
non-marital relationship is also a legitimate heir (Art 1790). For a detailed overview, see Axel Weishaupt,
‘Brasilien’, in Murad Ferid and Karl Firsching (eds), Internationales Erbrecht, supplement XVIII (2007) no
163 ff.
32
Cahali and Hironaka (n 30) 264 f; see also Monteiro (n 30) 123. One may add that it may be a
general trait of Latin American people to live for today and not to be too concerned about the future.
only dispose of one-third of his or her property.33 In modern-day Brazilian law the
figure is one-half.34 Finally, it has to be remembered that large parts of Brazilian
society, and indeed of Latin American society in general, are too poor to have a real
interest in the law of succession.
Whatever its actual practical relevance, the law of wills has always received
considerable attention both from the legislator35 and from legal academia.36 The
average citizen, on the other hand, does not seem familiar with the exact legal
requirements for the making of a will.37
III. Public wills
1. Formal requirements
A public will is one which is declared by the testator before a notary38 or his legal
substitute. The notary records the will in his minute book, either by hand or with the
help of a mechanical device,39 and then reads it out to the testator and two witnesses,
33
See Art 1008 Consolidação das Leis Civis. The Consolidação das Leis Civis, prepared between 1855
and 1857 by Augusto Teixeira de Freitas, was a kind of restatement of private law. Its main source was the
Portuguese law from colonial times which, for the time being, had been left in force after Brazil’s
independence in 1822. See further Schmidt (n 3) 27 ff; in this chapter the 3rd edition (1896) of the
Consolidação is quoted. Under Spanish law, freedom of testation was even more limited: a testator who had
descendants or ascendants could only dispose of one-fifth of his property, the remaining four-fifths being
the so-called legı́tima. One-third of the legı́tima (the mejora) could be assigned to one or several of the
descendants. Under current Spanish law, the legı́tima is two-thirds of the property (one-third of the
legı́tima being the mejora), thus leaving one-third for free disposition. For a historical overview, see Luis
Montojo y Burguero, La Legı́tima de los Hijos y Descendientes (1941) 16 ff; Manuel Albaladejo Garcı́a, La
Mejora (2003) 18 ff. The old Spanish regime is (at least in a modified version) still in force in many Latin
American countries: see, eg Arts 1181 ff CC Chile (the testator who has a spouse, descendants, or
ascendants can dispose of one-quarter of his property); Arts 1239 ff CC Colombia (one-quarter); Arts
725 ff CC Peru (one-third).
34
Regina Bottentuit Gondim, Invalidade do Testamento (2001) 9.
35
At least if one compares the number of provisions on this topic with those on intestate succession.
36
Of the sixty-four volumes of his monumental Tratado de Direito Privado, Francisco C Pontes de
Miranda dedicated no fewer than four to the law of wills (vols 56–9, 3rd edn, 1984). See also the extensive
treatment of this area of the law in such classical works as Carlos Maximiliano, Direito das Sucessões vols
1–3 (3rd edn, 1952); and Orosimbo Nonato, Estudos sobre Sucessão Testamentaria vols 1–3 (1957). All of
these works are characterized by extensive coverage of the historical and comparative background.
37
This assessment was given to the author by Zeno Veloso, a law professor and notary who is also
Brazil’s most prominent writer on wills.
38
The official term is tabelião, obviously stemming from the Roman tabellion. The word notário,
which is frequently used both in legal and in common language, is a synonym: see Zeno Veloso, ‘Artigos
1.857 a 2027’, in Antônio Junqueira de Azevedo (ed), Comentários ao Código Civil vol 21 (2003) 55. For
the general functions of a Brazilian notary, see n 9 above; for the legislation, see Art 236 caput [head] of the
Brazilian Constitution, and Lei No 8.935/1994. Chilean Law allows a public will to be made before a
judge as well as a notary (Art 1014 CC) and in some instances also before the official of the civil register:
see Pablo Rodrı́guez Grez, Instituciones de Derecho Sucesorio vol 1 (3rd edn, 2002) 126.
39
Art 1864 parágrafo único CC/2002. When this rule was drafted in the early 1970s, its authors
obviously had the typewriter in mind, but of course it applies equally to wills written with the help of
a computer: see Veloso (n 38) 67.
who in practice are usually employees of the notary.40 Finally, the document is
signed by the testator, the notary, and the witnesses.41 Although there is no require-
ment to so do, the practice is for the notary to add the place and date, in accordance
with the general rules on public documents.42 As a public document the will cannot
be written in a foreign language.43 The notary is not obliged to draw up the will in
his office, but may also attend the testator in, for example, the testator’s house or a
hospital, as long as he stays within his district. Testators, on the other hand, may
choose any notary, whatever their domicile or the location of their property.44
2. The declaration
The testator does not need to dictate the will to the notary word by word, but can use
a draft or notes, whether the testator’s own or prepared by another person such as an
advocate.45 It is not uncommon for testators to bring an advocate with them to the
notary’s office.46 There is a division of views as to whether the declaration must be
always oral or whether it is sufficient for the testator simply to hand over a piece of
paper.47 While an oral declaration was necessary under the 1916 Code, at least to
some extent,48 under the new Code most writers regard such a declaration as
dispensable.49 One important argument is that the new Code has not retained the
rule of the 1916 Code which barred persons incapable of speech from making a
public will.50
3. The signature
The testator may sign in an abbreviated form, but it is thought that at least one first
and one last name must be present. In this context it should be borne in mind that
40
See below VIII.2.
41
Art 1864 CC/2002.
42
Art 215 } 1 CC/2002; see also Veloso (n 18) 135 ff. If the date is wrong by mistake the will remains
valid: see Orlando Gomes, Sucessões (12th edn, 2004, by Mario R Carvalho de Faria) 108. The result was
different in STF 14.2.1984, in Wilson Bussada, Código Civil Brasileiro Interpretado pelos Tribunais vol 5/II
(1994) 306, but only because under the particular circumstances the wrong date seemed to indicate that
the will had been drawn up by the notary alone.
43
Art 215 } 3 CC/2002. Dimas Messias de Carvalho and Dimas Daniel de Carvalho, Direito das
Sucessões (2nd edn, 2009) 92 regard this as a disadvantage of public wills.
44
Veloso (n 38) 57 f.
45
STF 9.8.1967, RF 228 (1969) 77 at 78, saying that this corresponds to ‘99%’ of the practice.
46
Zeno Veloso, ‘Testamentos: noções gerais; formas ordinárias; codicilo; formas especias’ in Giselda
M F Novaes Hironaka and Rodrigo da Cunha Pereira (eds), Direito das Sucessões (2007) 125, 132.
47
A possibility clearly admitted by, among others, German law (for which see ch 8 below at 210).
48
Veloso (n 18) 153 f.
49
Gomes (n 42) 107, 112; Sı́lvio de Salvo Venosa, ‘Arts 1.857 a 1.911’, in Arruda Alvim and Thereza
Alvim (eds), Comentários ao Código Civil Brasileiro vol 16 (2004) 309; Silva Pereira (n 26) 232. Other
authors, such as Veloso (n 38) 60 and Cahali and Hironaka (n 30) 274 f, hold that the need for an oral
declaration still exists.
50
Art 1635 CC/1916.
Brazilians often have a whole string of first and last names. Signature by a pseudonym
may also be sufficient if it is a name which the testator generally uses.51 Normally the
signature is placed at the end of the document, but it is also permissible to place it
elsewhere, for example at the top, in the margin, or even on the other side of the
document.52 Where the will is written by computer or other mechanical means and
runs to more than one page, it must be initialled by the testator on each page.53 If the
testator is unable to sign, the notary notes this on the document and asks one of
witnesses to sign on the testator’s behalf.54 Although it is not required, notaries often
give the reason for the inability to sign, and may even include the testator’s
fingerprints on the document.
4. Unity of the act

The 2002 Code relaxed the rules regarding unity of the act. While previously
the witnesses had to be present at all stages, beginning with the moment when the
will was drawn up,55 now they are needed only when the will is read out.56 From
then on, however, the unity of the act has to be strictly observed, which means
that reading and signing of the will must be carried out in one go. This requirement
is not understood as absolute, however; short interruptions, due for example to
a power blackout, urgent telephone calls, or physical necessities, are deemed
permissible.57
5. Evaluation
It is estimated that between 70 and 80 per cent of all wills are public wills,58 and
indeed the public will has a number of advantages over the other two ordinary
forms.59 The intervention of a notary guarantees a high degree of legal certainty, not
only as regards the fulfilment of the formal requirements and the correct and clear
formulation of the testator’s intention, but also concerning preservation of the will,
which remains in notarial custody. Furthermore, public wills, being issued by a
public authority, enjoy a privileged position in matters of proof.60 In particular, they
do not need to be confirmed in probate proceedings, and the judge can order their
execution without further steps being required.61
A disadvantage of the public will vis-à-vis the sealed will is that the testator’s
intentions cannot be kept secret, as not only the notary but also the witnesses learn
51
Carlos Maximiliano, Direito das Sucessões vol 1 (3rd edn, 1952) 448 ff, 547 f; Veloso (n 18) 164 f.
52
Maximiliano (n 51) 450.
53
Art 1864 parágrafo único CC/2002.
54
Art 1865 CC/2002. Veloso (n 30) 1397 criticizes the latter requirement as a ‘useless formalism’.
55
Art 1632 CC/1916. The courts, however, did not interpret this requirement too strictly: see IX
below.
56
Art 1864 II CC/2002.
57
Veloso (n 38) 63.
58
Veloso (n 30) 1394; Veloso (n 38) 91.
59
See also Veloso (n 46) 153 f; Carvalho and Carvalho (n 43) 92.
60 61
Art 215 CC/2002. Art 1128 Civil Procedure Code.
about them.62 Indeed, the ‘publicness’ of the public will goes even further than that,
for it is generally understood that, like other types of document issued by an official
authority, anyone is entitled to ask the notary for a copy, even during the testator’s
lifetime.63
A disadvantage of the public will vis-à-vis the private will is, of course, that it
produces costs in the form of the notary’s fees. Their regulation falls under the
legislative authority of the federal states and as a consequence they differ markedly.
While for instance in the Federal District of Brasilia, the capital, the approximate fee
is a mere 20, in the State of Rio de Janeiro it is 100 and in the state of São Paulo
a remarkable 400.64
IV. Sealed wills
The sealed will – or ‘mystic’ or ‘secret’ will as it is also sometimes known65 – is one
written by the testator, or by another person at the testator’s request,66 either by hand
or by computer or other mechanical means.67 If the will is written by mechanical
means, the testator signs and numbers every page; otherwise a signature at the end is
sufficient. After signing,68 the testator hands the will over to a notary in the presence
of two witnesses, declaring that the document contains his or her last will and asking
the notary for attestation.69 On the same document, starting where the writing of the
testator ends,70 the notary draws up the act of attestation in the presence of the
witnesses and reads it out to them and the testator.71 After that, the attestation has to
be signed by the notary, the testator, and the witnesses.72 To avoid fraud or
interference, the act of attestation requires unity of time and place, although minor
interruptions are permitted.73 Finally, the notary closes the document and sews it
with needle and thread.74 Although not required to do so, he usually also seals it with
62
Orosimbo Nonato, Estudos sobre Sucessão Testamentaria vol 1 (1957) 210 ff; Veloso (n 46) 154,
pointing out that ‘not all persons are reserved or discrete’.
63
See Rui Ribeiro de Magalhães, Direito das sucessões no novo código civil brasileiro (2nd edn, 2004)
153. The common understanding of the ‘public’ nature of the public will is sharply criticized by Veloso
(n 46) 154 ff.
64
I am grateful to Professor Zeno Veloso for providing me with these and other figures.
65
Veloso (n 30) 1399; Bevilaqua (n 16) 264. For the testamentum mysticum in the ius commune, see ch
2 above at 38 and ch 8 below at 181 f.
66
But not by an heir or legatee under the will: see the decision quoted by Humberto Theodoro Júnior,
Sucessões: Doutrina e Jurisprudência (1990) 181.
67
68
The signature can also be made out in the notary’s presence, and this will usually be the case where
the notary wrote the will at the testator’s request (for which see n 71 below).
69
The notary or witnesses may read the will if the testator asks them to do so: Veloso (n 46) 163.
70
As Art 1869 CC/2002 states: ‘immediately after the last word of the testator’.
71
The notary who attests the will may also be the person who wrote it at the request of the testator: Art
1870 CC/2002. This rule had already been established by the Portuguese courts in 1811: see Veloso (n 46)
161.
72
Art 1868 CC/2002.
73
Maximiliano (n 51) 514. This is the same rule as for public wills.
74
Art 1869 CC/2002.
wax.75 After that, the will is handed back to the testator and the notary makes a
record of the place and date of the attestation.76 On the testator’s death, the sealed
will is presented to a judge, who orders its execution provided that he does not find
any grounds for invalidity or falsification.77
Secrecy is the obvious advantage of a sealed will. A serious disadvantage is its lower
level of reliability: not only might the testator’s intentions be expressed incorrectly or
incompletely, due to the lack of notarial advice, but, the testator takes the will home,
as is the usual practice,78 so it might thereafter be lost or destroyed. To avoid such
loss, the creation of a central register for sealed wills (or even wills in general) has
been suggested.79 Further, even though the 2002 Code relaxed some of the rules,80
sealed wills are still regarded as requiring more formalities than any other.81 Actual
usage of what was once the most popular type of will82 is uncertain. One estimate is
that sealed wills account for 20 per cent of all wills, and another that they are gaining
in popularity,83 yet there are also calls for their abolition on the ground of modest
usage.84 And while in other countries that recognize the sealed will, such as France
and Italy, its practical use is very limited indeed,85 this can be explained by the fact
that a testator intent on secrecy can use a holograph will, which is not available to
testators in Brazil.86
V. Private wills
1. Formal requirements
Private wills are the only type of ordinary will not to require the intervention of a
notary. The testator can write the will out by hand or type it provided there are no
erasures or blank spaces.87 What the testator cannot do, however, is to have someone
else write or, probably, type the will on his or her behalf;88 a proposal to allow this in
the new Civil Code was rejected.89 The will is read out by the testator to three
75
Veloso (n 46) 162, saying that this prevents or at least hinders cases of fraud. Maximiliano (n 51)
512 f is also approving.
76 77 78
Art 1875 CC/2002. Art 1875 CC/2002. Veloso (n 38) 88 f.
79
Veloso (n 38) 89 ff, praising Portugal and also the Brazilian state of São Paulo as a model. As another
solution, already possible now, he proposes the creation of a duplicate of the will right from the start.
80
Veloso (n 38) 91. Art 1638 CC/1916 regulated the making of a sealed will even more meticulously.
81
This view is confirmed by a comparison of the number of provisions dedicated to each type of will.
82
N Tolentino Gonzaga, Testamento Cerrado (1922) 8; Maximiliano (n 51) 465 f.
83
Compare Veloso (n 18) 257 with Silva Pereira (n 26) 231.
84
Veloso (n 38) 91 describes these as exaggerated.
85
See ch 3 above at 64 and ch 6 below at 133 f.
86
Maximiliano (n 51) 466.
87
Art 1876 } 2 CC/2002.
88
Of course the testator is free to take legal (or other) advice as to the contents of the will: see Veloso
(n 18) 269 f.
89
See Veloso (n 38) 128, who, however, assumes that mechanical writing by a person other than the
testator is permitted. While it is true that the wording of Art 1876 CC/2002 is not quite clear in this
respect, the suggested distinction seems inconsistent. Under the CC/1916, courts sometimes allowed
dictation of private wills (see n 228 below). Portuguese law was to the same effect: see Veloso (n 18) 266;
witnesses90 and signed by them and the testator.91 Therefore, a private will cannot be
made by a person unable to speak or read.92 It is open to the testator to sign before
presenting the will to the witnesses, but witnesses may only sign after the reading has
taken place.93 The will may be written in a foreign language, provided it is one that
the witnesses understand.94 There is no requirement that the will be dated95 or that it
be signed on every page.96
For as long as the will has not been signed, the testator is free to amend it, but
amendments made after the conclusion of the formal proceedings require their
repetition, otherwise the changes will have no effect.97 Interlineations, deletions,
and so on are furthermore recommended to be explicitly rectified by the testator, in
order to guard against later controversies about falsification.98 A document can be
incorporated into a will by referring to it only where it meets the formal requirements
of a will,99 although in other cases the reference might still be taken into consider-
ation for the purposes of interpretation.100
2. Evaluation
In Brazilian legal writing, the private will is regarded as the simplest, most conveni-
ent, and most economical way of making a will.101 Yet in practice it is the form
Clovis Bevilaqua, Código Civil dos Estados Unidos do Brasil (historical edn, 1979) Art 1645. In view of the
requirement that the testator write in person, Clovis Bevilaqua, in his draft of the 1916 Civil Code, used
the term testamento holographo instead of testamento particular: see Arts 1.812 ff Projecto Primitivo, in
Sabino Barroso Junior (ed), Trabalhos da Commissão Especial da Camara dos Deputados, Projecto de Código
Civil vol I (1902) 47 ff. Equally, Orlando Gomes in Art 822 of his draft of 1963 (n 23) preferred the
expression testamento hológrafo.
90
Veloso (n 30) 1406 is critical that three (and not two) witnesses are needed for private wills, but it
should be recalled that both public and sealed wills require the intervention of a notary. Orlando Gomes’
draft (see n 23), on the other hand, would even have maintained the requirement of five witnesses for
private wills set out in Art 1645 II CC/1916, despite accepting a reduction to two for public and sealed
wills.
91
Art 1876 CC/2002. The signatures are usually at the end, but this is practice rather than law: see
III.3 above.
92
Zeno Veloso, in Ricardo Fiuza (ed), Código Civil Comentado (6th edn, 2008) 2064. However, see
also the decision cited in n 229 below which gave effect to a private will that had not been read out at all.
93
Veloso (n 18) 285 f. The mentioning of the testator’s name in the text (‘I, . . . , hereby decree’) does
not fulfil the signature requirement: see Maximiliano (n 51) 548.
94
Art 1880 CC/2002.
95
Bevilaqua had inserted this requirement in the initial draft for the CC/1916, but it was later
removed. For his criticism, see Bevilaqua (n 89) Art 1645.
96
Carvalho and Carvalho (n 43) 100, however, regard such signature as necessary, whereas Veloso
(n 92) 2065 only deems it advisable.
97
Veloso (n 18) 285; Maximiliano (n 51) 542 f; Cahali and Hironaka (n 30) 290 f.
98
99
Francisco C Pontes de Miranda, Tratado de Direito Privado vol 56 (3rd edn, 1984) 231 f;
Maximiliano (n 51) 476. Silva Pereira (n 26) 198; Gomes (n 42) 101 f.
100
Veloso (n 38) 45 f.
101
Veloso (n 18) 265.
least used,102 a fact that is mainly attributed to a further, somewhat hidden, formal
hurdle in probate proceedings:103 the private will needs to be confirmed by a judge,
and this requires that all witnesses acknowledge their signatures and testify that the
testamentary act took place.104 Hence, if just one witness refuses to do so, the will is
unenforceable unless the judge is convinced that the witness is intentionally giving
false testimony.105 It is easy to see that this confirmation requirement may invite all
kinds of manipulation.106
Further problems occur in the event of the death or disappearance of one or more
witnesses. The 1916 Code required the testimony of at least three out of the five
witnesses then needed to make a will;107 otherwise the will could not be executed
even if the judge was convinced of its authenticity. The 2002 Code reduces the
requirement to one witness (out of three), but the principle remains.108 It is this rule
on the minimum number of surviving witnesses that has caused particular dissatis-
faction among Brazilian scholars.109 Pontes de Miranda, for example – arguably
Brazil’s most prominent private lawyer in the twentieth century – formulated his
criticism in an unusually sharp manner:
Brazilian law fenced the private will with such reservations, threatened its precarious life
to such an extent, that in fact it almost prohibited it . . . It required holograph writing
and signature, required five witnesses . . . All this was reasonable and sufficient. But the
legislator . . . obstinately continued to make requests, in a somnambulism of persecution: if
three witnesses die, what was said remained unsaid, what was testated remained untestated . . .
Absurd law, inconsequent law, bad law, law which gives the heritage to the person the testator
did not consider, just because he and the witnesses died in the same accident!110
102
Veloso (n 30) 1405 (‘figura rarı́ssima’); Monteiro (n 30) 145; Gondim (n 34) 37. It is estimated
that only 10% of all wills are private wills: see the references in n 58.
103
104
Art 1878 CC/2002. It is not necessary that they agree as to the contents.
105
Veloso (n 38) 138 f; Gomes (n 42) 129; Francisco C Pontes de Miranda, Tratado de Direito Privado
vol 59 (3rd edn, 1984) 177, 182 f.
106
See Leite (n 29) 479 f; Sı́lvio de Salvo Venosa, Direito Civil, vol 7: Direito das Sucessões (4th edn,
2004) 181.
107
Art 1648 CC/1916.
108
Art 1878 CC/2002. An interesting question of inter-temporal law is whether this rule applies to
wills that were executed under the regime of the CC/1916 but whose judicial confirmation takes place
now, when the CC/2002 is in force. Tribunal de Justiça de Minas Gerais 3.12.2004, cited in Carvalho and
Carvalho (n 43) 102, answered this question affirmatively and confirmed a will from 1980 on the basis of a
single witness.
109
See Maximiliano (n 51) 553; Veloso (n 18) 310. The rule goes back to Portuguese law where, in the
absence of express legislation, the issue was controversial. Some writers argued that the absence of even a
single witness was enough to make the will unenforceable: see Manuel Antônio Coelho da Rocha,
Instituições de Direito Civil vol II (2nd edn, 1848, repr 1984) } 681. Bevilaqua (n 89) Art 1656 thought
that only three out of the five witnesses were needed. Thus, from his point of view the rule that he proposed
in his draft for the CC/1916 was a liberalization. All the same, Bevilaqua would have been better advised to
abolish the confirmation requirement altogether or at least to allow judges to verify the authenticity of wills
by other means than witnesses (a solution found in, eg Art 1020 of the Chilean CC, and also suggested by
Veloso (n 18) 310 f).
110
Pontes de Miranda (n 105) 144. This outburst has often been quoted: see, eg Antônio Elias de
Queiroga, Curso de Direito Civil – Direito das Sucessões (2005) 118; Veloso (n 18) 264 f; Leite (n 29) 467.
In view of this criticism, it is puzzling that the 2002 Code relaxed the rule rather than
abolished it altogether. A faint-hearted attempt at abolition had been made in a pre-
draft of 1972, but in the amended version from 1973 the confirmation requirement
was reinstated. The issue received no attention during the discussions in Parliament,
and warnings that the new Civil Code would regulate a type of will totally useless for
practice (a ‘dead letter’), and that it would have been better to abolish the private will
altogether,111 as Portugal had done in 1867,112 remained unheard.
Comparing private wills to attested wills in the common law world or to the
witnessed (allograph) will of Austrian law113 – the forms that appear most closely
equivalent – two other disadvantages become apparent: the private will may not
be written by another person, such as the testator’s advocate, and its content must be
read out to witnesses and thus cannot be kept secret.
VI. The fate of the holograph will
1. Brazil
As we have seen, criticism of private wills was directed less at the need for witnesses
than at the onerous requirements for confirmation. Nonetheless, the question arises
of why the simple holograph will, a private handwritten will without witnesses, has
never been recognized in Brazil.
On the Iberian Peninsula, the holograph will had had quite a promising start. Its
recognition by Valentianus III (446)114 was repeated by the Lex romana visigothorum
(506)115 (although not by the Corpus iuris civilis) and later confirmed by the Lex
visigothorum (654)116 and the Fuero Juzgo (694).117 Early Portuguese law, however,
‘was carried away by Romanism’ and abolished the holograph will completely.118 It
never reappeared.
Given that colonial Brazil had thus never been exposed to holograph wills, it is not
surprising that, after the country’s independence, little need was felt to introduce
them. When, during the Parliamentary discussions on the 1916 Civil Code, a
111
112
In Portuguese law the only ordinary forms of will are the public will and the sealed will. See now Art
2204 of the Civil Code of 1966.
113
See chs 9 and 13 below.
114
Novellae Valentiani XXI, 2, 1. See Max Kaser and Rolf Knütel, Römisches Privatrecht (17th edn,
2003) 415; Monika Beutgen, Die Geschichte der Form des eigenhändigen Testaments (1992) 11 ff.
115
Novellarum Valentiani III, Title IV ‘De Testamentis’, 2 (which can be found in Haenel (n 12) 278);
see also Torres (n 6) 98 ff; Beutgen (n 114) 17 f; Walther Brock, Das eigenhändige Testament. Darstellung
seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung sowie seiner Voraussetzungen und Wirkungen nach dem Bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuch (1900) 10 f.
116
See Brock (n 115) 12 ff and Beutgen (n 114) 19 ff, who both reject the thesis (defended by Pontes
de Miranda (n 105) 141, among others) that the Lex visigothorum only recognized the holograph will as an
extraordinary form for situations in which witnesses were not available.
117
See Torres (n 6) 107; for general information on the Fuero Juzgo, see Rauchhaupt (n 3) 33 ff.
118
Pontes de Miranda (n 105) 141 (‘already then this had to be considered a step backwards’), quoting
a law from 1349.
motion was tabled for their recognition, rapporteur Alfredo Pinto was quick to reject
the idea, justifying his decision by saying that holograph wills were ‘dangerous’ for
not offering the ‘necessary guarantees’. The counter-argument, that they were
recognized and widely used in France, was dismissed by quoting the French jurist,
Marcel Planiol, according to whom this type of will had given rise to all kinds of
controversies.119 As a result, holograph wills were not admitted to the 1916 Code
even as a type of extraordinary will.
The position remained largely unchanged for the rest of the century. Neither the
draft for a new code, of 1963, nor the draft that served as the basis for the 2002 Code
envisaged the introduction of holograph wills, and the idea did not resurface during
discussions in Parliament. However, at a very late stage, holograph wills were
introduced as a type of extraordinary will.120 One can only speculate whether this
is now the first step towards full recognition. In Brazilian legal literature, it is
acknowledged that holograph wills are accepted in the great majority of legal systems
and that overall the experiences have been positive. Some authors have even called
the holograph will the ‘form of the future in Brazil’.121
2. Elsewhere in Latin America

At first, the Brazilian story was largely replicated in the Spanish territories of
Latin America, and for much the same reasons. While the Castilian Siete Partidas
(1256–65) had continued to recognize the holograph will in the form of the testamen-
tum inter liberos,122 the Leyes de Toro (1505) abolished it and it was only readmitted by
the Novı́sima Recopilación de las Leyes de España (1805) as an extraordinary will for
soldiers.123 Hence, the three centuries of Spanish rule in Latin America were exactly
the centuries when the holograph will was not recognized by Spanish law.124
Following independence, legislators in the former Spanish colonies showed little
interest in the holograph will. Andrés Bello, draftsman of the highly influential
Chilean Civil Code, gave no reasons for rejecting this form, but the decision was
unsurprising on the part of someone who both admired Roman law and was drawn
towards formalism.125 Dalmacio Vélez Sarsfield, the single-handed draftsman of the
119
See Sabino Barroso Junior (ed), Trabalhos da Commissão Especial da Camara dos Deputados, Projecto
de Código Civil vol VI (1902) 297, 494. The dangers that were attributed to holograph wills were not
further specified, but one can assume that they referred especially to undue influence and fraud. For the
much more extensive discussion on the dangers of holograph wills in nineteenth-century Germany, see ch
8 below at 182 ff. Pinto’s statement that the holograph will had ‘fallen into disuse’ in Brazil (297) is
somewhat puzzling, but probably refers to private wills which were sometimes described as ‘holograph’ (see
n 89 above) despite requiring witnesses.
120
See VII.4 below.
121
Veloso (n 18) 264; see also Gondim (n 34) 36.
122
Partida VI, Law 7, Title I.
123
Torres (n 6) 109 ff.
124
See also ch 4 above at 76 f.
125
I am grateful to Professor Alejandro Guzmán Brito for sharing his views with me on this matter.
Argentinian Civil Code of 1869, was an exception to this trend. Sarsfield pointed out
that holograph wills were widely recognized in Europe, that they were an easy and
personal way to make a will, and that the French experience had shown the dangers
of fraud to be remote.126 Accordingly, they were included in the Argentinian Code
and seem on the whole to have been successful, although there was also some
criticism.127 From Argentina, the holograph will found its way within a couple of
years into the law of Paraguay, which adopted the Argentinian Code as a result of the
catastrophic defeat in the war against the ‘Triple Alliance’ of Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay.128 A new Code in 1985 retained holograph wills.129
In Mexico, holograph wills were introduced at a national level by the Civil Code
of 1928.130 The main influence seems to have been French law, but in one respect
the Mexican rule was both original and modern: it required that the will be executed
in duplicate and that one copy be deposited in the General Notarial Archive. The
testator’s fingerprints were also required.131 Panama132 and Peru133 also adopted the
holograph will in their Civil Codes of, respectively, 1916 and 1936, the rapporteur in
respect of the latter, Juan José Calle, stating that it was the ‘easiest, sincerest and most
convenient form’ to make a will and referring to the many legal systems which
already recognized it.134
VII. Extraordinary wills
1. Introduction
At first glance the Brazilian Civil Code of 2002 provides three types of extraordinary
will: wills made on a ship, wills made on an aircraft, and the soldier’s will.135
However, in a somewhat hidden place in the chapter on private wills, one also
finds a fourth type: the holograph will made in ‘exceptional circumstances’.136
126
See Sarsfield’s comment on Art 3639 CC. (As Vélez Sarsfield’s draft was passed in Parliament
without a single change, even today his commentaries and notes to many articles are usually included in the
printed versions of the Argentinian Civil Code.)
127
See Francisco Ferrari Ceretti, De los Testamentos: Requisitos esenciales de forma y otras cuestiones
conexas (1983) 16 (‘The cause [for the controversies] has to be attributed to the fact that no intervention of
a specialized professional is required’). As a notary, Ceretti is probably not free from a certain bias. Less
negative is Santiago C Fassi, Tratado de los Testamentos vol 1 (1970) 125 f.
128
See Guzmán Brito (n 8) 455 ff.
129
Art 2628 ff CC.
130
By that time some federal states had already adopted the holograph will.
131
Arts 1550 ff CC; Antonio de Ibarrola, Cosas y Sucesiones (15th edn, 2006) 697 ff.
132
Arts 720 ff CC of 1916. The 1916 Code replaced the Colombian Code, which was left in force after
Panama’s secession from Colombia in 1903.
133
Arts 694 ff CC of 1936 (retained in Arts 707 ff CC of 1984).
134
Quoted in Rómulo E Lanatta, Formalidades de los Testamentos (1974) 122.
135
Art 1886 CC/2002.
136
Art 1879 CC/2002.
As well as the soldier’s will, Portuguese law had also allowed a kind of general
emergency will, which a person who was seriously ill could make by oral declaration
before six witnesses.137 Further, it seems that oral wills were also sometimes used to
rescue ordinary wills that were void due to some missing formal requirement, such as
the testator’s signature.138 During the preparation of the Brazilian Civil Code of
1916, oral wills were quite widely discussed. Deeming them too susceptible to
mistake and fraud, Clovis Bevilaqua banned oral wills from his draft,139 but the
commission instituted for its revision favoured the nuncupative will, with six
witnesses, even as an ordinary will.140 In the event, the final version of the Code
admitted oral wills only as a special type of soldier’s will, and this solution was
retained in the 2002 Code.141
Other types of extraordinary will from Roman law, such as the testamentum ruri
conditum, inter liberos, and tempore pestis conditum, were not expressly recognized
under Portuguese law;142 whether they were admitted in practice was disputed.143
Interestingly, Bevilaqua included the testamentum tempore pestis conditum in his draft
of the 1916 Code, but it did not survive.144 The testamentum ad pias causas was
sometimes found in Portuguese practice, but was never recognized formally and later
fell into oblivion.145
It is interesting to note that, while the Brazilian legislator has yet to introduce a
new type of ordinary will, he has accepted much more readily the idea of new
extraordinary wills, regardless of their rather limited practical relevance. In legal
literature, on the other hand, an argument has sometimes been made for the
complete suppression of extraordinary forms on the basis that ‘a diligent person
can always make a will beforehand’146 – a rationale that is certainly plausible for wills
made on ships or aircraft and for the soldier’s will, but is less convincing for cases of
unforeseen emergency.
137
Art 1061 Consolidação das Leis Civis (n 33). Later the will needed to be recorded by a public official.
Its validity lapsed in the event of the testator’s recovery: see Teixeira de Freitas’ comment to Art 1061
Consolidação. Freitas rejected the view that the oral will was recognized as an ordinary will under
Portuguese law: see comment to Art 1053 } 4 Consolidação. In Chile the oral will remains an extraordinary
form available where death is imminent and requiring three witnesses (Art 1033 CC).
138
Bevilaqua (n 16) 273 f; Teixeira de Freitas in his note to Art 1062 Consolidação das Leis Civis (n 33)
condemned this practice as ‘abusive’, although it seems to have been quite common under the ius
commune: see ch 2 at 46. For a parallel doctrine in Poland, see ch 11 below at 278.
139
Bevilaqua (n 16) 281. See also VII.3 below.
140
See Arts 1987 ff Projecto Revisto, in Sabino Barroso Junior (ed), Trabalhos da Commissão Especial da
Camara dos Deputados, Projecto de Código Civil vol I (1902) 163 ff.
141
See VII.3 below.
142
The testamentum ruri conditum was recognized until the Ordenações Filipinas of 1603: see Bevilaqua
(n 16) 251 f.
143
Coelho da Rocha (n 109) } 685. Spanish colonial law, on the other hand, eased the testamentary
formalities for the indigenous population, taking into account its difficulties in meeting the general
requirements, due to lack of knowledge and access to the administrative and judicial authorities. For
further details see Francisco J Andrés Santos, ‘Especialidades Testamentarias de los Indios’ (1999) 21
Revista de Estudios Histórico-Juridicos (Valparaı́so/Chile), 105–9.
144
See Arts 1822 f of the Projecto Primitivo.
145
Bevilaqua (n 16) 253.
146
Silvio Rodrigues, Direito Civil, vol 7: Direito das Sucessões (26th edn by Zeno Veloso, 2003) 171.
2. Wills made on ships or aircraft

The will made during a ship’s voyage (testamento marı́timo)147 has an ancestor in
Portuguese law,148 although in Brazilian law the Civil Code of 1916 was the first to
regulate it explicitly.149 The will is declared before the captain in the presence of two
witnesses. Further procedure is directed to be by analogy with public and sealed wills,
a drafting solution – new in the Code of 2002150 – that has met with some
criticism.151 Equivalent rules apply to the will made on an aircraft (testamento
aeronáutico),152 which was introduced for the first time by the 2002 Code.153
Both types of will remain in the custody of the captain, who must hand the will
over to the appropriate administrative official at the next national port or airport.154
Its validity lapses if the testator is still alive ninety days after return to land unless he
or she is unable to make an ordinary will, for example due to serious illness.155
3. Soldiers’ wills
The soldier’s will can only be made in time of war. It exists in three variants. The first
two are similar to, respectively, the public and the sealed wills, with an officer
fulfilling the function of the notary.156 The wills lapse after the testator has stayed
for ninety days in a place where an ordinary will could be made.157
The third variant is only available to soldiers who are fighting or were wounded
in battle. They can declare their will orally before two witnesses.158 This is the only
type of oral will that has survived from Portuguese law,159 and it was already
147
Art 1888 CC/2002. Art 1656 CC/1916 had required a voyage ‘on the high sea’, but it was generally
accepted that the rule also applied to ships on rivers and lakes, provided that the journey was of a certain
duration. Veloso (n 38) 164 points out that in a country like Brazil it is possible to cover immense
distances on rivers.
148
Coelho da Rocha (n 109) } 685.
149
As his sources of inspiration, Clovis Bevilaqua named, among others, French and German legisla-
tion: see Bevilaqua (n 89) Art 1656. See also Andrés Bello’s comment in his draft for the Chilean Civil
Code of 1841: ‘In the present state of our navigation, one does not yet feel the necessity for the maritime
will, which has been taken from the French Code . . . But it is to be believed that in the near future our
navigation will extend itself with the same speed as other branches of our industry’: see Andrés Bello, Obras
Completas, vol 3: Proyecto de Código Civil (1932) 52 (note to Art 38).
150
Arts 1656 ff CC/1916 had provided express rules.
151
Veloso (n 38) 166 f, saying that it is unclear whether the choice between the public will and the
sealed will is to be made by the testator or the captain.
152
Art 1889 CC/2002.
153
It had already been present in the draft of 1963 (n 23) as Art 832. Aircraft wills can also be found,
eg, in Argentina (Art 85 Código Aeronautico), Italy (Art 616 Codice civile, see ch 6 below at 135 f), Portugal
(Art 2219 Código civil), and the Netherlands (Art 4:101 BW, see ch 7 below at 159 f).
154
Art 1890 CC/2002.
155
Art 1891 CC/2002.
156
The precise procedure depends on the circumstances: see Arts 1893 f CC/2002.
157
Unless the will was made like a sealed will: see Art 1895 CC/2002. Veloso (n 46) 186 is critical that
this exception is not admitted for wills made on a ship or aircraft, where the same ratio legis would apply.
158
Art 1895 CC/2002.
159
Art 1066 Consolidação das Leis Civis (n 33), also requiring the presence of just two witnesses.
controversial during the preparation of the 1916 Code.160 Clovis Bevilaqua, whose
decision to ban the oral will completely was overturned in the course of Parliamen-
tary discussions,161 did not hide his concern in his subsequent commentary on the
Code:
It is a dangerous Romanism that this article retains. The oral will declared in a peaceful recess,
where a major number of witnesses can congegrate in order to listen to the testator, does not
offer sufficient guarantees, and that is why the Code rejected it; with even better reasons it
should not be admitted at the moment of battle, in which everything is absorbed, swept along
and confounded by the anxious fighting . . . and the will can easily be adulterated or fraudu-
lently invented.162
Some later authors have shared this view,163 while others have welcomed the
retention of the nuncupative soldier’s will in the 2002 Code, arguing that a person
facing death ought to be able to make a will in order to ‘part from this world with his
conscience at peace’.164 However, this does not explain why oral wills are a privilege
only for soldiers and not for other people facing imminent death.
The oral will lapses if the testator survives the war or recovers from his injury.165
This rule, already found in the 1916 Code, has been criticized for being too vague
due to the absence of a definite time limit.166
4. Wills made in ‘exceptional circumstances’

The will made in ‘exceptional circumstances’ slipped into the new Code at a very late
stage of the Parliamentary proceedings, at the suggestion of Miguel Reale, the
coordinator of the drafting commission.167 It constitutes a real innovation for
Brazilian law as it is the only type of will that does not require the presence of
witnesses.168 It needs to be handwritten and signed by the testator, who also has to
mention what the ‘exceptional circumstances’ are. As examples, writers give the case
of a testator caught in a building on fire, a testator who has been hijacked and is in
fear of death,169 or, somewhat less dramatically, a testator who lives in a deserted
place where no witnesses are available.170 The decisive element is that the circum-
stances prevent the testator from using an ordinary type of will.171 Whether the
160
Bevilaqua (n 89) Art 1663.
161
See VII.1 above.
162
Bevilaqua (n 89) Art 1663. The Polish experience with oral wills seems to confirm its considerable
susceptibility for fraud: see ch 11 below at 279 f.
163
Rodrigues (n 146) 173 (‘grande absurdo’).
164
Veloso (n 38) 190.
165
166
Veloso (n 18) 357 ff.
167
Veloso (n 38) 143 f. One wonders why Reale did not think of this idea at an earlier stage.
168
See the highly critical views of Leite (n 29) 484 f to the effect that the new rule is in conflict with the
traditional system.
169
Veloso (n 38) 145.
170
Cahali and Hironaka (n 30) 291.
171
Veloso (n 38) 144. Venosa (n 49) 345 even regards the will in exceptional circumstances as
subsidiary to the other types of extraordinary will.
requirement of ‘exceptional circumstances’ is fulfilled is decided by the judge on

whose confirmation the will ultimately depends.172
Unlike with other types of extraordinary will, the Code does not submit the
validity of the will to a time limit. Interestingly, legal literature is uncomfortable with
this and argues for the necessity of introducing such a limit.173
VIII. Further aspects
1. Disabled testators
The Civil Code of 2002 continues the tradition of providing a range of special rules
for disabled persons. A blind person can only make a public will. It is read out to the
testator twice, once by the notary and once by one of the witnesses.174 A deaf person
who wants to make a public will has to read (rather than listen to) the will drawn up
for him by the notary or, if incapable of reading, has to appoint someone to read it
for him in the presence of the witnesses.175 This person may not be the notary or a
witness.176
As mentioned earlier, the rule preventing those incapable of speech from making a
public will, present in the 1916 Code, was dropped from the Code of 2002,177
leading to the view that all that is needed by way of a declaration is for the testator to
hand over a written document to the notary. Some, however, argue that the
impediment nevertheless continues to exist on the basis that a declaration must be
oral at least in part.178 If that is correct it would have the unfortunate consequence
that a person incapable of both speaking and reading is excluded from testating
altogether:179 the former disability would preclude a public will and the latter a
private will or, as the Code expressly provides, a sealed will.180 That the prohibition
in respect of a sealed will is express is because such a will does not need to be written
by the testator in person.181 During the preparation of the 1916 Code the
corresponding provision had been controversial. To prohibit persons incapable of
reading from making a sealed will was said to be ‘cruel’, and, referring to the high rate
of illiteracy in Brazil (then estimated to be around 80 per cent), it was argued that
sealed wills must not be ‘a privilege of the few’.182 The argument has not prevailed.
172
See the last part of Art 1879 CC/2002.
173
See Venosa (n 49) 346 (arguing for a reform of Art 1879 CC/2002); Veloso (n 38) 146 (arguing
that the task of determining the time period should be for the courts).
174
Art 1867 CC/2002.
175
Art 1866 CC/2002.
176
Veloso (n 38) 81 f.
177
Art 1635 CC/1916.
178
Veloso (n 38) 82 ff. For discussion of the requirement of an oral declaration, see III.2 above.
179
For the same problem, and its solution, in German law, see ch 8 below at 209 f.
180
Art 1872 CC/2002.
181
See IV above.
182
Sabino Barroso Jr (ed), Trabalhos da Commissão Especial da Camara dos Deputados, Projecto de
Código Civil vol VI (1902) 281.
A person unable to speak and hear who wants to make a sealed will must declare in
writing on the other side of the document, or on the envelope, that it contains his
will and that he asks the notary for attestation.183
2. Witnesses
The fact that nearly all types of will require the participation of witnesses gives
considerable importance to the question of who is qualified to fulfil this role. The
1916 Code provided a list of grounds for exclusion, a person being excluded either
because of some inherent incapacity (for example, being under sixteen years of age or
mentally ill or blind or deaf-mute) or because the person benefited directly or, as a
relative, indirectly from the will.184 If a witness was ineligible, the will was totally
void.185 This regime met with some criticism, especially for excluding relatives of
heirs without also excluding relatives of legatees. The discrepancy was apparently an
oversight by the legislator. Portuguese law, in the spirit of the Roman tradition, had
allowed legatees to be witnesses,186 and they were added to the excluded category in
the draft of the 1916 Code only at a very late stage. In the rush it was forgotten to
extend the exclusion to relatives.187 As a consequence, the question of whether the
impediments regarding the relatives of heirs could be applied by analogy to relatives
of legatees remained disputed in case law and legal literature.188
Probably in view of this and other criticisms, but nonetheless rather surpris-
ingly,189 the 2002 Code dropped the provision altogether. This raises the question
of how the eligibility of witnesses is now to be determined. Part of the answer can be
found in the rule that a witness – or the relative (ascendants, descendants, siblings,
spouse, and stable partner) of a witness – cannot inherit under the will,190 although
the will remains otherwise valid.191 As regards other causes for exclusion, legal
writing usually refers to Article 228, which provides rules on witnesses in civil
procedure. However, while this was probably what the legislator had in mind,192
there is an obvious awkwardness in applying to testamentary witnesses rules which
were designed with a different purpose in mind. For instance, how is the exclusion of
183
Art 1873 CC/2002.
184
Art 1650 CC/1916.
185
This at least seemed to be the prevailing opinion; other authors argued for differentiation, and in
case of relative incapacity assumed only partial invalidity. For an overview, see Veloso (n 18) 407 ff.
186
Bevilaqua (n 16) 257.
187
See Bevilaqua (n 89) Art 1650.
188
See Silva Pereira (n 26) 225 and Monteiro (n 30) 147 f, both with further references.
189
It would surely have been better to retain the provision in an amended form: see Silva Pereira
(n 26) 225.
190
Arts 1801 II and 1802 parágrafo único CC//002. The latter rule seems to be overlooked by many
writers. See, for instance, Silva Pereira (n 26) 224, or Venosa (n 106) 193, who seeks to achieve the same
result by applying Art 228 V CC/2002 by analogy. Other jurisdictions are less strict as regards the
exclusion of (potential) beneficiaries: see, eg ch 13 below at 327 f and ch 15 below at 368–9.
191
Art 1802 caput CC/2002. The solution is the same in, eg, Austrian law and English law: see ch 9 at
249 f and ch 13 below at 328.
192
The travaux préparatoires of the CC/2002 are generally of little help when it comes to details: see
Schmidt (n 3) 91 f.
the ‘intimate friend’, the ‘arch-enemy’, and the ‘spouses, ascendants, descendants
and relatives up to the third degree of one of the parties’193 to be adapted to wills?
While the testator’s arch-enemy is unlikely to be invited as a witness, an intimate
friend might well be without necessarily being also instituted as heir or legatee. Then,
however, there is no reason why he should be excluded as a witness. The same applies
to the testator’s spouse or relatives,194 and indeed under the 1916 Code it was
accepted that an heir who was not instituted by the will was free to act as a witness.195
All in all, Article 228 will need to be interpreted ‘creatively’196 if it is to be applied
sensibly to testamentary witnesses.
Typically, the witnesses to a public will are employees of the notary, thus reducing
attestation to a rather empty ritual. Bevilaqua’s draft of the 1916 Code – in line with
the rule in a number of other countries197 – had expressly prohibited this practice,
but the prohibition was omitted from the final version.198 In this respect, both the
legal regime and notarial practice have long been criticized in legal literature,199 but
the Brazilian legislator has neither acted to prevent a notary’s employees from
participating in the making of a will nor abolished the witness requirement for
public wills altogether. The first solution, in any event, may not prove very effective:
if the experience in Germany is any guide, the result may merely be that some other,
equally random, persons are asked to act as witnesses.200
3. Codicils
The codicil is another legal institution which underlines both the strong ties of
Brazilian law with the ius commune201 as well as the degree of continuity found in the
law of testamentary formalities. Brazil is one of the few countries where the codicil, in
the Roman sense of the term, still survives,202 but it is of so little use in practice that
it has twice been on the verge of abolition: Orlando Gomes’ (unsuccessful) 1963
193
Art 228 IV, V CC/2002.
194
Silva Pereira (n 26) 222 f; Venosa (n 106) 193.
195
Pontes de Miranda (n 105) 212; Nonato (n 62) 350. In other cases, of course, the application of the
rules for witnesses in civil procedure is straightforward. No problems arise, eg from the exclusion of
persons under the age of sixteen years, or of mentally ill, blind, or deaf persons. A small change in the 2002
Code, responding to criticism of the 1916 Code (see Nonato (n 62) 346), is that all deaf persons are now
excluded, not merely those who are deaf-mute.
196
Silva Pereira (n 26) 222.
197
See, for instance, Art 1012 no 9 CC Chile.
198
See Bevilaqua (n 89) Art 1650.
199
Pontes de Miranda (n 105) 208. Veloso (n 18) 369 f says that not only ‘the seriousness and dignity
of the notarial act’ is being compromised, but that also the witnesses will often be unable to give reliable
evidence in the event of controversy, as they have acted in numerous cases on behalf of testators they hardly
knew.
200
See ch 8 below at 208 (n 272) (‘coachmen, porters, and loafers’).
201
For the role of the codicil in Roman law and in the ius commune, see ch 2 above at 28 f, 33 ff.
202
It also continues to exist in Austria (ch 9 at 223), the Netherlands (ch 7 at 157 ff), and in some
Autonomous Communities of Spain (ch 4 at 90 f). And see also ch 18 at 454. In the common law world, a
codicil is simply an authenticated addition to an existing will, sometimes added at the foot of the existing
will and sometimes in a separate document.
draft for a new Code203 omitted it, and during the Parliamentary discussions on the
2002 Code a motion for its suppression was tabled. Nonetheless, the rapporteur in
the House of Representatives, Ernani Satyro, argued successfully for its retention,
saying that its limited use in practice was not a sufficient reason for abolition.204
That few people make codicils is easily explained. Wills under Brazilian law do not
require the institution of an heir205 – the very requirement that, in Roman law and in
the ius commune, the codicil was developed to avoid.206 Hence its retention makes
sense only because, unlike an ordinary will, a codicil can be written by the testator
alone, without either a notary or witnesses.207 On the other hand, only certain types
of bequest are allowed: those regarding the deceased’s funeral, gifts of ‘small amount’
to particular people or ‘to the poor of a certain place’, and legacies concerning goods,
garments, or jewellery of ‘little value’ and personal use.208 Codicils may also be used
to appoint or replace the executor of a will209 or, perhaps (but it is disputed), to
acknowledge paternity of a child.210 The validity of a codicil does not depend on the
simultaneous existence of a will.211
IX. Court practice and the flight from formalism
In Brazilian law the testamentary formalities are matters of solemnity and not just of
proof.212 Hence, as a rule, their breach leads to the invalidity of the will.213 Yet
courts, with support from legal academia, have long shown a rather liberal approach
in this respect,214 with a growing tendency to rate individual justice above legal
certainty. That Brazilian judges are often criticized for being overly positivistic and
formalistic makes this all the more surprising.215
One method of rescuing wills is to interpret the formal requirements rather
broadly. Thus, for instance, the requirement of a ‘written’ will was held to be met
203
For the 1963 draft, see nn 22 and 23 above.
204
See the account by Veloso (n 38) 148 f.
205
Art 1857 } 2 CC/2002 even states that a will may contain only dispositions of a non-patrimonial
nature. For the 1916 Code, see Bevilaqua (n 89) Art 1626.
206
See ch 2 above at 33 ff.
207
Art 1881 CC/2002. Not even writing by hand is required: Veloso (n 38) 149. The courts had
already admitted typewritten codicils under the 1916 Code: see TJSP 20.4.1923, RT 46 (1923) 351; TJSP
25.9.1945, RT 164 (1946) 287 f.
208
The concepts of ‘small amount’ and ‘little value’ are not subject to an absolute standard, but fall to
be determined in relation to the overall property of the deceased. According to Veloso (n 38) 151 f, the
courts tend to fix these at around 10% of the overall value of the deceased’s estate. Compare Dutch law,
where the absence of fixed limit has been criticized: see ch 7 below at 158 f.
209
Art 1883 CC/2002. Dutch law (for which see ch 7 at 159) abolished this usage in 2003.
210
Veloso (n 38) 150 f supports this view.
211
Art 1882 CC/2002.
212
Monteiro (n 30) 124; Veloso (n 38) 15; STF 22.8.1975, JB 81: Testamento, 88.
213
Art 166 IV CC/2002 (corresponding to Art 145 III CC/1916).
214
Veloso (n 18) 35 ff regards Louis Josserand’s article, ‘La “désolennisation” du testament’ [1932]
Recueil Hebdomadaire de Jurisprudence Dalloz (Chronique) 73–6, as very influential in this respect; see also
Leite (n 29) 391 f.
215
See Schmidt (n 3) 457 ff.
by typewriting,216 long before the 2002 Code allowed this expressly,217 while the five
witnesses formerly needed to make a private will did not, it was held, have to be
present at the same time, but could assist the reading and signing of the will one after
the other.218 ‘The superstition of obsolete formalism’, it was said, ‘must not be
fostered’.219 In a similar vein, the unitas actus requirement was applied with flexibil-
ity, so that in the making of a public will, a witness’s temporary absence during the
drawing up of the testator’s declaration was deemed permissible,220 and a person
who signed a public will for the testator and at his request was allowed to be absent
during the preceding stages.221
Where formal requirements have been more plainly disregarded, the courts look
for ways of saying that not all kinds of formal errors are of relevance. As the Supreme
Court stated as early as 1942: ‘Simple formal defects cannot invalidate the clear and
express will of the testator.’222 Thus, for instance, a sealed will was allowed despite
the fact that the act of attestation had not been signed by the testator,223 while at least
some courts have been willing to recognize public wills drawn up by the notary alone
and only later read out to the testator.224
Although most of these decisions appear as a healthy check on exaggerated
formalism, some seem to go rather too far. The Superior Court, for instance, has
recently confirmed a private will, made under the 1916 Code, in which only four
(and not the required five) witnesses had participated.225 The court’s reliance on the
rule that three witnesses are enough to confirm a will in probate226 is unpersuasive,
disregarding as it does the fact that five witnesses are a mandatory solemnity.227
Equally questionable seems the decision to uphold a private will that was dictated by
the testator but written by another person,228 or one which had not been read out to
216
STF 21.9.1973, JB 81: Testamento, 70 (regarding a sealed will); Tribunal de Justiça do Paraná
8.3.1983, JB 81: Testamento, 171 (regarding a private will). Also allowed were: a private will written
partly by hand and partly by mechanical means (STF 13.9.1979, JB 81: Testamento, 103); a private will
the first part of which was written by another person (TJSP 8.4.1990, JB 81: Testamento, 312). The
admissibility of typewriting always remained controversial, however, especially for private wills: see Cahali
and Hironaka (n 30) 288.
217
218
STJ 2.10.1990, RT 673 (1991) 167.
219
Ibid at 168.
220
Tribunal de Apelação de São Paulo 13.10.1943, RT 149 (1944) 153, 174.
221
STF 15.5.1971, JB 81: Testamento, 59.
222
STF 11.6.1942, RT 143 (1943) 330.
223
STJ 18.11.1999, Lex – Jurisprudência do Superior Tribunal de Justiça e Tribunais Regionais Federais
129 (2000) 158.
224
See Cahali and Hironaka (n 30) 27 and Veloso (n 18) 154, who are both critical of this liberal
approach.
225
STJ 2.2.2010, REsp 701.917/SP, DJ 1.3.2010.
226
See V.2 above.
227
This is why the decision of the Tribunal de Justiça do Rio de Janeiro 20.7.1972, JB 81:
Testamento, 195, not to confirm a private will that had been set up in the presence of only three witnesses,
deserves approval.
228
STJ 19.4.1994, REsp 21.026/RJ, DJ 30.5.1994; STJ 1.4.1997, REsp 89.995/RS, RSTJ 98, 246.
Where, however, it could not be proved that a private will had been drawn up strictly according to the
testator’s instructions, it was regarded as invalid: STF 18.3.1974, JB 81: Testamento, 76; Tribunal de
the witnesses.229 The admission of a public will that was drawn up by a notary’s
employee, who was not his legal substitute, is more difficult to assess, as at least the
notary had been present during all stages and had also signed the will.230 Still, this
form of delegation appears as a dangerous dilution of the notary’s role in giving legal
advice to the testator and in guaranteeing the authenticity of the will.
Thus far, neither the courts nor legal writers have developed clear criteria to
distinguish relevant formal defects from those which are irrelevant and so not fatal
to the will. The references made to the general ends of formal requirements are
usually rather vague. Still, it seems that the courts are ready to forgive almost any
defect as long as they are convinced that the testator’s intention was expressed clearly
and freely. The result is an unexpected resemblance to the ‘condonation’ of defects
practised, under legislative authority, in some common law jurisdictions,231 even
though Brazilian judges do not seem to be aware of this or, if they are, do not refer to
it expressly.
X. Concluding remarks
In some respects a study of the law of testamentary formalities in Latin America can
seem like a leap backwards in time. Institutions that appear rather outdated, such as
the nuncupative will or the codicil, have survived at least in part, and the tradition of
the ius commune continues to be strongly felt. At the same time, European develop-
ments of the twentieth century, such as the breakthrough of the holograph will or the
move away from a requirement of witnessing, have not usually succeeded in crossing
the Atlantic. If one asks for the reasons, there are no straightforward answers.
Cultural aspects seem, at most, an indirect factor: as will-making is less common
in Latin America than in Europe, the pressure to adapt to the necessities of modern
times has been correspondingly lower. But once the testamentary formalities them-
selves are discussed, the conflict between formalism and the need for certainty on the
one hand, and the aim of giving the testator’s will its due on the other, appears to be
exactly the same on both continents. The slow, but clearly perceptible, trend towards
the relaxation of formal requirements in Latin America supports this view. One can
expect, therefore, that the law of testamentary formalities in the Latin American
countries will continue to develop in parallel with Europe, although always with a
certain delay in time.
Justiça de São Paulo 25.3.1982, JB 81: Testamento, 258; Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo 15.4.1980, JB
81: Testamento, 311.
229
STJ 5.9.2006, REsp 828.616/MG; DJ 23.10.2006.
230
STJ 20.5.2010, REsp 600.746/PR, DJ 15.6.2010; Veloso (n 38) 54 ff seems to assume that the will
should be void in this case.
231
See ch 18 below at 465 ff.
6
Testamentary Formalities in Italy
Alexandra Braun*
I. Historical introduction 121

II. Wills and will-substitutes 122
1. Will-substitutes 122
2. Succession agreements 124
3. Types of will 124
4. Publication 126
1. The text 126
2. The date 128
1. Public wills 130
(a) Essential requirements 130
(b) Three phases 131
(c) Impediments to signature 132
2. Secret wills 133
1. Introduction 134
2. Wills made in case of contagious disease, public
calamity, or accident 135
3. Wills made on board a ship or aircraft 135
VI. International wills 136
VII. Evaluation 137
VIII. Defects of form 138
1. Void and voidable wills 138
2. Invalidity excused 139
3. Validity as a will of a different type 139
4. A trend towards leniency 139
IX. Conclusion 140
* The author would like to thank Dott Giovanni Liotta, Dott Alessandro Paradiso, and Dottssa Maria
Teresa Pelle for helpful comments on the drafting of wills in Italian legal practice.
Testamentary Formalities in Italy 121
I. Historical introduction
Italian inheritance law is deeply rooted in French law. In fact, most of the law in force
today stems from the French Code civil of 1804.1 The French code had immediately
entered into force in those areas of Italy that were annexed to France, such as
Piedmont, the Republic of Genoa, Parma, and the Papal States. Between 1805
and 1810 it was further extended to those Italian states which were directly or
indirectly under French control.2 Only Sardinia, Sicily, and San Marino were
unaffected.
With the end of the Napoleonic era in 1814–15, the Code civil was formally
abrogated in most Italian states, but it continued to be highly influential. In some
states, such as the Republic of Lucca and Genoa, it was even provisionally main-
tained, although with modifications. The reasons for this continuing influence
are several. The Code civil was seen as of intrinsic value.3 Moreover, it represented
a law that was neither entirely new nor perceived as foreign. In the pages of the
Code Napoléon, Italians could recognize their own law, based on Roman law.4 At
the same time, it seemed hardly practicable to return to the old system.5 Hence,
nearly all private law codes in existence before the unification of Italy in 1861
were largely influenced by the Code civil.6 The Kingdom of Lombardy-Venice,
which was incorporated into the Austrian Empire and where the Austrian Allgemeines
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch entered into force in 1816, represented an important
exception.
After unification, the first Italian Codice civile, of 1865, closely resembled the Code
civil, and the same can be said of the current civil code, the Codice civile of 1942,
which is largely based on the Code of 1865. In this respect Book 2, dealing with the
law of succession, follows the general pattern. However, while French succession law
has since been significantly reformed, most recently in 2001 and 2006,7 Italian
succession law has remained largely untouched since 1942. The only major changes
were those effected by Law no 151 of 19 May 1975 reforming Italian family law,
Law no 307 of 25 May 1981 introducing the General Register of Wills, and Law no
1
Guido Astuti, ‘Le “Code Napoléon” in Italia e la sua influenza sui Codici degli Stati italiani
successori’, in Giovanni Diurni (ed), Tradizione romanistica e civiltà giuridica europea: Raccolta di scritti
vol II (1984) 711 ff. For an analysis of the law in the Middle Ages, see Antonio Pertile, Storia del Diritto
Italiano vol IV (2nd edn, 1893) 25 ff. For a reconstruction of testamentary formalities from the Ars
Notaria to the 1942 Code, see Ugo Bruschi, ‘Old questions, old answers? Testamentsformen in Italy from
the beginning of the Ars Notaria to the 1942 Civil Code’, in Mathias Schmoeckel and Gerhard Otte (eds),
Europäische Testamentsformen (2011) 155 ff.
2
G-P Chironi, ‘Le Code civil et son influence en Italie’, in Le Code Civil 1804–1904: Livre du
Centenaire vol II (1904) 763.
3 4
Astuti (n 1) 736. Chironi (n 2) 763.
5
Guido Alpa, La cultura delle regole: storia del diritto civile italiano (2000) 83–4.
6
Arts 894–927 Codice delle due Sicilie; Arts 725–43 Codice Parmense; Arts 387–409 Codice Cant
Ticino; Arts 692–720 Codice Estense; Legge del Granduca di Toscana of 15 November 1814. As for the
Papal States, Art 33 of the Regolamento Gregoriano of 1834 referred to the ius commune.
7
Law no 1135 of 3 December 2001; Law no 728 of 23 June 2006.
122 Alexandra Braun
387 of 29 November 1990 introducing the international will.8 Thus, although other
parts of the Italian Civil Code have been significantly reformed, succession law and
in particular the provisions regulating testamentary formalities have remained sub-
stantially the same over two centuries.9 In fact, the forms of will recognized by the
1942 Code are essentially those introduced by the French Code civil in 1804.10
II. Wills and will-substitutes
1. Will-substitutes
Italian law does not recognize the validity of the donatio mortis causa, nor does it
admit inheritance contracts.11 As a consequence, mortis causa dispositions can only
be made by will, regulated in Book 2 of the Civil Code.12 In modern times, however,
legal scholars have spoken of a crisis of the will in Italy.13 Writing in the 1970s,
Vincenzo Ferrari concluded that the will had lost most of its historical significance.14
On the basis of an empirical study, he showed that wills were fulfilling a merely
secondary social function and that intestate succession was much more frequent than
testate succession.15 On the other hand, recent statistics from the General Register of
Wills show that, since its establishment in 1989, there has been an increase in the
number of wills published each year, rising from 43,735 in 1989 to 64,654 in
2010.16 Overall, however, the percentage of Italian citizens making wills is lower
than in many other countries.17 Indeed, it would appear that increasing use is being
made of will-substitutes (mortis causa and inter vivos) that can in some cases antici-
pate the moment of succession.18 Among the devices employed are life insurance
8
There is also the more recent law introducing the patto di famiglia: see II.2 below.
9
Alpa (n 5) 316.
10
The only significant changes introduced by the 1942 Code in the field of testamentary succession
concern the capacity to receive by will, natural children, and the limited admissibility of the sostituzioni
fedecommissarie. For an examination of the transition from the 1865 Code to the 1942 Code, see Roberto
Bonini, Disegno storico del diritto privato italiano (dal codice civile del 1865 al codice civile del 1942) (1982);
Carlo Ghisalberti, La codificazione del diritto in Italia: 1865–1942 (1985).
11
This was also the case under the 1865 Code which was inspired by Art 893 of the Code civil. See
Angelo Chianale, ‘Osservazioni sulla donazione mortis causa’ [1990] II Rivista di diritto civile 91 ff.
12
Like the 1865 Code, the Code of 1942 does not distinguish between wills and codicils. The
distinction was present in the French Ordonnance of 1735, but not included in the Code civil.
13
See Maria Vita De Giorgi, I patti sulle successioni future (1976) 7; Giovanni Criscuoli, Il testamento:
corso di diritto civile (1985) 15.
14
Vincenzo Ferrari, Successione per testamento e trasformazioni sociali (1972) 169. According to Marco
Ieva, people in the 1980s made less and less use of wills: see Marco Ieva, ‘Il trasferimento di beni produttivi
in funzione successoria: patto di famiglia e patto di impresa. Profili generali di revisione del divieto dei
patti successori’ (1997) 51 Rivista del Notariato 1371 ff. See further Enrico Marmocchi, ‘Il testamento
olografo tra segretezza e sicurezza’ [1998] II Rivista di diritto civile 115 ff.
15
See also Andrea Zoppini, ‘Le successioni in diritto comparato’, in Rodolfo Sacco (ed), Trattato di
diritto privato comparato vol XIII (2002) 125 ff.
16
Statistics can be found at <http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/it/mg_1_14.wp?selectedNode=0_1>.
17
See ch 4 above at 72.
18
Much literature has been published on this particular point. For an overview of the various devices
employed in legal practice, see Francesco Pene Vidari, ‘La successione legittima e necessaria’, in Rodolfo
policies in favour of third parties,19 contracts in favour of third parties where

performance takes place after the promisor’s death,20 mandate contracts with
performance after the death of the principal,21 contracts granting a life annuity to
a third party,22 and deposits in favour of a third party.23 Another option is to make
an inter vivos donation under reservation of a usufruct. Finally, more and more
frequently, articles of companies and partnerships contain clauses that regulate the
succession of shares.24
In addition, in the course of the past twenty years courts have recognized the
possibility of setting up trusts governed entirely by foreign law, so-called ‘trust
interni’.25 Such trusts, although not regulated by Italian law, may be recognized
under the Hague Trusts Convention of 1985 which was ratified in Italy in 1989.26
However, this is only possible if the law governing the trust is the law of a country
that recognizes such a device and if Italian courts do not consider the trust to be in
conflict with principles of public policy. Thus, in Italy trusts may now be employed
as an alternative to wills.27
There are several reasons for the increasing popularity of will-substitutes. One is
longer life expectancy which may encourage testators to anticipate the moment of
intergenerational transfer. Another appears to be dissatisfaction with the limits to
freedom of testation under the rules on forced heirship. Moreover, a change in the
nature of wealth seems to have made wills less attractive. Since family wealth is no
longer composed of immovable property only, testators may prefer less formal ways
to transfer their property. This seems especially true for large estates. Furthermore, a
will is not the ideal method for transferring, for instance, a family business.28
Another reason is that a will does not guarantee that the wishes of the testator will
Sacco (ed), Trattato di diritto privato comparato vol IV (2009) 155 ff; Maria Rosa Marella, ‘Il divieto dei
patti successori e le alternative convenzionali al testamento’ [1991] Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata
vol II, 91 ff; Antonio Palazzo, ‘Attribuzioni patrimoniali tra vivi e assetti successori per la trasmissione della
ricchezza familiare’, in Autori Vari (ed), La trasmissione familiare della ricchezza. Limiti e prospettive di
riforma del sistema successorio (1995) 17 ff; Antonio Palazzo, ‘Declino dei patti successori, alternative
testamentarie e centralità del testamento’ [1997] Jus 289 ff.
19
Art 1920 C civ.
20
Art 1412 C civ.
21
Fabrizio Gradassi, ‘Mandato post mortem’ [1990] Contratto e impresa 827 ff.
22
Art 1875 C civ.
23
Art 1773 C civ.
24
Francesco Pene Vidari, ‘Patti successori e contratti post mortem’ [2001] Rivista di diritto civile 249 ff.
25
For an overview of the developments, see Alexandra Braun, ‘Italy: Il trust interno’, in D Hayton (ed),
The International Trust (3rd edn, 2011) ch 15.
26
Law no 364 of 16 October 1989, in force from 1 January 1992.
27
If, however, a trust contains provisions in conflict with the rules on forced heirship, it is subject to
claw-back claims from legitimate heirs. This is in line with Article 15 of the Hague Trusts Convention. See
Trib Lucca, 24 September 1997, Foro italiano 1998, I, c 2007.
28
See also Emanuele Lucchini Guastalla, ‘Gli strumenti negoziali di trasmissione della ricchezza
familiare: dalla donazione si praemoriar al patto di famiglia’ (2007) 53 Rivista di diritto civile Pt II,
303, 304.
124 Alexandra Braun
be enforced, given that the heirs are neither bound to accept it nor to respect its
provisions.29 Finally, tax reasons also come into play.30
2. Succession agreements
Unlike the position in, for instance, Germany or Austria, succession agreements in
Italy are prohibited.31 An exception is the recently established patto di famiglia.
Following increasing pressure from the European Commission to provide more
flexible devices for the transfer of small and medium-sized enterprises,32 the patto
di famiglia was introduced into the Civil Code in February 2006 with the purpose of
regulating the passage of businesses from one generation to the next.33 By means of
the family pact, owners of a business or of shares in a business can assign all or part of
their business, or shares, to one or more descendants with the consent of the other
legitimate heirs. The assignment is gratuitous and takes immediate effect. The exact
nature of the pact – whether it represents an inter vivos or a mortis causa disposition –
is still under debate. Be that as it may, and despite the increasing amount of legal
literature on the subject, the patto di famiglia has so far hardly been used in legal
practice.34
3. Types of will
Italian law regards the will or testament as a unilateral and revocable act by means of
which a person disposes of all or part of his or her patrimony. It follows that, unlike
in Germany, Austria, or England, mutual or joint wills are not permitted, whether
made in one document or in two.35 Moreover, under Italian law a will is a strictly
personal act which must be the direct and exclusive manifestation of the testator’s
will.36 It is not therefore possible to delegate will-making to someone else. Unlike
Roman law, Italian law does not, for instance, allow an incapable person to make a
will through a parent or tutor.
In accordance with the French tradition, a variety of wills are recognized, each
fulfilling different purposes and satisfying different needs. A first distinction is
between ‘ordinary’ and ‘special’ wills. Ordinary wills may take the form of a
29
Giovanni Criscuoli, ‘Testamento’, in Enciclopedia giuridica Treccani (1994) 2.
30
Maurizio Lupoi, Trusts (2nd edn, 2001) 620 ff.
31
Art 458 C civ. Interestingly, unlike the French Code civil, the Italian Code does not recognize an
exception equivalent to the institution contractuelle or indeed any of the other exceptions recognized under
French law.
32
Recommendation 1994/1069/EC of 7 December 1994 and Communication of the Commission
98/C 93/02 of 28 March 1998 on the transfer of SMEs.
33
Law no 55 of 14 February 2006 introducing Arts 768-bis to 768-octies into section IV of Book II of
the Codice civile.
34
See Andrea Zoppini, ‘Il patto di famiglia non risolve le liti’, in Il Sole 24 ore, 3 February 2006, 27 ff.
35
See Art 589 of the 1942 Civil Code and Art 761 of the 1865 Code. The French Code civil contains a
similar provision (Art 968) which has, however, been interpreted, contrary to the stance of the Italian
courts, as concerning only the form and not the substance. See Maurizio Lupoi, ‘I trust nel diritto civile’, in
Rodolfo Sacco (ed), Trattato di diritto civile vol II (2004) 72.
36
Giovanni Bonilini, ‘Testamento’, in Digesto IV: Sezione civile vol XIX (1999) 338, 362.
holograph will (testamento olografo) or a notarial will (testamento per atto di notaio).
Notarial wills are either public or secret. Special wills cover a number of specific
situations, such as the will in case of contagious disease, public calamity, or accident,
the will made on board a ship or aeroplane, and the will of military personnel and
similar persons. In addition to the types of wills regulated by the Civil Code, Italy
also recognizes the international will introduced by the Washington Convention of
26 October 1973.
The holograph will is the most commonly used in Italian legal practice.37
According to statistics provided by the General Register of Wills, out of all wills
published in 2010, 77.57 per cent were holograph and only 22.18 per cent public.38
This is probably explained by the fact that holograph wills are less formal than the
other types of wills recognized by the Italian Code. They do not, for instance, require
the presence of witnesses, nor is there a need for depositing the will with a notary.
Thus, there is no need to involve another person in the process. Also the holograph
will is less expensive than public or secret wills. Although the notarial fee for public,
international, or secret wills is fixed at 74,39 additional charges are made for legal
advice so that, in reality, the average cost of a notarial will (including taxes) seems to
be around 500. This is much higher than in Spain, for example.40
No matter what form the testator may end up choosing, the will must be in
writing, oral (nuncupative) wills not being admitted under Italian law. The prelimin-
ary project for the 1942 Civil Code considered allowing oral wills in cases of ‘injury
or in places where there are contagious illnesses and where public officers authorised
to receive the will are missing’,41 but the proposal was abandoned because of the
difficulties in reconstructing a will simply on the basis of witnesses. This was held to
be the case even when no attempt at fraud was involved.42 Nevertheless, it is debated
in Italian legal scholarship whether an oral will is to be considered void or non-
existent, and thus whether it can, exceptionally, be validated under Article 590 of the
Civil Code. This provision states that a person who confirms or executes a deceased
person’s will while knowing it to be void is barred from founding on the invalidity.
Although some jurists consider an oral will to be non-existent,43 part of the academic
37
Lorenzo Balestra, in Paolo Cendon (ed), Commentario al Codice Civile, Artt 456–712 (2009) 963,
967; Marmocchi (n 14) 115; Antonio Palazzo, Istituti alternativi al testamento (2003); Alessandra
Ambanelli, ‘Il testamento olografo’, in Giovanni Bonilini (ed), Trattato di diritto delle successioni e dona-
zioni: La successione testamentaria vol II (2009) 1265, 1267.
38
Interestingly, compared with 1989, the year in which the register was activated, there has been an
increase in the percentage of holograph wills from 72.67% to 77.57%.
39
Ministerial Decree of 27 November 2001, Art 7.
40
For Spain, see ch 4 above at 72.
41
Art 166 of the preliminary project of the Code. See Francesco Saverio Azzariti, Giovanni Martinez,
and Giuseppe Azzariti, Successioni per causa di morte e donazioni (1979) 354.
42
Calogero Gangi, La successione testamentaria nel vigente diritto italiano (1952) 231; Antonio Cicu, Il
testamento (1951) 88.
43
Giovanni Caramazza, ‘Delle successioni testamentarie (artt. 587–712)’, in Vittorio De Martino
(ed), Commentario teorico-pratico al Codice civile (1982) 56; Guido Capozzi (ed), Successioni e donazioni vol
I (1983) 442; Marco Cannizzo, Successioni testamentarie (1996) 46.
126 Alexandra Braun
community tends towards the applicability of Article 590 to oral wills,44 and the
judiciary also seems to share this position.45 Hence, in exceptional circumstances an
oral will may take effect under Italian law.
4. Publication
In 1989 a General Register of Wills (Registro Generale dei Testamenti) was set up
under the management of the Notarial Archives on behalf of the Ministry of
Justice.46 It fulfils an information function, facilitating the knowledge of the exist-
ence of wills. The duty to register lies with notaries who must do so within ten days
of drafting or receiving a will. This extends to public as well as secret wills, special
wills, and those holograph wills that have been formally deposited with a notary
(other than on a fiduciary basis). Failure to register gives rise to a pecuniary sanction,
but does not affect the validity of the will.
After the testator’s death, private wills are required to be made public. Thus, a
person in possession of a holograph will must present it to a notary, who proceeds to
its publication in the presence of two witnesses by writing a minute in which he
describes the state of the will, reproduces its content, and, where the will was
presented under seal, narrates the opening of the will.47 The minute is signed by
the person who presented the will, the witnesses, and the notary. Secret wills, being
already in notarial custody, are opened and published by the notary as soon as the
testator’s death is intimated.48 Thereafter, the procedure for all wills, public or
private, is the same. The notary transmits the will to the tribunal and communicates
its contents to the designated heirs and legatees.49 If not previously done, the will is
also registered in the General Register of Wills.
III. Holograph wills
1. The text
Although only recognized in the pays de droit coutumier, holograph wills were
adopted by Article 970 of the French Code civil which was reproduced almost
identically by Article 775 of the 1865 Italian Civil Code and, with some minor
changes, by Article 602 of the Civil Code in force today.50
44
For references to literature, see Balestra (n 37) 962.
45
Cass 16 May 1941, no 1479, Foro italiano 1941, I, 1036; Cass 11 July 1996, no 6313, Rivista del
Notariato 1997, II, 163. For Art 590, see VIII.2 below.
46
Law no 307 of 25 May 1981 (not in operation until 1989).
47
Art 620 C civ.
48
Art 621 C civ. Similarly, if a holograph will had previously been deposited with a notary, the notary
proceeds to publication.
49
Arts 622 and 623 C civ.
50
Holograph wills were also recognized in some of the codes in existence before the unification of Italy,
eg in Art 726 of the Codice Parmense and Art 694 of the Codice Estense.
Under Article 602, holograph wills must be entirely handwritten by the testator,
and the testator must also date and sign them. This is because through the handwrit-
ing it will be possible to ascertain the authenticity of the document and to establish
its provenance. A will which is not wholly in the testator’s hand is void.51 It follows
that a holograph will cannot, for instance, be written using a typewriter or computer.
Equally void is a will that is written by filling in a set form.52 It does not, however,
matter whether the testator uses a pen, a pencil, or a brush to write, nor is it relevant
what material the will is written upon. According to the Corte di Cassazione any
material is sufficient as long as it is capable of conserving and fixing the writing in a
way that is intelligible.53 It is, therefore, possible to write the will on a piece of wood,
a piece of metal, or a tile.54 And it does not matter if the material also contains other
writing, so that a will may be written on the page of a newspaper. In legal scholarship
a debate has arisen as to the validity of wills written on the wall of a prison. The
problem seems to arise mainly because of Article 620, which requires the possessor of
a holograph will to present it to a notary for publication as soon as the testator’s
death has been intimated – something which is scarcely possible for a wall (except by
photograph or other pictorial representation).55
Although Article 602 does not say so, the courts require that the handwriting be
capable of identifying the testator.56 Problems may, therefore, arise when the will is
written in block capitals, as these can easily be forged. Further, the will has to be
written in the testator’s usual and habitual writing, although this requirement is not
interpreted in a strict manner57 and courts have taken into account the emotional
impact of making a will and recognized that slight modifications in habitual
handwriting may occur.58 Interestingly, Article 602 does not require the handwriting
to be legible, so that an illegible will is valid in principle, although in practice it
may not be possible to ascertain the testator’s intentions.59 This may be contrasted
with the position in Belgium where the courts consider the unreadable part void,
thus endangering the entire will.60 As for the language employed, it is not necessary
to use Italian as long as the language chosen exists and was not invented by the
testator.
The will is not valid if another person participates too actively in its preparation,
and that is so even if the additions made by that person turn out to be irrelevant.61 It
is not a problem if the testator, being literate, copies out a draft prepared by
51 52
Art 606(1) C civ. Ambanelli (n 37) 1282.
53
Cass 10 April 1963, no 920, Settimana della Cassazione 1963, 307.
54
Enrico Marmocchi, ‘Forma dei Testamenti’, in Pietro Rescigno (ed), Successioni e donazioni (1994)
757, 768.
55
Balestra (n 37) 968; Ambanelli (n 37) 1280–1.
56
Cass 7 January 1992, no 32, Giustizia civile 1992, I, 1495.
57
See App Torino 19 December 2000, Giurisprudenza italiana 2001, 1641. In this case the testator,
although usually making use of cursive script, was proved sometimes to have used block capitals.
58
Balestra (n 37) 974.
59
Cass 28 October 1994, n 8899, Archivio civile 1995, 951, Vita notarile 1995, 834.
60
61
Cass 27 February 1947, no 275, Massimario della giustizia civile 1947, 77.
128 Alexandra Braun
another.62 But it is impermissible for the other person to write the will out, even if
the text was dictated by the testator,63 or to guide the testator’s hand. But what if
health makes writing difficult? In such circumstances the courts allow assistance as
long as the testator’s hand is not directly guided. It is one thing to prevent the
testator’s hand from trembling, quite another to replace the testator.64 If more
assistance would be needed the testator must use another type of will.
A different case is where a person interferes once the will is written, whether by
making a change or by adding something such as the date. If the testator was not
aware of the interference the will remains valid,65 although the added elements will
not have effect. Where, however, the intervention took place with the consent of the
testator, it is arguable that the entire will is void.66 A will is valid if interventions are
confined to inessential matters and it otherwise contains all of the necessary
requirements.67
The requirement of handwriting entails that the testator is capable of reading and
writing. It is not permissible for an illiterate person to copy by hand a text written out
by someone else,68 for the person would not understand the meaning of what is
being copied.69 However, the holograph will of a blind person is valid if the testator
knows how to write and how to sign. In fact, unlike Article 604, regulating the secret
will, Article 602 does not require the testator to read out the text.70
2. The date
Not only the text but also the date must be handwritten by the testator who, under
Article 602, is required to state the day, month, and year. It is therefore not possible
to indicate the date by use of a stamp. In the absence of a date, the will is voidable,
although it is not void.71
Unlike public wills, a holograph will need not give the exact time of the writing of
the will, nor is it necessary to specify the place. Moreover, it does not matter where
on the will the date is indicated, so long as it is found somewhere on the document.72
62
App Messina, 21 June 1955, Repertorio giuridico italiano 1955, headword Testamento, c 2988, nn
30–1. The same seems to be true in Belgium.
63
Cass 29 July 1938, Repertorio del Foro italiano 1938, headword Testamento, nn 67–8.
64
App Milano 17 July 1953, Foro padano 1953, I, c 653; Cass 26 March 1949, no 681, Foro italiano
1949, I, c 788; Cass Sez II, 10 July 1991, no 7636, Archivio civile 1992, 40, Giustizia civile 1992, I, 747,
Giurisprudenza italiana 1992, I, 1, 104; Cass 17 March 1993, no 3163, Giurisprudenza italiana 1994, I, 1,
1956.
65
Cass 25 March 1946, no 314, Giurisprudenza italiana 1947, I, 1, 66.
66
67
Ambanelli (n 37) 1277.
68
69
Trib Napoli, 2 May 1975, Diritto e giurisprudenza 1976, 553.
70
See Balestra (n 37) 972.
71
Cass 9 December 1988, no 6682, Rivista del Notariato 1990, II, 184; Cass 8 June 2001, no 7783,
Vita notarile 2001, 1320, Rivista del Notariato 2002, 476. For voidable wills, see VIII.1 below. The
position was different under the 1865 Code (Arts 775(2) and 804).
72
Cass 18 September 2001, no 11803, Diritto e giustizia 2001, 34, 51, Guida al diritto 2001, 41, 56,
Nuovo diritto 2001, 1009.
The date can be given either in numbers or letters. Although the courts are quite
lenient, they do not go as far in this respect as the courts in France.73 It is, for
instance, far from clear whether a will can be dated ‘Christmas 2009’ or ‘Thursday of
the 20th week of the year’.74 Moreover, a date must not be wrong or impossible, as
for example where it does not appear on the calendar.
3. The signature
Naturally the testator must sign, and in the absence of a signature the will is void.75
The signature usually consists of the testator’s forename and surname. However,
unlike Article 775 of the 1865 Code, Article 602(2) of the 1942 Code explicitly
states that a signature is valid even without the forename and surname so long as it
designates with certainty the person of the testator. This change in wording was
much debated during the proceedings that led to the adoption of the 1942 Code, but
was eventually maintained.76 Accordingly, although an illegible signature is insuffi-
cient, it is possible to sign the will by using, for instance, only the surname or the first
name (whether with77 or without the initial of the surname) or a nickname if that is
habitually used to identify the testator or even the initials of the first name and
surname.78 Thus, in Italy the legislature, courts, and scholars have taken a lenient
approach in relation to this formality requirement, which is only necessary in order
to guarantee the authenticity of the document.79
The testator has to sign the will at the end of the document so that the signature
becomes ‘a conscious seal of the intent manifested in the document’.80 Thus, the
signature cannot be inserted in the body of the writing, although it may be added on
the following page. It is also possible to sign the will in the margins, but only if there
is not sufficient space at the end.81 A signature on the envelope containing the will is
not, however, accepted.82
The will need not be written in one go. Since it can be modified until the moment
of death, it is perfectly possible for a will to be composed progressively as long as
73
Jacopo Mattei, Il Codice Civile Italiano (1873) 130.
74
Ambanelli (n 37) 1286–7 is favourable towards the validity.
75
Cass 16 February 1949, no 253, Foro italiano 1949, I, 566; App Milano, 3 November 1964,
Giurisprudenza italiana 1966, I, 2, 253.
76
G Pandolfelli, G Scarpello, M Stella Richter, and G Dallari, Codice civile: Libro delle successioni per
causa di morte e delle donazioni, illustrato con i lavori preparatori e con note di commento (1939) 189.
77
App Cagliari, 15 January 1993, Rivista giuridica sarda 1996, 364.
78
In favour of the use of nicknames, see: Cass 11 January 1947, no 15, Rivista del Notariato 1947, 275;
Cass 21 October 1992, Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata 1993, 803. See also Balestra (n 37) 1002.
79
This was already visible in the preparatory works to the 1942 Code. See the Relazione della
Commissione Parlamentare, in Pandolfelli et al (n 76) 189.
80
Cass 21 May 1960, no 1296, Settimana della Cassazione 1960, 980.
81
Cass 31 July 1947, no 1337, Foro italiano 1948, I, 102; Cass 28 October 2003, no 16186, Vita
notarile 2004, 301, Rivista del Notariato 2004, 546, Giurisprudenza italiana 2004, 1842.
82
Cass 1 December 2000, no 15379, Rivista del Notariato 2002, 261, Giustizia civile 2001, I, 1283.
As for Belgium, see ch 3 above at 61.
130 Alexandra Braun
there is some sort of conceptual unity.83 Thus, the testator may make changes,
additions, and corrections at any time without any formality requirements. Once the
text is signed, the signature is also valid for future changes and amendments.84 Both
legal scholarship and the judiciary adopt an objective approach to wills. In other
words, they consider it sufficient to ascertain the presence of the date and signature
without the need to investigate the intention of the person.
Since a holograph will can be written over time, the question arises as to how to
distinguish a final will from a mere project. One case in particular seems to have
caught the attention of legal academics. A testator prepared the draft of a will which
he explicitly qualified as a project. The next day he added a sentence to what he had
previously written, declaring that ‘I have written my will’, and dated the document as
well as signing it. Although at first instance the document was classified as a project,
the Court of Appeal of Genoa and the Corte di Cassazione took a different view.85
A holograph will may be written in the form of a letter, whether directed at the
beneficiary or a third party, provided that it contains all of the requisites of a
holograph will, that is to say that it is entirely handwritten, dated, and signed by
the testator.86 If that is the case, the signature may even be expressed by reference to
family ties, for example ‘mamma’.87 Interestingly, although the French Civil Code
does not forbid holograph wills in the form of a letter, it was explicitly forbidden in
the Ordonnance of 1735 as it was thought to cast doubt upon the seriousness of the
testator.88
IV. Notarial wills
1. Public wills
(a) Essential requirements
The holograph will aside, the Civil Code also recognizes another type of ordinary
will, the notarial will, which may be either public or secret. Secret wills are considered
later and the present section is concerned only with public wills. A notarial will can
only be executed by those who are enrolled in the register of notaries. As a
consequence, public wills are regulated not only by the Civil Code, but also by the
notarial law no 89 of 16 February 1913, which applies to all public documents.
83
See, in particular, Cass 22 May 1985, no 2074, Giurisprudenza italiana 1986, I, 1, c 470, Rivista del
Notariato 1986, 744.
84
Cass 6 May 1965, no 834, Foro italiano 1965, I, 967; Trib Torino, 8 April 1944, Foro italiano
1944–6, c 992, 995.
85
App Genoa, 5 December 1952, Giurisprudenza italiana 1953, I, 2, 314; Cass 25 June 1954, no
2194, Foro italiano 1954, I, 1243.
86
Cass 10 April 1963, no 920, Settimana della Cassazione 1963, 307; Cass 21 January 1964, no 134,
Giurisprudenza italiana 1965, I, 1, 954. See also Angelo Verga, ‘Testamento olografo in forma di lettera
missiva’ [1931] II Rivista di diritto privato 33 ff; Balestra (n 37) 1008–10.
87
Cass 21 October 1992, no 11504, Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata 1993, 803.
88
For a historical analysis of this type of will, see Romolo Astraldi, Le nullità formali del testamento
olografo (1940) 63.
Under Article 777 of the Civil Code of 1865, public wills had to be received by the
notary in the presence of four witnesses or by two notaries in the presence of two
witnesses. When the 1942 Code was drafted, there was a proposal to eliminate the
requirement for witnesses, but this was rejected.89 The present position, under
Article 603 of the 1942 Code, is that the will must be received by a notary in the
presence of two witnesses,90 who must be of legal age (eighteen) and full capacity and
not have any interest in the will.91 It follows that testamentary dispositions in favour
of a witness are void,92 although the validity of the rest of the will is unaffected.
In practice, the witnesses are often employees or trainees of the notary.
(b) Three phases

The procedure for public wills is set out in Article 603 of the Civil Code. The testator
declares his or her intention to the notary, who will put this into writing. Subse-
quently, the notary reads the will to the testator in the presence of two witnesses, who
have the function of verifying that the writing corresponds to the testator’s declar-
ation. Hence, the whole process is split into three phases: the first in which the
testator, in the presence of two witnesses, declares his or her intentions to the notary;
the second in which the notary puts those intentions into writing; and the third in
which the notary reads out the document to the testator and the witnesses.
In relation to the first phase, Article 603 does not explicitly state that the
declaration must be oral, but that seems to be implied. As in Belgium and France,93
so in Italy it would seem that the testator cannot communicate merely by gesture or
by responding in monosyllables to questions posed by the notary.94 And it would
further seem that the testator cannot simply hand over to the notary a piece of paper
containing the will. However, it would appear perfectly acceptable for the testator to
read out a draft which had been prepared in advance.
Once intention has been communicated, the notary, or someone under the
notary’s supervision, will put it in writing, a process during which the witnesses
do not have to be present. In this regard, a debate has developed as to whether
the notary can interpret the testator’s intentions or must simply reproduce on
paper the testator’s exact words.95 The question arises because Article 603 employs
the word ‘declare’ and not ‘dictate’.96 Be that as it may, it is undisputed that
the notary can prepare his own draft as long as he asks the testator to repeat his
intentions in the presence of the two witnesses before reading out the document to
all of them.97
89
Pandolfelli et al (n 76) 191.
90
Compare with Art 971 Code civil, which dispenses with witnesses where there are two notaries.
91
Art 50, Law no 89 of 16 February 1913.
92
This is explicitly provided for by Art 597 C civ.
93
94
95
Balestra (n 37) 1024–6.
96
Art 972 of the French Code civil is more explicit on the point, employing the word dicté.
97
This is the position taken by the Corte di Cassazione. See Cass 11 July 1975, no 2742, Giustizia civile
1975, I, 1615; Cass 7 December 1971, no 3552, Massimario della giurisprudenza italiana 1971, 1806.
132 Alexandra Braun
As well as the substantive provisions a public will must also state, in chronological
order, all of the formalities required by law and carried out by the notary. Further, it
must give the date and exact time of signature as well as the place where the will was
received.98 In the absence of any of these requirements, the will is voidable (but not
void). The time is important in relation to capacity of the testator or subsequent
revocation of the will. The date must be given in words, stating the year, month, and
day.99 As for the place, it is necessary to indicate not only the town, but also the office
or the number of the house in which the declaration was received by the notary.
Once the will is prepared, the notary must read it out to the testator and witnesses.
All then subscribe. Unlike with a holograph will, the testator must sign with
forename and surname, irrespective of the testator’s habitual mode of signing.100
(c) Impediments to signature

Signature is excused for testators who cannot sign or can do so only with great
difficulty. The testator must, however, declare the reason for this, and the notary will
need to mention the declaration when reading out the will. Common grounds are
illiteracy or old age. However, difficulties may also arise due to a temporary
impediment, such as a broken wrist, or because of an impediment of psychological
nature.101 Hence, the testator does not need to be affected by a severe illness. If he
lies about his condition and makes a false declaration, this is usually interpreted as a
refusal to approve of the document, with the result that the will is void.102
Blind persons are regarded as capable of signing all types of document. Neverthe-
less, practical difficulties may arise and it has been questioned whether, in preparing a
will, the testator should be assisted by two persons as provided for by Article 3 of Law
no 18 of 3 February 1975. According to case law, however, this article only applies to
private documents (scritture private) and not to public documents (atti pubblici) such
as a public will.
Finally, Article 603(4) applies the provisions of the notarial law of 1913 to wills
made by mute, deaf, or deaf-mute persons.103 In relation to deaf persons, the notarial
law draws a distinction between those who can and cannot read. In the first case it is
necessary that not only the notary but also the deaf testator reads the will out aloud,
and that this is mentioned by the notary in the will. In the second, an interpreter is
appointed to translate the will into a language, composed of signs and gestures,
98
App Bari, 10 May 1952, Corti di Bari, Lecce e Potenza, 1953, 246; App Palermo, 7 June 1962,
Giurisprudenza siciliana 1962, 833.
99
Art 51(2), Law no 89 of 16 February 1913.
100
Cass 22 July 1966, no 1999, Foro padano 1967, I, 350.
101
Cass 3 April 1973, no 912, Massimario della giurisprudenza italiana 1973, 332. It is, for instance,
sufficient that the testator has difficulties signing because he is elderly and frail.
102
Cass 3 October 1978, no 4781, Rivista del Notariato 1979, II, 221; Cass 6 November 1996, no
9674, Nuova giurisprudenza civile commentata 1997, I, 612. See A Giuliani, ‘Effetti della falsa o inesatta
dichiarazione di impedimento a sottoscrivere atti pubblici’ [1947] Rivista del Notariato 40 ff; Roberto
Triola, ‘La falsità della dichiarazione della parte di non sapere o non potere sottoscrivere l’atto’ [1998] Vita
notarile 1540 ff.
103
The provision is not applicable if the person can understand the notary by means of a hearing aid.
comprehensible to the testator. This too has to be mentioned by the notary. Testators
who are mute or deaf-mute must read the will and state in writing that they have
done so and that it coincides with their intentions. If they cannot read or write, two
interpreters will be necessary unless one of the witnesses can communicate with the
testator.104 In all cases where a testator cannot read, the number of witnesses is
increased to four.105
2. Secret wills
The other form of will involving the participation of a notary is the secret will,
regulated by Articles 604–6 of the Civil Code. Its execution comprises two phases:
the preparation of the will and its reception by the notary. Thus, the secret will differs
from the public will because the notary does not usually prepare the document. His
task is merely to receive the will, draft a record, and keep both in his custody.
Unlike holograph wills, a secret will can be written by mechanical means and by a
person other than the testator.106 When handwritten by the testator, the will is
signed by the testator at the end of the document. If, on the other hand, the will is
written entirely or in part by someone else, or if it is written using a computer or
other mechanical device, the testator signs on every page. This is intended to ensure
that the testator has read the document and also to prevent the substitution of pages.
Consequently, only those who can read can make secret wills.107 The ability to write,
however, is not needed and, as with a public will, a testator can avoid signing by
making a declaration explaining the reason and confirming that the will has been
read.108 Arguably, a secret will could be made for a blind person by use of Braille.109
Once the will is drafted, the paper on which the testamentary provisions are set
out, or the envelope that contains the paper, is sealed so that the will cannot be
opened, extracted, or removed without being damaged.110 In the presence of two
witnesses – the 1865 Code had required four – the testator then hands the will
personally to the notary. Alternatively, the testator can seal the will in the presence of
the notary and witnesses. In either case the testator must declare that the document
contains his or her will.111 On receipt of the will the notary writes a record (atto di
ricevimento) on the piece of paper containing the will or envelope, or on a different
104
Art 57, Law no 89 of 16 February 1913.
105
Art 603(4) C civ. This does not apply to a person who is merely blind: see Cass 8 June 1983, no
3939, Giustizia civile 1983, 2628.
106
It seems, however, that paper must be used, both Arts 604 and 605 referring to a piece of paper.
107
If the testator cannot read, the will is voidable: see Cass 6 February 1948, no 193, Foro italiano
1948, I, 613. Compare ch 3 above at 64.
108
Art 604(2) C civ. This is then mentioned in the notarial record.
109
Carlo Giannattasio, Delle successioni: successioni testamentarie (Artt. 587–712) (1978) 128; Giu-
seppe Branca, ‘Dei Testamenti Ordinari: Artt. 601–608’, in Antonio Scialoja and Giuseppe Branca (eds),
Commentario del Codice Civile (1986) 123.
110
Art 605 C civ.
111
Testators who are mute or deaf-mute declare in writing that the document contains their will and, if
written by another person, that they have read it.
134 Alexandra Braun
envelope provided by the notary and sealed by him. This states that the will has been
handed over and that the notary has received the declaration by the testator, as well as
giving the number and imprint of the seal and noting the assistance of the witnesses
at all stages. The testator, witnesses, and notary then sign.112 In order to prevent
possible interference with or substitution of wills, all of this has to be done consecu-
tively and without intervals or attending to other instruments.
It will be seen that, although the secret will represents some sort of middle ground
between holograph and public wills, the formality requirements are rather complex.
Hence, the making of this type of will is cumbersome113 and it is, therefore, perhaps
not surprising that it is hardly ever used in practice.114
V. Special wills
1. Introduction
As many other legal systems, Italy recognizes a number of special wills: wills made in
case of contagious disease, public calamity, or accident; wills made on board a ship or
aircraft; and military wills.115 Although all three are classified as public, the normal
formality requirements are somewhat softened.116 And while each is governed by
specific provisions, some rules are common to all, such as those concerning the
formalities that have to be followed by the person who receives the will, the rules
regarding the deposit of the will in the archive, and the requirement that writing be
used.117 Further, unless the testator dies first, special wills lapse three months from
the time when the testator returns to a place where he or she could make use of an
ordinary form of will.118
Today, the conditions for the making of special wills have largely disappeared.119
Accordingly, they are only exceptionally employed and there is very little case law.120
Only military wills seem still to retain some relevance. The treatment here of special
wills can therefore be brief.
112
If the testator is unable to sign, the procedure is the same as for public wills, already discussed.
113
Balestra (n 37) 1047; Maria Leonara Loi, ‘Le successioni testamentarie: Artt. 587–623, cod. civ.’, in
Walter Bigiavi (ed), Giurisprudenza sistematica civile e commerciale (1992) 253; Giovanni Bonilini,
Manuale di diritto ereditario e delle donazioni (2005) 249.
114
The same is true in, eg Spain: ch 4 above at 82.
115
Arts 609–16. These were already present in the Code of 1865.
116
Balestra (n 37) 1073; Michele Onorato, ‘I testamenti cosı̀detti speciali’, in Bonilini (n 37) 1407,
1410.
117
118
The period under the 1865 Code was six months, except for military wills, for which it was three
months.
119
Giovanni Di Giandomenico, ‘Testamento a bordo di nave o di aeromobile: una rarità interessante’
[1996] I Rivista del Notariato 357.
120
For an example see Trib Salerno, 1 March 2004, Archivio civile 2004, 624.
2. Wills made in case of contagious disease, public calamity, or accident

When a person cannot use the ordinary forms of will because of an outbreak of
contagious illness, the occurrence of a public calamity, or an accident taking place,121
a declaration of testamentary intentions can be made to a notary, the local justice of
the peace, the mayor or a person representing the mayor, or a clergyman, in the
presence of two witnesses who are at least sixteen years old. The will is written out by
the person who receives the declaration and signed by that person, the testator, and
the witnesses. If the testator or a witness cannot sign, the reason has to be indicated,
although no formal declaration is needed. As can be seen, this is a simplified version
of the public will. Thus, the will can be received by a person who is not a notary; the
testator and witnesses can be excused from signing; and even minors can act as
witnesses.
The courts have approved the use of this type of will only when it is not possible
for the testator to use an ordinary will.122 An example is the outbreak of an epidemic
(whether or not the testator is personally affected). The special form can also be used
if a catastrophic event takes place, such as an earthquake, or if a person lives in the
mountains and is isolated during the winter.123 Finally, Article 609 mentions cases in
which the testator was the victim of an accident, for example one that caused severe
injury or put lives at risk.124
3. Wills made on board a ship or aircraft

The Code does not restrict wills on board a ship to cases where the ordinary forms of
will are unavailable.125 Nevertheless, a majority of legal scholars thinks that merely
being on a ship is insufficient to allow the use of this form. In other words, they
require that the use of an ordinary will is difficult or impossible.126 Further, it is
questionable whether the provision applies to ships on a river, a lake, or in har-
bour.127 However, Italian legal scholarship tends to view special wills as exceptions
that are not to be further extended.
A will on board a ship may be received by the ship’s captain.128 The will has to be
written out in duplicate original (doppio originale) in the presence of two witnesses,
121
Art 986 of the French Civil Code does not mention the case of an ‘accident’.
122
123
Onorato (n 116) 1412. Unlike Arts 985 and 986 of the French Civil Code, the Italian Code does
not refer to the fact that communication has to be interrupted.
124
As to the interpretation of the word ‘infortunio’, see Azzariti et al (n 41) 402; Cicu (n 42) 88; Gangi
(n 42) 237.
125
Art 611 C civ.
126
For a different view, see Di Giandomenico [1996] I Rivista del Notariato 366. Art 988 of the French
Civil Code requires the impossibility of communication with land.
127
Art 988 of the French Civil Code explicitly mentions, and thus admits, wills made during stoppage
in a port.
128
Art 611 C civ. The will of the captain may be received by the next person in order of command.
136 Alexandra Braun
and signed by the testator as well as by the person receiving the will and the witnesses.
The will is kept among the documents of the ship and registered in the logbook
(giornale di bordo) or navigation book (giornale nautico) and on the crew list. Article
613 deals with the delivery of the will once the ship arrives in a harbour where there is
a consulate, and Article 614 regulates how this delivery is to be reported (verbale di
consegna). The same provisions apply mutatis mutandis to wills made on aircraft, an
innovation of the 1942 Code.129
4. Military wills
The military will was already present in Roman law. Article 617 allows this will to be
received by an officer, a military chaplain, or an official of the Red Cross, in the
presence of two witnesses. It has to be signed by the testator, the person who receives
it, and the witnesses. As soon as possible thereafter, the will is transmitted to the
competent ministry, which will order its deposit with the notarial archive in the last
place of domicile or residence of the testator. The will is restricted to members of the
armed forces who are involved in a war, find themselves in a war zone, or are
deployed outside their country or in a place where communication is interrupted.130
Thus, although not explicitly mentioned in Article 617, it is necessary that the
testator could not avail himself of an ordinary form of will.131
VI. International wills
The international will, which derives from the Washington Convention on the Form
of an International Will (1973), was introduced in Italy by law no 387 of 29
November 1990. Unlike in Belgium, where the international will replaced the secret
will, in Italy it became an additional form of will.
A detailed account of international wills is given in chapter 3 and only a brief
discussion is needed here. As with secret wills, the preparation of an international will
comprises two distinct stages: the drafting of the will itself and the preparation of a
certificate. The will is unilateral (mutual or joint wills being excluded), and can be
written by means of a computer or other mechanical device. Like the secret will, it
can be written by someone other than the testator; unlike that will, it can also be
prepared by one of the witnesses, by both, by the notary, or by all of them together.
Another difference is that, at least according to some authors, the person who drafts
the will for the testator as well as the person authorized to receive it can be
beneficiaries in the will.
Thus far international wills have hardly been used in Italian legal practice, and no
case law seems to exist on the subject. This is partly because this form of will is hardly
129
Art 616 C civ.
130
Balestra (n 37) 1118–19.
131
See Pandolfelli et al (n 76) 203.
known to Italian citizens and partly because to a large extent the international will
duplicates other forms of will that are already recognized by the Civil Code,
especially the secret will.132 Nevertheless, it is a useful option where a testator has
property in another contracting state.
VII. Evaluation
Holograph wills have the advantage of secrecy and they can easily be changed without
the assistance of an outside person. Nobody need know about the content or even the
existence of the will, which can eliminate the risk of pressure from others. And if the
testator wishes to make changes, this can be done without the involvement of a notary.
On the other hand, a holograph will might be stolen, destroyed, or even lost after
death. Also, doubts may arise as to its authenticity. Some of these risks would be
avoided by requiring testators to deposit holograph wills with a notary, as indeed was
the case in some of the pre-unification Codes.133 As it is, a voluntary deposit is possible
but rarely used,134 testators generally preferring secrecy over security.135
As a public document, a notarial will can be challenged only on the ground of
fraud.136 It thus provides conclusive evidence, not only of the notary who drafted it,
but also of the declaration of the parties and of other facts that were attested by the
notary as having occurred in his presence or executed by him. By contrast, holograph
wills, as mere private documents, are conclusive as to the testator’s declaration only if
the person against whom they are produced accepts the authenticity of the document
and signature.137 The probative force of a holograph will is different from that of a
notarial will.138 Notarial wills also have other advantages. They are unlikely to be lost
or destroyed. They capture the testator’s intentions by the use of technical-juridical
language, and there is a greater likelihood that those intentions were well consid-
ered.139 At the same time, however, this type of will requires the presence of a notary
and makes public not only the will’s existence, but also its contents. Moreover, the
costs are inevitably higher.
The secret will has characteristics of both the holograph and the public will. Its
content remains secret, although the fact of having been deposited with a notary is
known. There is no requirement that it be handwritten by the testator, that it be
132
R Perchinunno, ‘Note introduttive’, in R Perchinunno (ed), ‘Commentario alla l. 29 novembre
1990, n. 387’, in Nuove leggi civili commentate (1996) 50 and n 2.
133
Art 5 Legge del Granduca di Toscana of 15 November 1814; Art 696 Codice Estense. When the 1865
Code was being drafted, the possibility of a duty to deposit holograph wills with a notary was considered.
See Vittore Vitali, ‘Delle successioni legittime e testamentarie’, in Pasquale Fiore and Biagio Brugi (eds),
Trattato di diritto civile pt III vol 9 (1923) 285; F Degni, ‘Successioni testamentarie’, in Nuovo Digesto
italiano (1940) 1067 ff. But this view did not prevail.
134
Art 61(1), (3), Notarial Law of 1913; Arts 608, 620(4) C civ.
135
Marmocchi (n 14) 116.
136
Balestra (n 37) 1042–3; Art 2700 C civ.
137
Art 2702 C civ; Balestra (n 37) 1010–14.
138
Balestra (n 37) 1010–16.
139
This may explain why, during the drafting of the 1865 Code, some suggested following the model
of the Codice Albertino and abolishing holograph wills.
138 Alexandra Braun
dated, or (if the testator cannot write) that it be signed. Yet because the will is handed
over to a notary, the document is securely held. Thus, in a way the secret will
combines the advantages of both the holograph and the public will. However, as
mentioned earlier, there are further formal requirements that render the will cum-
bersome and unattractive in practice.
VIII. Defects of form
1. Void and voidable wills

What if the formality requirements established by the Civil Code and the notarial
law are not met?140 Unlike for inter vivos transactions, Italian law does not provide an
organic set of provisions, but simply indicates in which cases a will is void and
in which it is voidable. This distinction had been unknown to the 1865 Code,
which provided that the lack of any of the formality requirements would render the
will void.
A will that is void has no effect, whereas one that is voidable is fully effective unless
or until the formality defect is raised and established. The distinction is also of
relevance for third parties. If a will is void, any right acquired from a person who
turns out not to be the heir or legatee is void in turn. By contrast, a judgment that
invalidates a voidable will does not affect rights that a third party has acquired in
good faith and for value.141
The rules are mainly contained in Article 606 of the Civil Code.142 A holograph
will is void if it is not handwritten or if the signature is missing, while a notarial will
(be it public or secret) is void if there is no reduction to writing of the testator’s
declaration or if the signature of the testator or notary is missing. Where, in the case
of notarial wills, the testator is incapable of signing, the will is void if there is no
declaration indicating the reason. The same applies if the impediment founded on
does not exist, since in that case the testator is deemed to have refused to sign the will.
This list is exhaustive: in all other cases – that is to say, when other formality
requirements are missing – the will is voidable and can be set aside within five
years from the day on which the testamentary disposition was executed. This can be
done by anyone whose interest derives from a right that would arise if the will were to
be invalidated.143 It follows that, unless a person having an interest files a claim
alleging its invalidity, the will produces its effects, and in any event does so once the
limitation period has expired.
An international will cannot be voidable and will be void only in respect of a
failure to comply with Articles 2 to 5 of the law implementing the Convention.
140
Art 58, Law no 89 of 16 February 1913, deals with the validity of notarial acts.
141
But see Art 2652(6) C civ for the position where the claim was registered.
142
For special wills, see Art 619 C civ. They are void if the testator’s declaration is not in writing or if
the signature of the person authorized to receive the will, or that of the testator, is missing.
143
Cass 30 January 1987, no 892, Vita notarile 1987, I, 744. See: Cicu (n 42) 100; Lina Bigliazzi Geri,
Il testamento (1976) 189, n 7, 202, n 40.
2. Invalidity excused
A void will may still take effect on the basis of Article 590 of the Civil Code.
This prevents a challenge to a will by a person who, having been informed as to the
cause of invalidity, nonetheless confirms the disposition or voluntarily executes it
after the testator’s death. This does not make the will valid as such; it simply
precludes the person who has confirmed or executed it from raising its invalidity.
This means that other interested persons can still challenge the will. Article 590
seems to extend to special wills which have lost their validity due to the lapse of
three months from the moment in which it was possible for the testator to make
an ordinary will.144
3. Validity as a will of a different type

Article 607 of the Civil Code allows a failed secret will to take effect as a holograph
will so long as it is handwritten by the testator and dated and signed by him.
Similarly, a blundered international will can be converted into a will of some other
type,145 which in practice (and then only rarely) could only be a holograph will.146
But there is no general principle allowing failed wills to jump species barriers, and in
any event the differences between the will types are such as to make the issue unlikely
to arise in practice.
4. A trend towards leniency

In modern times there has been a move away from strict adherence to formalities and
towards a more lenient approach, although not as lenient as in France or Belgium,147
and a majority of legal scholars as well as the judiciary seek to favour the validity of
the instrument. For instance, in the case of public wills, Article 603(2) is being
interpreted in a less stringent manner, with the result that the two witnesses may not
necessarily have to be present when the testator declares his or her will to the notary.
Instead, it is thought to be sufficient that they assist when the notary reads out
the will.148 As for holograph wills, we have seen that they can take the form of a letter
and that courts are not particularly strict as far as concerns the testator’s signature or
the date.149 But this trend towards leniency does not go so far as to admit oral wills
and, unlike in countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, the courts
144
Giovanni Bonilini, Manuale di diritto ereditario e delle donazioni (2003) 276. For the possible
application of Art 590 to oral wills, see II.3 above.
145
See Art 1(1), Law no 387 of 29 November 1990.
146
G Capaldi, ‘Commento all’art. 1’, in Perchinunno (n 132) 61, 65.
147
See Maria Chiara Tatarano, Il Testamento (2003) 108–12. As for special wills, it would seem that
courts have been strict in restricting their use to cases where an ordinary will is impossible.
148
Branca (n 109) 116.
149
See III.2 and III.3 above.
140 Alexandra Braun
do not have a dispensing power which would allow them to overlook errors in
testamentary formalities.
IX. Conclusion
Many of the provisions of the 1942 Civil Code concerning testamentary formalities
stem directly from the 1865 Civil Code, which, in turn, is largely based upon the
French Code civil. All in all, Italian testamentary law resembles French succession law
much more closely even than Belgian law does. Of course, there are some minor
differences between the 1942 and the 1865 Codes, such as the addition of wills
written on aircraft or made in case of an accident. However, the principal forms of
will remain substantially the same.
Moreover, since the 1942 Code was introduced, no major reforms have been
passed in this field. This is somewhat surprising given that the provisions concerning
testamentary formalities have not met with much success. Special wills have long lost
their importance and the same can be said of secret wills, the requirements for which
are over-complex and have rendered the form obsolete. Further, the international
will is hardly ever used in legal practice. The only types of wills in regular use today
are therefore public wills and holograph wills, of which the latter is much more
popular. The holograph will is valued for not requiring the assistance of an outside
party either in the form of a witness or notary. At the same time, however, it is
exposed to a number of risks and not infrequently gives rise to difficulties concerning
the handwriting, the date, the revocation of the will, or the intervention of a third
person.150 Nevertheless, Italian testators favour the simplicity and secrecy offered by
this form over the security provided by the notarial will.
In any event, compared to many other countries, only relatively small numbers in
Italy seem to use wills to manage their succession. Although there is, unfortunately,
little empirical data to hand, it is clear that at least since the 1970s wills have become
less popular. As mentioned earlier, there seem to be several reasons for this develop-
ment, most of which are not peculiar to the Italian legal system.151 Whatever the
reasons for the ‘crisis of the will’, it cannot easily be overcome by using contractual
devices, for the management or arrangement of inheritance by succession pacts is
void.152 However, will-substitutes seem to offer a promising alternative.153
It may be that the time has come for a reform of the formality requirements for
wills. Whether and how one should go about such a reform depends on what the
ultimate function of the requirements is thought to be.154 They can be seen as
protecting testators from unconsidered decisions or, from another viewpoint, as
150
Pene Vidari (n 18) 33.
151
See II.1 above.
152
Giovanni De Nova, ‘Autonomia privata e successioni mortis causa’ [1997] Jus 273 ff.
153
See II.1 above.
154
Michele Giorgianni, ‘Forma degli atti (dir. Priv)’, in Enciclopedia del diritto vol XVII (1986) 988 ff;
Antonio Liserre, Formalismo negoziale e testamento (1966).
safeguarding heirs against hasty decisions by the testator. In other words, they serve a
cautionary function, making sure that the will is deliberate and corresponds to a
serious intention. At the same time, the requirements also fulfil an evidentiary
function, increasing the level of certainty in determining the intention of the testator.
At the moment there is little debate in Italian legal scholarship concerning the
form of wills, much less a proposal to reform the existing requirements.155 Most of
the academic discussion in this area focuses on will-substitutes and on the prohibi-
tion of succession pacts. However, among those who deal with testamentary for-
malities, some have advocated relaxation of the requirements,156 while others have
expressed a certain distaste for the holograph will and advocated its removal.157 In
any event, it seems that a clearer picture as to why relatively few people make wills is
required if forms are to be provided that are more in line with the needs of testators.
155
Bruschi (n 1) 181.
156
Marino Bin suggests relaxing the requirements in recognition of the dominance of mechanical
devices: see Marco Comporti, ‘Considerazioni conclusive e prospettive di riforma legislative’, in Autori
Vari (n 18) 177, 192.
157
Liserre (n 154) 181–6; Pietro Perlingieri, ‘Il diritto ereditario all’affacciarsi del nuovo millennio:
problemi e prospettive’, in Stefano Delle Monache (ed), Tradizione e modernità nel diritto successorio dagli
istituti classici al patto di famiglia (2007) 317, 321.
7
Testamentary Formalities in the Netherlands
Wilbert D Kolkman
I. Historical overview 143

1. To the early Middle Ages 143
2. Late Middle Ages and Old Dutch period 144
3. French era and the Civil Code of 1838 145
4. Present-day situation 146
II. Types of will 147
1. Notarial wills 147
(a) Terminology 147
(b) No special formalities 147
(c) Role of the notary 148
(d) Formalities in the Notaries Act 150
(e) Incorporation by reference 151
(f ) Sanctions 153
2. Deposited wills 153
(a) Terminology 153
(b) Formalities for private deeds 154
(c) Procedural aspects 154
(d) Practical implications 156
3. Codicils 157
(a) Terminology 157
(b) Formalities 157
(c) Informal testamentary dispositions 158
4. Emergency (extraordinary) wills 159
5. Donatio mortis causa 160
III. Evidence 161
1. General 161
2. Practical implications 163
IV. Special features of testamentary formalities 164
1. Registration in the Central Register of Wills 164
2. Prohibition of ‘joint’ wills 165
3. Signature 166
(a) Signing notarial deeds 167
(b) Inability to sign 168
4. Witnesses 168
Testamentary Formalities in the Netherlands 143
V. Adherence to formalities 170

1. Sanctions and the reasoning behind them 170
2. Two examples 171
3. Proportionate application of sanctions 173
VI. Concluding remarks 173
I. Historical overview
1. To the early Middle Ages

Et nullum testamentum: with these famous words Tacitus, with some surprise, exclaimed
that the population of the territory which now comprises the Netherlands did not make
testamentary dispositions.1 The main explanation is that the concept of individual
property was still foreign to these regions at the beginning of the Common Era.2
However, from the fifth century onwards people started making irrevocable gifts
mortis causa on a small scale. They were accompanied by extensive formalities, such as
a solemn court hearing and the presence of a king.3 Such formalities and the
multilateral nature of these juristic acts stood in the way of making dispositions ad
pias causas. Therefore, under the influence of the Church, efforts were made to create
the possibility of making unilateral dispositions in anticipation of death. This prac-
tice, based on Roman law, lasted in the region until the ninth century, but then it fell
into disuse.4 For centuries after that all dispositions in anticipation of death were
made during the giver’s lifetime – including those in the form of a donatio reservato
usufructu and a donatio post obitum, often ad pias causas.5 The formalities attached to
these donationes post mortem varied, but they were never minor: they entailed solemn
proceedings relating to a charter of gift in the presence of many witnesses, for instance,
or even judicial proceedings.6 Due to the advent of what in contemporary termin-
ology can be called an executor – initially an intermediary between the giver while still
alive and the ultimate beneficiaries – the disposition increasingly came to resemble
a modern will, namely a revocable juristic act.7 Fischer concludes that from the
twelfth century onwards the time was ripe in the Netherlands (just as in Germany
1
Tacitus, De origine et situ Germanorum or Germania 98 no 20.
2
Cf M Puelinckx-Coene, Erfrecht (1989) 19 ff.
3
According to H F W D Fischer, ‘De voorgeschiedenis van het testament in Nederland’, in E M Meijers
and J Eggens (eds), Het Testament (1951) 26. He discusses the various forms these dispositions could take,
including the thinx and the affatomie. H Auffroy, Évolution du testament en France, des origines au XIIIe siècle
(Paris, 1899) 146 ff calls dispositions of this kind ‘équivalents du testament’.
4
R W H Pitlo, De ontwikkeling der executeele (1941) 89 ff.
5
As is shown by a great number of charterbooks of that period, eg J F Niermeijer, Honderd Noord-
Nederlandse oorkonden en akten uit de jaren 1254–1501 (1939) nos 1, 38, and 55.
6
Fischer (n 3) 31.
7
A Schultze, Die langobardische Treuhand und ihre Umbildung zur Testamentsvollstreckung (Breslau,
1895); R Caillemer, Origines et développement de l’exécution testamentaire (Époque Franque et Moyen Age)
(1901); Pitlo (n 4).
144 Wilbert D Kolkman
and in the French pays de droit coutumier) for the introduction of the will as we know it
today.8 In his opinion the development of the donatio post mortem, the early reception
of Roman law, the shift in legal views (with more emphasis on earthly possessions and
thus less inclination to dispose of them irrevocably during life), and the development
of the nomination of executors were all factors that contributed to this increase.
2. Late Middle Ages and Old Dutch period

From the twelfth century onwards, the profession of the public notary started developing
in the context of both church and secular authorities.9 The survival of notarial deeds
containing wills enables one to paint a picture of that time, but this picture is by no
means clear and comprehensive. Only in places where research has been conducted at
the local level can one form a good idea of the form, number, and contents of these wills.
Places where this type of data is available include ’s-Hertogenbosch10 and Maastricht.11
In his Inleyding Hugo de Groot describes the forms of will that existed at his time,
the so-called Old Dutch Period.12 Three forms of will were acknowledged in practice
in those days: (a) the Roman nuncupative will in its original form (purely oral, seven
witnesses); (b) the sealed will (presented to a notary and two witnesses); and (c) the
‘oral’ will (drawn up in writing by the notary, executed with two witnesses).13 All of
these still quite accurately reflected the old Roman rules.14
Form books (also known as notary books or artes notariae) which came into
vogue from the sixteenth century onwards are of great importance.15 They provide
a detailed picture of the procedural requirements for medieval notarial deeds.
As a rule, a deed had to include at least the following elements: (a) the invocatio
(invocation of the name of God); (b) the year in which the deed was drawn up; (c)
the indictio (further indication of the year); (d) the names of the incumbent Pope or
Emperor; (e) further details of the date (month, day, and hour); (f) an indication
8
Fischer (n 3) 34.
9
An excellent overview is to be found in A F Gehlen and P L Nève (eds), Het notariaat in de Lage
Landen ( 1250–1842) (2005).
10
A H P van den Bichelaer, Het notariaat in Stad en Meierij van’s-Hertogenbosch tijdens de Late
Middeleeuwen (1306–1531) (1998) 169 ff and 356–7; G A M van Synghel, Actum in camera scriptorum
oppidi de Buscoducis. De stedelijke secretarie van’s-Hertogenbosch tot ca. 1450 (2007) 323 ff.
11
A Fl Gehlen, Het notariaat in het tweeherig Maastricht, een rechtshistorische schets van de inrichting en
practijk van het Maastrichtse notariaat vanaf zijn opkomst tot aan het einde van de tweeherigheid over de stad
(1292–1794) (1981) 70 ff.
12
H de Groot, Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechts-geleerdheid vol II (F Dovring, H F W D Fischer, and
E M Meijers (eds), 1965) 17.
13
T H M H Borret, De historische ontwikkeling der testamentsvormen van het Nederlandsch burgerlijk
recht (1909) 89–90. Both the court and the notary were authorized to execute wills, but this did not affect
the formalities.
14
Nevertheless, there were differences of opinion and controversies, such as that between Voet and de
Groot as to whether the main national form of will – namely the oral will which was subsequently reduced
to writing – should be classified with the Roman nuncupative will (according to de Groot) or the
testamentum scriptum (according to Voet): cf J W Tromp, ‘Opmerkingen omtrent den vorm en het
wezen van uiterste willen volgens het oud Hollandsch regt’ [1851] Themis 257 ff.
15
See P L Nève and J J Verbeek (eds), Forma servata (1998) 1 ff; A Pitlo and A Fl Gehlen, De
zeventiende en achttiende eeuwse notarisboeken (2004) 3 ff.
of the place where the deed was executed; (g) the names of the attesting witnesses; (h)
the subscriptio (signature); and (i) the notary’s seal.16
These notary books show, first, that a distinction was drawn between a testament
(formal will) and a codicil (informal will). Traces of this distinction – derived from
Roman law – can still be found in modern law.17 Second, the notary books show a
classification of wills – which again goes back to Roman law18 – into oral wills and
sealed or secret wills.19 At that stage an oral will (also known as an open, public,
nuncupative, or solemn will) entailed the nomination of heirs or legatees in the
presence of seven witnesses.20 Often the oral will was subsequently drawn up in
writing by a notary and signed by the witnesses.21 Most authors regarded this will as
having taken effect in the oral declaration itself; the written form served only ‘as an
aid to the memory’.22 The sealed or secret will, on the other hand, was written by
either the testator himself or by someone else. After being sealed, it was submitted to
either the notary or a court of law. In the presence of a small number of witnesses a
deed of superscription was then placed on the cover, with a declaration by the
testator that the document contained his last will.23
3. French era and the Civil Code of 1838

The Dutch Civil Code of 1838 (henceforth also referred to as ‘OBW’, that is, Oud
Burgerlijk Wetboek (old Civil Code)), which was based on the French Code
civil, included four standard types of will.24 The first was the public will
(the most common type) – the model for the modern notarial will. This had
to be executed in the presence of a notary and two witnesses.25 That this form
of will was the most common can be inferred from evidence relating to notaries
and notarial deeds from places such as Amsterdam,26 Amersfoort,27 Beuningen,28
16
See Pitlo and Gehlen (n 15) 147; C M Cappon, ‘De continuı̈teit van het notariaat’, in A Fl Gehlen
and P L Nève (eds), Het notariaat in de Lage Landen ( 1250–1842) (2005) 23.
17
See further II.3 below.
18
J Inst 2, 10 pr.
19
Pitlo and Gehlen (n 15) 169.
20
See, eg J Thuys, Ars Notariatus, Dat is Conste ende stijl van Notarischap begrepen in Theorijcke
ende Practijcke (Antwerp, 1590) cap XXII 26.
21
Cf de Groot (n 12) II, 17, 23: ‘De uiterste willen die mondeling geschieden werden meest altijd oock
schriftelick vervatet’ (‘The wills made orally were usually also drawn up in writing’).
22
Cf E M Meijers, Mr C. Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlandsch Burgerlijk Recht, 4e
deel, Erfrecht (1941) 193. See also de Groot (n 12) II, 17, 10: ‘om de geheuchenisse wille’; Tromp [1851]
Themis 267: ‘ad faciliorem probationem’. See also II.1(b) below.
23
Pitlo and Gehlen (n 15) 169–70.
24
The 1838 Civil Code was preceded by bills which were – in view of the composition of the
Kingdom, which until 1830 also included Belgium – strongly influenced by the Code civil: see Y M I
Greuter-Vreeburg, De codificatie van het erfrecht 1798–1838 (1987).
25
Arts 985 and 986 OBW.
26
B Duinkerken, Notariaat in overgangstijd 1796–1842 (1988) 347–8.
27
E J L M de Bruijn and P Maarschalkerweerd, Waarvan akte . . . zes eeuwen notariaat in Amersfoort
(1989) 21 ff.
28
T Duffhues, ‘Notariaat Roes te midden van boeren en burgers’, in T Duffhues, O Moorman van
Kappen, and J Roes (eds), Verleden in het Land van Maas en Waal (1993) 103–4.
Nijmegen,29 and Groenlo.30 However, for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
(especially from the time before the Notaries Act took effect in 1842), there is no
comprehensive information regarding the numbers of wills. Another factor is that
wills could be executed not only before notaries, but also at court.31
The second type was the holograph will, which was written entirely by the testator
himself and then deposited with a notary in the presence of two witnesses for safe
keeping.32 The notary then drew up a deed of deposit. Thirdly, there was the sealed
or secret will;33 it seems questionable, however, whether this type of will was justified
in addition to the holograph will.34 The sealed will did not have to be written by the
testator himself. The closed and sealed document was presented to the notary in the
presence of four witnesses, after which the notary drew up a deed of superscription
with the testator’s declaration that the document contained his last will. Following
the Roman example, all of these acts had to take place uno contextu. Finally, the
OBW also included the possibility of making certain dispositions through a codicil, a
private deed.35
4. Present-day situation
There are two reasons why the inheritance law which applied from 1838 to 2003 is
still relevant today. First, hundreds of thousands of wills were drawn up under the
old regime, but will only be implemented under the new.36 Second, the new rules
regarding wills differ from their predecessors only to a limited extent. The old
doctrine therefore still retains its significance.
With the introduction on 1 January 2003 of the new inheritance law in Book 4 of
the new Civil Code (henceforth also referred to as BW, that is, Burgerlijk Wetboek
(Civil Code)), the current legal position took shape. Whereas the position of the
forced heirs and of the surviving spouse caused the real controversies, the form of last
wills (Articles 4:93 and further BW) attracted considerably less attention. A number
of improvements were made, mainly simplifying and elucidating existing concepts.
In the next paragraphs, I will describe and analyse the current types of wills (II).
Subsequently, the evidential value of these types will be discussed (III), followed by a
number of special features of testamentary formalities (IV). Then the practical
adherence to these formalities will be addressed (V), followed by a number of
concluding remarks (VI).
29
R de Jong, Tussen ambt en vrij beroep (2002) 65–6.
30
J S L A W B Roes, De goede, afvallige notaris (2009) 51 ff.
31 32
See II.1(c) below. Arts 979 and 980 OBW.
33 34
Arts 987 and 988 OBW. See II.2(a) below.
35
Art 982 OBW.
36
If they were executed in a way which was legally valid under the old law, a new legal rule cannot
affect them: Art 79 of the New Civil Code Transition Act (Overgangswet Nieuw BW ).
II. Types of will
1. Notarial wills
(a) Terminology
It seems strange that the most common kind of will in the Netherlands does not have
a consistent name in the literature. Both openbaar testament (public will) and
notarieel testament (notarial will) are frequently used. The ‘public’ element is twofold:
the contents of the will have been made known to the notary (and any witnesses
involved), and the notary has public authority. However, in practice the term tends
to create confusion, because the ‘public’ status of the will seems to suggest that the
notary’s duty of confidentiality does not apply to this document. For that reason
I prefer the term ‘notarial will’. Since this is the only kind of will in which the actual
dispositions are set out in a notarial deed, I think the term has sufficient distinct-
iveness, even though the next type of will to be discussed (the deposited will) also
requires the intervention of a notary. Note, however, that the Dutch law of succes-
sion uses neither the term ‘notarial’ nor the term ‘public’.37
(b) No special formalities

Since 2003 no special civil-law provisions have applied to the formalities for a
notarial will. The only implication arising from Article 4:94 BW is that, except as
provided for in Articles 4:97 to 107 BW, a last will and testament can only be made
by notarial deed.38
The OBW, on the other hand, did contain some specific formalities for wills. The
following requirements were set: (a) the testator had to communicate the substance
of the will to the notary, who then drew up the will; (b) this statement by the testator
had to be done in the presence of the notary and two witnesses; (c) the will had to be
read out in full by the notary; (d) the notary had to ask the testator to confirm that
what had been read out was indeed his last will; and (e) the testator, the witnesses,
and the notary had to sign the document.39
Some of these old rules are reminiscent of the view that what was set out in a deed
reflected an oral declaration by the testator. The requirement that the testator was to
state the substance of the will in the presence of the notary and two witnesses was
seen as a manifestation of the requirement that the last will had to be made known
viva voce.40 One of the consequences of this view was the fact that a will was seen to
37
On the other hand, it does refer to ‘a last will and testament, made by notarial deed’. See, eg Arts
4:94 and 135(1) BW. Elsewhere there is at least one reference to a ‘public will’: see Art 2:286(2) BW.
38
Or in a private deed deposited with a notary for safe keeping. See II.2 below for a discussion of
deposited deeds.
39
Art 986 OBW.
40
See J F Houwing, ‘Het testament bij openbare akte’ (1908) 2015 WPNR 405–8; G Tripels,
‘Interpretatie van artikel 986 al. 1 en 2 B.W.’ [1908] Themis 63. The Supreme Court confirmed this in
HR 27 November 1908, W 8773. For arguments against, see Borret (n 13) 164 ff.
be valid even if the testator died before signing the document.41 However, the
declaration of a testator’s intention as set out in a notarial deed is now regarded as
a written declaration by the testator himself, not as an official declaration in writing
of what he has stated orally to the notary.42 It is only by signing it that the testator
makes the text his own.43 Authority for this view is Article 109(4) BW, which states
that a will is invalid if the testator’s signature is missing.
In fact, not many of the formalities dating from 1838 have been abandoned in the
present legislation. However, they are now set out in the Notaries Act (Wet op het
notarisambt), which makes no distinction between wills and other officially certified
deeds. The legislator states that there is no need for additional provisions (neither in
the Notaries Act, nor anywhere else), because the intervention of the notary can be
regarded as a sufficient guarantee that the testator’s intentions are correctly reflected
in the deed.44 The conclusion seems to be that the notarial will does not entail more
than any other officially certified (notarial) deed. However, in view of the importance
of the legal act embodied in a will – in many cases the disposition of all of a person’s
property – the notary has a vital advisory role to play.
(c) Role of the notary

Civil law notaries enjoy fides publica, which to a significant degree is due to the fact
that they hold public authority.45 Through the centuries the increasing authority of
notaries went hand in hand with increasing government authority. However import-
ant the formalities may be for the evidential value of a deed, the authenticity of the
deed hinges on the trust placed by the community in the notary.46 Today a
significant number of advantages are attributed to the notarial deed: legal certainty,
evidential value, enforceability, verification of the intent of a party, the availability of
legal advice, protection of the weaker party, retrievability, and tax advantages.47
The roots of the Dutch notarial profession – or more broadly speaking, the Latin
notarial profession – lie with the Roman notarius, an official who drew up deeds of
41
Cf H G Gordon, Vormen en formaliteiten in het Burgerlijk Wetboek voor Testamenten voorgeschreven
(Leiden, 1885) 30 ff; Meijers (n 22) 193. For an opposite view, see C van Bijnkershoek, Quaestionum juris
privati (Leiden, 1730) III c 5 and 8.
42
A R de Bruijn, ‘Het karakter van de notarieele functie volgens de Wet op het Notarisambt’ (1927)
3007 WPNR 552; W Breemhaar, De uiterste wilsbeschikking (1992) 38.
43
In the words of De Bruijn (1927) 3007 WPNR 552: ‘Wie de verklaringen formuleert doet niets ter
zake; het komt er slechts op aan, wie ze onderteekent’ (‘It makes no difference who formulates the
declarations; all that matters, is who signs them’). Regarding the signature, see also IV.3 below.
44
See Gr van der Burght, E W J Ebben, and M R Kremer (eds), Parlementaire Geschiedenis van het
Burgerlijk Wetboek, Boek 4, Erfrecht (2003) 667, following Committee on Inheritance Law, Report I (1960)
59: ‘Prescribing these [additional, WDK] formalities would be a failure to acknowledge the notarial
profession’.
45
For the current position see Art 3(1) Notaries Act 1999. Notaries are appointed by Royal Decree.
46
C M Cappon, De opkomst van het testament in het Sticht Utrecht (1992) 141.
47
Cf L C A Verstappen, ‘Notariële herstelwerkzaamheden in het rechtsverkeer’, in W J Zwalve, L C A
Verstappen, and J B Huizink (eds), Bekrachtiging en aanverwante rechtsfiguren (2003) 68.
conclusive evidential value and who was in the service of the government.48 From
approximately 900 onwards a trend started in the Kingdom of Lombardy, which
eventually led to the present-day public notarial practice: judge-notaries were trained
in courts to execute deeds between private individuals in the form of ‘court deeds’,
with conclusive evidential value.49 From the twelfth century onwards, under the
influence of Roman law, these judge-notaries gave themselves the title of notarius
publicus.50 At the same time the notarial profession began to flourish within the
Church.51 The unconditional acceptance of a notarial deed as evidence was a strong
incentive for the Church to involve notaries.52
Throughout the centuries the notary’s role in executing wills has become increas-
ingly important. In the past wills were private deeds, with the notary merely acting as
a passive ‘scribe’ and a witness.53 However, to an increasing extent notaries began to
draw up testators’ wills in their own words.54 Gradually the difference between wills
and actual notarial deeds thus disappeared.55
Until the introduction of the French Ventôse law56 in 1803, the old Dutch
jurisdiction regulations were in force. According to them the court and the notary
were equally authorized to execute all public deeds.57 The Ventôse law, however,
introduced a notarial monopoly for the execution of wills. Throughout all of the
successive legislative overhauls,58 this monopoly remained unaffected.
Practice shows that the notarial will is much more popular than other available
types of will. As far as the more recent past is concerned, the compulsory registration
of last wills in the CTR59 provided a clear picture of the number of notarial wills.
Since 1976 this number has fluctuated between 250,000 and 350,000 annually.60
However, earlier figures are difficult to estimate.61
48
J A Ankum, ‘De Romeinse tabelliones, directe voorlopers van de moderne notarissen’, in E M van
der Marck, A F Gehlen, and P H M Gerver (eds), Atlas van het notariaat: het notariaat in de wereld: acht
eeuwen latijns notariaat, vier decennia Internationale Unie (1989) 391 ff.
49
Cappon (n 16) 6–7.
50
Cappon (n 16) 7.
51
G R Dolezalek, ‘De kerkelijke notaris in de Middeleeuwen’, in C C T M van Haren, J Ch Janssens,
and M J Swenker (eds), Gepasseerd. De rol en positie van notarissen in het verleden (1987) 6 ff.
52
Cappon (n 16) 9.
53
See IV.4 below. Cf Borret (n 13) 79.
54
Cf L J van Apeldoorn, Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleerdheid, beschreven bij Hugo de Groot
(1939) 159: ‘Langs verschillende overgangsvormen komt men dan tot de akte, waarin niet meer de
testator, maar de notaris spreekt en ook mede teekent’ (‘After various transitional forms, the deed came
into being in which not the testator, but the notary, speaks and also signs’).
55
According to Borret (n 13) 80.
56
Law of 25 Ventôse, year XI (ie 16 March 1803).
57
Borret (n 13) 116.
58
Such as the Old Civil Code of 1838, the Notaries Act of 1842, the Notaries Act of 1999, and the
Civil Code of 2003.
59
The Centraal Testamentenregister (Central Register of Wills): see further IV.1 below.
60
Data of the CTR, presented to the author upon request.
61
First, it should be determined how many notaries worked in the Low Countries from the twelfth to
the eighteenth centuries. Only from 1842 onwards – when the old Notaries Act came into force – do we
have reliable figures of the number of notaries in office (eg this number was 747 in 1844, 829 in 1900, 835
in 1940, 863 in 1980, 1351 in 2000, and 1480 in 2009: cf de Jong (n 29) 147 and the annual reports of
the Royal Dutch Notarial Society). Second, the number of deeds per notary should be established,
although these figures are far from complete. The proportion of wills among the total number of deeds
(d) Formalities in the Notaries Act

As mentioned above, the rules with which notarial deeds – and therefore also wills –
must comply are set out in the Notaries Act. I will touch on these rules briefly and
discuss a few of them in more detail.
First, the Act sets some external requirements for a deed. The text of the deed must
be easy to read and may not contain abbreviations. As far as possible it must be
continuous and any spaces left open must be rendered unusable (that is, crossed out)
before the deed is signed. Numbers or sizes of objects and also time indications must
be written out in words.62 The text in the deed must be written in a permanent form
on sound material.63 The written pages of the deed must be numbered consecutively
and be initialled in accordance with Article 43(3) of the Notaries Act. The purpose of
all of these external requirements is to prevent uncertainties and fraud; they are also
important with regard to the external evidential value of the will (acta se probant).64
Second, the Act contains content-related rules regarding, for instance, the notary,
the person appearing, and the place and time of execution. Obviously there must be
absolute clarity as to the individuals involved in the deed. A will must contain the
name and a few other particulars of the notary executing it, of the testator, and of
any witnesses attesting it.65 The place, year, month, day, and hour at which the
deed is executed must also be stated.66 These particulars are not only of probative
value, but are also important for other reasons: for example, to make it possible to
establish that the notary was indeed authorized on the day the deed was executed.67
Apart from these official particulars and the substance of the testator’s will, no
other juristic acts may be embodied in a notarial will.68 This provision – contained in
Article 4:42 BW and Article 20(a) of the Notaries Act – ensures a ‘closed system’ of
wills. A violation of this regulation has no implications for the validity of the will;
it is a prohibition which is solely aimed at the notary.
In principle, the will is to be drawn up in Dutch.69 However, if the testator so
wishes, it can also be done in a foreign language or in Friesian, provided that the
has always been between approximately 15% and 55%. See nn 10, 11, and 26–30 above, and P Godding,
Le droit privé dans les Pays-Bas méridionaux du 12e au 18e siècle (1987) 438.
62
Art 41(1) Notaries Act 1999.
63
Art 41(2) Notaries Act 1999. This obligation is set out in more detail in the Deed Paper Regulations
2000 (Verordening aktepapier), which state among other things that, with normal usage, deed paper and
everything printed and written on it must last for at least 100 years (Art 2). The Explanatory Notes make it
clear that ‘permanent’ means not in pencil or disappearing ink, and not on thermal paper.
64
For evidential value, see III below.
65
Art 40 Notaries Act 1999.
66
Art 40(2) Notaries Act 1999. Art 40(3) requires mention of the hour only if this ‘may be of
importance in connection with registration in the public records or for some other reason’. In view of the
possibility of making two wills on the same day (with the second revoking the first), I do think that stating
the hour is relevant. This entails the notary incorporating the hour and minute of the signature into the
deed just before signing it (Art 43(4) Notaries Act 1999).
67
Cf J C H Melis and B C M Waaijer, De Notariswet (2003) 96.
68
See Kamerstukken II (Dutch Parliamentary Documents) 1999/2000, 27 245 nos 3, 11.
69
Art 42 Notaries Act 1999. It is not prohibited for a deed to contain more than one language.
notary and obviously also the testator has sufficient command of that language. This
option demonstrates a welcome degree of pragmatism; because of internationaliza-
tion there is obviously a growing need for it.70
Third, the Notaries Act includes formalities relating to the execution of the deed.
Some of these formalities have to be referred to in the conclusion of the deed.71 As
a point of departure, the testator must have ample opportunity to read the
contents of the deed before it is executed. In practice, many testators go no further
than commenting on their own particulars (for example, a name or address is
misspelt), but sometimes this requirement does generate meaningful questions or
comments.
Before proceeding to the execution of the will, the notary informs the testator of
the substance of the deed and explains it in further detail.72 Then a limited reading of
the will follows73 or, if the deed is being executed in the presence of witnesses, it is
read in full. In conclusion, the will is signed by the testator, any attesting witnesses,
and finally the notary.74 Since 2003 the presence of two witnesses is no longer
mandatory. However, the notary is free to ask for the presence of two witnesses if he
considers it desirable.75
Before signing the deed, the notary can introduce alterations to the text.76 Several
form books of the old Dutch Period, referred to above, already contained the exact
procedure for this.77 Now Article 45(1) of the Notaries Act provides as follows: the
words deleted must remain legible; the alterations must be placed in the margin of
the page or right above the conclusion of the deed; the alterations are to be confirmed
by initials or signature; and the approval must state the number of deleted and added
characters.78 Currently, only small-scale alterations are made in this fashion. Modern
technical facilities usually make it possible to print a complete new will, containing
all of the alterations, almost instantaneously. If the testator changes his mind after the
will has been executed, a new will must be made; additions to or subtractions from
the existing notarial will are not possible.79
(e) Incorporation by reference

According to Article 4:42(3) BW, a testamentary disposition may only be made in a
will; and it may only be made and revoked by the testator personally. The require-
ment that dispositions can only be made or revoked personally means that the
70
Cf P Blokland, Teksten en toelichting op de Wet op het notarisambt (2001) 95.
71
See below at the conclusion of this section.
72
73
This consists of reading out: (a) the notary’s name and business address and the date and place of the
execution of the deed; (b) the particulars of the testator; and (c) the conclusion of the deed.
74
See IV.3 below for a discussion of the signature.
75
Cf Art 39(2) Notaries Act 1999. See further IV.4 below.
76
77
See, eg, A Lybreghts, Redenerend Vertoog over ‘t Notaris Ampt I (Amsterdam, 1734) 28; J B J
Huygens, Notarius Belgicus (Brussels, 1725), Book III, Cap IV.
78
For greater detail, see Art 45(1) Notaries Act 1999.
79
Setting aside the rectification of a clerical error in terms of Art 45(2) Notaries Act 1999. See V.2
below.
delegation of the authority to make a will is prohibited.80 The law requires that
anything designated as a testamentary disposition must be recorded in a formal
will.81 Any incorporation of documents which is intended to circumvent this
requirement is therefore prohibited82 and will result in the disposition being void.83
The first situation brought to mind by the term ‘incorporation by reference’ is the
attachment of a notarial will to some other deed referred to in the will.84 Here the
will contains a testamentary disposition which explicitly states that the text attached
to the original of the will is applicable and is to be regarded as an integral part of the
will.85 In view of the direct connection between the two deeds and the safeguard of
notarial intervention, it is difficult to see why there should be any objection to this.86
A second possibility is that a will might refer to another deed which is not attached
to it. If this other document also complies with the formalities for wills, there is no
problem. An example is a codicil describing a legacy in greater detail than the notarial
will that first mentions the legacy.87 But what if the other document is not drawn up
in accordance with testamentary formalities? For example, the testator states in his
will that he will notify his heirs by letter (or e-mail) to whom they must give a
legacy.88 In a judgment dating from 1955, the Dutch Supreme Court makes it clear
that this kind of incorporation by reference is not permissible, since ‘a provision
which can only be validated in a will obviously has to be included in the will itself
and cannot be substituted by a reference to another document which is not a will’.89
However, with this judgment the Supreme Court also shows that reference to
another document is permissible for the purpose of individualizing an agreement
referred to in the will. What it boils down to is this: the will itself must contain the
80
This prohibition means that only the testator may determine what legal effect a testamentary
disposition aims to achieve: cf Breemhaar (n 42) nos 72 and 74–77; M J A van Mourik, Monografieën
Privaatrecht: Erfrecht (2008) no 46. Although at present it is of little practical importance, for the sake of
completeness there should be mentioned the increasing support for the idea that a legal representative – for
instance an administrator – should be given the statutory power to make a will for the principal. See, eg I
Jansen, ‘De hoogstpersoonlijke rechtshandeling, in het bijzonder de uiterste wilsbeschikking’, in S C J J
Kortmann, V A E M Meijers, M van Olffen, A H M Rieter, L C A Verstappen, and R T G Verstraaten
(eds), Yin-Yang (essays in honour of M J A van Mourik) (2000) 109 ff; F W J M Schols, ‘Het ontbreken
van de uiterste wil. Wills for persons lacking capacity; Een eerste gedachte’ (2009) TPR 143.
81
Cf E A A Luijten and W R Meijer, Huwelijksgoederen- en erfrecht, II: Erfrecht (2008) no 113.
82
Cf S Perrick, Mr, C. Assers Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlandsch Burgerlijk Recht,
Erfrecht en schenking (2009) no 116.
83
See II.1(f) below.
84
For deposited wills, see II.2 below.
85
See J P F Kooijman, ‘Rechtsvragenrubriek; reactie’ (1999) 6347 WPNR 166.
86
Cf the discussion between Kooijman (1999) 6347 WPNR 166; M J A van Mourik, ‘Rechtsvragen-
rubriek; naschrift’ (1999) 6347 WPNR 166; P G H T Konings, ‘Rechtsvragenrubriek; reactie’ (1999)
6361 WPNR 456; and M J A van Mourik, ‘Rechtsvragenrubriek; naschrift’ (1999) 6361 WPNR 456. See
also Melis and Waaijer (n 67) 93.
87
Cf II.3(c) below on the clausula reservatoria.
88
See Breemhaar (n 42) no 78 for other examples. Oral instructions are not allowed either.
89
HR 22 April 1955, NJ 1955 403. Cf also Middelburg District Court 26 September 1951, NJ
1952 496.
essence of the juristic act.90 Through the application of the rules of the Notaries Act,
the assistance of the notary is fully acknowledged.91
(f) Sanctions
Failure to comply with formalities may lead to a sanction in the sense that the deed
cannot be regarded as evidence, because it lacks authenticity; and also to a sanction
under civil law in that the juristic act may be void or voidable.92 A juristic act is
regarded as void if a defect in it means that the performance of the act fails to achieve
the intended legal effect.93 A voidable juristic act is in principle regarded as being
valid, but its validity can be contested by another interested party.
Often the Notaries Act states what the penalty is for the failure to comply with a
particular requirement. In addition to this, there is also the threat of a disciplinary
sanction against a notary who disregards formal requirements – even if this failure
has not resulted in any of the sanctions mentioned above.94
The OBW required an express statement in the deed that all statutory require-
ments had been complied with; non-compliance resulted in the deed being void.95
The present law is more flexible. The only formalities that have to be mentioned
specifically in the conclusion of the deed are references to the substance of the deed
and the explanation thereof, the reading of the deed, and the signatures.96 Moreover,
if the notary fails to comply with this rule, the deed is not subject to the sanction that
it lacks authenticity, nor is it void or voidable.
2. Deposited wills
(a) Terminology
The special feature of a deposited will is that it consists of two deeds: a private deed
containing one or more testamentary dispositions, and a notarial deed of deposit.97
Together they comprise a deposited will (depot-testament).
This type of will is a convenient combination of two types of will from 1838: the
secret will and the holograph will. The Code civil – as previously mentioned, the
predecessor of the OBW – included the secret will for those who wanted to make it
known that they had made a will, but not the contents of that will. The holograph will,
which remained in the hands of the testator, was intended for those who not only did
not want the contents of their will made known, but also not that they had made a
90
Perrick (n 82) no 116.
91
Melis and Waaijer (n 67) 93.
92
See also V below on the strict adherence to formalities.
93
C Asser, A S Hartkamp, and C H Sieburgh, Algemeen overeenkomstenrecht 6-III (2010) no 607; HR
15 November 1985, NJ 1986 227.
94
Cf V.2 below.
95
See the conclusion of Art 986 OBW. Some relief was provided by the Dutch Supreme Court ruling
of 9 October 1863, W 2527, which stated that the formalities to be referred to did not include the notary’s
drawing up of the will.
96
97
In this section I will not go into further detail regarding the formalities of the notarial deed of
deposit, since the rules for all notarial deeds have already been discussed at II.1(d) above.
will.98 However, the Dutch legislator of 1838 prescribed that a holograph will was to
be deposited with a notary. There were intense discussions in parliamentary circles
about this deviation from the provisions of the Code civil;99 the change did away with
any meaningful distinction between the holograph will and the secret will.100
(b) Formalities for private deeds

Unlike notarial wills, deposited wills are regulated in the Dutch Civil Code. The
relevant provisions concern private deeds and the procedure to be followed when
they are deposited.
According to Article 4:95(2) BW, a will made by private deed must be signed by
the testator; and the sanction for non-compliance is nullity.101 However, upon
further reflection one realizes that this severe sanction cannot really be justified.
The reason is that when the testator deposits the document for safe keeping, he must
in any event state that it contains his will and he must sign the deed of deposit.102
The private deed can be written in the testator’s own handwriting (holograph), by
mechanical means, or written by some person other than the testator (sometimes
referred to as an ‘allograph’ will). If a will written by some other person consists of
more than one page, each page must be numbered and authenticated103 by the
testator’s signature.104 Here I take the word ‘page’ to mean the two different sides of
one sheet of paper;105 in other words, if such a will is written on both sides of one
sheet of paper, both sides must be numbered and signed. If the signature on the first
page is missing, the will is voidable;106 if the signature on the second (that is, last)
page is missing, the will is void.107
(c) Procedural aspects

The testator must hand the private part of the deposited will over to the notary.
When doing this, the testator must declare that the document in question contains
98
Cf Meijers (n 22) 196. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of the holograph will, see
E M Meijers, ‘Holografische testamenten’, in E M Meijers and J Eggens (eds), Het Testament (1951) 51 ff.
99
See the deliberations in J C Voorduin, Geschiedenis en beginselen der Nederlandse wetboeken,
Burgerlijk Wetboek, vierde gedeelte, art. 877–1268 (Utrecht, 1838) 110 ff; and for discussions J W W
Wildervanck, Iets over testamenten in ‘t algemeen en art. 979 en 980 B.W. meer speciaal behandeld (Leiden,
1884) 18 ff; and H van Loghem de Josselin de Jong, Het olographisch testament (Zutphen, 1888) 5 ff.
100
Cf W G Delbaere, De bewijslast bij olografische testamenten (Leiden, 1893) 31; Meijers (n 22) 207.
The differences between the two old forms, such as the number of witnesses – two and four respectively –
were in fact difficult to justify.
101
Art 4:109(1) BW.
102
Cf the criticism by Breemhaar (n 42) 49.
103
See Art 4:95(2) BW.
104
According to Luijten and Meijer (n 81) no 121, initialling is insufficient in this case.
105
For the same interpretation regarding the pages of a notarial deed (which must be numbered and
signed or initialled), see B C M Waaijer, ‘Parafen op de notariële akte’ (2000) 6412 WPNR 562; P
Blokland, ‘Hoe ver reikt de parafeerplicht van artikel 43 lid 3 Wet op het notarisambt’ (2001) 6431
WPNR 81–2.
106
‘Authentication’ as defined in Book 4 Art 4:95(2) BW is a formal requirement within the meaning
of Art 4:109(4) BW; if this requirement is not met, the deed is voidable.
107
The signature required in terms of Art 4:109(1) BW is missing.
his last will and that it complies with the statutory formalities. The notary must draw
up a deed recording the deposit of the will and the testator’s declaration, which is
signed by both.108 The notary must attach the two documents to each other and
must register the combined document in his notarial records.109
Both a holograph and an ‘allograph’ will can be submitted to the notary open or
sealed. By virtue of Article 48 of the Notaries Act, notaries are obliged to take note of
the contents of every deed presented to them for inclusion in their notarial
records.110 One reason for this is that they must establish whether or not the contents
can ‘bear the light of day’.111 However, Article 48 makes an exception for the sealed
private will. This is the only deed which a notary can accept without seeing the
contents. If the document is submitted sealed, the testator may state that the
document may only be opened when certain conditions prescribed by him are met
on the day of his death.112 An example might be the continued existence of the
testator’s marriage at the time of his death.
After the testator’s death, the notary must submit the sealed private will to the
subdistrict court in the subdistrict of the testator’s sterfhuis.113 The judge must open
the document and record the fact that the document has been submitted and opened,
and he must also check the physical condition of the will. This regulation raises some
practical issues, such as whether the notary must submit the will of his own
accord,114 and what should be done if the testator’s last address was abroad.115
It seems reasonable that failure to comply with the procedural requirements of
108
See Art 4:95(3–4) BW. It seems as though in formulating these provisions the legislator had the
Roman nuncupativum in mind. Initially subsection 3 even explicitly required an ‘oral declaration’: cf Van
der Burght et al (n 44) 673. For current doctrine, see II.1(b) above.
109
Now a separate notarial deed is always required, unlike under the old regime, when the notarial
declaration could be placed at the bottom of an open holograph will.
110
Cf Amsterdam Court of Appeal 8 May 2008, LJN BD2236.
111
Kamerstukken II 1994/1995, 23 706 no 3, 42 and 1996/1997, no 12, 39.
112
Art 4:95(3) BW. Non-fulfilment of a condition leads to cancellation. For deferment see Art 49(a)
Notaries Act 1999, which enables the testator to stipulate in a will that no copies (certified or otherwise) or
transcripts of the will may be issued and that his will may not be inspected before his corpse has been
buried or cremated, with the proviso that this deferment may not exceed five days after his death. This is
sometimes referred to as the ‘compulsory funeral attendance clause’ because of the possibility that the as yet
undisclosed will states that the decedent’s heirs are to be all those who attended the funeral: cf B M E M
Schols, ‘De verplichte begrafenisclausule’ (2001) 1 Tijdschrift Nieuw Erfrecht 14.
113
Ie the testator’s last address: see Art 47 Notaries Act 1999 and Art 1:13 BW. The subdistrict court
(kantongerecht) is the lowest court of first instance.
114
For confirmation that this is in fact the case, see Perrick (n 82) no 315. The implementation of the
deposited will would be severely endangered if the submission were to depend on the (ab intestato) heirs,
who may after all be adversely affected by the will.
115
It can be assumed that the subdistrict court in the subdistrict where the testator lived before leaving
the country is the competent authority. For this assumption even in relation to Art 984 OBW – the
forerunner of Art 47 Notaries Act 1999 – see Van Loghem de Josselin de Jong (n 99) 63. See also J P W
Schermer, ‘Iets over den vorm van uiterste willen’ (1898) 1479 WPNR 214. On the other hand, it would
be convenient to give competence to the court of the subdistrict of the notary who holds the will: cf Perrick
(n 82) no 315; Luijten and Meijer (n 81) no 170.
Article 47 of the Notaries Act has no implications for the validity of the will. A will
which is valid at the time of the testator’s death cannot be invalidated by the error of
a third party.116 Nevertheless, it is suggested that the formalities of Article 47 are
awkward and unnecessary: do they not fail to acknowledge the status and function
of the notary?117
(d) Practical implications

Since the notary is supposed to take note of the contents of an open deposited deed
as a matter of course, in my opinion there is very little need for this version of the
deposited will. The strength of the deposited will lies in the possibility of its being
sealed, that is, that the contents are kept secret from everybody else. In addition, it
is extremely likely that after reading the open deposited will, the notary will draw
the testator’s attention to any defects in the private will drawn up by the testator
himself – with the result that he might have a notarial will drawn up after all.
Another disadvantage of the deposited will is that neither the open nor the sealed
version is suitable for juristic acts which can only be made in certified deeds, such as
setting up a foundation.118
That these wills are unpopular is clearly demonstrated by the figures relating to
numbers of wills: in 2009 only twenty-three deposited wills were executed in the
Netherlands as opposed to approximately 320,000 notarial wills.119 My expectation
is that in the coming years the number of deposited wills will rise, but will remain
substantially lower than that of notarial wills. I attribute the expected increase to the
rising fees of notaries in the area of family law120 and the growing accessibility of
‘alternatives’ on the internet.121 For some time now these ‘internet wills’ have been
available, but unsurprisingly they are not a success, as appears from the above
numbers. People are accustomed to the safer notarial route, they realize the dangers
of slip-ups when cobbling together something without the proper legal assistance,
and they are aware of the severe problems private deeds can cause during the
administration of the estate (for example, regarding issues such as retrievability,
evidence, and interpretation).122
116
According to Meijers (n 22) 205.
117 118
Cf II.1(b) and n 44 above. Cf Art 2:286 and 4:135 BW.
119
Figures are from the CTR, fact sheet of the Royal Dutch Notarial Society on the notarial
profession, January 2010.
120
Since 1999 there have been no fixed fees for Dutch civil-law notaries. The consequences of this
include the rise in the fees referred to and the drop in fees for real estate transactions: cf Z D Laclé, B Krop,
and N J H Huls, Balansverschuiving? Notarissen over ontwikkelingen in de notariële beroepsethiek na vijf jaar
Wet op het Notarisambt 1999 (2005) 21 ff.
121
On the validity of this new phenomenon, see C Rautenbach, ‘Internet wills as “foreign” wills: South
Africa versus The Netherlands’, in E W J Ebben, F A Groote Wassink, W J J G Speetjens, and A H N
Stollenwerck (eds), Liber amicorum for Gr. van der Burght (2009) 165 ff.
122
Cf the recent discussion regarding an internet will initiative: E W J Ebben, ‘Zin en onzin van
internet-testamenten’ (2008) 6738 WPNR 52–5; J H M ter Haar, W D Kolkman, and L C A Verstappen,
‘De onwenselijke aspecten van een internettestament’ (2007) 6722 WPNR 745–51; idem, ‘Zin en onzin
van internet-testamenten, naschrift’ (2008) 6738 WPNR 56–8.
3. Codicils
(a) Terminology
Article 982 of the OBW referred to a ‘private document’, which in practice was known
as a codicil. The legislators of 1838 avoided referring to this document as a last will.123
They were mistakenly influenced by the Roman-law distinction between a testamentum,
which had to include the nomination of an heir, and a codicillus, in which that could not
be done.124 In terms of Article 982 OBW, as is the case under the present law, there
were essential differences between codicils and notarial wills, but a codicil also contained
testamentary dispositions. There is no reason why the codicil should not be regarded as
one of the standard types of will; under the present law the ‘private document’ referred
to in Article 4:97 BW is also regarded as a last will.125 However, to distinguish it from
the other types of will, I will use the term ‘codicil’.
(b) Formalities
To the extent that it comprises only a private deed, the codicil is exceptional among
Dutch wills. The only prescribed formalities are that the document must be
completely handwritten by the testator, dated, and signed.
This means that a codicil is, in effect, always holograph. As far as the formalities
are concerned, their roots can be traced to the French regulation of the holograph
will in Article 970 of the Code civil. For that reason French and Belgian doctrine may
be of importance, especially in view of the paucity of Dutch sources in this area.126
However, it should be borne in mind that the substantive scope of a codicil was
drastically limited by the Dutch legislator in the nineteenth century; as will become
apparent, only a few minor types of dispositions are allowed in a codicil.
There are very few formal requirements for a codicil. No rules apply as to how,
with what, or on what it has to be written, so long as it is written in the testator’s own
hand.127 If the testator has typed the will – or downloaded an example from the
internet and printed it out – it would in principle be voidable.128 In practice, formal
errors of this kind occur frequently with codicils. However, if those involved are
convinced that the document is ‘genuine’, they are usually just glossed over. The fact
that no expert help is required in the drawing up and safe keeping of a codicil is
123
See Voorduin (n 99) 136, where it is stated that a codicil was ‘in no way equivalent to a true last will
and testament’. Previously there had been an unsuccessful attempt to remove the distinction: eg
Wierdsma, who drew up the 1798 Bill, refers only to wills in general (Cap 14 Art 5). Cf Borret (n 13)
94; Y M I Greuter-Vreeburg, Erfrecht 1798–1820, Bronnen van de Nederlandse codificatie sinds 1798, deel
VI (1987) 27.
124
Cf Pitlo and Gehlen (n 15) 168: in the Netherlands this view was held until into the eighteenth
century. See also Meijers (n 22) 208.
125
Art 4:94 BW.
126
This conclusion is also drawn by C H Beekhuis, ‘De vormvereisten voor een codicil’ (1957) 4513
WPNR 477.
127
See the exposition of Beekhuis (1957) 4513 WPNR 479, which is richly larded with French
case law.
128
However, see V.3 below.
possibly an argument in favour of caution when it comes to the punishing of formal

errors.
No particular requirements apply to the dating and signature of a codicil.129 If the
codicil consists of more than one page, not every page needs to be signed and
dated.130 Nor are there any guidelines regarding the position of the date and
signature on the will, or their order. From experience I know that many codicils
are dated at the top; this is perfectly permissible. It may be assumed that the signature
should be placed right at the bottom. In view of the private nature of a codicil, it is
not unimaginable that the testator might later insert alterations or additions beneath
the original signature. I agree with Beekhuis131 that, as a rule, such alterations or
additions should be regarded as valid (even without separate signatures and dates),
provided that they are compatible with the rest of the codicil’s contents and only
serve to explain the contents.
(c) Informal testamentary dispositions

Codicils can only contain legacies of, by way of summary, clothing, specific personal
jewellery, specific things forming part of the household effects, or books.132 In this
respect, Dutch law differs from that of practically all surrounding countries where
the scope of possible bequests in such a handwritten deed goes considerably further.
In the Netherlands, the fear of legal uncertainty thus outweighed the convenience of
making testamentary dispositions in a codicil.133
It cannot be denied that Dutch law on this point contains many anomalous and
arbitrary elements. For example, the bequest of an extremely valuable diamond ring
is allowed, but not that of a nearly worthless painting. Some argue in favour of
extending the scope of possible bequests in a codicil, for example by allowing
dispositions of all property with the exception of real estate and money.134 Others
think this form of will should be done away with altogether.135 In my opinion, a
compromise could be found in the setting of a maximum percentage in this regard.
129
See IV.3 below.
130
Also according to Perrick (n 82) no 317. Cf regarding the private deed of the deposited will II.2
above.
131
See Beekhuis (1957) 4513 WPNR 477, 501.
132
For further details see Art 4:97 BW. Here the ‘free of duties’ clause is missing (ie the inheritance tax
is to be paid not by the beneficiary, but by the heirs). W Breemhaar, ‘De testamentaire clausule “vrij van
rechten” en het vormvereiste’ (2005) 5 Nieuw Erfrecht 78–9 assumes that this clause is not possible with
codicils.
133
See Kamerstukken II 1952/1953, 2846 no 5, question 40 of the ‘Vraagpuntenprocedure’ in the run-
up to the present Book 4 of the Dutch Civil Code.
134
A Eiff-Klein Lankhorst, ‘Pleidooi voor het codicil’ (1990) 5947 WPNR 82–3.
135
A Pitlo, ‘Het nieuwe burgerlijk wetboek: codicillen’ (1953) 4292 WPNR 197. Pitlo thinks notarial
intervention is desirable for all types of will; in his opinion the codicil as an ‘emergency will’ is unnecessary
because ‘in the Netherlands there is no place where a civil law notary and two witnesses cannot be reached
within half an hour’. Nowadays witnesses are no longer required: see IV.4 below.
It could be specified that not more than, for example, 5 or 10 per cent of the net
value of the estate could be bequeathed in a codicil.136
In practice, people try to overcome the uncertainties associated with a codicil by
giving the document to a notary for safe keeping. However, this does not convert it
into a deposited will. Sometimes the notary attaches the document to the record of a
notarial will, if one has been made. But under Dutch law a codicil remains an
independent testamentary disposition. No clausula reservatoria137 in a will is
required as a mandatory basis for a codicil; it is therefore not regarded as a
‘complementary deed’.
The inheritance law of 2003 severely curtailed the practical usefulness of codicils
by no longer allowing them to include the nomination of an executor. In this way the
legislator ensured that such a nomination – which is of great importance to the
settlement of the estate – would not remain unnoticed; after all, a codicil is not
registered in the CTR.138
4. Emergency (extraordinary) wills

In exceptional cases inheritance law relaxes the strict requirements for the various types
of will. Emergency (or extraordinary) wills are regulated in Articles 4:98 and further
BW. These provisions are in fact very similar to their predecessors in the OBW.139 And
it seems that in the more distant past formal requirements were also sometimes eased,
for example in times of war or plague.140
Modern emergency wills can be divided into three categories: (a) military emer-
gency wills; (b) wills made on aircraft or ocean-going vessels (the so-called ‘Titanic-
testament’); and (c) ‘disaster wills’.141 In all of these cases the relaxation of the formal
requirements boils down to the substitution of the notary with some other authority
(officer, non-commissioned officer, captain, consular officer, mayor, etc).142 This
individual does not have to comply with the rules of the Notaries Act. The only
requirement is that the will must be written down properly and signed by the
testator, the witnesses, and the person in whose presence it is executed.143 The
136
A maximum percentage of this kind is not unknown in current inheritance law: see, eg Art 4:37 BW
on ‘lump sums’. This idea has also been put forward previously: Art 1651 of the 1820 Bill of the old Civil
Code set a ceiling of ‘one tenth of the net estate’.
137
For the Dutch history of this clause, see Greuter-Vreeburg (n 24) 56–9.
138
See Van der Burght et al (n 44) 1981. Cf IV.1 below on the CTR. For the validity of an executor
appointed in a codicil under the old law, see n 36 above.
139
Art 993 ff OBW. These sections were thoroughly amended and supplemented in 1961 (Act of 27
September 1961, Staatsblad 1961 304).
140
Intriguing examples from the Old Dutch period are to be found in Gerard van Wassenaar’s form
book Practyk Notariael (Utrecht, 1661) XVIII, 441 ff.
141
Arts 4:98, 101 and 102 BW.
142
Ibid. There is an emergency version for each of the three standard types of will (notarial will,
deposited will, and codicil).
143
Art 4:103 BW.
presence of two witnesses is required for all emergency wills, which to some extent
makes up for the lack of other formal requirements.
In terms of Article 4:107 BW emergency wills are voidable if the testator dies more
than six months after the ‘emergency situation’ has come to an end.144 The testator
should be aware of the special nature of his will and should therefore – if possible –
replace it with a standard will within a reasonable period.
However, the question remains whether even the reduced formalities for emer-
gency wills still do not constitute an excessively high threshold for making a will in a
true emergency. Because of the detailed provisions of Articles 98 and further BW,
I think it is quite possible that some cases fall by the wayside: inclusio est exclusio.
There is something to be said for giving the court the general power to declare a will,
made orally or in writing in an emergency, valid.145 This would bring ‘probate
proceedings’ like those in common law systems into existence, but only in ‘emer-
gency cases’.
5. Donatio mortis causa

This chapter focuses mainly on deeds containing unilateral juristic acts. Nevertheless,
in my opinion it is also important to mention a category of multilateral juristic acts
which the new inheritance law calls ‘quasi legacies’, because of their similarity to
testamentary dispositions.146 Now that these juristic acts are lumped together with
testamentary dispositions, the question arises of whether the formalities which apply
to the latter should also apply to them. With regard to one of these ‘quasi legacies’,
the donatio mortis causa, the law contains a clear affirmative answer. In terms of
Article 7:177(1) BW, this kind of gift must be made personally and a notarial deed of
gift must be drawn up.147 The other cases referred to in Article 4:126 BW148 are
treated differently; while they remain ‘quasi legacies’, the formal requirements for
wills do not apply to them.
In the case of wills and gifts (whether or not in anticipation of death), the idea
behind the formalities is the same. For the party bestowing the favour, they create an
opportunity for reflection – they safeguard that party against excessive haste. They
also reduce the risk of the testator or donor succumbing to undue influence.
Intervention by a notary also ensures elements of legal certainty. On these grounds
a notarial deed was required for a ‘formal’ gift under the Dutch law of gifts which
applied prior to 1 January 2003; namely an obligatory agreement in accordance with
Article 1703 OBW. The sanction for non-compliance with this requirement was
144
The time limit is continually extended by one month if the testator has been unable to make a will
during the previous month. Voidability does not apply to the ‘emergency codicil’ set out in Article 4:105
BW.
145
For similar reasoning see S Boas, ‘Het wetsontwerp op de noodtestamenten’ (1961) 4664 WPNR
73–5, with a few distressing examples from the Second World War.
146
A term which can also be used here is ‘informal legacy’ – informal in the sense that the bequest can
be made and revoked regardless of the regular formalities required: cf Van der Burght et al (n 44) 393.
147
Cf Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 17 213 no 6, 2.
148
See Art 4:126(2) BW.
inevitable nullity.149 However, the arbitrary distinction between formal and infor-
mal gifts led to considerable discussion.150
In the 1930s, Van Oven argued in favour of doing away altogether with formal-
ities in the law of gifts, provided that the judicial grounds for revocation were
extended.151 The objections to formalities for gifts led to a general consensus in
favour of abandoning the formalities when the new Civil Code was introduced.152
The view was that general property law provided sufficient protection against
thoughtlessness, excessive haste, and undue influence.153 However, there was one
exception: the donatio mortis causa. Its similarity to a will resulted in both the
retention of formalities and mandatory registration in the CTR.154 If the law were
to leave the possibility open that, after settlement of the estate, gifts in anticipation of
death might turn up which have not been taken into account in the settlement, a
loophole would exist in the carefully drawn-up regulation of wills and their registra-
tion in the CTR.155
III. Evidence
1. General
A will is always a deed, that is, a signed document intended to serve as evidence.156
A deed can be either private or certified. Here I will use the term ‘certified deed’ to
149
Art 1719 OBW.
150
Cf J C van Oven, ‘Giften van hand tot hand’ (1935) 22–3 NJB 325 ff and 341 ff; H Schuttevâer,
‘Het reële element in de verbruiklening en de schenking van hand tot hand’ [1978] Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn
Themis 481 ff; idem, ‘Schenking van hand tot hand’ (1978) 5448 WPNR 549 ff; P L Dijk, ‘Enige
civielrechtelijke aspecten van de schenking’, in P L Dijk and J Klein (eds), Preadvies Broederschap der
Candidaat-Notarissen (1962) 1 ff.
151
See n 150 above, in particular van Oven (1935) 22–3 NJB 347: ‘Zoo dunkt mij dus inderdaad ook
bij de schenkingsovereenkomst volledige vormvrijheid het meest gewenschte’ (‘I do in fact think that for
gift agreements as well, complete absence of formalities is the most desirable’).
152
Nevertheless, there were also opposite views: see J Th Smalbraak, ‘Schenking (Titel 7.3 NBW)’
(1982) 24 NJB 701; K L H van Mens, Civielrechtelijke en fiscaalrechtelijke aspecten van het schenkingsbegrip
(1985) 164–5; T R Hidma, ‘Vormvereisten en schenking: tussen woord en daad’ (1995) 6186 WPNR 419
ff; E Cohen Henriquez, ‘De bescherming van de schenker naar huidig en komend recht’, in Gr van der
Burght, K E J Dijk, T J van der Ploeg, and H A G Splinter-van Kan (eds), Liber amicorum P.L. Dijk (1986)
80–1.
153
According to Kamerstukken II 1981/82, 17 213 no 3, 8. See also Toelichting op het voorontwerp
(Explanatory Notes to the Provisional Draft) 896.
154
The Explanatory Notes say the following about these gifts (899): ‘Dezelfde redenen die er toe
hebben geleid in Boek 4 van het nieuwe wetboek, evenals in het geldende recht, bepaalde vormvereisten te
stellen voor uiterste wilsbeschikkingen . . . leiden ook hier tot een vormvereiste’ (‘The same reasons which
led to the adoption of certain formalities for wills in Book 4 of the new Code, just as under the present
law . . . also lead to a formality here’).
155
P W van der Ploeg, ‘De gift ter zake van het overlijden’ (1983) 5636 WPNR 17. Actually this
‘loophole’ already exists, since s 1 of the Central Register of Wills Act 1977 (Wet op het CTR) does not
make registration of all quasi-legacies mandatory. See further IV.1 below on the registration of wills.
156
Art 156 Code of Civil Procedure 2002.
denote a deed drawn up in the required form by an authorized notary.157 From the
evidence point of view, the testamentary formalities described above can be seen as a
specification of the words ‘in the required form’ in Article 156(2) of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
Under Dutch law a certified deed has stronger evidential value than a private deed in
two ways. First, in judicial proceedings a document which has the outward appearance
of a notarial deed is assumed to be a notarial deed: acta probant se ipsa.158 This
presumption of authenticity – proof to the contrary is possible – is sometimes referred
to as ‘external evidential value’. This is one difference between a certified will and a
private will; if a private deed constitutes compelling evidence which adversely affects a
certain party and that party firmly denies that the signature on the deed is genuine,
then, unless the other party can prove whose signature it is, the deed does not
constitute proof (that is, the burden of proof is on the party producing the private
deed as evidence).159 But when does a notarial will have the outward appearance of a
notarial will? In my view this entails more than merely a notary’s signature.160 In
addition to the signature, weight should also be attached to outward features such as
the definition of the lines of text and the use of prescribed deed paper.
Second, the notarial deed delivers conclusive proof to everyone161 of what the notary
has declared within the scope of his competence regarding his observations and
actions.162 ‘Observations’ may include the place and date of execution, while ‘actions’
may refer to the explanation to the testator and the limited reading of the will.
The fact that the notary must remain ‘within the scope of his competence’ means
that no conclusive evidential value may be attributed to a notary’s assessment of the
testator’s state of health.163 In the Netherlands a notary’s judgment that the testator
is of sound mind is not regarded as something that must be included in the will,
although it is seen as an implicit prerequisite for the notary in providing his services
to the testator.
157
My definition paraphrases Art 156(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 2002, which contains a wider
definition to cover both notaries and other officials.
158
See further, eg F G Scheltema, Nederlandsch Burgerlijk Bewijsrecht (1938) 370. See also Art 159(1)
Code of Civil Procedure 2002.
159
According to HR 30 November 1951, NJ 1953 3, the authenticity of the deed and the signature are
preliminary to other evidential questions. Cf T R Hidma and G R Rutgers, Het Nederlands burgerlijk recht,
deel 7 Bewijs (2003) 87.
160
This view is shared by C A Kraan, De authentieke akte (1984) 51, who gives the example of a will
made on a blank piece of newspaper, which seems to bear the signature of a notary; this document does not
have the outward appearance of a certified deed.
161
Conclusive proof means that the court is not free to assess the evidential value it attributes to the
contents of the deed. However, evidence to the contrary is possible.
162
Art 157 Code of Civil Procedure 2002.
163
The evidential value of any such declaration is subject to the discretion of the court: cf A H M
Santen, ‘Boekbespreking’ (1984) 5717 WPNR 681. Proof that the testator lacked mental capacity must be
supplied by the person claiming this. However, the notary does have a duty to provide procedural
information, as is shown by HR 10 January 1997, NJ 1999 286.
Note, finally, that the prescribed formalities are required for the creation of a
notarial will, but not for its continued existence. The contents of a lost or illegible
will can be proved using any legal means.164 For codicils, Article 4:114 BW makes an
exception: if the testator destroys such a document, it is thereby revoked. The same
section contains the praesumptio iuris that if a codicil is destroyed, it is presumed that
this was done by the testator. Of course, this question of evidence arises more
frequently in legal systems in which it is not obligatory to deposit a holograph or
‘allograph’ will, and where testators therefore tend to keep their wills themselves.165
The consequence of the rebuttable presumption in the Dutch system is that the
burden of proof lies with the party who alleges that someone other than the testator
has destroyed the document. If this party succeeds in proving this, the next tricky
question to arise, of course, is whether he can prove the contents of the destroyed
document.
2. Practical implications
If one considers the implications of the above for the standard types of will, one sees
that notarial wills and notarial deposited wills (both certified) are in a more favour-
able evidential position compared with testamentary deeds submitted for safe
keeping and codicils (both private): the private deed has no external evidential
value and obviously does not contain binding notarial declarations.
However, deposited wills are covered by the special provision of Article 4:96
BW which, contrary to the main rule of the law of evidence, ascribes evidential
value to this kind of private deed. Therefore, a party who contests the validity of
a deposited will on the grounds that it is not signed or written in the hand of the
testator or that the pages comprising the will are not authenticated in the
testator’s hand bears the burden of proof.166 This lex specialis was introduced
into the OBW in 1892 as a result of several cases in which heirs under intestacy
rules denied that a holograph will had been signed by the testator. This saddled
the testamentary heirs with the burden of proof to the contrary.167 I agree with
Luijten that the depositing of a will with a notary provides a sufficient guarantee
of its validity, and that it therefore justifies Article 4:96 BW.168 In practice, a
different view might well make the deposited will redundant, even more than it
already is.169
164
Art 152 Code of Civil Procedure 2002. For the same view see Breemhaar (n 42) 37.
165
Perrick (n 82) no 339 also points this out.
166
A similar rule applies to the ‘emergency deposited will’, as evidenced by Art 4:104 BW.
167
See Delbaere (n 100); W Jonker, De wet van 18 juni 1892, tot wijziging van art. 980 en 988
B.W. (Amsterdam, 1893) 39.
168
Luijten and Meijer (n 81) no 162.
169
See section II.2(d) above.
IV. Special features of testamentary formalities
1. Registration in the Central Register of Wills

Ever since the fourteenth century, public notaries have kept archives of their
deeds.170 Today, all wills must be registered in the Centraal Testamentenregister
(the Central Register of Wills or CTR).171 Registration means that certain particu-
lars of a will are submitted – digitally or otherwise – to the CTR: the testator’s name,
the notary’s name, the date of the deed, and the kind of deed.172 The contents of the
deed are not registered, except in the case of a revocation.173 Nor is the deed itself
sent to the register; the testator receives a copy of the will and the notary keeps the
original deed in his safe for at least twenty years. After this period the notary may
transfer the deed to a general depository in his region. Deeds over 100 years old are
transferred to the State Archives.
Strictly speaking, registration in the CTR is not a formal requirement for wills,
nor is it a constitutive requirement for their validity. Nevertheless, the registration is
a crucial element of the Dutch inheritance system. The CTR ensures that immedi-
ately after a death it can be established with almost complete certainty whether the
decedent has left a will and, if so, with which notary. There are a few minor
loopholes: foreign wills are not registered in the CTR, nor are codicils.174 In
addition, it is not completely clear whether or not some juristic acts, such as certain
marital agreements which contain a ‘final netting covenant’, have to be registered.175
However, it is generally assumed that the system works properly due to the central
role of the notarial profession.176 It is why probate proceedings do not exist in the
Netherlands.177 In general, the Dutch courts play no part at all in estate settlement.
170
Cappon (n 16) 24.
171
Since 1890 all wills have been registered centrally. The CTR has been digital since 1 January 1976.
Details of wills dating from before 1976 are stored on microfilm.
172
See Arts 1 and 2 of the Central Register of Wills Act 1977. Since 1 January 2007 the register has
been managed by the Royal Dutch Notarial Society (KNB), on the basis of a mandate from the Ministry of
Justice. Bill 32 250, which is now pending, puts the CTR entirely in the hands of the KNB.
173
Because the fact of revocation is registered, when an estate is settled it suffices to ask the notary for
the latest will; no further searching is required.
174
In view of their limited scope – see II.3(c) above – this is not an insurmountable problem.
175
For: F W J M Schols, ‘Het finaal wederkerig verrekenbeding werkend bij overlijden als quasi-
legaat?!’ (2000) 6384 WPNR 3 ff. Against: L C A Verstappen, ‘Naar nieuwe verrekenstelsel (II, slot)’
(2000) 6388 WPNR 95; J P Schmal, ‘Reactie, het finaal wederkerig verrekenbeding werkend bij overlijden
als quasi-legaat?!’ (2000) 6403 WPNR 377–9; S Perrick, ‘Over giften ter zake des doods, andere fictieve
legaten en verwante rechtshandelingen onder het komend recht’ (2000) 6422 WPNR 790.
176
Cf L C A Verstappen, ‘Het Nederlandse systeem van de boedelafwikkeling en de rol van de notaris’
(2003) 3 Tijdschrift Nieuw Erfrecht 33 ff.
177
Just over a century ago, Scholten stated that in inheritance law matters ‘the notary is actually the
judge’: P Scholten, ‘Uitlegging van testamenten’ (1909) 2057 WPNR 294. In some areas of the law there is
but a fine line between these two professions: cf J M Polak, ‘Rechterlijke bemoeiingen met notariële
werkzaamheden’ (1976) 5349 WPNR 305 ff; T R Hidma, Op het kruispunt van notariële en rechterlijke
functie (1992) 1 ff; M J A van Mourik, ‘De notaris, de kantonrechter en het erfrecht’ (2004) 6574 WPNR
279 ff; L C A Verstappen, ‘De notariële verklaring van verjaring; de notaris als rechter?’ (2005) 6641
The procedure for registration is as follows: at the latest on the first working day
after the day on which the deed was executed, the notary in question must enter the
details referred to above in the CTR.178 When the will is registered, a check is done
to ensure that the testator is registered in the municipal personal records database.
This ensures that a notary cannot register the will of a tourist on holiday in the
Netherlands, or that of a foreigner residing illegally in the Netherlands.
The registration may only be used after the death of the testator, although
presumably testators themselves may inquire during their lifetime whether the
CTR has their details.179 When a doctor has established that someone has died,
that doctor issues a formal declaration of death. The death is registered with the
municipality and then entered into the municipal personal records database. To find
out whether the deceased has left a will, interested parties must send a copy of an
extract from the register of deaths to the CTR.180
Obviously in the future it would make sense to link the CTR to a European
network of national registers of wills. The Royal Dutch Notarial Society has already
taken the first step by seeking to link the CTR with the French, Belgian, and
Slovenian registers of wills.
2. Prohibition of ‘joint’ wills

In some cases before the French era a last will could be made by more than one
person in the same instrument.181 In the Code civil and the OBW this possibility was
abolished as a response to the introduction of irrevocable hereditary contracts.182
Today, the explicit prohibition is laid down in Article 4:93 BW, applying to both
joint and mutual last wills – the latter being a species of the first.
Especially spouses often express the wish to benefit each other in the same notarial
document, or at least to sign each other’s last will, thus creating a testamentary
contract.183 Since 1 January 2003, Dutch law no longer provides for the possibility
of making such a contract that is unilaterally irrevocable. Up to that date, Articles
1:146 and further BW contained provisions regarding gifts of (a part of) the estate of
one spouse to the other. However, this type of instrument was used only very
seldom.184
WPNR 833 ff; M E L Fikkers, ‘Waar bemoeit de kantonrechter zich mee’ (2006) 4 Tijdschrift Nieuw
Erfrecht 59 ff.
178
A fee is charged for the registration of a will; in 2010 this was €8.17.
179
Cf J G Gräler, ‘Inzage in het Centraal Testamentenregister’ (1999) 6354 WPNR 293.
180
Close family members of the deceased can apply for an extract from the register of deaths in the
municipality where the deceased was registered. Often the funeral director takes care of this.
181
Cf de Groot (n 12) II, 17, 24: ‘Twee luiden, als man ende vrouw, moghen haer uiterste wille
vervatten in een schrift’ (‘Two persons, as husband and wife, may lay down their last will in one deed’). For
a short overview of the Dutch history, see V A M van der Burg, ‘De opheffing van het verbod van
gemeenschappelijke en mutuele testamenten in Boek 4 N.B.W.’ (1970) 5106 WPNR 535 ff.
182
See Art 968 C civ; Art 653 Code Lodewijk Napoleon; Art 977 OBW. More elaborate: Report I (n
44) 152.
183
F W J M Schols, Quasi-erfrecht met bindende elementen (2005) 31.
184
Cf Kamerstukken II 1964/5, 3771 nos 8, 3, and 49.
The question does arise whether the argument in favour of the prohibition of joint
wills is a conclusive one. The formal requirement of Article 4:93 BW is said to serve
no other purpose than to prevent the testator from being under the erroneous
impression that his last will is unilaterally irrevocable and immutable. However, in
his advisory role the notary almost always points out the revocability of the will to the
testator.185 On the other hand – at least as far as spouses are concerned – a middle
course is now followed. Although spouses cannot combine their last wills in one
deed, it is common notarial practice to allow them to be present at the execution of
each other’s wills. The reason for this may be found in the marital bond: spouses will
inform each other of their last wills anyway.186 A further (and more practical)
explanation might simply be that it is an attempt by the notary to save time. Before
2003 a last will had to be read in full by the notary; but for spouses the identical parts
of the two deeds were only read once.
3. Signature
A signature in a text has at least three functions: (a) identification of the person
signing; (b) attribution of the text to that person; and (c) an inhibition against rash
actions.187 In the case of ordinary notarial wills, the notary also fulfils these
functions – especially the last one. Nevertheless, the testator’s signature is a crucial
component of the will – as is the notary’s. Without a signature, nothing has
actually been declared.188
It is clear from the literature and the case law that a signature is deemed to consist
of a certain set of characters, written in the signatory’s hand, which individualize the
signatory.189 This implies that a cross, for instance, is insufficient, since it does not
provide individualization.190 Nor is a fingerprint satisfactory, since it is not a
character.191
May a testator sign a will digitally?192 Under current law an electronically signed
document does not have the same status as a deed. Since 2004, Article 6:227(a) BW
has provided that certain agreements which can only be made in writing can also be
entered into electronically. However, the scope of this regulation does not extend to
unilateral juristic acts such as wills.193 Alternatives which are even further removed
185
Schols (n 183) 35 mentions 96%.
186
Perrick (n 82) no 314.
187
Cf P van Eecke, De handtekening in het recht: van pennentrek tot elektronische handtekening (2004)
199. The second element in particular is stressed in C J J de Joncheere, Het rechtskarakter der onderteeken-
ing (Amsterdam, 1892) 3–46.
188
A R de Bruijn, ‘Het karakter van de notarieele functie volgens de Wet op het Notarisambt’ (1927)
3007 WPNR 552.
189
H W Wiersma and K Wiersma, Bewijs door geschriften (1988) 52.
190
For the same view see de Joncheere (n 187) 60; HR 26 May 1846, W 731; HR 21 January 1898,
W 7078.
191
Hidma and Rutgers (n 159) 83.
192
According to Art 3:15a(1) BW, electronic signatures have the same legal consequences as hand-
written signatures only if certain requirements of reliability have been met.
193
See also Art 6:227a(3) BW and II.2(d) above on internet wills.
from authentic deeds, such as video-taped wills, do not fulfil the criteria of the
Notaries Act – at least not in its present form.
(a) Signing notarial deeds194

Article 986(5) OBW stated that the deed had to be signed ‘by the testator, the notary
and the witnesses’. This rule did not govern the order of the signatures.195 The
current Notaries Act leaves no room for doubt as to that order: first the testator, then
any witnesses there may be, and finally the notary.196 At the end of the deed the
notary must state that the deed has been signed by the person appearing, the
witnesses, and himself. He can hardly declare this if he has signed before the others.
I am not aware of any disputes regarding the authenticity of a notary’s signature.
Immediately after taking the oath, notaries file their signatures and initials with the
registry of the district court in the district in which their office is located, so that there
can be no misunderstanding on this score.197 Because of the presence of the notary
when the deed is executed, disputes regarding a testator’s signature are also rare. In
view of the far-reaching obligations pertaining to identity checks under the Act on
Preventing Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (Wwft ),198 the
chance of such disputes is in my view becoming even lower.
However, in practice it has occurred a few times that a will was not signed by the
notary or that it was signed by a different notary from the one referred to in the
opening sentence of the deed. It has also occurred, for example, that one spouse has
inadvertently signed the other’s will and vice versa.199 If the law is applied strictly, a
defect of this kind would result in the invalidity of the will. But under certain
circumstances such a severe sanction can be avoided by means of a deed of rectifica-
tion or ratification.200
Signing must be distinguished from initialling. Every page of a notarial deed must
be initialled, except, of course, for the last page which must be signed.201 The
original draft Bill of the Notaries Act provided that not only the notary, but also
the person appearing (in the context of will-making, the testator) had to initial every
page.202 For practical reasons, and to prevent the use of proxies (which is in fact not
194
See II.3(b) above for the signing of private deeds.
195
Cf Amsterdam Court of Appeal 30 March 1898, W 1898, 7185; K M F J Houben, ‘De volgorde
van ondertekening van testamenten’ (1998) 6315 WPNR 333–5 with further references.
196
Art 43(4) Notaries Act 1999. Cf Kamerstukken II 1997–8, 23 706 nos 16, 39.
197
198
This Act (Dutch title: Wet ter voorkoming van witwassen en financieren van terrorisme) came into
force on 1 August 2008. It is accompanied by a manual issued by the Royal Dutch Notarial Society
regarding the identification and verification of a client’s identity (Art 11 Wwft).
199
Cf A H M Santen, ‘Nogmaals de clerical error’ (1989) 5909 WPNR 178.
200
See Verstappen (n 47) 138–41; Waaijer (n 67) 150–1. For a more detailed discussion see V.2
below.
201
Art 43(3) Notaries Act 1999. For the meaning of ‘page’, see II.2.(b) above.
202
Art 39(3) draft Notaries Act.
an option in the case of a will), the legislator rightly decided not to include this
requirement.203
(b) Inability to sign

A testator’s inability to sign is not in itself an impediment to will-making. Cases are
known from the Middle Ages in which illiterate testators were permitted to make a
cross, but to which the notary added a note stating: ‘This is the personal mark of so-
and-so’.204 There was also a discussion as to whether ‘being deceased’ could be
interpreted as ‘being unable’: if a will is regarded as finalized once it has been declared
orally, then the testator’s death before signing would make no difference.205
However, as pointed out above, the present doctrine is different.206 The wording
of Article 43(4) of the Notaries Act leaves no room for doubt in this regard: ‘If an
individual declares that he or she is unable to sign, this declaration, and also the reason
for the inability, will be reported’.207 The current position is therefore clear: every
individual who is mentally capable of making a will has the right to make one208
(at least as far as a notarial will is concerned). As is evident from Article 4:95(1) BW,
an illiterate person cannot make a deposited will: a private will cannot be validated
by someone who is unable to read that will due to a lack of reading skills or for any
other reason.
4. Witnesses
For an oral will Roman law required the presence of seven witnesses in order to check
the testator and ‘for the sake of memory’.209 However, throughout the centuries
procedural emphasis gradually shifted from the oral to the written and the role of the
scribe – the notary – became increasingly important. Initially the notary merely
functioned as one of the witnesses. Later he became a figure of authority in addition
to whom only two other witnesses were required.210 The reduction in the number of
203
Kamerstukken II 1996–7, 23 706 no 12, 35.
204
Pitlo and Gehlen (n 15) 153. These authors also suggest other solutions, such as an extra witness.
205
J van der Linden, Gewijsden I (Leiden, 1803) cas 25; otherwise Van Bijnkershoek (n 41) III c 5 and
8. Cf Meijers (n 22) 193.
206
See II.1(b) above.
207
Luijten and Meijer (n 81) no 160 point out that the alternative to a signature can only apply for the
person appearing, not for witnesses.
208
According to S Perrick, Mr, C. Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlandsch Burgerlijk
Recht, Erfrecht (1996) no 247. Cf District Court of The Hague 11 June 1947, NJ 1948 338; W G de Vries,
‘Rechtsvraag IV’ (1977) 5390 WPNR 301; A G Lubbers, ‘Boekbespreking’ (1977) 5390 WPNR 780;
W Heuff, ‘Ontwikkelingen in het erfrecht’ (1988) 5885 WPNR 483.
209
See also n 22 above.
210
Art 9 of the Ventôse law is an interesting intermediate form: ‘Les actes seront reçus par deux notaires,
ou par un notaire assisté par deux témoins’. For a more comprehensive historical account, see A F A
Leesberg, De getuigen bij notarieele acten volgens de Nederlandsche wetgeving (Amsterdam, 1873); and for a
more general account, P J van Wijngaarden, De instrumentaire getuigen bij notarieele acten volgens de Wet op
het notarisambt (Leiden, 1888).
witnesses was for practical reasons.211 By then the role of the witness was not so
much to check the testator – since that was also the notary’s task – but to check the
notary. And it was precisely this role that was increasingly seen as being redundant:
the requirement of the presence of witnesses constituted a failure to appreciate the
role of the notary.212 In 1971 this led to the abolition of the requirement of two
witnesses to every notarial deed, except in the case of certain special deeds, including
wills.213 In 2003, the requirement was finally also abolished for wills; deeds are now
only executed in the presence of two witnesses if the notary so requires.214
In terms of Article 43(2) of the Notaries Act the presence of witnesses requires the
notary to read the entire text out loud. However, one may question whether there is
any point to this at all. Non-professionals will meekly sit through the reading and
they are not very likely to discover mistakes. The same, of course, applies to
witnesses. Moreover, an experienced notary – who probably has plenty of other
work to do – usually reads very fast.215 As a counter-argument one can point out that
current digital techniques can easily lead to substantial errors in a deed: with the
pressing of one key a block of text can disappear, or a block can be inserted by
mistake.216 However, it is doubtful that reading the entire will out loud is the right
way to counteract such clerical errors.
It is interesting to note that the presence or not of witnesses is at the sole discretion
of the notary, and not that of the testator. The motivation for this is that a notary can
refuse a testator’s request if he suspects a certain witness of manipulation.217
However, except in a situation of that kind, a notary is unlikely to disregard a
testator’s request for the presence of witnesses. It would be better to add a provision
to Article 39 of the Notaries Act which stipulates that both the notary and the
testator may arrange for witnesses to be present, but that it is up to the notary to
determine who may act as a witness.
In disciplinary proceedings in connection with a testator’s competence to make a
will, it is sometimes argued that the fact that a notary has arranged for witnesses to be
present can count against him. However, the idea that ‘the notary knew he was doing
211
According to Meijers (n.22) 194, this large number was a problem for the Church; a decree of Pope
Alexander III dating from 1171 stated that two witnesses were enough. However, the province of Friesland
stubbornly adhered to the Roman requirement of seven witnesses for long after that date. Moreover, until
2003 four witnesses were required for a secret will (Art 987 OBW). Understandably, for emergency wills
the requirement of witnesses still applies: see II.4 above.
212
See, eg HR 13 January 2006, NJ 2008 545.
213
For a discussion of the abolition of the witness requirement at the time, see B Duinkerken, ‘Weg
met “ijdele formaliteiten”, of het open deurtje gered (I)’ (2006) 6677 WPNR 603–5, in particular n 7. See
V.2 below for a discussion of the violation of the witness requirement under the old law.
214
Art 39(2) Notaries Act 1999. Melis and Waaijer (n 67) 134 aptly refer to ‘a further step in the
demythologization process with regard to drawing up notarial deeds’.
215
Cf P Blokland, ‘De eerste aanpassing in de Wet op het notarisambt 1999’ (2001) 6451 WPNR 637,
who also draws attention to a consequence of the abolition of the obligation to read wills out loud: wills are
becoming longer.
216
For a distressing example of a revocation clause mistakenly included in a will, see ’s Hertogenbosch
Court of Appeal 9 September 2002, NJ 2003 446.
217
Kamerstukken II 1999–2000, 27 245 no 3, 12.
wrong, otherwise he would never have called in witnesses’ cuts no ice. Behaving with
exceptional care cannot be seen as a ground for a complaint.218
One can conclude that the changes relating to witnesses are very typical of the
changes to which other testamentary formalities have also been subject: a shift,
namely, towards ‘only’ a notarial deed. Public faith in the notarial profession is the
safeguard which ensures that no additional formalities are required.
V. Adherence to formalities
1. Sanctions and the reasoning behind them

Unless the law provides otherwise, juristic acts which do not meet the formal
requirements are void.219 This strict principle, taken from general property law,
does not bode well for a will with a formal defect. It harks back to former times
during which all formal defects inexorably resulted in an act’s nullity: lex dura sed lex.
However, things are not always what they seem. For some decades now there has
been a tendency to take a more lenient approach to this issue. If the purpose of the
provision which has not been complied with is the protection of a certain individual
against another, the implementation of the principle of voidness will often be left to
the interested parties themselves. In principle, therefore, such juristic acts would be
voidable and not void.220 The idea has taken hold that voidness is really only justified
when violation of a legal rule has in fact compromised the underlying interest
protected by that rule.221 Moreover, as will be illustrated below, the parties involved
are not automatically entitled to invoke voidability of the act.
Dutch inheritance law has followed this trend. Since 2003 only failure of the
notary or the testator to sign the will has resulted in voidness; any other formal
defects result only in voidability.222 This is much more lenient than Article 1000
OBW, which punished every error with voidness.223 The two examples below
illustrate this trend.
218
Cf W D Kolkman, ‘Deontologische dilemma’s in het erfrecht’, in G J C Lekkerkerker, C G
Breedveld-de Voogd, W D Kolkman, and V A E M Meijers (eds), De goede notaris. Over notariële
deontologie (2010) 141.
219
Art 3:39 BW. See II.1(f) above for some general remarks on sanctions.
220
According to Hartkamp and Sieburgh (n 93) no 615. See also HR 17 February 2006, NJ 2006 378,
in which the Supreme Court refers to the ‘basic point of departure of the Civil Code that in principle
nullities do not go further than is compatible with their purpose’. For a similar view, see Beekhuis (n 126)
527, who draws attention to increasing endeavours ‘to ensure that formalities are replaced by the essence of
the case’.
221
Cf Verstappen (n 47) 67. Support for this view is also to be found in J Hijma, Nietigheid en
vernietigbaarheid van rechtshandelingen (1988) 121 ff.
222
Art 4:109 BW.
223
Art 1000 OBW said: ‘The formalities required for the respective wills by virtue of the provisions of
this section must be observed, subject to the wills being declared void’.
2. Two examples
A striking judgment passed by the Supreme Court on 5 October 2001 pertains to a
notarial will which begins as follows: ‘On this twenty-sixth day of April there
appeared before me, Lambertus van Solkema, civil law notary in The Hague . . . ’.224
The notary had inadvertently mentioned only the day, but not the year. Under the
old law, in the opinion of most authors, this could have only one consequence:
voidness.225 A mistake which occurs more frequently in practice is that soon after the
turn of the year the notary attaches the date of the previous year. However, as a rule
the latter type of error has been treated a little more leniently.226
The Supreme Court showed that it was not in favour of excessive adherence to
formalities. It found – even though Article 1000 OBW was still in force – that
according to currently accepted views an error such as the omission of the date did
not result in voidness, but only in voidability. This means that even under the old
law the new rules of Article 4:109 BW were effectively applied; voidability was clearly
gaining ground on voidness.227
However, in my view the next step taken by the Supreme Court has even more
significance for our current law. In many cases when one or more details relating to
the place and date of execution of a deed are missing, it can be established without
too much difficulty where and when the deed was executed and thus where and when
the will came into being.228 This prompted the Supreme Court to block the path for
those who are in principle entitled to invoke voidability: ‘ . . . this ground for voiding
a will cannot be invoked if it can be established in some other way than through the
will itself with the high degree of certainty required in a case like this in which year the
224
HR 5 October 2001, NJ 2002 410.
225
See G Diephuis, Het Nederlandsch Burgerlijk Recht, VIII (Groningen, 1883) 224; J P Suijling and
H F R Dubois, Inleiding tot het burgerlijk recht, 6e stuk (erfrecht) (1931) no 106; Meijers (n 22) 217–18; J
G Klaassen, J Eggens, and E A A Luijten, Huwelijksgoederen- en erfrecht, Tweede gedeelte: Erfrecht (1989)
162; A Pitlo and Gr van der Burght, Erfrecht (1997) 192.
226
Cf the Hague Court of Appeal 6 December 1984, NJ 1986 61 on a will dated ‘19 January 1972’,
which the parties involved agreed had actually been executed on 19 January 1973. The court considered
that Art 26 Notaries Act (the old Act, about mandatory reference to a date in a deed) did not apply, ‘since
the deed does refer to a date – even though it is not the right one – and the parties agree as to the correct
date of execution, so that there is no uncertainty at all between the parties in that regard’. For authors who
agree with this view, see W G de Vries, ‘Recente rechtspraak’ (1986) 5779 WPNR 252–3; A L G A Stille,
‘De verzekering van de dagtekening in de notariële akte’ (1987) 5815 WPNR 65; Perrick (n 208) no 268.
Others say the court was wrong to disregard the statutory sanction referred to in Art 1000: see R J H M
Berntsen, ‘De verzekering van de dagtekening in de notariële akte’ (1986) 5806 WPNR 716–18; C A
Kraan, ‘De dagtekening en de ondertekening van de notariële akte’ (1987) 5828 WPNR 267–9.
227
In its judgment the Supreme Court makes reference to Art 4:109 BW, which in 2001 had not yet
come into force.
228
This was definitely not a problem in this case. The fact that the year in question was 1994 was
crystal clear: it was certain that on 26 April 1994 the testator’s wife had been present at the execution of the
will; that during that same session her own (‘identical’) will had been executed; that the copy sent to the
wife is dated 26 April 1994; that the appointment with the testator and his wife was entered in the notary’s
diary on 26 April 1994; that the notary registered the will in his records on 26 April 1994; and, finally, that
the will was registered in the CTR in April 1994.
will was executed’. We have thus travelled from voidness via voidability to
incontestability.
In this context one should also take note of Article 45(2) of the Notaries Act. In
terms of this provision a notary may unilaterally correct both obvious clerical errors
and obvious errors in the text of a deed, even after it has been executed.229 There is
no consensus as to the scope of this provision with regard to clerical errors,230 but
I share the view of the Supreme Court that it certainly covers the omission of the year
in a date.231 What is meant by the term ‘obvious’ is that it must be objectively clear
that the error in question is clerical; the correction must not change the contents of
the deed.232
The second example concerns a judgment of the Supreme Court of 13 January
2006 where it had to decide whether a notarial will executed in 1990 was void
because the witnesses (assistants in the notary’s office) were not literally present at the
execution of the will.233 For the sake of efficiency they were not in the same room as
the notary and the testator, but in the adjacent room, where they simply carried on
with their daily work. This practice (known in the Dutch notarial world as ‘the open
door’ (open deurtje)) was customary in many offices until 2003 and was particularly
common for standard wills, such as those favouring the spouse of the testator.234
Until the mid-twentieth century, following the literature and case law, district courts
and courts of appeal declared such wills void.235 However, the Supreme Court ruled
that a strict adherence to formalities in such a situation would constitute a failure to
acknowledge the role played by the notary: the execution of a will by notarial deed is
a sufficient guarantee that the deed represents the testator’s true will. According to
the Supreme Court, a notarial will is not void or voidable just because the witness
rule has not been obeyed in the correct way. Thus, an inappropriate sanction should
not be applied.236
However, it is a different matter when it comes to disciplinary measures. The fact
that a will is rescued in civilibus does not mean that the notary has not acted
unprofessionally in the discharge of his official duties. In a number of such cases
notaries had to face heavy disciplinary sanctions.237
229
See the provision for further formalities (record, note on the original deed, and copy sent to
parties).
230
P Blokland, Tekst en Toelichting Wet op het notarisambt (2001) 102; W G Huijgen and A J H
Pleysier, De wetgeving op het notarisambt (2001) 84; Verstappen (n 47) 107–10.
231
HR 5 October 2001, NJ 2002 410, ground 3.8.
232
Kamerstukken II 1993/1994, 23 706 no 3, 40.
233
HR 13 January 2006, NJ 2008 545.
234
Cf Duinkerken (n 213) 603.
235
Cf Leesberg (n 210). See also, much longer ago, de Groot, who declares a will executed in 1616
void because of a defect with regard to one of the witnesses: H de Groot, Hollandsche Consultatien I
(Rotterdam, 1645) c 231.
236
Cf J H M ter Haar, ‘Generaal pardon voor open deurtjes’ (2006) 2 Tijdschrift Nieuw Erfrecht 33.
237
See Amsterdam Court of Appeal 14 May 1998, (1999) 6340 WPNR 12–13, with the heavy
measure of a reprimand which eventually led to HR 13 January 2006, NJ 2008 545; and Amsterdam
Court of Appeal 29 August 1991, (1991) 6019 WPNR 652–3, with the heaviest possible sanction, namely
the removal of the notary, because he ‘executed more than 2000 void wills by deliberately and systematic-
ally failing to observe the mandatory statutory rules which apply’. The notary had had the witnesses sign
3. Proportionate application of sanctions

The developments outlined above are to be welcomed, because they reflect a refusal
to apply the formalities blindly. A sanction for the non-compliance with formalities
should never go further than what is appropriate to the rationale behind that
sanction. I therefore support Verstappen’s view that if a notarial deed is a formal
requirement for a juridical act, then the juridical act should be void only if there is no
deed signed or recorded by a notary. If the notarial deed required for the juridical act
in question lacks authenticity because of a formal defect, the juridical act should only
be voidable.238 With this view Verstappen rightly emphasizes the fact that in such
cases the error is not made by the testator, but by the notary – that is, by the person of
whose services the testator is obliged to avail himself.239
In addition to the less rigid approach to voidness, a second trend has become
apparent: the idea, namely, that it should not be too easy to invoke the voidability of
a will. In my opinion a formal error should not necessarily have any consequences,
provided that the required degree of certainty can be attained regarding the facts of
the case. In such instances a juristic act which on first sight seems void will ultimately
prove to be incontestable.
VI. Concluding remarks
Because of the importance of the notarial profession in the Netherlands, the discus-
sion of testamentary formalities in this chapter may seem to have a somewhat
different tone from that with regard to countries where it is more common to
make a will without professional legal advice. Due to the reliable and solid profes-
sional practice of Dutch notaries, few disputes arise about testamentary matters.
Nevertheless, a closer look reveals a number of interesting questions, such as whether
or not the more lenient approach to the adherence to the statutory formalities is
justified.
Over the centuries three crucial developments have taken place. First, testamen-
tary formalities have been gradually reduced. This is clearly demonstrated by the
number of witnesses required, which dropped from seven to two and finally to none
retrospectively. On the other hand, in a special case the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (28 January 1999,
(1999) 6380 WPNR 884–5) ruled that it was permissible for others besides the notary, the testator, and the
witnesses to be present at the execution of a will.
238
See Verstappen (n 47) 169.
239
For a similar view, see W Snijders, ‘Bekrachtiging en aanverwante rechtsfiguren’ (2003) 6547
WPNR 697–709, who draws attention to the fact that changing societal views may mean that we must
distance ourselves from what was said in parliamentary history in relation to Art 3:39 BW (see V.1 above)
about sanctions for failing to observe formalities. See also B C M Waaijer, ‘Nietigheid als sanctie op
vormfouten in notariële akten? Het moet anders’, in P H M Gerver, J G Kuijl, A J H Pleysier, and R T G
Verstaaten (eds), Heden verscheen voor mij (1995) 353 ff, who argue in favour of toning down the
significance of formal errors.
at all. The more a legal system matures, the less need there is for formalities.240
Moreover, the increasing number of wills executed – from a handful annually in the
fifth century to nearly 350,000 in 2009 – has made it inevitable that formalities be
reduced or at least significantly simplified.
Second, the formal differences between wills and notarial deeds have gradually
disappeared. The importance of notarial involvement grew as the notary evolved
from a passive ‘scribe’ to a highly esteemed official holding both public authority and
a monopoly in the execution of wills. This rendered formalities other than those
referred to in the Notaries Act obsolete. The guidelines set out in this Act regarding
formalities for all notarial deeds, including wills, must be seen in the light of the
notary’s task – the essence of which is to foster legal certainty in judicial matters and
to provide legal protection.241 The advantages of the notarial will have caused the
other standard type of will, namely the deposited will (both the holograph and
the ‘allograph’ versions), to remain rather undeveloped. It is quite characteristic of
the Dutch position that the legislation of 1838 provided that a holograph will was to
be deposited with a notary – something which constituted a departure from the
provisions of the predecessor legislation in France. The substantive scope of the
remaining ‘true’ holograph will, namely the codicil, was significantly curtailed in
1838 and then even further in 2003, leaving it practically useless.
Finally, a third development has become apparent: a trend away from the strict
adherence to formalities and also from the unqualified application of sanctions. Since
2003 the failure to comply with certain formalities has no longer made a will void,
but only voidable. In a case involving an incompletely dated will, the Dutch Supreme
Court ruled that such an error is not a ground for declaring a will void if it can be
established ‘with a high degree of certainty’, in some way other than through the will
itself, on which date the will was executed. In my opinion this is a laudable
development, as sanctions should not extend further than is justified by the rationale
which underlies them.
240 241
Cf Wildervanck (n 99) 1. Cf Melis and Waaijer (n 67) 87.
8
Testamentary Formalities in Germany
Reinhard Zimmermann
I. Introduction 176
II. Private wills in nineteenth-century Germany 177
III. Holograph wills: principle and exceptions 180
IV. The battle over holograph wills: travaux préparatoires
of the BGB 182
1. Gottfried von Schmitt’s Preliminary Draft 182
2. Rejection confirmed 183
3. Acceptance at last 185
V. The holograph will and the courts (1900–35) 187
1. ‘ . . . like writing a business letter’? 187
2. Formalism . . . 188
3. . . . but not too much 189
4. Reactions 190
5. The dawn of a new era 191
VI. Another battle over holograph wills 193
1. Opposition: The Academy for German Law 193
2. Reform: The Testamentsgesetz 194
3. Farewell to the Testamentsgesetz; continuity in substance 196
VII. Holograph wills today 197
1. The testator’s intention and the form requirement 197
2. Two characteristic decisions of the Federal Supreme Court 198
3. Will to be written by the testator ‘in his own hand’ 199
4. Will to be ‘signed’ by the testator 200
5. Other issues 203
6. The future 203
VIII. Public wills 205
1. The regime in the BGB and its background 205
2. Relaxation in 1938 207
3. The abolition of judicial wills 208
4. No discrimination against disabled persons 209
5. Public wills today 210
176 Reinhard Zimmermann
IX. Extraordinary wills 212

1. Emergency wills: background and the BGB 212
2. Changes 214
3. Emergency wills today 216
4. Wills made during a sea voyage 218
X. The German experience: a general assessment 218
I. Introduction
German law recognizes two ordinary types of will: the will recorded by a notary and
the holograph will.1 Although not civil servants, German notaries discharge a public
office2 and cannot, therefore, act outside Germany; that is why, for the benefit of
Germans staying abroad, wills recorded by consular officers are equated with wills
recorded by a notary.3 In addition, three extraordinary types of will are recognized by
the German Civil Code: emergency wills made before the mayor of the community
where the testator is staying, in the presence of two witnesses; emergency wills made
before three witnesses; and wills made during a sea voyage (here a specific emergency
is not required).4 In all three instances the will fails if three months have passed since
it was made and the testator is still alive.5
Today, the holograph will is the most popular type of will.6 Yet its introduction
throughout Germany was hotly disputed in the years leading up to, and immediately
following, the entry into force of the BGB (the German Civil Code) on 1 January
1900. In fact, the holograph will slipped into the Code only at the very last minute.
The initial provision (} 2231 no 2 BGB old version) gave rise to considerable
litigation and was reformed in 1938. The history of the holograph will7 is, therefore,
1
} 2231 BGB.
2
For an overview in historical and comparative perspective, see Manfred Wenckstern, ‘Notariat’, in
Jürgen Basedow, Klaus J Hopt, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Handwörterbuch des Europäischen
Privatrechts (2009) 1114 ff.
3
For the details, see }} 10 ff Konsulargesetz (Consular Act); and see Wolfgang Baumann, in J von
Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (revised edn, 2003), Vorbem zu }} 2229–64 nn 44 ff.
4
}} 2249–51 BGB. Soldiers’ wills are no longer known today in German law as an extraordinary type
of will: see n 355 below.
5
} 2252 I BGB. But see for wills made during a sea voyage the special provision of } 2252 III BGB
concerning testators embarking on a new voyage before the expiration of the three-month period; this can
lead to such wills being valid for very much longer than merely three months: see Staudinger/Baumann
(n 3) } 2252 n 8.
6
Text to n 239 below.
7
See Walther Brock, Das eigenhändige Testament (1900) 4 ff; J W Hedemann, Fortschritte des
Zivilrechts im XIX. Jahrhundert (1910) 22 ff; Hans Hagmann, Das eigenhändige Testament im schweizer-
ischen ZGB (Art. 505) unter Berücksichtigung des deutschen und französischen Rechts (thesis Zürich, 1918) 7
ff; Fritz von Hippel, Formalismus und Rechtsdogmatik (1935) 163 ff; Peter Breitschmidt, Formvorschriften
im Testamentsrecht (1982) 5 ff; Uwe Beinke, Der Formzwang beim privatschriftlichen Testament (thesis
Marburg, 1995) 4 ff; and see now, in particular, Monika Beutgen, Die Geschichte des eigenhändigen
Testaments (1992) and Eike Götz Hosemann, ‘Von den Bedenken gegen das Testieren “im stillen
Testamentary Formalities in Germany 177
particularly interesting, and may also be instructive in a comparative perspective in

view of the fact that such wills are recognized in a majority of member states of the
EU.8 Holograph wills are the subject of the opening sections of this chapter. This is
followed by an overview of the development of, and the problems arising with regard
to, notarial wills. The extraordinary types of will are then discussed, but compara-
tively briefly. Finally, the chapter attempts to present a general assessment of the
German experience with regard to testamentary formalities.
At the outset, however, a few words should be said about the legal framework, as
far as it is common to all types of will. A will that lacks the required form is invalid
according to } 125 BGB. The invalidity of only part of a will does not, as a rule, lead
to the invalidity of the remainder (} 2085 BGB); the general rule of utile per inutile
vitiatur, in other words, as laid down in } 139 BGB,9 is reversed in the law relating to
wills. German courts do not have a general power of condonation concerning
formally defective wills,10 and an invalid will can only be upheld if the conditions
for } 140 BGB (conversion) are met, that is, if it satisfies the requirements of another
transaction (including another form of will). Thus, for example, it is conceivable that
an invalid notarial will can be upheld as a holograph will.11 All of this is straightfor-
ward and uncontroversial.
It may also be noted that the form requirements for wills do not correspond to the
form requirements established by the BGB for other types of transactions.12
II. Private wills in nineteenth-century Germany
Germany only became a modern nation state in 1871, in the wake of the Franco-
Prussian War. The establishment of the Reich in 1871 brought to an end the
constitutional regime set up in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna: a loose federation
of forty-one formally independent ‘German’ states, among them one Empire
(Austria), five kingdoms (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, and Württemberg),
Kämmerlein”: Die Geschichte des eigenhändigen Testaments in Deutschland, dargestellt aus Anlass des
200. Geburtstags des Badischen Landrechts’ [2010] Rheinische Notar-Zeitschrift 520 ff.
8
See, eg, } 578 ABGB; Art 970 Code civil; Art 678 Código civil (Spain); Art 505 (Swiss) ZGB; Art 602
Codice civile; Art 1721 Astikos Kodikas.
9
See Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition
(paperback edn, 1996) 75 ff.
10
But see, concerning emergency wills, nn 334 and 347 below.
11
See Herbert Roth, in J von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (revised edn, 2003)
} 140 n 49; Walter Hagena, in Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol 9 (5th edn, 2010)
} 2232 n 34.
12
That applies, in particular, to holograph wills and extraordinary wills. A notarial will can be made in
two different ways: (a) by an oral declaration to be minuted by the judge or notary; or (b) by handing over
a sealed or unsealed document. For the second alternative, there are no parallels in the BGB, while the first
is in line, by and large, with other instances where the BGB requires notarial recording (eg contracts for the
alienation of immovable property); however, even here the Notarial Recording Act (Beurkundungsgesetz) of
1969 has a number of special provisions for notarial wills (}} 27 ff ). For the form requirements in German
private law, see }} 126–9 BGB; and see, eg Dieter Medicus, Allgemeiner Teil des BGB (10th edn, 2010)
nn 609 ff. The general rule in German law, of course, is that juridical acts do not require a specific form.
one electorate (Hesse), seven grand duchies, a great number of duchies and princi-
palities, and also the four ‘Free Cities’ (Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, and
Frankfurt).13 Each of these states had its own (and sometimes also more than just
one) legal regime, and with it its own rules on succession, including the formalities
required for the making of a valid will.14 The bewildering variety of legal regimes
continued to coexist even in the Empire, until what were commonly called the
‘particular laws’ (Partikularrechte) were finally replaced by a uniform German Civil
Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). The Bavarian ministerial counsellor Gottfried von
Schmitt, who was responsible for preparing a Preliminary Draft Code concerning the
law of succession on which, in turn, the deliberations of the First Commission were
to be based,15 specifically stated that just about all conceivable forms for making
a will were recognized in some or other part of the Empire, and he attributed that
state of affairs to a ‘feature of the German national character which is susceptible to
a great diversity of distinctive forms’.16
Very broadly speaking, a distinction could be drawn between wills which, in
some way or other, involved the intervention of the public authority (‘public
wills’) and those which did not (‘private wills’). Concerning private wills, the legal
regimes prevailing in Germany until the end of the nineteenth century could
be subdivided into those which: (a) did not recognize them at all as an ordinary
type of will; (b) recognized private wills attested by witnesses; and (c) recognized
the holograph will, either in addition to the one attested by witnesses, or
exclusively.17 The prime example for the first regime is the Prussian Code
(Preußisches Allgemeines Landrecht) of 1794, } 66 I 12, which stated that, as
a rule, each testament or codicil had to be handed over by the testator, or
recorded by a court of law. The involvement of a court of law, it was thought,
would best prevent any doubt about the identity of the testator and the content of
13
In 1866, as a result of the Prussian military victory against Austria, the German Federation
(Deutscher Bund) had been dissolved. The Northern German States then, under Prussian hegemony,
formed the North German Federation (Norddeutscher Bund). The Reich, in 1871, was created on the
model of the North German Federation; it was a federation of four kingdoms, six grand duchies, twelve
duchies and principalities, and three free cities. Austria had, effectively, been dismissed from German
constitutional history in 1866.
14
For an overview of the laws prevailing in Germany on the eve of the entry into force of the BGB, see
the references provided in Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch und die Entwicklung des
Bürgerlichen Rechts’, in Mathias Schmoeckel, Joachim Rückert, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds),
Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB vol I (2003) vor 1 n 5; for the succession regimes, see Gottfried
von Schmitt, ‘Entwurf des Rechtes der Erbfolge für das Deutsche Reich, 1879’, reprinted in Werner
Schubert (ed), Die Vorlagen der Redaktoren für die erste Kommission zur Ausarbeitung des Entwurfs eines
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches, Erbrecht 1 (1984) 117 ff; for the formalities required for the making of a valid
will, see von Schmitt (this footnote) 483 ff.
15
On the origin of the BGB, and the individual phases of that process, see Stefan Stolte, in
Schmoeckel, Rückert, and Zimmermann (n 14) xxvii f; and see the literature cited in Zimmermann
(n 14) n 11. On Gottfried von Schmitt, see Werner Schubert, ‘Einleitung’, in Schubert (n 14) xv ff.
16
von Schmitt (n 14) 516 (‘ . . . jene[r] Zug im deutschen Volkscharakter, welcher zur Mannigfaltigkeit
eigenartiger Formen neigt’).
17
For details, see von Schmitt (n 14) 516 ff.
the will.18 Certainty about the true will of the testator was taken to be in the
interests of the entire civil society.19
The second regime was the one prevailing, inter alia, in the territories still
governed by the ius commune. Here the making of a private will required the
simultaneous presence of seven witnesses in front of which the testator had either
to state his last will in speech or to sign a previously drawn-up document which, in
turn, had to be signed and sealed by the witnesses.20 This will requiring the presence
of seven witnesses went back to post-classical Roman law21 and was often referred to,
citing J Inst 2, 10, 3, as ‘testamentum tripertitum’,22 both in its oral (testamentum
nuncupativum) and written (in scriptis) varieties.
The third regime, finally, was known only on the fringes of the territory of the
German Reich: in (parts of ) the Rhineland, in Alsace and Lorraine the Code civil
continued to apply, and with it the holograph will recognized in the Napoleonic
codification;23 the Grand Duchy of Baden had adopted the holograph will as part of
the Badisches Landrecht, a codification that was based on a translation of the Code
civil;24 some places in Bavaria lived according to Austrian law which also knew the
holograph will;25 and in the Duchy of Schleswig that type of will had been
introduced in 1854 by an ordinance of the (Danish) King.26 The Austrian Code
recognized the will attested by (three) witnesses in addition to the holograph will,27
while the Code civil and the Badisches Landrecht knew private wills only in the latter
form. Interestingly, the requirements for holograph wills differed in France and
Baden on the one hand, and in Austria on the other.28 Whereas according to Article
18
C F Koch, Das Preußische Erbrecht aus dem gemeinen deutschen Rechte entwickelt (Berlin, 1866) 568;
idem, Allgemeines Landrecht für die preußischen Staaten, Kommentar vol I/2 (2nd edn, Berlin, 1856) 26 f.
19
Carl Gottlieb Suarez, Vorträge über Recht und Staat (ed by Hermann Conrad and Gerd Kleinheyer,
1960) 290.
20
See, eg, Bernhard Windscheid and Theodor Kipp, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol III (9th edn,
1906) 220 ff (} 541); and see ch 2 above at 38.
21
See, eg, Max Kaser and Rolf Knütel, Römisches Privatrecht (19th edn, 2008) 358; Beutgen (n 7) 11
ff; and see ch 1 above.
22
Tripertitum (in three parts, ie in the present context, from three sources): ‘ . . . from the old [ius civile]
witnesses and presence at a single will-making occasion; from imperial pronouncements the requirement
that testator and witnesses subscribe; from the praetorian edict the seals and the number of the witnesses’
(trans Peter Birks and Grant McLeod, Justinian’s Institutes (1987) 69).
23
See Beutgen (n 7) 44 ff, 50 f; generally, see Hans-Jürgen Becker, ‘Rheinisches Recht’, in Handwör-
terbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte vol IV (1990) cols 1022 ff.
24
The ultimate recognition of holograph wills in the BGB is regarded as ‘the one really significant
contribution’ of the Badisches Landrecht towards the German Civil Code: Karlheinz Muscheler, Die Rolle
Badens in der Entstehungsgeschichte des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs (1993) 75; and see Hosemann [2010]
Rheinische Notar-Zeitschrift 520 ff, written on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the Badisches
Landrecht.
25
} 578 ABGB. On holograph wills in Austria, see Beutgen (n 7) 52 ff; ch 9 below at 230 ff. On the
role of Franz von Zeiller in this context, see von Hippel (n 7) 180 ff.
26
For details, see Max Pappenheim, ‘Eigenhändiges Testament und Testierfreiheit im früheren Rechte
Schleswigs’, in Festgabe zum XXVII. Deutschen Juristentage (1906) 9 ff; cf also the overview by Beutgen
(n 7) 62 ff. More precisely, that Ordinance had abolished the requirement of Royal confirmation of
holograph wills that had been imposed in an Ordinance of 1759.
27
} 585 ABGB (repealed 2004).
28
For Schleswig, see Pappenheim (n 26) 22 f.
970 of the Code civil it had to be written in its entirety, dated, and signed ‘by the
hand of the testator’ (Article 970 Badisches Landrecht: to be written entirely and
signed by the hand of the testator, with place, day, and year to be added), } 578
ABGB only required the will to be written, and signed with his name, by the testator:
‘The addition of the day, year, and place where the last will is made, is not
indispensable but it is advisable in order to avoid disputes.’29 The latter provision,
phrased in the fatherly and explanatory tone characteristic of the ABGB, had been
introduced in the Austrian legislator’s desire to give effect, as far as possible, to the
will of the testator and to do everything in his power to avoid the deplorable situation
that a will might have to be declared invalid because of the infringement of
a formality with which the testator may not have been sufficiently familiar. German
law would have been saved some tribulations had the draftsmen of the BGB followed
the Austrian example.30 In no other German state did the holograph will come to be
recognized as an ordinary will in the course of the nineteenth century. Nor was it
embraced by the Draft Codes for Bavaria (1811),31 for Hesse (1854),32 and for the
German Empire by Friedrich Mommsen (1876).33
III. Holograph wills: principle and exceptions
The prevailing mood was reflected also in the deliberations leading up to the
Saxonian Civil Code of 1865,34 the most modern German codification before the
enactment of the BGB. The Saxonian legislator followed the ius commune in
recognizing as ordinary wills both public wills recorded by, or handed over to,
a court of law and private wills attested by witnesses (five rather than seven).35 The
holograph will was not elevated to the same status because it did not properly reflect
the great significance of the act of making a will.36 In addition, attention was
drawn to the fact that many testators, particularly those in rural areas, did not have
29
} 578 second sentence ABGB.
30
See Breitschmidt (n 7) 24; Beutgen (n 7) 60.
31
Walter Demel and Werner Schubert (eds), Der Entwurf eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs für das
Königreich Bayern von 1811 (Revidierter Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis) (1986) 323 ff.
32
Entwurf eines bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs für das Großherzogthum Hessen, nebst Motiven, Dritte Abthei-
lung (Darmstadt, 1845) Arts 85 ff, 98 ff (for the motivation, see 59 ff, 72 ff ). The draftsmen rejected
holograph wills in spite of the fact that they were known in their French version in a part of Hesse known
as Rhenish Hesse (Rheinhessen).
33
Friedrich Mommsen, Entwurf eines Deutschen Reichgesetzes über das Erbrecht nebst Motiven
(Braunschweig, 1876) Arts 59 ff (for the motivation, see 183 ff ).
34
On which see, in the present context, Beutgen (n 7) 64 ff.
35
}} 2092 ff, 2100 ff Saxonian BGB.
36
Entwurf eines Gesetzbuchs für das Königreich Sachsen, nebst allgemeinen Motiven und Inhaltsverzeich-
nisse (Dresden, 1852) Specielle Motiven 420 (‘It is also expedient to remind the testator, by means of a
certain solemnity of the act, of the importance and significance of the same, so that he may contemplate in
a serious mood the reasons for, and consequences of, a disposition which can be accompanied unalterably,
after his death, by the greatest influence on the fate of individual persons, or even entire families and
houses’).
a well-trained and characteristic handwriting;37 also, the handwriting of testators

could be altered as a result of disease or infirmity. And then, of course, there was the
danger that the will of the testator might be distorted by extraneous influences.38
The picture presented thus far would be misleading, however, if account were not
taken of situations in which the succession regimes of the first and second type,39
exceptionally, recognized holograph wills (or even oral wills without witnesses).
Thus, according to the ius commune, a will disposing of property in favour of
descendants did not require attestation by witnesses as long as it was made in writing
(testamentum parentum inter liberos),40 and legacies could even be valid if they had
been orally imposed upon, and vis-à-vis, the heir.41 In many different modifications
these exceptions were also recognized in contemporary codes and statutes,42 even in
the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht.43 The Saxonian Code had special provisions
for these two situations44 and was even prepared to extend the privilege concerning
dispositions in favour of descendants to spouses.45 In addition, it allowed the
testator, in the course of making his will, to refer to a written document, as far as
the object of his disposition and the identity of the beneficiary were concerned; and it
continued:
. . . if in such case, upon the testator’s death a document is found which is written in his own
hand and signed by him with his family name, and which designates the beneficiary with his
family name and at least one unabbreviated Christian name, and the shares of the inheritance
or sums in words, and which also names the place, year and day where and when the document
was drawn up, no further formality is required.46
That was also, in modern garb, a well-known device available to testators under
the ius commune where it was referred to as testamentum mysticum.47 Under the ius
37
Reference was made, in this context, to the ‘identity of the handwriting, occurring not infrequently,
of those who have benefited from the services of the same writing-teacher’ (Specielle Motiven (n 36) 423).
38
Specielle Motiven (n 36) 422 f.
39
Text to nn 17–22 above.
40
Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 228 f (} 544, 4); cf also Helmut Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht vol I
(1985) 570; Kaser and Knütel (n 21) 359; ch 2 above at 28.
41
Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 590 f (} 629); cf also Coing (n 40) 577 f.
42
For details, see von Schmitt (n 14) 557 f, 558 ff.
43
See }} 172–4 I 12 PrALR concerning legacies (limited, however, to the twentieth part of the value of
the inheritance); }} 378 ff II 2 PrALR concerning the testamentum parentum inter liberos (on which, see von
Schmitt (n 14) 558; Heinrich Dernburg, Lehrbuch des Preußischen Privatrechts und der Rechtsnormen des
Reichs vol III (Halle, 1880) 325 ff (} 116)).
44
}} 2115, 2384 Saxonian BGB.
45
} 2115 Saxonian BGB. For the interpretation of this rule, see Stephan Hoffmann, P Kaden, and
G Scheele (eds), Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch für das Königreich Sachsen vol II (Leipzig, 1889) 148; Bernhard
Gottlob Schmidt, Vorlesungen über das in dem Königreiche Sachsen geltende Privatrecht vol II (Leipzig,
1869) 179 f.
46
} 2084 Saxonian BGB (‘ . . . und es bedarf solchenfalls, wenn sich bei seinem Tode eine von ihm
eigenhändig geschriebene und eigenhändig mit seinem Familiennamen unterschriebene Schrift findet, in
welcher der Bedachte mit dem Familiennamen und wenigstens einem voll ausgeschriebenen Vornamen,
und die Erbtheile oder Summen mit Worten angegeben, auch Ort, Jahr und Tag der Abfassung der
Schrift beigefügt sind, zu deren Gültigkeit keiner weiteren Form’).
47
Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 240 (} 546, 3); Carl Georg von Wächter, Pandekten vol II (Leipzig,
1881) 717 (} 289); Heinrich Dernburg and Johannes Biermann, Pandekten vol III (1901) 147 (} 77, 5);
commune, however, it had been notoriously disputed whether an oral will could
contain such self-authorization on the part of the testator to designate his heir in
a declaration that did not satisfy the ordinary requirements for making a will;48 and it
was also unclear whether an informal note was sufficient for that subsequent
declaration.49 What was possible with regard to the institution of an heir also, of
course, had to be possible for the granting of legacies. Once again, this was
recognized in the Saxonian Civil Code as much as under the ius commune.50
Effectively, therefore, both under the ius commune and under the most important
German codification immediately preceding the BGB, many important dispositions
mortis causa could be made by an informal document, written and signed by the
testator, and the testamentum mysticum went a considerable way towards establishing
the holograph will more generally.51
IV. The battle over holograph wills:

travaux préparatoires of the BGB
1. Gottfried von Schmitt’s Preliminary Draft

The Saxonian Civil Code entered into force in 1865. Ten years later, Gottfried von
Schmitt was asked to prepare a draft code of succession for the German Reich, and
the resulting ‘Preliminary Draft’ was presented in 1879. Von Schmitt was distinctly
more conservative, as far as testamentary formalities were concerned, than the
draftsmen of the Saxonian Code. His Preliminary Draft only recognized public
wills, to be drawn up either before a judge or notary.52 Private wills (holograph
wills and wills made in front of two witnesses) were to be admissible, first, if the:
. . . inhabitants of villages, streets or buildings find themselves, as result of prevailing diseases
or other extraordinary circumstances, in an emergency excluding resort to the ordinary form of
von Schmitt (n 14) 564 f; ch 2 above at 38; and see Max Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht vol I (2nd edn,
1971) 694. Dernburg and Biermann describe the testamentum mysticum as ‘unhealthy and inappropriate’
and express their satisfaction that it was not adopted by the BGB. The terminology under the earlier ius
commune appears to have been somewhat different: see ch 2 above at 38.
48
For references, see Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 240 (} 546, 3).
49
See von Wächter (n 47) 717 (} 289) on the one hand, Dernburg and Biermann (n 47) 147 (} 77, 5)
on the other.
50
For a clear statement to this effect, see Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 590 (} 628, n 16); and see
} 2383 Saxonian BGB. Windscheid and Kipp rightly emphasize that, as a result, the rules concerning
codicilli testamento confirmati were rendered largely ‘illusory’. On codicilli testamento confirmati, see
Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 589 (} 628); von Wächter (n 47) 802 (} 313); Dernburg and Biermann
(n 47) 142 (} 75 II); von Schmitt (n 14) 565 f; ch 2 above at 44; and see Kaser I (n 47) 694.
51
See also the assessment by Coing (n 40) 570.
52
The basic principles concerning testamentary formalities, on which his Preliminary Draft was to be
based, had been presented by Gottfried von Schmitt to the so-called First Commission charged with the
preparation of the BGB, and discussed by that Commission, as early as 1875: see Horst Heinrich Jakobs
and Werner Schubert (eds), Die Beratung des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs in systematischer Zusammenstellung
der unveröffentlichten Quellen vol Erbrecht I (2002) 19 ff, 28.
will or making it particularly difficult, provided the competent public authority had granted
permission to resort to these types of wills for the duration of the emergency.53
That was a considerably modified version of the testamentum tempore pestis.54
Second, both types of private will were also to be recognized if they had been
made on board a German ship that did not belong to the navy and was outside
a German harbour.55 Third, testators could avail themselves of a holograph will for
the regulation of their burial and for a limited number of dispositions of an
administrative nature concerning, for example, the distribution and partition of
their estate, whether or not property received prior to the testator’s death should
be taken into account in the distribution of the estate, and the appointment of an
executor.56 A fourth situation where the holograph will was recognized did not have
to be dealt with by Gottfried von Schmitt because it had been regulated in the
Imperial Law on the Armed Forces (Reichs-Militärgesetz, } 44): the wills of persons
in active service and subject to the military laws were valid, as long as they had been
written and signed by the respective testators themselves.57 This was the modern
statutory version of the testamentum militis (or militare) that had been known since
Roman times.58
As far as the general recognition of holograph wills was concerned, Gottfried von
Schmitt conceded that they were convenient, dispensed with the necessity, in
a number of situations, to recognize extraordinary wills, and respected the testator’s
desire for secrecy. ‘It is also claimed’, Gottfried von Schmitt continued with a touch
of scepticism, ‘that in view of the progress which the education of the population in
general has made, the holograph will may be made available on a broad basis’.59 But
ultimately the counter-arguments prevailed with him: there is no clear feature
distinguishing a mere draft will from a will itself; there is the danger that holograph
wills may be forged, suppressed, or fraudulently fabricated; and whether a will is kept
and, eventually, found, is dependent on all sorts of vagaries of life.60
2. Rejection confirmed
The deliberations leading up to the First Draft of the BGB resulted in a number of
modifications, but did not change the key feature of Gottfried von Schmitt’s
53
} 179 Preliminary Draft (von Schmitt (n 14) 39). A holograph will, under these circumstances, had
to be written and signed by the testator himself who also had to add the place, date, and year when the will
was made.
54
On which, see Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 227 (} 544, 2); Dernburg and Biermann (n 47) 136
(} 72); von Schmitt (n 14) 550 ff; cf also }} 198 I 12 PrALR; } 2113 Saxonian BGB.
55
} 183 Preliminary Draft (von Schmitt (n 14) 39). For background and motivation, see von Schmitt
(n 14) 554 f (referring to Germany’s extensive connections with countries overseas which are bound
‘undoubtedly’ to grow even further); cf also } 205 I 12 PrALR. For details concerning wills made in cases of
emergency, and on board ship, particularly how long they remained valid, see } 184 Preliminary Draft
(von Schmitt (n 14) 39 f ).
56
}} 186 ff Preliminary Draft (von Schmitt (n 14) 40).
57
See, eg, Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 227 (} 544, n 6a); Beutgen (n 7) 68.
58
Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 226 f (} 544, 1); Kaser I (n 47) 680 ff.
59 60
von Schmitt (n 14) 519. von Schmitt (n 14) 519.
Preliminary Draft: the rejection of the private will.61 Additional arguments advanced
against the holograph will were the danger that testators might all too easily be
subject to extraneous influences, as well as the fact that the observation of this form
required more legal knowledge on the part of the general public than it predomin-
antly possessed.62 The holograph will, it was maintained, was unsuitable for pre-
venting formal mistakes and for clarifying what the testator really wanted to say, and
formal mistakes could no longer be corrected, nor the content of the will be clarified,
when the document became effective: for by that time ‘the testator’s mouth had been
closed forever’.63 Even lawyers from the state of Baden, commenting on the BGB,
were sceptical at first;64 eventually, however, they were among the most influential
proponents of a type of will that had been recognized in their state for such a long
time.65
Among the more interesting points raised in the Second Commission was that the
use of informal notes (Nachzettel) of the type envisaged in a testamentum mysticum
had become very frequent, which was taken to demonstrate the practical need to
recognize holograph wills.66 Also, the desirability or not of providing incentives to
make a will was raised. The availability only of the public will with its annoying
necessity to visit a notary or court of law (so it was feared) would prevent many
people from making a will, which was all the more inappropriate in view of the fact
that most people, in any event, do not easily make up their mind to make a will. But,
then, it was also argued that the rules on intestate succession envisaged by the BGB,
contrary to those prevailing in Roman law, were so fair and reasonable that there was
little need to induce those living under such a benign regime to derogate it by making
a will.67 Reference to the many countries in which the holograph will was recognized
was countered by the remark that not too much weight should be given to the
customs and traditions of non-German people.68 And what about Germans living in
regions that knew the holograph will? They would easily become accustomed to the
new regime of ‘public wills only’.69 The Austrian academic socialist Anton Menger,
61
For the relevant discussions, see Jakobs and Schubert I (n 52) 28 (concerning submission 14/1875
by von Schmitt, reprinted in Jakobs and Schubert I (n 52) 19 ff ); Horst Heinrich Jakobs and Werner
Schubert (eds), Die Beratung des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs in systematischer Zusammenstellung der unver-
öffentlichten Quellen vol Erbrecht II (2002) 1529 f; Motive, in Benno Mugdan (ed), Die gesammten
Materialien zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich vol V (Berlin, 1899) 135 f. For a modern
overview of the travaux préparatoires concerning } 2231 BGB, see Beutgen (n 7) 76 ff and Hosemann
[2010] Rheinische Notar-Zeitschrift 523 ff.
62
Motive (n 61) 136.
63
Motive (n 61) 135 f.
64
See Adrian Bingner, Bemerkungen zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für das Deutsche
Reich, Sächsisches Archiv für Bürgerliches Recht und Prozess 1 (Leipzig, 1891) 181 (Bingner was a Presiding
Judge of the Imperial Court (Reichsgericht) from Baden); and see the reference in Muscheler (n 24) 76.
65
See Muscheler (n 24) 77 and Hosemann [2010] Rheinische Notar-Zeitschrift 523 ff (drawing
attention to the influential role of Eugen von Jagemann, the plenipotentiary of the Government of
Baden in Berlin). On Jagemann, see Muscheler (n 24) 39 f.
66
Protokolle, in Benno Mugdan (ed), Die gesammten Materialien zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch für das
Deutsche Reich vol V (Berlin, 1899) 697.
67
Protokolle (n 66) 697 f.
68 69
Protokolle (n 66) 698. Protokolle (n 66) 698.
incidentally, had drawn attention to a completely different argument against

the introduction of such ‘public wills only’ regime: it would, in view of the costs
involved in the making of a public will, effectively place a restriction on the
testamentary freedom of the ‘lower and middle social classes’.70 When the issue
was discussed in the committee on legal affairs of the Federal Council (Bundesrat),
Bavaria tabled a motion requesting the introduction of the holograph will, but was
supported only by the state of Baden.71 Once again, the argument was raised that for
the Germans living in the Rhineland this was bound to appear as a very reactionary
step,72 but to no avail.
3. Acceptance at last
The swing of opinion only came when the Draft BGB reached the Reichstag, and
was referred, after a first reading, to the relevant committee (the so-called XII.
Kommission des Reichstages).73 The assault on the ‘public wills only’ regime was
launched, again, by representatives from Baden and Bavaria. The introduction of
holograph wills in Baden, it was pointed out, had not caused difficulties in spite of
the fact that there had then still been considerable problems, as far as the reading
and writing skills of the population were concerned.74 The arguments against the
holograph will (such as that the testator has to be protected, by means of the
solemn form required for the making of a will, not only against third parties, but
also, so to speak, against himself, that is, against ‘temporary moods and impressions
imposing themselves upon him’)75 were based on theoretical speculation and failed
to take account of the practical experiences that had been gathered. Thus, for
instance, attention was drawn to the fact that in the district of the Supreme Court
of Appeal of Cologne where the holograph will had been recognized for a long
time, many more law suits had been brought with regard to the validity and
interpretation of notarial wills than of holograph wills.76 Eventually, the Commit-
tee voted twelve to eight in favour of recommending the introduction of the
holograph will.77
70
Anton Menger, ‘Das Bürgerliche Recht und die besitzlosen Volksklassen’ (1890) 3 Archiv für soziale
Gesetzgebung und Statistik 69 f. Most of the other commentators on the first draft, among them Julius
Baron and Otto von Gierke, approved of the rejection of holograph wills: see Julius Baron, ‘Das Erbrecht
in dem Entwurf eines bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs für das deutsche Reich’ (1889) 75 Archiv für die
civilistische Praxis 225; Otto (von) Gierke, Der Entwurf eines bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs und das deutsche
Recht (Leipzig, 1889) 523.
71
Jakobs and Schubert II (n 61) 1549 (Prussia, Saxony, Württemberg, Hesse, and Lübeck declared
their opposition to that motion).
72
‘ . . . als einen grossen Rückschritt ansehen . . . ’: Jakobs and Schubert II (n 61) 1549 f.
73
The report of that Commission, dated 12 June 1896, has been reprinted in Benno Mugdan (ed), Die
gesammten Materialien zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich vol V (Berlin, 1899) 878 ff.
74
Kommissionsbericht (n 73) 887.
75
Kommissionsbericht (n 73) 887; cf also text to nn 60, 62, and 63 above.
76
Kommissionsbericht (n 73) 887 f.
77
Kommissionsbericht (n 73) 888. That decision was confirmed, this time by a majority of 12:6,
during the second reading: Jakobs and Schubert II (n 61) 1552.
The decisive vote in favour of the holograph will, and thus confirming the
Committee’s recommendation, was taken in the course of the plenary meeting of
the Reichstag of 27 June 1896 and after an extended, and partly also emotional,
debate.78 Most of the arguments raised over the past twenty years (that is, ever since
Gottfried von Schmitt had made his original submission to the First Commission)79
were reiterated. Much of what was said was based on speculation. Would holograph
wills pave the way for fraudulent manipulation?80 Would they endanger legal
certainty?81 Who could be sure that a holograph will, tucked away in a remote
corner of the testator’s writing desk, or hidden in a book within his library, would
actually be found, or, if it was found, that it would not perhaps be suppressed either
accidentally or intentionally?82 Was the disposition mortis causa really the most
significant transaction in a person’s life (‘das allerwichtigste Rechtsgeschäft’), there-
fore requiring a certain level of solemnity?83 Was a holograph or public will typically
the most suitable device for conveying the real intention of the testator?84 Did one or
the other more often give rise to disputes because the real intention had not been
adequately expressed?85
Other arguments revealed conflicting views as to freedom of testation. Would
holograph wills facilitate will-making, and was that really desirable?86 Did the rules
of intestate succession not provide an entirely adequate and equitable regime for the
distribution of the testator’s property?87 Of course, once again, the representatives
from states which recognized the holograph will lined up, quite independent of their
party allegiance, against those from states which did not, and related the experiences
gathered in the past.88 They also drew attention to the disadvantages associated with
the mandatory public will. Baron von Stumm-Halberg from Trier illustrated them
with a case that had happened within his own family: two spouses had drawn up
a will that would have been entirely valid, had it been deposited with a court of law.
They had decided to keep it at home in order to be able, without any inconvenience,
78
‘Zweite Berathung im Plenum des Reichstages’, in Mugdan (n 73) 893 ff.
79
See n 48 above.
80
See, eg, Gerhard von Buchka, in ‘Zweite Berathung’ (n 78) 894 (yes); Eugen von Jagemann, in
‘Zweite Berathung’ (n 78) 896 (no).
81
See, eg, von Buchka (n 80) 894.
82
See, eg, Gustav Kauffmann, in ‘Zweite Berathung’ (n 78) 895; but see von Jagemann (n 80) 897.
83
See von Buchka (n 80) 894 and Kauffmann (n 82) 894; but see also von Jagemann (n 80) 896.
84
See, eg, Kauffmann (n 82) 895 on the one hand, and Bernhard Stephan, in ‘Zweite Berathung’
(n 78) 899 f on the other.
85
See von Jagemann (n 80) 896 and Jakob Simonis, in ‘Zweite Berathung’ (n 78) 902 (both arguing in
favour of the holograph will because it allowed the testator to express himself in his own language rather
than in the artificial language of the law).
86
See, eg, von Jagemann (n 80) 896, disputing the proposition that holograph wills would create a
will-making addiction (‘ . . . Sucht zu testiren’ (897)).
87
Kauffmann (n 82) 894 f invoking the ‘old Germanic principle’ that intestate succession should be
the rule. But see Ludwig von Cuny, in ‘Zweite Berathung’ (n 78) 899.
88
See, eg, von Cuny (n 87) 898 f. See also Hosemann [2010] Rheinische Notar-Zeitschrift 525,
detailing the constituencies and party affiliations of all speakers during the debate. However, two members
of Parliament backed holograph wills in their speeches in spite of coming from states which did not
recognize them: Stephan (n 84) 899 f (drawing attention to the frequent use of Nachzettel by testators
under Prussian law: see text to n 66 above), and Ludwig Enneccerus, in ‘Zweite Berathung’ (n 78) 902 f.
to adapt it to changed circumstances. Then one of the spouses had suddenly died
before the other had been able to fulfil the requirement of deposition with
the court.89 Some of the speeches were peppered with passionate appeals: both the
possible introduction and rejection of the holograph will were described as a ‘grave
misfortune’;90 it was maintained that the decision taken by the XII. Commission had
caused ‘the greatest distress in all levels and classes of society’,91 while it was also
reported that ‘general rejoicing’ had burst forth when news of that decision had reached
the Rhine-Province.92 The differences in mentality prevailing within Germany were
invoked. For while those living in the Rhineland or in Alsace-Lorraine may be inclined
to make their will in good time, and to do so prudently and free from external influence,
the same cannot be said about the northern Germans: they were generally said to be
reluctant to make a will, possibly because it was widely believed that a death will soon
occur within the family of someone who has made a will.93 Even the emancipation of
women, to be promoted by the holograph will, was dragged into the debate.94
V. The holograph will and the courts (1900–35)
1. ‘ . . . like writing a business letter’?

In the end, therefore, the final version of the BGB (18 August 1896) contained a rule
according to which a will could be drawn up in the form of ‘a declaration, specifying the
place where, and the day when, it had been made, and written and signed by the testator
in his own hand’ (} 2231 no 2 BGB). That was hardly a very complex provision; and the
requirements laid down by it appeared to be ‘so straightforward and so easy to be
complied with, that no testator has to worry about invalidity according to } 125,
provided he has made his last will . . . at least with the same diligence which anybody
applies to the writing of a business letter’.95 That contented statement96 appeared in
a commentary published in 1928. Yet, by that time, the seemingly straightforward
89
Ferdinand Freiherr von Stumm-Halberg, in ‘Zweite Berathung’ (n 78) 900.
90
von Buchka (n 80) 894 on the one hand, and Freiherr von Stumm-Halberg (n 89) 900 on the other.
91
Adolf Görtz, in ‘Zweite Berathung’ (n 78) 901. On the other hand, according to Simonis (n 85) 902
there had been ‘general dismay’ in Alsace-Lorraine when news got around that the draft BGB did not
recognize holograph wills.
92
von Cuny (n 87) 898.
93
As a result, north German testators will usually only make their will when they feel that their
last hour has come. At that moment, however, they tend to be frail and subject to all kinds of influences
so that it is in the public, as well as in their own, interest to require the presence of a judge or notary:
Görtz (n 91) 901.
94
Freiherr von Stumm-Halberg (n 89) 900; cf also Simonis (n 85) 902.
95
Michaelis and Seyffarth, in Das Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtspre-
chung des Reichsgerichts (RGRK) (6th edn, 1928) } 2231 n 3 (‘ . . . so einfach und leicht erfüllbar, dass kein
Erblasser die Nichtigkeit aus } 125 zu besorgen hat, wenn er seinen letzten Willen, so wie er ihn im
Augenblick der Errichtung wirklich hegt, ohne Benutzung eines Vordrucks mindestens mit der Sorgfalt
niederschreibt, die jedermann an einen Brief geschäftlichen Inhalts zu wenden pflegt’). The rule referred to
in this quotation, } 125 first sentence BGB, states: ‘A juridical act which lacks the form prescribed by
law is void’.
96
‘ . . . behaglich dahinplätschernder Rechtspositivismus’: von Hippel (n 7) 23.
provision had already given rise to an endless series of legal disputes.97 The reason for
most of those disputes was quite simply that, while a significant amount of time had
been spent discussing whether or not the holograph will was to be introduced, hardly
any consideration had been given to the details of the form to be required for that type
of will.98 The provision appears to have drawn on the requirements laid down in } 1927
E I for emergency wills99 and these, in turn, corresponded to the requirements for
holograph wills in Baden.100 As a result, } 2231 no 2 BGB (in line with Article 970
Badisches Landrecht) was stricter than the Code civil (which did not require the testator
to indicate the place where he had made his will) and considerably stricter than the
Austrian Code (which did not regard the specification of day, year, and place as
indispensable).101
2. Formalism . . .
The generally accepted point of departure for the German courts was that the
requirements laid down in } 2231 no 2 BGB for holograph wills had to be taken
seriously.102 As a result, countless wills eventually failed, even though there could be
no doubt at all that they reflected the real intention of the testator. Thus, the
Reichsgericht held a will to be invalid that had indicated the place (‘Witten an der
Ruhr’) in pre-printed form, in spite of the fact that it had been found in a sealed
envelope on which the testator had written in his own hand: ‘Testament von Gustav
W., Witten am 14./7.1900’.103 The same result was reached in a case where the
testator had died in a sanatorium situated in a suburb of Berlin called ‘Westend’,
because he had dated his will ‘Berlin, 29. Februar 1916’ rather than ‘Westend, 29.
Februar 1916’;104 where a person who had hanged himself had been found in his flat
with a will in his pocket which, although mentioning the imminent suicide, was
merely dated ‘15. July, 7:30 nachmittags’;105 where a will was dated ‘Berlin, Ostern
1902’ (it was invalid in view of the fact that ‘Easter’ does not unambiguously refer to
one specific day but to the two days which are celebrated ‘everywhere in Prussia and
in the German Empire under the name of that feast’);106 where a will had been made
97
The book by Fritz von Hippel, Formalismus und Rechtsdogmatik (1935), contains a detailed and
critical, partly also polemical, analysis extending over 177 pages and culminating in a reform proposal. For
overviews, cf also Felix Herzfelder, in J von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (9th edn,
1928) } 2231 V; O Strecker, in Planck’s Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol V (4th edn, 1930)
} 2231 II; Beutgen (n 7) 83 ff; Hosemann [2010] Rheinische Notar-Zeitschrift 525 ff.
98
That point has also been made by von Hippel (n 7) 30 f; Breitschmidt (n 7) 27 f; Beutgen (n 7) 81;
Hosemann [2010] Rheinische Notar-Zeitschrift 525.
99
Cf also already } 180 Preliminary Draft von Schmitt.
100
Text after n 28 above. One of the two motions in favour of holograph wills debated and approved
in the XII Commission (text to n 73 above) was copied literally from Art 970 Badisches Landrecht
(‘ . . . von der Hand des Erblassers durchaus geschrieben und unterzeichnet, auch mit Ort, Tag und Jahr
versehen . . . ’): Kommissionsbericht (n 73) 886.
101 102
Text to n 29 above. See, eg, von Hippel (n 7) 33 ff.
103 104
RG [1908] Juristische Wochenschrift 336 f. RG (1919) 63 Gruchot 100 ff.
105 106
RG [1923] Juristische Wochenschrift 604. KG [1904] Recht 450.
in January 1909 but had mistakenly still been dated 1908,107 or where it had been
dated 23 December even though it had only been made on the following day;108 or
where the testator had signed herself merely as ‘Lotte’ (who intended to leave her
estate to her only beloved Paulchen);109 ‘Dein dich liebender Vater’ (your loving
father; in a will addressed to the testator’s son Theo)110 or ‘Eure treue Mutter’ (your
faithful mother; in a will addressed to the testator’s children Fritz and Ata R).111
Many German testators, obviously, did not think of business affairs112 when they sat
down to make their will, but were full of tender feelings and therefore wrote their will
in the form of a letter to their loved ones. And if they thought of business it may not
have occurred to them that the use of letter-heads with their place of residence
printed on them as well as a skeleton date that merely needed to be filled in
(‘Hamburg, . . . . . . 19.’) was sufficient for professional purposes (and any standard
letter), but not for the making of a will.113
3. . . . but not too much

It is hardly surprising that many commentators were uneasy about these and other
decisions.114 Had it been a mistake to introduce the holograph will? Were the
statutory requirements laid down in } 2231 no 2 BGB too strict, or were they too
strictly interpreted? Many of the superior courts themselves, including the Reichs-
gericht, appear to have shared that uneasiness, for in a variety of other cases they did
their utmost to avoid a harsh result. A testator in Berlin had instituted his wife in
a will in which the words ‘Berlin W. Nürnbergerstr. 21, den . . . . . . . . 190..’ had been
printed. That will was upheld in view of the fact that the testator had repeated, this
time in his own hand, the street (but not the city!) under his signature and that he
had filled in the date by adding ‘1. September’ as well as the figure ‘3’ in the slot left
for the year. The Kammergericht115 argued that the place where and the year when
the will had been made could be determined on the basis of what the testator had
written in his own hand, as interpreted in the light of the document as a whole
(including its printed part!).116 The Regional Appeal Court of Munich was prepared
to uphold a will where the name of the place where the will had been made
was written on the envelope rather than in the will itself.117 Providing an ambigu-
ous place name such as Frankfurt, Freiburg, or Neustadt without any further
107
KG, 29 June 1908, OLGE 18, 350.
108
RG [1901] Juristische Wochenschrift 814 f.
109
KG, 9 November 1905, KGE 31, A 109 ff.
110
KG, 7 November 1917, OLGE 36, 234 ff.
111
RG, 5 July 1915, RGZ 134, 308 ff. In this context, attention was also drawn to } 126 I BGB, the
general rule on the requirement of writing: ‘If writing is prescribed by law the document must be signed by
its maker in his own hand by signature of his name or by his mark notarially authenticated.’
112
Text to n 95 above.
113
See also von Hippel (n 7) 177 ff.
114
Cf also the overview by Beutgen (n 7) 87 f.
115
Kammergericht is the traditional name of the Regional Appeal Court of Berlin.
116
KG, 22 November 1909, OLGE 20, 428 ff.
117
OLG München [1936] Juristische Wochenschrift 2484 f.
specification was also held not to endanger the validity of a will.118 Furthermore,
wills were regarded as valid that had merely been dated 31 May (because it was
obvious that there had been a direct connection with the suicide committed by the
testator, her husband, and her son and because, therefore, the will could only have
been made on 31 May 1934);119 that had been dated ‘August 1914’ (because its text
had commenced with the words ‘Im Augenblicke der Mobilmachung bestimme
ich . . . ’ (‘At the moment of mobilization (of the German Army) I determine’) and
it could therefore be concluded that it had been made on 1 August 1914);120 that
had been dated ‘Dresden, den 18. April 1804’ (because it was clear that the testator
who had died in 1904 aged 67 could not have lived in 1804 and that the indication
of the wrong century could therefore only have been a slip of the pen);121 that had
been dated 2 August 1928 even though the testator had only started to write it on
that day but had continued until some time after midnight (because the date, though
‘inexact’, was not ‘wrong’, and because anything else would amount to a formalism
running counter to the requirements of life);122 and that had been signed ‘Dein
treuer Fritz’,123 or ‘E.’.124
4. Reactions
A comparison between these two lines of decision brings out obvious discrepancies. In
some instances they reveal differences in approach between different courts, in others
they demonstrate a gradual relaxation of the formal requirements over the years.
Sometimes elaborate attempts were made to rationalize these discrepancies; thus, in
particular, it was repeatedly pointed out that wills could be upheld, if what was lacking
from the handwritten text could be supplemented by the courts, provided that that
information could be gathered from the text of the will itself. But the way in which
these and other criteria were applied was far from evident. It was hardly foreseeable
which deficits in the drawing up of a will a court was prepared to condone, and legal
certainty was thus jeopardized to a remarkable degree. Commentators trying to sum up
the situation either sought their refuge in somewhat helpless statements, such as that
there has to be formalism but not too much,125 or they resigned themselves to
recommending to the testate and intestate heirs, locked in dispute about the validity
of a will, the conclusion of an inheritance settlement.126 Others called for reform,
118
RG [1907] Juristische Wochenschrift 143 (anything else would amount to excessive formalism:
‘ . . . eine Überspannung des Formerfordernisses’).
119
RG, 9 March 1935, RGZ 147, 193 ff.
120
OLG Colmar, 6 January 1915, OLGE 30, 211 f.
121
RG, 6 December 1906, RGZ 64, 423 ff.
122
RG, 29 February 1932, RGZ 136, 125 ff.
123
RG, 5 July 1915, RGZ 87, 109 ff.
124
ObLG München, 5 March 1930, Jahrbuch für Entscheidungen in Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen
Gerichtsbarkeit und des Grundbuchrechts 7, 127 ff.
125
Fritz Keidel, in Handausgabe des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs aufgrund von J von Staudingers Kommen-
tar (3rd edn, 1931) 976 (‘Exact compliance with the provisions on the drawing up of the holograph will is
indispensable, though the formalism must not be exaggerated’).
126
Friedrich Endemann, Erbrecht des BGB (1923) 31.
sharply criticizing the sheer number of holograph wills that were declared invalid
for non-compliance with the form requirements laid down in } 2231 no 2 BGB127 as
well as the ‘see-saw’ method128 employed by courts that had become caught up
inextricably between the Scylla of legalism and the Charybdis of their natural desire
to do individual justice. Two alternatives were available for such reform: abolition of
the holograph will, or relaxation of its requirements. Both of them were propagated,
the second one most forcefully by Fritz von Hippel, both in his book129 and in a
subsequent article.130
5. The dawn of a new era

The latter article had been prompted by a decision of the Regional Court of Hamburg
from November 1937,131 and another one of the Kammergericht reversing the for-
mer.132 The Regional Court of Hamburg had openly rebelled against what it regarded
as an excessive formalism and had upheld a will as valid in which the place (‘Hamburg 1,
Barkhof Haus 1, den . . . ’) had not been written by the testator in his own hand, but pre-
printed at the head of the sheet of paper on which the will was written. To hold
otherwise, the court argued, might be in line with } 2231 no 2 BGB and the way in
which that rule was applied by the higher courts, but it ran counter to the contemporary
conception of law (‘heutige Rechtsanschauung’) and to healthy popular sentiments
(‘gesundes Volksempfinden’), the supreme source of German law.133 Clearly, by that
point, people were living in extraordinary times. Four-and-a-half years previously the
national socialists had taken over the government and had subsequently ‘coordinated’
just about the entire public life,134 and the decision of the Regional Court of Hamburg
is an example of what judges were prepared to do to transform the legal system in the
spirit of the new ideology. Other courts, among them the Kammergericht when it
quashed that decision, still subscribed to more traditional ideas of justice and separation
of powers. (von Hippel’s book, too, although written in a strongly anti-positivistic
127
Weyer, ‘Das eigenhändige Testament – Gedanken und Erfahrungen eines Nachlassrichters’ [1935]
Deutsche Notar-Zeitschrift 348 ff (estimating that about 25% of all holograph wills were invalid); cf also the
reference in Werner Schubert, ‘Erbrechtsausschuss und Ausschuss für Schadensersatzrecht (Nachtrag)’, in
Werner Schubert, Werner Schmid, and Jürgen Regge (eds), Akademie für Deutsches Recht 1933–1945:
Protokolle der Ausschüsse vol III, 8 (1996) 2 (‘at least 10%’).
128
von Hippel (n 7) 28.
129
von Hippel (n 97) passim.
130
Fritz von Hippel, ‘Rechtsform und Rechtsformalismus’ [1938] Juristische Wochenschrift 625 ff.
131
LG Hamburg [1938] Deutsche Justiz 199 f.
132
KG [1938] Deutsche Justiz 428 f.
133
LG Hamburg [1938] Deutsche Justiz 200.
134
For an overview, see Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘“Was Heimat hiess, nun heisst es Hölle”: The
Emigration of Lawyers from Hitler’s Germany: Political Background, Legal Framework, and Cultural
Context’, in Jack Beatson and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Jurists Uprooted: German-speaking Émigré
Lawyers in Twentieth-century Britain (2004) 2 ff, 54 ff (on the ‘Nazification’ of legal life in Germany) with
further references.
spirit,135 displayed no traces of specifically national socialist ideology.136) The two

decisions were widely publicized and commented upon.137 Adolf Hitler himself, when
he heard of the outcome of the case, was incensed because he realized that the
holograph will that he had made on 2 May 1938, in view of his conviction to be
seriously ill,138 would have been invalid had he died without amending it: for just as
the merchant X. in Hamburg,139 he had written it on a piece of paper with an official
letterhead on which the place (‘Berlin’) had been pre-printed. Four years later he still
remembered how he had grasped his head in disbelief and had drawn the Minister of
Justice’s attention to this ‘nonsense’: if not even the will of the Imperial Chancellor
satisfied the statutory requirements, the law was an ‘absolute scam’.140 The Minister
of Justice, Franz Gürtner,141 like many other lawyers, realized that the
Kammergericht could hardly have arrived at a different conclusion and defended its
decision; the Kammergericht, he said, had been quite aware of the inequity of the
result. But it was the legislature rather than the judiciary that had to change the law.
Franz Gürtner promised that the drafting of the reform bill would be given special
priority.142
135
See, in particular, von Hippel (n 7) 141 ff (discussing the legal literature attempting to rationalize
the court decisions).
136
For an evaluation of Fritz von Hippel as a lawyer and of his role under the national socialist regime,
see Thilo Ramm, ‘Fritz von Hippel als Rechtstheoretiker und Rechtsphilosoph’ [1992] Juristenzeitung
1141 ff. After the war it was Fritz von Hippel who wrote the first influential study critically analysing the
‘perversion of the law’ under the Nazi regime: Fritz von Hippel, Die nationalsozialistische Herrschaftsord-
nung als Warnung und Lehre: Eine juristische Betrachtung (1946); and see, more generally, idem, Die
Perversion von Rechtsordnungen (1955). The first of these texts is analysed by Raphael Gross, ‘Der Führer
als Betrüger: Moral und Antipositivismus in Deutschland 1945/1946 am Beispiel Fritz von Hippels’, in
Anne Klein and Jürgen Wilhelm (eds), NS-Unrecht vor Kölner Gerichten nach 1945 (2003) 23 ff. Gross
argues that by blaming the positivistic attitude of German lawyers for the corruption of justice during the
national socialist regime (an argument that was subsequently reiterated again and again) von Hippel
inadvertently perpetuated the anti-positivistic thinking patterns prevailing in national socialist ideology.
On the subtle and not so subtle mechanisms instrumental for the ‘perversion of law’ see now, in particular,
Bernd Rüthers, Die unbegrenzte Auslegung: Zum Wandel der Privatrechtsordnung im Nationalsozialismus
(6th edn, 2005).
137
See, eg, Gustav Boehmer, ‘Privattestamente mit vorgedruckter Ortsangabe’ [1938] Zeitschrift der
Akademie für Deutsches Recht 264 ff; and see today the discussion in Jörg Schliepkorte, Entwicklungen des
Erbrechts zwischen 1933 und 1953 (1989) 137 ff; Lothar Gruchmann, ‘Die Entstehung des Testaments-
gesetzes vom 31. Juli 1938: Nationalsozialistische “Rechtserneuerung” und Reformkontinuität’ (1985) 7
Zeitschrift für neuere Rechtsgeschichte 54 f.
138
The story is told by Gruchmann (1985) 7 Zeitschrift für neuere Rechtsgeschichte 55 f.
139
LG Hamburg [1938] Deutsche Justiz 199.
140
Henry Picker, Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941–42 (ed by Gerhard Ritter, 1951)
210 f (‘ . . . um diesen Unsinn zu beseitigen’; ‘ . . . dass derartige Rechtsauffassungen ein absoluter
Rechtsschwindel seien’).
141
Hitler’s low opinion of Gürtner becomes apparent from Picker (n 140) 211 f.
142
See Gruchmann (1985) 7 Zeitschrift für neuere Rechtsgeschichte 56 f, quoting from archival sources.
Cf also, on this episode, Gerhard Otte, ‘Zivilrechtliche Gesetzgebung im “Dritten Reich”’ [1988] NJW
2840; Hosemann [2010] Rheinische Notar-Zeitschrift 527 ff.
VI. Another battle over holograph wills
1. Opposition: The Academy for German Law

By that time, the Academy for German Law (founded in October 1933 in order to
‘pave the way for the renewal of German law in the spirit of the national socialist
philosophy of life according to the principles of a strictly scientific method’)143 had
already charged a committee with making proposals for a revision of the law of
succession,144 and that committee, under the chairmanship of Heinrich Lange,145
had produced a first memorandum on the law relating to wills by the end of 1937.146
The issue of the holograph will, of course, played a prominent role in that memoran-
dum. Heinrich Lange himself was strongly opposed to that type of will which he
regarded as a ‘stronghold of the neglect of duty [on the part of the testator]’.147 That
view was based on an ideology which regarded individualism and liberalism as odious
and which gave pride of place to the ideas of community and solidarity. The law of
succession had to be concerned with ‘the transmission of values in the spirit of a caring
promotion of family and community, of aims and endeavours that can be approved of,
rather than with the execution of the testator’s arbitrary will’ (the German original does
not sound much less stilted).148 The holograph will was denounced as providing an
opportunity for the testator ‘to be guided, alone in his little room and without
supervision by the community, by feelings of annoyance, by a malicious mentality
or by moral inferiority’.149 It would be much more preferable to compel testators to
make a public and oral declaration in front of a ‘preserver of the law’150 who might, if
necessary, remind him of his duties vis-à-vis his family.151 The holograph will also did
143
On that Academy, see Hans Hattenhauer, ‘Die Akademie für Deutsches Recht (1933–1944)’
[1986] Juristische Schulung 680 ff; Horst Göppinger, Juristen jüdischer Abstammung im ‘Dritten Reich’:
Entrechtung und Verfolgung (2nd edn, 1990) 127 ff.
144
Its minutes, as far as they have been preserved, have been edited by Schubert (n 127); for overview
and background, see the introduction by the editor xi ff.
145
On whom see Wilhelm Wolf, Vom alten zum neuen Privatrecht: Das Konzept der normgestützten
Kollektivierung in den zivilrechtlichen Arbeiten Heinrich Langes (1998) 15 ff.
146
Heinrich Lange, Das Recht des Testamentes: 1. Denkschrift des Erbrechtsausschusses der Akademie für
Deutsches Recht (1937).
147
Heinrich Lange, ‘Zur Vergangenheit und Zukunft der Formen im Vermögensrecht’ [1934]
Deutsche Notar-Zeitschrift 898 (‘Hort der Pflichtwidrigkeit’).
148
Lange (n 146) 5, sketching the idea on which the renewal of the law of succession was to be based
(‘ . . . seine Aufgabe besteht nicht in der Vollstreckung der Willkür des Erblassers, sondern in der
Weitergabe von Werten in sorgender Förderung von Familie und Gemeinschaft, von billigenswerten
Zielen und Bestrebungen’). For an examination of the community idea in the reforms of the law of
succession during the Nazi era in general, see Rüdiger Hütte, Der Gemeinschaftsgedanke in den Erbrechts-
reformen des Dritten Reichs (1988).
149
Heinrich Lange, ‘Zur Frage des handgeschriebenen Testaments’ (1936) 3 Jahrbuch der Akademie
für Deutsches Recht 132 (‘ . . . ohne Überwachung durch die Gemeinschaft im stillen Kämmerlein
sich . . . von Verärgerung, hämischer Gesinnung oder sittlicher Minderwertigkeit leiten zu lassen’).
150
The term ‘Rechtswahrer’ (literally, preserver of the law) was coined as a result of a desire to jettison
old-fashioned and outdated terms such as ‘jurist’: see Zimmermann (n 134) 56.
151
Heinrich Lange, ‘Nationalsozialismus und bürgerliches Recht’, in Hans Frank (ed), Nationalsozia-
listisches Handbuch für Recht und Gesetzgebung (1935) 952; and see Schliepkorte (n 137) 150 f.
not advance the respect for the dignity of the law. Again and again, Heinrich Lange
wrote, one was faced with cases which made a mockery of the last will and its
significance: cases where testators had used, in a most slapdash manner, torn-off scraps
of paper, scribbling pads, or the back of an invoice, to make their will.152
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that during the opening session of the Law of
Succession Committee of the Academy, only two of its members spoke out in favour
of holograph wills,153 and that in the course of the second working session the
holograph will was ‘nearly unanimously’ rejected as an ordinary will.154 But in the
course of the further deliberations the mood swung; and the memorandum of 1937,
after rehearsing all of the well-known arguments pro and con,155 eventually recorded
a majority view that the holograph will was to be retained.156 A chief consideration
influencing the majority appears to have been a purely factual one: the popularity
that the holograph will (‘the intruder’, as Heinrich Lange added somewhat grudg-
ingly)157 had acquired over the past decades throughout the Reich.158 However, of
course, the Law of Succession Committee also recommended a reform of the
formalities required for holograph wills. The committee’s proposals went in the
direction of the reform suggested by von Hippel.159 Von Hippel was not a member
of the committee (nor of the Academy of German Law). Dr Werner Vogels,
however, was; and he was the government official whose task it was to become in
the early spring of 1938 to draft the relevant reform bill.
2. Reform: The Testamentsgesetz

From the outset, Werner Vogels had been in favour of retaining holograph wills,160
and he was now in a position to implement the necessary reform.161 At first, an
amendment of the BGB had been envisaged, but in April 1938 the decision was
taken to draft a special statute dealing with the law relating to wills (Testamentsgesetz
152
Lange (n 146) 47 (‘ . . . in flüchtigster Form auf abgerissenen Papierstücken, in Schmierbüchern, auf
der Rückseite von Rechnungen . . . ’). Cf also Alfons Roth, ‘Rechtsform und Rechtsformalismus’ [1938]
Deutsche Notar-Zeitschrift 286 f, emphasizing the solemnity of the act.
153
See Schliepkorte (n 137) 147.
154
Schubert (n 127) 6.
155
Lange (n 146) 42–53. Cf also the analysis by Hütte (n 148) 144 ff.
156
Lange (n 146) 53.
157
Lange (n 146) 41. Cf also Lange [1934] Deutsche Notar-Zeitschrift 898 (‘ . . . this child of French law’).
158
Lange (n 146) 50 f. Cf also Hütte (n 148) 164 ff.
159
Lange (n 146) 54 ff.
160
Werner Vogels, ‘Inwieweit sind die Testamentsformen des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs erneuerungs-
bedürftig?’ [1935] Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht 636. Werner Vogels was also one of the two
members mentioned above: text to n 153 above. For Werner Vogels’ arguments in favour of a retention of
the holograph will, cf also Schliepkorte (n 146) 147 ff.
161
Vogels acknowledged that the reform was based, in part, on the deliberations of the Law of
Succession Committee of the Academy of German Law: Werner Vogels, ‘Das neue Testamentsrecht’
[1938] Deutsche Justiz 1269. The chairman of that committee, Heinrich Lange, of course, emphasized its
role more strongly: the reform was ‘the result of an exemplary cooperation between the Law of Succession
Committee of the Academy of German Law and the Imperial Ministry of Justice’ and was based
‘throughout’ (allenthalben) on its deliberations. See also Schliepkorte (n 137) 136.
of 31 July 1938).162 That may have been intended as a first step towards dismember-
ing the BGB (in order eventually to replace it by a ‘people’s code’ better suited to
a national spirit emanating from a ‘community of blood and soil’);163 but it may also
have been a device to make the new law applicable to Austria which had been
annexed in March of the same year, but where the ABGB continued to apply.164
The key provision of the Testamentsgesetz was } 21 dealing with holograph
wills.165 It was now no longer necessary, but merely advisable, for a testator to
indicate in his will the date when and the place where it had been made. The
signature ‘should’ normally contain both his first name and his family name. If
the testator signed in a different manner, for example, merely by providing his
first name or by indicating his position within his family, this did not affect the
validity of the will, provided such signature was sufficient for determining the
authorship of the testator and the seriousness of his declaration. If the validity of a
will was doubtful in view of the fact that it did not state the time when it had
been made (for example, because the testator had left several conflicting wills), the
testament was to be regarded as valid only if the relevant date could be deter-
mined otherwise. The same applied, mutatis mutandis, for a will that did not state
the place where it had been made. The Testamentsgesetz thus, essentially, followed
the recommendations made by von Hippel,166 while it implicitly rejected certain
162
For details of the drafting process, see Schliepkorte (n 137) 147 ff. The text of the Gesetz über die
Errichtung von Testamenten und Erbverträgen (usually referred to, more briefly, as Testamentsgesetz (Wills
Act)) is easily accessible today in J von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, BGB-Synopse
1896–1998 (1998) 1729 ff.
163
See the suggestion by Schliepkorte (n 137) 149. The ‘farewell from the BGB’ had been advocated
by Franz Schlegelberger, the highest public official in the Ministry of Justice, in 1937: Abschied vom BGB
(1937). On the project of a ‘Volksgesetzbuch’ (literally, people’s code), see Hans Hattenhauer, ‘Das NS-
Volksgesetzbuch’, in Festschrift für Rudolf Gmür (1983) 255 ff; Gert Brüggemeier, ‘Oberstes Gesetz ist das
Wohl des deutschen Volkes: Das Projekt des “Volksgesetzbuches”’ [1990] Juristenzeitung 24 ff.
164
See Vogels [1938] Deutsche Justiz 1269; Gruchmann (1985) 7 Zeitschrift für neuere Rechtsgeschichte 59.
165
Equally important was the relaxation of the formal requirements for holograph mutual wills
between spouses in } 28 Testamentsgesetz (today, see } 2267 BGB). Mutual wills between spouses had
been permitted by the BGB in holograph form, provided the will was written by the one spouse in his or
her own hand and the other appended to it a declaration, in his or her own hand, that the will was also to
be accepted as his or her will. The latter declaration had to be signed, and it had to contain, in the (second)
spouse’s own hand, the place where, and the day when, the declaration had been made (} 2267 BGB old
version). Countless testators got caught in the intricacies of this provision: see for an estimate of invalid
mutual wills, Heinrich Lange and Kurt Kuchinke, Erbrecht (5th edn, 2001) 431. The reform of } 2267
BGB was, therefore, a major concern in the contemporary literature relating to testamentary formalities:
see, eg, von Hippel (n 7) 121 ff; Lange (n 146) 60. Also implemented in 1938, it brought the formalities
for mutual wills in line with } 21 Testamentsgesetz: the second spouse merely has to sign the declaration in
his or her own hand; it is advisable, but not necessary, that he or she also provides the place and date where
and when the will is signed. For all details, see the modern commentaries relating to } 2267 BGB.
166
von Hippel (n 7) 188. Cf also idem [1938] Juristische Wochenschrift 633: indication of place and
date no longer mandatory; the testator no longer has to identify himself by providing his first and family
name; however, he has to make clear, in his own hand, that he regards the document as complete. Fritz von
Hippel wanted two further points to be added to the proposed rule: (a) amendments of the will are
normally valid, even if the testator has not specifically indicated that he regards the amendment as
complete (eg by appending his signature to it); and (b) any defect as to the form required for the will is
cured for as long as the testator has deposited it with a competent official organ – normally the local court
of law (the possibility of such deposit was and still is envisaged by } 2248 BGB). Neither of these
proposals of the Law of Succession Committee of the Academy advocating a more

rigorous line.167
The new provision facilitating the making of holograph wills was hardly in line with the
collectivist ideology pursued by national socialism and its reluctance to commit the
regulation of succession upon death to the individual – or, as it was usually put, arbitrary –
will of the testator. Not surprisingly, therefore, considerable criticism had been raised
against it (for example, by the representatives of the SS as well as by the ministry of
ecclesiastical affairs) when it was still at draft stage.168 Heinrich Lange’s proposal to open
the Testamentsgesetz with a preamble calling attention to the testator’s responsibility vis-à-
vis his family, kinship, and nation (‘Familie, Sippe und Volk’), although it was accepted,
did not assuage the critics.169 Thus, eventually, a counterbalance was introduced in the
form of a rule tightening up the policing of the content of a will: dispositions mortis causa
were to be void, as far as they violated, in a manner going grossly against the healthy public
sentiment, the consideration that a responsible testator has to show for his family as well as
his national community.170 The same applied if a person had induced the testator to
make a disposition mortis causa by exploiting the latter’s fears in extremis.171 The latter
provision was clearly aimed at members of the clergy prompting persons on their
deathbed to leave their property, or part of it, to religious institutions.
3. Farewell to the Testamentsgesetz; continuity in substance

} 21 Testamentsgesetz, being ideologically inoffensive, continued to apply in the
Federal Republic of Germany until 1953.172 By means of the Act restoring legal
suggestions was taken up by the legislator. Yet, it was taken to be inherent in } 21 Testamentsgesetz that
amendments did not have to be signed; it was regarded as sufficient that the testator, while making the
amendment, clearly intended it to be covered by his earlier signature: Vogels [1938] Juristische Wochens-
chrift 2162; idem, Gesetz über die Errichtung von Testamenten und Erbverträgen vom 31. Juli 1938 (1938)
} 21 n 8. (Presumably, this only refers to amendments of the text of the will above the testator’s signature.)
167
Lange (n 146) 54 ff: the testator’s signature has to conclude the document, ie it has to constitute its
end; and any amendment has to comply with the formality required for a will, ie it has to be specifically
signed.
168
For details, see Gruchmann (1985) 7 Zeitschrift für neuere Rechtsgeschichte 56 ff; Schliepkorte
(n 137) 145 ff.
169
Lange himself never really seems to have been happy with the new dispensation: see his memoran-
dum referred to by Schliepkorte (n 137) 151; and see Lange (n 146) 61 (‘ . . . we must endeavour, to the
best of our ability, to promote the public will in view of its advantages’), as well as the somewhat sour
comment in his article on the new law: ‘Even if the recognition of the holograph will is unavoidable, it is
still to be regretted that . . . attention has not been drawn to the dangers inherent in it’: [1938] Zeitschrift
der Akademie für Deutsches Recht 578.
170
} 48 II Testamentsgesetz (‘Eine Verfügung von Todes wegen ist nichtig, soweit sie in einer gesundem
Volksempfinden gröblich widersprechenden Weise gegen die Rücksichten verstösst, die ein verantwor-
tungsbewusster Erblasser gegen Familie und Volksgemeinschaft zu nehmen hat’). This rule thus specified
the general ‘contra bonos mores’ provision of } 138 I BGB, that would have been applicable otherwise, in
the spirit of the new ideology.
171
} 48 III Testamentsgesetz (‘Eine Verfügung von Todes wegen ist nichtig, soweit ein anderer den
Erblasser durch Ausnutzung seiner Todesnot zu ihrer Errichtung bestimmt hat’).
172
} 48 II Testamentsgesetz, however, had already been repealed in 1946: see Schliepkorte (n 137) 239 ff.
unity in the area of civil law of 5 March 1953,173 the provision was incorporated into
the BGB;174 in the process, a number of changes of a merely editorial nature were
made. In particular, some overly didactic parts contained in } 21 Testamentsgesetz were
deleted.175 With one minor amendment, also of a merely editorial character and
dating from 1969, } 2247 still applies today. In the East German Republic, } 21
Testamentsgesetz survived until 1976 when the new (socialist) civil code was enacted.176
Its } 385 recognized the holograph will177 in spite of the fact that there had been
considerable opposition against it.178 The arguments against the holograph will had
included reference to the socialist legality (‘sozialistische Gesetzlichkeit’) that could be
jeopardized by leaving the disposition of his property to the free will of the testator.179
VII. Holograph wills today
1. The testator’s intention and the form requirement

The reform legislation of 1938, perpetuated eventually in } 2247 BGB, managed to
solve most of the problems that had hitherto bedevilled the law concerning holo-
graph wills. Place and date had ceased to be mandatory, and the testator’s signature
no longer had to contain his first name and family name, but could be given ‘in
another manner’. Thus, it would now have been possible to recognize as valid all of
the wills that had given rise to dispute in the cases listed above.180 At the same time,
new disputes were bound to arise, and did in fact arise, under the new dispensa-
tion.181 For a certain conflict of interests is inherent in the establishment of any form
requirement for the making of a will: the law has to ensure, on the one hand, that the
173
Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung der Gesetzeseinheit auf dem Gebiete des bürgerlichen Rechts, I Teil,
Art 5, Nr 5.
174
} 2247 BGB.
175
‘It is not necessary but advisable . . . ’ in subparagraph (1); ‘ . . . eg by merely providing his first name
or by indicating his position within his family . . . ’ in subparagraph (2); ‘ . . . eg because the testator . . . had
left several conflicting wills . . . ’ in subparagraph (3); for details, see Beutgen (n 7) 93.
176
For an overview, see Beutgen (n 7) 100 ff; Hosemann [2010] Rheinische Notar-Zeitschrift 528.
177
‘The holograph will has to be written and signed by the testator in his own hand; it should
contain the place where and the date when it was made.’
178
Helmut Pötzsch, ‘Hat das privatschriftliche Testament noch Daseinsberechtigung?’ [1951] Neue
Justiz 361 f; Walter Curs, ‘Zur Ausgestaltung des zukünftigen Erbrechts II’ [1959] Neue Justiz 702; Günter
Ritter and Herbert Pompoes, ‘Das zukünftige Erbrecht und die Ausgestaltung des Notariatsverfahrens-
rechts’ [1959] Neue Justiz 523.
179
Friedrich Jansen, ‘Zur Konzeption des sozialistischen Erbrechts’ [1959] Neue Justiz 349. As under
the Testamentsgesetz during the national socialist period, incidentally, freedom of testation and the
availability of holograph wills in the German Democratic Republic were flanked by a general provision
declaring dispositions mortis causa as invalid as far as they were incompatible ‘with the principles of
socialist morality’: } 373 I ZGB (DDR).
180
Text to nn 103–13 above.
181
See the references in Werner Vogels and Karl Seybold, Gesetz über die Errichtung von Testamenten
und Erbverträgen vom 31. Juli 1938 (4th edn, 1949) } 21 Testamentsgesetz n 8 (referring to a new dispute
that has arisen concerning the spatial requirements for the signature: see KG [1941] Deutsche Notar-
Zeitschrift 222 ff; LG Hamburg [1942] Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht 110 f ).
testator’s will is carried out as far as possible, while, on the other hand, providing
a mechanism by means of which it can be established beyond any reasonable doubt
what the testator’s will actually is.182 The draftsmen of the 1938 legislation saw this
underlying conflict very clearly183 and thus it was, and continues to be, accepted that
the invalidity of holograph wills cannot always be avoided. The requirements of
} 2247 BGB are designed to ensure the authenticity of the text of the will and to
provide an indicium of seriousness: that the testator, when drawing up his will, had
wanted that document conclusively to indicate how he intended (at that time) to
dispose of his property.184 This can, when the will becomes effective, no longer be
established by asking the testator; and thus the law requires the will to have been
written in his own hand and to have been signed by him. At the same time, there will
always be borderline cases giving rise to dispute, and the question can merely be
where that borderline is to be drawn. The German courts, in that respect, have
pursued a moderately liberal approach; for, by and large, they have attempted to
avoid harsh results as far as this was possible without unduly compromising the
minimum requirements imposed by } 2247 BGB.185 In particular, they have been
guided by the spirit of this rule; and they have also, cautiously, begun to interpret the
requirement of ‘signature’ in the light of the (presumed) intention of the testator.
2. Two characteristic decisions of the Federal Supreme Court

A decision by the Federal Supreme Court of 3 February 1967 illustrates the first
proposition.186 Here the Court took a document to be a valid will that constituted
a carbon copy of the document that had been written by the testator. Arguably,
therefore, the testator had not written the will, that is, the document now before the
court, in his own hand.187 The Court, however, adopted a purposive approach:
a carbon copy disclosed the individual characteristics of the testator’s handwriting
sufficiently accurately to warrant the conclusion that it had been the testator himself
who had wanted to make a disposition mortis causa.188 The declaration contained in
the copy could thus be taken to be authentic.189
182
See, today, Stefan Grundmann, ‘Favor Testamenti: Zu Formfreiheit und Formzwang bei privat-
schriftlichen Testamenten’ (1987) 187 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 439 ff; and see Breitschmidt (n 7)
53 ff; Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 1; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) Vorbem zu }} 2229–
64 n 1; Wolfgang Voit, in Wolfgang Reimann, Manfred Bengel, and Jörg Mayer (eds), Testament und
Erbvertrag (5th edn, 2006) } 2247 n 5.
183
See the preamble to the Testamentsgesetz of 1938, second paragraph; Vogels [1938] Juristische
Wochenschrift 2163.
184
See, eg, Grundmann (1987) 187 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 441.
185
See also, eg, Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 1; Erich Burkart, ‘Das eigenhändige
Testament nach } 2247 BGB – Seine Problematik und seine Zukunft’, in Tradition und Fortentwicklung
im Recht: (III.) Festschrift für Ulrich von Lübtow (1991) 257, 259.
186
BGH, 3 February 1967, BGHZ 47, 68 ff.
187
This was in fact the view of the Kammergericht, 28 March 1963, as quoted in BGHZ 47, 68 (69),
and of the courts of first and second instance in the present case.
188
BGHZ 47, 68 (71 ff ).
189
The decision of the BGH is approved by Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 Rd 14;
Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 28; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 14; Wolfgang Edenhofer, in Palandt,
For the second proposition a decision by the Federal Supreme Court of 20 March
1974 provides a case in point.190 A testator had made her will on the first two pages
of a folded A4-sized paper, that is, on the outside and first inside pages. She had
signed it on the first inside page, at the end of her text. When she realized that she
had forgotten to write down one of the dispositions she had intended to make, and in
view of the fact that on the first inside page no space was left, she added that
disposition on the second inside page without, however, signing it. Was the
added disposition covered by the original signature? The literalist line of argu-
ment – it had apparently been adopted by the court of first instance – would be
that a signature has to conclude a document: the testator signs his name under his
will (this is brought out particularly clearly by the German term ‘Unterschrift’).
The disposition in question was a kind of postscript. Admittedly, it had not been
placed underneath the testator’s signature, but it was also not part of the text
above that signature. It was on another page, and thus next to the duly signed
remainder of the will. The Federal Supreme Court did not regard that as an
obstacle to the validity of such disposition. Amendments made on the same piece
of paper, the Court argued, even if they are ‘not fully covered by the signature’,
need not be individually signed if the testator obviously ‘intended [them] to be
covered by her signature’ under the will.191 Of decisive importance, in other
words, is not the place of the signature, but what the testator intended his or her
signature to cover.192
3. Will to be written by the testator ‘in his own hand’

Both decisions have been widely accepted by the legal literature.193 Other judicial or
doctrinal efforts to mark the borderline of what is still acceptable, under } 2247
BGB, concerning the two features characterizing the holograph will have also met
with approval, and only relatively few questions have remained disputed. The
testator has to write the will in his own hand. This means that his hand must not
have been guided by another person so that the writing is not really his own;194
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (69th edn, 2010) } 2247 n 6; Rolf Stürner, in Jauernig, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
(12th edn, 2007) } 2247 n 2; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 377; Hans Brox, Erbrecht (19th edn, 2001) 75;
Olaf Werner, ‘Zur Eigenhändigkeit letztwilliger Verfügungen’ [1972] Deutsche Notar-Zeitschrift 6 ff;
Grundmann (1987) 187 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 436 f, 463 f.
190
BGH [1974] NJW 1083 f.
191
BGH [1974] NJW 1083, 1084.
192
The decision of the BGH is approved by Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 25; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189)
} 2247 n 14; Jauernig/Stürner (n 189) } 2247 n 5; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 382; Grundmann (1987)
187 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 434 ff. But cf also Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 65; Brox
(n 189) 78.
193
See nn 189 and 192 above.
194
RG [1909] Warneyer no 31. Cf also BGH [1981] NJW 1900 f (concerning the question of whether
the testator had signed the will in his own hand). For details, see Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11)
} 2247 n 15; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 38; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 17; Palandt/Edenhofer
(n 189) } 2247 n 7; Jauernig/Stürner (n 189) } 2247 n 2; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 377 f; Brox
(n 189) 75.
that the will must not have been written in braille (because the writing in braille does
not disclose individual characteristics of the testator’s hand);195 and that it must not
constitute a photocopy, or have been digitalized by means of a scanner.196 Nor can the
writing be substituted by videofilm, or a sound storage medium such as a record or
CD.197 On the other hand, a will is not invalid because it has been written, by
a physically disabled person, with his mouth or foot, rather than by hand.198 A will
may be written in shorthand, in print, in any language, and by means of any system of
signs, or form of notations, of which the testator has command.199 If parts of the will
have not been written by hand, they are invalid.200 The remainder of the will remains
valid, provided the requirements of } 2085 BGB are met, that is, if it can be assumed
that the testator would have wanted his will to stand even without its invalid part. (In
deciding the latter question the content of the will’s invalid part can be taken into
account.201) If a will refers to documents that have not been written by hand it can still
be valid, provided these documents merely serve to explain or specify what the testator
has determined in his will.202 Illegible wills are usually held to be invalid.203
4. Will to be ‘signed’ by the testator

The will has to be signed by the testator. The signature has to be in the testator’s own
hand, that is, a facsimile signature or the use of a stamp is insufficient.204 It does not
have to contain both the testator’s first name and family name; the testator’s signature
can, as } 2247 III 2 BGB expressly states, be made ‘in another manner’. Clearly,
195
LG Hannover [1972] NJW 1204 f; Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 14; Staudinger/
Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 31; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 16; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 7; Lange and
Kuchinke (n 165) 377; Brox (n 189) 75; Grundmann (1987) 187 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 464 f.
For criticism, see Burkart (n 185) 260.
196
See, in particular, Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 14. Cf also Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 29;
Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 7.
197
Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 32; Burkart (n 185) 257.
198
Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 14; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 34; Voit
(n 182) } 2247 n 16; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 377; Brox (n 189) 76.
199
Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 nn 26 ff; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 377 f; Brox (n 189) 76.
200
See, in particular, Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 11.
201
Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 11.
202
See BGH [1980] Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht 1039 ff; BayObLG, 10 July 1979,
BayObLGZ 1979, 215 ff; OLG Hamm [2003] NJW 2391 f (the decision of the OLG Hamm appears to
adopt a more liberal line than that of the BayObLG). For further details, see Münchener Kommentar/
Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 20; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 nn 68 ff; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 12; Palandt/
Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 8; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 383. Cf also Grundmann (1987) 187 Archiv
für die civilistische Praxis 465 ff; Burkart (n 185) 261 f.
203
OLG Hamm [1991] NJW – Rechtsprechungsreport 1352 f; Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11)
} 2247 n 17; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 45; Jauernig/Stürner (n 189) } 2247 n 2; Lange and
Kuchinke (n 165) 377. But see, for a more liberal view, Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 15. Voit maintains that wills
which are, for the time being, illegible are not invalid, but merely of no effect. Apart from that, the main
practical problem is whether, or to what extent, circumstances outside of the document may be drawn
upon in order to decipher the signs written by the testator. According to Voit, this is permissible.
Cf also Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 45. But see see OLG Hamm above; Lange and Kuchinke
(n 165) 377.
204
Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 85. Cf also Burkart (n 185) 258.
therefore, the use of just the first name, of a nickname or term of affection (‘your little
mouse’),205 or of the testator’s position within his family (‘your father’, ‘aunt Lilly’) are
admissible.206 Contrary to the intention of the draftsmen of the Testamentsgesetz in
1938,207 it is widely accepted today that the testator may sign by using his initials, as
long as this is sufficient for the purpose of identification, and as far as it can be
assumed that he intended to make a will rather than merely a draft.208 The
signature does not have to be legible.209 The testator’s self-identification within
the text of the will – for example, his use of the imperatorial opening phrase
‘I, Peter Müller, merchant in Hamburg, hereby determine . . . ’ – does not substi-
tute for a signature.210 This may be different if the will concludes with a sentence
such as ‘This is the last will of Peter Müller’; for the insistence on an additional
signature would then appear to be a piece of senseless formalism.211 The signa-
ture must usually be at the end of the document. Under certain circumstances
(particularly when there is no space at the end of the document) it may, however,
be written on the margin of, or across, or even at the top of, the document.212 If
the will consists of several pages, only the last one has to be signed, provided the
several pages are obviously intended to constitute a coherent whole.213
The two most intricate problems, in the present context, arise in cases where
the testator has merely signed the envelope into which he has placed his will (but not
the will itself ), and where he has made amendments to his will. Concerning the first
205
von Hippel (n 7) 184.
206
For details, see Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 26; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3)
} 2247 n 107; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 21; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 10; Jauernig/Stürner (n 189)
} 2247 n 3; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 379.
207
See ‘Begründung zum Gesetz über die Errichtung von Testamenten und Erbverträgen vom
31.7.1938’ [1938] Deutsche Justiz 1257; Vogels and Seybold (n 181) } 21 Testamentsgesetz n 8.
208
This may be the case, eg, if the testator was in the habit of using merely his initials. Generally, see
OLG Celle [1977] NJW 1690 f; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 20; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 10;
Jauernig/Stürner (n 189) } 2247 n 3; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 379; Brox (n 189) 77. Contra:
Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 107. The handwritten word ‘personally’ (‘persönlich’) at the end of a
will cannot be regarded as a substitute for the signature: BayObLG, 28 June 1979, BayObLGZ 1979,
203 ff.
209
Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 27; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 20; Palandt/Edenhofer
(n 189) } 2247 n 10. Cf also Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 87.
210
OLG Köln, 9 December 1966, OLGZ 1967, 69 (70); BayObLG, 28 June 1979, BayObLGZ 1979,
203 ff; BayObLG [1986] NJW – Rechtsprechungsreport 494 (495); Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11)
} 2247 n 28; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 92; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 21; Palandt/Edenhofer
(n 189) } 2247 n 11; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 380. Contra: Grundmann (1987) 187 Archiv für die
civilistische Praxis 458; Burkart (n 185) 259.
211
(n 182) } 2247 n 21; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 11.
212
BayObLG, 12 March 1981, BayObLGZ 1981, 79 ff; OLG Hamm [1986] Zeitschrift für das gesamte
Familienrecht 728; OLG Köln [2000] Monatsschrift für deutsches Recht 523 f; Münchener Kommentar/
Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 25; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 94; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 22; Palandt/
Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 11.
213
BayObLG [1985] Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 1286 f; BayObLG [1991] Zeitschrift für
das gesamte Familienrecht 370 f; Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 34; Staudinger/Baumann
(n 3) } 2247 n 53; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 22; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 11; Lange and Kuchinke
(n 165) 380 f.
issue, a distinction is drawn whether the signature on the envelope can be regarded
as a continuation of the will itself: the envelope then essentially becomes a part of
the will.214 This is supposed to be the case where the testator just signs the envelope,
or writes ‘My last will. Peter Müller’, but not where the signature is appended to
a separate statement written on the envelope, such as ‘To be opened after my death’,
or ‘Here my will may be found’.215 This is a very fine line.216 Sometimes
a distinction is also drawn whether the envelope is still open or whether it has
been closed.217
The answer to the second question is also not straightforward. Generally speaking,
amendments to a will are valid if they can be taken to be covered by the signature.218
That is the case where they have been made in the text above the signature.219 The
Federal Supreme Court, as we have seen, has also, under certain circumstances,
endorsed amendments next to the text of the will.220 But what about amendments
appended to the will underneath the testator’s signature? Normally, they are only
valid if they have been signed. Matters can be different, however, if the amendment is
so closely related to the text of the will that the latter only makes sense in the light of
the amendment; and also, possibly, in other situations where it is obvious that the
testator intended the amendment to be covered by his original signature.221 Even
where the amendment is invalid, it can be drawn upon for purposes of interpreting
the testator’s will.222 This follows from the general rule that all circumstances, not
only those that can be gleaned from the will itself, can be relevant to its interpreta-
tion.223 Amendments to the will made on a separate page have to be specifically
signed in any case.224
214
OLG Frankfurt [1971] NJW 1811 f; BayObLG, 2 March 1982, BayObLGZ 1982, 131 ff; OLG
Celle [1996] NJW 2938; Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 30; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3)
} 2247 n 102; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 23; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 12; Lange and Kuchinke
(n 165) 380; Brox (n 189) 78.
215
RG, 7 February 1925, RGZ 110, 166 ff; OLG Düsseldorf [1972] NJW 260 f; and see Voit (n 182)
} 2247 n 23.
216
Cf also the critical comments by Grundmann (1987) 187 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 458 f and
Jauernig/Stürner (n 189) } 2247 n 4.
217
OLG Hamm [1986] NJW – Rechtsprechungsreport 873 f; Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247
n 32; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 12. Contra: Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 102; Voit (n 182)
} 2247 n 23; Grundmann (1987) 187 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 460 ff; Burkart (n 185) 261.
218
Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 63; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 14; Voit (n 182)
} 2247 n 25; Jauernig/Stürner (n 189) } 2247 n 5; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 382; Burkart (n 185) 259.
219
See, eg, Grundmann (1987) 187 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 434; Cordula Stumpf, ‘Postscripta
im eigenhändigen Testament’ [1992] Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 1132 f.
220
Text to nn 190 and 191 above.
221
See BayObLG [2004] Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 1141 ff; BayObLG [2005] Zeitschrift
für das gesamte Familienrecht 1012 ff; Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 35; Voit (n 182)
} 2267 n 26. Cf also Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 64 f; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 14. For
an even more liberal approach, see Grundmann (1987) 187 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 435 f, 456 f;
Stumpf [1992] Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 1134 ff.
222
Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 26.
223
BGH, 8 December 1982, BGHZ 86, 41 (45 ff ); Jürgen Ellenberger, in Palandt, Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch (69th edn, 2010) } 133 nn 13, 19; generally, Sebastian Herrler, ‘Testament’, in Basedow,
Hopt, and Zimmermann (n 2) 1475.
224
BGH [1974] NJW 1083; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 16. But see Grundmann (1987) 187
Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 460 ff; Stumpf [1992] Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 1134 ff.
5. Other issues
There are, of course, also a number of more general points concerning the holograph
will. It does not matter on what medium it is written: writing paper, envelope,225
postcard, a table cloth, beer mat, blackboard,226 or, indeed, the back of an invoice:227
any material can be used on which the characteristics of the testator’s handwriting are
recognizable.228 It may be written in the form of a letter.229 Its validity does not
depend on the use of specific words; nor does the testator have to state that he is
making a will.230 Also, there is no requirement of unitas actus, that is, the writing of
the will may extend over a considerable, or even a very long,231 period and it does not
have to occur at one and the same place.232 Finally, the testator must have been
animated by a serious intention to make a will.233 Much of what has been said, so far,
is coloured by this central requirement. The serious intention to make a will can, for
instance, be doubtful, and may thus be difficult to determine, where certain disposi-
tions have been made on a blackboard or beer mat, where they are part of a letter, or
where they have just been initialled. The point, however, is that such documents are
not invalid, per se, for failure to comply with the formalities required for the making
of a will; they constitute valid wills, provided a serious intention to make a will can
be established.
6. The future
All in all, the holograph will in its contemporary statutory form, and as shaped by
courts and legal writers, has gained general acceptance. Empirical data are surpris-
ingly sparse and somewhat patchy. They are either based on an analysis of the files of
individual local courts (Amtsgerichte) responsible for probate matters234 or, more
225
BayObLG [1992] Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 227.
226
RG [1910] Juristische Wochenschrift 291.
227
Text to n 152 above.
228
(n 182) } 2247 n 18; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 378.
229
RG, 5 July 1915, RGZ 87, 109 (110); BGH [1985] NJW 969; BayObLG [1990] Zeitschrift für das
gesamte Familienrecht 672; Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 30; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3)
} 2247 nn 76 ff; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 7; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 5; Jauernig/Stürner (n 189)
} 2247 n 1; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 376; Brox (n 189) 73; Burkart (n 185) 260.
230
Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 6; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 49.
231
See BayObLG [1984] Monatsschrift für deutsches Recht 1024 (seventeen years).
232
BGH [1974] NJW 1083 (1084); Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 nn 18, 34;
Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 46; Voit (n 182) } 2247 n 8; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 4.
233
For details, see Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2247 n 5; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3)
} 2247 nn 15 ff; Voit (n 182) } 2247 nn 4 ff; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2247 n 5; Jauernig/Stürner
(n 189) } 2247 n 1.
234
Dieter Leipold, ‘Wandlungen in den Grundlagen des Erbrechts’ (1980) 180 Archiv für die
civilistische Praxis 191 ff; Günther Schulte, Art und Inhalt eröffneter Verfügungen von Todes wegen (doctoral
thesis, University of Münster, 1982); Paul Rotering, Rechtstatsächliche Untersuchungen zum Inhalt eröff-
neter Verfügungen von Todes wegen (doctoral thesis, University of Münster, 1986); Andreas Guericke,
Rechtstatsächliche Untersuchung über das Verfügungsverhalten und die Auswirkungen auf das Ehegattener-
brecht des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (doctoral thesis, University of Marburg, 1994); Jeanette Vollmer,
recently, on surveys conducted by public opinion research institutes.235 From the

material available it appears safe to conclude that only between 25 and 35 per cent of
the German population die testate.236 They have usually either made a holograph
will, a public (that is, notarial) will, or concluded a contract of inheritance (often,
among spouses or persons engaged to marry, in combination with a contract of
marriage); contracts of inheritance have to be recorded by a notary in the simultan-
eous presence of both parties.237 The figures for these three categories vary between
40, 38, 58, 65, and 50 per cent for the holograph will; 19, 13, 19, 31, and 45 per cent
for the notarial will; and 41, 49, 23, 4, and 5 per cent for contracts of inheritance.238
All of these figures have in common that holograph wills appear to be considerably
more popular than notarial wills.239 Legal writers (particularly when they happen to
be notaries) often point to the dangers and drawbacks of holograph wills and
recommend the making of a public will.240 Nonetheless, no one today would
Verfügungsverhalten von Erblassern und dessen Auswirkungen auf das Ehegattenerbrecht und das Pflichtteils-
recht (2001). Generally on the responsibility of local courts in probate matters, see }} 2259 ff BGB; Lange
and Kuchinke (n 165) 975 ff; Brox (n 189) 366 ff.
235
EMNID, commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Justice: see Hans A Stöcker, ‘Die Neuordnung
der gesetzlichen Erbfolge im Spiegel des mutmasslichen Erblasserwillens’ [1971] Zeitschrift für das gesamte
Familienrecht 609 ff; Christoph Hommerich and Nicole Hommerich, ‘Erbrechtliche Vorsorge in
Deutschland’ (a survey commissioned by the Deutsche Vereinigung für Erbrecht und Vermögensnachfolge
in 2006); Institut für Demoskopie Allenbach, ‘Das eigene Testament’, Allensbacher Berichte 2006/Nr 16;
TNS Infratest, commissioned by Deutsches Forum für Erbrecht eV (2007).
236
See, most recently, Anne Röthel, ‘Ist unser Erbrecht noch zeitgemäss’, in Verhandlungen des 68.
Deutschen Juristentages vol I, Gutachten (2010) A 14 f, A 63. She refers to a figure of 20–25%. However,
according to the sample analysed by Leipold (1980) 180 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 193, the figure is
just over 30% and Guericke (n 234) 28 f has a figure of around 33%. Vollmer (n 234) 41 even reports a
testation rate of 43.55%.
237
} 2276 BGB.
238
In each case the first of these figures is provided by Leipold (1980) 180 Archiv für die civilistische
Praxis 230 f (based on the files of the Amtsgerichte Erlangen, Fürth, Neumarkt (Oberpfalz), and Neustadt
(Aisch), all in Franconia or Upper Palatinate); for the second, see Schulte (n 234) 31 (based on the files of
the Amtsgerichte Köln, Brühl, and Grevenbroich in North Rhine-Westphalia); for the third, see Rotering
(n 234) 104 (based on around 2,500 files in the districts of the Amtsgerichte of Münster, Coesfeld, and
Ibbenbühren in Westphalia); for the fourth, see Guericke (n 234) 30 ff (based on the files of the
Amtsgerichte of Wiesbaden, Bad Schwalbach, and Eltville; Wiesbaden is the capital of Hesse, Bad
Schwalbach and Eltville are within its catchment area); and for the fifth, see Vollmer (n 234) 42 (based
on the files of the Amtsgerichte of Marburg/Lahn, Kirchhain, and Königstein/Taunus in Hesse; Marburg is
a small university town, Königstein houses many commuters to Frankfurt and is thus a particularly affluent
community). I would like to thank Eike Götz Hosemann for compiling (and sometimes calculating) these
figures.
239
Apart from that, it may be said that testators living in the countryside tend to consult a notary more
often than those living in big cities; in particular, they resort to inheritance contracts considerably more
frequently. For the reasons, see Leipold (1980) 180 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 199 f.
240
See Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2231 nn 17 ff (listing under the heading ‘Advantages
and disadvantages of public wills’ only advantages and under the heading ‘Advantages and disadvantages of
holograph wills’ only disadvantages); Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2231 n 15 (‘The disadvantages of the
holograph will clearly prevail’). Cf also Burkart (n 185) 253 f, 263, referring to the ‘great strains’ brought
to the German people by the holograph will (‘ . . . die schweren Belastungen, die dieses Rechtsinstitut der
rechtssuchenden Bevölkerung beschert hat’). Burkart, in particular, conjures up the unwarranted idea that,
as before 1938, the requirements for holograph wills constitute a rich and deplorable source of legal
seriously suggest the abolition of holograph wills. Even a reform of } 2247 BGB is
hardly ever advocated.241 A few years ago, one author proposed to dispense with the
requirement of the will having to be written in the testator’s own hand (so as to
include wills that have been written by someone else, or on a typewriter or computer,
as long as they have been duly signed by the testator),242 without however attracting
any support.243 Stefan Grundmann, on the other hand, regards that requirement as
the key component of the holograph will that has to be strictly applied, whereas he
argues in favour of a more liberal approach towards the signature requirement.244
This does not, however, require a legislative reform of } 2247 BGB, but can,
according to Grundmann, be implemented by the courts on the basis of the rule
as it stands.245 If the courts were, indeed, to take up this suggestion, they would be
perpetuating the general trend, evident in any event since the adoption of the
holograph will by the BGB, to liberalize the ordinary forms for the making of
a will.246 At the same time, however, it has to be borne in mind that the form
required by } 2247 BGB has, in an age of largely computerized communication,
acquired the characteristics of an exceptional solemnity that it did not possess at
a time when even business letters were still written by hand.247
VIII. Public wills
1. The regime in the BGB and its background

Public wills had, apparently, first been known in post-classical Roman law;248 in
medieval and early modern Europe they existed in many different forms and
varieties.249 The draftsmen of the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century codifica-
tions seized the opportunity both to fix and to streamline the form requirements for
public wills. The BGB provides a good example. Gottfried von Schmitt’s Prelimin-
ary Draft, as we have seen,250 was hostile towards private wills. It only recognized
one type of ordinary will, and that was the public will. It could be made either before
a judge or a notary.251 At the same time, von Schmitt rejected the possibility of
disputes and uncertainty. According to Schulte (n 234) 179 f, on the other hand, only 4% of all holograph
wills are invalid because of lack of the required form. But see Burkart (n 185) 254 f, 262.
241
Cf also, most recently, Röthel (n 236) A 63 ff.
242
Bernhard Görgens, ‘Überlegungen zur Weiterentwicklung des } 2247 BGB (Eigenhändiges Testa-
ment)’ [1979] Juristische Rundschau 357 ff (based on the author’s doctoral thesis, University of Bochum
(1975), under the title Die Bindung des Richters an das Gesetz und die Formerfordernisse des eigenhändigen
Testaments).
243
Cf also Breitschmidt (n 7) 507 f.
244
Grundmann (1987) 187 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 429 ff; see, eg, 454.
245
Grundmann (1987) 187 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 475 f.
246
Röthel (n 236) A 62.
247
Röthel (n 236) A 64.
248
Max Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht vol II (2nd edn, 1975) 481.
249
Ch 2 above at 40.
250
Text to nn 52 ff.
251
} 168 Preliminary Draft (von Schmitt (n 14) 37).
making a will by handing it over to the sovereign of the testator’s state (testamentum
principi oblatum),252 and of making a will before a pastor and two witnesses (as it had
been known under the rules of Canon law)253 or before a local government official
(as it was laid down in a number of individual statutes).254
Ideally, the draft should have come down in favour either of the judicial or the
notarial will. Both of them, however, were widely spread throughout the various
parts of the Reich: the judicial will (testamentum iudici oblatum) had a venerable
tradition reaching back (at least) to C. 6, 23, 19, 1 (AD 413). Alongside the
apparently little-used testamentum principi oblatum, it continued to be the ordinary
public will under the nineteenth-century German ius commune,255 and it had also
been adopted by the Prussian256 and Saxonian Codes.257 Nonetheless, it was not
really clear why this type of non-contentious business should continue to be dealt
with by a court of law.258 The obvious alternative, therefore, was the notarial will as
it was known not only under the Code civil259 and in the states and territories
influenced by French law (such as Baden and Rhenish Prussia), but also in Bavaria
and other parts of Germany ranging from Schleswig and Holstein to some of the
Thuringian states (for example, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha) and Württemberg.260 But then
there were also states which did not know the office of a notary, or of a notary who
was involved in the making of a will.261 Thus, it was impossible for the draftsmen of
the BGB to elevate the notarial will to the status of the only ordinary public will to be
recognized throughout Germany. On the other hand, the notarial will was too deeply
entrenched to be abolished. Hence the Solomonic compromise solution, suggested
by von Schmitt262 and ultimately adopted in the BGB,263 to accept both the judicial
and the notarial will. (According to Article 141 EGBGB, however, the individual
states within the Reich were free to determine that either only the judge or only the
notary were to be competent for the making of wills.)
Both judicial and notarial wills could be made in two different ways: (a) by an oral
declaration to be minuted by the judge or notary; or (b) by handing over a sealed or
unsealed document, written by the testator or by another person,264 and by stating
252
On which, see C. 6, 23, 19 pr and 1 (AD 413); Christian Friedrich Glück, Ausführliche Erläuterung
der Pandecten nach Hellfeld vol 34 (Erlangen, 1830) 165 ff, 178 ff; Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 231 (} 545
in fine); von Schmitt (n 14) 520; Motive (n 61) 136; Coing I (n 40) 569; ch 2 above at 41.
253
See, eg, Glück (n 252) 180 ff; von Schmitt (n 14) 520 f; Motive (n 61) 136; Udo Wolter, Ius
canonicum in iure civili (1975) 17; ch 2 above at 32, 39.
254
For details, see von Schmitt (n 14) 521; Motive (n 61) 136 f.
255
Glück (n 252) 188 ff; Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 229 ff (} 545). Cf also Friedrich Endemann,
Lehrbuch des Bürgerlichen Rechts vol 3 (8th/9th edn, 1919) 278 f.
256
}} 66 ff I 12 PrALR.
257
}} 2092 ff Saxonian BGB. See also the Drafts for Hesse (n 32) Art 85 ff and by Mommsen (n 33)
}} 59 ff; }} 587 ff ABGB. For further references, see von Schmitt (n 14) 522 f; Motive (n 61) 137.
258
See von Schmitt (n 14) 522 f.
259
Art 971 ff Code civil.
260
For all references, see von Schmitt (n 14) 523 f. Cf also Motive (n 61) 137 f.
261
von Schmitt (n 14) 522 f; Motive (n 61) 137.
262
} 168 Preliminary Draft (von Schmitt (n 14) 37); von Schmitt (n 14) 522 ff.
263
} 2331 no 1 BGB; Motive (n 61) 137.
264
There was no unanimity in legislation prior to the BGB as to whether the document had to be
written by the testator himself; sometimes it was also required that the document had to be signed by the
(such statement to be minuted by the judge or notary) that that document con-
stituted the testator’s last will.265 Thus, it may be said that the BGB effectively
recognized four different types of public wills. All of them had in common that at
least one further person had to be involved, for the judge had to call in either a clerk
or two witnesses, and the notary either another notary or two witnesses.266 There
were a number of rules stating under which circumstances a judge, clerk, notary, or
witness was precluded from participating in the making of a will (particularly when
he was closely related or married to the testator, or if he stood to benefit under the
will),267 determining the content of the minute that had to be drawn up,268 and that
it had to be read to the testator and to be approved and signed by him in his own
hand.269
2. Relaxation in 1938
It has never seriously been questioned that the possibility to make a public will
should be – and should remain – available to German testators. Nor has there been
much dispute about the general outline of the regime laid down by the BGB.
Nonetheless, a number of changes have been effected over the past 110 years. The
first significant change occurred in 1938 when the provisions on public wills were
moved, together with all of the other provisions on the making and revocation of
a will, from the BGB to the Testamentsgesetz (Wills Act).270 At the same time, and in
line with the general spirit in which the holograph will was reformed, the form
requirements for the making of public wills were relaxed. In particular, the necessity
of calling in further persons (a clerk, a second notary, or two witnesses) was restricted
to cases where the testator, to the conviction of the judge or notary, was deaf, blind,
testator (see, as far as the signature is concerned, }} 101, 102, 108 I 12 PrALR and Art 976 Code civil on
the one hand, } 2096 Saxonian BGB and RGZ 34, 161 ff on the other). Under the BGB no signature was
(and is) required. See von Schmitt (n 14) 541 ff; Motive (n 61) 143 f.
265
} 2238 BGB of 1900; see also } 174 Preliminary Draft (von Schmitt (n 14) 38). This dualism was in
line with tradition: see, as far as judicial wills are concerned, Glück (n 252) 188 ff; Windscheid and Kipp
(n 20) 229 ff; }} 66, 100 ff, 104 ff I 12 PrALR; }} 2092 ff Saxonian BGB; }} 587 ff ABGB; the Drafts for
Hesse (n 32) Art 85 ff and by Mommsen (n 33) }} 59 ff. Under the ius commune, the terms testamentum
nuncupativum apud acta conditum and testamentum judici oblatum mysticum were often used to designate
these two types of judicial testament. Details, of course, could differ; under the ius commune, eg, the
testamentum judici oblatum had to be sealed (hence: mysticum). Concerning notarial wills, see Arts 971 ff,
976 Code civil. Generally, see von Schmitt (n 14) 540 ff; Motive (n 61) 142 f.
266
} 2233 BGB of 1900; see also } 169 Preliminary Draft (von Schmitt (n 14) 37). For background
and references concerning the ius commune and previous legislation, see von Schmitt (n 14) 527 ff.
267
}} 2234 ff BGB of 1900; see also }} 170 ff Preliminary Draft (von Schmitt (n 14) 37 f ). For back-
ground and references, see von Schmitt (n 14) 531 ff.
268
} 2241 BGB of 1900 (place and date of the proceedings, designation of the testator and of the
persons involved in the proceedings, and the declarations required under } 2238 BGB; see text to n 265
above); and see Motive (n 61) 142 ff.
269
} 2242 BGB of 1900; see also } 175 Preliminary Draft (von Schmitt (n 14) 38) and, for background
and references, von Schmitt (n 14) 543 f.
270
Text to nn 160 ff above.
mute, or otherwise unable to speak.271 For normal situations that requirement had
been found both cumbersome and unnecessary.272 Apart from that, the notarial or
judicial minute no longer had to record the place where it was drawn up; and
a failure to record the date no longer invalidated the will, provided the date could
be gleaned from the note which the judge or notary was supposed to make on the
envelope within which he placed the will and which he sealed.273 Obviously, even
experienced notaries had occasionally proven prone to mistake in the general rush
and commotion when they were called to a person’s deathbed in order to take down
his will.274 Also, it was no longer mandatory for the notarial minute to contain a note
to the effect that the minute had been read out to the testator, and had been approved
and signed by him: if the testator had signed the minute in his own hand it was to be
presumed that it had been read out to, and approved by, him.275
3. The abolition of judicial wills

When in 1953, as a result of the Act restoring legal unity in the area of civil law,276
the provisions of the Testamentsgesetz were moved back into the BGB, no changes
were made to the rules on public wills. This remained the position until 31 December
1969 when the procedural rules concerning public wills were taken out of the BGB
again in order to become part of a comprehensive Beurkundungsgesetz (Notarial
Recording Act).277 At the same time, the Beurkundungsgesetz brought about the most
fundamental reform to have affected public wills since the enactment of the BGB:
the abolition of judicial wills. For a very long time it had been argued that judges in
a court of law should be relieved of non-contentious matters such as the taking down
of wills; their proper business being, after all, dispute resolution. It was an argument
that had won the day in France where the notarial will was the only type of public
will recognized by the Code civil.278 In Germany, it gained some ground in the
aftermath of the political events of 1848: the notarial profession of the French (and
271
} 6 Testamentsgesetz.
272
Lange (n 146) 62 ff (pointing out that testators often appear before the judge or notary without
witnesses and that, as a result, a corps of professional witnesses has established itself, ‘consisting of
coachmen, porters, and loafers’); ‘Begründung zum Gesetz über die Errichtung von Testamenten und
Erbverträgen’ [1938] Deutsche Justiz 1255 (drawing attention to the fact that testators sometimes have no
confidence in the discretion of the witnesses); Vogels [1938] Deutsche Justiz 1270.
273
} 13 III and IV Testamentsgesetz. (Subsequently, ie in 1969, the rule was further relaxed so that
today the notarial minute ‘should’ (but does not have to) contain the place and the day of the transaction:
see } 9 II Beurkundungsgesetz.)
274
Vogels [1938] Deutsche Justiz 1270.
275
} 16 I Testamentsgesetz.
276
277
Beurkundungsgesetz of 28 August 1969. For the official motivation, see Friedrich Mecke, Beurkun-
dungsgesetz (1970). Cf also, eg, Wilhelm Appell, ‘Auswirkungen des Beurkundungsgesetzes auf das
Familien- und Erbrecht’ [1970] Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 520 ff; Karl Firsching, in J von
Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (12th edn, 1983), Appendix to } 2246; Peter
Limmer, in Wolfgang Reimann, Manfred Bengel, and Jörg Mayer (eds), Testament und Erbvertrag (5th
edn, 2006) 1165 ff.
278
See n 259 above.
subsequently in Germany: Rhenish) type was regarded as a quintessentially liberal

institution helping to restrict the activities of the state in matters concerning primarily
the individual citizen.279 The range of activities of the notary was considerably
extended in the course of the nineteenth century.280 However, attempts to unify
the law relating to the notarial profession failed,281 and by the end of the century
the differences among the various states within the German Reich thus remained
considerably greater in this field than in most others concerning the administration
of justice. Hence the compromise solution reported above (recognition of the
notarial and the judicial will),282 but hence also the provision contained in Article
141 EGBGB enabling the individual states to adopt the French system of recogniz-
ing only notarial wills. A number of states in fact made use of this provision, among
them Bavaria, Baden, and Hamburg.283 A general nationwide legal framework for
the notarial profession was only created in 1937 (Reichsnotarordnung (Imperial Act
on the Notarial Profession)) and revised in 1961 (Bundesnotarordnung (Federal
Act on the Notarial Profession)).284 The scene was thus set for moving the recording
and attestation of legal acts to the exclusive sphere of competence of notaries.
4. No discrimination against disabled persons

The last significant change of the law relating to public wills occurred in 2002, and it
resulted from a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court. Between 1970 and 2002,
} 2233 II BGB provided that testators who were incapable of reading could only
make their will by oral declaration to a notary. Those who were unable to speak, on
the other hand, were only allowed to make a (public) will by handing over to the
notary a document (} 2233 III BGB).285 Similar provisions had already been
contained in the original text of the BGB.286 But what about persons who were
incapable of speaking and reading? They were effectively excluded from the possibil-
ity of making a will; for they were neither allowed to hand over a document
containing their will (because they were unable to read),287 nor to make an oral
declaration to the notary (because they were unable to speak). According to the
Federal Constitutional Court, that legal position was not in line with the German
279
Werner Schubert, ‘Geschichte des Notariats und Notariatsrechts in Deutschland’, in Mathias
Schmoeckel and Werner Schubert (eds), Handbuch zur Geschichte des Notariats der europäischen Traditio-
nen (2009) 211 ff.
280
Schubert (n 279) 216 ff.
281
Schubert (n 279) 222 ff.
282
283
See Staudinger/Firsching (n 277) } 2231 nn 25 ff.
284
For details, see Schubert (n 279) 227 ff.
285
See also } 31 Beurkundungsgesetz (in force between 1970 and 2002): the declaration that the
document handed over to the notary contains his will had to be written by the testator in his own hand and
had to be part of the notarial minute or be appended to it.
286
See, concerning persons incapable of reading, } 2238 II BGB (1900–38), } 11 IV Testamentsgesetz
(1938–53), } 2238 IV BGB (1938–69); and, concerning persons incapable of speaking, } 2243
(1900–38), } 17 Testamentsgesetz (1938–53), } 2243 (1953–69).
287
For the same reason they are also unable to make a holograph will: } 2247 IV BGB.
Basic Law (that is, the Constitution), for it constituted an infringement of the freedom
to make a will (which is part and parcel of the ‘right of inheritance’ (Erbrecht) being
guaranteed in Article 14 I GG), of the principle of equality before the law (Article 3 I
GG), and of the prohibition of discrimination against persons labouring under a
disability (Article 3 III 2 GG).288 The Federal Parliament was thus called upon to
remedy this defect, and it did so by scrapping altogether the requirement of an oral
declaration for the making of a public will.289 Thus, a testator who cannot, or does not
want to, hand over a document containing his will to the notary, may now make his
will ‘by declaration’ to the notary; and that declaration may be made by any imaginable
means of non-verbal communication: sounds of any kind, gestures, signs, even the
movement of an eyelid.290 Strangely, perhaps, and going beyond what was required by
the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, the possibility of using non-verbal
communication was generalized, that is, also extended to testators who are in fact able
to speak (and who may thus make a kind of trappist’s will).291
5. Public wills today

Since 1970, therefore, only three provisions are to be found in the BGB. One
allows a will to be made by notarial record (‘zur Niederschrift eines Notars’; } 2231
no 1 BGB). A second sets out the two different types of public will that remain
recognized: a will made by declaration to the notary,292 or by handing over to the
notary a document with the declaration that that document constitutes the testa-
tor’s last will (} 2232 BGB). The document can either be sealed or unsealed, and it
need not be written by the testator. No witnesses are normally required.293
Everything else is subject to the rules on notarial recording laid down in the
Beurkundungsgesetz.
The third provision on public wills deals with the special situation of a will made
by a minor.294 A minor was, originally, only allowed to make a will by oral
288
BVerfG, 19 January 1999, BVerfGE 99, 341 ff.
289
Article 5 I no 23 Gesetz zur Änderung des Rechts der Vertretung durch Rechtsanwälte vor den
Oberlandesgerichten (literally, Act Changing the Right to be Represented by Lawyers before Regional
Supreme Courts) of 23 July 2002.
290
See Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2232 n 2; Münchner Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2232 n 5; Voit
(n 182) } 2232 nn 6 ff; Hans-Jürgen von Dickhuth-Harrach, ‘Testament durch Wimpernschlag: Zum
Wegfall des Mündlichkeitserfordernisses bei der Beurkundung von Testamenten und Erbverträgen’
[2003] Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 493 ff.
291
Voit (n 182) } 2232 n 6.
292
Until 2002 an oral declaration was required.
293
But see } 22 Beurkundungsgesetz, as far as deaf, blind, and mute testators are concerned. Even this
rule, however, has been much relaxed, when compared to } 6 Testamentsgesetz (= } 2231 I BGB (1953–
69)): the calling in of a second notary and one witness (rather than two witnesses) is no longer mandatory,
but just regarded as proper practice.
294
} 2233 I - 2233 II BGB contains the rule on wills made by persons incapable of reading mentioned
above (text before n 285 above); the former } 2233 III was, of course, abandoned in 2002, in the wake of
the decision by the Federal Constitutional Court concerning persons who are unable to speak and read:
text to nn 286 ff above.
declaration to a judge or notary.295 This was in order to give him the benefit of legal
advice and of preventing undue influence to be exercised upon him.296 In 1938 minors
were, in addition, allowed to make a will by handing over an unsealed document to the
judge or notary.297 In view of the fact that the judge or notary was now generally
requested to take note of the content of the will,298 this form of making a will also
provided the protection that was (and is) regarded as desirable for minors making a
will. (In 1969, of course, the judicial will disappeared from the scene.)
The main advantage of public wills consists in the benefit of the legal advice
provided by the notary. Doubts about the authenticity of a public will are hardly
possible, the risk of invalidity for failure to comply with the form requirements is
largely excluded, and it is probable that disputes concerning the interpretation of
what the testator intended to say are much less frequent.299 In addition, the notary
has to see to it that notarial wills are kept in special official custody,300 whereas a
person who has made a holograph will is free to decide whether or not he wants his
will to be kept in such custody.301 The risk of the will being subsequently falsified,
lost, destroyed, forgotten, or not found after the testator’s death is thus significantly
reduced.302 In addition, public wills enjoy a privileged position as public documents
in terms of }} 415 and 418 Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure) with
probative force, and it will usually, therefore, not be necessary for the heir to obtain
a certificate of inheritance (which he normally needs if he has been instituted in
a holograph will, particularly in order to effect the transfer of immovable
property).303 Thus, in spite of the notary’s fee that has to be paid when making a
295
} 2238 BGB (1900–38). This only applies to minors above the age of sixteen: } 2229 II BGB
(1900–38), } 1 II Testamentsgesetz (1938–53), } 2229 I BGB (after 1953).
296
‘Denkschrift des Reichsjustizamtes’, in Mugdan (n 73) 870. Cf also Lange (n 146) 32 (the minor is
placed ‘under the supervision of a mature personality’).
297
} 11 III Testamentsgesetz. This was in order to allow mute minors to make a will: ‘Begründung zum
Gesetz über die Errichtung von Testamenten und Erbverträgen’ [1938] Deutsche Justiz 1256; Vogels
[1938] Deutsche Justiz 1270.
298
} 11 II Testamentsgesetz. According to Planck/Strecker (n 97) } 2238 3 (a), notary and judge had
previously not been allowed to take note of the content of the will. The rule in } 11 II Testamentsgesetz was
subsequently moved to } 2238 II BGB and can be found today in } 30 Beurkundungsgesetz.
299
Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2231 n 14; Münchener Kommentar/Hagena (n 11) } 2231 nn 17 ff.;
Voit (n 182) } 2231 nn 5 ff; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 334.
300
} 34 I Beurkundungsgesetz.
301
} 2248 BGB. A central, electronic registry for wills, located at the Federal Association of Notaries
(Bundesnotarkammer), is to be in operation from 1 January 2012: see Gesetz zur Modernisierung des
Benachrichtigungswesens in Nachlasssachen durch Schaffung des Zentralen Testamentsregisters bei der Bundes-
notarkammer und zur Fristverlängerung nach der Hofraumverordnung of 22 December 2010, Bundesgesetz-
blatt I, 2255 ff. The registry includes both notarial wills and, if kept in special official custody, holograph
wills. On the registry, see Thomas Diehn, ‘Das Zentrale Testamentsregister’ [2011] NJW 481 ff.
302
It also has to be taken into account, however, that the existence of a (holograph) will can be proved
by all of the ordinary means of leading evidence, including witnesses. Thus, it is perfectly possible to
establish the existence of a will that cannot be found, ie the succession may be regulated by a (holograph)
will that no longer exists: see, for a recent example, LG Nürnberg-Fürth [2009] Juristische Schulung 868 f
(with further references in n 7).
303
On the certificate of inheritance, see }} 2353 ff BGB. For notarial wills see, in this context, } 35 I
Grundbuchordnung (Land Registry Act), and Voit (n 182) } 2231 n 5.
public will, the latter will often, in the end, create less cost (for the testator and the
heir, taken together) than a holograph will.304
The greatest disadvantage of public wills is that, by comparison, it is so much
more convenient to make, change, or rescind a holograph will. In addition, many
testators are reluctant to disclose the content of their will to another person, even if
that person is a notary who is subject to a professional duty of confidentiality.305
IX. Extraordinary wills
1. Emergency wills: background and the BGB

The BGB, as has been mentioned above,306 recognizes three extraordinary wills.
Two are emergency wills, made before the mayor or before three witnesses.307
Both have – very remote – ancestors in the Roman testamentum tempore pestis conditum
and testamentum ruri conditum, respectively: wills made during a time of pestilence and
wills made in the country by rustic persons were subject to reduced formal require-
ments.308 Over the centuries some of their features had been subject to both change
and dispute,309 but essentially they still remained recognized in the nineteenth-century
German ius commune.310 In his Preliminary Draft Gottfried von Schmitt attempted
to place them on more rational foundations. Thus, on the one hand, he generalized
the idea obviously underlying the testamentum ruri conditum, that is, that the testator
finds himself in a position where it is impossible for him to make a normal will. In
Roman times, a testator living in the country was often, probably, unable to find the
required number of (seven) witnesses to make a will and was thus allowed to make do
with five of them.311 The ordinary will in the Preliminary Draft, however, was
the will made before a judge or notary312 and thus the specific problem situation for
which the Preliminary Draft had to cater was that the testator happened to be in a place
where he was unable to take advantage of the services of a judge or notary:
304
The fees for (a) applying for an inheritance certificate and (b) being granted an inheritance
certificate by the relevant court are higher than those for the making of a public will and for the opening
of the will in the competent court. Information kindly supplied by Dr Hartmut Wicke (Munich) and
Dr Johann Andreas Dieckmann (Freiburg/Br).
305
} 18 Bundesnotarordnung (Federal Notary Act).
306
Text to n 4 above.
307
}} 2249 and 2250 BGB. The third, the will made during a sea voyage, is discussed at IX.4 below.
308
Kaser II (n 248) 482; Velten Kappeßer, Die Nottestamente des BGB (1995) 38 ff; Heike von der
Beck, Norminhalt und Formenstrenge im Recht der Nottestamente (1995) 26 ff; ch 1 at 23 above.
309
See Kappeßer (n 308) 55 ff.
310
Christian Friedrich Glück and Christian Friedrich Mühlenbruch, Ausführliche Erläuterung der
Pandecten nach Hellfeld vol 42 (Erlangen, 1841) 245 ff, 262 ff; Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 227 f
(} 544, 2 and 3). For Prussia, see }} 93 ff I 12 and }} 198 ff I 12 PrALR. For further codes and statutes, see
von Schmitt (n 14) 546 ff.
311
Another difficulty was that the witnesses a testator living in the country eventually managed to find
might not have been able to read and write, at least not all of them. This was also taken into account in
devising the form required for a testamentum ruri conditum.
312
either because there were no such officials, or because they were disqualified from
taking down the will of this specific testator; and that did not, or at least not
necessarily, depend, in late nineteenth-century Germany, on whether the testator
was living in the country. } 178 of the Preliminary Draft thus merely determined
that the judge or notary could be replaced by certain communal officers, such as the
head of the local authority where the testator was staying when he wanted to make his
will.313 In the course of the deliberations leading up to the First Draft of the BGB, the
requirements of this type of will were tightened, in that it was no longer sufficient that
no competent judge or notary was within reach; it had to be feared that the testator
would die before it was possible for him to make a will before a judge or notary.314 The
old testamentum ruri conditum had thus been converted into an emergency will in the
strict sense of the word; and it was in this form that it found its place in the BGB.315
But for the fact that the judge or notary was substituted by another, a communal,
official316 who was closer at hand, it corresponded in all of its details to the (ordinary)
public will.317
On the other hand, von Schmitt also deprived the testamentum tempore pestis
conditum of its historically contingent features and reconceptualized it under the
auspices of the testator being unable to make an ordinary will.318 After von Schmitt’s
draft had been modified in a number of respects, the second emergency will to be
contained in the BGB was to be available to persons staying at a place which, as a result
of prevailing diseases or other extraordinary circumstances, is blocked off in such a
manner that the making of a will in its ordinary form is not possible or extremely
difficult.319 Such persons were then allowed to make a will before the head of their
local authority (that is, they could resort to the first type of emergency will), by oral
declaration before three witnesses, or by a declaration written and signed in their own
hand.320 When, ultimately, the holograph will had become one of the ordinary forms
of will, the latter option, of course, was scrapped.321 As far as the will made by oral
declaration before three witnesses was concerned, } 2250 BGB of 1900 provided that
a record had to be drawn up and that it had to be read to the testator, and to be
approved and signed by him in his own hand. The procedure was thus the same as in
313
For details, see von Schmitt (n 14) 549 f.
314
See }} 1925 E I, 2113 E II; Motive (n 61) 148 f. Cf also Kappeßer (n 308) 75, 77 f, 80 f.
315
} 2249 BGB of 1900.
316
} 2249 BGB of 1900 only referred to the head of the local community.
317
See the reference in } 2249 I 3 BGB to }} 2234–46 BGB; and see text to nn 264 and 266 ff above.
318
} 179 Preliminary Draft (von Schmitt (n 14) 39), and see text to n 53 above; von Schmitt (n 14)
550 ff.
319
}} 1927 E I, 2114 E II, 2250 BGB of 1900; Motive (n 61) 150 f.
320
von Schmitt, inter alia, had prescribed the presence of only two (rather than three) witnesses; on the
other hand, he had required a permission by the competent public authority to resort to these types of will.
Moreover, von Schmitt appears to have proceeded from the assumption that the testator himself is struck
by the disease; this was no longer required under the E I. Also, von Schmitt had not permitted resort to the
will made before the head of the local authority. The requirement of the place where the testator was
staying being ‘blocked off’ was also new. For the details of the development between the Preliminary Draft
and the E I, see Kappeßer (n 308) 75 f, 78 f, 80 f.
321
Kommissionsbericht (n 73) 888.
the case of a public will. The same was true as far as the content of the record and the
qualifications of the witnesses were concerned.322 A distinguishing feature of the will
involving three witnesses was that it could only be made by oral declaration and not
also, as in the case of public wills generally, by handing over a document with the
declaration that that document contained the testator’s will.323
Both emergency wills lapsed if three months had passed since they had been made
and the testator was still alive.324
All in all, therefore, we have an odd situation. The two extraordinary wills
recognized by the BGB were conceptualized as public wills. While the ordinary
public will had to be made before a judge (with either a clerk or two witnesses being
present) or a notary (with either another notary or two witnesses being present),325
the emergency wills could be made before the head of the local authority with two
witnesses, or before three witnesses. Apart from that the form requirements were
largely the same. Such scheme obviously made sense as long as the public will was the
only ordinary will. The adoption of holograph wills should have necessitated a re-
examination. For while it is easily imaginable that someone finds himself in an
emergency where it is impossible to take advantage of the services of a judge or
notary, it happens fairly rarely that he cannot make either a notarial or a holograph
will. The holograph will, after all, is characterized by being a particularly convenient
form of will. But since the holograph will was such a late arrival in the BGB, there
was no time to undertake the necessary re-examination.326
2. Changes
One should have thought that the preparation of the Testamentsgesetz (Wills Act) in
the second half of the 1930s327 would have provided an opportunity to do what had
been left undone in the years before 1900 and to subject the emergency wills to
critical scrutiny in the light of the general availability of the holograph will. Heinrich
Lange, in the memorandum that he wrote on behalf of the Law of Succession
Committee of the Academy for German law, saw the problems that had dwarfed
the role of the emergency wills within the BGB and that bedevilled their practical
utility.328 Nonetheless, the recommendations of the committee, as well as the
changes eventually implemented in the relevant provisions of the Testamentsgesetz,
remained half-hearted and only marginally improved the situation.329
322
See the references contained in } 2250 II 2 BGB of 1900.
323
For the ordinary public will, see } 2238 BGB of 1900; for the will before a local authority,
see } 2249 BGB of 1900, referring, inter alia, to } 2238 BGB of 1900.
324
} 2252 I BGB of 1900. For further details, as far as the running of that period is concerned,
see } 2252 I BGB of 1900.
325
326
Cf also Keppeßer (n 308) 99 ff; von der Beck (n 308) 45 ff, 79 ff.
327
On which, see text to nn 162 ff above.
328
Lange (n 146) 89 f.
329
For details, see the analysis by Kappeßer (n 308) 81 ff, 101 ff.
For one of the two emergency wills it was now specified that it could be made
before the mayor of the community where the testator was staying (plus two
witnesses), or before the statutory representative of the mayor.330 Moreover, the
record no longer necessarily had to contain a note to the effect that the making of the
will before a judge or notary was impossible; the mayor was merely advised to include
a note to that effect.331 The mayor was also advised to draw the testator’s attention to
the temporal limitation of the will’s validity.332
The scope of application of the second emergency will was extended so as to cover
also situations where the testator was ‘in such imminent mortal danger that it is
probable that even the making of a will [before the mayor] is no longer possible’; and
to illustrate this phrase, } 24 II Testamentsgesetz added in brackets: ‘for example as
a result of a mountain accident’.333
At least at first blush, the most significant relaxation of the form requirements
related to both emergency wills: formal errors made when drawing up the record
concerning the making of the will do not invalidate the will, provided it can be
assumed with certainty that the will contains a reliable reproduction of the
testator’s declaration.334 This provision, however, only had a limited effect as
a result of being confined to formal errors made ‘in the process of drawing up
the record’. Thus, for instance, failure to indicate the date when the record was
drawn up335 no longer necessarily invalidated the will. The provision did not
dispense with the requirements for the making of the will as such: that a record
had to be made, that it had to be read to the testator and to be approved and signed
by him,336 the number and the suitability of the witnesses that had to be called in,
etc.337 It is not entirely clear why the 1938 legislation refrained from further-
reaching reforms, but the contemporary anti-individualistic ideology may have
played a role.338 The testator’s ‘arbitrary’ will339 was not to be given too much
330
} 23 I and V Testamentsgesetz.
331
} 23 II Testamentsgesetz.
332
} 23 III Testamentsgesetz. For this limitation, see } 26 Testamentsgesetz (virtually identical with
} 2252 BGB of 1900, on which see text to n 324 above).
333
According to Werner Vogels, the civil servant responsible for the drafting of the Testamentsgesetz,
} 24 II was added as a result of an Austrian request. Attention had been drawn to the fact that ‘our share in
the Alps has significantly increased as a result of the re-unification of Austria with the Altreich, so that a
special rule taking account of alpine accidents was indispensable’: see Werner Vogels and Karl Seybold,
Gesetz über die Errichtung von Testamenten und Erbverträgen vom 31. Juli 1938 (3rd edn, 1943) } 24 n 4,
and Vogels [1938] Deutsche Justiz 1272. Cf also Kammergericht [1940] Deutsches Recht 1686; Lange and
Kuchinke (n 165) 396. (The ‘Anschluss’ of Austria had occurred a few months before the enactment of the
Testamentsgesetz.) Mountaineering and the dangers associated with it were much discussed, both in
Germany and internationally, particularly in the wake of the dramatic events on the north face of the
Eiger in the summers of 1934, 1935, and 1936. (The first successful ascent by a mixed German/Austrian
rope team occurred only a few days before the enactment of the Testamentsgesetz.)
334
} 23 VI and } 24 III 2 Testamentsgesetz.
335
See } 13 II no 1 Testamentsgesetz.
336
This, of course, entails that the record has to be made while the testator is still alive.
337
See Lange [1938] Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht 580, and, as far as the same provisions in
}} 2249 VI and 2250 III 2 BGB are concerned, eg Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2249 n 11, } 2250 n 10.
338
See also Kappeßer (n 308) 101 ff.
339
leeway. Heinrich Lange, it will be remembered, even rejected the holograph will as
an ordinary form of will;340 in his memorandum drawn up on behalf of the
Academy’s Law of Succession Committee he eventually described the holograph
will, somewhat unsympathetically, as ‘the emergency will of a testator who is able
to lay down his last will in writing’.341 It is clear that to someone who still regarded
the judicial or notarial will as the norm, the issue of emergency wills was bound to
appear in a different light than it appears to those who are inclined to facilitate the
making of (private) wills in general. The general provision of Article 506 of the
Swiss Civil Code342 with its less rigid regime concerning the recording, on the part
of the witnesses, of the testator’s oral will343 was not regarded as a model to be
followed. The objections against ‘such relaxation of all forms’ prevailed.344
3. Emergency wills today

In 1953 the provisions of }} 23 and 24 Testamentsgesetz were moved back to their
old place within the BGB, without substantial change. (The illustration of the
accident in the mountains, however, kindly provided in the 1938 legislation as an
interpretative aide, disappeared from the text, the ‘Anschluss’ of Austria having
been reversed in 1945.)345 These provisions have continued to lead a largely
neglected existence in the shade of the convenient holograph will. When the courts
have been confronted with problems concerning emergency wills,346 they have
tended to apply the provisions of }} 2249 and 2250 BGB as leniently as possible.
Thus, for example, they have given a wide interpretation to the rule
condoning formal mistakes made in the drawing up of the required record;347 and for
340
Text to nn 147 ff above.
341
Lange (n 146) 88.
342
Referring to ‘extraordinary circumstances’ preventing the testator from availing himself of one of
the ordinary forms of making a will.
343
See Art 507 (Swiss) ZGB. The emergency will, according to Art 506 f ZGB, only requires the
presence of two witnesses.
344
Lange (n 146) 91 (specifically referring to the Swiss Code). It is interesting to note that Heinrich
Lange, in an article on the Testamentsgesetz published in 1938, welcomed the ‘significant relaxations’
brought about by that Act in the area of emergency wills ([1938] Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches
Recht 580), while in his textbook, written after the war, he criticized the relaxations effected by the
Testamentsgesetz as being ‘insufficient’ (Heinrich Lange, Erbrecht (1962) 193).
345
Reference to Austria and to the Anschluss (see n 333 above) had already been deleted from the 4th
edition of Werner Vogels and Karl Seybold, Gesetz über die Errichtung von Testamenten und Erbverträgen
vom 31. Juli 1938 (1949) } 24 n 4.
346
In absolute terms, as the modern commentaries on }} 2249 and 2250 BGB demonstrate, there is
not very much case law. On the other hand, however, it may be said that there is a surprising amount of
litigation given the relative practical insignificance of emergency wills: see, eg, von der Beck (n 308) 20. Cf
also BGH [1971] Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 162 (163): ‘Indeed, it may be that this form of
will [ie the will made before three witnesses] gives rise to more uncertainty and litigation than others’. Most
of the reported cases concern wills made in hospitals or nursing homes in situations where the death of the
patient or inhabitant appears to be imminent.
347
BGH, 4 April 1962, BGHZ 37, 79 (88); BayObLG [1996] Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht
763; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2249 n 11. The exact delimitation of formal mistakes that may be
condoned and those that may not, can be difficult and appears to be inexpedient (see Lange and Kuchinke
the oral declaration before three witnesses required by } 2250 BGB it has been regarded as
sufficient if a previously prepared draft is read to the testator who then confirms it by saying
‘yes’.348 Nonetheless, it is to be feared that many emergency wills, particularly those made
before three witnesses, are void.349 Unless the mayor or the three witnesses (or at least one
of them) are qualified and experienced lawyers, it is expecting too much of them to know
about the form requirements laid down in }} 2249 and 2250 BGB.350 In other cases the
emergency wills, as laid down by the BGB, will be of no avail. This is the case, for instance,
when the testator dies before a record can be drawn up, read to him, and be approved and
signed by him, or when he has a mountain accident with just one or two rope-partners
being present.351 Some of the rules concerning emergency wills are unnecessarily cumber-
some, unclear, or otherwise unsuitable;352 and the will made before a mayor could,
without any inconvenience or disadvantage, be removed completely from German
law:353 it is hardly conceivable today that a mayor can more easily be reached for the
purposes of making a will than a notary. All in all, therefore, it would appear to be best
(n 165) 391). This becomes immediately apparent by looking at the sheer size of the commentary devoted
to the problem in books such as Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 391 ff, Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2249
nn 28 ff, or Voit (n 182) } 2249 nn 7 ff. For an extensive and critical discussion, covering no fewer than 41
pages, see Kappeßer (n 308) 146 ff. Cf also von der Beck (n 308) 99 ff.
348
BGH, 4 April 1962, BGHZ 37, 79 (84); BayObLG, 25 October 1968, BayObLGZ 1968,
268 (272); OLG Hamm [2000] Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 703; OLG Zweibrücken
[1987] NJW – Rechtsprechungsreport 135; Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2250 n 6; Münchener Kommen-
tar/Hagena (n 11) } 2250 n 13; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2250 n 24; Voit (n 182) } 2250 n 7. Except in
} 2232 BGB (see text to nn 292 and 293 above), the requirement of an ‘oral’ declaration on the part of the
testator has not been dropped in } 2250 BGB. Thus, persons unable to speak remain excluded from this
form of making a will and this entails a discrimination which may be seen to be unconstitutional.
349
See BGH [1971] Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 162; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 396;
Brox (n 189) n 135. See also, eg, the last reported decisions on emergency wills by the LG Nürnberg-Fürth
[2009] Juristische Schulung 867 ff and by the OLG München [2010] NJW 684 ff.
350
‘The complexity of the formalities that have to be observed can hardly be surpassed’: Jörg Mayer,
‘Zur wirksamen Errichtung eines Nottestaments’ [2002] Zeitschrift für Erbrecht und Vermögensnachfolge
141. Since 1969 both rules, of course, refer to the relevant provisions of the Beurkundungsgesetz (on which
see text to n 277 above).
351
See, eg, von der Beck (n 308) 176 ff.
352
See, apart from the problems arising under }} 2249 VI, 2250 III 2 BGB (text to nn 349 and 350
above), the requirement of three (rather than two) witnesses (Kappeßer (n 308) 134 ff; von der Beck
(n 308) 154 ff; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 396; also already Lange [1938] Zeitschrift der Akademie für
Deutsches Recht 580); the distinction drawn between wills made before the mayor and wills made before
three witnesses, as far as the possibility of handing over a written document is concerned (text to nn 322
and 323 above; Kappeßer (n 308) 139 ff; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 396); or the excessive use of the
technique of cross-referencing (Kappeßer (n 308) 113 f ). In addition, it may be said that the description of
the emergency situations covered by } 2250 BGB (eg the testator being in a place that has been ‘blocked
off’ as a result of extraordinary circumstances) is outdated and unnecessarily restrictive (von der Beck
(n 308) 140 ff ), and that the three-month period for which emergency wills remain valid, as laid down in
} 2252 BGB (text to n 324 above), is too long (Kappeßer (n 308) 144 f ).
353
See also Kappeßer (n 308) 122 ff, 210; Röthel (n 236) A 66. Von der Beck (n 308) 59 ff, 194, on
the other hand, argues in favour of the retention of wills made before a mayor and only advocates a limited
reform. Cf also already the somewhat ambivalent attitude of the Law of Succession Committee of the
Academy for German Law: Lange (n 146) 90. Meyer [2002] Zeitschrift für Erbrecht und Vermögensnach-
folge 141 regards emergency wills as altogether redundant.
to replace }} 2249 and 2250 BGB by a rule modelled on a more liberal regime such as the
one established by Article 506 of the (Swiss) ZGB.354
4. Wills made during a sea voyage

The third extraordinary will regulated by the BGB is the will made during a sea
voyage.355 In spite of the official title given to the relevant provision, it is not an
emergency will (unless, of course, one were to regard a sea voyage per se as an
emergency). Like the emergency will made in imminent mortal danger, or at a
place which, as a result of extraordinary circumstances, is blocked off in such a
manner that the making of a will before a notary is impossible or extremely difficult,
it is a will made by oral declaration before three witnesses (and subsequently recorded
in accordance with the provisions of the Beurkundungsgesetz). Whether it is really
necessary to have this type of will is open to considerable doubt. Nothing prevents a
person who is about to embark on a sea voyage from making an ordinary (private or
public) will before his departure.356 Once he has started the voyage, and assuming
there is no notary on board, he can still make a holograph will.357 And in emergency
situations he can resort to the emergency will before three witnesses anyway. In other
words, there does not appear to be any reason to single out the sea voyage as the only
type of situation not involving an emergency, for which a special testamentary form
should be required.358
X. The German experience: a general assessment
The analysis of the development of testamentary formalities in German law has

produced a number of instructive insights. Holograph wills were introduced into the
354
For a proposal, see Kappeßer (n 308) 208 ff. Cf also von der Beck (n 308) 195 f; Röthel (n 236)
A 66 f.
355
} 2251 BGB. Today this rule also applies to members of the Navy. Originally, they were excluded
from } 2251 BGB in view of the fact that they could avail themselves of another type of extraordinary will,
the soldier’s will. The soldier’s will, as it had been regulated in special statutes, lapsed as a consequence of
the dissolution of the German Army after the Second World War. It was not reintroduced after the re-
establishment of the armed forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. On the history of the soldier’s will
in late nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany, see Windscheid and Kipp (n 20) 226 (} 544); von
Schmitt (n 14) 547 f; Motive (n 61) 151; Planck/Strecker (n 97) vor } 2229 III 1 (S 695 ff ); von Hippel
(n 7) 118 ff; Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) Vorbem zu }} 2229–64 nn 38 ff; Voit (n 182) } 2231 n 9; Lange
and Kuchinke (n 165) 404 f.
356
See already Motive (n 61) 152.
357
Cf also Lange (n 146) 87; von der Beck (n 308) 33, pointing out that the introduction of the will
made during a sea voyage must be seen against the background of public wills having been intended by the
BGB draftsmen as the only ordinary form of will. Cf also, in this context, the comment in Motive (n 61)
152 on the position in English law.
358
For criticism, see also Staudinger/Baumann (n 3) } 2251 n 3; Voit (n 182) } 2251 n 1; von der Beck
(n 308) 151 f; Röthel (n 236) A 66. It is very widely agreed that } 2251 BGB cannot be applied to air
voyages: see, eg Palandt/Edenhofer (n 189) } 2251 n 2; Lange and Kuchinke (n 165) 398 (pointing out,
however, that the making of a will before three witnesses may be possible under } 2250 II BGB, if one were
to assume that every air voyage entails an immediate mortal danger).
BGB at a very late stage, or, more precisely, at the last possible moment.359 There
had been considerable opposition to such a step being taken. Much of what was said
in the debate was based on speculation. Other arguments revealed conflicting views
as to freedom of testation. And it was feared that what might be fine for France and
for those areas of Germany governed by French law might be disastrous for Germany
at large where different traditions prevailed. It is surprising to see, in view of such
culturalist misgivings, how quickly the holograph will came to be accepted in
Germany after 1900.
Yet, judicial experience with it in the first four decades of the twentieth century
was anything but encouraging. The requirements for the holograph will, as laid
down in } 2231 no 2 BGB of 1900, turned out to be ill-conceived and gave rise to an
endless series of legal disputes, with the courts providing the unedifying spectacle of
vacillating helplessly between strict legalism and their natural desire to do justice in
individual cases.360 The reason for most of those disputes was quite simply that,
while much time had been spent discussing whether holograph wills should be
introduced at all, hardly any consideration had been given to the details of the
form required for that type of will.
The problem was solved, eventually, by legislative reform: the Testamentsgesetz
(Wills Act) of 1938 laid the foundations of the holograph will as it has come to be
established as an indispensable and generally accepted part of modern German
law.361 In finding solutions to most of the difficulties, the Testamentsgesetz provides
the interesting example of a therapeutic herb growing on poisonous soil. For while it
can be seen as a manifestation of the anti-formalism inherent in contemporary
thinking, a piece of legislation effectively strengthening freedom of testation was
hardly in line with the collectivist ideology generally underpinning national
socialism.
Of course, even after 1938 new disputes were bound to arise, for a certain conflict
of interests is inherent in the establishment of any form requirement for the making
of a will: while the law has to ensure that the testator’s will is carried out as far as
possible, it also has to provide a mechanism by means of which it can be established,
beyond any reasonable doubt, what the testator’s will actually was. German courts
and academic writers have, in characteristic cooperation, pursued a moderately
liberal approach; for, by and large, they have attempted to avoid harsh results as
far as this is possible without unduly compromising the requirements imposed by
} 2247 BGB.362
The holograph will is a particularly convenient device for testators. Of course,
there are certain risks associated with it, even if German law has gone a long way
towards reducing them:363 a holograph will may be falsified, lost, destroyed, for-
gotten, or not found after the testator’s death. The testator may be unfamiliar with
the formal requirements established for holograph wills, and, without legal advice, he
359 360
See IV.3 above. See V above.
361 362
See VI.2 above. See VII above.
363
See, eg, VII.1 above (relaxation of the form requirements so as to adjust them to what the average,
reasonable testator can both expect and cope with), and VIII.5 above (nn 301, 302).
may be unable to express himself with a sufficient degree of felicity to make his
intentions clear. If, therefore, a testator wants to be on the safe side, he has the option
of making a notarial will.364 This involves some inconvenience, particularly for
testators who like to amend their wills. On the other hand, the notary is able to
offer legal advice, and he is a generally trusted expert who can be expected to draw up
a valid will, properly reflecting the testator’s intentions.
Nobody today mourns the abolition, in 1969, of judicial wills, the other type of
public will that had been included in the BGB.365 The proper business for courts of
law, after all, is dispute resolution. The abolition was, however, only possible after
a general nationwide legal framework for notarial wills had been created.366
The demise on 1 January 1900 of the witnessed will as an ordinary type of will is
also not regarded as a misfortune. Its resurrection has never been contemplated. Nor
are there any plans to adjust the law of wills to the age of modern technology by
making use of sound storage media, video, or other electronic devices. The idea is
occasionally raised,367 but has not attracted any noticeable support.368
The law relating to the ordinary types of will therefore appears to be in generally good
shape: it serves its intended purposes in an entirely satisfactory manner, does not give
rise to a significant amount of dispute, and cannot, probably, be regarded as the source
of the rather low testation rate in Germany.369 However, the same cannot be said about
the extraordinary types of will. They may have made good sense against the background
of the public will as the only ordinary will – as had been the intention of the draftsmen
of the BGB until the summer of 1896. The decision to embrace holograph wills should
have led to – but, for lack of time, did not actually lead to – a re-examination.
Sea voyages cannot, per se, be regarded as events which require the availability of
a witnessed will.370 The emergency will made before a mayor could also, without any
inconvenience or disadvantage, be removed from German law.371 The emergency
will made before three witnesses, on the other hand, if it is to be retained, needs to be
thoroughly modernized.372 A model could be provided by Article 506 ZGB (Swiss
Civil Code). Its key features are: (a) extraordinary circumstances, as a result of which
the testator is unable to resort to either a holograph or a notarial will; and (b) form
requirements adjusted both to the emergency situation and to the fact that witnesses
are not usually trained lawyers. Two rather than three witnesses appear to be
sufficient. In actual practice, emergency wills are not normally made by the textbook
mountaineer who has fallen into a crevasse, but by elderly persons on their deathbed
in hospitals or nursing homes.373 As such persons are often very impressionable, it
may be questioned whether the law is well advised to allow a will uttered in extremis
to determine matters of succession.
364 365 366

See VIII above. See VIII.3 above. See n 284 above.
367
See, eg, Frank Hartmann, Moderne Kommunikationsmittel im Zivilrecht (2006) 217 ff; Staudinger/
Baumann (n 3) } 2247 n 32. Cf also n 242 above.
368 369
See, in particular, Röthel (n 236) A 65. See text to n 236 above.
370 371
See IX.4 above. See text to n 353 above.
372 373
See IX.3 above. See n 346 in fine above.
9
Testamentary Formalities in Austria
Christiane C Wendehorst
I. Relevant instruments and their practical significance 223

1. Unilateral dispositions mortis causa 223
(a) Testaments and codicils 223
(b) Foundations mortis causa 223
(c) Functional equivalents 224
2. Types of will in terms of formalities 224
(a) Holograph wills 225
(b) Witnessed wills 225
(c) Regular oral wills 226
(d) Emergency wills 226
(e) Judicial and notarial wills 226
3. Deposit and registration 227
1. The situation during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries 228
(a) The ius commune 228
(b) Adaptations by local laws and customs 229
(c) The role of holograph wills 230
(d) Natural law theory 232
2. Testamentary formalities in the ABGB of 1811 233
(a) Sources and style 233
(b) The spirit: doctrinal conservatism and a certain naı̈veté 234
3. Later amendments 235
(a) Amendments made in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries 236
(b) The 2004 reform of family and succession law 236
III. Modern doctrine and court practice 237
1. Holograph wills 237
(a) Requirements 237
(b) Additions and amendments 239
(c) Critical evaluation 239
2. Witnessed wills 240
(a) Production of the document 240
222 Christiane C Wendehorst
(b) Signature of the testatrix 241

(c) Nuncupatio 241
(d) Signatures of the witnesses 243
(e) Sequence of events and unity of the act 243
(f) Additions and amendments 244
(g) Critical evaluation 244
(a) Rationale 246
(b) Scope of application 246
(c) Requirements 247
(d) Effects 247
(e) Critical evaluation 248
4. General issues relating to testamentary formalities 248
(a) Incorporation of other documents 248
(b) One testator, one will 249
(c) (Incapable) witnesses 249
(d) Failure to comply with the formal requirements 250
IV. Current debates and plans for reform 251
1. Issues discussed at the 2009 Austrian Jurists’ Forum 251
2. The debate after the 2009 Dornbirn scandal 252
V. Summary 253
The Austrian Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB)1 was promulgated in 1811

and is the second oldest civil code still in force.2 Most of today’s Austrian law of
succession, which is to be found in }} 531 to 824 of the ABGB, dates from that
period. Unlike some other areas of private law which have either been largely
rewritten over the course of time or tacitly derogated by doctrine, Chapters 8 to
15 of the First Part, Second Subdivision of the ABGB have been changed only here
and there and are still very much living law. The relevant sections on testamentary
formalities are contained in the ninth chapter. However, important provisions
concerning public wills are also to be found in }} 70 to 75 and other sections of
the Notariatsordnung 3 and provisions concerning all wills deposited with public
notaries or attorneys-at-law in } 140c Notariatsordnung. As foundations mortis causa
can to a large extent replace the traditional will, relevant provisions are also contained
in the laws on foundations, in particular in the Privatstiftungsgesetz.4
1
Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, Justizgesetzsammlung no 946/1811, as amended by BGBl I no
58/2010.
2
For an overview, see Walter Doralt, ‘Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’, in Jürgen Basedow, Klaus
J Hopt, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Handwörterbuch des Europäischen Privatrechts (2009) 40 ff with
further references.
3
RGBl no 75/1871 as amended by BGBl I no 111/2010.
4
BGBl no 694/1993 as amended by BGBl I no 111/2010.
Testamentary Formalities in Austria 223
I. Relevant instruments and their practical significance
1. Unilateral dispositions mortis causa

This chapter focuses on unilateral dispositions mortis causa, deliberately omitting
instruments such as mutual wills, pacta successoria, or donations mortis causa. Under
Austrian law, three types of unilateral act exist: testaments, codicils, and foundations
mortis causa. In this chapter, the term ‘testamentary formalities’ will, for the sake of
simplicity, be used for all three types of instrument.
(a) Testaments and codicils

The ABGB still draws a distinction between testaments and codicils: according to
} 553 ABGB, a last will is called a testament (Testament) only where it nominates at
least one heir. Failing that, ie where the will contains only other dispositions such as
legacies, it is called a codicil (Kodizill). Whereas two testaments can coexist only
in the exceptional case where the more recent one incorporates the previous one
(} 713 ABGB), a codicil can coexist with a testament as well as with other codicils
(} 714 ABGB). However, as far as formalities are concerned, there is no difference
between a testament and a codicil.5 ‘Will’ is the generic term comprising both.
Statistical data as to how many Austrians make a will are not available. A survey
made among experts from the Federal Ministry of Justice as well as from the courts
and other legal professions suggests that the vast majority of Austrians die intestate.6
However, according to information provided by the Austrian Notarial Chamber,
more than 1.8 million wills are currently registered in the Austrian Central Register
of Wills (below at 3). Taking into account that there are likely to be at least as many
unregistered private wills, these figures indicate a different picture. This finds support
in more recent research.7
(b) Foundations mortis causa

Where the testator intends to give away all or part of his estate for charitable
purposes, this may take the form of a charitable foundation mortis causa, which is
regulated by a series of federal or state legal instruments (cf } 646 ABGB). Details
would go beyond the scope of this chapter; in terms of formalities, the rules on last
wills also apply to the law of foundations.8
5
OGH 7 Ob 563/78 (20.04.1978); OGH 6 Ob 23/00a (5.10.2000).
6
For research data from various periods supporting this assumption, cf Jurij Ferdynskyj, Rechtstat-
sachen auf dem Gebiete des Erbrechts im Gerichtsbezirk Innsbruck (1968) 29; Franz Gschnitzer and
Christoph Faistenberger, Österreichisches Erbrecht (2nd edn, 1983) 32.
7
Rudolf Welser, ‘Zur Reform des Anrechnungsrechts – Ergebnisse einer Umfrage im Notariat’ [2001]
Notariatszeitung 105 ff.
8
Peter Apathy, in Helmut Koziol, Peter Bydlinski, and Raimund Bollenberger (eds), Kurzkommentar
zum ABGB (3rd edn, 2010) } 646 n 5; Rudolf Welser, in Peter Rummel (ed), Kommentar zum ABGB vol I
(3rd edn, 2000) } 646 n 10; Bernhard Eccher, in Michael Schwimann (ed), Praxiskommentar zum ABGB
vol III (3rd edn, 2005) } 601 n 7.
A non-charitable foundation may be established as a private foundation (Privat-

stiftung) under the Privatstiftungsgesetz. Recently, private foundations have – in
particular for big estates – taken over functions of estate planning that were tradi-
tionally fulfilled by wills. They may be established by unilateral act during the
settlor’s lifetime, or mortis causa, } 8(1) Privatstiftungsgesetz.9 In terms of formalities,
the establishment of a foundation mortis causa must fulfil both the general formal
requirements of a foundation and the formal requirements of a last will, cf } 39(1)
Privatstiftungsgesetz. Therefore, the provisions on wills and codicils are relevant also
for private foundations. In any case, the numerous problems that arise10 are hardly
ever problems of formalities, and foundations mortis causa will therefore not be a
special focus of this chapter.
(c) Functional equivalents

In this context, it should at least briefly be mentioned that functional equivalents
to these unilateral dispositions mortis causa may be created under contract and
company law. The most widely used type of instrument is life insurance, which
remains largely untouched by mandatory provisions of the law of succession,
including testamentary formalities: the disposition made in a life insurance contract
in favour of the beneficiary is valid even though none of the formalities prescribed
for last wills has been fulfilled; in practice, the name of the beneficiary is often
entered into the blank on the application form by the insurance agent, and even
pre-formulated clauses exist. This goes largely unquestioned11 despite the fact that
with most types of life insurance, through which capital is accumulated over decades
to serve either the policy holder’s or his family’s future needs, the insurance is often
by far the most valuable asset of the policy holder’s estate.12
2. Types of will in terms of formalities

The programmatic provision of } 577 ABGB states that it is possible to make a will
privately or before a court, in writing or orally, and if in writing, with or without
9
Nikolaus Arnold, Kommentar zum Privatstiftungsgesetz (2nd edn, 2006) } 39 n 6 ff with further
references.
10
Many private foundations are established in order to evade the Austrian rules on forced heirship,
which is, however, possible only where the foundation has been established during the settlor’s lifetime,
and not mortis causa, cf } 785(3) ABGB. Meanwhile, the Austrian Supreme Court has taken first steps to
prevent a circumvention of mandatory law (OGH 10 Ob 45/07a), and there has also been further case law
restricting the beneficiaries’ influence on the management. For details, see, eg Rudolf Welser, Die Reform
des österreichischen Erbrechts: Verhandlungen des Siebzehnten Österreichischen Juristentages vol II/2 (2009)
147 ff; Brigitta Jud, ‘Privatstiftungsrecht und Pflichtteilsrecht: Erste Klärung durch den OGH’ [2007]
Zivilrecht Aktuell 640 ff; and Verena Hügel, ‘Stiftungsgestaltungen und Umgehung des Pflichtteilsrechts’
[2008] Zeitschrift für Stiftungswesen 108 ff, both with further references.
11
However, the relationship between life insurance and forced heirship is a point of lively discussion, cf
Wolfgang Zankl, ‘Die Lebensversicherung im Pflichtteilsrecht’ [1989] Notariatszeitung 1 ff; Manfred
Umlauft, Die Anrechnung von Vorempf ängen im Erb- und Pflichtteilsrecht (2001) 167 ff; Bernhard Eccher,
‘Anmerkung’ [1997] Juristische Blätter 46; Rudolf Welser, Bürgerliches Recht vol II (13th edn, 2007) 449 f,
556; Welser (n 10) 32 ff.
12
Welser (n 8) 33.
witnesses. Wills that can be made by individuals without the help of a public officer
are regarded as ‘private’ wills. Those wills the establishment of which involves one or
several persons occupying a public office are called ‘public’ wills.
(a) Holograph wills

The most important regular type of private will is the holograph will, handwritten
and signed by the testatrix him- or herself without any further requirements, in
particular without witnesses. In Austria, as in most other countries, the holograph
will is the most commonly used form of will.13
(b) Witnessed wills

The second regular type of private will is the witnessed will (in Austria referred to as
the ‘allograph’ will), written wholly or in part by other persons and/or other than by
hand and signed by the testatrix as well as by three capable witnesses in front of
whom the testatrix has declared that the document contains his or her last will. It is
not possible to establish a will in electronic form,14 even where the requirements of a
qualified electronic signature are met.15
Given the far easier alternative of a holograph will, which the testatrix can – in
order to reduce the danger that the document will be suppressed after her death –
disclose or hand over to as many witnesses as she deems necessary, a real need for the
witnessed will as a genuinely private will arises only in cases where the moribund
testatrix is too weak to write the whole text herself (below at II.2(b)). In modern
times, where many people have not produced a handwritten text for decades and
are used to keypads instead, there may also be a growing demand by testators who
simply feel uncomfortable with holograph texts or are even unable to produce such
texts without an excessive number of corrections.
However, the more important practical significance of witnessed wills is that of a
substitute for notarial wills. Even public notaries usually try to avoid the formalities
that have to be observed according to the Notariatsordnung (below at (e)): it is usually
much easier to set up a simple written document, have it signed by the testator, and
then call in two secretaries or notarial assistants to come over for a couple of minutes
in order to hear the testator’s nuncupatio and sign.
As a public will cannot be made before only an attorney-at-law and witnesses,
witnessed wills are the only possibility for attorneys-at-law to engage in the testa-
mentary business. In theory, it would of course also be possible to draft a will and
have it hand-copied by the testator, but this is probably not what the clients really
13
Egon Weiß, in Heinrich Klang and Franz Gschnitzer (eds), Kommentar zum Allgemeinen Bürgerli-
chen Gesetzbuch vol III (2nd edn, 1952) } 578, 301; Gschnitzer and Faistenberger (n 6) 32; Welser (n 11)
503. According to Ferdynskyj (n 6) 31, around 70% of the wills under examination were holograph wills.
14
In Austria, new forms of will, such as audio or video tape wills, do not seem to be a point of
discussion, cf Welser (n 10) 43.
15
Cf } 4(2) no 1 of the Signaturgesetz, BGBl I no 190/1999. This is criticized by a few authors, eg
Klaus Hoffmann, ‘Gedanken eines Praktikers zum österreichischen Erbrecht’, in Constanze Fischer-
Czermak, Andreas Kletecka, Martin Schauer, and Wolfgang Zankl (eds), Festschrift für Rudolf Welser
(2004) 290 ff.
want and are willing to pay for. It is therefore the legal profession that takes the
keenest interest in the admissibility of witnessed wills.
(c) Regular oral wills

Until 31 December 2004, there was the possibility of making a regular private will by
an oral declaration before three capable witnesses. It was not even required that the
three witnesses put the declaration down in writing within a certain period of it being
made or before the testator’s death, even though this would of course enhance their
credibility in case the oral will is challenged.16 All that was required was that the three
witnesses – or two of them in the event that one was unavailable – testified
congruently and under oath that this was indeed the testator’s last will.17 Oral
wills that had already been made when the amendment came into force on 1 January
2005 remain valid.18
(d) Emergency wills

The emergency will is a special form of will, available only where the testator is in fear
of dying or losing his capacity to make a will before the requirements of any of the
regular forms can be fulfilled. It can take the form of a witnessed will within the sense
of } 579 ABGB or even of an oral declaration, in both cases only two witnesses being
required.19
This type of will was created in 2004 and replaced the former privileges for wills
established at sea or in places struck by the plague or similar contagious diseases, and
wills made by military servicemen. No data are available as to how many people
make use of this form of will and whether it works well in practice.
(e) Judicial and notarial wills

The Austrian rules on judicial and notarial wills are very complex.20 The ABGB itself
provides solely for oral or written judicial wills, whereas the notarial will was officially
introduced only in 1850.21 Strictly speaking, there are today six different types of
judicial and notarial wills: (1) the oral will declared before and minuted by the court,
ie a judge and either one court officer or two other witnesses (}} 588 to 590 ABGB);
(2) the written will handed over to the court (}} 587, 589, 590 ABGB); (3) the oral
16
} 585 ABGB; Weiß (n 13) } 578, 325; Welser (n 8) } 585 n 5.
17
} 586 ABGB; Weiß (n 13) } 578, 324 ff; Welser (n 8) } 585 nn 6 ff.
18
Article 4 } 3 of the Family and Succession Law Reform Act 2004 (Familien- und Erbrechts-
Änderungsgesetz 2004 – FamErbRÄG 2004), BGBl I no 58/2004.
19
See, eg, Martin Spitzer, ‘Neues zu letztwilligen Verfügungen’ [2006] Notariatszeitung 14 ff; Con-
stanze Fischer-Czermak, ‘Neueste Änderungen im Abstammungs- und Erbrecht’ [2005] Juristische Blätter
2 ff; Andreas Tschugguel, ‘Das ungültig gewordene Nottestament’ [2008] Notariatszeitung 69.
20
For details, see Leopold Pfaff and Franz Hofmann, Commentar zum österreichischen allgemeinen
bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche vol II/1 (Vienna, 1877) 184 ff; Martin Schauer, ‘Was ist ein notarielles Testa-
ment?’, in Constanze Fischer-Czermak, Andreas Kletecka, Martin Schauer, and Wolfgang Zankl (eds),
Festschrift für Rudolf Welser (2004) 919 ff.
21
On the role of notaries before 1850, see Christian Neschwara, Geschichte des österreichischen
Notariats vol I (1996) 389 ff.
will declared before and minuted by two public notaries or one public notary and
two witnesses (}} 70 to 73, 75 Notariatsordnung); (4) the written will handed over to
the aforementioned persons (}} 70, 72 to 75 Notariatsordnung); (5) the will in the
form of a notarial act (}} 52 ff, 67 Notariatsordnung); and (6) the solemnization of a
written will by notarial act (}} 52 ff, 54 Notariatsordnung). Normally, it will be the
testator who goes to court or to the notary’s office, but it may also be the other way
round if need be (} 590 ABGB).
Types (1) and (3) are clearly considered to be the most solemn: they are public
wills, and the records produced are public documents (öffentliche Urkunden).22 This
is also the reason why persons with limited capacity to testate – persons under
guardianship (Sachwalterschaft)23 or minors over the age of fourteen (mündige Mind-
erjährige) – can only make a will orally before a court or notary (}} 568, 569 ABGB),
at least where the situation at hand does not allow for an emergency will according to
} 597 ABGB. Types (2) and (4) are considered public wills, but the documents as
such are private documents. Types (5) and (6) may not be classified as public wills,24
but in the situation of (5) the document itself is a public document.
In Austrian practice, the judicial will plays hardly any role at all. The ‘notarial will’
in the wider sense is in common use, but it is impossible to tell how many wills made
with the help of a public notary are notarial wills in the strict sense, that is, types (3)
or (4), or at least types (5) or (6), and how many are really written private wills where
a public notary only served as a legal adviser and witness (above at (b)).
A survey made among notaries shows that the costs of a notarial will, including
deposit and registration, typically lie within the range of €150 and €250. According
to } 26 f Notariatstarifgesetz a billable hour for preparing and establishing a notarial
will amounts to €49.20, but usually a flat charge is agreed upon in advance.
3. Deposit and registration

A public will is always deposited with the court or public notary, thus minimizing the
danger of the will being suppressed or fraudulently altered. However, the advantages
of deposit are not only available for public wills: it is also possible to deposit a private
will with a public notary or with an attorney-at-law according to } 104c Notariats-
ordnung. As far as formalities are concerned, these wills must fulfil the requirements
of either } 578 or } 579 ABGB. They may be home-made wills, but far more often
they are witnessed wills made under } 579 ABGB with the help of a public notary
or an attorney-at-law (above at 2(b)). However, it is not possible to deposit a private
will with a district court.25
22
Schauer (n 20) 928.
23
This applies only where the restrictions imposed by the Sachwalterschaft include the establishment of
wills.
24
Pfaff and Hofmann (n 20) 186. Schauer (n 20) 923 rightly observes that, at the end of the day, this is
irrelevant because private and public wills have the same consequences.
25
Welser (n 8) } 578 n 9.
Public wills as well as private wills deposited with a public notary must be
registered in the Austrian Central Registry of Wills.26 For private wills deposited
with an attorney-at-law, registration is optional. According to information provided
by the Austrian Notarial Chamber, more than 1.8 million wills were registered in the
Austrian Central Register of Wills by the end of 2009; this is four times the number
in 1972 when 423,000 wills were registered. The vast majority (94 per cent) of wills
are registered with public notaries, 5 per cent with attorneys, and only 1 per cent with
district courts.
II. Historical development
The current situation in Austria is best understood against the background of

Austrian legal history since the reception of Roman law. The following brief outline
will focus on historical developments which have left a lasting imprint on Austrian
law of testamentary formalities, neglecting other important aspects like the
discrimination against women, Jews, and clergymen.
1. The situation during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries

‘Austrian law’ during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries was the law in force in the
Habsburg hereditary lands, in particular those whose successor states belong to
Austria until the present day, ie Vienna, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Styria,
Carinthia, and the Tyrol.
(a) The ius commune

The Reichsnotariatsordnung of 1512 had largely adopted the testamentary formalities
of the Corpus Juris Civilis,27 notably the regular written will (testamentum solenne,
testamentum tripertitum28) and the regular oral will (testamentum nuncupativum),
both of which required the participation of seven witnesses. Under Justinianic law,
there was also a series of privileged types of wills, requiring a less elaborate ceremonial
set-up because of the particular situation in which they were made or the particular
purpose they served.29 Over the centuries, these privileged wills underwent signifi-
cant modifications concerning both the relaxation of formal requirements and their
26
According to } 140 b para 1 the Austrian Central Registry of Wills is operated by the Austrian
Notarial Chamber, } 1.1 of the Richtlinien der Österreichischen Notariatskammer vom 21.10.1999 für das
Österreichische Zentrale Testamentsregister as of 22 April 2010. The fee for the registration of a will is fixed
by the committee of delegates (Delegiertentag) of the Notarial Chamber and amounts to €18.50 per
registration.
27
For details see ch 1 above at 19ff; ch 2 above at 37ff, both with further references.
28
J Inst 2, 10, 3–13; see ch 2 above at 28, n 7.
29
Privileged wills were the testamentum ruri conditum for the rural population, the testamentum
tempore pestis conditum for times of epidemic plague, the testamentum parentum inter liberos for the
distribution of assets by parents among their children, and the testamentum militare for servicemen; cf
ch 1 above at 21ff; ch 2 above at 41f.
official justification.30 Apart from these types of private will, the Corpus Juris
expressly recognized the possibility of a testamentum apud acta conditum31 and tacitly
also that of a testamentum principi oblatum.
Canon law introduced further types of will, for which the formal requirements
were less strict than under Roman law. In particular, there was the possibility of an
oral or written will being made before a priest and two witnesses.32 For testamenta ad
pias causas the requirements were even more relaxed.33
(b) Adaptations by local laws and customs

The Justinianic forms of will – either directly or as adopted by the Reichsnotariats-
ordnung – were the basis of legal doctrine and practice in the Austrian territories from
the sixteenth century onwards, and to a certain extent Canon law was also received.
However, this did not provide much more than the overall conceptual framework, as
the usus modernus pandectarum adapted the Roman law rules to local customs and to
the needs of early modern society in Europe.34 Therefore, local statutes, authoritative
academic works, and customs in the Habsburg hereditary lands largely deviated from
the Corpus Juris.
As to the formal requirements of a written private will along the lines of the
Roman testamentum solenne, there was a broad variety of different regimes and much
legal uncertainty. Where the will had been signed and sealed by the testator, local
statutes contented themselves with the seals of between one and four witnesses,
depending also on the type of seal.35 Later, in particular in the eighteenth century,
two witnesses were generally held to be sufficient. Often, this number of witnesses
was justified by referring to Canon law.36 The formal requirements were stricter in
various respects where the testator was a woman, where the testator had omitted his
seal or signet or even his signature, or where the testator was unable to read or write.
It was a particularity of Austrian law that the witnesses need not be present in
the case of a written will, but that the signed and sealed document could be sent to
the witnesses together with an accompanying letter (Petzetl) asking for their seal.37
It follows that the Roman law principle of unitas actus was not strictly adhered to,
and the period within which the witnesses had to react remained another matter
of uncertainty.38 However, compared with Roman law, the Petzetl were not only
30
For instance, C. 6, 23, 31, 3 and Nov 107 cap 1 and 2 allow a testamentum parentum inter liberos
without any witnesses where the crucial parts of the will were holograph, whereas Reichsnotariatsordnung I
} 2 demanded two witnesses, but no holograph parts. Similarly, C. 6, 23, 8 dispensed the witnesses in
tempore pestis only from simultaneous presence, whereas later also the number of witnesses was reduced.
31
C. 6, 23, 19.
32
33
34
Werner Ogris, ‘Testament’, in Albrecht Cordes (ed), Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte
vol V (1998) 158.
35
For details, see Leopold Pfaff and Franz Hofmann, Excurse über österreichisches allgemeines Recht vol II/1
(Vienna, 1878) 88 ff; Gunter Wesener, Geschichte des Erbrechtes in Österreich seit der Rezeption (1957) 131 ff.
36
Wesener (n 35) 135 and above at n 32.
37
Philipp Harras Ritter von Harrasowsky, Codex Theresianus vol II (Vienna, 1884) 175 ff n 8; Wesener
(n 35) 135; Ursula Flossmann, Österreichische Privatrechtsgeschichte (6th edn, 2008) 351.
38
Cf Wesener (n 35) 138.
a relaxation of formalities. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, these

letters became an additional formal requirement, as a will could only be witnessed by
a person who had been formally invited via Petzetl to do so.39
As to the question of who could act as a witness, local statutes and customs
were more restrictive than Roman law.40 It ought to be mentioned in this
context that not only the heir and his close relatives and servants were excluded, but
also the beneficiaries of a major legacy41 worth one-quarter of the estate or more.42
The testamentum nuncupativum of Roman law had been adopted by the Reichs-
notariatsordnung of 1512 as a regular form of private will. Local law in the Austrian
territories, however, was rather reluctant to receive oral wills. In Vienna, oral wills
were merely recognized in cases of emergency where the testator was about to die and
unable to make a written will.43 In most territories, between three and five witnesses
were needed, and they were required to go to the public authorities immediately after
the death of the testator to have the will minuted.44 Therefore, oral wills under local
Austrian law were really a mixture of the Roman testamentum nuncupativum and
medieval forms of public will declared before the authorities.45
The Justinianic types of privileged will with the modifications they had undergone
over the centuries (above at 1) were, to some extent, also received in the Austrian
territories. However, as formalities in Austria were in any case considerably less strict
than under Roman law, the privileged wills did not play a significant role.46
Privileges for the rural population differed significantly from the Roman testamen-
tum ruri conditum: the law in Lower Austria, for instance, referred to the customs of
the relevant village or borough, or in the absence of such to the Canon law will before
a priest and two witnesses.47
Public wills were not very common in the Austrian territories. As far as local
statutes and similar authorities are concerned, only Upper Austria seems to have
recognized oral or written wills established before the authorities.48 However, as
already pointed out, oral wills in the Austrian territories of that time embraced some
elements of public wills.
(c) The role of holograph wills

Holograph wills established without witnesses had been recognized by Valentinianus
III and introduced in the lex Romana Visigothorum, but they had not been adopted
by the Corpus Juris Civilis.49
39
This aspect of the Petzetln is stressed by Pfaff and Hofmann (n 35) 89 f.
40
For details, see Wesener (n 35) 151–3.
41
Pfaff and Hofmann (n 35) 193 n 2.
42
Wesener (n 35) 152 with further references.
43
Josef Pauser, “In sterbenden leuffen, der wir dann teglich nach dem willen des allmechtigen
gewartten muessen”. Das Seuchentestament in der Wiener Stadtordnung von 1526’, in Gerhard Kohl,
Christian Neschwara, and Thomas Simon (eds), Festschrift für Wilhelm Brauneder (2008) 477, 484.
44 45
Pfaff and Hofmann (n 35) 109; Wesener (n 35) 140 ff. Wesener (n 35) 142.
46 47 48
Wesener (n 35) 142. Wesener (n 35) 143. Wesener (n 35) 148.
49
Monika Beutgen, Die Geschichte der Form der eigenhändigen Testamente (1992) 11 ff; Gunter
Wesener, ‘Ephemere Besonderheiten des spätrömischen Erbrechts’, in Holger Altmeppen et al (eds),
Festschrift für Rolf Knütel (2009) 1401, 1414 f; cf also ch 1 above at 19.
Despite their rejection by Justinian, holograph wills were recognized in large

parts of Europe from medieval times, notably under customary law in France50
and in the Austrian territories.51 This ‘local custom from ancient times’52 is clearly
reflected in the Vienna Stadtordnung of 1526, but also in several of the early modern
treatises or draft statutes which served as written sources of law for the territories
of Lower Austria, Upper Austria, and Styria.53 According to most of these Austrian
sixteenth-century treatises and local statutes, not even the testator’s signature was
required if the document carried his seal.54
Very probably, as in France, the Austrian holograph wills had developed
independently from Roman law. Their origin was the ordinary sealed private
document.55 They thus belonged to a legal regime other than the Corpus Juris and
its local adaptations and were neither an extended version of the Roman testamentum
parentum inter liberos56 nor a watered-down version of the testamentum solenne with
the number of witnesses being reduced to zero.
In the late eighteenth century, the awareness among Austrian jurists that holo-
graph wills on the one hand and witnessed wills on the other were two potentially
competing regimes gradually faded and was lost. The authors of the ABGB, at least
those of earlier drafts, still took a historical view.57 Others, however, made some
effort to reconcile the holograph will with the Corpus Juris, relating the holograph
form to C. 6, 23, 28, 6(1).58 Within the regular written wills under Justinianic law,
there had indeed been a distinction between holograph and other documents in
so far as the testator’s signature was not required where the testator had written
the whole text with his own hand. However, this ‘Justinianic holograph will’
was something very different from the customary holograph will, as in the case of
the former the main solemnity was still the seven witnesses, whereas in the case
of the latter it was the testator’s personal handwriting. It is unclear to what extent
this misinterpretation59 of C. 6, 23, 28, 6(1) was the result of sheer ignorance, of
50
Cf Heinrich Mitteis, Die germanischen Grundlagen des französischen Rechts (1943) 63 ZRG (GA) 137,
190 n 194; Beutgen (n 49) 32 ff.
51
Beutgen (n 49) 53 ff; Wesener (n 49) 1417.
52
Benedictus Finsterwalder, Practicarum observationum ad consuetudines Archi-Ducatus Austriae
Superioris accomodatorum (Salzburg, 1687) lib II, observatio CXVII, 608.
53
Pfaff and Hofmann (n 20) 141 f; Wesener (n 35) 129.
54
Wesener (n 35) 130 f with further references.
55
Pfaff and Hofmann (n 20) 141; Wesener (n 35) 130; idem (n 49) 1417; Beutgen (n 49) 53 ff; Ogris
(n 34) 158.
56
According to Pfaff and Hofmann (n 20) 141 n 5, this was a frequent assumption; cf also Herbert
Hausmaninger and Walter Selb, Römisches Privatrecht (9th edn, 2001) 340.
57
Cf von Harrasowsky (n 37) 174 for the Codex Theresianus. The view taken in 1804 by the Zeiller
commission is much less clear, cf Julius Ofner (ed), Der Ur-Entwurf und die Berathungs-Protokolle des
Oesterreichischen Allgemeinen bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches vol I (Vienna, 1888) 345. Arguably, the holograph
will was seen as a relaxed form of the Roman written will.
58
Franz Aloys Tiller, Sistem der bürgerlichen Rechtslehre aus dem sammentlichen römischen rechte, mit
Bezug auf die österreichischen Gesetze, sonderlich aber auf das allgemeine bürgerliche Gesetzbuch vol II (Graz,
1787–9) 332; Josepus Balthasar Winckler, Tractatus theoretico-practicus de successione ex testamento
(Graz, 1771) 205.
59
Wesener (n 35) 131 n 11.
the desire to create coherence within the multi-layered chaos of early modern private
law, or a deliberate attempt to upgrade the holograph will by providing it with
a Roman law pedigree.
The result of all of this was that Austrian doctrine from the early nineteenth
century no longer differentiated between holograph wills and the successors of the
Justinianic forms of will, in particular the witnessed written will and the nuncupative
will. Rather, the allegedly Roman trias of testamentum holographum, testamentum
allographum, and testamentum nuncupativum60 became the cornerstone of legal
doctrine, and also the ABGB came to be seen in the light of this trias. This was
questionable not only from a historical point of view, but also for conceptual
reasons:61 after all, the main characteristic of what came to be called ‘allograph
wills’ was not so much that they were written by someone else than the testator, but
that they relied on witnesses.
The shift from an adapted form of the Justinianic written will to a testamentum
allographum62 was more than a terminological issue; it also indicated a shift in
function that had gradually taken place with the growing acceptance of holograph
wills: under Roman law, the main reason for a testator to opt for the testamentum
solenne instead of a testamentum nuncupativum had been that the witnesses need not
know the content of the will, while the document itself was quite frequently hand-
written by the testator himself 63 and while also the content of an oral will was often
immediately committed to paper. Where secrecy was not an issue, it could even be
safer to make a nuncupative will and put it down in writing as the witnesses could
then certify its content even in a case where the document was destroyed or
suppressed. With the rise of holograph wills the main function of witnessed wills
shifted to the convenience of having the document set up by a person in a healthier
condition, with better writing skills or with legal expertise.
(d) Natural law theory

Along with the rise of natural law theory in the eighteenth century came a further
relaxation of formalities, but it is unclear how far this relaxation actually went. The
majority of authors report that all kinds of formalities were eventually dropped and
that any declaration of a last will was accepted.64 However, these statements are to be
read with some caution as contemporary jurists drew a distinction between formal-
ities (solemnitates) and formal requirements of proof. Thus, there is also the view that,
even though witnesses were no longer necessary as a solemnity, proof of the will had
60
Cf the leading Austrian textbook Hausmaninger and Selb (n 56) 340, according to which these are
the three forms of private will in post-classical Roman law (sic).
61
Pfaff and Hofmann (n 20) 140.
62
Hausmaninger and Selb (n 56) 340.
63
Cf Max Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht. Zweiter Abschnitt: Die nachklassischen Entwicklungen (2nd
edn, 1975) 480.
64
Cf von Harrasowsky (n 37) 175; Flossmann (n 37) 352; Wesener (n 35) 142.
to be made through the congruent testimony and sometimes also the signatures of
two witnesses.65
The most plausible explanation is that there was simply a broad range of
different practices and views, with some courts and academic authors being more
inclined to abandon all formal requirements than others. It is probably true that,
in eighteenth-century Austria, wills were hardly ever rejected for want of formal
requirements. But this has never made an impact on the law in the books, and when
the first preparations were made for a comprehensive codification of Austrian civil
law, the abolition or further relaxation of testamentary formalities was not seriously
discussed as an option.66
2. Testamentary formalities in the ABGB of 1811

The drafting of the ABGB itself did not take place in one single step. Rather, it relied
on a series of former drafts, some of which differed significantly from the final text.67
Already in 1766, the Codex Theresianus was finished, but it was harshly criticized and
never came into force. The same holds true for its revised version, the so-called
Horten Draft of 1776. Parts of the Horten Draft were again revised, and statutes on
marriage law (1783) and parts of succession law (1786) were enacted under Joseph
II, as was the first chapter of a comprehensive Austrian civil code (1787) which later
came to be called the Josephinian Code. A further decade later, a new draft of the
civil code was prepared under the coordination of Karl Anton von Martini, and was
finished in 1796. This so-called Martini Draft was enacted in 1797 as the West-
galician Code in the territories of West and later also East Galicia. After Martini’s
death, this code served as the original draft (Ur-Entwurf ) of the ABGB, which was
eventually finalized by a new commission under Franz von Zeiller. The ABGB was
promulgated in 1811 and came into force on 1 January 1812.68
(a) Sources and style

The overall framework of }} 577 to 603 ABGB was more or less that of the late
eighteenth-century usus modernus, ie of contemporary adaptations of Roman law
(above at 1(b)), mixed with local legal ingredients including the holograph will
(above at 1(c)). Wills were divided into private and public, private wills into written
and oral, and written private wills into holograph and ‘allograph’. The types of
privileged will were largely reduced to wills made at sea or during times of epidemic
65
Wesener (n 35) 134. This is confirmed by Zeiller in Ofner (n 57) 346, who elaborates on the
problem that the ABGB requires three witnesses and that wills made with only two witnesses before 1
January 1812 had to be recognized as valid.
66
Cf von Harrasowsky (n 37) 177 already for the Codex Theresianus.
67
For the historical development cf, eg Wilhelm Brauneder, ‘Das Allgemeine Burgerliche Gesetzbuch
für die gesamten Deutschen Erblander der osterreichischen Monarchie von 1811’ [1987] Gutenberg
Jahrbuch 205–54; Moritz von Stubenrauch, Commentar zum allgemeinen österreichischen bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuche (Vienna, 1864) 1 ff; Josef Schey, in Heinrich Klang and Franz Gschnitzer (eds), Kommentar
zum Allgemeinen Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch vol I (2nd edn, 1964) 1 ff.
68
Above at n 1.
plague: given the general reduction of formalities compared with Roman law, further
privileges for codicils, testamenta ruri condita, or testamenta parentum inter liberos
seemed superfluous. For wills made by soldiers, } 600 ABGB referred to specific
provisions of military law.
Even though the ABGB is generally said to be one of the three great ‘natural law
codifications’ of the time, the part on testamentary formalities seems to have been
scarcely influenced by natural law theory. Compared with the situation in the
sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, }} 577 to 603 ABGB meant a step back towards
Justinianic law: the number of witnesses required for a witnessed will was increased
to (not seven, but) three; the testator had actually to sign the will; he also had to
declare in front of the witnesses that this was his last will; the local practice of Petzetln
(above at 1(b)) was discarded,69 ie the witnesses had to be present at one and the
same point in time; the oral nuncupative will was in so far readjusted to its
Justinianic origin as there was no obligation of the witnesses to put the will down
in writing or to report to the authorities; and last but not least also the public will,
which had not been very common in Austria (above at 1(b)), was given a prominent
role in the codification.
When the current Austrian law of succession, including the part on testamentary
formalities, was drafted around the turn of the nineteenth century, the Allgemeines
Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten of 1794 and the draft and final versions of the
French Code civil were already available as comparative sources. Even though they
were cited now and then, it is unclear to what extent they really served as additional
sources of inspiration. There seems to have been some influence as far as the
facilitation for wills made at sea were concerned.70 Other early modern codifications,
like the Codex Maximilianeus Bavaricus Civilis of 1756, seem not to have influenced
the relevant parts of the ABGB, and the same holds true for Canon law.71
(b) The spirit: doctrinal conservatism and a certain naı̈veté

The part on testamentary formalities in the ABGB was strongly based on the usus
modernus. In particular in its final version edited by Zeiller and his commission, it
sought to preserve what was already practised or to resurrect Roman law principles
that were in danger of being lost, rather than to remedy a mischief or to reform the
law. This doctrinal conservatism went hand in hand with a certain naı̈veté, or
possibly resignation, with regard to fraudulent misbehaviour.
The first example that serves to underpin this claim is the preservation of oral wills.
The preparatory materials reveal that the commission was very well aware of the fact
that oral wills – in particular where the number of witnesses was reduced to two or
three – were extremely susceptible to fraud.72 And yet, as oral wills had a long history
in Roman law, the abolition of oral wills was not even an issue. This is all the more
remarkable as Franz von Zeiller had originally voted against the holograph will out of
concern that handwritten documents might easily be forged.73
69 70
Cf von Harrasowsky (n 37) 177. Pfaff and Hofmann (n 20) 201.
71
By decree of 4 September 1771 the participation of clergymen in the making of wills was prohibited
and such wills declared void.
72
Cf Ofner (n 57) 346.
73
Ofner (n 57) 345 f; Zeiller was eventually outvoted by the majority.
With regard to witnessed wills, the Westgalician Code had still demanded that the
testator read the document carefully in front of the witnesses or, if he could no longer
read himself, have it read aloud to him, and then declare both orally and in
handwriting that this was indeed his last will.74 While one might argue about the
double requirement of a handwritten and an oral confirmation, the general policy of
providing safeguards against documents being fraudulently foisted on the testator
seemed to be a bare necessity. This held all the more true as – given the full
recognition of holograph wills and the low quota of illiterates among the nine-
teenth-century population – witnessed wills were de facto chosen mainly by mori-
bund persons who were no longer able to write even a short text themselves; and
when a person is physically so weak, it is usually not difficult clandestinely to take
down distorted content, or to replace the document.
Strangely enough, the commission drafting the ABGB was not impressed by
considerations of that kind. The only safeguard against forged wills they upheld
was the oral nuncupatio. Otherwise the final } 579 ABGB not only fell far behind the
Westgalician Code, but even behind Justinianic law: apart from the reduced number
of witnesses, also the requirement of unitas actus was more or less abandoned as,
under the ABGB, it is neither necessary that the testator signs in the presence of the
witnesses nor, arguably, that the witnesses sign in the presence of the testator.
} 594 ABGB declares an heir as well as a legatee to be an incapable witness, and
the same holds true for an heir’s or legatee’s spouse, parents, brothers and sisters, or
persons related in the same degree by marriage. However, unlike in Roman law and
in earlier drafts,75 this incapability is only relative, ie relevant only in so far as the
heir’s own share in the estate or the legatee’s own legacy is concerned. Taken as such,
this decision seems to be an acceptable compromise. However, it can lead to the
disturbing76 result that four persons A, B, C, and D act as witnesses for a will where
A, B, C, and D are the only heirs: in so far as a particular quarter of the estate is
concerned, one out of the four does not count, but the other three are capable
witnesses.
3. Later amendments
Even though today’s testamentary formalities in Austria are largely identical to those
of 1811, some amendments were made in the course of time. The Testamentsgesetz of
1938,77 which also came into force in Austria, will be omitted in this context, as its
effects were fully reversed in 1946.78
74
Westgalizisches Gesetzbuch II }} 375, 376.
75
Kaser (n 63) 480.
76
Pfaff and Hofmann (n 20) 196.
77
RGBl I 1938, 973; for details, see ch 8 above at 194 ff. For an overview of the implications that arose
with the implementation of the German Testamentsgesetz in Austria, see Herbert Hofmeister, ‘Privat-
rechtsgesetzgebung für Österreich im Nationalsozialismus’, in Ulrike Davy (ed), Nationalsozialismus und
Recht (1990) 140 f.
78
BGBl no 30/1947.
(a) Amendments made in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the provisions on testamentary
formalities in the ABGB were amended four times. Already in 1860, } 593 ABGB,
according to which witnesses to the last will of a Christian must themselves be of
Christian belief, was repealed. This rule, which was mainly designed to discriminate
against Jews, had been controversial from the very beginning. An imperial decree of
6 January 186079 not only abolished this discrimination, but was even attributed
retroactive effect provided the testator had still been alive when the decree was
published.
According to } 592 ABGB, a person who had been convicted of fraud, or of a
major crime committed for greed, was not a capable witness. Law 131 of 186780
already touched upon this, fixing certain periods after which all negative conse-
quences of the conviction would end. In 1914, with the first of three ‘partial
amendments’ (Teilnovellen) of the ABGB,81 } 592 was eventually repealed. At the
same time, }} 591 and 597 were changed, which until then had excluded women as
well as members of a religious order from being witnesses to a regular private will.82
In the course of the third Teilnovelle from 1916,83 the wording of } 579 ABGB
was modified in order to eliminate some points of doubt which had arisen in the
meantime, in particular concerning the signature of the witnesses. Also, } 581 ABGB
on the establishment of a written will by a testator who is unable to read was changed
in so far as now the person who writes the text cannot at the same time be the person
who reads it aloud.
In 1999,84 also the wording of } 591 ABGB was amended in order to avoid any
terminology that might seem discriminatory towards disabled persons.
(b) The 2004 reform of family and succession law

The most far-reaching amendments were made in the course of the 2004 reform
of family and succession law (FamErbRÄG 2004),85 which came into force on
1 January 2005. First of all, the oral testamentum nuncupativum of the former
}} 585 and 586 ABGB (above at I.2(c)) was abolished. There was a widespread
conviction that the possibility of making a will orally in front of three witnesses was
susceptible to abuse because it was usually not difficult to persuade three persons to
give a false testimony. That is why the Austrian legislator abolished this type of
regular private will.86 However, oral wills that were made before 1 January 2005
remain valid.87
79 80 81
RGBl no 9/1860. RGBl no 131/1867. RGBl no 276/1914.
82
Ludwig Schiffner, Die Erbrechtsreform in der Novelle zum österreichischen allgemeinen bürgerlichen
Gesetzbuche (1908) 14.
83 84 85
RGBl no 69/1916. BGBl I no 164/1999. Above at n 18.
86
Cf no 471 Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrats XXII. Gesetzgebungsperiode:
Regierungsvorlage – Materialien 11.
87
Above at n 18.
The former }} 597 to 599 ABGB dealt with wills made at sea, under conditions of
the pest or similar epidemic plagues, or during armed conflicts, with } 599 referring
to the specific provisions of military law for the latter. In the course of the 2004
reform, the privileged forms of will mentioned above were replaced by one single
form of emergency will (above at I.2(d) and below at III.3).
III. Modern doctrine and court practice
The Austrian law of testamentary formalities is a rather static part of the law which
has remained largely unimpressed by the dramatic sociological changes that have
taken place since the early nineteenth century. This is reflected also in doctrine and
court practice, which differs little from that of the period shortly after the promul-
gation of the ABGB. The following exposition will concentrate on private wills: the
Austrian law of public wills is so complicated (above at I.2(e)) and at the same time
so seldom the object of academic discussion or judicial scrutiny that any detailed
analysis would do nothing but bore the readership.
1. Holograph wills
(a) Requirements
As the holograph will is the most commonly used type of will in practice,88 most of
the case law and doctrinal analyses available probably concern this type of will. The
requirements under Austrian law are listed in } 578 ABGB.
The text of a holograph will must be handwritten by the testator himself; he may
not use a typewriter or computer.89 Assistance by others, for example, by stabilizing
his hand, is admissible as long as the testator’s individual handwriting is still clearly
discernible.90 The main reason for this requirement is that it allows identification of
the author through a comparison with other handwritten documents produced by
the testator during his lifetime.91 The courts have held the requirement still to be
fulfilled where a text was written in block letters,92 in short-hand,93 or even where it
was a copy produced by means of a sheet of carbon paper.94 Where only parts of the
text have been handwritten by the testator, these parts are valid as a holograph will
provided they make sense on their own and it can be proved that the testator acted
88
Above at n 13.
89
Weiß (n 13) } 578, 303; Gschnitzer and Faistenberger (n 6) 39; Apathy (n 8) } 578 n 1; Eccher (n 8)
} 578 n 2; Welser (n 8) } 578 n 2.
90
Winfried Kralik, Erbrecht, in Armin Ehrenzweig, System des österreichischen allgemeinen Privatrechts
vol II/2 (3rd edn, 1983) 131; Welser (n 8) } 578 n 2; Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 2; Weiß (n 13) } 578, 304 ff.
91
OGH 4 Ob 29/04z (16.03.2004); OGH 6 Ob 758/82 (6.10.1982); Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 2.
92
OGH 10 Ob 2335/96x (5.11.1996), SZ 69/247; Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 3; Apathy (n 8) } 578 n 1.
93
OGH 3 Ob 375/33 (26.4.1933), SZ 15/91; Apathy (n 8) } 578 n 1; Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 3; Welser
(n 8) } 578 n 1; Kralik (n 90) 131.
94
OGH 1 Ob 571/93 (22.6.1993), SZ 66/78; Apathy (n 8) } 578 n 1.
with animus testandi;95 the other, not handwritten parts may only be valid as a
witnessed will if the requirements of }} 579 ff ABGB are fulfilled.96 The medium on
which the will has been written is often said to be irrelevant,97 so that a holograph
will might theoretically be carved in stone.98 However, the carvings would probably
not allow ascertaining the identity of the author, unless the testator made frequent
use of this medium. Where the testator has made use of an unusually perishable
medium, this may indicate a lack of animus testandi.99
The testator can write down his dispositions in any language he wishes.100 The
terms ‘testament’, ‘will’, or the like need not be used; any formulation is sufficient
that reflects an animus testandi. In particular, the will can take the form of a letter
as long as it is clear that the letter itself contains the will and not merely the
information that the testator intends to make a will.101
The second indispensable requirement for a holograph will is the testator’s
signature. The rationale behind it is not so much that it helps to identify the author,
but rather to show that the text is neither a mere draft102 nor an incomplete torso.103
Therefore, it is not essential that the testator signs his full name. Rather, the first
name,104 the initials,105 or even a term denoting a family relationship (for example,
‘Mother’)106 may be sufficient if the testator used the expression in question vis-à-vis
the beneficiaries of the will and there is no doubt as to the identity of the testator.107
The testator’s signature must conclude the text, ie be positioned below the
testamentary dispositions.108 Any additional disposition that is not above the signa-
ture and thus covered by it needs a separate signature, otherwise it will be invalid.109
Where the will is on more than just one sheet of paper, it is usually sufficient for the
testator to sign the last page, provided it is clear from the text itself or the page
95
OGH 1 Ob 18/74 (27.2.1974), SZ 47/18; Apathy (n 8) } 578 n 2; Weiß (n 13) } 578, 302; Welser
(n 8) } 578 n 1.
96
Armin Ehrenzweig, System des österreichischen allgemeinen Privatrechts (2nd edn, 1937) 427; Welser
(n 8) } 578 n 1. For a different opinion, cf Pfaff and Hofmann (n 20) 144.
97
OGH 7 Ob 185/05i (31.8.2005); Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 3; Welser (n 11) 503.
98
Kralik (n 90) 131; Weiß (n 13) } 578, 304.
99
Weiß (n 13) } 578, 304; Welser (n 8) }578 n 4; Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 3.
100
OGH 7 Ob 185/05i (31.5.2005); Welser (n 11) 503; Kralik (n 90) 131; Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 3.
Some authors insist that the testator himself must understand the chosen language, which can even be a
dead language: see Weiß (n 13) } 578, 303 f; Gschnitzer and Faistenberger (n 6) 39; Karl Silberer, ‘Über
fremdsprachige Testamente’ [1951] Notariatszeitung 108 ff. In my view, this is a problem of } 565 ABGB,
not of } 578.
101
OGH 10 Ob 2335/96x (5.11.1996), SZ 69/247; Welser (n 8) } 578 n 1.
102
Weiß (n 13) } 578, 303; Kralik (n 90) 131.
103
Joseph Unger, Das österreichische Erbrecht (Leipzig, 1894) 47.
104
OGH 1 Ob 899/54 (10.12.1954), Evidenzblatt der Rechtsmittelentscheidungen 1955/102; Kralik
(n 90) 132.
105
OGH 4 Ob 237/04p (30.11.2004), SZ 2004/172; Apathy (n 8) } 578 n 2; Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 6;
Kralik (n 90) 132.
106
OGH 1 Ob 899/54 (10.12.1954), Evidenzblatt der Rechtsmittelentscheidungen 1955/102; Eccher
(n 8) } 578 n 6. For the opposite view, cf Weiß (n 13) } 578, 306 ff; Kralik (n 90) 132.
107
Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 6; Apathy (n 8) } 578 n 2; Welser (n 8) }578 nn 5 f.
108
Weiß (n 13) } 578, 305; Apathy (n 8) } 578 n 2; Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 5.
109
OGH 1 Ob 38/68 (22.2.1968), SZ 41/23; Weiß (n 13) } 578, 303; Eccher (n 8) } 578, n 5.
numbering that the different sheets and pages belong together.110 The courts have
even held it to be sufficient that the testator signs on the sealed envelope where it is
clear that the signature has the function of concluding the will.111 The requirement
that the signature must conclude the text is true only in terms of space, not of time: it
is immaterial whether the testator has drafted the will in one go or in several steps,
and also whether or not the signature was the last step.112
According to } 578 AGBG, it is advisable (rätlich) to add to the signature the exact
date and the place.113 However, unlike earlier drafts of the ABGB,114 } 578 explicitly
states that this is not necessary for the will to be valid.
(b) Additions and amendments

As there is no principle of unitas actus for holograph wills (above at (a)), this type of
will can be supplemented or amended by the testator at any point in time later on.115
Obviously, these additions or amendments, too, have to be holograph, otherwise
they are valid only where the requirements of another form of will have been met.
If, due to their position on the document, the new dispositions are still covered
by the signature – or indeed by one of the various signatures116 – no new signature is
needed.117 However, if they are below the lowest signature, they are of no
relevance.118
(c) Critical evaluation

Holograph wills have many practical advantages: they can be made easily, quickly,
cheaply, and at almost any time, and the same holds true for their amendment or
revocation. Furthermore, their content and even their existence can be kept secret by
the testator. Their major disadvantage is that they can easily be suppressed after the
testator’s death, but there are many possibilities for the testator to take precautions
against this: he can either deposit the will or even have it registered; he can show
the will to as many witnesses as he deems necessary, or he can hand over the will or
a handwritten copy of it to the major beneficiary.
110
OGH 5 Ob 1571/94 (21.10.1994), Ehe- und familienrechtliche Entscheidungen 75.297; OGH 4
Ob 29/04z (16.3.2004); Weiß (n 13) } 578, 304 f; Apathy (n 8) } 578 n 2; Welser (n 8) } 578 n 5; Eccher
(n 8) } 578 n 5.
111
OGH 4 Ob 29/04z (16.3.2004); Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 5. A different view is taken by Welser (n 8)
} 578 n 5. Cf also Kralik (n 90) 132.
112
OGH 2 Ob 538/78 (8.6.1978), SZ 51/85; Welser (n 8) } 578 n 7; Weiß (n 13) } 578, 302 ff;
Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 7; Apathy (n 8) } 578 n 1; Welser (n 8) } 578 n 7. Cf also Wilhelm Tschugguel, ‘Die
Einheit des Testieraktes beim eigenhändigen und beim fremdhändigen Testament: Eine Kurzanalyse und
Gegenüberstellung einschlägiger OGH-Entscheidungen’ [2006] Interdisziplinäre Zeitschrift für Familien-
recht 107; Kralik (n 90) 132.
113
Welser (n 8) } 578 n 8.
114
Unger (n 103) 47; Weiß (n 13) } 578, 307 f.
115
Welser (n 8) } 578 n 7; Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 7.
116
OGH 1 Ob 38/68 (22.2.1968), SZ 41/23; Kralik (n 90) 132; Weiß (n 13) } 578, 305.
117
Eccher (n 8) } 578 n 7.
118
OGH 8 Ob 283/63 (12.11.1963), Evidenzblatt der Rechtsmittelentscheidungen 1964/160; Kralik
(n 90) 133; Welser (n 11) 503; Weiß (n 13) } 578, 305 f.
With the general improvement of scientific techniques, holograph wills are also
rather reliable, as in cases of doubt an expert can usually be more than 90 per cent
sure whether or not a holograph document was really written by the testator.
The Austrian practice not to demand a new signature where a holograph will has
been altered and the additions or amendments are covered by the old signature
(above at 2) is problematic in this context, as it is difficult to prove that a mere
deletion, or the insertion of a short name, was really made by the testator himself.
2. Witnessed wills
The details on the Austrian witnessed will, which has developed from the Roman law
testamentum solenne and its local adaptations by Austrian early modern statutes and
customs (above at II.1(c)), are regulated in }} 579 to 581 ABGB. The basic provision
is } 579, whereas }} 580 and 581 only provide certain modifications for cases where
the testator cannot write and/or read.
(a) Production of the document

The text of this type of will can be produced by any means and by any person.119
Even a beneficiary under the will is not excluded from writing it down,120 but in this
case } 595 ABGB imposes further requirements: the writer does not count as
a witness in so far as his own position under the will or that of his spouse, children,
parents, siblings, or any other person related to him in the same degree in law is
concerned; either there are three other witnesses,121 or the testatrix writes the
disposition benefiting the writer of the remainder of the will with her own hand.
Quite naturally, and despite the misleading term ‘allograph’, the text can also
be written by the testatrix herself, in particular if she prefers to type the will using
a machine or computer.122
A difficult issue is to what extent } 565 ABGB, according to which a will can never
be made merely by approving of someone else’s suggestions, plays a role in the
context of written wills. The clear rationale behind } 565 is to make sure that the
testatrix has contemplated and understood what her dispositions really mean and
that she made her declaration free of undue influence and being fully aware of the
gravity of the act. This leads to the question of whether the testatrix must have
dictated the will to the person writing it or must at least have explained to him what
she had in mind, or whether it is admissible that the content has been devised by the
writer or by a third person, and the testatrix merely adopts the text as her own by
means of nuncupatio (below at (c)). Arguably, the first of the two options is the
119
Cf already Unger (n 103) 46 with historical references and Weiß (n 13) } 579, 308 f. Cf Eccher
(n 8) } 579 n 1.
120
} 595 ABGB: see Apathy (n 8) } 595 n 1; Weiß (n 13) } 579, 342.
121
OGH 1 Ob 510/94 (25.1.1994), SZ 67/8; Welser (n 8) } 595 n 8; Weiß (n 13) } 595, 341 f;
Apathy (n 8) } 595 n 1.
122
Weiß (n 13) } 578, 307.
correct one,123 as is also underpinned by the wording of } 579 ABGB (‘has had
written’ – niederschreiben ließ ). The Austrian Supreme Court has not yet fully
answered the question.124 Of course, it will often be difficult to prove that } 565
ABGB has actually been violated.
(b) Signature of the testatrix

The testatrix must sign the document herself, although not necessarily in the
presence of the witnesses.125 But where the testatrix cannot write,126 she must
make signs (for example, three crosses) in lieu of a signature, and this has to be
done in the presence of all three witnesses (} 580 ABGB).127 It is advisable in this
case that one of the witnesses also writes the testatrix’s name in order to avoid any
doubt about her identity. If the testatrix later gains the ability to write, the will
established according to } 580 ABGB does not lose its validity.128
‘Signature’ in this context is commonly held to have the same meaning as in the
context of } 578 ABGB (above at 1(a)).129 However, it is highly doubtful whether
signing a text written by someone else merely by using initials can really be regarded
as sufficient, as two block letters are much easier to forge than a whole signature.
Similarly, a signature on an envelope can hardly be considered to be sufficient.
Nobody has, apparently, suggested that the testatrix has to sign separately on each
sheet of paper or that the various sheets be fastened together with a string.
(c) Nuncupatio
A core element of this type of will is that the testator explicitly130 confirms before
three capable witnesses that the document,131 which must be at hand and be shown
to the witnesses,132 contains his last will. The witnesses do not need to have been
explicitly summoned as witnesses; it is sufficient that they are present and are aware
of the fact that they are acting as witnesses.133 Furthermore, the witnesses do not
need to be acquainted with the testator, although they have to be able to confirm his
identity.134
123
Weiß (n 13) }} 564–5, 258 ff; unclear Pfaff and Hofmann (n 20) 98.
124
In OGH 6 Ob 16/66 (2.2.1966), SZ 39/20, the court left undecided whether } 565 was really
applicable to written wills, but held its requirements to be fulfilled in the case at hand.
125
OGH 1 Ob 578/57 (6.11.1957), SZ 30/66; Welser (n 8) } 579 n 3. Weiß (n 13) } 579, 310 states
that the testatrix may sign prior to the nuncupatio.
126
It makes no difference whether the testatrix is unable to write because of illiteracy or physical
inability: Weiß (n 13) } 580, 316; Welser (n 8) } 580 n 2.
127
Unger (n 103) 48; Weiß (n 13) } 580, 316.
128
Weiß (n 13) } 580, 316; Welser (n 8) } 580 n 2.
129
Weiß (n 13) } 579, 310; Apathy (n 8) }} 579 n 2; Welser (n 8) } 579 n 3.
130
The term ‘ausdrücklich’ (explicitly) was inserted into } 579 by the third Teilnovelle of the ABGB in
1916 (above at n 83), as discussions had arisen on whether the nuncupatio could also be made implicitly:
Weiß (n 13) } 579, 311.
131
The document shown to the witnesses must be one and the same document, not a copy of it: Weiß
(n 13) } 579, 311.
132
Weiß (n 13) } 579, 311; Kralik (n 90) 134.
133
OGH 7 Ob 576/76 (18.3.1976); Weiß (n 13) } 578, 313; Eccher (n 8) } 579 n 4.
134
Welser (n 8) } 579 n 4 and }} 584–6 n 4.
The content of the will need not be revealed to the witnesses.135 Nor does } 579
ABGB require that the testator has to read the text in front of the witnesses or that he
has the text read aloud to him. Only where the testator cannot read – be it due to
blindness, poor sight,136 or illiteracy – does the document have to be read aloud by a
witness who must be different from the person who has written the text (} 581
ABGB). Arguably, this does not apply where the testator is simply so weak that
reading would cause him too much effort, because this would create too much
uncertainty:137 how weak a testator was at the relevant time is very difficult to prove
after his death. The other two witnesses must take a look at the document, which
does not mean they have to check every word against what is read out.138
The nuncupatio must be made before all three witnesses, but only two of them
must be present together at the same time.139 It is therefore possible that the testator
confirms first before witnesses A and B and then, after A has left and C has arrived, a
second time before witnesses B and C. According to the courts, it is not required that
the nuncupatio was actually heard by all three witnesses,140 but a different view is
frequently taken by legal scholars.141 In any case, there is no valid nuncupatio where
it was never made before the third witness because the testator was asleep or already
deceased when the third witness arrived to sign.142
This nuncupatio is an indispensable requirement of a witnessed will, and its
omission makes the will invalid. However, there is much uncertainty as to what an
explicit confirmation on the part of the testator really means. The Supreme Court
has held it not to be sufficient that the testator merely watches the witnesses signing
the document.143 However, in another case, it was held that smiling and nodding
may be sufficient.144 This is problematic not so much in the light of the explicitness-
requirement as a declaration made through generally accepted signs is considered to
be explicit under Austrian law (} 863(1) ABGB).145 Rather, the court raised the issue
of } 565 ABGB (above at (a)), ie whether this was merely the confirmation of what
someone else had suggested; however, the court was eventually satisfied as a result of
the fact that the document itself had been made according to the testator’s directions.
135
Unger (n 103) 48; Weiß (n 13) } 579, 312. This holds true even where the testator is unable to
write: Welser (n 8) } 578 n 1.
136
OGH 6 Ob 116/99y (20.5.1999); Eccher (n 8) } 581 n 1.
137
Unclear Welser (n 8) } 581 n 1 (illness). Originally, the draftsmen of the ABGB had intended } 581
to apply only where the testator had never been able to read: see Ofner (n 57) 350.
138
Welser (n 8) } 581 n 2; Weiß (n 13) } 581, 317.
139
Eccher (n 8) } 579 n 6.
140
OGH 1 Ob 578/57 (6.11.1957), SZ 30/66; OGH 6 Ob 425/60 (23.11.1960), Evidenzblatt der
Rechtsmittelentscheidungen 1961; OGH 1 Ob 481/60 (11.1.1961); OGH 6 Ob 16/66 (2.2.1966), SZ 39/
20; OGH 7 Ob 86/73 (6.7.1973), Evidenzblatt der Rechtsmittelentscheidungen 1973/314; OGH 7 Ob 795/
79 (20.12.1979); OGH 7 Ob 732/80 (27.11.1980); OGH 10 Ob 507/96 (27.2.1996).
141
Welser (n 11) 504; Welser (n 8) } 579 n 5; Apathy (n 8) } 579 n 2.
142
OGH 3 Ob 546/53 (30.9.1953), SZ 26/244; OGH 2 Ob 559/93 (30.6.1994).
143
OGH 1 Ob 527/83 (9.3.1983), Evidenzblatt der Rechtsmittelentscheidungen 1983/99.
144
OGH 6 Ob 16/66 (2.2.1966), SZ 39/20.
145
Weiß (n 13) } 579, 311 and above at n 130. Cf also Eccher (n 8) } 579 n 3.
(d) Signatures of the witnesses

The three witnesses have to sign the document. These signatures definitely have to
consist in their full names, or at least their family names. The law requires that they
be accompanied by a clause indicating their capacity as witnesses.146 No specific
formula is demanded, and a general remark relating to all three witnesses is sufficient.
This clause need not necessarily be written by hand.147 The signatures may be on the
face of the document itself or, if the testator wants to keep the content secret, on the
outside of the folded document.148 However, unlike in the case of the testator of a
holograph will (above at 1(a)), it is insufficient for the signature to be given on the
envelope.
(e) Sequence of events and unity of the act

The code suggests the following sequence of events: (1) drafting of the text; (2)
signature by the testator; (3) nuncupatio; and (4) signature by the witnesses. There is
much uncertainty as to how flexible this sequence is, ie which of the elements may
also come in a different order. Occasionally a remark can be found to the effect that
the sequence of events is more or less irrelevant.149 However, the drafting of the text
itself must always be the first step. Some authors contend that the witnesses may not
sign before the nuncupatio,150 but the courts have taken a different view.151 The
signature by the testator can arguably also constitute step (3) or (4).
Similarly, it is a point of uncertainty whether and, if so, to what extent the Roman
law doctrine of unitas actus still applies in Austrian law. As has already been
mentioned (above at (b)), the testator normally need not sign the document in the
presence of the witnesses, but can have a signed document ready when the witnesses
arrive. This already constitutes an important restriction of the principle of unity of
the act. Another restriction is that the three witnesses need not all be present
simultaneously, but only two of them at any one time (above at (c)). It is controver-
sial to what extent the principle is still valid for the signatures of the witnesses. A view
has been expressed that the signatures of the witnesses can be added at any time
before or after the testator’s death.152 Many authors contend that the witnesses
must sign before the testator’s death.153 Still others demand that a close relationship
146
Weiß (n 13) } 579, 313. Prior to the third Teilnovelle, it was highly disputed whether or not the
clause indicating that the person present signed as witness was a necessary requirement for the validity of
the will. The dispute was resolved by the legislature, which substituted the word ‘sollen’ with ‘müssen’: see
Schiffner (n 82) 10.
147
OGH 1 Ob 578/57 (6.11.1957), SZ 30/66; OGH 2 Ob 508/95 (9.3.1995); Apathy (n 8) } 579 n
3; Eccher (n 8) } 579 n 5.
148
Weiß (n 13) } 579, 314.
149
Eccher (n 8) } 579 n 6; Kralik (n 90) 135; Welser (n 8) } 579 n 1.
150
Apathy (n 8) } 580 n 3. According to Weiß (n 13) } 579, 314, the signatures of the witnesses are
required to conclude the making of the will and therefore naturally have to be the last step.
151
OGH 1 Ob 578/57 (6.11.1957), SZ 30/66; OGH 8 Ob 88/70 (14.4.1970), SZ 43/74.
152
Wolfgang Sperl, ‘Die zweiaktigen Testamentsformen’ [1972] Juristische Blätter 547.
153
Welser (n 11) 504; Welser (n 8) } 579 n 7; Weiß (n 13) } 579, 314.
in terms of time and place should exist between the witnessed nuncupatio and
the signing of the document, but that the intervening death of the testator should
be of no relevance, ie that the will may be valid if the testator dies immediately after
the nuncupatio and before the witness had any possibility to sign.154 In 1999, the
Austrian Supreme Court opted for the latter view,155 although leaving the issue of
intervening death undecided and remaining rather vague as to the details. What is
particularly unclear is the significance of an older line of cases according to which
the third witness may sign at a later point in time provided the will has not been
altered in the meantime.156
(f) Additions and amendments

Where a witnessed will is to be supplemented or amended later on, the additions or
amendments themselves have to fulfil the requirements of one of the recognized
types of will.157 Supposing the amendments are not made in any of the public forms,
they have to take either the form of } 579, and thus require a new nuncupatio and
new signatures, or the holograph form of } 578. The Austrian Supreme Court held in
a decision from 1974158 that mere deletions made by the testator’s own hand are
always valid, but that the holograph parts must make sense on their own. This latter
requirement was interpreted strictly, and where the testator had crossed out the
name of his former wife, added the name of his new wife and signed and dated the
amendments, the will was held to be invalid as the name of the new wife taken by
itself and without a context did not make sense. This decision has been harshly
criticized.159
(g) Critical evaluation

Whereas the holograph will has not lost its appeal over the centuries, the witnessed
will as a private will and in the shape given to it by }} 579 to 581 ABGB fails to fulfil
some of the basic functions of testamentary formalities.
As can be easily imagined, the Austrian witnessed will is extremely susceptible to
fraudulent manipulation. Either (1) the document can be forged in its entirety, the
witnesses taking part in the plot, or (2) the document can be clandestinely replaced
before the witnesses arrive to sign, or (3) the person entrusted with writing the text
can put down a distorted content and manage to prevent the testator from reading
the will before signing. In cases (1) and (2) it is either possible that (a) the forged will
carries a forged signature of the testator or (b) it carries the signature of the testator
which he had previously put on a blank piece of paper or on a document that was
submitted to him by a person of his confidence under misrepresentation of its
content. In situations (1b), (2b), or (3), there is hardly any possibility to detect the
154 155
Kralik (n 90) 136. 6 Ob 321/98v (28.1.1999), SZ 72/16.
156
OGH 7 Ob 86/73 (6.7.1973), Evidenzblatt der Rechtsmittelentscheidungen 1973/314; OGH 6 Ob
540/77 (17.3.1977); OGH 6 Ob 710/77 (1.9.1977).
157
Welser (n 8) } 579 n 9.
158
OGH 1 Ob 18/74 (27.2.1974), SZ 47/18.
159
Welser (n 8) } 579 n 9.
fraud after the testator’s death. But as an expert can only be 60 to 70 per cent sure
whether or not a signature is forged and as the person challenging a will has to give
proof of the forgery, fraudulent manipulation will usually be successful also in cases
(1a) or (2a).
In a way, the witnessed will according to } 579 ABGB is even more susceptible to
fraudulent manipulation than was the oral will under the old law: in the case of an
oral will, it was at least still necessary to recruit three false witnesses, but in the case of
the modern witnessed will, a single person clandestinely manipulating the act is
sufficient.
In 2009, a scandal in the city of Dornbirn aroused attention: two clerks at the local
court and a third person had forged witnessed wills on a large scale, thereby obtaining
millions of euros. The two clerks had access to the relevant insider information as
well as to the signatures of the deceased in old court files. What exactly happened is
not quite clear and has not been disclosed by the police in order not to provide
incentives for comparable crimes. In 2010, another, similar case became known. It is
to be feared that this is just the tip of an iceberg, even though the involvement of
court officers will hopefully remain a one-off phenomenon. Naturally, no informa-
tion is available on how many of the witnessed wills in Austria are actually forged.
However, it would be incorrect to say that }} 579 to 581 ABGB are simply too lax.
On the contrary, their rigorous formalism leads to many home-made wills being
invalid. Apart from the specific problem of later amendments (above at (f)), there are
three general pitfalls of which laypeople are usually unaware: the nuncupatio, the fact
that heirs and legatees, as well as their relatives, are not capable of being witnesses,
and the clause indicating that the persons signing the will sign it as a witness, which
can easily be forgotten.160
As concerns the nuncupatio, it is easily overlooked and felt to be unnecessary, for
normally all persons involved know very well that the reason why they have been
called is that they are supposed to attest to the fact that the testator is making, or has
made, a will.161 In particular, if the testator signs in the presence of the witnesses and
then hands the document over to them, asking them for their signature, hardly
anyone will find it necessary to add the words: ‘This document contains my last will.’
As concerns the issue which persons are capable witnesses, laymen are often ignorant
of the rule in } 594 ABGB, believing that the heirs and legatees or their relatives are
the natural witnesses to a will: first, because they are precisely the persons trusted by
the testator, and second, because they have a natural interest that the will is not
suppressed after the testator’s death.
3. Emergency wills
According to } 597 ABGB the emergency will has replaced the former privileged
types of will made at sea, in places struck by the plague or other contagious diseases,
160
See Wilhelm Tschugguel, ‘Häufige Fehler bei Errichtung eines Testaments’ [2008] Interdisziplinäre
Zeitschrift für Familienrecht 346 ff.
161
Welser (n 10) 43 f.
or by military servicemen.162 Unlike these former types, it is not restricted to a

particular group of persons or to a particular setting. It should be mentioned in this
context that it is even open to persons under guardianship or minors over the age of
fourteen who normally can only make a will orally before a court or notary (}} 568,
569 ABGB).
(a) Rationale
The preparatory materials to the FamErbRÄG 2004 (above at II.3(b)) reveal little as
to what the Austrian legislature had in mind when repealing the former }} 597 to 600
ABGB and enacting the new } 597 ABGB.163 The rationale behind the new
provision is obviously to enable as many persons as possible to make use of their
freedom to make a will, even those who have – for whatever reason – put off the
making of a (new) will until the very last moment. The rationale of the former
privileges was different: even though the set of privileged situations before 2005 was
certainly questionable and completely outdated, their common denominator was
that the testator was in a situation (sea, plague, war) that might continue for weeks,
months, or even years, and where the testator could not be too fussy concerning the
witnesses to his will, as possibly only few people were going to survive anyway. It was
clearly not sufficient that the testator was close to death and had failed to make a will
earlier.164
(b) Scope of application

The emergency will is open to a testatrix who fears that she will either die or lose her
capacity to make a will before she can make use of one of the regular types of will.
It is not necessary that this subjective assessment is correct, neither from an ex ante
nor from an ex post point of view.165 However, there must arguably be some objective
facts that make the testatrix’s assessment a plausible assumption.166 A mere hunch
which is not substantiated by anything that a neutral bystander would regard as
imminent danger should not be regarded as sufficient. It is of vital importance that
the testatrix not only fears that she will die soon, but that she will die so soon that she
can no longer make a regular type of will.167 This means that old age or a poor health
condition does not as such justify the making of an emergency will.
It is an unresolved question whether an emergency will can be made if there is no
sudden event, such as an accident or an unforeseen and rapid deterioration of the
testatrix’s condition, but if the time has simply come that the testatrix is so close to
death that it seems impossible for her still to fulfil the requirements of } 579 ABGB.
162
Regarding ex }} 597–600, see Weiß (n 13) }} 597–600, 345 ff; Welser (n 8) }} 597–600 nn 1 ff.
163
Cf the preparatory material for the reform of Family and Succession Law 2004, as above at n 86.
164
Cf Ofner (n 57), 359: the proposal to offer a privileged form of will to women who come into
mortal danger during childbirth had been rejected, mainly on the basis that this situation was foreseeable
and that enough witnesses were usually available.
165
Spitzer [2006] Notariatszeitung 14; Fischer-Czermak [2005] Juristische Blätter 2.
166
OGH 4 Ob 27/07k (23.4.2007), SZ 2007/60, left this issue open.
167
OGH 4 Ob 27/07k (23.4.2007), SZ 2007/60.
If this were the case, it would mean that, at a certain point in time, everyone can
make an oral will before just two witnesses, if only he waits long enough.
(c) Requirements
An emergency will can be made both orally or in writing as a witnessed will.
In the case of a written emergency will, the only difference between the emergency
will and the regular witnessed will (above at 2) is that only two (other than three)
capable witnesses are required. These witnesses have to be present at the same
time. Needless to say, the other requirements of } 579 ABGB have to be fulfilled,
in particular signatures and nuncupatio. Interestingly, and unlike under the former
} 597 ABGB, the age that the witnesses are required to have is not reduced.168 Thus,
the testator himself need only be fourteen, but the witnesses must be over the age of
eighteen (} 591 ABGB).
} 597(1) does not repeat the formulation of the former } 585 ABGB according to
which the witnesses must be able to certify the testator’s identity. This omission may
have been a mistake. However, it may also have been omitted on purpose, taking
account of the fact that in emergency situations one is often surrounded by strangers.
Likewise, it is unclear to what extent the case law concerning the former }} 584 to
586 ABGB is still applicable with regard to the mindset of the witnesses, in particular
whether they must have been aware of their role as witnesses of a last will and whether
they must have accepted that role.169
According to } 597(2) ABGB, the two witnesses must testify congruently that this
was indeed the testator’s last will. The rather antiquated170 formulation that the
testimony must be made upon request of any interested person and that otherwise
the will is invalid has been copied from the former } 586(2) ABGB. Compared with
the former } 586(2), the requirement that the testimony must be made ‘under oath’
has been omitted. Again, the question arises whether the omission was made
intentionally and what this means in practice.
(d) Effects
An emergency will ‘loses its validity’ after three months, to be calculated from
the time when the danger is over (provided death or loss of capacity has not oc-
curred in the meantime).171 This leaves open the question of whether, after this
period has lapsed, the will is deemed to have never existed, which would leave
previous testamentary dispositions untouched,172 or whether the effect of revoking
previous dispositions remains,173 at least as far as they are in conflict with the
168
Spitzer [2006] Notariatszeitung n 10.
169
Eccher (n 8) }} 597–600 n 2 regards as relevant the case law on the – now abolished – regular oral
will.
170
When the ABGB was drafted, this formulation reflected a kind of compromise between the old
view, according to which the presence of witnesses was a solemnity, and the prevailing view under natural
law theory that this was merely a matter of proof (above at II.1.(d)).
171
For critical remarks cf Spitzer [2006] Notariatszeitung 14 f.
172
Tschugguel [2008] Notariatszeitung 268; Weiß (n 13) } 713, 705.
173
Welser (n 8) } 713 n 1.
emergency will.174 But as this is not really a question of formalities, a more thorough
analysis of the issue would go beyond the scope of this chapter.
(e) Critical evaluation

As the former }} 597 to 600 ABGB had essentially been dead law and hardly suitable
to respond to the needs of modern society, the decision by the Austrian legislator to
launch a reform was certainly laudable. However, the new provision is not well
drafted, leaving ample room for speculation, and the preparatory materials give
hardly any hints as to what the legislature had in mind.
In terms of policy, the new } 597 ABGB is not beyond dispute. The legislative goal
to enable as many persons as possible to make use of their freedom of testation may
be justified where death was indeed so close that no regular type of will was possible.
However, as } 597 is supposed to be available already where the testatrix subjectively
fears she might be close to death or loss of capacity, even if she later goes on to live for
some while and might well have made a regular will, its scope of application is too
broad and gives room for fraudulent assertions after the alleged testatrix’s death: all
that is necessary is to assert that the deceased, at some point during the last three
months of her life, made an oral statement before two witnesses in a situation where
she (might have)175 felt a fear of imminent death or loss of capacity.
Another questionable issue is the decision of the legislature that witnesses must be
over the age of eighteen: where three young people aged seventeen go on a hiking
tour in the mountains, and one of them has a fatal accident in a secluded place, there
is no possibility for this person to establish a valid emergency will.
4. General issues relating to testamentary formalities

There are a number of issues which arise not only in the context of one particular
type of will, but which are of general relevance. Among these issues are the in-
corporation of documents into a will, the question of which persons are capable
witnesses, and the legal consequences of a failure to comply with the formal
requirements.
(a) Incorporation of other documents

} 582 ABGB expressly states that where the testator, in his will, refers to another text
or document, this other text or document must itself fulfil the formal requirements
of a last will. This does not necessarily mean that the type of will must be the
same:176 it is possible, for instance, that a witnessed will refers to a document which
is holograph and signed by the testator. However, the full set of formal requirements
174
Spitzer [2006] Notariatszeitung 14.
175
Naturally, no one can ask the testatrix what exactly she felt in this situation: Spitzer [2006]
Notariatszeitung 14; Fischer-Czermak [2005] Juristische Blätter 11.
176
Weiß (n 13) } 582, 319; Welser (n 8) } 582 n 1. See also Hans Klingstedt, ‘Das testamentum
mysticum und dessen Formgebundenheit’ [1955] Notariatszeitung 177 ff.
of some type of will must be fulfilled.177 Where this is not the case, the document
may merely serve as an aid for the construction of the will.178 The intricate problems
which may arise in this context would go beyond the scope of this chapter.
(b) One testator, one will

According to } 583 ABGB, one and the same written will can only be valid for one
testator, except for mutual wills of married couples, which are dealt with in the
chapter on marital property.179 The reason behind this rule is that the draftsmen of
the ABGB were afraid that one testator might be unduly influenced by the other and
that disputes concerning the interpretation of the will might arise.180 Thus, in one
case where a mother and a daughter had written a joint will, the whole will was held
to be invalid, and not even the parts that were handwritten and signed by the mother
herself were upheld when the mother died.181
(c) (Incapable) witnesses

Those types of will that rely on the involvement of witnesses require, without
exception, that the witnesses be ‘capable’ witnesses. The relevant rules for private
wills are to be found in }} 591, 594, and 595 ABGB.
According to } 591 ABGB, witnesses must not be under the age of eighteen and
they must not suffer from a physical or mental disability which prevents them from
witnessing the relevant type of will. These grounds of incapability are absolute, ie the
incapable person does not count as a witness, and if there have not been enough other
capable witnesses to the will, the whole will is invalid.182 Even though listed in } 591,
the fact that a witness does not understand the language in which the last will and the
nuncupatio are declared is considered to be a ground of relative incapability only.183
According to } 594 ABGB, a person who is a beneficiary under the will and his
spouse, parents, children, siblings, and persons related to him in law to the same
degree, as well as paid staff living in the same household, may not act as witness.
However, this incapability is ‘relative’ in the sense that where a witness counts among
the group of persons referred to and there are not enough other witnesses, only the
disposition benefiting this witness or his relative, etc will be invalid. Other testamen-
tary dispositions are upheld, provided this is consistent with the testator’s (pre-
sumed) last will.184
In order to avoid the invalidity of the disposition, there must be either three
disinterested witnesses in addition to the relatively incapable witness, or the testator
must write the relevant disposition with his own hand. As has been described earlier
177
OGH 5 Ob 531/91 (17.9.1991), Evidenzblatt der Rechtsmittelentscheidungen 1992/36; Apathy
(n 8) } 582 n 1; Eccher (n 8) } 582 n 1; Weiß (n 13) } 582, 319; Welser (n 8) } 582 n 1.
178
Weiß (n 13) } 582, 319.
179
ABGB } 1248.
180
Apathy (n 8) } 583 n 1; Eccher (n 8) } 582 n 1; Welser (n 8) } 583 n 1.
181
OGH 6 Ob 762/82 (6.10.1982), SZ 55/143.
182
Weiß (n 13) }} 591–5, 341.
183
Weiß (n 13) }} 591–5, 338; Welser (n 8) }} 591–6 n 3.
184
Weiß (n 13) }} 591–5, 339 f.
(above at II.2(b)), the notion of disinterested witnesses is in turn to be understood in

relative terms, ie A, B, C, and D can act as witnesses where all four are beneficiaries
under the will.185 This is quite obviously anything but an adequate solution for cases
of conflict of interests.186
Austrian courts have interpreted the notion of beneficiary under the will in rather
broad terms, including also the intestate heir where the will revokes a previous
will.187 Some authors include even the executor of a will where he is entitled to
remuneration.188
The circle of persons who due to their close relationship with the beneficiary also
count as relatively incapable witnesses has, however, been interpreted rather nar-
rowly.189 Thus, the divorced spouse has been held to be a capable witness,190 as has
the long-term companion or fiancé,191 or the organs of a legal person.192 The uncle
or guardian of the beneficiary is not excluded, either.193 As to household staff, their
capability as witnesses depends on whether or not they live in the same household as
the beneficiary.194
(d) Failure to comply with the formal requirements

Where a testator has failed to fulfil the formal requirements of one of the recognized
types of will, the whole will is invalid. It is immaterial whether there is clear evidence
that the document indeed reflected the deceased’s last will.195 This holds true even
where only one rather minor formal requirement is not met, ie there is no doctrine
of substantial compliance or any similar tool that would allow a court to uphold
the will. There are some exceptions to this rule where a public will is concerned
and the judge or public notary has made a minor mistake.196 On the other hand,
it is irrelevant whether the testator did indeed want to fulfil a specific formal
requirement – for example, whether he knew a nuncupatio was necessary – as long
as he does indeed fulfil it.197
Where the testator originally wanted to fulfil the formal requirements of one
particular type of will, but failed to do so, while the formal requirements of another
185
Unger (n 103) 52; Apathy (n 8) } 594 n 3; Weiß (n 13) }} 591–5, 341; Welser (n 8) }} 591–6 n 7.
186
Gschnitzer and Faistenberger (n 13) 38; Eccher (n 8) } 594 n 6; Kralik (n 90) 144.
187
OGH 3 Ob 579/78 (9.5.1978), SZ 51/60.
188
Apathy (n 8) } 594 n 1. For a different view, see Weiß (n 13) }} 591–5, 339.
189
Also according to Weiß (n 13) }} 591–5, 339 the enumeration of incapable witnesses in } 594 is
exhaustive.
190
OGH 8 Ob 620/92 (26.11.1992).
191
OGH 3 Ob 317/53 (17.6.1953), SZ 26/161; OGH 7 Ob 64/03t (28.4.2003), SZ 2003/46.
192
OGH 1 Ob 705/79 (17.10.1979), SZ 52/148; 6 Ob 122/02p (20.6.2002); Apathy (n 8) } 594 n 2;
for a different view, see Welser (n 8) }} 591–6 n 4.
193
Apathy (n 8) } 594 n 2; Eccher (n 8) } 594 n 3.
194
For examples, see, eg, OGH 8 Ob 118/69 (1.7.1969), SZ 42/101; and OGH 4 Ob 1587/95
(27.6.1995). See also Weiß (n 13) }} 591–5, 340.
195
OGH 5 Ob 531/91 (17.9.1991), Evidenzblatt der Rechtsmittelentscheidungen 1992/36; OGH 7 Ob
263/64 (18.11.1964), Juristische Blätter 1965, 264.
196
Welser (n 8) }} 587–90 n 10 with further references.
197
OGH 3 Ob 546/53 (30.9.1953), SZ 26/244; OGH (21.12.1949) 3 Ob 348/49, Juristische Blätter
1950, 165; OGH 2 Ob 588/84 (22.4.1986).
type of will are met, the will can be upheld by way of conversion.198 Witnessed wills
that were made before 2005 and that are invalid, for instance because the witnesses
had forgotten to sign, can be upheld as oral wills where the testator had explained his
last will before three capable witnesses.199 Similarly, a witnessed will that fails due
to the fact that one of the witnesses is incapable can be upheld as a holograph will
where the relevant parts have been handwritten by the testator.200
Even where a will is invalid, it can be recognized by all interested parties and
treated as valid. There is some controversy as to the nature of such recognition from a
doctrinal point of view.201 According to the courts and some authors, the lack of
form is cured.202 A more convincing explanation is that recognition is a contract
between the interested parties, with the intestate heirs making the contractually
binding promise that they will not rely on the invalidity of the will.203
IV. Current debates and plans for reform
In 2011, Austria celebrates the 200th anniversary of the ABGB. Originally, the
launch of a comprehensive reform and presentation of an entirely modernized code
had been envisaged in time for the celebrations, but this turned out not to be feasible.
The Austrian Ministry of Justice has not yet given up on this ‘Project ABGB 2011’,
even if it is clear that it will take many more years. The law of succession is certainly
one of the candidates for reform, and there is a fair chance that at least something will
change in this field during the next couple of years. However, even if a reform should
indeed be carried out, the focus will most probably be on the rules on forced heirship
and not on testamentary formalities, as this part of the law of succession is not the
subject of great debate.
1. Issues discussed at the 2009 Austrian Jurists’ Forum

A possible reform of the Austrian law of succession was discussed at the 2009
Austrian Jurists’ Forum. Rudolf Welser, who has been the doyen of Austrian
succession law for some decades, presented a very comprehensive, expert report on
198
OGH 3 Ob 546/53 (30.9.1953), SZ 26/244; OGH 1 Ob 749/83 (30.11.1983), SZ 56/180; Weiß
(n 13) } 579, 315; Gschnitzer and Faistenberger (n 13) 31 f. According to a previously held view,
conversion was admissible only in cases where the testator had intended to combine two different types of
will: Unger (n 103) 50.
199
OGH 3 Ob 109/00a (29.11.2000).
200
Welser (n 8) } 578 n 3.
201
See, eg, Unger (n 103) 101; Kralik (n 90) 129; Kurt Cholewa, ‘Die Anerkennung formwidriger
Testamente’ [1951] Notariatszeitung 120 ff; Friedrich Fenzl jun, ‘Das formungültige Testament’ [1947]
Juristenzeitung 304 ff; Hubert Lohse, ‘Das Kompromiß-Testament’ [1949] Notariatszeitung 27.
202
OGH 3 Ob 385/25 (3.6.1925), SZ 7/297; OGH 6 Ob 602/86 (9.10.1986), SZ 59/164;
Ehrenzweig (n 96) 425.
203
Unger (n 103) 101; Welser (n 8) } 601 n 5; Brigitta Jud, Der Erbschaftskauf (1998) 113.
the issue,204 and several commentators provided a critical analysis and evaluation in
particular areas of interest. Again, testamentary formalities were not a prime focus of
the debate.
Concerning testamentary formalities, Welser briefly addressed three issues: the
future role of new media, the possible abolition of the nuncupatio, and a revision of
the rules on incapable witnesses. As far as new forms of wills are concerned, forms
which would take account of the fact that the majority of the population today
communicates via digitalized media, Welser concluded that there was no need for the
introduction of electronic wills, video wills, and the like.205 With regard to the
nuncupatio, the omission of which causes many home-made wills to be invalid
(above at III.2(g)), he opted for its abolition as a formal requirement of the witnessed
will.206 However, during the discussions at the Forum, one of the commentators
objected strongly to this point, and Welser gave in, stating that the issue was not
among his greatest concerns. More emphasis was placed on a revision of }} 591, 594,
and 595 ABGB, which contain the rules on which witnesses are incapable (above at
III.4(c)) and which are felt to draw somewhat arbitrary distinctions, thus failing to
meet the needs of modern society.207 It is in particular the minimum age of eighteen,
the inclusion of household staff, and the omission of cohabitants and organs of legal
persons among the class of relatively incapable witnesses that were mentioned as
points in need of reform.
2. The debate after the 2009 Dornbirn scandal

The 2009 Austrian Jurists’ Forum took place only shortly before the Dornbirn
scandal (above at III.2(g)) became public. Had it been the other way round,
testamentary formalities would certainly have played a more prominent role. As
the series of forgeries had been possible only because Austrian law provides for the
private witnessed will (} 579 ABGB), this form of will has recently come under
scrutiny.
Among the measures that may be taken against fraudulent misbehaviour, an
identity card requirement for witnesses is currently being discussed. This is obviously
meant to reduce the danger of fictitious persons being mentioned as witnesses on a
forged document, but it is highly doubtful whether an identity card requirement
would really resolve the problem. A more courageous option would be altogether to
abolish the private witnessed will.208 In my view, this would be a very wise decision.
However, as the Austrian attorneys-at-law and their associations take a keen interest
in the preservation of } 579 ABGB (above at I.2(b)) and as the abolition of the
204
Above at n 10. Some issues had already been addressed at an earlier date, cf eg Rudolf Welser, ‘Das
Wichtigste aus der erbrechtlichen Judikatur der letzten Jahre’ [1988] Der Wiener Richter no 20, 13 ff.
205
Welser (n 10) 43.
206
Welser (n 10) 43 f.
207
Welser (n 10) 44 f.
208
Cf a statement made by the then Austrian Minister of Justice, Claudia Bandion-Ortner, on 21 July
2010 <http://derstandard.at/1277338653460/Gegen-Erbschleicher-Justizministerin-will-Testamente-
sicherer-machen>.
witnessed will is bound to meet with strong resistance, it is not very probable that the
Austrian legislature will eventually take this step.
V. Summary
Early modern law of succession in the Austrian territories reflected the usual melee of
Justinian law, Canon law, established local customs, and the combination and
adaptation of all three by local statutes and other authorities of the usus modernus.
It was characteristic of Austrian law that the holograph will, on the one hand, and the
Justinianic types of witnessed will, on the other, were not considered as essentially
competing regimes, but were instead integrated in a triad of testamentum hologra-
phum, testamentum allographum, and oral testamentum nuncupativum. This trias
became the cornerstone of the relevant parts of the ABGB of 1811, together with
relaxed formal requirements for specific privileged situations and public wills made
before a court or (later) a public notary. Doctrinal conservatism and a certain naı̈veté
with regard to fraudulent misbehaviour have become the hallmark of this part of
Austrian law from the finalization of the ABGB until the present day. Only in 2004
was the oral will abolished as a regular form of private will and the various privileged
forms of will replaced by one type of emergency will. After a spectacular series of
forgeries became known in 2009, both the witnessed private will and the Austrian
rules on incapable witnesses have come under scrutiny. In terms of safeguards against
fraud, the relevant provisions fall well behind their predecessors in the Westgalician
Code or in Justinianic law, while at the same time causing many home-made wills to
be invalid. A comprehensive reform of Austrian succession law is envisaged, but the
time and scope of its realization are still uncertain. Even if the reform is carried out, it
is unlikely to include major changes to the law relating to testamentary formalities.
10
Testamentary Formalities in Hungary
Lajos Vékás
I. Introduction 255
1. Freedom of testation and testamentary formalities 255
2. A brief historical summary 255
3. The incidence of testate successions 256
II. Common requirements for wills 257
III. Private wills 258
1. Common formalities 258
(a) Drafting 258
(b) Testamentary character; date and place 259
(c) Signature 259
(d) Attestation clause 260
(b) Advantages 261
(c) Amendments 262
3. Witnessed wills 262
(b) Witnesses 263
(c) Amendments 263
(d) In practice 264
4. Deposited wills 264
V. Oral wills for emergency situations 265
1. Emergency situations 266
2. Form requirements 266
3. In practice 267
VI. Legal consequences of formal mistakes 267
1. Invalidity 267
2. Partial invalidity 268
VII. Summary: relaxation of testamentary formalities 268
Testamentary Formalities in Hungary 255
I. Introduction
1. Freedom of testation and testamentary formalities

In every legal system, the validity of wills is subject to compliance with special form
requirements. Such requirements already existed in Roman law,1 at a time when even
contracts inter vivos were subject to significantly stricter formal requirements than
today. Special form requirements for wills are necessary in view of the fact that wills
only become effective when the testator has died. Thus, the testator cannot ensure
that his wishes are implemented, nor can he confirm the genuineness of his will, or
clarify ambiguities. Hence, the form requirements facilitate the implementation of
the testator’s last will. This is in line with the principle of favor testamenti. It is
apparent, however, that unreasonably strict form requirements may have the reverse
effect, becoming obstacles to, instead of facilitating, the realization of the testator’s
intentions. This is why, at some stage or another, they are likely to be relaxed by
the courts. On the other hand, less stringent form requirements will only fulfil their
role of guaranteeing the implementation of the testator’s intentions if they are
interpreted strictly. When drafting legislation regulating the law of wills, legislators
have to bear these points in mind.
The form requirements – if properly calibrated – may remain unaltered for a long
period of time. Technical and social changes may, of course, compel the reconsider-
ation, and perhaps also the modification, of form requirements. Thus, different rules
were necessary at the time of mass illiteracy than today in the light of the modern
level of schooling. The widespread use of computers, and with it of e-mail and SMS,
may compel legislators eventually to revise the concept of written wills. Modern
forms of will, such as audiotape, videotape, or electronic wills, have been discussed
also in Hungary, but have not yet been accepted.
2. A brief historical summary

Freedom of testation has been recognized in Hungarian private law since the late
Middle Ages. István Werbőczy’s Tripartitum,2 an official collection of customary
laws of Hungary from 1517, confirms this at several points.3 This freedom could
obviously prevail only within the limitations of feudal ownership which lasted until
well into the nineteenth century. It was particularly as a result of the legal regulations
of 1848 that the range of freedom of testation was extended.4 Today the closest
relatives’ ‘compulsory portion’ represents the only limitation to this freedom under
the Hungarian law of succession.
1
2
Opus tripartitum juris consvetudinarii inclyti regni Hungariae partiumque eidem annexarum (Wien,
1517).
3
Tripartitum (n 2) eg III 30 pr.
4
Act IX of 1848 and Act XV of 1848: see Béni Grosschmid, ‘Öröklött és szerzett vagyon’, in Magánjogi
Tanulmányok vol I (1901) 1 ff; Gábor Vladár, ‘Öröklési jogunk 1848 előtt’, in Károly Szladits (ed),
Magyar Magánjog vol VI (1939) 18 ff.
256 Lajos Vékás
As from 1715, testamentary succession was no longer incompatible with intestate

succession, ie from this date onwards the Roman principle of nemo pro parte testatus
pro parte intestatus decedere potest no longer applied.5 If a testamentary disposition has
been left by a decedent, it will determine the succession; and if what is left to the
beneficiaries does not exhaust the entire estate, the rules of intestate succession will
determine how the rest of the estate is distributed.
Until 1715, there was a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the formal require-
ments of wills. Late medieval and early modern law of succession in the Hungarian
territories reflected the usual melee of Justinianic law,6 Canon law, established local
customs and the combination and adaptation of all three by local statutes. Act XXVII
of 1715 set out comprehensively, for the first time, the formal requirements of wills.
In the so-called free royal towns, however, local charters and customs (for example,
the Law Book of Buda from 1421) remained in force. Act XXVII of 1715 acknow-
ledged both holograph and witnessed wills. Between 1853 and 1861, the form
requirements were set out in the rules of the Austrian Civil Code (ABGB) of
1811.7 After this period the former Hungarian law from 1715 entered back into
force, but the influence of the Austrian ABGB has remained strong.8
Today’s basic requirements in respect of testamentary formalities were originally
laid down in Act XVI of 1876;9 they have been modernized only by slight modifica-
tions in the Civil Code of 1959. In 2013 a new Civil Code will come into force, but
even this is not very likely to bring about major changes concerning testamentary
formalities.
3. The incidence of testate successions

Before we begin our discussion of the present types of will and their formal require-
ments, we should examine to what extent Hungarians leave wills and to what extent
they allow their succession to be determined by the rules of intestate succession.
Completely reliable statistics are not available, but a reasonably accurate picture
can be gauged from the number of probates of wills executed before public notaries.
On that basis it may be estimated that fewer than one-third (around 30 per cent) of
probates involve testamentary dispositions.10 However, it must be noted that the
execution of probates of wills before a public notary is not always compulsory.
If we not only consider the number of cases involving a transfer of property mortis
causa, but also the value represented thereby, the importance of testate successions
considerably exceeds 30 per cent. In order to evaluate the current figure of approxi-
mately 30 per cent, we must also make reference to the fact that before the
5
Act XXVII of 1715. See Ignác Frank, A közigazság törvénye Magyarhonban (Buda, 1845) 431.
6
7
8
See Vladár (n 4) 35.
9
For an explanation of this law, see Miksa Teller, ‘Végintézkedésen alapuló öröklés’, in Szladits (n 4)
228 ff.
10
The author is grateful to Dr Ádám Tóth, president of the Chamber of Hungarian Notaries Public,
for the kind provision of data concerning wills and will-making.
restoration of private property in 1989 to 1990, wills only represented approximately

15 per cent of succession cases. This means that the accumulation of wealth over the
past twenty years has doubled the incidence of testate successions. This does not
mean that the willingness to make testamentary dispositions (‘testamentary intent’)
depends only on the estate’s value, although this is certainly an important consider-
ation when deciding whether or not to make a will. Other (sociological, psychologic-
al, etc) factors, not to mention traditions, obviously play a role in this decision, as
do considerations such as whether the testator has any close relatives who would
succeed him ab intestato, his relationship with them, and the details of the applicable
intestate succession regime.
II. Common requirements for wills
The relevant provisions on testamentary formalities are contained in Chapter LIII of

Act IV of 1959 on the Hungarian Civil Code (in force since 1 May 1960). As will
be demonstrated, the Civil Code has in some respects decreased the number of
testamentary formalities previously laid down in Act XVI of 1876. Before we discuss
the different types of will, it is necessary to set out some common requirements.
A will is a document of a particularly personal nature and thus it is quite under-
standable that it has to be made by the testator personally. The power to make a will,
in other words, cannot be delegated to another person.11 This also implies that there
is no room for legal representatives of persons without capacity, or of limited
capacity, to make a will on their behalf.
As a consequence of the personal nature of testamentary dispositions, the testator
cannot delegate the execution, completion, clarification, etc of a disposition laid
down in a will to anyone else, nor can the decision as to whether or not a testamen-
tary disposition is enforceable be left to another person. Such dispositions are null
and void. Another consequence of this principle is that testamentary dispositions
cannot be made by persons without legal capacity.
Freedom of testation means that the testator is free to decide about the content of
his will. According to judicial practice,12 a document can be considered as a will if it
fulfils two requirements. It must be obvious that the document can be attributed to
the testator, and it must contain a declaration as to how his assets will be distributed
in the event of his death. If both of these conditions are fulfilled, the document will
be considered to be a will.
Hungarian private law does not follow the classical Roman law principle of heredis
institutio est caput et fundamentum testamenti.13 Therefore, the designation of an heir
is not compulsory under Hungarian law. It does not affect the validity of a will if, for
example, it only contains a legacy, or if the testator merely disinherits certain
11
See, eg, Supreme Court of Hungary, BH 1996/425.
12
Supreme Court of Hungary, PK 85.
13
Gai 2, 229.
258 Lajos Vékás
persons.14 Nonetheless, in Hungarian practice the designation of an heir is, of

course, the most characteristic element of a will.
According to Hungarian law, a testamentary disposition can be made in writing
as a private will or as a public will. Wills that can be made by individuals without the
help of a public officer are considered to be ‘private’ wills. Wills the making of which
involve persons occupying a public office (notary public or court secretary), on the
other hand, are referred to as ‘public’ wills. Exceptionally, in emergency situations,
Hungarian law acknowledges oral wills. Private wills (except for deposited wills) are
not registered, whereas public wills (as well as deposited wills) are always registered
by public notaries.
III. Private wills
1. Common formalities
A private will may be handwritten by the testator himself (a holograph will, see below
III.2) or by another person, in which case, however, it involves the presence of two
witnesses (witnessed, or ‘allograph’, will, see below III.3). A deposited will is a special
type of private will (see below III.4), deposited with a notary public. There are a
number of form requirements that are common to all private wills.
(a) Drafting
The testator can make his will in any language he wishes, provided he can under-
stand, read, and write that language. Merely understanding the language in which
the will is drafted is insufficient for the will to be valid, even in respect of witnessed
wills not written by the testator himself.
The terms ‘testament’, ‘will’, or the like need not be used in drawing up a will; any
phrase suffices provided that it reflects an animus testandi. In particular, a will can
have the form of a letter, as long as it is clear that the letter itself contains the will and
not merely the information that the testator intends to make a will.
Private wills are invalid if they are drafted in shorthand, or symbols, rather than in
normal writing, or if they are encoded. The reason for this is that wills which are
written in symbols which differ from the common characters can more easily become
the subject of a dispute. The will is also invalid if the symbols, or characters, used are
not part of the language in which the will is drafted. For example, a will in
Hungarian language written in Gothic, Cyrillic, or Arabic symbols will be invalid,
even if the testator is familiar with the languages in which these characters are used
(German, Russian, Arabic, etc). On the other hand, a German will can be validly
prepared in Gothic letters.
14
(b) Testamentary character; date and place

A private will is only valid if its testamentary character and its date as well as place are
indicated in the document itself.
The testamentary character of the deed must be apparent from the entire docu-
ment, although, as has just been stated, it is not a requirement for the document to
contain the term ‘will’ in its title or in the text itself.
The date does not necessarily have to appear at the end of the document, but
it must be obvious from the document itself.15 The date of the will must consist in
one specific day; it is not enough to indicate the year and the month.16 The day need
not be given in numbers; it suffices that the date can be unambiguously determined.
Thus, for instance, the text may read ‘written on the second day of Easter of 2010’
or ‘on my fiftieth birthday’.
The indication of the date on the will is important for several reasons. In
particular, it can clarify whether or not the testator had testamentary capacity at
the time of making the will. In the case of several wills made by the same testator, the
date can determine their order and thus which will is in force. Nonetheless, judicial
practice regards the date as a formal requirement only to a limited extent, for it has
been held that an erroneous date does not make the will invalid. The incorrect date
can be corrected by proving, beyond all doubt, the correct date of the will.17
Recently, court practice has also applied a flexible interpretation to the require-
ment concerning the place of the will. It is sufficient if the place can be identified,
although it must be identified from the document itself and not, for example, from
its date.18
Based on notarial experience and on judicial practice, the legislator does not, de
lege ferenda, intend to retain the requirement that the place of the will must be
indicated by the testator. Experience has shown that the problems created by the
requirement to indicate the place where the will was drawn up outweigh the
advantages associated with it, in particular the certainty which it provides in respect
of determining the validity of the will.
(c) Signature
A private will must be signed by the testator. The signature cannot be replaced even
by the handwritten name of the testator appearing somewhere in the text of the will.
The signature must be separate from the text of the will and it must conclude the
text, ie it has to be placed below the testamentary dispositions.19 Any additional
disposition that is not above the signature, and thus not covered by it, needs a
separate signature, otherwise it will be invalid. It is immaterial whether the testator
has drafted the will in one go or in several steps, and also whether or not the signature
15
16
17
See, eg, Supreme Court of Hungary, BH 1984/190; BH 1990/59.
18
19
See, eg, Supreme Court of Hungary, BH 1981/320; BH 2001/373.
260 Lajos Vékás
was the last step. The testator’s signature need not be legible. Even if the signature is
illegible, this does not affect the validity of the will. In respect of this question judicial
practice tends to go quite far in the application of the principle of favor testamenti.
It is not possible to establish a will in electronic form, even where the requirements
of a qualified electronic signature are met. According to European Parliament and
Council Directive 2000/31/EC and its Hungarian implementing Act XXXV of
2001, electronic signatures are not permitted in respect of wills.
If a private will consists of several separate pages, it will only be regarded as valid if
each page is consecutively numbered and signed by the testator. The logic behind
this rule is to make it impossible to remove or exchange pages. This formal
requirement has particular practical relevance in respect of witnessed wills in that
also the witnesses have to sign each page. If the testator does not sign a certain page,
only the testamentary dispositions made on that page will be invalid (partial
invalidity of the will).20
(d) Attestation clause

Act XVI of 1876 specified the use of the so-called attestation clause by means of
which the witnesses expressly had to certify compliance with the formal require-
ments. More specifically, this meant that the witnesses had to provide a declaration,
in the text of the document, that the testator had declared in their presence, and in a
language which they understood, that the document contained his will and that he
had signed it in their presence, or if the will had already been signed beforehand, that
the testator recognized it as his own, and, finally, that all of the other formal
requirements had been complied with. However, the Act itself did not specify the
exact phrases to be used in the text of the will. Judicial practice subsequently relaxed
the initial severity of this rule in accordance with the principle of favor testamenti.21
Thus, for example, while it had originally been required that the attestation clause
must appear after the signature of the testator, it was later accepted that the certifica-
tion of the witnesses as to compliance with the formal requirements need only appear
at some point within the text: it did not matter where. In addition, the Kúria (which
was the highest contemporary judicial authority, similar to today’s Supreme Court)
did not demand that the clause identify the language in which the testator expressed
himself in the will, nor that the witnesses understood that language. In addition,
the clause did not have to indicate the names of the witnesses, or the date.22
However, this did not much improve the clarity and predictability of judicial practice
and, as a result, the courts continued to annul a large number of wills.23
Today, the Civil Code no longer requires the use of an attestation clause. Wills
made after 1 May 1960 are therefore valid even if they do not contain such clause.
20
See, eg, Supreme Court of Hungary, BH 1979/417; BH 1987/441; BH 2001/373; BH 2006/154.
21
Teller (n 9) 283.
22
Kúria: 574. EH; Kúria: 999. EH; Kúria: 1643/1908; Kúria: 5469/1910; Kúria: 1120/1911; Kúria:
462/1917; Kúria: 3683/1929.
23
Teller (n 9) 287.
2. Holograph wills
(a) Requirements
A holograph will must be handwritten by the testator himself from beginning to
end, and it must be signed by him. The main reason for this requirement is that it
allows the identification of the author of the will through a comparison with other
handwritten documents which the testator has produced during his lifetime. The
testator’s signature does not have to consist in giving his full name. The first or
second name alone, or even a term denoting a family relationship (for example,
‘Father’), may be sufficient if the testator used the expression in question during his
lifetime towards the beneficiaries of the will and there is no doubt as to the testator’s
identity.
The medium on which the will is written is irrelevant. Type-writing will not be
considered to be the testator’s own handwriting, even if the document has been typed
by the testator himself. Where parts of the text have been handwritten by the testator,
these parts are valid as a holograph will, provided they make sense on their own;
the other, not handwritten parts may only be valid as a witnessed will where the
requirements for that type of will are fulfilled.
Between 1876 and 1960, a holograph will was only valid if it had been attested by
two witnesses. The witnesses did not have to be aware of the content of the will; it
was sufficient if the testator stated the will to be his own and signed it, or declared the
signature to be his own in the presence of the witnesses.24 However, a will that was
written by hand and signed by the testator was valid even without witnesses,
provided that the dispositions in it had been made in favour of direct descendants,
or of the spouse of the testator. Act XVI of 1876 had incorporated this relaxation of
the formal requirements in the light of the direct relationship between these relatives
and the testator.
Today the holograph will is valid without the involvement of witnesses. Naturally,
a holograph will must also meet the general requirements for the validity of private
wills, as described above.
(b) Advantages
Holograph wills have many practical advantages which make them ‘popular’;
according to information supplied by notaries public, the current percentage of
holograph wills is 45 per cent. Such a high proportion can be explained first of all
by the simplicity of this type of will: it can be made easily, quickly, cheaply, and at
any time. No involvement of any other person is required for the declaration of the
will. The simplicity of the holograph will may serve to encourage those who would
otherwise be afraid of making a will because of the complicated formal requirements
involved in its preparation. Furthermore, the content of a holograph will and even its
existence can be kept secret by the testator. It can certainly be said that the possibility
24
Teller (n 9) 248 ff.
262 Lajos Vékás
of keeping the will secret until the testator’s death, if he so wishes, psychologically
plays a key role in the extensive use and popularity of the holograph will. Without
doubt a will made in this way can be considered to be the most personal, and in that
sense most credible, declaration of the testator. Last but not least, with the improve-
ment of scientific techniques, holograph wills are today rather reliable documents:
in most cases an expert can make sure whether or not a holograph document was
really written by the testator.
The major disadvantage of holograph wills is that they can easily be suppressed
after the testator’s death. Furthermore, the practice of public notaries shows that a
will written by the testator on his own often contains mistakes which make it invalid.
(c) Amendments
As there is no principle of unitas actus for holograph wills in Hungarian law, this type
of will can be subsequently supplemented or amended by the testator at any point in
time. Obviously, these additions or amendments, too, have to be holograph, other-
wise they are valid only if the requirements of another form of will are met. If, due
to their position on the document, the new dispositions are still covered by the
signature, no new signature is needed. However, if they are below the signature, they
cannot be taken into account.
3. Witnessed wills
(a) Requirements
The witnessed will has developed from the so-called testamentum solemne (!)25 of the
Middle Ages and its local adaptations by Austrian and Hungarian early modern
customs and town-law books.26 In the form it takes today, the witnessed will in
Hungarian law is quite different from that in the Austrian ABGB.27
If the testator does not write the will himself from beginning to end, in his own
hand, a private will is valid, if he signs it in the presence of two witnesses or, if he has
previously signed it, declares the signature to be his own before the two witnesses,
indicating in both cases their capacity as witnesses. This clause need not necessarily
be written by hand. A witnessed will consisting of several separate pages is only
regarded as valid if each page is not only signed by the testator, but also by both
witnesses. The witnesses’ signatures must contain their full names, or at least their
family names. (It has to be mentioned that the Civil Code has reduced the number of
witnesses. Between 1876 and 1960 four witnesses had been required.) The testator
must sign with his full name.
25
In pre-classical Roman law the testamentum calatis comitiis could only be made on the occasion of a
solemn assembly of the Roman people (comitia calata). In the course of making a testamentum per aes et
libram solemn words had to be spoken. Also in the Middle Ages several kinds of will were considered as a
negotium solemne. For details, see chs 1 and 2 above.
26
See Antal Szirmai, Glossarium Vocum, in Politicis, ac Juridicis negotiis, Regni Hungariae occurren-
tium, cum formulis brevioribus (Košice, 1806) 186.
27
For which see ch 9 above at 235 ff.
As mentioned above, the Roman requirement of unitas actus does not apply under
Hungarian law and the testator can therefore sign the document in the presence of
the witnesses, or he can have a signed document ready when the witnesses arrive.
Nevertheless, the two witnesses have to be present at one and the same time.
The text of a witnessed will can be produced by any means and by any person.
It is valid even if it is put into writing by a minor, as long as the testator himself is a
person with full capacity.
(b) Witnesses
A witnessed will is invalid if a witness is unable to verify the testator’s identity. This
requirement can be satisfied not only by persons who knew the testator beforehand,
but also by those who ascertain the identity of the testator (for example, on the basis
of a document appropriate for this purpose: a passport, etc).28 The witness cannot be
a minor, a person with limited capacity, or an illiterate person. The testamentary
witnesses only certify the signature of the testator. It is not necessary for the witness
to have knowledge of the content of the will, or to have participated in its drafting.29
According to Hungarian law, for a valid witnessed will a so-called nuncupatio is not
required: the testator does not explicitly have to confirm before two capable witnesses
that the document, which will be signed by them, constitutes his will.30
Any disposition in favour of a witness, or other participating person, or one of
their relatives, shall be invalid (partial invalidity).31 The person drafting, editing, or
putting the will in writing is regarded as a ‘participating person’.32 However, this
part of the will is not invalid if it has a holograph character, ie if it is handwritten and
signed by the testator himself.33 The same result can be achieved if the signatures of
two witnesses other than those who are due to benefit under the will have been
appended to it.
This rule is one of the major pitfalls of which laymen are usually unaware and
which therefore leads to many home-made wills being invalid.
(c) Amendments
Where a witnessed will is supplemented or amended later on, the additions or
amendments themselves have to fulfil the requirements of one of the recognized
types of will. This means that they have to take either the form of a witnessed will or
be handwritten by the testator himself from beginning to end and signed by him. Of
course, they can also take the form of a public will.
28
Supreme Court of Hungary, PK 86; cf György Gellért, A Polgári Törvénykönyv Magyarázata
(6th edn, 2004) } 634.
29
30
This is different in Austrian law: see ch 9 above at 241.
31
32
See, eg, Supreme Court of Hungary, BH 1979/417; BH 1980/92; BH 1986/234; BH 1986/418;
BH 1990/103; BH 1998/175; BH 2001/576; cf Lajos Vékás, Magyar polgári jog – öröklési jog (2007) 72.
33
Supreme Court of Hungary, BH 2000/439; BH 2000/444.
264 Lajos Vékás
(d) In practice
According to information supplied by notaries public, the percentage of witnessed
wills, although lower than the percentage of holograph wills, is still significant, at
almost 30 per cent. Although the testator will need help in the preparation of a
witnessed will (that is, witnesses and, occasionally, someone actually to write the
will), he is spared the costs arising from the involvement of a notary public. Where
the content of the will is not very complex, or where it involves an estate of not very
significant value, this can be considered a rational choice.
Today a considerable part of witnessed wills are not actually written by another
person, but typed by the testator himself by means of a typewriter or computer. The
witnessed will may be considered to be the ideal form of a last will in the age of
the computer. Its making is almost as simple as that of a holograph will, for it can be
made as easily, as quickly, and as cheaply. Furthermore, it is equally personal in
character because its content need not be revealed to the witnesses. These advantages
may explain why the percentage of witnessed wills is about 10 per cent higher than
the percentage of wills made before a notary public.
The major disadvantage of witnessed wills is that they are extremely susceptible to
fraudulent manipulation. Even an expert cannot be sure whether or not a signature is
forged. It is a real miracle that no scandal has as yet arisen in Hungary in this respect.
4. Deposited wills
The deposited will is a special type of private will. It has been a part of Hungarian
private law since 1876. A will is deposited if the testator personally deposits a
holograph will, or a will written on his behalf by someone else, with a notary public,
either as an open or as a sealed document, and specifically marks it as his will. The
notary public does not have to know the content of the will. He must make a record
and keep this record locked away, together with the will. There is a central registry
of wills for all deposited (and public) wills in Hungary.34 It is not possible to deposit
a private will with a court.
Where written wills are deposited with a notary public, they only need to fulfil the
minimum form requirements of a private will (see above at III.1). This means
primarily that even in the case of a will not written by the testator himself, witnesses
are not required. Furthermore, a deposited will keeps its personal and secret character
while providing much more safety. In contrast to the other types of private written
wills, the deposited will cannot be suppressed by intestate heirs or by other interested
persons and it is not to the same extent susceptible to fraudulent manipulation.
Despite these advantages and the relaxation of the validity requirements, this
type of will currently appears to represent a relatively small proportion (around
3 to 4 per cent) of all wills. This can probably be explained by the fact that if a
34
Act XLI of 1991, as amended, on Public Notaries.
testator decides to use a notary public and to pay the related costs, he is more likely to
make a public will than a private one.
A deposited will does not become invalid if the testator takes it back from the
notary. However, in this case, in order for the will to be valid, it must comply with
the formal requirements of another type of private written will. If the testator wrote
the will himself in his own handwriting from beginning to end, and signed it, it may
be recognized as a valid holograph will. If two witnesses have correctly signed the
will, it will constitute a witnessed will. The same rules apply if the will has been
removed from the notary by someone other than the testator.
IV. Public wills
A public will is drafted by a notary public, and in theory (but rarely in practice) can
also be drafted by a court secretary. It must comply with the requirements for any
public deed. A document will not qualify as a public will if the notary public only
certifies the signature. A public will is always deposited with the notary public or
court, thus minimizing the danger that the will is suppressed or fraudulently altered.
In addition, as mentioned above, there is a central registry of wills for all public (and
deposited) wills. The proportion of public wills has risen significantly in the past
twenty years. Today around 18 to 20 per cent of all wills are public wills.
A public will cannot be drafted by a notary public who is a relative of the
testator, or of the testator’s spouse. Any disposition in favour of the notary public,
or another participating person, or in favour of a relative of either of them, will be
invalid.
A person between twelve and eighteen years of age is only entitled to make a public
will. This requirement is justified by the fact that minors are more susceptible to
external influence. Neither the consent of the minor’s parents, nor the approval of
the office of guardianship, is required for such wills to be valid. Equally, blind or
illiterate persons, or persons who are incapable of reading or signing their own name,
are only entitled to make public wills. It is irrelevant whether the testator is unable to
sign his will because he is illiterate, or just temporarily unable to write (for example,
due to illness or injury).
V. Oral wills for emergency situations
Before the entry into force of the Civil Code of 1960, Hungarian private law (Act
XVI of 1876) recognized certain extraordinary (or emergency) situations in which
the making of a will was facilitated. An emergency will could be made, for example,
by persons living in a place where a life-threatening contagious disease had broken
out, or by those who were on board a vessel in the open sea. They could also be made
by soldiers on front-line service or by persons living in a place surrounded by armies.
In all of these cases it was possible to make a will orally, in the presence of two
266 Lajos Vékás
witnesses. A will made under these circumstances remained valid for three months
after the emergency situation had ceased to exist.35
The Civil Code has generalized these extraordinary cases. According to } 634, an
oral will can be made by persons who are in an extraordinary, life-threatening
situation and are unable, therefore, to make a written will, or would only be able
to do so with considerable difficulty.
1. Emergency situations
This type of will has replaced the former privileged types of wills. Unlike the latter, it
is not restricted to a particular group of persons or to a particular setting. The
rationale behind the provisions of the Civil Code is to enable as many persons as
possible to make use of their freedom of testation, even those who have – for
whatever reason – put off the making of their will until a time when they are no
longer able to resort to the ordinary forms of will.
The courts, when determining the validity of such wills, have been restrictive in
their interpretation of what constitutes an emergency situation in terms of } 634.36
An emergency landing of an aeroplane, a shipwreck, an earthquake, a flood, a serious
road accident, or a sudden, life-threatening illness would, for example, be covered by
it. In the courts’ understanding, whether or not there is an extraordinary, life-
threatening situation is a matter that is, at least partly, based on the subjective
assessment of the testator. However, there must also arguably be objective facts
making the testator’s assessment plausible. This means that old age, a poor health
condition, or hospital treatment do not, as such, justify the making of an oral will.
For the courts, medical opinions or statements by witnesses provide the basis for
determining the existence of the conditions required for the making of an oral will.
So far, the courts have recognized the validity of oral wills primarily in cases of
accidents, heart attacks, and similar serious circumstances.
2. Form requirements
The testator has to declare his will in its entirety in the presence of two witnesses and
in a language understood by the witnesses. At the same time he has to state that
the oral statement constitutes his will. A declaration by the testator in the form of
answers to questions put to him does not qualify as an oral will. The presence of both
witnesses at one and the same time is an absolute requirement for the validity of oral
wills. The witnesses have to hear the content of the will directly from the testator.
Notes made by the testator containing elements of his will cannot be taken into
account in determining the validity of an oral will.
The witnesses must be able to certify the identity of the testator. Furthermore,
they must also be able to relate the content of the will, which is why they have to
35
Teller (n 9) 252 ff.
36
Supreme Court of Hungary, PK 88; cf Vékás (n 32) 74 ff.
understand the language used by the testator. A minor or a person with limited
capacity cannot be a witness in respect of an oral will. There is no requirement,
however, that the witnesses be literate. The conflict-of-interest rule relating to
witnesses concerning witnessed wills is also applicable here.
Hungarian law only recognizes the validity of an oral will for three months after
the extraordinary circumstances have ceased to exist, provided that the testator has
the opportunity to draft another will in a different form without difficulty.
3. In practice
By making oral wills available, the Civil Code aims to enable as many persons as
possible to make use of their freedom of testation. This is justified in cases where
death is so close that an ordinary type of will cannot be resorted to. At the same time,
however, the oral will raises a number of problems. Thus, for example, the witnesses
must relate the content of the will. Quite often, however, they make conflicting
statements, so that the court is unable to determine the content of the will even after
careful consideration of the various testimonies.37 Also, in the practice of the
Hungarian courts it is not really clear whether the testator’s subjective feeling
concerning the closeness of his death or of not being able to make an ordinary will
is sufficient for the oral will to be valid.38
According to data provided by notaries public, the number of wills which are
made orally is low, and decreasing. This can be explained by the fact that the
preconditions for the making of an oral will are interpreted restrictively by the
courts, coupled with the unreliable nature of the testimonies provided by witnesses.
VI. Legal consequences of formal mistakes
1. Invalidity
Errors in testamentary formalities result in invalidity. In the case of contracts and
other legal declarations inter vivos, Hungarian law recognizes two forms of invalidity:
nullity and voidability. Nullity means invalidity without any act on the part of either
the other party or the court being necessary. It is taken into account ex officio.
Voidability requires a declaration by the other party to the contract, or by another
interested person, but it also leads to invalidity ex tunc. In the case of wills, only
voidability is employed, and this is true not only in cases of substantial mistakes
concerning the will, but also in respect of formal errors. The idea is that defects
should not be penalized unless they affect another person who objects to the defective
will. This means that neither a notary public nor a court can take into account ex
officio a formal mistake made in the drawing up of a will; they can only take it into
37
38
Supreme Court of Hungary, PK 88.
268 Lajos Vékás
account if an interested party objects to the will in view of the formal mistake and
takes the initiative by avoiding the will.
A will can only be avoided by a person who would inherit or be relieved of a
burden if the will was declared invalid. The person entitled to object is usually
someone who would have been an intestate heir but for the will. But it may also be
the beneficiary under a previous will made by the testator. In this case, if the
objection is successful, and the (second) will is thus invalid, the beneficiary named
in the previous will can ‘step forward’. This is, of course, conditional upon the
previous will being considered valid and the case, therefore, becomes a battle between
the beneficiaries named in subsequent wills.39
Any objection as to the validity of a will has relative effect, ie is effective only to
the extent that the objecting person is affected. The will is not invalid in respect
of any of the remaining interested persons who could also have objected to the
validity of the will. If, for example, only one of several intestate heirs successfully
challenges the will, the will is only invalid as far as it prejudices his position.
It remains valid vis-à-vis the other intestate heirs who chose not to challenge
the will. In practice this means that, as far as the uncontested part of the will is
concerned, the estate is inherited by the heir named in the will.40
Testamentary claims are subject to a special prescription period. Beneficiaries
who wish to have a will declared invalid are only entitled to lodge their claims
within one year.
2. Partial invalidity
The law limits the invalidity of a testamentary disposition to the particular provision
that has been challenged, ie the principle of partial invalidity applies. More precisely,
if only one disposition of a will is invalid, this does not affect the validity of other,
independent dispositions, unless otherwise provided by the testator.41
VII. Summary: relaxation of testamentary formalities
Hungarian private law – in line with an international trend – has slowly been
relaxing the formal requirements relating to wills. This was already noticeable in
the comprehensive regulations of 1876, and even more so when the Civil Code
entered into force in 1960. The requirement of an ‘attestation clause’ was abolished,
the number of witnesses required for the validity of written private wills was reduced,
and so on. In addition, the legislator now intends to abolish the requirement that the
testator has to state in his will the place where it has been made. This relaxation of
formal requirements was made possible mainly by a significant improvement in the
level of education of the population over the last century and a half. Nowadays,
39
See, eg, Supreme Court of Hungary, BH 1994/136; cf Vékás (n 32) 85.
40
See, eg, Supreme Court of Hungary, BH 1988/3; BH 1992/319; cf Vékás (n 32) 86.
41
illiteracy is no longer a significant issue. The will-making process could thus be

facilitated.
In my view, the relaxation of the formal requirements for wills has not gone so far
as to jeopardize legal certainty as a result of a significant increase in the incidence
of wills being falsified. This is the reason why, when considering how to interpret
the existing formal requirements, the Supreme Court of Hungary, as well as the
legal literature, emphasize the principle of favor testamenti, and thus attempt
to discover and fully to implement the true intentions of the testator. However,
this principle cannot be used as an excuse for ignoring, or remedying, formal
errors in a will.42
42
See, eg, Supreme Court of Hungary, PK 88; BH 1994/315; BH 1994/672; BH 1996/476; cf Vékás
(n 32) 94.
11
Testamentary Formalities in Poland
Fryderyk Zoll
I. Historical development 270

II. The modern law 272
1. Types of will 272
2. A trend towards leniency? 273
3. The rule against delegation 273
4. Content 274
5. Publication after death 274
1. The text 275
3. The date 276
4. Storage 277
V. Allograph wills 278
VI. Emergency wills 279
1. Oral wills 279
VII. Recodification 281
I. Historical development
The development of testamentary formalities in Poland cannot easily be presented as

a part of a continuing historical process. With the country’s partition at the end of
the eighteenth century, the natural process of legal evolution ceased. A direct linkage
between modern succession law and the legal institutions of pre-partition Poland
cannot be proved, although there are some striking similarities. For these reasons the
Testamentary Formalities in Poland 271
history of private law in those countries whose systems came to be in force on Polish
territory – Austria, France, Germany, and Russia1 – is also to some extent a history of
the current Polish law.2
Something needs to be said about the old law.3 From the thirteenth century
onwards, a will was required to be in writing, and later the participation of witnesses
was added. In the Land Law (prawo ziemskie) of 1437, which was the law of the
nobility, a will of immovable property needed be completed at the court,4 and in the
following century nobles were deprived altogether of the right to dispose of immov-
able property.5 Such limitations did not, however, exist in the law governing cities,
and there the written form of will was maintained until partition.6 In the cities it was
common for wills to be made in front of the city council and their content recorded
in the city books, while in rural areas wills were often made in the presence of the
Vogt (mayor of the village) and two witnesses. The content of the will was recorded at
the place where the will was made, or the witnesses (or sometimes even the testator)
testified to the books of the court.7 In addition, there were special military wills
which, exceptionally, could be done orally with the participation of witnesses, who
had then to testify to the hetman, a commander of the Polish (or Lithuanian) army.8
After partition in 1795, and even after independence was regained in 1918, there
were five legal systems in force in Poland – the German, Austrian, French, Russian,
and Hungarian legal systems. By the time of the Second World War, the Codification
Commission was only just beginning work on the law of succession,9 and when the
work was taken up again at the end of the war, most of it had to be started from the
beginning.10 A decree on succession law was passed in 1946.11 Following the failure
of the Civil Code of 1954, drafted under Soviet influence,12 the 1946 decree formed
the basis, with some modifications, of the Civil Code of 1964.13 This remains in
force today and, while a new Code is in preparation, the draft provisions on
1
In small areas Hungarian law was in force until 1922, but it did not influence further development.
2
For the historical development in three of these countries, see chs 3, 8, and 9 above.
3
See generally S Płaza, Historia prawa w Polsce vol I (2002) 302.
4
This prohibition was repeated in the constitutions of the Sejm (Parliament) from the years 1505,
1510, and 1519. The disposal of immovable property by will was allowed with the special permission of
the Sejm: see L Górnicki, Prawo cywilne w pracach Komisji Kodyfikacyjnej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach
1919–1939 (2000) 297.
5
J Bardach, B Leśnodorski, and M Pietrzak, Historia ustroju i prawa polskiego (2005) 260.
6
This freedom was, however, confined to acquired (as opposed to inherited) immovable property.
7
This resembles the allograph will of the modern law: see V below.
8
Some similarities with the modern law (discussed at VI.3 below) are visible.
9
Drafts were submitted to the Commission by H Konic, S Wróblewski, and K Przybyłowski. For a
discussion, see Górnicki (n 4) 272–311, and also S Płaza, Historia prawa w Polsce vol III (2001) 141. Of
these drafts, the first had no provisions on testate succession, the second contained some preliminary
concepts on testate succession with visible Austrian influence (for example, the requirement to appoint an
heir), while the third focused on intestate succession.
10
A Lityński, Historia prawa Polski Ludowej (2008) 209.
11
Decree from 8.10.1946, Dz U no 60 pos 328.
12
Lityński (n 10) 220.
13
Lityński (n 10) 233.
272 Fryderyk Zoll
succession law are not yet ready and the requirements for the formalities of wills have
still to be settled.14
The different traditions once in force in the territory of Poland have left their
traces on the modern law. Unfortunately, few materials exist to document this.
In respect of testamentary formalities, the pre-war activities of the Codification
Commission did not reach the stage of preliminary drafts, while no motives were
prepared for the post-war legislation. Even without such sources, however, different
inspirations and their origins are quite easy to recognize. In the law of wills the
influence of French law was probably the strongest, and Austrian and German
influence, more visible in other parts of succession law, can also be seen. But this
does not mean that Polish law should be regarded as merely a mixture of these legal
traditions. On the contrary, it has developed autonomously into a system which is
truly its own.
II. The modern law
1. Types of will
If formalities are a limitation on testamentary freedom,15 the obstacle which they
present is reduced in Poland by the provision of different sets of formal require-
ments, allowing testators to choose the best method according to personal prefer-
ence and existing circumstances. In imitation of Roman law,16 a distinction is made
between ‘ordinary’ wills and ‘emergency’ wills.17 In the first group there are the
handwritten or holograph will, the notarial will, and the allograph will, in the second
the oral will, a will made on board a ship or aircraft, and the military will.18 A will
in one of the ‘emergency’ forms may only be selected in special circumstances.
Otherwise, the testator has a free choice.19 There is no hierarchy of will types. Not
even the notarial will enjoys a stronger position than the others. For example, every
will may revoke an earlier will, even one with a higher level of formality.20 An
emergency will is weaker only in respect of its limited duration.21
14
F Zoll, ‘Das polnische Erbrecht im Wandel: die geplanten Reformen’, in R Welser, Erbrechtsent-
wicklung in Zentral- und Osteuropa (2009) 33–7.
15
S Wójcik and F Zoll, ‘Testament’, in Zbigniew Radwański (ed), System Prawa Prywatnego vol 10
(2009, ed Bogudar Kordasiewicz) 299; S Wójcik, ‘Glosa do uchwały SN z 19.7. 2001, III CZP 36/01’
[2002] Orzecznictwo Sa˛dów Polskich no 2 pos 18.
16
At least in post-classical Roman law: see Franciszek Longchamp de Berier, ‘Spadki’, in Wojciech
Dajczak, Tomasz Giaro, and Franciszek Longchamps de Berier, Prawo rzymskie. U podstaw prawa
prywatnego (2009) 289.
17
Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 299.
18
Art 954 Kodeks cywilny ((Polish) Civil Code, hereafter ‘Kc’).
19
20
Zoll (n 14) 35.
21
By Art 955 Kc emergency wills (including oral wills) lose their effect six months after the special
circumstances justifying the use of the emergency form have passed, unless the testator died within this
period. The period is suspended for any time during which the testator lacks the opportunity to use an
ordinary form of the will. See Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 325–6.
Joint wills are forbidden.22 A joint will is one in which the common declaration of
testators is incorporated in a single document.23
Once a testator has expressed his or her intention by a completed will, it can be
changed only by a new will, complying with one of the recognized testamentary
forms.
2. A trend towards leniency?

There is a continuing dispute on the proper approach to the requirements of form.
Some authors and also a majority of decided cases24 adopt a liberal approach, using
the maxim favor testamenti to justify an interpretation which, so far as possible,
upholds the validity of wills.25 This approach tends, for example, to be lenient as to
the signing and dating of holograph wills, and to minimize the conditions for the
validity of oral wills.26 The opposite position, however, is also represented. This
argues that the favor testamenti principle cannot be used to relax formal require-
ments. Rather, it is no more than a principle of interpretation of a will which is itself
valid.27 On this view, the formal requirements for wills should be taken seriously, as a
guarantee that the testator’s intention is expressed accurately and completely, and has
not been altered or falsified by the others.28 Be that as it may, there is at least an
agreement that the whole content of a will must be declared in the required form.
The mere reference to other documents is therefore not sufficient and cannot
produce effects which are reserved only to wills.
3. The rule against delegation

Since a will is regarded as a strictly personal act, a testator is not allowed to delegate
the expression of any kind of testamentary disposition to another person.29 Legal
literature discusses whether, nonetheless, another person might be given this power
by reference to criteria formulated in the will. In general, such a possibility is
22
Art 942 Kc. On the reasons for this restriction, see K Przybyłowski, ‘Niedopuszczalność wspólnych
testamentów’ (1963) 4 Studia Cywilistyczne 11 ff; K Osajda, Testamenty wspólne (2005) 89 ff.
23
M Pazdan, in K Pietrzykowski (ed), Komentarz do Kodeksu cywilnego vol II (2009) 1012. For a fuller
discussion, see Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 296.
24
See, eg the following decisions of the Supreme Court: 28.4.1973, III CZP 78/72, OSN 1973 no 12
pos 207; 23.4.1960, 3 CO 8/60, OSN 1961 no 1 pos 27; also A Szpunar, Forma podpisu w testamencie
własnore˛cznym (1993) 16.
25
M Niedośpiał, ‘Glosa do postanowienia SN z 16.IV. 1999 r II CKN 255/98’ [2000] Państwo i
Prawo 7/109.
26
See III.2, III.3 and VI.1 below.
27
E Skowrońska-Bocian, in Komentarz do Kodeksu cywilnego Book IV (2007) 91; Wójcik and Zoll
(n 15) 347.
28
A Ma˛czyński, Dziedziczenie testamentowe w prawie prywatnym mie˛dzynarodowym (1976) 67 ff;
S Wójcik, ‘O niektórych uregulowaniach w prawie spadkowym de lege ferenda’, in Leszek Ogiegło,
Wojciech Popiołek, and Maciej Szpunar (eds), Rozprawy prawnicze, Ksie˛ga pamia˛tkowa M Pazdana (2005)
1491; Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 298.
29
274 Fryderyk Zoll
rejected.30 However, there is some support for allowing it if the criteria are so clear
and objective that the beneficiary could, if necessary, be determined on the basis of
the will alone and without the participation of the nominated person.31
4. Content
The appointment of an heir is not a formal requirement.32 No distinction is made
between wills and codicils.33 A will may contain any kind of proprietary provision,
such as the appointment of heirs, legacies, simple substitution, withdrawal of the
status of intestate heir (a so-called ‘negative will’), and exclusion of the right to legal
portion.34 In addition, a will may contain provisions which do not have proprietary
effect, such as recommendations concerning guardians for children, but these are not
strictly part of the will and their effectiveness does not depend on the will’s validity.35
5. Publication after death

On the testator’s death, the will is officially ‘announced’ by the court or notary; if
there is more than one will, all must be announced.36 Anyone who is in possession of
a will must deliver it to a court on pain of a fine and possible liability for damages.37
The court may also order a special disclosure procedure to identify whether a will
exists and where it is to be found.38 Following the announcement, the will itself and
a transcript of the announcement are stored at the court or with the notary.
III. Holograph wills
Holograph wills are common in practice. Despite the accessibility of notaries and the
low costs of notarial wills, many people prefer to use holograph wills, ignoring or
accepting the risk of violation of some requirements of form and hence of nullity. The
reasons for this practice are partly the simplicity of holograph wills, and probably also
a deep-rooted tradition.39 There may also be a lack of awareness of the low costs of
notarial wills due to the fact that notarial fees are usually high.
30
Skowrońska-Bocian (n 27) 130; Pazdan (n 23) 1058–9; J Ignaczewski, Komentarz KC Book IV
(2004) 164; Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 356.
31
E Bystrzyńska-Fornal, ‘Oznaczenie (określenie) osoby spadkobiercy w testamencie’ [2004] Przegla˛d
Sa˛dowy 2/67; M Niedośpiał, ‘Glosa do postanowienia SN z 13.6. 2001, II CKN 543/00’ [2003] Przegla˛d
Sa˛dowy 9/144–6.
32
33
The distinction between a will and a codicil was also unknown in Polish medieval law: see Płaza (n 3)
303–4. On this distinction in Austrian law, see ch 9 above at 223.
34
35
36
Arts 646–654 Code of Civil Procedure.
37
Art 646 Code of Civil Procedure.
38
Art 647 Code of Civil Procedure.
39
As many chapters of this book show, the same is true in other countries, despite the cultural
differences between them.
1. The text
A holograph will is one which is handwritten by the testator, signed, and dated.40
This must be done in a way that preserves the natural lines of the testator’s
handwriting.41 The use of computers, typewriters, or similar devices infringes this
requirement. The same is true of electronic devices which preserve handwriting, for
this would be the product of an applied algorithm and contain no guarantee of
having been produced personally by the testator. Equally, block capitals do not
qualify since the natural, personal lines are absent. A failure to use handwriting
invalidates the will.42
A holograph will can be made on any object which is capable of preserving the
testator’s natural lines of writing.43
2. The signature
The will needs to be signed by the testator. As well as identifying the testator, the
signature demonstrates the intention to make a will and also indicates that the will is
complete.44 For that reason the signature must be placed at the end of the text,45 and
any writing beneath the signature is not part of the will and is disregarded.46 So, for
example, a date put below the signature does not satisfy the form required for a
holograph will. The requirement is relaxed only when the text occupies the whole of
the page, in which case a signature in the margin is allowed.47 If a will extends to
more than one page, it is sufficient to sign at the end of the last page provided that
there is a logical connection between the text on each successive page.
As in the case of the text itself, it must be possible to attribute the signature to the
testator. A signature must therefore display the natural lines of the testator’s
writing.48 Although normally done by hand, a signature by a handicapped person
40
Art 949 } 1 Kc. The rules in Poland are close to, eg those in France and Austria (for which see chs 3
and 9 above), but it was the German holograph will (for which see ch 8 above) which was probably the
source of inspiration. In the matter of holograph wills the major legal systems of the divided Poland shared
a similar approach, and it is natural to continue to follow this pattern.
41
42
Art 958 Kc.
43
44
A Szpunar, ‘Glosa do uchwały SN z 9.5. 1995, III CZP 56/95’ [1995] Rejent 12/82; decision of the
Supreme Court from 5.6.1992, III CZP 41/92, OSN 1992 no 7 pos 46; Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 301.
45
As in France this is not expressed directly by law, but there is a parallel development and clarification
in both countries which has brought the same result. See D Guével, Droit des successions et de le libéralités
(2009) 172–3.
46
Decision of the Supreme Court from 5.6.1992, III CZP 41/92, OSN 1992 no 7–8 pos 46;
A Szpunar, ‘Forma podpisu na testamencie własnore˛cznym’ [1993] Rejent 3–4/301; J Gwiazdomorski,
‘Podpis na testamencie holograficzny’ [1962] Nowe Prawo 7–8/953 ff; Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 301.
47
E Niezbecka, Komentarz do Kodeksu cywilnego vol IV (2008) 107; Pazdan (n 23) 1030; Wójcik and
Zoll (n 15) 301.
48
As in France and for the same reasons, an electronic signature cannot be accepted: see Guével
(n 45) 172.
276 Fryderyk Zoll
might also be done using a foot or by mouth.49 As to its content, a signature should
normally consist of first name and surname. Mere initials are regarded as insufficient
to identify the natural lines of the testator’s writing.50 Whether a longer, but still
abbreviated, signature might be sufficient is disputed. The predominant view is to
allow, for example, a shortened version of both first name and surname provided that
this is a usual way of signing for the person in question.51
In certain circumstances a signature which refers to a family relationship – ‘your
father’, for example – may be regarded as sufficient.52 The issue mainly arises in
connection with wills expressed in the form of a letter. Such wills have been treated
with considerable leniency. The courts have allowed a signature of the kind that one
would expect to find in a letter of the type in question (for example, between close
family members).53 Further, it is thought acceptable that the signature is at the end
of the letter, even if the intervening text is not related to the will itself.54 This
interpretation is not self-evident, and there is room for doubt as to whether state-
ments made in such an informal way, or signatures not immediately at the end of
those statements, give sufficient indication of testamentary intention.55
3. The date
A handwritten will must contain a date.56 In its absence the will is invalid, unless all
doubts are removed concerning the capacity of the testator to make the will, the will’s
content, and its chronological relationship to any competing wills.57 According to
the Supreme Court, this issue is to be determined by considering all available
evidence.58 However, this does not take sufficient account of the fact that the date
is a formal requirement, and the better view is that evidence should be restricted to
the will itself.59
The date should give the day, month, and year. If it fails to do so, it may yet be
sufficient if the doubts mentioned above do not emerge.60
49
Pazdan (n 23) 1027–8; Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 300.
50
Skowrońska-Bocian (n 27) 96; Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 302. Compare the more liberal approach in
this respect in France and Belgium described in ch 3 above at 61.
51
Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 302–3.
52
Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 303, but compare Gwiazdomorski (n 46) 947 ff.
53
Decision of the Supreme Court from 28.4.1973, III CZP 78/72, OSN 1973 no 12 pos 207;
J S Pia˛towski, Prawo spadkowe (2003) 107; Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 303.
54
Gwiazdomorski [1962] Nowe Prawo 7–8/954; Szpunar [1993] Rejent 3–4/17.
55
56
Art 949 } 1 Kc.
57
Art 949 } 2 Kc. This statutory rule expresses the same idea as French case law on this topic. See ch 3
above at 59; Guével (n 45) 176.
58
Decision of the Supreme Court from 23.10.1992, III CZP 90/92, OSN 1993 no 1–2 pos 4.
59
60
Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 304. If there are two or more wills from the same day, the date must be more
precise, eg by indicating the hour: see Pazdan (n 23) 1031.
4. Storage
Like any other document, a holograph will can be deposited with a notary.61 A will
which is later lost or destroyed (but without revocation) remains valid, and its
content may be proved by whatever evidence is available. However, the court must
handle such cases with great care if a lost will is not to be used as an opportunity to
forge the intention of the testator.62
IV. Notarial wills
A will may be also made in the form of a notarial act63 and, if so, it is governed by the
Law on Notaries (prawo o notariacie) of 1991.64 As well as documenting the
testamentary dispositions of the testator,65 a notarial will gives the day, month,
and year of the act and also, at the testator’s option, the hour and minute of
the beginning of the process and of its conclusion. It must also contain the place
of the act, the name and the place of operation of the notary, the first names, family
name, and place of residence of the testator, and the names of his or her parents.
In addition, there is a note that the document has been read to the testator, accepted,
and signed.
By Article 2 } 2 of the Law of Notaries, a notarial act has the quality of an official
document only if it complies with all the requirements of the said law. Academic
opinion is divided as to the meaning of this provision. According to one view, any
infringement of the Law on Notaries results in invalidity of the will.66 The contrary
view emphasizes that the Law on Notaries provides a range of different requirements,
some of which relate to the person of the notary rather than to the document itself.
For example, as well as requiring that the testator is not in a close relationship with
the notary, the law makes further provisions as to the method of identification of the
testator and the duty to refuse to act in case of doubts as to the testator’s legal
capacity. On this view, it is not every breach of the rules that affects the validity of the
will.67 Case law does not provide a clear answer to this issue.68
Access to a notary is straightforward. A will can be made in a notary’s office, but
also, for example, at the testator’s home or in hospital. At 50 PLN (€12.50) for a
simple will and 150 PLN (€37.50) for one containing a legacy, charge, or deprivation
61
Arts 106–7 of the Law on Notaries 1991, Dz U 2008, no 189 pos 1158.
62
Decision of the Supreme Court from 2005.07.20, II CK 2/05, LEX no 152531.
63
Art 950 Kc.
64
Law on Notaries 1991, Dz U 2008, no 189 pos 1158, especially Arts 91–3.
65
The declaration of testamentary dispositions must be the testator’s own: see Decision of the Supreme
Court from 12.10.1992, I CRN 156/92, LEX No. 79944.
66
Skowrońska-Bocian (n 27) 104–5.
67
M Wojewoda, ‘Kilka uwag na temat testamentu notarialnego osoby nieumieja˛cej pisać’ [2004]
Rejent 1/116–17; Niezbecka (n 47) 109; Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 306.
68
See decision of the Supreme Court from 19.7.2001, III CZP 36/01, OSN 2002 no 1 pos 7.
278 Fryderyk Zoll
of the legal portion,69 notarial wills are cheap. But despite a growing number of wills
in this form, they have not replaced the holograph will in terms of popularity.
V. Allograph wills
An allograph70 will is one which is received by a nominated official71 of the

local government in the presence of two witnesses.72 The testator declares
the contents of the will in the presence of the official and witnesses, and this
is recorded in writing (not necessarily by the official) and dated. It is then
read aloud in the presence of the testator and the witnesses, who sign together
with the notary. If the testator is unable to sign, the will is still valid, but the reasons
must be recorded in the document. Certain persons are ineligible to act as wit-
nesses.73 Those who do act must be invited as such by or on behalf of the testator,
and must be capable of understanding the declaration, and be aware of the role of
the witness and accept it.
In principle, a failure to comply with a formality results in invalidity. But
where the mistake was made by the official, the will is ‘converted’ into an
oral will.74 For otherwise a testator, who, not unreasonably, was relying on
the efficiency of a government official, would be deprived of the opportunity
of making a valid will.75 Opponents of this rule argue that it removes the
sanction of invalidity in respect of significant failures in the preparation of an
allograph will.76
At one time allograph wills were quite popular, especially outside cities, in areas
where access to notaries was difficult. Today, access to notaries is quite easy and
certainly no more difficult than access to local government officials. The popularity
of the allograph will has dwindled accordingly, although statistical data are not
available.77
69
See } 8 nos 3–5 of the Regulation of the Polish Ministry of Justice from 28 June 2004 on maximum
notarial fees, Dz U 2004, no 148 pos 1564 (amended by Dz U 2008, no 173 pos 1078).
70
A document is ‘allograph’ or ‘allographic’ if it is written by one person on behalf of another. But with
the involvement of a local government official, the Polish version is quite distinct from the allograph will of
other countries such as Austria and Hungary. See ch 9 above at 225 and ch 10 above at 262.
71
These are chairmen of local government community administration of each of the first three levels as
well as the Director of the Civil Registry Office (kierownik urze˛du stanu cywilnego). See Art 951 } 1 Kc and,
for details, Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 308.
72
Art 951 Kc. This resembles the German form of will made before the mayor and witnesses, although
in Germany this is an emergency will only: see ch 8 above at 212.
73
Arts 956 and 957 Kc.
74
75
Decision of the Supreme Court from 22.3.1971, III CZP 91/70, OSP 2/1972 pos 26, with the note
of A Ma˛czyński; decision of the Supreme Court from 22.4.1974, III CZP 19/74, OSN 1974 no 12 pos
209; E Skibińska, ‘Testament ustny (art 952)’ [2000] Monitor Prawniczy 1/42–3; Pazdan (n 23);
E Niezbecka, Prawo spadkowe w zarysie (1998) 76; Skowrońska-Bocian (n 27) 116.
76
J Gwiazdomorski, ‘Wykładnia przepisów o testamencie na tle uchwały 7 se˛dziów Sa˛du Najwyższego
z 23 marca 1971’ [1973] Nowe Prawo 6/822 ff.
77
Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 305, 310.
VI. Emergency wills
1. Oral wills
The oral will is the only emergency will with continuing relevance for modern
practice.78 A testator may opt for an oral will if either there is fear of approaching
death or if, due the exceptional circumstances, it is not possible or at least excessively
difficult to comply with the ordinary form requirements.79 The will must be declared
in the concurrent presence of at least three qualifying witnesses. To qualify as a
witness a person must be capable of understanding the testator’s declaration, be
aware of the role of a witness, and not fall into one of the excluded categories.80
An invitation from the testator is not necessary: even a bystander can be a witness
simply by being present at the time.81
The declaration is not enough by itself. In addition, the content of the will must be
formally ascertained. Two methods are available.82 One is by written document
produced within a year of the declaration and signed by the testator and two
witnesses, or by three witnesses. As well as containing the declaration itself, the
document must also state the date and place of the declaration and also the date and
place of the signing of the document. The other method is by court determination
within six months of the declaration and on the basis of the consistent testimonies of
the witnesses. If taking evidence from one of the witnesses is not possible or
extremely difficult, the hearing may be confined to the testimonies of the other
two.83 Most writers regard these methods as interchangeable,84 but an alternative,
and more convincing, view is that the first method can only be used before the
testator’s death and the second only after.85 For the first method can be characterized
as requiring the testator to remain in control of the process and the second as
imposing the hurdle of consistent testimony to prevent falsification of the testator’s
wishes.
Currently, the oral will does not seem sufficiently protected against abuse, and the
resulting opportunity for false testimony deprives testators of the security that his
78
Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 310. Austrian law (for which see ch 9 above at 245 ff) was an influence here,
but in Poland the concept has been developed into quite a different institution.
79
Art 952 } 1 Kc. In the decree on succession law from 1946 (Art 82), the requirements for oral wills
were more restrictive.
80
The excluded categories are listed in Arts 956 and 957 Kc.
81
Decision of the Supreme Court from 21.3.1966, III CO 9/66, OSN 1966 no 9 pos 146; Skow-
rońska-Bocian (n 27) 125. J Gwiazdomorski is opposed to allowing a bystander as a witness: see Prawo
spadkowe (1990) 119.
82
Art 952 } 2 and 3 Kc; Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 315.
83
There is some uncertainty as to how this provision applies where there were more than three
witnesses, the majority view being that the testimony of only two will suffice: see Wójcik and Zoll (n 15)
316.
84
F Błahuta, Komentarz do Kodeksu cywilnego vol III (1972) 1879–80; Skowrońska-Bocian, Komen-
tarz (n 27) 120–1.
85
Pia˛towski (n 53) 113–14; Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 316.
280 Fryderyk Zoll
or her intention, expressed in the ordinary form of a will, is likely to be respected.

In reforming the law, the minimum change necessary would be to treat the two
conditions for use of an oral will – the apparent imminence of death, and the
difficulty or impossibility of using an ordinary form of will – as cumulative and
not, as at present, as alternative.

A special procedure exists for wills made on board a Polish seagoing vessel or
aircraft.86 Although classified as an emergency will, the procedure is available merely
by the fact of travel.87 The testator communicates his or her testamentary intentions
to the ship’s (or aircraft’s) captain or deputy in the presence of two witnesses. After
the captain has reduced this statement to writing, it is signed by the testator, the
captain, and the witnesses. If the testator cannot sign, this has to be explained in the
document. If the captain and deputy are not available, for example due to attending
to duties brought on by an emergency, the testator may resort to an oral will even if
the other requirements for such a will are not fulfilled.
In the event that the captain or deputy makes an error in the procedure, the
question arises as to whether the failed will can be regarded as having been ‘con-
verted’ into a valid oral will. The majority opinion accepts such a possibility88 despite
the fact that this would leave little role for the formalities of wills on board ships or
aircraft.89
3. Military wills
Military wills can only be made at time of war or mobilization, or in captivity.90 The
will is communicated orally to a military judge, who records the statement in writing
and notes the place and date. After the will is read back to the testator (an event
which itself requires to be noted), it is signed by the judge and testator. If the testator
cannot sign, the judge has to document the reason. A variant of this method is for the
will to be declared in the presence of three witnesses, one of whom is given the task of
reducing it to writing. Finally, a person who is in direct danger of death, due to
illness or wounds, or for whom compliance with one of the other forms of military
will would be impossible or extremely difficult, can make a will by communicating
his intentions to two witnesses, who need not be present at the same time. The
provisions on oral wills then apply by analogy.
86
Art 953 Kc.
87
Wójcik and Zoll (n 15) 319–20.
88
Pazdan (n 23) 1048; Skowrońska-Bocian (n 27) 123.
89
90
Art 954 Kc; Dz U 1965 no 162 pos 1117, with subsequent alterations. For details, see Wójcik and
Zoll (n 15) 324–5.
VII. Recodification
At the time of writing, the Codification Commission was still continuing with its
work on a new Civil Code, and the draft on succession law was not yet publicly
available. Some changes in testamentary formalities are to be expected. The holo-
graph and notarial forms will probably remain without far-reaching modification.
The allograph will, however, is likely to be abolished, and this could also be the fate
of the emergency wills, although the discussion on this point has not yet been
concluded. Probably, a new form – the will deposited with a notary often known
as the secret will – will be added. It appears that proposals for electronic wills have
been rejected. Although it is premature to discuss any of this in detail, it is possible to
discern the general trend. The number of available forms will be reduced and the
rules of compliance with the other forms strengthened. Current law and practice are
regarded as too loose, and it is likely that a more conservative approach will be
adopted.
12
Testamentary Formalities in Islamic Law
and their Reception in the Modern
Laws of Islamic Countries
Nadjma Yassari
I. Introduction 282
II. Classical Islamic law 284
1. Freedom of testation under Islamic law 284
2. The forms of wills 286
(a) Oral wills 287
(b) Written wills 287
(c) Wills by gesture 288
(d) Secret wills 289
(e) Internal formalities 289
3. Attestation of the will 290
(a) Diversity of opinion 290
(b) Practical considerations 292
(c) Quality and quantity of the witnesses 293
4. Evaluation 295
III. Modern laws 295
1. The principle of informality 296
2. Documentation of the will 298
3. Requirement of written wills 300
IV. Conclusion 303
I. Introduction
When Mohammad, the Prophet of Islam, died in Mecca in ad 632, he left no

written will. Shiite Muslims claim that he made an oral will in the oasis of Ghadeer
Khumm to designate his son-in-law and cousin Ali Ibn Abi Talib (who died in 661)
Testamentary Formalities in Islamic Law 283
as his successor to lead the Islamic community.1 Sunni Muslims, on the other hand,
contest the right of Ali to succeed Mohammad and maintain that the prophet
never made a will,2 notwithstanding the many verses of the Qur’an, the holy book
of revelations, and the prophetic traditions3 which enjoin all Muslims to make
proper testamentary dispositions. Sunni scholars explain this by the fact that the
prophet had given away his property during his lifetime and that his legacy was
the Islamic religion, which he left to the world.4 The controversy over the last will
of the prophet Mohammad is the starting point of the Sunni/Shiite divide in
the Muslim world.
In fact, the power to dispose of one’s property mortis causa is generally acknow-
ledged under Islamic jurisprudence. A will (in Arabic: wasiyya; in Persian: vasiyat or
˙
vasiyat-nāme) is defined as a revocable declaration of intention by a person˙ with
˙
regard to his property, in substance or concerning the usufruct over it, which he
desires to become effective after his death.5 Apart from making dispositions relating
to a person’s property, the Islamic wasiyya may also be used to appoint a guardian for
the testator’s offspring (testamentary ˙ guardian), or to grant another person the
authority to do something or to take charge of the estate (testamentary executor).
There are, however, differences between and within the schools of Islamic law as to the
regulations on wills and the form of testamentary dispositions. In fact, ‘Islamic law’,
which is deduced from the sources of Islam,6 is not a uniform corpus iuris, but was
developed by various schools of law, which emerged at different places and at different
times. The first schools of law developed during the first half of the eighth century,
particularly in the context of the competition between the cities of Kufa (in Iraq) and
Medina (in Saudi Arabia). Different interpretations of the primary sources as well as
the disparate social structures of the two cities led to the development of diverging
schools of Islamic thought. Eventually, the connection to geographic regions gave way
to adherence to the doctrines associated with an eminent personality. The four major
1
Cf Wilfred Madelung, The Succession to Mohammad (1997) 1 ff.
2
The collections of the traditions of both the Sunni and the Shiite schools contain many traditions to
support their respective claims. For a critical assessment of the authenticity of those traditions, see Ignaz
Goldziher, Muhammedanische Studien vol 2 (Hildesheim/New York 1888, reprint 1971) 117; Madelung
(n 1) 18 ff.
3
The traditions (sunna) are narrations of the deeds and words of the prophet Mohammad related by a
chain of reliable transmitters. The Shiite legal doctrine additionally acknowledges the traditions of the
twelve Imams, of which Ali Ibn Abi Talib is the first.
4
Frédéric Peltier, Le livre des testaments du Cahı̂h d’El-Bokhâri (1909) 11; Madelung (n 1) 360 ff.
5
For various slightly differing definitions given˙ by ˙ the Islamic schools, see Tanzil-ur-Rahman, A Code
of Muslim Personal Law vol 2 (1980) 174 f.
6
The sources of Islamic law are divided into primary and secondary sources according to their origin
and their relevance. The primary sources are the Qur’an, ie the holy book of revelations, and the traditions
(sunna). The secondary sources of Islamic law comprise the consensus of the jurists (ijmāc ) and legal
findings by means of analogy (qiyās) and logic (caql). For a concise account of the sources of Islamic law,
see Nadjma Yassari, ‘Islamisches Recht’, in Jürgen Basedow, Klaus J Hopt, and Reinhard Zimmermann
(eds), Handwörterbuch des Europäischen Privatrechts (2009) 913.
284 Nadjma Yassari
Sunni schools of law which still exist today are the Hanafi,7 Maliki,8 Shafi’i,9 and
Hanbali shools.10 Furthermore, there are several Shiite schools of law, the prevailing
one being the Twelver Shiite, also called Ja’fari, school.11
In this chapter the rules concerning the form of testamentary dispositions in
accordance with the five schools of Islamic law will be traced and connected to the
respective rules in selected Islamic countries today.
II. Classical Islamic law
1. Freedom of testation under Islamic law

The verses in the Qur’an dealing with testamentary dispositions are manifold.12
Verse 2:180,13 known as the ‘bequest verse’, represents historically the first regula-
tion on the subject of succession, envisaging testamentary disposition primarily as a
means to make suitable provision for surviving relatives.14 These verses were gener-
ally held to be superseded by verses revealed later on, known as the ‘inheritance
verses’,15 which lay down the rules of compulsory intestate succession.16 As both
commands emanate from the Qur’an, the consensus of the Islamic scholars17 held
that the two systems of voluntary and compulsory devolution of property had to co-
exist. Thus, the entire estate cannot be subject to disposal by testamentary disposi-
tion. Principles were thus developed to limit the testamentary power.
The first restriction lies in the kind of disposition allowed. The essence of Islamic
inheritance law is the protection of the interest of the intestate heirs by maintaining
the balance of their respective claims established under the system of compulsory
succession.18 As a consequence, the nomination of an heir is not permitted, nor can
intestate heirs be disinherited by way of a last will, since this would defeat their legal
7
This school emerged from the school of thought in Kufa; its founder is Abu Hanifa (699–767).
Today, it is prevalent in Central Asia, Pakistan, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. It has experienced a wide
expansion particularly because the Ottomans adopted it as their main school of law.
8
This school emerged from the ancient school of Medina, founder Ibn Malik (715–95), prevalent in
North and West Africa, Sudan, and some Gulf States.
9
Founder al-Shafi’i (767–820), prevalent in East Africa, Indonesia, and the Far East.
10
Founder Ibn Hanbal (780–855), prevalent in Saudi Arabia.
11
Founder Ja’far al-Sadiq, the sixth Shiite Imam (702–65), prevalent in Iran, parts of Afghanistan,
Southern Iraq, and Bahrain.
12
See, eg, Qu’ran 2:180–2; 2:240; 5:105–6.
13
The translations of the qur’anic verses are from Yusuf Ali, The Holy Qur’an: English Translation of the
Meanings and Commentary (1990). Qur’an 2:180: ‘It is prescribed, when death approaches any of you, if
he leaves any goods that he make a bequest to parents and next of kin, according to reasonable usage; this is
due from the Allah-fearing.’
14
Cf David Powers, ‘On the Abrogation of the Bequest Verses’ (1992) 29 Arabica 246 ff.
15
Qu’ran 4:12 in particular.
16
Cf the tradition reported by Imam Malik Ibn Anas, Al-Muwatta of Imam Malik ibn Anas: The First
Formulation of Islamic Law (trans Aisha Abdurrahman Bewley, 1989) tradition no 37.5, 316; Noel J
Coulson, Succession in the Muslim Family (1971) 213.
17
The consensus of the scholars (ijmā c ) is one of the secondary sources of Islamic law: see n 6.
18
Coulson (n 16) 214.
entitlement to the estate. Thus, testamentary dispositions are limited to bequests.

Their purpose may be to provide for a case of particular hardship, or to fulfil a
charitable purpose, or to perform a task conceived by the testator. In Islam, last wills
are therefore codicils rather than testaments. Second, a Muslim may only dispose of
one-third of his property by way of testamentary disposition. This restriction is based
on a tradition of the prophet Mohammad reported by Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas,19 in
which the prophet is asked about the portion of the estate available for bequests.20
Bequests in excess of one-third of the estate may only become valid by the consent of
the intestate heirs.21 However, as far as the third available for testamentary disposi-
tions is concerned, the latter are seen favourably and Muslims are enjoined to make
use of their discretionary power.22 Third, there is a restriction particular to the Sunni
schools of law as to the person of the legatee: a bequest in favour of an intestate heir is
not permissible. This is also based on a prophetic tradition which states: ‘No bequest
in favour of a legal heir.’23 The purpose of this ruling is, once again, not to interfere
with the rules of compulsory inheritance.24 Furthermore, Sunnis argue that the rule
is meant to avoid animosities between the intestate heirs, which would inevitably
19
Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas was an early convert to Islam and one of the companions of the prophet
Mohammad. He became a famous Muslim general instrumental in the conquering of Iraq. He died in 664
leaving considerable wealth.
20
Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas said: ‘The Messenger of God used to visit me at Mecca, in the year of the
Farewell pilgrimage, on account of my illness which had become very severe. So I said: “My illness has
become more severe and I have much property and there is none to inherit me but a daughter, shall I then
bequeath two-third of my property as a charity?” He said: “No.” I said: “Half?” He said: “No.” Then he
said: “Bequeath one-third and one-third is much, it is better for you to leave your heirs rich than to leave
them in destitute, begging from others.”’ For a detailed analysis of this tradition, see David Powers, ‘The
Will of Sa’d b. Abı̂ Waqqâs: A Reassessment’ (1983) 58 Studia Islamica 33 ff, where he compares nineteen
parallel versions of this tradition.
21
All Islamic countries have, without exception, adopted this rule. See, eg, Art 843 Iranian Civil Code
1928/35; Art 70 Iraqi Code of Personal Status 1959; Art 179 Tunisian Code of Personal Status 1956,
amended 1959; Art 37 Egyptian Law on Testamentary Dispositions No 71/1946. For a detailed account
of the respective sources in Arab countries, see Hans-Georg Ebert, Das Erbrecht arabischer Länder (2004)
143.
22
See Peltier (n 4) with the corresponding traditions, 8–12; Asaf Fyzee, The Ismaili Law of Wills
(1933) 25; see Ebert (n 21) 133 for an account of the different instances where a will is considered a
religious and/or a legal obligation.
23
Peltier (n 4) 19. There is, however, some divergence within the views of the schools. Whereas some
Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali authors strictly abide by the prohibition, the Hanafis and the majority of the
Malikis, Shafi’is, and Hanbalis make the validity of the will in favour of an intestate heir dependent on the
consent of the (other) intestate heirs; cf Hamid Khan, The Islamic Law of Inheritance (2007) 232.
24
Many modern legislators of Sunni countries, however, have abolished this rule. The first country to
do so was Sudan with the Judicial Circular No 53 of 1945; on the Sudanese circulars, see Carolyn Fluehr-
Lobban and Hatim Babiker Hillawi, ‘Circulars of the Sharı̄’a Courts in the Sudan, 1902–1979’ (1983) 27
Journal of African Law 128. It was followed by the Egyptian law No 71/1946, Art 37 of which states that
intestate heirs may receive a bequest, following the doctrine of the Shiite school. For an account of the
regulations in other Sunni countries, see Khan (n 23) 232. The reformers argued that the mechanism of
testamentary disposition offered the best solution to rectify many of the shortfalls in the rules of intestacy
as it enables testators to make an adequate provision for the widow, a disabled son who is unfit to work, or
a widowed or divorced daughter; cf S A Kader, Muslim Law of Marriage and Succession in India (1998) 76;
Norman Anderson, ‘Recent Developments in Sharia Law IV’ (1952) 42 The Muslim World 35: ‘ . . . it is
clear however that the dominant motive was social rather than juristic’.
286 Nadjma Yassari
result from the preferential treatment of some of them over others.25 The Shiite
school of law, on the other hand, not only allows bequests in favour of intestate heirs,
but encourages them.26 The ground for this is their emphasis on Qur’an 2:18027 and
the specific interpretation given by the Shiites of the prophetic tradition mentioned:
that tradition is meant to abrogate the duty to make bequests to near relatives in
Qur’an 2:180, but not the right to do so. As long as the legacy does not infringe the
rule of the one-third, the fact that the legatee is an intestate heir is immaterial.28
To sum up, the Islamic law’s general point of departure is a system of compulsory
succession, in which freedom of testation, although acknowledged and based on
qur’anic grounds, knows substantial limitations as to the subject matter of the will,
the amount to be disposed of, and the beneficiaries.
2. The forms of wills

The chapters on the form of testamentary dispositions in the books of authority are
not consistent and there are thus considerable differences within and between the
various schools of law. Generally, the literature on the way in which testamentary
dispositions are formed revolves around two main topics: the distinction between
wills which are expressed orally, in writing, and by gesture or signs, ie the ‘drawing
formalities’, on the one hand, and the requirement of witnesses on the other.
Whereas the principle of informality in terms of ‘drawing requirements’ is generally
acknowledged, there is controversy over whether the testimony of witnesses is a
prerequisite for the validity of a will, that is a ‘condition de forme’, or whether it is
solely a means of evidence to establish the existence of a will.29
Generally, all literature on the form of testamentary dispositions acknowledges the
principle of informality: all schools of Islamic law concur that no specific way of
expression is required for the formal validity of a will. A will may be made by oral
statement, it may be written down, or it may be conveyed by signs.30 The intention to
bequeath suffices, provided it is ascertained clearly and without ambiguity.31
25
Coulson (n 16) 239; Ibrahim Khairallah, The Law of Inheritance in the Republics of Syria and
Lebanon (1941) 235 f.
26
Nāser Kātūziyān, Vasiyat dar hoqūq-e madanı̄-ye ı̄rān (2nd edn, 1990) 103; Asaf Fyzee, Outlines of
Muhammadan ˙ ˙ 1974)˙ 366.
Law (4th edn,
27
See n 13.
28
Coulson (n 16) 240; Fyzee (n 26) 367.
29
Cf O Pesle, Le testament dans le rite malékite (1932) 19: ‘Le testament est-il en outre, soumis à des
formes déterminées? Est-ce un acte solennel? Il y a quelque obscurité dans la loi musulmane sur ce point’.
See also the ambiguous formulations of Fyzee (n 22) 25: ‘A will need not be in writing and witnesses are
not absolutely necessary’ (emphasis added).
30
Mostafā Mohaqqeq Dāmād, Vasiyat, tahlı̄l-e feqhı̄ va hoqūqı̄ (3rd edn, 1999) 198; Mohaqqeq Hillı̄,
˙˙
Sharā’i c al-islām ˙ 2 (repr 1985) 383;
vol ˙ André˙ Colomer, ˙Droit musulman vol 2 (1968) 194; ˙ ˙
Muhsin
Tayyibji (ed), Tyabji’s Muslim Law: The Personal Law of Muslims in India and Pakistan (4th edn, 1968)
790; Jules Roussier, ‘Le livre du testament dans le nouveau code tunisien du statut personnel’ (1961) 15
Studia Islamica 93; Khalı̄l Ibn Ishāq al-Jundı̄, Al-Mukhtasar fi-l-fiqh (trans N Seignette, 1911) 636.
31
Tayyibji (n 30) 787; David˙Santillana, Istituzioni di˙Diritto Musulmano Malichita vol 2 (1938) 538,
who equates the form with the expression of the intention: ‘elemento essenziale del testamento è la forma
(sı̄gha) o espressione di volontà’.
˙
(a) Oral wills

Provided a testator is capable of speaking, he should make his bequest orally.32
Formulations such as ‘I have bequeathed such a thing to X’ are usual.33 However, the
use of the verb ‘bequeath’ (in Arabic: wassā) is not compulsory. The will can be
˙˙ of the testator to pass on his property
declared by any words, as long as the intention
after his death becomes clear. The books of authority give many examples of oral
wills, with the particular aim to distinguish testamentary dispositions from other
transactions.34 Examples given in the Fatāwā cĀlamgı̄rı̄, a famous compilation of
fatwas based on Hanafi law,35 point to the difference between making a will and
acknowledging a debt. If, for example, the testator says: ‘Bear witness that I have
bequeathed a thousand dirhams to Zaid and I have bequeathed that to Hasan there is
a thousand dirhams in my property,’ the first part of the declaration will be
considered a valid bequest of 1,000 dirhams in favour of Zaid, whereas the second
disposition is an acknowledgement of a debt of 1,000 dirhams to Hasan.36 Other
examples indicate the relevance of the words used to separate gifts inter vivos, or the
appointment of an agent during lifetime, from dispositions which are to come into
force after death.37 Thus, the interpretation of the words used by the testator and the
determination of his intention are the cornerstones for the validity of his will.
(b) Written wills

Generally, if a person is unable to speak, he may write down his will or have his will
written down by someone else.38 However, this view is not shared by all. According
to the Hanbalis, for example, oral and written wills are on an equal footing. A written
bequest is perfectly valid, notwithstanding the fact that the testator is capable of
speaking.39
According to the majority view, a handwritten will does not need to bear the
signature of the testator.40 This also applies in the Hanbali school, provided
the handwriting of the testator is recognizable. If, however, a third person has written
32
Zayn ad-Dı̄n al-Jobācı̄ al-cĀmelı̄, Sharh-e lomce (2004) 342.
33
al-cĀmelı̄ (n 32) 339. ˙
34
Cf Tanzil (n 5) 177; Abduldaziz Mohammed Zaid, The Islamic Law of Bequest and Its application in
Saudi Arabia (1986) 33; Eugène Clavel, Droit musulman du statut personnel et des successions vol 2 (Paris,
1895) 160.
35
The Fatāwā cĀlamgı̄rı̄ was compiled in the seventeenth century at the command of Emperor
Aurangzeb Alamgir, the sixth Mughal Emperor of India (who died in 1707): see Neil Baillie, A Digest
of Moohummudan Law (1957).
36
Baillie (n 35) 632; see also the examples given by Khairallah (n 25) 228.
37
eg, the declaration ‘This, my house, is for XY’ will be considered a gift inter vivos, whereas adding
‘after my death’ makes it a will. Similarly, if a person says ‘Pay my debts’, the appointed person becomes his
agent, whereas if a terminally ill man utters this sentence, the appointed person becomes his testamentary
executor; cf Khairallah (n 25) 229.
38
Santillana (n 31) 538.
39
Zaid (n 34) 32.
40
Syed Ameer Ali, Mahommedan Law vol 1 (1976) 571; Fyzee (n 26) 358.
288 Nadjma Yassari
the will, the document needs to bear some kind of identification of the testator.41 If
this is the signature of the testator, it does not need to be at the end of the text.
Traditionally, Muslims had the habit of writing their names in the middle or even at
the beginning of the text.42
The validity of written wills is derived in particular from traditions of the prophet,
two of which read: ‘It does not befit any Muslim to pass (even) two nights without
having a written will under his head’, and ‘A man shall always have his written will
with him.’43 These traditions are interpreted in the sense that the intention of the
testator should at all times be detectable. In other words, Muslims are asked to make
sure that they have made a proper (valid) will.44
(c) Wills by gesture

If a person is unable to speak, or to read and write, he may make his will by any
gesture which clearly indicates that the property in question should pass to the
legatee after his death.45 Accordingly, a nod with the head of a terminally ill man
who is too frail to speak will be accepted as a will.46 There is, however, some
discussion as to whether a will by gesture is only permissible when the testator is
incapable of any other means of expression.47 Whereas the majority of Shiite, Maliki,
and Shafi’i scholars permit the temporarily incapable testator to bequeath by gesture,
most Hanafi and Hanbali scholars demand a permanent incapacity to speak and
write.48 On the other hand, some Maliki and Shiite authors do not even require a
temporary incapacity. A person may testify by whatever of the three means he
wishes.49
Furthermore, the form of the will of a dumb testator is unclear. For some, the
dumb testator who is literate must make his will in writing, others hold that he may
choose between writing or making an appropriate sign.50 The reasons for this
differentiation are, however, not accounted for in the literature. They must be sought
in the rule of informality as the overriding principle and the emphasis placed on the
intention of the testator and its clear assertion, no matter by which means.
41
Zaid (n 34) 45.
42
Zaid (n 34) 44.
43
Cf Al-Muwatta (n 16) tradition no 37.1.1, 314; Peltier (n 4) 8.
44
Peltier (n 4) 8; Fyzee (n 22) 63.
45
Clavel (n 34) 160; M Hidayatullah and Arshad Hidayatullah (eds), Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan
Law (19th edn, 2008) 100; Ameer Ali (n 40) 570; Tanzil (n 5) 177; al-cĀmelı̄ (n 32) 342; Santillana (n 31)
540.
46
This rule is based on a prophetic tradition, whereby a victim had identified his murderer by a nod of
his head, as narrated in the Fatāwā cĀlamgı̄rı̄, see Baillie (n 35) 652; cf also Peltier (n 4) 18.
47
Cf Dāmād (n 30) 202; Colomer (n 30) 195.
48
Mohammad Javād Maghniye, Ahwāl shakhsiyya al-fiqh calā-l-madhāhib al-khamsa (2000) 202.
49 ˙
Colomer ˙
(n 30) 195, citing the Maliki ˙ Abd El Baqi: ‘Le testament est également valable et
author
légal lorsque il est fait par signes, et ce, quoi que le testateur puisse parler.’ To that end, see also Rūhollāh
Khomaynı̄, Resāle tawd: ı̄h al-masā’el (1988) Rule no 1368, 381: ‘A person can make a will by any signs ˙ that
convey his intention, even ˙ if he is not dumb.’
50
Gaston Stefani, Les successions ab intestat et testamentaires en droit français comparé au droit égyptien
vol 2 (1951) 73.
(d) Secret wills

The Maliki and the Shiite schools additionally know the concept of secret wills.51 It
is chosen when the testator intends to conceal the content of his will.52 A secret will is
made in writing, the writer being either the testator himself or another person who is
neither an intestate heir nor a legatee. The document must be folded and presented
in a closed envelope to (professional) witnesses,53 with the affirmation that the said
envelope contains the will of the person presenting the envelope.54 Furthermore, the
written document has to contain an execution note and be free of any overwriting or
mutilations.55 This last condition is meant to prevent subsequent falsification of the
will and to highlight the importance of making bequests, as a testator who wants to
revoke his secret will need to re-do it completely. Any amendment of the initial text
would render the will null and void.
The witnesses do not need to know the content of the will. It suffices for them
to attest that the document presented to them constitutes a will.56 The presentation
of the document to the witnesses satisfies two needs: first, the recovery and identifi-
cation of that particular document after the death of the testator and, second,
to make it known that the said person has made a will.57 Holograph wills, that is,
wills written by the testator himself and kept by him without the intervention
of witnesses, do not serve these needs, and they are therefore considered invalid.
The permissibility of the secret will has been controversial, and it seems that it has
never been widely used; its formal requirements deterred many Muslims and most
commentators condemned it for contravening the principle of informality.58
(e) Internal formalities

In declaring his will, a testator does not need to use any specific words, as long as his
intention is clear.59 Certainly, the chosen formulation can help to identify the kind
of will in question. A bequest with the formula ‘I have bequeathed such and such
property to X . . . ’ points to a will by means of which something is given to someone.
The appointment of an executor or a guardian is usually phrased by saying
‘I entrusted X with . . . ’ But the use of such phrases is by no means required for
the validity of the will; they are useful guides for its interpretation.60
51
Mohamad Mossadegh, Le testament en droit musulman (secte chyite) (1914) 109, calls this kind of will
‘mystique’.
52
Pesle (n 29) 115; Colomer (n 30) 197.
53
See below at 292.
54
V Meysonnasse, Code civil musulman rite malékite (1989) 107, cites Maliki literature according to
which the secret will must be handwritten in its entirety by the testator.
55
Santillana (n 31) 538; Cebbar Tasdemir, Comparaison des principes fondamentaux de la succession en
droit musulman et en droit romain (1939) 155; Al-Jundı̄ (n 30) 660.
56
Al-Jundı̄ (n 30) 659 f.
57
Pesle (n 29) 124.
58
Cf Pesle (n 29) 120; Colomer (n 30) 197 f.
59
Tanzil (n 5) 177; Dāmād (n 30) 200; Maghniye (n 48) 202.
60
Zaid (n 34) 33. Zaid calls the various formulations ‘preferable phrases of bequest’.
290 Nadjma Yassari
Some authors argue that a religious formula61 at the beginning of the will is a
necessary condition,62 whereas the majority view holds that its utterance is a purely
religious duty without legal relevance.63 Some Malikis and Shafi’is require the
written will explicitly to state the intention of the testator to have his will executed;
they thus require the insertion of an execution note.64 This view is not, however,
widely shared and later gained momentum only in Moroccan Law.65 It aims at
distinguishing testamentary dispositions from other dispositions concerning a per-
son’s property.66 Finally, no requirement to use any particular language is required
under any of the schools.67
3. Attestation of the will

(a) Diversity of opinion
Except for the secret will, there is a controversy about whether a will needs to be
certified by witnesses as a condition for its validity. The starting point of this
discussion is the qur’anic verse 5:106, which reads: ‘O ye who believe! When death
approaches any of you, [take] witnesses among yourselves when making bequests –
two just men of your own [brotherhood] or others from outside . . . ’. As far as oral
wills are concerned, it seems obvious that if the testator intends his bequest to be
carried out, he needs to present it to someone who is able to testify as to its content.
Notwithstanding the unclear doctrinal position of witnesses, an intended oral will
which lacks witnesses will be quite useless. However, many Sunni scholars purport
that Qur’an 5:106 contains a mere recommendation68 and does not establish
a compulsory requirement for the validity of wills.69 In fact, most books of
authority do not mention the need for testimony when the essentials of wills are
61
Zaid (n 34) 34 f, quoting an example of a religious formula which has been widely adopted: ‘In the
name of Allah, the most gracious most merciful. This is the wasiyya of so and so who bears witness that
there is no God except Allah, alone with no associate; Mohammad is his slave and Messenger; Paradise is
true so is hell. Doomsday is no doubt coming and Allah resurrects those in graves, I enjoin my family to
fear Allah and to reconcile their differences, to obey Allah and his messenger if they are to remain believers,
I prescribe to them what Ibrahim “the Prophet” prescribed to his children and Jacob, “O my children,
Allah has chosen for you the religion, do not die unless you are Muslims”.’ See also Fyzee (n 22) 64 f, for
variations of the religious formula.
62
Cf al-Jundı̄ (n 30) 659.
63
However, according to Tasdemir (n 55) 154 f, the use of religious formulas before the performance
of any important act is so common with Muslims, that ‘les juristes ne se demandent même pas quelle serait
la conséquence de sa non-observation’.
64
Clavel (n 34) 161; Santillana (n 31) 539.
65
See Art 296 of the Moroccan Mudawana: ‘Le testament rédigé de la main du testateur doit contenir
une déclaration autorisant son exécution.’ See 299 below.
66
Cf Roussier (1961) 15 Studia Islamica 95.
67
Mossadegh (n 51) 109.
68
Islamic law categorizes human behaviour in five categories: the compulsory (al-wājib), the recom-
mended (al-mandūb), the neutral (al-mubāh), the disapproved (al-makrūh), the forbidden (al-harām): see
Hasan, The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence˙ (2008) 38 ff; Bernard G Weiss, The Search for˙God’s Law
(1992) 1 f; Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (1964) 200 f.
69
Tayyibji (n 30) 789; Fyzee (n 26) 359; Tanzil (n 5) 178: ‘ . . . the verse in the Holy Qur’an regarding
witnesses is considered merely as a recommendation, and is not compulsory.’
dealt with.70 Witnesses for a testamentary disposition are generally treated in the
chapters on evidence and proof.71 As informality is the general principle, it is said
that a deviation from it is only exceptionally permitted where witnesses are explicitly
required for the validity of an act. This applies, for example, in the case of marriage,
where the presence of two witnesses is compulsory in Sunni law and thus directly
mentioned in the corresponding chapter on the validity of marriage.72 One might
therefore assume that the requirement of witnesses applies only to the proof of
the will, not to its validity stricto sensu.73
There are also, however, different opinions. Within the Maliki school, for
instance, there is the view that a written will in the known handwriting, or under
the known signature, of the testator should be valid without witnesses,74 while it is
also held that a will being a gratuitous transaction without consideration, testimony
is a condition for its validity.75 The Hanbalis adhere to the first view and accept
holograph wills written in the recognizable handwriting of the testator,76 whereas
most Hanafi and Shafi’i authors join the opposite opinion and require the hand-
written will to be testified by two witnesses in order to be valid.77
Shiite writings also display some ambiguity. According to some authors, all wills,
be they oral or in writing, require the presence of two witnesses.78 An oral will needs
to be declared loudly to the witnesses, whereas written wills are presented to two
witnesses by the testator, who declares that the document contains his last will.
According to Mossadegh, it is not essential that the witnesses know the content of the
will. If the content is concealed, the will is a mystical or secret will.79 Mossadegh
concludes for the Shiites that the presence of witnesses is a formal condition for the
making of a will. He only deviates from this rule in cases where the judge is
unequivocally convinced that the alleged will effectively constitutes the deceased’s
last wish.80 The power of the judge to validate an otherwise unattested will is
70
No witnesses are mentioned in the Fatāwā cĀlamgı̄rı̄, see Baillie (n 35) 623 ff, nor in Al-Hidāya of
Shaykh al-Islām Burhān ad-Dı̄n al-Marghı̄nānı̄ (who died in 1197), another leading authority on Hanafi
law. There are no rules on the form of the bequest in the Code of Mohammedan Personal Law according to
the Hanafite School by Muhammad Qadrı̄ Pasha (Kitāb al-ahkām ash-sharciya fi-l-ahwāl ash-shakhsiya calā
madhhab Abı̄ Hanı̄fa an-Nu ˙ cmān, English translation by˙ Sterry and Abcarius, ˙1914) or in the ˙ four
volumes of Moh˙aqqeq Hillı̄ (n 30).
71
Cf Robert˙ Brunschvig,
˙ ‘Le système de la preuve en droit musulman’, in Études d’islamologie vol
2 (1976) 202.
72
Cf Art 7 of the Qadri Pasha Code (n 70).
73
Tayyibji (n 30) 790; Stefani (n 50) 73; Coulson (n 16) 215: ‘ . . . ideally, perhaps, in accordance with
a procedure specifically recommended by the Qur’an itself, bequest ought to be in writing and witnesses
called to its oral declaration. However a purely oral declaration of a bequest is perfectly valid.’
74
Cf Coulson (n 16) 216.
75
Jamal Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal Status (3rd edn, 2002) 236; Santillana (n 31) 538.
76
Zaid (n 34) 43.
77
Maghniye (n 48) 202; cAlā’ ad-Dı̄n Abū Bakr Ibn Mascūd al-Kāsānı̄, Kitāb badā’i c as-sanā’i c fı̄ tartı̄b
ash-sharā’i c vol 7 (1910, repr 1974) 330. ˙˙
78
Mossadegh (n 51) 108.
79
Mossadegh (n 51) 109. There is, however, some controversy on this latter point, as the majority view
in Shiite Islam holds that the witnesses must be aware of the content of the will to be able to testify to it: see
al-cĀmelı̄ (n 32) 342.
80
This was the case, in particular, where the testator had declared his will to the judge himself.
292 Nadjma Yassari
explained by the high standards of scholarship and reputation attributed to Islamic

judges in general.81 On the other hand, there is the view, held in particular by
Ayatollah Khomeini, that whenever a testator has written and signed his last will and
his clear intention as to how he wants to dispose of his property is unequivocally
established, the will is to be enforceable even without witnesses.82 This view is based
on the assumption that the regulations on witnesses relate to procedure and cannot
be treated as matters of substantive law.83
(b) Practical considerations

In practice, the high rate of illiteracy on the Arabian Peninsula of the seventh/eighth
centuries and the lived tradition of oral transmission of the Arab people, as exem-
plified in the sciences of the prophetic traditions, favoured the oral over the written
will.84 However, it is told that, at the time of the prophet, written wills were not
unusual,85 despite the fact that written documents in general were regarded with
distrust.86 Simple holograph wills were believed to be easily forgeable and their
execution was considered doubtful without certification by the testimony of wit-
nesses. Therefore, as a matter of fact, written wills were certified by the testimony of
(professional) witnesses. In classical Islam, the testimony of witnesses was highly
estimated.87 Judges would carefully verify the social and religious reputation of a
person before admitting his testimony in court.88 Persons recognized as enjoying a
solid social and religious reputation were registered by the judge as ‘just witnesses’,
so-called cadūl; they were integrated as a special category into the judicial apparatus
and their testimony was accepted as evidence.89 In the words of Messick, a just (cadl )
witness was the ‘ideal conveyer of truth’.90 Professional witnesses had their ‘own
shops and benches where they always sat, so that people who have transactions to
make engage them to function as witnesses and register the testimony in writing’.91
This kind of activity progressed in the course of time and led to the creation of
Islamic notaries,92 still operative in particular in the Maghreb states as civil servants
concluding marriages and registering matters of personal status.
81
Accordingly, a judge must have twelve obligatory and fifteen desirable qualities, be highly educated
in all relevant fields, and be of good reputation: Mossadegh (n 51) 111.
82
Khomaynı̄ (n 49) Rule No 2696, 381.
83
See also Ameer Ali (n 40) 654.
84
Cf Roussier (1961) 15 Studia Islamica 93.
85
Pesle (n 29) 98 f; Peltier (n 4) 8; Santillana (n 31) 538; Jeanette A Wakin, The Function of Documents
in Islamic Law (1972) 9.
86
See Émile Tyan, Le notariat et le régime de la preuve par écrit (2nd edn, 1959) 6.
87
See Tyan (n 86) 6 ff.
88
Baber Johansen, ‘Signs as Evidence: the Doctrine of Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1228) and Ibn Qayyim
Al-Jawziyya (d 1351) on Proof ’ (2002) 9 Islamic Law and Society 169.
89
Cf Wakin (n 85) 9; Tyan (n 86) 12.
90
Brinkley Messick, ‘Evidence: From Memory to Archive’ (2002) 9 Islamic Law and Society 231.
91
Wakin (n 85) 9, quoting Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddima: An Introduction to History vol 1 (trans
Franz Rosenthal, 1958) 462.
92
See Tyan (n 86) 14 ff.
When a written will was officially certified by professional witnesses or a judge, it

was considered a public will and had probative force. This meant that it was
considered valid and true without any further proof.93 These kinds of will were
supposed to secure the execution of the testator’s will particularly well. In addition to
the publicity of the act, the advantage of consulting professional witnesses was to
benefit from their technical knowledge to produce a valid document that was both
stylistically correct and took account of the restrictions on testamentary powers.94
Thus, although some authors argue that simple holograph wills were permissible,
in particular where the intestate heirs did not contest them,95 the majority view
seems to have considered those wills to be invalid without testimony.96 In the words
of Peltier: ‘ll n’est point indispensable, on le sait, que l’écriture vienne s’ajouter aux
témoignages pour qu’un testament soit valable, et à l’inverse, l’écriture toute seule et
sans les témoignages, serait inutile.’97 This view promotes a stricter compliance with
Qur’an 5:106. Consequently, a valid will, oral, written, or by signs, requires the
testimony of witnesses.
(c) Quality and quantity of the witnesses

If the testimony is provided by professional witnesses, it suffices that there be two. If,
however, the witnesses are ordinary persons, there is some discussion as to the
number of the witnesses and their credentials. No unanimous solution is offered in
classical law: according to some, in the absence of cadūl witnesses, there must be
twelve ordinary witnesses, six for each missing cadūl.98 If there are fewer witnesses,
their testimony can be validated through an official recognition of the good reputa-
tion of the available witnesses, called teskı̄a.99 The teskı̄a seems to have had great
practical importance. Where a terminally ill person was thinking of making a will
while lying on his deathbed, professional witnesses would not normally be instantly
available. The testator would then orally make whatever bequest he wanted to make
93
Clavel (n 34) 162; Santillana (n 31) 539.
94
Wakin (n 85) 10.
95
Pesle (n 29) 127. His assumption is criticized by Roussier as being founded on a wrong translation of
an Arabic manual; see Roussier (1961) 15 Studia Islamica 94.
96
See al-Kāsānı̄ (n 77) 330; Achim Umstätter, Das Testament im ägyptischen Recht (2000) 25:
‘Allerdings ist im islamischen Recht die Anwesenheit von Zeugen zur rechtswirksamen Errichtung eines
Testaments unverzichtbar’; Roussier (1961) 15 Studia Islamica 94; Maghniye (n 48) 202; Tyan (n 86) 5:
‘Il est un principe, qu’enseigne la doctrine unanime et ininterrompue, au cours de toute l’histoire du droit
musulman, à savoir que l’écrit en soi n’a aucune valeur; que le titre écrit ne peut constituer une preuve’;
Meysonnasse (n 54) 107; Roussier (1961) 15 Studia Islamica 94: ‘N’est pas valable le testament sous
signature privée non certifié par deux témoins. C’est pourquoi on dit très justement que le droit musulman
qui admet le testament oral n’admet pas le testament olographe’; Pesle (n 29) 100; Tasdemir (n 55) 152;
Nicolaus V Thornauw, Das Moslemische Recht aus den Quellen dargestellt (1855, Amsterdam, repr 1970)
151; Santillana (n 31) 538.
97
Peltier (n 4) 8.
98
Cf Pesle (n 29) 100; Colomer (n 30) 196; G Surdon, Précis élémentaire de droit musulman de l’école
malékite d’occident (1935) 157.
99
Colomer (n 30) 196; Pesle (n 29) 101, defining the teskı̄a as a ‘brevet d’ honorabilité’; Tasdemir
(n 55) 153.
294 Nadjma Yassari
in front of the persons present100 and the legatee would then try to have the witnesses
officially recognized by a teskı̄a procedure in order to acquire what had been left to
him.101
In the course of time, the rules of evidence and proof were further developed.
Faithful to its preference of the spoken over the written word, Islamic doctrine
concerning proof and evidence was based on the notion that the most effective
evidence is the word. As a general rule, a will can be proven by three means: through
the testimony of witnesses, by oath, and by refusing to take an oath when asked to do
so.102 Evidence by means of witnesses requires the testimony of two male Mus-
lims.103 Alternatively, one man and two women can certify a will.104 If there is only
one male witness available, his testimony will be valid if confirmed by oath.105
The schools furthermore elaborated on the religion and gender of the witnesses,
according to the kind of will in question. The Shiites, for instance, accept the
testimony of women only106 in cases in which the bequest consists in the transfer
of property. Where a person is appointed as a testamentary guardian or an executor,
female testimony will not be acceptable.107 Testimony of non-Muslims will also be
recognized under Shiite law, as long as the witnesses are adherents to the mono-
theistic religions of Christianity, Judaism, or Zoroastrism and possess an impeccable
reputation, whereas the Sunni schools reject non-Muslim testimony for any
transaction.108
Furthermore, there is some divergence as to what the witnesses must testify to.
Some hold that they must personally have heard the testator declaring his will. This
applies for both oral and written wills, which must be read aloud.109 Others maintain
that it is not necessary for a written will that the witnesses acknowledge its content. It
suffices that they can corroborate that the testator has written the document in their
100
Some have argued that these persons should best be the relatives of the testator: see Santillana (n 31)
539. But Peltier (n 4) 86 contends that ‘on ne voit pas du tout pourquoi le testament doit être prouvé de
préférence par des proches du testateur plutôt que par des témoins capables quelconques’.
101
Pesle (n 29) 105.
102
Johansen (2002) 9 Islamic Law and Society 170.
103
Qur’an 5:106; cf Louis Milliot and François-Paul Blanc, Introduction à l’étude du droit musulman
(2001) 584 ff;
104
This is based on a qur’anic verse, 2:282: ‘ . . . and get two witnesses, out of your own men, and if
there are not two men, then a man and two women, such as ye choose, for witnesses, so that if one of them
errs, the other can remind her.’
105
Mossadegh (n 51) 112; Maghniye (n 48) 231. According to Mohaqqeq Hillı̄ (n 30) vol 4 (repr
1983) 1782 ff, the testimony of two women equals the testimony of a man ˙ under˙ oath.
106
Mossadegh (n 51) 111. This is a particularity of Shiite law which gives an important role to women,
as the Shiite creed is based on the descent of the Prophet’s daughter Fatima; cf Yann Richard, Shi’ite Islam:
Polity, Ideology, and Creed (1995) 7. According to the Hanbali law of evidence, the testimony of women
is only permissible for events to which men cannot testify in view of the fact that they are normally
not present (eg births, menstruation, menopause): see Henri Laoust, Le précis de droit d’Ibn Qudama
(1950) 294.
107
Ameer Ali (n 40) 654; Mossadegh (n 51) 110; Mohaqqeq Hillı̄ (n 30) 386.
108
Mossadegh (n 51) 110; Maghniye (n 48) 230; Laoust ˙ (n 106)
˙ 295.
109
For the Hanbali, see Zaid (n 34) 46; for some views within the Shiite school, see al-cĀmelı̄ (n 32)
342; Tasdemir (n 55) 156.
presence or that he has shown it to them saying that it contains his will, which he
wants to be executed.110
4. Evaluation
In Islamic law, testamentary dispositions are not subject to any formality. Any means
by which the clear and unequivocal intention of the testator can be ascertained is
admissible. However, there is no unanimity, whether the requirement of witnesses, as
laid down in Qur’an 5:106, is a condition for the validity of the will or a mere
recommendation facilitating the proof of its existence. It must always be borne in
mind that, in Islamic law, the establishment or disregard for formal requirements is
driven less by the common purposes of form requirements in general, but rather by
the aspiration to adhere to the ordinances of the Qur’an and the prophetic traditions.
Since, however, in the present case the sources of law are lacking definite instructions,
there is a wide range of interpretations by individual scholars and a variety of views
not only between but also within the schools of law. A general conclusion on this
issue is therefore problematic. In practice, it appears that wills were generally
accompanied by the testimony of witnesses, without a clear doctrinal position as to
its nature. Islamic scholars bear a deep suspicion towards written documents, as they
are seen to be easily forgeable and generally unreliable. The testimony of witnesses
prevents fraud and secures the proper execution of the written will. Furthermore, it
transforms the will into a formal act with full probative power. It can thus be
concluded that, while the principle of informality in terms of ‘drawing requirements’
is acknowledged, wills were generally made before witness for practical reasons. The
public will is an example of such a practical tool. It is borrowed from the Roman-
Hellenistic tradition and was installed to meet contemporary needs.111
III. Modern laws
For many centuries the law relating to wills was governed by the rules and
regulations of the respective school of law dominant in a particular region. This
changed in the beginning of the twentieth century with the emergence of independ-
ent Islamic nation states and a codification process that also embraced the law of
succession. These codifications were often the result of the compilation of the
classical rules of the prevalent school of Islamic law and the consultation and
reception of foreign, mostly European, law.112 The first country to codify its law
110
Stefani (n 50) 73. See Zaid (n 34) 40 f for the various forms of evidence for oral wills under Hanbali
and Saudi Arabian law.
111
Pesle (n 29) 115; Tasdemir (n 55) 154. On the elements of Greek philosophy in Islamic thought,
see David Santillana, Al-madhāhib al-yūnāniyya al-falsafiyya fi-l-cālam al-islāmı̄ (1981); Abdelrashid
Mahmoudi, Tāhā Husain’s Education: From the Azhar to the Sorbonne (1998) 57 ff.
112 ˙
For a concise˙ account of the nature of codification in Islamic countries in the twentieth century, see
Nadjma Yassari, ‘Ausstrahlung des europäischen Privatrechts auf islamische Länder’, in Jürgen Basedow,
296 Nadjma Yassari
of succession was Iran. Grounded in the Shiite school of law, the Iranian Civil
Code of 1928/1935 contains detailed regulations on intestate and testamentary
succession (Arts 825 to 949), further complemented by various by-laws. The
Iranian Probate Act of 23 June 1940 (hereinafter: PA), which contains the rules
on the form of testamentary dispositions, however, draws mainly from the French
regulations on form and procedure. Among the Arab countries, Egypt has played a
pioneering role. Not only is its famous Civil Code of 1948 considered to be the
mother of all Arab private law codifications,113 Egypt was also the first Arab
country to codify in a comprehensive way the law on testamentary dispositions
in 1946. The Law on Testamentary Dispositions No 71/1946 contains eighty-two
articles and regulates testamentary dispositions in a very detailed manner, including
their form. Finally, there are also countries, such as Pakistan, which have not
codified Islamic inheritance law and rely solely on the books of authority of the
prevalent school of law.114
The modern laws of Islamic countries are thus as diverse as the opinions of the
classical jurists. Some have adopted the ‘black letter of Islamic law’ with an extensive
application of the principle of informality to govern not only the making of the will, but
also the law of evidence. Other countries have chosen different compromises: they have
adopted the general rule of informality while simultaneously recognizing exceptions, or
procedural devices, to limit its effect, while yet others have turned away from Islamic
law by abolishing de jure or de facto oral wills as a rule and by accepting the holograph
will instead. Finally, there are also substantive differences regarding the law of evidence
and the relevance of witness testimony as a means of proof.
In what follows, three exemplary categories of countries will be presented accord-
ing to the degree of their adherence to the principle of informality under Islamic law:
(a) countries which have retained (and even extended) the principle of informality;
(b) countries which have adhered to the principle of informality, but by introducing
the requirement of documentary evidence have substantially modified it; and, finally,
(c) countries which have favoured the written and/or certified will over the oral
declaration of the last will.
1. The principle of informality

Countries of the first category have adhered to the Islamic principle of informality of
wills and do not require any form for the validity of testamentary dispositions.
Klaus J Hopt, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Handwörterbuch des Europäischen Privatrechts (2009)
150 ff.
113
The Egyptian Civil Code, Law No 131/1948, was drafted by Abd ar-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri
(1895–1971), an Egyptian professor, judge, lawyer, and politician, who had been a disciple of Edouard
Lambert in Lyon. Sanhuri aimed to blend Islamic law and adopted provisions of European law to create a
new code. See Kilian Bälz, ‘Europäisches Privatrecht jenseits von Europa? Zum fünfzigjährigen Jubiläum
des ägyptischen Zivilgesetzbuches (1948)’ (2000) 8 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 51.
114
The prevalent school in Pakistan is the Hanafi school of law. The leading contemporary textbooks
on Islamic law are Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law (n 45) and Verma’s Commentaries on Moham-
medan Law, edited by Shri A B Srivastava and Shri S I Jafri (9th edn, 2006).
Pakistan and the Muslim law in India belong to this category. Under Pakistani
and Indian-Muslim doctrine, the form of the will is considered to be ‘immaterial’.115
A will can be expressed orally, in writing, or by gesture, without the need of
witnesses. If the will is in writing, it does not have to be signed116 or attested by
any witnesses for its validity.117 Furthermore, the will does not have to be framed or
worded in any technical form or language.118 The sole condition for the validity of
any kind of declaration is the true and unambiguous intention of the testator to
dispose of his property after death. The leading case is Mazar Husen v Bodha Bibi,119
a case before the Privy Council in 1898. In that case, a letter written by the testator to
his lawyers shortly before his death, containing inter alia instructions as to the
transfer of his property after his death, was held to constitute a valid will. This ruling
has subsequently been confirmed on many occasions. In Abdul Hameed v Mohamed
Yoonus,120 the court held that: ‘ . . . by the Muhammadan Law no writing is required
to make a will valid and no particular form even of verbal declaration is necessary as
long as the intention of the testator is sufficiently ascertained.’121 Finally, even the
use of legal terms designating other transactions can constitute a valid will if the
intention of transferring property after death is established with certainty, consider-
ing all facts and circumstances.122
This lack of formality obviously causes problems as to the proof of wills. Accord-
ingly, the cases before the courts have been numerous and the onus of establishing an
oral will is heavy.123 In Mahabir Prasa v Mustafa Husain, the court held that:
. . . upon a question whether an oral statement amounts to a will the greatest care must be
taken and strict proof must be required. The Court must be made certain that it knows what
the speaker said and must from the circumstances and from the statement be able to infer for
115
Hidayatullah and Hidayatullah (n 45) 100.
116
Ameer Ali (n 40) 571; Tanzil (n 5) 177. In Auliya Bibi v Ala-Ud-Din and Sharf-Ud-Din (1906) 28
Indian Law Reports, Allahabad Series, 715, it was held that a document purporting to be the will of a
Muslim woman which was drawn up by her lawyer in accordance with her instructions was a valid will
notwithstanding the fact that she had not signed the document. According to the court (at 718), ‘it is
sufficient if a will can be proved to have been really and truly the will of the testator’.
117
Tanzil (n 5) 178; Hidayatullah (n 45) 101.
118
Tayyibji (n 30) 788.
119
Mazar Husen v Bodha Bibi (1898) 21 Allahabad 91.
120
Abdul Hameed v Mohamed Yoonus (1940) 1 Modern Law Journal 276.
121
In Shirin Bai v Muhammad Ali [1970] Pakistan Legal Decisions Karachi 450 ff, the testator had left
a handwritten document containing many amendments and overwriting. It furthermore contained
calculations and short notes on the side as to their meaning. The court held that the document neither
made the intention of the writer clear nor did it give any concrete indication as to how much money the
deceased wanted to give to the persons concerned. The court thus found that the document could not be
treated as a valid will.
122
Tanzil (n 5) 176; in Thakur Ishri Singh v Baldeo Singh (1884) 11 Indian Appeals 135, the court held
that, in spite of the document being named ‘assignment’ (tamlı̄knāma), in fact the intention of the party
was to establish a testamentary disposition (141 f).
123
In Goodu Saheb v Rakiabi (1978) 2 Modern Law Journal 426, the court held that the onus of proof
is on the person who produces a will. He must prove that the will was made by the testator who at the time
of making the will was in a sound state of mind. However, if the making of the will is proven, the onus will
switch to the person claiming that the document was procured by undue influence.
298 Nadjma Yassari
itself that testamentary effect was intended in addition to being satisfied of the content of the
direction given.124
As this requirement is very difficult to establish in practice, wills in India and
Pakistan are generally embodied in writing.125 In all cases, however, in which the
intention of the testator has been clearly established, Pakistani and Indian-Muslim
courts have upheld the principle of informality. The Indian-Pakistani position
does not only adhere to the Islamic disregard for formalities, but is even taking it
further: there are no formalities for the ‘drawing requirements’ or for the means
of proving a will.
2. Documentation of the will

Countries of the second category acknowledge, in principle, any type of declaration
for the making of the will. However, the requirement of documentation, and the
regulations on evidence and proof, have led to a formalization of the act of
bequeathing.
Under Moroccan law, for example, a will may be made orally, in writing, or by
any unambiguous sign if the testator cannot speak or write (Art 295 Moroccan
Mudawana 2004).126 A written will is valid if it is in the handwriting of the testator
and has been signed by him. In all other cases, that is for oral wills, wills by signs, and
wills written by a third party, the testator must have the will certified by a notary
(cadūl ) or by any agent authorized by the state (Art 296 Moroccan Mudawana).127
Only exceptionally can an oral will be established without a solemn act: where an
‘imperious necessity’ makes the authentication or the writing of the testament
impossible, an oral will made in the presence of two ordinary witnesses will be
accepted if after the said situation has ended the witnesses present themselves before
the court to provide their testimony concerning the will.128
Moroccan law thus abides by the rule of informality as far as the ‘drawing
requirements’ are concerned and establishes a hierarchy, favouring oral and written
wills over wills by signs. The requirement of certification is only instituted for oral
124
Mahabir Prasa v Mustafa Husain (1937) 24 All India Reporter (Privy Council Section) 174;
confirmed in Izhar Fatma Bibi v Ansar Fatma Bibi (1939) All India Reporter Allahabad 348.
125
Ameer Ali (n 40) 655; Tanzil (n 5) 178.
126
Code of Family Law, Law No 70.03 of 3 February 2004, in force since 6 February 2004, Official
Gazette No 5184 of 5 February 2004. Art 295 Moroccan Mudawana 2004: ‘Le testament est conclu au
moyen de toute expression ou écrit ou au moyen de tout signe non équivoque, dans le cas où le testateur est
dans l’impossibilité de s’exprimer verbalement ou par écrit.’
127
Art 296 Moroccan Mudawana 2004: ‘Pour être valable, le testament doit faire l’objet d’un acte
adoulaire ou constaté par toute autorité officielle habilitée à dresser des actes ou par un acte manuscrit du
testateur et signé par lui.’
128
Art 296(2) Moroccan Mudawana 2004: ‘Lorsqu’une nécessité impérieuse rend impossible de
constater l’acte du testament ou de l’écrire, ce testament est recevable lorsqu’il est fait verbalement devant
les témoins présents sur les lieux, à condition que l’enquête et l’instruction ne révèlent aucun motif de
suspicion à l’encontre de leur témoignage, et que ce témoignage fasse l’objet d’une déposition le jour où
elle peut être faite devant le juge qui autorise de l’instrumenter et en avise immédiatement les héritiers, en
incluant les dispositions du présent alinéa dans cet avis.’
wills, wills written by a third party, and wills by signs, even though according to the
majority view of the Maliki school, which is underlying Moroccan law, certification
applies to all kinds of wills. The Moroccan legislator has thus deviated from this rule
in that holograph wills handwritten and duly signed by the testator are valid without
certification by the cadūl. Interestingly, as a reminiscence of Maliki law, Moroccan
law requires the holograph will to contain an explicit execution clause (déclaration
autorisant son exécution,129 Art 297 Moroccan Mudawana).130 The explanatory
guidelines to the Moroccan Mudawana unfortunately do not expand on this regula-
tion in any detail.131 It seems that it is intended, as in classical law, to distinguish
testamentary dispositions from other dispositions. If considered a condition de forme,
its omission would invalidate the will.
Egypt is another example within this category of countries. Although permitting,
in principle, all means of expression of the will, oral wills have in fact, by means of
procedural law, become obsolete. Article 2 s 1 of the Egyptian Law No 71/1946
states that a testator may express his will orally or in writing and, if he cannot speak
or write, by unequivocal signs.132 A written will under Egyptian law may be in the
handwriting of the testator or of a third party. In both cases, the will has to be signed
by the testator.133
The Egyptian rule thus follows the general principle of informality.134 The
apparent indifference towards the ‘drawing formalities’ of a will is however
challenged by ss 2 and 3 of the same article, as in cases where the will is contested
only documentary evidence will be accepted in court. This rule has a precedent in
that it had already been part of the Law for the Regulation of the Sharia Courts of
1931;135 and thus it passed the legislative process without any further discussion.136
Accordingly, law suits concerning the existence or the revocation of testamentary
dispositions may only be heard if the claim is based on authenticated documents, or
documents handwritten and signed by the testator, or documents carrying the
authenticated signature of the testator. Strictly speaking, the requirement of writing
is not a condition for the validity of the will, but merely for the acceptance of the
claim in court.137 An oral will is valid, but no judicial relief is available in the courts
129
No particular form is prescribed for the declaration of the execution note.
130
Art 297 Moroccan Mudawana 2004: ‘Le testament rédigé de la main du testateur doit contenir une
déclaration autorisant son exécution.’
131
Ministère de la Justice (ed), Guide pratique du Code de la Famille (3rd edn, 2005) 171, commenting
on Art 297 Mudawana: ‘Lorsqu’il est manuscrit de l’auteur du testament et signé par lui-même, l’acte de
testament doit faire mention de l’autorisation donnée pour son exécution. L’autorisation d’exécution peut
être rédigée selon toute formulation exprimant cette volonté.’
132
Art 2 of Law No 71/1946 has been a model for subsequent Arab laws: see, eg, Art 214 Kuwaiti
Code of Personal Status No 51/1984, or Art 246 Code of Personal Status of the United Arab Emirates,
Law 28/2005.
133
Sami Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, Les successions en droit musulman: cas de l’Égypte (2009) 33.
134
Cf Stefani (n 50) 72: ‘[L]e testament n’est pas un acte solennel’.
135
Art 98 of the Egyptian Law No 78/1931, Law Gazette of 4 May 1931, 285 ff, provided exactly the
same rule as in Art 2 ss 2 and 3 of Law 71/1946.
136
See Umstätter (n 96) 26.
137
Aldeeb (n 133) 34; Stefani (n 50) 75.
300 Nadjma Yassari
for claims based on an oral will if it is not proven by documentary evidence.138 And
even though the Egyptian Court of Cassation has confirmed that the requirement of
written documentation is merely of a procedural nature, leaving intact the possibility
to bequeath by any means,139 the fact remains that the rule of Article 2 ss 2 and 3
largely deprives the oral will of its sphere of operation.140 In actual practice,
Egyptians tend to write down their wills in order to make them enforceable in
court.141 In fact, the explicatory memorandum concerning Law No 71/1946 high-
lights that, under the new law, testamentary disposition can be made in three forms:
(a) as a public (authenticated) will; (b) as a private document (written by someone
else and authenticated by the signature or the personal sign of the testator); and (c) as
a holograph will handwritten by the testator and duly signed by him.142 Egyptian
law in this way evidently deviates from Islamic law as it admits holograph wills
without further certification, and adheres to documentary evidence as opposed to the
testimony of witnesses.
3. Requirement of written wills

Finally, in some Islamic countries the requirement that wills must be in writing as
well as the necessity of documentary evidence has been established, while oral wills
have been abolished or restricted to particular emergency situations. Contrary to
classical Islamic law, holograph wills are de jure the prototype of wills in these
jurisdictions.
Article 65 s 1 of the Iraqi Code of Personal Status143 provides that no regard shall
be accorded to a bequest which is not supported by documentary evidence, signed,
sealed, or thumb-marked by the testator. Written wills are thus obligatory. The will
may be written by the testator or by another person with the testator signing, sealing,
or thumb-marking the document.144 Article 65 s 1 continues to state that, if
the value of the legacy exceeds 500 dinars, the disposition must be authenticated
by a notary.145 Only where a ‘material impediment’ prevents the production of
138
On the issue of circumventing or restricting the scope of application of Islamic law by means of
procedural law, see Norman Anderson, ‘Islamic Law Today: The Background to Islamic Fundamentalism’
(1987) 2 Arab Law Quarterly 339.
139
See the decisions of the Egyptian Court of Cassation of 4 November 1969, Appeal Case No 193,
thirty-fifth judicial year, in Majmūcat al-ahkām as-sādira min al-hay’a al-cāma li-l-mawādd al-madaniya
wal-tijāriya wa min ad-dā’ira al-madaniya˙ wa min ˙ ˙ dā’irat al-ahwāl ash-shakhsiya vol 3 no 179 (1969)
1159 f, confirmed in the decision of 21 March 1979, Appeal Case ˙ No 7, 47th judicial year, in Majmūcat
al-ahkām vol 2 no 166 (1979) 903 f.
˙ Stefani (n 50) 74 considers that the scope of application of oral wills is restricted to cases where the
140
existence of the will is not contested. One might, however, question the utility of such a rule.
141
Umstätter (n 96) 26.
142
Umstätter (n 96) 26.
143
Law No 188/1959 with subsequent amendments.
144
Y Linant de Bellefonds, ‘Le code du statut personnel irakien du 30 décembre 1959’ (1960) 13
Studia Islamica 125.
145
See Chibli Mallat, ‘Shi’ism and Sunnism in Iraq: Revisiting the Codes’ (1993) 8(2) Arab Law
Quarterly 157; Norman Anderson, ‘A Law of Personal Status for Iraq’ (1960) 9 ICLQ 557. In view of the
inflation of the Iraqi currency, it is questionable whether this exception has not become the rule.
documentary evidence, oral proof will be accepted exceptionally (Art 65 s 2). The
Iraqi code thus follows the Egyptian model by requiring, as a rule, documentary
evidence; but it even ventures beyond that model in that no place is left, in principle,
for oral wills. However, the provision of Article 65 s 2 is not quite clear, for it leaves
open whether the making of a will by means of an oral declaration is permitted, even
though only in exceptional situations, or whether the proof of a written will may be
established by oral testimony. Some authors assume that, if used skilfully, Article 65
s 2 may render Article 65 s 1 redundant.146 Unfortunately, no decisions by Iraqi
courts are available at the moment to see how this rule is applied in practice.
Iranian Law provides three types of will: holograph, public, and secret wills (Art
276 PA).147 The holograph will must be written in its entirety by the testator,148 it
must contain the day, month, and year when it was made,149 and it must be
personally signed by the testator (Art 278 PA). The signature may be anywhere on
the document. If the will consists of more than one page, the signature must figure
on each page.150 Thus, the signature is essential for the validity of the holograph
will.151 It is not necessary to name the document ‘last will’ (vasiyat-nāme),152 or to
use the Iranian language.153 If the testator is unable to read or˙ write, he may not
make a holograph will and has to choose one of the other solemn forms.154 The
public will may be written either by the testator or by another person, and must be
signed by the testator; furthermore, it has to be registered and authenticated at
the office competent for the registration of documents according to the rules for the
registration of documents (Art 277 PA).155 Accordingly, if the testator intends to
bequeath real estate, an entry must be made in the respective land register. The
content of the public will is thus generally known. This is different in the case of
the secret will. This third type of will has to be handwritten by the testator or by
another person, signed by the testator, put into an envelope, and sealed and
deposited at the document registration office (Art 279 PA).156 By depositing the
will, the testator secures it against outside intervention. The secret will is not,
however, considered to be an official document.
146
Y Linant de Bellefonds (1960) 13 Studia Islamica 125.
147
Nāser Kātūziyān, Hoqūq-e madanı̄: darshā-ye az shofce, vasiyat, erth (1999) 125.
148 ˙ of the will ˙are typed or if the will contains a pre-printed
If parts ˙ formula, it is invalid: Jacfar Jacfarı̄
Langrūdı̄, Hoqūq-e madanı̄: vasiyat (2nd edn, 2005) 389.
149 ˙ doctrine maintains
Iranian ˙ that if the date is missing or is obviously wrong, the will is to be upheld
provided the date can be derived otherwise from the content of the will: Nāser Kātūziyān, Vasiyat dar
hoqūq-e madanı̄-ye ı̄rān (1991) 189 f; Seyyed Hasan Emāmı̄, Hoqūq-e madanı̄ vol ˙ 3 (16th edn, 2002) ˙ 160.
˙ 150 Langrūdı̄ (n 148) 389. ˙ ˙
151
Kātūziyān (n 147) 128.
152
Cf the Iranian Court of Cassation, Department 1, Judgment No 19/4/13 - 1292, as quoted in
153
Dāmād (n 30) 204; Kātūziyān (n 147) 127.
154
Thus, the ‘drawing’ of words, ie the copying of words by an illiterate testator, will not be valid:
155
The Law on the Registration of Documents and Real Estate, qānūn-e thabt-e asnād va amlāk, of 17
March 1932 governs the formalities for the registration of bequests.
156
This kind of will is, however, very rare.
302 Nadjma Yassari
Like Moroccan law, Iranian law recognizes certain cases in which, due to the
impossibility to make a will in the legally prescribed form, oral wills are exceptionally
acceptable. Iranian law is more explicit in that it enumerates these cases (Arts 283 to
290 PA): emergency situations such as war, acute danger of death, captivity, or being
on board of a ship with communication with the outside world being cut off.
Furthermore, soldiers may bequeath orally in the presence of two witnesses and an
army officer. As soon as the emergency situation is over, the witnesses must present
themselves at a branch of the document registration office and testify to the will of
the deceased. If, however, the testator survives and the danger is over, the oral
disposition is automatically invalidated one month after his return to a place where
he may make a regular will.
Despite the detailed and clear regulation on the forms of will, Iranian doctrine
maintains that the formal requirements are but a means of proving the will.157
Accordingly, the difference between the three types of will (holograph/public/secret)
essentially lies in their probative effect. Authenticated wills are considered public
wills and thus official documents (Art 1287 Iranian Civil Code) that are directly
enforceable.158 Holograph and secret (deposited) wills, however, are considered to be
unofficial documents which can be challenged in court, even if the prescribed form
requirements have been met. At the same time Article 219 PA determines that any
will which does not meet the prescribed formal requirements can be healed by the
acknowledgement of the intestate heirs. This would theoretically also apply to an oral
will if the intestate heirs accept it. If, however, the latter contest an oral declaration of
the testator’s last will, statutory law does not – contra legem islamicam – admit the
testimony of witnesses to establish the existence of the will.159 In spite of this, Iranian
courts have joined legal doctrine and display great sympathy for the principle
of informality of classical Islamic law. In 1982, the Court of Appeal of Teheran
had to give judgment on a handwritten will that was only partly written by
the testator himself, although it had been signed and dated by him. Whereas some
of the intestate heirs had challenged the bequest, others had accepted it. The court
held – contrary to the applicable statutory law – that the whole will was valid vis-à-vis
all heirs, since it had been signed by the testator; by signing it, the testator had
demonstrated that the content of the will corresponded to his intention. According
to Shiite law, as the court saw it, the testator’s intention is the main condition for the
validity of a will and, therefore, a will must be upheld whenever the intention of the
testator is unequivocally established.160
157
Kātūziyān (n 149) 176; Langrūdı̄ (n 148) 58.
158
159
160
Decision of the Court of Appeal of Teheran, Department 2, No 2–60–321 of 13 November 1982,
as quoted in Dāmād (n 30) 205; this view has been backed up by the Council of Guardians, opinion no
2639 of 26 October 1988, and has been confirmed by various statements of the legal department of the
Ministry of Justice (Nazariye-ye mashveratı̄-ye edāre-ye kol-e hoqūqı̄-ye va tadvı̄n-e qavānı̄n-e qove-ye
˙
qad: ā’ı̄): see, eg, Statement No 7/2644 of 4 February 2002,˙ in Riyāsat-e jomhūrı̄ (ed), Majmūc-e
āyen-e dādresı̄-ye madanı̄ (The Directorate General for Codification and Compilation of Laws and
Regulations) vol 2 (2nd edn, 2004), commenting on Art 291 PA with further references.
Finally, Article 176 of the Tunisian Law of Personal Status of 1956 can be referred
to.161 It states: ‘Pour être valable, le testament doit être fait par un acte authentique
ou par un acte écrit, daté et signé du testateur.’ An oral will is thus invalid under
Tunisian law. All testamentary dispositions must be in writing, either in the form of
a public document made by notaries or as a holograph will, in the handwriting of the
testator, and signed and dated by him.162 Contrary to the law prevailing in Morocco,
Tunisian law also does not impose an obligation to include an execution note in the
handwritten will, and it does not recognize emergency situations in which an oral
will can be substituted for a written one.
IV. Conclusion
The law on the form of testamentary dispositions is not uniformly regulated in the
modern Islamic states. The reasons are probably threefold. First, the underlying
Islamic regulations are inconsistent. There is a vast variety of opinions to pick and
choose from, so that even those countries which have retained the basic principles of
Islamic law have diverging regulations. This applies to the ‘drawing requirements’ as
much as to the law of evidence. Second, the extent of codification and of the
reception of European law in that field vary from country to country. Pakistani
inheritance law, for example, is hardly codified and relies on the books of authority of
the Islamic school of law prevailing in that part of the world, thus abiding by the
principle of informality to the greatest imaginable degree. Iranian law, on the other
hand, has codified in utmost detail the form for testamentary dispositions in a total
of seventeen articles in the Probate Act (Arts 276 to 293 PA), drawing heavily on the
French Code civil. In fact, Articles 276 and 278 PA reiterate literally the wording of
Articles 969 and 970 of the French Code civil.163 Therefore, no room has been left
for oral bequests or for oral testimony as a means of evidence for the establishment of
the existence of a will. Traditional Islamic thinking patterns have, however, super-
imposed themselves over the imported Western law, for both Iranian doctrine and
the courts are inclined to be guided by the principle of informality even against the
wording of the statutory law. Third, some countries have felt the need to deny
judicial relief in cases ‘in which experience has shown that perjury and falsehood
abound’.164 This was the case in Egypt and Morocco. The laws of both countries
favour the written over the oral will and have switched to documentary evidence,
mainly with the objective of preventing fraud. They have done so, however, without
161
Book XI covering Arts 171–99 has been added to the Tunisian Code of Personal Status of 1956 by
the Law No 59–77 of 19 June 1959.
162
Cf Roussier (1961) 15 Studia Islamica 95; ‘Tunesien’, in Murad Ferid et al, Internationales Erbrecht
(2002) 35.
163
Art 969 French Code civil: ‘Un testament pourra être olographe ou fait par acte public ou dans la
forme mystique’; Art 970 French Code civil: ‘Le testament olographe ne sera point valable s’il n’est écrit en
entier, daté et signé de la main du testateur: il n’est assujetti à aucune autre forme’.
164
Anderson (n 24) 36; Linant de Bellefonds (1960) 13 Studia Islamica 124: ‘Il est superflu de
souligner les inconvénients pratiques d’un pareil système, et les fraudes auxquelles il peut donner lieu’.
304 Nadjma Yassari
directly abolishing the principle of informality, but by restricting its scope of

application. In Tunisia and Iraq, this was done in a more straightforward manner;
both legal systems do not mention the oral will as a mode of testation, and both
adhere to documentary evidence.
It can thus be concluded that – except for Pakistani and Indian-Muslim law – the
modern legislatures of most Islamic countries have displayed a clear tendency to
adhere to stricter formal requirements for the validity of wills. Whereas the classical
Islamic scholars favoured oral bequests as well as oral testimony over any written
evidence, modern Islamic legal systems have followed a path of formalization of the
law governing the form of testamentary dispositions. They have done this in different
ways, but their overall objective was to prevent falsification of the will, to secure the
execution of the last will and, finally, to make sure that the testator has thought about
the bequests he wanted to make and has not made them on the spur of the moment.
13
Testamentary Formalities in
England and Wales
Roger Kerridge*
I. Introduction 306
1. Jointly owned property 306
2. Statutory nominations 306
3. Pension scheme nominations 307
II. Formal wills: a history 307
1. The Middle Ages 307
2. Uses, and the Statute of Wills 308
3. The Statute of Frauds 310
4. The nineteenth century 311
III. The Wills Act 1837 312
1. History 312
2. The current provisions 314
IV. Incorporation by reference 316
V. Wills statistics 316
VI. Administration of estates 317
VII. Preparation and registration of wills 318
VIII. Forgery 321
IX. Nuncupative wills 322
X. Holograph wills 325
XI. Alterations 325
XII. Reform 326
* The writer would like to thank his colleague Gwen Seabourne for her helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this chapter.
306 Roger Kerridge
I. Introduction
This book is concerned with testamentary formalities and so with wills. But wills
have to be seen in context. What percentage of those who die within a particular
jurisdiction do so leaving wills? And what other ways, if any, are there of controlling
what happens to someone’s property on his death? At first sight it might seem as if
there are two, and only two, ways in which property may pass on death – either by
will or under the rules relating to intestacy. In English law,1 however, property may
also pass where there is: (a) a beneficial joint tenancy; (b) a statutory nomination; and
(c) a pension fund nomination.
1. Jointly owned property

English law provides for two kinds of concurrent ownership of property. Where
there is a beneficial tenancy in common, each owner has a separate interest and, on
death, his share passes under his will or the rules applicable on his intestacy. But
where there is a beneficial joint tenancy, there is a right of survivorship, the ius
accrescendi, and, as each joint owner dies, his rights vest in the surviving joint owner
or owners. Beneficial joint ownership of real and personal property may be severed,
so that the joint tenancy is converted into a tenancy in common.2 The creation of
joint ownership, and the failure to sever a joint tenancy, are both acts or omissions
which are part of the law of succession in the wider sense.3 Husbands and wives often
hold property, particularly bank accounts and the properties in which they live, as
beneficial joint tenants; and so, when one dies, his or her share passes to the other
irrespective of the terms of the will, or of the intestacy rules.
2. Statutory nominations
Several English statutes permit a person entitled to certain funds or investments to
dispose of them by a written nomination operating at his death. Such nominations
are less formal than wills, but the sums involved never exceed £5,000 and statutory
nominations are now less popular than they were. Some forms of savings which used
to be transferable by statutory nomination are no longer so transferable.4
1
‘English law’ is shorthand for the law which applies in England and Wales. The laws of Scotland and
of Northern Ireland, which are also parts of the United Kingdom, are different. For the law in Scotland,
see ch 17 below. To avoid repetition, ‘England’ in this chapter means England and Wales.
2
Charles Harpum, Stuart Bridge, and Martin Dixon, Megarry and Wade: The Law of Real Property
(7th edn, 2008) para 13.036.
3
See Chadwick LJ in Carr-Glynn v Frearsons [1999] Ch 326 at 336: ‘On a proper analysis, the service of
a notice of severance was part of the will-making process.’ Some property lawyers fail to classify the creation
and severance of joint tenancies as part of the law of succession, but they clearly are. A will draftsman who
fails to give adequate advice to a testator as to the severance of a joint tenancy may be held liable in
negligence to an intended beneficiary under a will whose gift is rendered ineffective by such failure. See
Kecskemeti v Rubens Rabin, The Times, 31 December 1992; Carr-Glynn v Frearsons [1999] Ch 326.
4
eg, National Savings Certificates are not transferable by statutory nomination, unless the nomination
was made before 1 May 1981.
Testamentary Formalities in England and Wales 307
3. Pension scheme nominations

Contributory pension schemes often provide that if an employee, who would have
received a pension on retirement, dies before reaching retirement age, the pension
fund’s trustees will make a lump sum payment,5 a form of insurance. The pension
scheme’s rules will indicate to whom the payment is to be made. There is usually
provision in the scheme’s rules for the employee to nominate the person to whom he
would like the payment to be made. The question then arises as to whether, when
there is such a nomination, it is a testamentary disposition. The answer is that it
depends in each case on the provisions of the individual pension scheme. In the
Canadian case of Re MacInnes,6 an employee’s contributions to a contributory
savings fund were held in such a way that during the employee’s lifetime he had
an absolute beneficial interest in his share of the fund. But, for tax reasons7 it is, in
England, very unusual for an employee’s contributions to be held in this way. In
England employees do not usually have beneficial interests in pension funds. Instead,
they have powers, under the funds’ rules, to nominate the persons who will receive
the benefits payable on their deaths. The trustees are not obliged to pay the
benefits to the persons nominated, but they will almost invariably do so. If the
employee were to have an absolute beneficial interest in his share of the fund, as the
Canadian employee had in MacInnes, then such share would be his property and
could pass only under a document which complied with the formality rules applic-
able to wills.8 But if (as is almost always the position in England) an employee does
not have such an interest, then a nomination is not a testamentary disposition,9 nor is
his share liable to inheritance tax as his property.
Reference will be made back to these three other ways in which property may pass
on death under English law, when looking at the wills statistics.10
II. Formal wills: a history
1. The Middle Ages

It is not entirely clear whether wills, that is, documents which were both revocable
and ambulatory, existed in Anglo-Saxon England.11 It was possible to execute
instruments which were designed to pass someone’s property on death, but it may
be that they were more akin to conveyances, which took effect inter vivos, than to
5
Often called a ‘death in service payment’.
6
[1935] 1 DLR 401.
7
ie the avoidance of inheritance tax.
8
ie Wills Act s 9 (below).
9
Re Danish Bacon Co Ltd Staff Pension Fund Trusts [1971] 1 WLR 248 (Wills Act formality rules were
not applicable); Baird v Baird [1990] 2 AC 548 (PC) (testator’s marriage did not revoke nomination,
although it would have revoked a will).
10
See V below.
11
ie before the conquest of England by the Normans in 1066.
308 Roger Kerridge
modern wills, instruments which take effect on death. Howsoever that may be, after
the Norman conquest in 1066, it became clear that it was possible for people to
control what happened, at least to some parts of their property, when they died.
During the twelfth century, it may have been possible to dispose of almost any kind
of property on death, but, by the thirteenth century it had been accepted, as far as
will-making was concerned, that there was a distinction between realty and person-
alty. Realty was property which could be recovered by real action, and the main form
of realty was freehold land. Personalty was property which could not be recovered by
real action and included not only moveables, but also leasehold land. Litigation
relating to realty was conducted in the common law courts and it became established
by the thirteenth century that it was not possible for someone who owned realty to
pass it by will, to ‘devise’12 it, on death. It was possible to transfer it inter vivos, but on
the owner’s death it passed automatically to his heir, his eldest son if he had one.13 By
contrast, it was established that the owner of personalty could, generally, bequeath it
as he chose on his death. He could do this by making a testament.14
There were no formalities for testaments which could be, and usually were, oral,
and which were usually made shortly before death. And, significantly for the English
law of succession, jurisdiction over testaments of personalty somehow passed not to
the common law courts, but to the ecclesiastical courts. It seems that England was
unusual in allowing the church courts to obtain control of this profitable work. In
fact, the church ended by playing a significant part both in the making and in the
upholding of testaments of personalty. It would often be the parish priest who was at
a dying man’s bedside when he chose to make his oral testament and, unsurprisingly,
such testaments often benefited the church. Having clergy by the bedsides of the
dying, and then having ecclesiastical lawyers to adjudicate on the authenticity of the
testaments which the clergy could confirm that the dying had made, were procedures
which, from the church’s point of view, worked well.
2. Uses, and the Statute of Wills

It was partly because they were not permitted to devise their realty by will that
landowners, in the mid-to-late Middle Ages, began to create uses, the precursors of
trusts. The use was a method of controlling what happened to someone’s realty when
he died, and of ensuring that it could pass to someone other than the heir. Another
advantage of the use, from the landowner’s point of view, was that it could assist in
the avoidance of payment of feudal incidents, themselves a thinly disguised form of
tax. The avoidance of feudal incidents was, of course, not something about which the
12
To ‘devise’ is to dispose of realty by will. The word ‘devise’ may be a verb or a noun. The recipient of
a devise is a ‘devisee’. The equivalent verb for personalty is ‘bequeath’. The property which is bequeathed is
a ‘bequest’ or ‘legacy’; and the person who receives a bequest or legacy is a ‘legatee’.
13
For a further discussion of the meaning of ‘heir’ in English law, see VI below.
14
The terminology is not strict, but in earlier times it was usual to speak of ‘wills’ when dealing with
realty and ‘testaments’ when dealing with personalty. Wills still often begin with the words ‘Last Will and
Testament’.
crown was enthusiastic and, in 1535, Henry VIII persuaded Parliament to pass the
Statute of Uses, the main purpose of which was to limit the effectiveness of uses and
to restore to the crown the full benefit of lost revenue. Parliament, which consisted
largely of substantial landowners, was not especially eager to pass the 1535 Statute.
Maitland said of it that it was ‘forced upon an extremely unwilling parliament by an
extremely strong-willed king’.15 But Henry could not have it all his own way; he was
involved in too many quarrels and needed allies. Pay-back time came in 1540 when
Henry permitted Parliament to pass the Statute of Wills. This Act allowed the
owners of realty to devise it on death. So, from 1540 onwards, the owner of freehold
land could control what happened to it when he died. And it was at this time that the
first formality rules were enacted. The 1540 Act required that a devise16 of realty
should be ‘in writing’. The writing did not have to be that of the testator himself,17
nor did the will have to be executed in any particular form – provided only that it was
‘in writing’.
From this point, 1540, onwards, it was possible for owners of realty, and of
personalty, to devise and bequeath both of them on their deaths.18 But there
remained a number of significant differences between realty and personalty. They
continued to be dealt with by different courts: realty by the common law courts, and
personalty by the ecclesiastical courts. There were the three principal common law
courts, namely the Kings Bench, the Common Pleas, and the Exchequer. However,
there were more than 300 ecclesiastical courts, the most important of which was
the Prerogative Court, the Court of the Province, the Archdiocese, of Canterbury.19
A testament of personalty had to be ‘proved’, that is, authenticated, in an ecclesiastic-
al court, and it would be proved by an executor, the person nominated in the will to
administer the estate. If no executor was nominated, or if the person nominated as
executor was unwilling or unable to act, the testament would be proved by an
administrator. An administrator also acted if there was personalty which was not
dealt with by the testament, that is, if there was a partial or total intestacy. Executors
and administrators were, and still are, together, known as ‘personal representatives’
because they originally administered personal property.20 By contrast, a will of realty
did not have to be ‘proved’ and realty did not pass to a (real) representative. If the
owner of the realty made no will, the realty passed directly to his heir. If he did make
a will, it passed directly to the devisee, the beneficiary. There was no need to ‘prove’
this, because a will of realty did not need to be authenticated by any court. If there
15
F W Maitland, Equity (1909) 35.
16
For the meaning of ‘devise’, see n 12 above.
17
Many testators would have been illiterate.
18
There were some parts of the country where there were restrictions on bequests of personalty, and
these lasted until the early years of the eighteenth century. They disappeared in the Province of York in
1692, in Wales in 1696, and in London in 1724.
19
The ecclesiastical courts consisted of the two Provincial Courts, of Canterbury and York; the Courts
of the Ordinaries (the bishops); the Archdeacons’ Courts; and the Courts of the Peculiars, exempt from the
control of the Ordinaries. The Prerogative Court of Canterbury sat in London at Doctors’ Commons (the
doctors were the ecclesiastical lawyers, the Doctors of Law or of Civil Law).
20
Since the passing of the Land Transfer Act in 1897, personal representatives have administered both
real and personal property, and so the term ‘personal representatives’ has been technically inaccurate.
310 Roger Kerridge
were a dispute as to the validity of a will of realty, it would be adjudicated upon by a

common law court at the time when the dispute arose. So, while a testament of
personalty would be proved, formally, shortly after the testator’s death, a will of
realty would not be proved at all. And, while a dispute over a testament of personalty
would normally occur soon after the death, a dispute over a will of realty might occur
much later. Moreover, the formality rules were different: there were no formalities
for personalty, but a will of realty had to be in writing.
The effect of this was that there was a dual system where two sets of courts might
be called upon to adjudicate upon the same facts, and might then come to different
conclusions.21 From the lawyers’ point of view it was a way of generating profitable
business. While, however, the common law courts dealt with wills of realty and the
ecclesiastical courts covered testaments of personalty, Chancery had little direct
involvement with either. Chancery had jurisdiction over uses (which later became
trusts), both inter vivos and testamentary. Chancery also had jurisdiction over the
interpretation of wills and testaments.22 But Chancery did not become involved in
adjudicating on the validity of wills or testaments. This needs to be said because
Charles Dickens’ well-known novel, Bleak House, gives the misleading impression
that Chancery, at least by the nineteenth century, was involving itself in major ‘wills’
cases. That does Chancery an injustice. In fact, the system might well have worked
better if Chancery had involved itself more, rather than less, with testing the validity
of both wills and testaments. In so far as there were problems in relation to litigation
over wills and testaments in the period after 1540, it seems that the blame lies
entirely with the ecclesiastical courts.
3. The Statute of Frauds

But that brings us back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The disturbances
in the middle part of the seventeenth century, the English Civil War, Oliver
Cromwell’s Commonwealth,23 all had an effect on the legal landscape. Feudal
incidents disappeared, trusts emerged to take the place of uses, and it became obvious
that the lack of formality rules to cover both wills and testaments24 was a major
problem.
In 1677 Parliament enacted ‘An Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries’,
usually referred to as the Statute of Frauds. This Act created an entire code of
21
If they were dealing with formalities, the rules would be different and so different conclusions would
not be surprising. But even in cases not concerning formalities, the ecclesiastical courts and common law
courts could reach different conclusions on identical facts. The best example of this is the unreported case
of Nicholls v Remigo: see R B Outhwaite, The Rise and Fall of the Ecclesiastical Courts 1500–1860 (2006)
169.
22
Wills of realty were much more likely to raise interpretation problems than were testaments of
personalty.
23
The English Civil War (referred to by some royalists as ‘The Great Rebellion’) lasted from 1642 to
1651. Charles I was executed in 1649 and there was an Interregnum until 1653 when Oliver Cromwell
became Lord Protector. He died in 1658 and was succeeded by his son Richard who resigned in 1659. The
monarchy was restored in 1660.
24
Wills of realty required only writing; testaments of personalty required no formalities at all.
formalities to cover all kinds of situations, and this included rules for wills and
testaments. Whereas before 1677 there were almost no formality rules, there were
now a number of different rules to cover different situations. There is insufficient
space in this chapter to cover this period in detail, but the formality rules for wills and
testaments during the period between 1677 when the Statute of Frauds was enacted,
and 1838, when the Wills Act 1837 took effect, could politely be described as
complicated.
4. The nineteenth century

The early years of the nineteenth century were the start of a period of significant law
reform in England and, in 1833, the Real Property Commissioners produced their
Fourth Report, the result of their ‘deliberations on the subject of Wills, except that
part of it which respects their construction’.25 Some of the reports of the Real
Property Commissioners were slightly amateurish, especially those which dealt
with aspects of foreign law, but the Fourth Report dealt with topics in relation to
which the Commissioners had considerable expertise, and the document was well
prepared. As far as formalities were concerned, the Report noted26 that there were
‘ten different laws for regulating the execution of Wills under different circum-
stances’.27 There were different rules for: (a) realty; (b) personalty (including leases),
valued at more than £30; (c) personalty valued at less than £30, and property of any
value belonging to soldiers in service and sailors at sea (with the exception of the
pay and prize money of sailors and marines); (d) the pay and prize money of sailors
and marines; (e) estates pur autre vie;28 (f) money in the funds (that is, government
stock – gilts); (g) copyholds;29 (h) customary freeholds;30 (i) to appoint testamentary
guardians; and (j) to exercise testamentary powers of appointment.
As the Report understated it:
This great variety of Rules for a similar purpose, with their complicated distinctions and
exceptions, has occasioned serious inconveniences.
The unnecessary multiplication of rules has the effect of diminishing the respect which
ought to be entertained for the Laws, because it tends to create litigation when there is no
substantial question in dispute. It also occasions mistakes which defeat lawful and proper
intentions . . .
25
Construction, ie interpretation, of wills, was dealt with by Chancery (see II.2 above); the Real
Property Commissioners were concerned with all other aspects, and, in particular, with formalities.
26
At 12.
27
The Report says that there were ‘ten different laws’, but, oddly, it does not include deathbed wills,
which might require no writing (see IX below). If deathbed wills are included, as they should be, there were
‘eleven different laws’.
28
An estate pur autre vie was a tenancy of land during the life of someone else, the cestui que vie. Before
1926, it was the lowest estate of freehold recognized.
29
Copyholds were land held by unfree tenure. Unfree status ended in England in 1660 (at the end of
the Commonwealth), but unfree tenure lasted until 1925 when copyholds were enfranchised, and became
freeholds.
30
Privileged copyholds.
312 Roger Kerridge
Perhaps the most serious evil produced by such mistakes is, the rendering a Will void as to
some property intended to be comprised in it, while it is valid as to other property . . .
There appears to be no good reason for making any distinction between the forms required
for the execution of Wills, with respect to different descriptions of property . . .
We think it of great importance that, as a general rule, Wills of every description should be
required to be executed according to one simple form, which may be easily and generally
understood; and we shall notice the very few exceptions, which ought, in our opinion, to be
allowed.31
III. The Wills Act 1837
1. History
Thirteen days after Queen Victoria ascended the throne, she gave her assent to ‘An
Act for the Amendment of the Laws with respect to Wills’ – the statute now known
as the Wills Act 1837.32 Section 9 of the Act, the principal section relating to
formalities, has been amended twice in 170 years, but the amendments have been
minor, and the section operates very much as it did when it was first enacted. It seems
odd that this relic of the pre-Victorian age should have survived so long, and so little
altered.
The original section 9, which applies to deaths before 1 January 1983, reads as
follows:
No will shall be valid unless it shall be in writing and executed in manner hereinafter
mentioned; (that is to say,) it shall be signed at the foot or end thereof by the testator, or by
some other person in his presence and by his direction; and such signature shall be made or
acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more witnesses present at the same
time, and such witnesses shall attest and shall subscribe the will in the presence of the testator,
but no form of attestation shall be necessary.
In the decade after it was first enacted, section 9 was interpreted strictly and this led,
in particular, to problems as to the position of the testator’s signature. The Wills Act
Amendment Act 1852, otherwise known as Lord St Leonards’ Act,33 attempted to
undo the effects of this strict interpretation by setting out an exhaustive, if verbose,
definition of ‘at the foot or end’. Essentially, the 1852 Act provided that it did not
31
Fourth Report made to His Majesty by the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Law of England
respecting Real Property HC 226 (1833) vol xxii, 13.
32
William IV, the third son of George III, died on 20 June 1837. He left no legitimate descendants
and so was succeeded by his eighteen-year-old niece, Alexandrina Victoria. The Wills Act received the
Royal assent on 3 July.
33
Edward Burtenshaw Sugden was a barber’s son who left school at the age of twelve to work as a clerk
in an attorney’s (ie solicitor’s) office and who, although having received almost no formal instruction, rose
by merit and industry to become leader of the Chancery Bar, then, twice, Lord Chancellor of Ireland and,
finally, as Lord St Leonards, Lord Chancellor of Great Britain. He is best remembered as the Lord
Chancellor whose own will was missing at the time of his death: see VII below.
matter if there was a blank space between the end of the will and the signature; and it
did not matter that the signature was placed on a page on which no part of the will
was written: but the signature could never operate to give effect to any part of the will
which was underneath it or which followed it. The provisions of the 1852 Act were
applied with reasonable leniency, although the attitude of the courts did seem
sometimes to vary.
The 1837 Act, and its amendment in 1852, made no changes to jurisdiction, or to
the court structure. The ecclesiastical courts continued to ‘prove’ testaments (that is,
wills) of personalty, and, therefore, to deal with challenges based on lack of formal-
ities. The common law courts dealt with wills of realty, which still did not need to be
‘proved’. But, in 1858, as an indirect result of divorce law reform, the ecclesiastical
courts lost their jurisdiction over probate and this passed to the newly established
Court of Probate.34 This looks, at first sight, as though it was going to mean a loss of
work for those who had practised in the ecclesiastical courts, but they actually gained
much more than they lost. They, the lawyers who had served as advocates in the
ecclesiastical courts, took over the work in the newly established Court of Probate
and, to avoid duplication, and in a spirit of efficiency, challenges to wills of realty
were now transferred from the common law courts to the new Court of Probate.
There had been discussion earlier in the nineteenth century about transferring this
jurisdiction to Chancery, but it did not happen.35 In 1875 the jurisdiction of the
Court of Probate was transferred to the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of
the newly created High Court, and in 1897 it was finally enacted that a will of realty,
like a testament of personalty, had to be ‘proved’ in this division. Then, at long last,
in 1971, the jurisdiction over contested probate was transferred from Probate,
Divorce, and Admiralty (which was renamed the ‘Family Division’) to Chancery.
But this was at least 113 years36 too late, because the modus operandi of those dealing
with contested probate had, by this stage, been formed and moulded by the mild-
mannered advocates of the ecclesiastical courts and not by the harsher and more
logical lawyers of Chancery.
Following recommendations made in the Law Reform Committee’s Twenty-
second Report, ‘The Making and Revocation of Wills’,37 section 17 of the Adminis-
tration of Justice Act 1982 then substituted a new section 9. But the Twenty-second
Report was a disappointingly conservative document which recommended only the
most minor of changes. Although the substituted section is laid out differently from
the original section 9, the changes in substance, as opposed to form, are of very small
significance. These minor differences between the original section and the post-1982
section will be noted below.
34
This newly established Court of Probate shared a judge with the newly established Divorce Court.
The first Judge Ordinary was Sir Cresswell Cresswell.
35
The writer thinks that this was unfortunate, but not because of problems relating to formalities.
36 37
1858 to 1971. 1980: Cmnd 7902.
314 Roger Kerridge
2. The current provisions

If a testator dies on or after 1 January 1983, the substituted section 9 provides that:
No will shall be valid unless –
(a) it is in writing, and signed by the testator, or by some other person in his presence and by
his direction; and
(b) it appears that the testator intended by his signature to give effect to the will; and
(c) the signature is made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more
witnesses present at the same time; and
(d) each witness either –
(i) attests and signs the will; or
(ii) acknowledges his signature, in the presence of the testator (but not necessarily in
the presence of any other witness), but no form of attestation shall be necessary.
Section 9 applies to all wills required to be executed in accordance with English
internal law, except the wills of privileged testators38 and the ‘statutory’ wills of
persons lacking mental capacity.39
Section 9 has five requirements. First, the will must be in writing, but there are no
restrictions as to the materials on which, or by which, it may be written, or as to what
language may be used. In Hodson v Barnes,40 a will written on an empty egg-shell was
not refused probate on the ground that it had been so written.41
Second, the will must be signed. A mark suffices, and the will may be signed by the
testator or by some other person in his presence, and by his direction. The original
section 9 required the signature to be ‘at the foot or end’ of the will, and the courts
interpreted this requirement strictly. The 1852 Act attempted to temper the strict-
ness of the interpretation, but still insisted that the signature had to be at the end of
the will. The substituted section 9 (applicable to a death on or after 1 January 1983)
does not insist that the signature has to be at the foot or end of the will – it can be
anywhere.42
Third, under the substituted section, it must appear ‘that the testator intended by
his signature to give effect to the will’. A signature can give effect to something
written after it, but it must be ‘all one operation’.43
Fourth, the testator’s signature must be made or acknowledged in the presence of
two witnesses present at the same time. This requirement has not changed since 1837
38
Privileged testators are covered by the Wills Act s 11: see IX below.
39
A ‘statutory’ will may be executed by order of the Court of Protection where a person lacking
capacity is incapable of making a valid will for himself. The formalities are specified in the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 sch 2 para 3.
40
[1926] 43 TLR 71.
41
Although it was refused probate for other reasons. Quaere: why did it take six counsel to argue this
case? This seems to be an extreme example of the traditional English vice of over-manning.
42
In Wood v Smith [1993] Ch 90 the testator made a holograph will which began with the words ‘My
will by Percy Winterbone. . . . ’ He did not sign anywhere else, and the Court of Appeal, upholding the trial
judge, held that once it was established that this was his signature, there was no problem with its position.
43
Wood v Smith [1993] Ch 90; Re White [1991] Ch 1.
and there was surprise in some circles that it was not altered when the section was re-
drafted in 1982. Section 15 of the Wills Act 1837 deprives a witness and his or her
spouse of any benefit under a will which he or she has witnessed. But the witness is
still a good attesting witness and the will is not invalidated.
Finally, each witness must sign or acknowledge his signature ‘in the presence of the
testator’. The witnesses do not need to sign or acknowledge in the presence of one
another; the only time they both have to be present together is when the testator signs
or acknowledges. The acknowledgement, as opposed to the signature, by a witness, is
something first permitted when the re-drafted section took effect in 1983. Before
that, the testator could acknowledge, but the witnesses could not. Under the sub-
stituted section, a witness must ‘attest and sign’,44 but it is not clear what is involved
in ‘attestation’ above and beyond signing. The implication of the judgment of the
Court of Appeal in Sherrington v Sherrington45 is that the requirement to attest has
no real meaning.46
The requirement that the testator must sign or acknowledge his signature in the
presence of two witnesses, and that the witnesses must then sign or acknowledge in
his presence, mean that electronic and/or digital signatures have no place in the
execution of English wills.
Where a will appears to have been duly executed, but there is no proof of due
execution, it may be inferred. A recent example of this is Channon v Perkins,47 where
two witnesses whose signatures appeared on the will accepted that the signatures were
theirs, but said that they had no recollection of attesting it. The Court of Appeal,
reversing the trial judge, considered the fact that someone could not remember
witnessing a document some years before did not mean that he had not done so. As
there was no positive evidence to rebut the presumption of due execution, probate
was granted.
An English will does not need to be dated. It is, of course, good practice to date a
will for at least two reasons. First, if the testator leaves more than one purported will,
it will be important to know the order in which they were made. A later will revokes
an earlier will in so far as it is inconsistent with it.48 Second, the date on which a will
was made may affect its interpretation, particularly in relation to descriptions of
44
Or acknowledge his signature.
45
[2005] 3 FCR 538.
46
Sherrington is a good (or, should one say, bad) recent example of the way in which ‘suspicious wills’
(ie wills in the making of which beneficiaries have played a part) manage to obtain probate in England. The
trial judge was clearly anxious to refuse probate and did so on two grounds: (a) that there was no attestation
by the witnesses; and (b) that the testator lacked ‘knowledge and approval’. The Court of Appeal reversed
him on both points, holding, in effect, that the attestation requirement is meaningless, and that the testator
did know what was in his will. The present writer believes that the Court of Appeal was correct on the
attestation point, and also that the testator did know what was in his will, but the court did not deal
properly with ‘approval’. Further discussion on this point is outside the scope of this chapter, but the case
does illustrate the unhappy influence of the ecclesiastical courts on this branch of English law. The overall
attitude is far too trusting, and not at all as it would have been had Chancery lawyers laid down the original
rules.
47
[2006] WTLR 425.
48
Or, of course, if it contains a revocation clause.
316 Roger Kerridge
persons.49 The dating of a will after its execution caused a serious problem in the
recent case of Corbett v Newey,50 but discussion of this is outside the scope of the
present chapter.
IV. Incorporation by reference
Under English law, a testator may incorporate in his will a document which he has
not executed, and that document may become part of his will. This ‘doctrine of
incorporation by reference’ applies if three requirements are satisfied. First, the
document must be in existence when the will is executed. The onus of proving this
lies on the person seeking to rely on the doctrine. Second, the will must refer to the
document as being already in existence; so, for example, a reference in a will to ‘such
articles as may be described in a paper in my own handwriting’51 does not satisfy the
requirement. Third, the document must be sufficiently described in the will to
enable it to be identified.52
A document which has been incorporated in a duly executed will is admissible to
probate as part of the will. Once probate has been obtained, an English will is a
public document and so the incorporated document is also open to inspection by the
public. If a testator wants to avoid publicity, he could employ a secret trust.53
Because of the publicity, incorporation by reference is not popular, and if someone
wants to incorporate (say) the terms of a trust into his will, it is probably best to set
out the terms in the will, in full.
V. Wills statistics
The existence of jointly owned property, of pension fund nominations, and, to a

lesser extent, of statutory nominations,54 make it more difficult than it would
otherwise be to get an accurate sense of the statistics relating to property passing
on death. The Judicial and Court Statistics show how many estates are ‘with a will’
and how many are ‘confirmed intestacies’, but they appear to be incomplete.
The statistics for 2008, the latest year available, are as follows.55 There were
509,090 deaths. 214,970 (just over 42 per cent) of these consisted of estates ‘with
a will’, that is, they were cases where there were grants of probate, or grants of
administration with wills annexed.56 In only 52,510 cases (less than 11 per cent) were
49 50
Wills Act 1837 s 24; Re Whorwood (1887) 34 Ch D 446. [1998] Ch 57.
51
In the Goods of Sutherland (1866) LR 1 P&D 158.
52
In the Goods of Tovey (1878) 47 LJP 63.
53
For secret trusts, see Roger Kerridge (assisted by A H R Brierley), Parry and Kerridge: The Law of
Succession (12th edn, 2009) paras 6.15–6.31.
54
See I above.
55
Taken from the Court and Judicial Statistics. The writer is grateful to members of the staff of the
Law Commission for assistance in making sense of the statistics.
56
Grants of administration with wills annexed are cases where there are wills, but such wills either fail
to appoint executors, or the executors are unable or unwilling to act.
there confirmed intestacies, that is, grants of administration with no will. That is a
total of 53 per cent, and it leaves 47 per cent unaccounted for. So, were these 47 per
cent cases where the deceased owned no property? Not necessarily. The 47 per cent
would, on the whole, have consisted of small estates,57 and a small proportion of
them would be the estates of infants. But these unaccounted for estates would also
include a proportion where some or all of the deceased’s property passed by the right
of survivorship to a surviving beneficial joint tenant, or by a pension-fund58 or
statutory nomination. In these cases there would be no need for probate, and no
need for letters of administration, so they would not figure in the statistics. Yet, in
each case, the deceased would, during his lifetime, have taken a conscious decision59
as to what was to happen to the property on his death, and property of considerable
value might pass under either or both headings.60 There appears to be no easy way of
incorporating such statistics as there are on jointly owned property, and such statistics
as there are on pension fund nominations, into the figures relating to wills and
intestacies. But even if they are not added in (and there should be some allowance for
them, given that they represent forms of inheritance which have some of the
characteristics of wills), the proportion of those who die leaving wills appears high.
If 42 per cent of estates are ‘with a will’, if only 11 per cent are confirmed intestacies,
and if 47 per cent are unaccounted for, it is reasonable to assume that some of the 47
per cent will involve, at least in part, property passing by the ius accrescendi and/or by
way of pension fund nominations, while most of the others will probably involve
persons who die leaving relatively little property.61 So, the large majority of those
who die with property of value either leave wills or arrange that their property shall
pass by the ius accrescendi or by way of pension fund nominations.
VI. Administration of estates
If a sui iuris adult dies in England, he may die having made a will, or he may die
intestate. There is no requirement in English law that a will must nominate an ‘heir’,
57
Appendix C to the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper No 191, Intestacy and Family Provision
Claims on Death (2009), shows that 32% of estates where the deceased died intestate and where letters of
administration to his estate were obtained, were valued at less than £25,000. It is almost certain that the
‘unaccounted for’ group will tend, on average, to have lower values.
58
Property passing by way of a pension-fund nomination is not technically the deceased’s property,
but that is more or less a fiction. The true significance of its not being technically the deceased’s property is
that it does not attract inheritance tax on his death.
59
Or, in the case of jointly owned property, appears to have taken a conscious decision. Someone who
acquires property as a beneficial joint tenant should be aware that, if he dies before the other beneficial
joint tenant, his interest will pass to such person, and not under his will or on intestacy. Lawyers should, of
course, warn their clients about this.
60
For an example of this, see Jessop v Jessop [1992] 1 FLR 591.
61
There is one other possible explanation for the ‘unaccounted for’ 47%. It may be that in some cases
where there should be applications for probate or letters of administration, those who should make them
fail to do so in an attempt to evade inheritance tax. This tax is payable by the personal representatives when
they apply for the relevant grant.
318 Roger Kerridge
and the notion of an ‘heir’ is completely different in English law from the notion
expressed by the same word in Roman law. The ‘heir’ in English law is the person
who, before 1926, would have inherited an intestate’s real property (his freehold
land).62
When someone dies, his estate has to be administered, or ‘wound up’. The
administration, or winding up, has never been the task of the heir. The administra-
tion is carried out by the personal representatives, who obtain a grant of representa-
tion to the deceased’s estate. So, the personal representatives stand in the deceased’s
place, they represent him. It is their task to pay his debts and then to distribute the
estate. Personal representatives are so called because, before 1897, they administered
only the deceased’s personal property. Since 1897 they have administered both real
and personal property.63 If someone leaves a will, he should name in it the person
who is to be his executor,64 that is, the personal representative whom he has chosen
to prove the will and wind up the estate. The grant of probate is the formal process
whereby the court authenticates the will. If someone dies without leaving a will, or if
he leaves a will which does not name an executor,65 the court will appoint an
administrator to wind up the estate. Where there is no will, the administrator
must administer the estate according to the rules of intestacy; where there is a will,
he must administer it according to its terms. In the latter case, he is granted letters of
administration with the will annexed. A will can, and should, appoint a residuary
beneficiary, the person who will take the residue of the estate after all of the debts
have been paid and all specific gifts (specific legacies and devises) have been
distributed. The personal representative and the residuary beneficiary share between
them the role taken by the Roman law heir.
VII. Preparation and registration of wills
The question of registration of wills under English law is linked with, and is to an
extent dependent upon, the rules which apply to the preparation of wills and
applications for probate. Section 9 of the Wills Act 1837 sets out the formality
provisions; it does not say who may draft, or prepare, a will. There could be rules, set
out elsewhere, which place restrictions on who may draft or prepare wills or,
alternatively, on who may charge fees for drafting or preparing wills. Yet, oddly
some may think, English law does not impose any such restrictions. Anyone may set
himself up as a ‘will draftsman’ and may charge fees for preparing wills. There appear
to be no official statistics which show what proportion of English wills are prepared
by persons who have charged fees, nor who these persons are. It is probable that most
62
The meaning of ‘real property’ is discussed in II above.
63
It was not until the enactment of the Land Transfer Act 1897 that personal representatives took over
administration of realty, as well as personalty. Since 1897 they have been both real and personal
representatives, but the old terminology survives.
64
There may be more than one.
65
Or where it does name an executor, but the executor is unwilling or unable to act.
of those who charge for the preparation of wills are solicitors, but there are also a
significant number of non-legally-qualified will draftsmen who operate in a largely
unregulated environment. If it can be shown that someone who has held himself out
as ‘will draftsman’ has acted negligently in the will-making process, it may be
possible for a would-be beneficiary to bring a civil action against him after the
testator’s death,66 but proving negligence may be difficult when the principal witness
(the testator) is dead. The position is not satisfactory. Moves are under way in
Scotland to restrict the categories of those who may charge fees for the preparation
of wills, but nothing similar is yet contemplated in England.67
While, however, there are no restrictions on those who may charge fees for
drafting or preparing wills, restrictions exist as to who may charge fees for applying
for probate. Applying for probate is a ‘reserved legal activity’. Traditionally, only
solicitors, barristers, and notaries68 could charge fees for applying for probate.69
Other persons (friends or family members of the deceased) could apply for probate,
but could not charge fees, so the only professionals engaged in probate practice were
the three listed and, in practice, solicitors had a virtual monopoly. But the Courts
and Legal Services Act 1990,70 as part of a move to open up competition within the
professions, provided that professional bodies other than the Law Society and the Bar
Council could apply to become ‘approved regulators’ so that their members could
provide probate services for profit. In 2008 the Council for Licenced Conveyancers71
became an approved regulator and was followed in 2009 by the Association of
Chartered Certified Accountants. The Institute of Legal Executives has now submit-
ted an application to join them.72 But the addition of these bodies does not, in
practice, appear to have had much effect on the market as a whole. It seems that, for
the time being at least, solicitors retain an effective monopoly when it comes to
providing probate services for profit.
The overall position is that will drafting has been considered less profitable than
applying for probate73 and that is probably why professional lawyers have been
keener to restrict the right to apply for probate than to restrict the right to draft wills.
But this impacts upon the question of registration.
66
Esterhuizen v Allied Dunbar [1998] 2 FLR 668.
67
For Scotland, see Legal Services (Scotland) Act 2010 ss 101–18. The Law Society, representing
English solicitors, would like to follow the Scottish lead and the Legal Services Board (the so-called super-
regulator) has now begun to examine the broader framework of reserved legal activities, including
conveyancing and litigation, but it appears to be in no hurry.
68
Notaries in England have different functions from notaries in Civil Law jurisdictions. Their main
function is to authenticate documents which are to be used abroad. Almost all English notaries are
solicitors – the qualification of notary is, for solicitors, an additional qualification.
69
The Solicitors Act 1974 s 23 made it an offence for anyone other than a solicitor, barrister, or duly
certified notary to provide probate services for gain or reward.
70
Section 55 and sch 9.
71
As well as the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, who appear to have stolen a march on
their English counterparts.
72
Since the start of 2010, applications are made under the Legal Services Act 2007 sch 4, which
replaces the equivalent provisions of the 1990 Act.
73
Would-be testators are often reluctant to pay for their wills, but personal representatives and
beneficiaries are less unwilling to pay for probate, for obtaining probate means coming into assets.
320 Roger Kerridge
It is possible to deposit a will for safe-keeping with the High Court. This can
be done pursuant to section 126 of the Senior Courts Act 198174 and a will
deposited under this section is stored at the Principal Probate Registry of the Family
Division. The fee is a mere £15 and the procedure is not complicated. But very few
wills are so deposited. Why is this? It seems that professionally drawn wills are usually
retained ‘for safe-keeping’ by those who drafted them. Solicitors who draft wills
regularly offer their clients a free custody service whereby such wills are kept
(securely) in the solicitors’ strong rooms. The advantage to clients is that the wills
are secure and will not be lost or accidentally destroyed. The advantage to the
solicitors who hold the wills is that when the testators die, the personal representa-
tives are likely to instruct such solicitors to proceed with obtaining probate. Drafting
a will is often a loss-leader, but if the will is retained by the solicitor-draftsman, he
will probably end up with the more profitable probate work. The problem with this
system is that it is hard to keep track of wills, and much more so if they are retained
by draftsmen who are not professionally qualified. Non-professionally qualified
draftsmen do not have the incentive that solicitors have to retain wills, but they
often do so for a mixture of reasons, including the fact that offering safe-keeping
facilities makes them appear more competitive with the solicitors. If solicitors offer
this service, they need to too. So, there is the problem of missing wills. Given the de
facto lack of any central wills register, and given the overall lack of regulation, it is not
possible to guess how many wills are actually mislaid or stolen.
If someone dies, and it is known that he has made a will, but the will cannot be
located, there is a presumption that the testator has destroyed it with the intention of
revoking it. But this presumption applies only if the will was in his possession, and
the strength of the presumption varies according to the surrounding circumstances.
If, for example, the testator was known to be careless with his papers; or if there is
some other explanation as to why some or all of his papers are missing, the
presumption may be rebutted without too much difficulty.
The leading case on rebutting the presumption is Sugden v Lord St Leonards.75
Lord St Leonards, the former Lord Chancellor, kept his will, and a number of
codicils to it, in a locked deed box in his sitting room. When he was dying, his
daughter, Charlotte, moved the locked deed box from his sitting room to hers, but
the box was not opened until after his death. When it was opened, it contained all of
the codicils, but no will. So, had Lord St Leonards destroyed his own will animo
revocandi? It was held that he had not. The deed box had been locked, but the keys
had not been kept securely and any servant could have obtained access to the box and
to the key while they were in the original sitting room. No careful Chancery lawyer
like Lord St Leonards would have destroyed his will without making another, or
would have destroyed his will without also destroying the codicils. And, fortunately,
the contents of the will were known. It had been his Lordship’s favourite evening
74
The Senior Courts Act 1981 was formerly the Supreme Court Act 1981.
75
(1876) 1 PD 154.
entertainment to ask Charlotte to read his will over to him, she knew its terms by
heart, her evidence as to its contents were accepted, and it was duly granted probate.
So, what may be called the rule in Sugden v Lord St Leonards, to the effect that,
when the will is missing and there is reason to believe that the testator did not destroy
it animo revocandi, other evidence of its contents can be produced and can then lead
to a valid grant of probate, appears recently to have become a standard way of
overcoming the difficulty which occurs when wills are missing. There have been a
number of recent cases where cynical observers might suspect that the wills in
question had been deliberately destroyed by third parties, before or after the testators’
deaths, but a polite fiction is maintained that they were mislaid by careless testators
and, while no blame attaches to anyone in particular, the wills are granted probate.
The system is far from perfect, but it does have the merit of saving some wills where
attempts have been made to suppress them. But this then leads to a discussion about
forgery.
VIII. Forgery
To what extent do the formality rules operate as a safeguard against forgery? It is

difficult to know, because it is hard to say how many forged wills, if any, obtain
probate; but the present writer suspects that some, and possibly many, do. Take the
relatively recent case of Fuller v Strum.76 An independent handwriting expert,
appointed by the court, submitted a written report to the effect that there was
‘very strong positive evidence’ that the testator’s signature to a ‘will’ (which had
been written out entirely in the handwriting of one of the beneficiaries) had been
forged. But the judge at first instance, following what some may think of as the over-
trusting approach traditionally adopted by the judges of the ecclesiastical courts, and
their successors in the Court of Probate, and apparently unwilling to come to a
conclusion implying misbehaviour by at least two persons, held that the signature
had not been forged. He went on to refuse probate on another ground, but an appeal
against his decision on this other ground was then allowed by the Court of Appeal.
The end result was that a will written out entirely in the handwriting of one of the
beneficiaries, with a signature regarding which there was ‘very strong positive
evidence’ that it had been forged, obtained probate. Readers can draw their own
conclusions.77
One of the least satisfactory aspects of English succession law is that, since the end
of the First World War, very few succession cases have been reported in the major
series of law reports. Because of this, it is difficult to tell how many forgery challenges
there have been. In the 2007 case of Supple v Pender,78 a will was set aside on the
76
[2002] 1 WLR 1097.
77
The testator’s son, who had unsuccessfully challenged the will in England, met with better success in
Israel. In fact, the matter should have been litigated in Israel in the first place, but conflict of laws points are
not directly relevant to this discussion.
78
[2007] WTLR 1461.
322 Roger Kerridge
ground that it had been forged, and counsel who had acted on behalf of the
successful challengers subsequently claimed that this was the first case in England
for thirty years where a forgery challenge had succeeded. He appears to have been
mistaken, in that there was at least one unreported case in 200279 and another case,
Vaccianna v Herod, in 2006.80 Since then, there has been one reported case of a
successful challenge based on forgery81 and there have been at least three other
unreported cases.82
There are some other recent cases which may be reported in due course, including
Gale v Gale,83 where the will was refused probate on the ground of forgery. But a
more surprising case is Devas v Mackay.84 Here, a will in favour of the testatrix’s
carer’s son (a son whom the testatrix had never met) was refused probate on the
ground that the testatrix ‘lacked knowledge and approval’. This is the standard way
of disguising allegations of wrongdoing in English contentious probate: the will can
be set aside without stating that anyone has misbehaved.85 But the oddity in Devas is
that a year after the contentious probate proceedings, there were criminal proceed-
ings in which, inter alia, it was held that the will had been forged.86 Well, of course it
had been, but this shows how reluctant the English civil courts are to come to
verdicts of misbehaviour in contentious probate proceedings.87
IX. Nuncupative wills
Before the enactment of the Statute of Frauds, any testament bequeathing personalty
could be oral. The Statute of Frauds laid down rules under which most testaments
had to be in writing, but, even after it came into force, there were three situations in
which someone could make a valid oral testament. They were: (a) where the property
consisted of personalty valued at less than £30; (b) where the testator gave instruc-
tions for a will, but died before he had had a chance to execute it; and (c) where the
testator was a soldier in actual military service, or a mariner or a seaman being at sea.
79
Mawby v Howard [2002] All ER (D) 114.
80
[2006] WTLR 367.
81
Treasury Solicitor v Doveton [2009] BPIR 352. But the report is in a relatively obscure series. And
why has there been no criminal prosecution here?
82
Three unreported forgery cases were referred to in the New Law Journal on 11 December 2009 at
1728.
83
[2010] EWHC 1575 (Ch).
84
[2009] All ER (D) 09.
85
Such an approach can be traced back to the lawyers of the ecclesiastical courts, who tended to
avoid unpleasantness in almost any event.
86
The (unreported) criminal proceedings were in the Cambridge Crown Court and ended in June
2010. Logically, it should have been more difficult to obtain a conviction for forgery in criminal
proceedings than to obtain a finding of forgery in civil (contentious probate) proceedings. There is
something seriously wrong here.
87
The point is obvious but nevertheless needs stressing: by the time that an attempt is made to obtain
probate of ‘a will’ the testator is incapable of coming forward to deny that the signature on the document is
his. In this sense, it is easier to get away with a forged signature to a will than a forged signature to almost
any other document.
If any one of these three should have survived the 1837 tidying-up operation, it
seems that it should have been the first. If there is to be a rule dispensing with
formalities, it ought to apply to small estates. Both the second and third exceptions to
the standard formality rules invited trouble. In fact, the 1837 Act got rid of the
dispensation for small estates and the special rule covering testators who made their
wills while in extremis, but retained the privilege accorded to soldiers and sailors. This
was probably in consequence of one case, now almost forgotten.
The rule that an oral testament could be granted probate, provided the testator
gave instructions for it, but then died before the person who had been commissioned
to prepare the necessary document had had time to complete it, was applied in the
case of Musto v Sutcliffe in 1818,88 but this was a relatively non-controversial
testament in favour of the deceased’s widow. Then came Theakston v Marson.89
Edward Theakston died suddenly on 7 November 1831, leaving a widow, but no
children and no next of kin. He was a trainer (of horses) and had personalty worth
somewhere between £5,000 and £8,000, a substantial amount in those days. Had he
died intestate, half of his estate would have passed to his widow and the other half, as
bona vacantia, to the crown. But the Reverend Mr Pochin, a clerk in holy orders and
the rector of Cornard, produced a paper which he said he had prepared three days
before Theakston’s death and in which Pochin recorded that Theakston wanted to
leave a small annuity to Mrs Theakston and the residue of his estate to a groom called
Marson. Such a paper could have been granted probate, provided that the court was
satisfied that the deceased had had a fixed and final intention that it was to constitute
his will and that he had been prevented from completing it by an act of God. In this
case, as in many others, the Prerogative Court carried out a minute and detailed
examination of all of the facts, including Mrs Theakston’s fondness for strong drink,
and, more to the point, the Reverend Mr Pochin’s dealings with the racing fraternity.
It was not particularly shocking that Pochin spent more of his time betting on horses
at Newmarket than looking after the welfare of his parishioners at Cornard; he was a
clergyman of the old school. What dismayed everyone was that he was reputed to
place bets against his own horses. In the gambling world, that was unforgivable – he
was a scoundrel. Pochin’s story was not believed, the court clearly thought that he
was in league with Marson, it refused probate to the alleged ‘will’, and ordered
Marson to pay the costs of the case. They must have been enormous.
The Theakston case was decided in 1832. The Real Property Commissioners
prepared their Report shortly afterwards. It is reasonable to suppose that they
knew all about it, and it must have given nuncupative wills, or claims concerning
them, a bad name. So, it is unsurprising that the 1837 Act made no provision for
grants of probate to oral death-bed wills. But oral wills made by soldiers and sailors
did not come under the spotlight and they were allowed to survive.
Section XXIII of the Statute of Frauds had enacted that:
88
3 Phill 104, 161 ER 1271.
89
(1832) 4 Hagg 290, 162 ER 1452.
324 Roger Kerridge
Notwithstanding this Act, any Soldier, being in actual military Service, or any Mariner, or
Seaman, being at Sea, may dispose of his Moveables, Wages and Personal Estate, as he or they
might have done before the making of this Act.
And section 11 of the Wills Act 1837 repeated these words in a very slightly
abbreviated form. The dispensation from the ordinary formality rules for soldiers
and sailors was said, when it was being applied in the English ecclesiastical courts, to
be based on the Roman law privilege given to legionaries, but the Emperor Justinian
had limited it to soldiers in expeditione and the rule applied by the ecclesiastical
courts in England was always wider. Under the Statute of Frauds and under the 1837
Act the privilege was limited to personalty, but it was extended to realty at the end of
the First World War and was, at the same time, extended to cover wills made by
minors and also by members of the Air Force.90
During the course of the twentieth century, the courts went out of their way to
give a wide interpretation to the words ‘a soldier in actual military service’ so that, for
example, in Re Wingham91 they were held to include a member of the Royal Air
Force who was training to fly in Canada, and to the words ‘a mariner or seaman
being at sea’ so that in In the Goods of Hale92 they were held to include a female typist
on the Lusitania.
Anyone who is now classified as: (a) a soldier in actual military service; or (b) a
mariner or seaman being at sea; or (c) a member of Her Majesty’s Naval or Marine
Forces under circumstances that if he were a soldier, he would be in actual military
service, may make a will without any formalities whatsoever.
It is submitted that nowadays this privilege makes no sense. It was different when
the Statute of Frauds was enacted and ‘servicemen were . . . likely to be engaged in
long campaigns abroad and thus likely to be cut off from the facilities for making a
will’,93 but that was more than 300 years ago and serving members of the armed
forces are today more, rather than less, likely than average members of the public to
be able to obtain legal advice.94
There have been few cases dealing with privileged wills since the end of the Second
World War, but there was one in 2010. In Re Servoz-Gabin (deceased): Ayling v
Summers,95 the deceased was a ship’s radio officer and it was held that he had made a
privileged will when he was ashore, but under orders to join a non-British-registered
ship,96 because he was deemed to be ‘at sea’. Given that the deceased’s estate was
valued at almost £600,000 after tax, and that the principal witness in favour of the
90 91
Wills (Soldiers and Sailors) Act 1918. [1949] P 187.
92
[1915] 2 IR 362.
93
Law Reform Committee’s 22nd Report, The Making and Revocation of Wills, 1980: Cmnd 7902, 9.
94
For criticism of the rule as it applies nowadays, see Martin Davey, ‘The Making and Revocation of
Wills’ [1980] The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 64, 70–72; Patricia Critchley, ‘Privileged Wills and
Testamentary Formalities: A Time to Die?’ (1999) 58 CLJ 49.
95
[2010] 1 All ER 410.
96
Earlier cases had established that a sailor could be regarded as ‘at sea’ when under orders to join a
British-registered ship. This case went further and included a non-British-registered ship. The distinction
between British registration and non-British registration ought to be irrelevant, but the idea that a sailor is
‘at sea’ when merely under orders to join any ship is hard to follow.
oral will was the mother of someone who was likely to benefit on the death of the
person who took under it, the writer cannot feel that the maintenance of the privilege
in this kind of situation is other than unsatisfactory.97
X. Holograph wills
In English law there is not, and never has been, a separate category of holograph wills
as such. Before the coming into force of the Statute of Frauds in 1677, any will, other
than a will of land, could be made without formalities, and a will of land had only to
be ‘in writing’. So, a will of land in the testator’s handwriting would have been valid,
not because it was in his handwriting, but because it was ‘in writing’ and a will of any
other property would have been valid if it was in the testator’s handwriting, although
such handwriting would not have been a condition of its validity.
After 1677 and before 1838, some of the rules which applied under the Statute of
Frauds when ‘there were ten different laws for regulating the execution of wills under
different circumstances’ would have encompassed holograph wills but, again, not
because they were holograph wills. R H Helmholz98 suggests that, before 1838,
English law recognized holograph wills. Well, yes and no. Holograph wills were
always valid before 1677, but not as such, and, between 1677 and 1838, they were
sometimes valid, but not as such. To suggest that English law recognized holograph
wills before 1838 is to attempt to make English law sound as though it was more in
line with the civil law than was really the case. The holograph will was never, as such,
a part of English law.
XI. Alterations
Section 21 of the Wills Act 1837 lays down the rule applicable to the alteration of a
will:
No obliteration, interlineation, or other alteration made in any will after the execution thereof
shall be valid or have any effect, except so far as the words or effect of the will before such
alteration shall not be apparent, unless such alteration shall be executed in like manner as
herein before is required for the execution of the will . . .
If an alteration is made to a will before execution, the alteration is valid, but there is a
rebuttable presumption that an unattested alteration was made after execution. If an
alteration is made after execution of the will, but is then itself duly executed, with the
formalities required for the execution of a will, the alteration will be valid. An
alteration made after execution, and not itself executed, is invalid but, in so far as
97
The oral will, upheld by the court, was in favour of the deceased’s aunt who, by the time when the
case reached court, was aged over ninety. It was admitted that the aunt had made a will in favour of the
daughter of the person whose evidence established the existence of the oral will in the aunt’s favour.
98
R H Helmholz, ‘The Origin of Holographic Wills in England’ (1994) 15 Legal History 97.
326 Roger Kerridge
it makes any part of the will not ‘apparent’, it revokes that part if the testator has an
intention to revoke it.99 If the testator’s intention to revoke is conditional, revocation
does not take place despite the obliteration, unless the condition is fulfilled.100
XII. Reform
The rules contained in section 9 of the Wills Act 1837 can be criticized both because
they sometimes invalidate authentic documents which unquestionably represent the
true intentions of those who executed them and also because they fail to offer
sufficient protection against certain forms of abuse of the will-making process.
Ever since section 9 was first drafted, the courts have applied it in so literal a way
that there have been occurrences of unintentional infringement. Take the 1969 case
of Re Groffman.101 The testator had been married twice and had adult children by his
first marriage; and so he wanted to make a will, the purpose of which was to ensure
that some of his property passed to his children by his first marriage and that it did
not all pass to his second wife, which it would do if he were to die intestate. The
testator asked a solicitor to draft and engross his will. The solicitor did so, and then
sent the will to the testator with instructions as to execution. The testator knew that
he had to sign or acknowledge the will in the presence of two independent witnesses;
so one evening he took the will, which he had already signed, to a social function.
Having arrived at the function, he chose two friends as witnesses and indicated to
them that he had the will with him and that he wanted them to witness his signature.
He then went with one of the witnesses into an adjoining room, took his will from
his pocket, acknowledged his signature in the presence of this witness who then
signed and left the room just as the second witness entered. The testator then
acknowledged his signature in the presence of the second witness who then signed.
It was held that the will had not been properly executed. The testator had not
acknowledged his signature in the simultaneous presence of the two witnesses. The
trial judge said: ‘ . . . I have been satisfied that the document does represent the
testamentary intentions of the deceased, I would very gladly find in its favour; but
I am bound to apply the Statute, which has been enacted by Parliament . . . ’102
In 1980 the Law Reform Committee published their Twenty-second Report, ‘The
Making and Revocation of Wills’,103 but it was a disappointing document which
99
‘Apparent’ in s 21 means optically apparent on the face of the will itself: Townley v Watson [1844] 3
Curt 761, 768, 163 ER 893, 895 (Sir H Jenner Fust); In the Goods of Itter [1950] P 130 at 132
(Ormerod J).
100
This is part of the doctrine of dependant relative revocation, otherwise known as conditional
revocation.
101
[1969] 1 WLR 733.
102
At 737 (Sir Jocelyn Simon P). There seems to have been a recent tendency towards a slightly more
liberal approach. See, eg Weatherill v Pearce [1995] 1 WLR 592. But a radical departure from tradition
seems highly unlikely.
103
1980: Cmnd 7902.
seemed to go out of its way to avoid all discussion of the need for real change.104 The
Committee considered two proposals for legislative reform. The first, and more
radical, was to confer on the court a dispensing power to admit a will to probate if
the court was satisfied that, notwithstanding its defective execution, it was genuine.
The second, much more limited, proposal was to relax the formalities prescribed
by section 9. The Committee favoured the second proposal, and then went on
to recommend the two very minor changes which were, in substance, enacted by the
Administration of Justice Act 1982 and now form part of the substituted section 9.
The two amendments amount to nothing more than minor tinkering. One is to the
effect that the testator’s signature no longer needs to be ‘at the foot or end’ of the will,
while the other is that the witnesses may acknowledge their signatures (rather than
sign) after the testator has signed or acknowledged in their presence. As far as the
writer is aware, there has been no case since the amendments were enacted where
either of them has had the effect of validating a will which would not otherwise have
been valid.105 A properly drafted dispensing power would have been a significant
improvement on the current position.106
But what troubles the present writer, more than the way in which some wills are
refused probate because they do not comply with the strict formality rules, is that it is
quite possible for a will to obtain probate in England when it ought to be clear to
everyone that there are grave doubts as to whether it represents the freely expressed
wishes of a competent and independent testator. Section 9 of the Wills Act does not
require that a will be prepared by, or executed in the presence of, a solicitor or a
notary. A will does not have to be written in the testator’s handwriting, nor does it
have to be typed. It does not have to be signed by the testator – it may be signed on
his behalf. It does not have to be signed in front of the witnesses – the signature may
be acknowledged. The witnesses do not need to be acquainted with the testator, or
know anything about the contents of the will. The witnesses do not need to be people
who are expected to survive the testator – so that they will be able to give evidence if
there is a problem or a query.107 And there is no rule which forbids their being linked
104
There is a huge contrast between the Fourth Report of the Real Property Commissioners in 1833
(n 31), which was a radical document, and the Twenty-second Report of the Law Reform Committee,
almost 150 years later, which was not.
105
There do not appear to be any reported cases on acknowledgement by witnesses of their signatures.
In Wood v Smith [1993] Ch 90 the fact that the testator’s signature was not at the ‘foot or end’ of the will
did not invalidate it, but other factors did. There were clearly a number of things wrong with the will, and
the fact that the testator had not signed at the end was an indication (to say the least) that something odd
was going on.
106
It is not for the writer of this chapter to comment on the position in other jurisdictions, but John H
Langbein, in two articles, ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88 Harvard LR 489 and
‘Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in
Probate Law’ (1987) 87 Columbia LR 1, compares and contrasts reforms enacted in Queensland and in
South Australia. He discusses the four functions served by formalities: (a) the evidentiary function; (b) the
channelling function; (c) the cautionary function; and (d) the protective function, and ends by being
strongly in favour of a dispensing power along the lines of the South Australian model. See also ch 14
below at 350; ch 18 below at 468.
107
The Groffman will (see n 101 above) would, almost certainly, not have been declared void if the
witnesses had been dead or untraceable.
328 Roger Kerridge
with a beneficiary. A would-be beneficiary loses his benefit if he is himself a witness,

or if his spouse or civil partner is a witness; but this does not happen where his
parent, his child, his cohabitant, or his closest friend is a witness. And a beneficiary
may be present when a will is drafted or executed.108 Finally, there is no rule which
provides that anyone needs to be informed when a will is executed. The execution of
a will may be secretive.109 If a testator makes a ‘suspicious will’, there is a good
chance that those who are his next of kin, or those who are the beneficiaries under an
earlier will, will not find out until after he is dead, by which time it is too late to ask
the testator to explain – and too late to request an examination of his mental state. All
in all, the position is thoroughly unsatisfactory, but there is insufficient space in this
chapter, which deals only with formalities, to pursue this further.110
But, to end on a positive note, one welcome development in recent years has been
a change in the attitude of the judges when dealing with negligence in the prepar-
ation of wills by professional draftsmen. It was accepted during the nineteenth
century that, in a case where a professional draftsman failed to prepare a valid will,
or failed to prepare a will in accordance with the testator’s instructions, no one had
an effective cause of action. The testator had lost nothing and the intended bene-
ficiaries had no contractual relationship with the draftsman.111 But in Ross v
Caunters112 and White v Jones,113 it was accepted that a negligent draftsman is liable
to a prospective beneficiary for any loss he suffered as a result of the draftsman’s
negligence if such negligence caused the will, or a legacy in it, to fail. The effect of
these decisions is, at least, to encourage draftsmen to take care over the drafting and
execution of wills, and so there are likely to be fewer failures as a result of undue
execution than there would have been had the old rule still been in place.
108
In Roman law, a gift to a person who had assisted in the preparation of the will was normally void
(Julian D. 34, 8, 1) and the would-be beneficiary would normally be liable to the penalty for forgery under
the Lex Cornelia de Falsis (D. 48, 10).
109
Before 1838, some wills had to be published, but publication was abolished by the Wills Act 1837
s 13.
110
See n 46 above, where reference is made to the Sherrington case, and see also Roger Kerridge, ‘Wills
Made in Suspicious Circumstances: The Problem of the Vulnerable Testator’ (2000) 59 CLJ 310; idem,
‘Draftsmen and Suspicious Wills’, in Martin Dixon (ed), Modern Studies in Property Law vol 5 (2009) 159.
111
Robertson v Fleming (1861) 4 Macq 167.
112 113
[1980] Ch 297. [1995] 2 AC 207.
14
Testamentary Formalities in Australia
and New Zealand
Nicola Peart*
I. Introduction 330
II. Historical overview 333
1. Before the Wills Act 1837 333
2. The Wills Act 1837 comes to Australia and New Zealand 333
3. Testamentary formalities in the Wills Act 1837 334
4. Incorporation by reference 336
III. Wills of indigenous peoples 336
1. Wills of New Zealand Maori 336
2. Wills of Aboriginal people of Australia 337
IV. Special wills 337
1. Wills of minors 337
2. Wills of persons lacking testamentary capacity 338
3. Privileged wills 339
V. The current law 339
1. Reform 339
2. Towards uniform succession laws 340
3. Retrospectivity 341
4. Australia 341
(a) Position of the testator’s signature 342
(b) Signature of someone other than the testator 342
(c) Witnessing requirements 343
(d) Altering wills 344
* I am indebted to the University of Otago for its financial support of a summer studentship and to
Darren Smith for his invaluable research assistance. I am also grateful to Alexandra McRae for further
research assistance.
330 Nicola Peart
5. New Zealand 345

(a) Signing the will 346
(b) Position of signature 346
(c) Witnessing requirements 347
(d) Altering wills 348
VI. Power to dispense with testamentary formalities 349
1. Overview of dispensing power 349
2. Meaning of ‘document’ 351
3. Document purporting to state testamentary intentions 351
4. Document intended to be testator’s will 352
5. Evidence and procedure 354
VII. Conclusion 355
I. Introduction
Australia and New Zealand are both former colonies of Great Britain. Australia was
settled as terra nullius and, in accordance with English common law in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, such English statute law and common law as existed at the
founding of a colony applied to the colony to the extent that it was applicable and
appropriate.1 Sovereignty over New Zealand was formally ceded by the indigenous
Maori chiefs to the British Crown by the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, but because
the colonists did not think indigenous law was suitable, New Zealand was treated as a
settled colony for purposes of its legal system.2
When settlement of Australia began in 1788 with the establishment of penal
colonies in New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land (later renamed Tasmania),3
the English settlers had the right to dispose of personalty as well as realty on death,
but such dispositions had to be made in accordance with the Statute of Frauds
1677.4 The principle of testamentary freedom and the formalities with which that
freedom was to be exercised thus became part of the law in the Australian colonies on
1
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England vol 1 (London, 1809) 107; Cooper v Stuart
(1889) 14 App Cas 286. Note, however, that due to the penal nature of New South Wales and Van
Diemen’s Land (later renamed Tasmania) there was uncertainty as to whether they were ‘settled colonies’.
That uncertainty was resolved with the adoption of an Act to provide for the Administration of Justice in
New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, 9 Geo IV c 83 s 24, which declared ‘that all Laws and Statutes
in force within the Realm of England at the Time of the passing of this Act . . . applied in . . . New South
Wales and Van Diemen’s Land’. As the Act’s date is 25 July 1828, that had the effect of incorporating law
that post-dated the settlement of New South Wales in 1788 and Van Diemen’s Land in 1803.
2
Phillip Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2007) 138; Jeremy Finn,
‘Development of the Law in New Zealand’, in Peter Spiller, Jeremy Finn, and Richard Boast (eds), A New
Zealand Legal History (2001) 75 ff.
3
J M Bennett and Alex Castles, A Source Book of Australian Legal History (1979) 1–5.
4
For the early history of will-making in England, see ch 13 above at 307 ff. See also Rosalind Croucher
and Prue Vines, Succession – Families, Property and Death (2009) ch 1.
Testamentary Formalities in Australia and New Zealand 331
settlement.5 In contrast to England, where different courts had jurisdiction over real
property and personalty, jurisdiction in the colonies was conferred on a single court:
initially the Court of Civil Jurisdiction and subsequently the Supreme Court.6 By the
time New Zealand was colonized in 1840, the Wills Act 1837 had been adopted in
England, and so governed the making of wills in New Zealand from colonization.7
The Australian colonies also adopted the Wills Act 1837 by means of the Imperial
Act Adoption Acts.
Both the Statute of Frauds 1677 and the Wills Act 1837 imposed formal
requirements on the making of wills and rendered non-compliant wills void, even
if the defect was minor and the document clearly expressed the deceased’s testamen-
tary intentions. While the requirements have been liberalized over time, most are still
in force. However, unlike England, where non-compliance is still fatal, both Aus-
tralia and New Zealand have amended their statutes to empower the courts to
dispense with the formal requirements if the document purporting to be a will
expresses the testamentary intentions of the deceased. As a result, the formal require-
ments no longer play the critical role they once did and testamentary wishes are less
likely to be defeated by technicalities.
Testamentary wishes may nonetheless be overridden even if the will complies with
the formal requirements. Both Australia and New Zealand have legislation that
empowers the court to intervene if the deceased has not made adequate provision
for the proper maintenance and support of close family members.8 This jurisdiction
has been liberally construed in both countries, going well beyond the provision of
relief for financial need.9 So, while the simplification of testamentary formalities and
the dispensing power are intended to give better effect to testamentary intentions,
testamentary freedom is significantly curtailed by family provision legislation. On
the other hand, since the abolition of estate duty, there is no risk that beneficiaries
will lose any of their inheritance to taxation.10
Wills and the intestacy rules are not the only means by which wealth is transmitted
between generations. Trusts are widely used in both Australia and New Zealand for a
variety of reasons, including succession and estate planning. Assets held in trust of
5
Testamentary freedom was subject to the widow’s right of dower: Croucher and Vines (n 4) para
1.21; Margaret Briggs, ‘Historical Analysis’, in Nicola Peart, Margaret Briggs, and Mark Henaghan (eds),
Relationship Property on Death (2004) para 1.2.
6
Bennett and Castles (n 3) 20. As to the meaning of probate, see ch 13 above at 318.
7
New Zealand was initially governed as part of the colony of New South Wales, but it became a
colony in its own right in 1840: Finn (n 2) 65.
8
Family Protection Act 1955 (NZ) s 4; Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 41; Testator’s Family Mainte-
nance Act 1912 (Tas) s 3; Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic) s 91; Family Provision Act 1969
(ACT); Family Provision Act 1970 (NT) s 8; Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) s 7 and Succession Act
2006 (NSW) s 59; Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1982 (SA) s 7; Inheritance (Family and Dependants
Provision) Act 1972 (WA) s 6.
9
John de Groot and Bruce Nickel, Family Provision in Australia (2007); W M Patterson, Law of
Family Protection and Testamentary Promises (2004).
10
Inheritance tax was abolished in Australia in 1979 by the Estate Duty Amendment Act 1978 s 3. In
New Zealand estate duty was reduced to zero by the Estate Duty Abolition Act 1993 and
repealed altogether by the Estate Duty Repeal Act 1999.
332 Nicola Peart
which the deceased is not a capital beneficiary do not form part of the deceased’s
estate and are therefore not subject to the will. Co-ownership of property may also
affect the estate. New Zealand and Australia follow English law by recognizing two
forms of co-ownership: joint ownership (joint tenancy), where all the joint owners
own the whole property, and common ownership (tenancy in common), where the
owners own the property in undivided shares.11 Jointly owned assets are retained by
the surviving owner and do not form part of the estate of the deceased owner.
Spouses and de facto partners (cohabitants) commonly hold substantial amounts of
property as joint owners, such as the family home and bank accounts. The will of the
first dying spouse or partner does not apply to those assets.12 Only the surviving
spouse or partner has the right to dispose of these assets by will.
Notwithstanding these non-probate transfers, wills remain an important means of
disposing of property on death, particularly in New Zealand where for the past five
years the testation rate has been around 52 per cent of people dying.13 In Australia
the rate varies significantly from state to state, averaging out at 37.8 per cent for the
year 2008–9. Victoria had the top rate with 50.3 per cent, while Queensland and
Northern Territory had the lowest rates with 27.2 and 15.3 per cent respectively.14
The comparatively high rate in New Zealand may be attributable to regular media
campaigns by the Public Trust and the New Zealand Law Society, urging people to
make wills and offering to make them for free.
This chapter examines testamentary formalities in Australia and New Zealand
since colonization. It begins with a brief historical overview of the testamentary
formalities before and after England adopted the Wills Act in 1837. This Act was the
foundation of the law of wills in both Australia and New Zealand for 150 years or
more, and much of the current law is still based on that Act. The current law will
then be addressed, starting with the changes to the formal requirements, followed by
the jurisdiction to dispense with those requirements.
11
See F H Lawson and B Rudden, The Law of Property (3rd edn, 2002) 92–3. See also ch 13 above at
306.
12
In New Zealand the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 may be invoked by the personal representa-
tive of a deceased spouse or partner to recover some of the jointly owned assets for the estate under the Act’s
equal sharing regime: Public Trust v Whyman [2005] 2 NZLR 696. See also ch 13 above at 306.
13
Between 2004 and 2009 there were between 27,034 and 29,188 deaths per year and between 14,117
and 15,780 wills admitted to probate or annexed to letters of administration. No grant of probate is
necessary for wills that do not dispose of land or where funds held in accounts are below a specified
amount. I am indebted to John Earles, Registrar of the High Court in Wellington, for the New Zealand
statistics. Will-making is strongly encouraged in New Zealand through the media, holding ‘will months’,
and making information about the process of will-making widely available.
14
The Australian figures for 2008–9 are: New South Wales – 48,782 deaths and 22,774 grants of
probate = 46.7%; Victoria – 35,497 deaths and 17,857 grants of probate = 50.3%; Queensland – 27,335
deaths and 7,439 grants of probate = 27.2%; Western Australia – 12,752 deaths and 5,581 grants of
probate = 43.8%; South Australia – 12,616 deaths and 4,968 grants of probate = 39.4%; Tasmania –
4,219 deaths and 1,961 grants of probate = 46.4%; Australian Capital Territory – 1,697 deaths and 571
grants of probate = 33.6%; Northern Territory – 1,041 deaths and 159 grants of probate = 15.3%. I am
grateful to Prue Vines and Alex McRae for locating the Australian statistics.
II. Historical overview
1. Before the Wills Act 1837

Prior to the adoption of the Wills Act 1837, the Statute of Frauds 1677 applied to
the Australian colonies with its complex array of rules for different circumstances.15
Section V of that statute stipulated that all devises of land and tenements had to be in
writing and signed by the devisor, or by someone else at the devisor’s direction.16
The devise also had to be attested and subscribed by three or four witnesses in the
presence of the devisor. Failure to comply with these requirements rendered
the devise void and of no effect. Bequests of personalty could be made orally in
the presence of three witnesses, but other requirements of the Statute of Frauds made
oral testaments almost impossible. Soldiers, mariners, and seamen were exempted
from these onerous requirements.17 As various parts of Australia were colonized,
these rules for disposing of property on death applied in the new colonies.18
2. The Wills Act 1837 comes to Australia and New Zealand

The Wills Act 1837 greatly simplified the law governing wills by stipulating one set
of rules for all wills other than wills of soldiers and seamen (so-called ‘privileged
wills’).19 The distinction between different types of property was abolished. As a
result, dispositions by will were treated differently from inter vivos transactions where
the distinction between realty and personalty applies to this day, with little or no
formality for personalty and writing being required for dispositions of land.
The 1837 Act was adopted into the various Australian colonies by the Imperial Act
Adoption Acts, first in New South Wales and Western Australia in 1839, then in
Tasmania in 1841, and finally in South Australia in 1842.20 The New South Wales
Act applied to Victoria until 1864 and to Queensland until 1867 when both adopted
their own Acts. The Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory were
governed by the laws of New South Wales and South Australia respectively. The
Northern Territory adopted its own Wills Ordinance in 1938 and the Australian
Capital Territory did so in 1968. When Australia became a federation in 1900, the
Acts then governing wills in each of the jurisdictions remained in force.21 Succession
15
16
As married women had no real testamentary capacity, the power to dispose of property on death was
usually confined to husbands: see R Atherton, ‘Expectation without Right: Testamentary Freedom and the
Position of Women in 19th Century New South Wales’ (1988) 11 University of New South Wales LJ 133.
17
Statute of Frauds 1677 s 22.
18
See n 3 above and G L Certoma, The Law of Succession in New South Wales (1987) 14.
19
Wills Act 1837 ss 11 and 12. See ch 13 above at 323–5.
20
Imperial Act Adoption Act 1839; Imperial Act Adoption Act 1842.
21
Several states had by then adopted their own wills statutes, but they did not substantively change the
requirements for making wills. For example, the Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW)
retained the substantive provisions of the Wills Act 1837, but also provided for probate and
administration.
334 Nicola Peart
law is not a federal matter under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia
Act 1900. There are therefore eight statutes regulating wills in Australia.22 Although
they are now very similar, as a result of a nationwide effort to create uniform
succession laws, there were and still are differences.23
New Zealand, by contrast, is a unitary state. As it was only colonized in 1840, the
Wills Act 1837 applied to New Zealand from the date of colonization until it was
replaced by the Wills Act 2007.24
3. Testamentary formalities in the Wills Act 1837

Section 9 of the Wills Act 1837, as originally worded, set down the formal require-
ments for the execution of wills other than privileged wills:
No will shall be valid unless it shall be in writing, and executed in manner hereinafter
mentioned; (that is to say), it shall be signed at the foot or end thereof by the testator, or by
some other person in his presence and by his direction; and such signature shall be made or
acknowledged by the testator in the presence of 2 or more witnesses present at the same time,
and such witnesses shall attest and shall subscribe the will in the presence of the testator, but no
form of attestation shall be necessary.25
These requirements derived from those in the Statute of Frauds 1677 for devising
realty, but section 9 applied to all property and required only two witnesses, rather
than three or four. Section 9 applied not only to wills, but also to codicils and to the
exercise of powers of testamentary appointment.26 Alterations to wills and the revival
of revoked wills also had to comply with these requirements.27
The Australian and New Zealand courts closely followed English precedent,
insisting on strict compliance with the requirements.28 Although they took a broad
view of what constituted a signature,29 they adopted a strict approach to the
requirement that the testator’s signature be at the foot or end of the will, as that
was thought to protect against fraudulent insertions. The expanded meaning given to
the words ‘at the foot or end’ by the 1852 Amendment to the Wills Act was adopted
by the Australian and New Zealand colonies.30 As in England, the amendment was
22
The statutes currently in force in Australia are: Succession Act 2006 (NSW); Succession Act 1981
(Qld); Wills Act 1936 (SA); Wills Act 2008 (Tas); Wills Act 1997 (Vic); Wills Act 1970 (WA); Wills Act
1968 (ACT); Wills Act 2000 (NT).
23
The Uniform Succession Laws Project initiated by the Attorneys-General of Australia in 1991.
24
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 3.
25
As servicemen on active service did not have to comply with any of the requirements and still do not
have to do so in South Australia, Tasmania, Australian Capital Territory, and New Zealand, these informal
wills are beyond the scope of this chapter. The other Australian jurisdictions have abolished this privilege:
Croucher and Vines (n 4) paras 8.2 ff.
26 27
Wills Act 1837 s 1. Wills Act 1837 ss 21 and 22.
28
See ch 13 above at 312–13.
29
Initials: In Will of Pugh (1889) 15 VLR 833. Marks: In Will of Hurd (1883) 9 VLR 23; In re
McNamee (1912) 31 NZLR 1007; Dodd v Lang 20 July 1989 SC New South Wales, cited in Croucher and
Vines (n 4) para 7.13C. Printed name: Re Isherwood [1946] VLR 312; Re Gibson [1953] NZLR 122. Will
signed under assumed name: Re Sister Albinus [1924] NZLR 880. Incomplete signature due to weakness:
Re Male [1934] VLR 318. Nowadays, it might also include an electronic signature.
30
Tasmania adopted the amendment in 1852, New South Wales in 1853, Western Australia and
Victoria in 1855, and South Australia in 1862. The New South Wales Acts applied to Queensland until
liberally construed, thereby saving many wills from invalidity.31 But it did not apply
to any writing that appeared below the signature, unless the writing could be
construed to be above the signature by ascertaining in what order the will was to
be read.32 The position of the signature thus remained a trap, particularly for do-it-
yourself testators.
The witnessing requirements were another common cause of invalidity. If
the witnesses were not present at the same time, or if one witnessed the testator
signing and the other witnessed the testator’s acknowledgement, the will was void.33
The witnesses did not have to know that the document was a will, but they did have
to be able to see the testator signing or the signature that the testator was acknow-
ledging, even if they did not in fact see it.34 Each witness had to attest the will,
thereby giving witness to the fact that the testator had signed or acknowledged his or
her signature while both of the witnesses were present. Being able to see the signature
was therefore insufficient. Attestation required mental presence as well. The Wills
Act did not set a competence or age requirement for witnesses, thus not excluding
persons with reduced mental capacity or minors from witnessing wills, but their role
implied that they had to have sufficient capacity to attest the testator’s signature.
Executors, creditors, and beneficiaries under the will were also competent witnesses
to prove the due execution of the will.35 But gifts to an attesting witness or the spouse
of such a witness were void.36 Gifts to a superfluous witness or the spouse of such a
witness used to be void as well.37 The legislation was amended in the late 1960s and
1970s to avoid that consequence.38
The writing and witnessing requirements gave the will-making process a degree of
formality thought to be necessary to give effect to the wishes of a deceased person.
1867 and to Australian Capital Territory until 1968. The South Australian Acts applied to Northern
Territory until 1938. In New Zealand the English Acts Act 1854 s 1 declared the 1852 Act applicable.
31
eg, In the Will of Doherty (1907) 24 WN (NSW) 150; In the Will of Hall [1910] VLR 14; Re
Campbell (1895) 13 NZLR 340; Re Bettley [1927] GLR 100; Cinnamon v Public Trustee (Tas) [1934] 51
CLR 403; In the Will of Smith [1965] Qd R 177; Re Allee [1960] VR 481; In Will of Spence [1969]
2 NSWR 195.
32
Cinnamon v Public Trustee (Tas) [1934] 51 CLR 403; Beven v Beven (1941) 41 SR (NSW) 261. In
Re Robertson (1972) 2 SASR 481 and Re Fairhurst [1976] 1 NZLR 51, only those parts of the will above
the testator’s signature were admitted to probate. See generally I J Hardingham, M A Neave, and
H A J Ford, Wills and Intestacy in Australia and New Zealand (1989) para 209; W M Patterson, The
Laws of New Zealand: Wills (2009) para 51.
33
Re Groffman [1969] 1 WLR 733; Re Colling [1972] 1 WLR 1440.
34
Hudson v Parker (1844) 1 Rob Ecc 14, 163 ER 948; In Will of Morgan [1950] VLR 355; Re
Groffman [1969] 1 WLR 733. Blind people cannot witness wills: Re Gunstan’s Goods (1882) 7 PD 102.
But In the Estate of Gibson [1949] P 434 left open the possibility of a blind person witnessing a will written
in Braille.
35
Wills Act 1837 ss 14–17.
36
Wills Act 1837 s 15; Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) s 13; Wills Act 1958 (Vic)
s 13; Succession Act 1867–1974 (Qld) s 47; Wills Act 1970–71 (WA) ss 12 and 13; Wills Act 1840 (Tas)
s 15; Wills Ordinance 1968 (ACT) s 15; Wills Ordinance 1938 (NT) s 17.
37
In Estate of Bravda [1968] 1 WLR 479; In Will of Elms [1964–5] NSWR 286.
38
Wills Act 1968 (England and Wales) s 1; Wills Amendment Act 1977 (NZ) s 3; Wills Act 1970–71
(WA) s 13(2); Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) s 13; Wills Act 1958 (Vic) s 13(3)(c)
(i); Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 15(2).
336 Nicola Peart
Their function was to provide reliable evidence of the testator’s testamentary inten-
tions and protect against the risk of fraud, forgery, and undue influence. The
ceremony was also intended to impress upon the testator the significance of making
a will.39 Yet, will-making was in other respects a very informal process. The legisla-
tion did not prescribe the material on which the will was to be written. They could
be, and were, written on a wide variety of materials, including walls, doors, cloth, and
even egg shells! The content was not prescribed either. Nor did wills have to use a
particular form of words. ‘All to Mum’ was an acceptable expression of testamentary
intent. However, such wills were not common. Most testators sought legal advice
and assistance in the preparation and execution of their wills. That generally ensured
that the will was validly executed.40 But there was no requirement that lawyers be
involved in any part of the process. Wills were also not registered, nor was there a
central repository where wills had to be lodged. The will-making process was in
essence a private matter that could be completed without any involvement from
professionals or the state. The absence of external oversight increased the likelihood
of wills not complying with the requirements of the Wills Act. It was easy to fall foul
of the technical requirements, thus invalidating documents that were clearly
intended to be wills and expressed the deceased’s testamentary intentions.
4. Incorporation by reference
As in England, it was possible to incorporate into a will a document that was not
formally executed, but was in existence when the will was executed and was referred
to in the will so as to clearly identify the document.41
III. Wills of indigenous peoples
1. Wills of New Zealand Maori

New Zealand’s indigenous Maori population currently constitutes about 15 per cent
of the total population.42 Their customs are recognized in various contexts, particu-
larly as regards land classified as Maori freehold land and Maori customary land.43 It
39
John H Langbein, ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88 Harvard LR 489; Andrew
Lang, ‘Formality v Intention – Wills in an Australian Supermarket’ (1985) 15 Melbourne University LR 82;
Julie Maxton, ‘Execution of Wills: The Formalities Considered’ (1982) 1 Canterbury LR 393.
40
Mistakes could still be made in the execution and, if they were attributable to the negligence of the
lawyer involved, disappointed beneficiaries could seek damages for the resulting loss: Ross v Caunters
[1980] Ch 297; Hill v Van Erp (1997) 142 ALR 687.
41
See ch 13 above at 316; Croucher and Vines (n 4) para 7.34; Will of Beveridge (1905) 6 SR (NSW) 1;
Will of Duncan [1916] VLR 1; Re Beckbessinger [1993] 2 NZLR 362.
42
In 2009 there were 653,100 Maori residents in New Zealand out of a total population of 4,318,100.
43
Jacinta Ruru, ‘Implications for Maori: Historical Overview’, in Peart et al (n 5) para 16.2.1; E Durie,
‘Will the Settlers Settle? Cultural Conciliation and Law’ (1996) 4 Otago LR 449. The Te Ture Whenua
Maori Act 1993 restricts the alienation of Maori land to persons who descend from a common ancestor.
Testamentary power is similarly restricted (s 108).
was not the custom of Maori to make written wills, but they did make verbal
deathbed declarations, known as ohaki.44 Persons who expected to die imminently
called relatives and tribal leaders to their bedside to inform them of their wishes as to
the disposition of their property. Once spoken, the wishes were binding on the
relatives who implemented them without question. Ohaki were effective to dispose
of property on death until 1895 when they were invalidated by the Native Land Laws
Amendment Act.45 Thereafter, Maori had to comply with the requirements of the
Wills Act 1837 if they wanted to determine how their property was to be disposed of
on death. However, the association of a will with imminent death remains a strong
disincentive to making a formal will.46 Anecdotal evidence suggests that ohaki are
still made, in spite of their formal legal ineffectiveness.
2. Wills of Aboriginal people of Australia

At 2.4 per cent of the total population, the proportion of Aborigines living in
Australia is very small.47 Many Aborigines were killed after European settlement
and the colonial classification of Australia as terra nullius meant that aboriginal
customs and governance were disregarded. Although the High Court of Australia
some 200 years later declared the terra nullius classification incorrect, the damage was
done.48 In recent decades, efforts have been made to recognize and accommodate
surviving local customs, but they are piecemeal and, for purposes of succession,
confined to recognizing relationships other than marriage. To the extent that
Aborigines had some form of will-making, it is not recognized in Australia. Abor-
igines wishing to make a will must comply with the ordinary statutory requirements.
Unsurprisingly, their testation rate is low.49
IV. Special wills
1. Wills of minors
Minors were traditionally incapable of making a valid will.50 Over time, that rule has
been relaxed. Although in general the minimum age requirement is still eighteen,51
44
N Smith, Native Custom and Law Affecting Native Land (1942) 97.
45
Native Land Laws Amendment Act 1895 s 33.
46
Although there are no reliable statistics, it seems that Maori have a low rate of testation.
47
There were 517,043 Aboriginal people resident in Australia in 2008 out of a total population of
21,374,000.
48
Mabo v Queensland (no 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. Law Reform Commission Report 31, The Recognition
of Aboriginal Customary Laws (1986) outlines the consequences of the terra nullius classification for
Aborigines and their customs.
49
Prue Vines, ‘When Cultures Clash: Aborigines and Inheritance in Australia’, in Gareth Miller (ed),
Frontiers of Family Law (2003) 98.
50
Wills Act 1837 s 7 set the minimum age at twenty-one. The current minimum age is eighteen: Wills
Act 1970 (WA) s 7; Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 8(1); Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 7(1); Succession Act (NSW) s 5
(1); Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 9(1); Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 5(1); Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 5; Wills Act 2008
(Tas) s 7(1); Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 9.
51
This is the age of majority in Australia. In New Zealand the age of majority is twenty: Age of
Majority Act 1970 s 4. However, legal guardianship ends at eighteen: Care of Children Act 2004 s 28. The
338 Nicola Peart
New Zealand and Australia (other than Western Australia) permit persons below
that age to make wills if they are or have been married.52 In New Zealand minors
who are or have been in a civil union or de facto relationship may also make wills.53
Even unmarried minors aged sixteen or seventeen have been able to make wills in
New Zealand since 1970 with approval from the court or the Public Trustee, if it was
satisfied that the minor understood the effect and implications of the proposed
will.54 New South Wales amended its statute in 1988 to give the court a similar
power, but without setting a minimum age.55 Aside from Western Australia, the rest
of Australia has followed that example.56 New Zealand has since gone one step
further. Rather than limiting permission to a specific will, section 9 of the Wills Act
2007 empowers the Family Court to authorize a minor of any age to make, change,
or revoke any will if the court is satisfied that the minor understands the effect of
doing so. Once court approval has been granted, the minor must comply with all the
other requirements for executing a valid will, as discussed in part V below.
2. Wills of persons lacking testamentary capacity

For adults who lack testamentary capacity there is legislative provision in both
countries for court-authorized wills.57 Such wills may be necessary where an existing
will or the intestacy provisions are not appropriate. The requirements for these wills
differ from ordinary wills and are aimed at ensuring that the will reflects what the
incapacitated person would have wished had he or she been competent. In Australia
such wills must be signed by the registrar of the court and sealed with the seal of the
court.58 The New Zealand requirements resemble more closely the requirements of
section 9 of the Wills Act 1837.59 The will must be signed by the ‘property manager’
age of eighteen has been the minimum age for making wills in New Zealand since the Wills Amendment
Act 1969.
52
Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 6; Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 7(2); Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 5; Succession Act (Qld)
s 9(2); Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 7(2); Succession Act (NSW) s 5(2); Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 8.
53
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 10(2).
54
Wills Amendment Act 1969 (NZ) s 2.
55
Wills Probate Administration Act 1898 (NSW) s 6A, as amended in 1988; Succession Act 2006
(NSW) ss 5 and 16.
56
Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 19; Wills Act 1968 (ACT) ss 8(4), 8A, and 8B; Wills Act 2000 (NT)
s 18; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 6; Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 20; Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 20.
57
Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 18; Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 19; Succession Act 1981(Qld) s 21; Wills
Act 2008 (Tas) s 22; Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 21; Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 40; Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 16A;
Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 7; Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (NZ) s 55. Re Fenwick:
Application of Fenwick [2009] NSWSC 530 explores the history of statutory wills in England and Australia
and the basis upon which an order authorizing a statutory will should be made. For New Zealand, see
Kirwan v Public Trustee [1995] 2 NZLR 498.
58
Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 23; Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 24; Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 26; Wills
Act 2008 (Tas) s 27; Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 25; Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 16F; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 7(9);
Wills Act (WA) s 40(4). The wills must be deposited in the office of the Registrar.
59
Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 s 55(4); Re Campbell HC Nelson, CIV-2009-
442-370, 2 December 2009.
acting for the person lacking capacity.60 The manager must sign the will in his or her
own name in the presence of two or more witnesses present at the same time, who
must attest and subscribe the will in the presence of the manager. The will must then
be sealed with the seal of the court.
3. Privileged wills
Soldiers on active service, mariners or seamen at sea, and, more recently, airmen have
traditionally been exempted from the formal requirements for making wills.61 That
privilege still exists in New Zealand, Australian Capital Territory, and South Aus-
tralia.62 Privileged persons may be of any age and do not have to comply with any of
the requirements for ordinary wills, not even the writing requirement. Privileged
wills have no expiry date in South Australia or Australian Capital Territory. They
remain valid even after the person ceases to be a privileged person or leaves the armed
forces. In New Zealand an oral privileged will generally expires twelve months after it
was made.63 A written privileged will has no expiry date.
Most of Australia has abolished the privilege, because there was great variation
between the jurisdictions and uncertainty as to who was within the class and what
was required to establish testamentary intention. Proving an oral will was particularly
difficult and there was ample scope for error as well as fraud. Furthermore, one of the
reasons for the privilege, the absence of legal assistance to servicemen, no longer
applies. Not surprisingly, privileged wills have been the subject of a great deal of
criticism.64 What is surprising is that Australian Capital Territory, South Australia,
and, in particular, New Zealand in its new Act, have chosen to retain it. The
remainder of this chapter will deal with ordinary wills.
V. The current law
1. Reform
Most of the Australian colonies promulgated their own wills legislation in the
latter part of the nineteenth century and during the twentieth century. Aside from
changes to style and format, no substantive changes were made to the testamentary
60
Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 s 31 provides for the appointment of a
manager to manage the property of a person who lacks capacity to manage his or her own property.
61
Statute of Frauds 1677 s 22 and Wills Act 1837 s 11 permitted these servicemen to make oral wills,
initially only in respect of personalty, but later also for realty.
62
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) subpart 3; Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 16; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 11.
63
If the privileged person makes an oral will within twelve months of becoming a prisoner of war or
while a prisoner of war, it expires twelve months after the will-maker ceases to be a prisoner of war: Wills
Act 2007 (NZ) s 35.
64
Croucher and Vines (n 4) summarize the criticisms at 309. See also Julie Maxton, ‘The Meaning of
“In Actual Military Service”’ (1981) 6 New Zealand LJ 129; Andrew Lang, ‘Privileged Wills – A
Dangerous Anachronism’ (1985) 8(2) University of Tasmania LR 166.
340 Nicola Peart
formalities until the 1970s. Nor did the courts relax their strict approach to the
formal requirements. In the latter part of the twentieth century the slavish adherence
to formalism began to be seen as unnecessarily defeating testamentary intentions.
From 1970 onwards, the Australian legislatures started reforming the law to simplify
will-making and empower the courts to excuse errors of execution. New Zealand
followed suit, but only in 2007.
Western Australia started the reform process in 1970 by abolishing the require-
ment that the testator’s signature be placed at the foot or end of the will.65 Then, in
1975, South Australia took the revolutionary step of giving its courts discretion to
validate wills that did not satisfy the testamentary requirements.66 Both changes have
since been implemented throughout Australia and New Zealand, although with
potentially significant differences in wording. What would qualify as a ‘document’
was broadened as well, to take account of modern forms of communication. As a
result of these changes, wills that in the past would have been void may now be
upheld as valid.
2. Towards uniform succession laws

In 1991 the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General of Australia resolved to work
towards uniform succession laws in Australia.67 The Queensland Law Reform
Commission was given the responsibility of coordinating this project. With signifi-
cant input from the Victorian Parliamentary Law Reform Committee, draft legisla-
tion was developed for discussion. It resulted in a Model Bill on the Law of Wills,
which has been adopted by New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, Tasmania,
Western Australia, and Northern Territory, although their wording is not always
identical, which may result in different outcomes. South Australia and Australian
Capital Territory have not as yet adopted the Model Bill, but they have also made
changes to the requirements for a valid will.
New Zealand’s Law Commission drew heavily on the Australian work and saw
advantages in maximizing uniformity between the laws of the two countries.68 Its
draft Wills Act, completed in 1997, incorporated many of the early Australian
proposals. However, the Act that was finally adopted in 2007 differs in significant
respects from the Law Commission’s draft statute and the Australian statutes. The
opportunity to achieve uniformity on both sides of the Tasman Sea was lost, which is
regrettable given the migration between the two countries. In view of the differences,
the two countries are discussed separately.
65
Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 8.
66
Wills Act 1936 s 12(2), as amended by Wills Amendment Act (no 2) 1975 (SA).
67
Croucher and Vines (n 4) para 1.65.
68
New Zealand Law Commission Report 41, ‘Succession Law – A Succession (Wills) Act’ (1997)
para 16.
3. Retrospectivity
Before addressing the legislative changes, it is important to note that in both
Australia and New Zealand some changes are retrospective, whereas others are not.
While the new provisions apply to all persons dying on or after the date that those
provisions came into force, not all of the changes apply to wills executed before those
changes came into force.69 In four of the Australian jurisdictions and in New
Zealand, the changes made to the formal requirements do not apply to wills made
before those changes came into force.70 On the other hand, the power to validate
wills applies retrospectively in all Australian jurisdictions, but not in New Zealand.71
So, a will that does not comply with either the old or the new requirements for
execution may still be admitted to probate in Australia under the dispensing powers,
but not in New Zealand.72 The consequences of partial retrospectivity are addressed
in the context of the New Zealand legislation where case law reveals significant
problems arising from this policy.
4. Australia
Each of the eight Australian jurisdictions has its own statute stipulating the require-
ments for making a valid will, but they are now substantively identical except for
Australian Capital Territory’s Wills Act.73 The Succession Act 2006 of New South
Wales is used by way of example.74 Section 6 of the Act provides as follows:
(1) A will is not valid unless:
(a) it is in writing and signed by the testator or by some other person in the presence of
and at the direction of the testator, and
(b) the signature is made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of 2 or more
witnesses present at the same time, and
(c) at least 2 of those witnesses attest and sign the will in the presence of the testator (but
not necessarily in the presence of each other).
(2) The signature of the testator or of the other person signing in the presence and at the
direction of the testator must be made with the intention of executing the will, but it is not
essential that the signature be at the foot of the will.
69
Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 5; Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 5.
70
Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 5; Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 5; Succession Act 2006 (NSW) cl 3 sch 1; Wills Act
1997 (Vic) s 52; Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 40(2)(i). The legislation in Western Australia, Queensland, South
Australia, and Australian Capital Territory is fully retrospective.
71
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 40(2)(k).
72
In Re Rejouis [2010] 3 NZLR 422, eg the deceased’s 2003 unwitnessed will could not be validated,
but the schedule of testamentary intentions he drew up in 2008 to be read in conjunction with his 2003
will was validated as a will under the Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 14.
73
Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 9 still retains the requirement that the testator’s signature be at the foot or
end of the will.
74
Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 8; Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 10, as amended by the Succession
Amendment Act 2006; Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 8; Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 7; Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 8, as
amended by the Wills Amendment Act 2007; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 8.
342 Nicola Peart
(3) It is not essential for a will to have an attestation clause.

(4) If a testator purports to make an appointment by his or her will in the exercise of a power
of appointment by will, the appointment is not valid unless the will is executed in
accordance with this section.
(5) If a power is conferred on a person to make an appointment by a will that is to be executed
in some particular way or with some particular solemnity, the person may exercise the
power by a will that is executed in accordance with this section, but is not executed in the
particular way or with the particular solemnity.
As a ‘will’ is defined to include a codicil and any other testamentary disposition,

section 6 applies to all testamentary instruments.75 The major change to the require-
ments relates to the position of the testator’s signature or the person signing at the
testator’s direction. The witnessing requirements are the same as in the 1837 Act.
(a) Position of the testator’s signature

Western Australia was the first state to abolish the requirement that the testator’s
signature be at the foot or end of the will.76 The other Australian jurisdictions have
done so as well,77 except for Australian Capital Territory, where the testator’s
signature must still be positioned at the foot or end of the will.78 That this
requirement should be abolished is not surprising in view of the liberal construction
given to the requirement. It was but a small step and was seen as avoiding unneces-
sary legal proceedings in relation to the will’s validity or family provision applications
to remedy the unintended consequences of an invalid will.79 Most jurisdictions now
require only that the testator’s signature be made with the intention of executing the
will.80 Western Australia requires the intention to be ‘apparent on the face of the
will’, but this is unlikely to make a substantive difference in outcome.81 By removing
the requirement as to the position of the signature, the purpose of signing a will is to
finalize and authenticate the document as the testator’s will, rather than to protect
against fraudulent insertions.
(b) Signature of someone other than the testator

The position of the signature of someone other than the testator is also irrelevant,
except perhaps in Tasmania and Northern Territory. While sections 8(1) of their
respective Wills Acts do not stipulate a position for the signature of either the testator
or any other person signing the will, a subsequent subsection states explicitly that it is
75
Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 3(1).
76
Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 8(b).
77
Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) s 7, as amended in 1989; Succession Act 1981
(Qld) s 10, as amended in 2006; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 8, as amended in 1994; Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 7;
Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 8; Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 8.
78
Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 9(1)(b).
79
See, eg, Queensland Law Reform Commission Report 52 ‘The Law of Wills’ (1997) 11–12.
80
As in Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 6(2), quoted above.
81
Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 8(b).
not essential for the testator’s signature to be made at the foot of the will.82 By
referring only to the position of the testator’s signature, it might be inferred that the
position of the signature of any other person is still relevant. This would appear to be
a drafting error or legislative oversight, rather than a deliberate distinction between
the testator and someone else signing the will.
Of greater significance are the different rules on the relevant intention when
someone other than the testator signs the will. In Western Australia, South Australia,
and Victoria, it is the testator who must intend to give effect to the will by the
signature, even where the signature is made by someone else.83 As the intention of
the person signing is irrelevant, he or she need not know that the document he or she
is signing is a will. He or she is merely an amanuensis performing a mechanical action
for the testator. In Queensland and New South Wales, by contrast, the relevant
intention is that of the person signing the will.84 That person must therefore know
that the document he or she is signing is the testator’s will, although the person need
not know its content. In Tasmania and the Northern Territory, only the testator’s
signature must be made with the intention of executing a will.85 The Act is silent on
the intention of another person signing the will at the testator’s direction. The reason
for these different rules is not clear, but they could easily produce different outcomes.
Western Australia stipulates that a person other than the testator must sign in the
testator’s name. The other jurisdictions are silent on this issue. The old law, which
allowed the person to sign in his or her own name or in the testator’s name, must
therefore still apply in these jurisdictions.86
(c) Witnessing requirements

All of the statutes require the witnesses to be present at the same time and witness the
same act. Aside from New South Wales, briefly, none of the statutes has addressed
the witnessing issue that invalidated the will in Re Colling, where one witness
witnessed the testator’s signature and the other witnessed the testator’s acknowledge-
ment.87 Following an amendment in 1998, such a will would not have been invalid
in New South Wales.88 But that change was not retained when the Succession Act
2006 was adopted. Wills that do not comply with the witnessing requirements are
therefore void, although they can be, and frequently are, saved by the dispensing
power.
Most jurisdictions have confirmed the previous rule that witnesses do not have to
know that they are witnessing a will.89 They must witness the signature and to that
82
Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 8(2); Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 8(3).
83
Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 8(b); Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 8(b); Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 7(b).
84
Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 6(2); Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 10, as amended in 2006.
85
Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 8(2); Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 8(3).
86
In Goods of Clark (1839) 2 Curt 329; 163 ER 428; In Goods of Bailey (1838) 1 Curt 914; 163 ER 316.
87
Re Colling [1972] 1 WLR 1440.
88
Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 s 7(2) as amended in 1989.
89
Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 7; Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 9; Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 10(5); Wills
Act 2008 (Tas) s 9; Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 8. Western Australia, South Australia, and ACT do not include
such a provision in their respective Acts.
344 Nicola Peart
end the statutes require that they must be able to see and attest the signature.90 That
excludes blind persons from witnessing a will, even it seems if the will was in Braille.
The blind person would still not ‘see’ the testator signing the will. In South Australia
and Australian Capital Territory, on the other hand, a will is not invalidated if it was
witnessed by an incompetent person.91 That does seem to call into question the
purpose of having witnesses.
Witnesses need not be together when they attest and sign the will, but most
jurisdictions insist on the witnesses signing in the testator’s presence.92 Only South
Australia permits the witnesses to acknowledge their signature in the presence of the
testator.93
Changes have been made to the rule that witnesses and their spouses cannot
benefit under the will, because the rule does not discriminate between guilty and
innocent witnesses.94 South Australia, Victoria, and Australian Capital Territory
have abolished the rule altogether, leaving it to the general law to invalidate non-
voluntary gifts.95 In the other jurisdictions the rule still applies, but only to witnesses
benefiting and anyone claiming under the witness-beneficiary. It no longer applies to
spouses of witnesses.96 A gift to an affected witness may also be saved. In addition to
the exception for supernumerary witnesses, mentioned earlier, a gift to a witness is
valid if the persons who would otherwise benefit consent in writing or the court is
satisfied that the testator knew and approved the gift and the gift was made
voluntarily.97 The validation of the gift does not affect the competence of the
witness.
(d) Altering wills

Alterations on an existing will must be executed in the same manner as a will. If the
changes are made on the will document itself, it is sufficient if the testator and
witnesses sign in the margin, beside, or close to the alteration.98 No signatures are
required if the testator has obliterated part of the will, provided the obliteration is
90
Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 11; Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 9; Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 10(10);
Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 10; Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 11; Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 11.
91
Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 14; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 16.
92
Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 6(1)(c); Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 9(1)(d); Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 8(1)
(c); Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 10(4); Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 8(1)(c); Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 7(1)(d);
Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 8(d).
93
Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 8(e).
94
Croucher and Vines (n 4) para 7.22.
95
Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 17; Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 11; Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 15.
96
The origin of the rule’s application to spouses of witnesses lies in the unitary principle that applied
to marriage before the Married Women’s Property Acts established the separate property principle in the
late nineteenth century: see Hardingham et al (n 32) para 902; Briggs (n 5) paras 1.2 ff.
97
Wills, Probate and Administration Amendment Act 1989 (NSW) s 13; Succession Act 2006
(NSW) s 10(3). And see, eg Estate of Miller [2000] NSWSC 767; Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 12(2); Wills
Act 2008 (Tas) s 4(2); Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 11(3). Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 12(3) extends the
rule to interpreters who are beneficiaries.
98
Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 16; Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 12; Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 14;
Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 16; Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 24; Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 15.
complete and was done with the intention of changing the will by obliteration.99
Alterations may also be made by a codicil and must be executed in the same way as a
will.100
5. New Zealand
New Zealand’s Wills Act 2007 is based on draft legislation prepared by the Law
Commission in 1997.101 By the time it was finally introduced, the increased legal
recognition of de facto partners102 and the legalization of civil unions103 necessitated
amendments to the Law Commission’s draft Act. Parliament made several other
changes as well, including to the testamentary formalities, some of which are creating
significant problems. The result is that New Zealand’s testamentary formalities
now differ materially from the Australian provisions. The Act came into force on
1 November 2007 and is only partially retrospective.104
In contrast to Australia’s statutes, New Zealand’s Wills Act includes a definition of
a ‘will’.105 It means a document that is made by a natural person and disposes of the
testator’s property or appoints a testamentary guardian or exercises a power of
appointment. Curiously, it does not include the appointment of an executor or
trustee. Whether that was intentional or a legislative oversight is unclear. It does
suggest that a document that merely appoints an executor may not be a will, even if
executed in accordance with the requirements for a valid will.
Section 11 stipulates the following requirements for a valid will:
(1) A will must be in writing.
(2) A will must be signed and witnessed as described in subsections (3) and (4).
(3) The will-maker must –
(a) sign the document;
(b) acknowledge that a person directed by the will-maker signed the document in the will-
maker’s presence.
(4) At least 2 witnesses must –
(a) be together in the will-maker’s presence when the will-maker complies with
subsection (3);
(b) each state on the document, in the will-maker’s presence, that the witness was present
when the will-maker complied with subsection (3); and
(c) each sign the document in the will-maker’s presence.106
99
Croucher and Vines (n 4) paras 9.35 ff.
100
A codicil is included in the definition of ‘will’: Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 3.
101
Report 41 (n 68).
102
De facto partners were given the same rights to property on death by the Property (Relationships)
Act 1976, Administration Act 1969, and Family Protection Act 1955, as amended in 2001. The Relation-
ships (Statutory References) Act 2005 extended recognition to many other statutes.
103
Civil Union Act 2004.
104
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 40 lists the transitional provisions.
105
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 8.
106
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 7 defines a valid will as one that complies with s 11, or is declared valid
under s 14.
346 Nicola Peart
The aim of this provision was to restate the existing law in plain English and merely
to abolish the requirement that the signature be placed at the foot or end of the will.
However, the changes go well beyond that, mostly as a result of drafting errors.
(a) Signing the will

As in Australia, the will must be signed by the testator or by someone else at the
direction and in the presence of the testator. In contrast to Australia, however, New
Zealand testators can no longer sign in the absence of witnesses and then acknow-
ledge their signature in the presence of witnesses. A testator can only acknowledge
another person’s signature made at the testator’s direction.107 It was not Parliament’s
intention to amend this aspect of the law and there is currently a bill before
Parliament to correct this error.108 Until that amendment is adopted, a will that
was signed by the testator in the absence of the witnesses, but acknowledged in their
presence, will be invalid. If the will was executed before 1 November 2007 the defect
is fatal, even though the will would have been valid under the 1837 Act.109 The
validation power cannot be invoked in respect of non-compliant wills executed
before that date.110
In contrast to the Australian jurisdictions, there is no requirement in section 11
that by signing the will the testator, or the other person signing the will in place of
the testator, intends to give effect to the will. It simply requires the testator or some
other person at the testator’s direction to sign the will. There was also no such
requirement in the 1837 Act, but, as explained above, testamentary intent was
implied. Documents that appeared to comply with the requirements, but where
the testator’s intentions were merely provisional or deliberative, were not admitted to
probate.111 It is implicit in section 11 that this requirement must still be met. Section
11 is silent on whether a person other than the testator signing the will must intend
to give effect to the document as a will and therefore know that he or she is signing a
person’s will. As in Australia, uncertainty remains with regard to this aspect of the
will-making process.
(b) Position of signature

Another drafting error in section 11 is not apparent on the face of the section. It
relates to the position of the signature. As in Australia, section 11 omits the
requirement that the signature be placed at the foot or end of the will. However, if
the testator died on or after 1 November 2007 and the will was executed before that
date, then the transitional provisions provide that sections 11(3)(a) and (b) must be
107
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 11(3)(b).
108
Statutes Amendment Bill 2011 cl 93(4)(ii). Margaret Nixon of the Parliamentary Counsel Office
argues against the proposed amendment out of concern for elder abuse: ‘Statutes Amendment Bill hides
Gold-digger’s Charter’ NZLawyer (online edition, 10 May 2010).
109
In Will of Campbell (1895) 13 NZLR 340.
110
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 40(2)(k).
111
White v White (1908) 28 NZLR 129; Re Young [1969] NZLR 454.
read as if the words ‘at its foot or end’ appeared at the end of each subsection.112 This
takes the law back to before 1852! The expanded meaning given to that requirement
by the Wills Amendment Act 1852 is not retained for wills predating the new Act. In
Taylor v Taylor, for example, the testator had initialled the first two pages of his will,
but had not signed the third and final page, although his witnesses did.113 As the will
was made in 2005, the validation power could not be used. However, relying on
ancient precedent, the court went ‘to all lengths to save a genuine act of execution
from entanglement in defeat by formal requirements’.114 It found that the omission
of the testator’s signature was obviously an oversight. The will was prepared by a very
experienced solicitor and executed in his office. The court was in no doubt that the
testator intended to give effect to his entire will and thought that had been achieved.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the testator’s initials on the first two pages
constituted his signature on the will and that the initialling was done with the
intention of making the entire document effective as a testamentary disposition.
While the outcome of this case is to be welcomed, the very liberal construction calls
into question the retention of the requirement regarding the position of a testator’s
signature for wills executed before 1 November 2007.
(c) Witnessing requirements

At least two witnesses must be present when the testator signs the will or acknow-
ledges that someone else signed the will at the direction and in the presence of the
testator. Each witness must then attest the will. In this attestation requirement there
is yet another drafting error. Section 9 of the old Wills Act 1837 did not stipulate a
form of attestation. Section 11(4) of the 2007 Act does do so and this requirement
applies to wills executed before and after the Act came into force on 1 November
2007. Witnesses must state on the will that they were present when the testator
signed the will. While many wills include an attestation clause, they are not always
worded as stipulated by section 11(4). Furthermore, wills that had no attestation
clause could in the past still be admitted to probate, because the court accepted that
by signing the will the witnesses were attesting to its due execution. Since the Wills
Act 2007 came into force, the court has had to decline probate in some cases for lack
of an appropriately worded attestation clause.115 Others have been saved by a very
liberal construction of the attestation requirement. As long as there are some words
in the will from which attestation can be inferred, there is now sufficient precedent to
enable the registrar of the court to admit such wills to probate without the need for a
court ruling.116 But where there is nothing on the face of the will from which
112
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 40(2)(i).
113
[2010] 1 NZLR 832.
114
In the Goods of Jones (1865) 164 ER 414; In the Goods of Peverett [1902] P 205.
115
Re Lauer, HC Auckland, CIV-2009-404-6324, 2 December 2009.
116
In Estate of Stevenson, HC New Plymouth, CIV-2009-443-432, 22 October 2009, a handwritten
will was admitted that was signed by two witnesses below the testator’s words ‘I sign this before two
witnesses’. The will in Re Lincoln, HC Auckland, CIV-2009-404-3402, 17 July 2009, narrowly missed
being invalidated for non-compliance with the attestation clause.
348 Nicola Peart
compliance with section 11(4) can be inferred, the court may be precluded from
upholding the will’s validity.
Far from liberalizing the formal requirements of wills, the current wording of
section 11 imposes stricter requirements than its predecessor did. As with the
acknowledgement of the testator’s signature, there was no intention to change the
law regarding attestation. It is another drafting error. A proposal to amend this aspect
of section 11 is also currently before Parliament.117
Aside from the new attestation requirements, witnesses may not witness the
testator acknowledging his or her own signature.118 Witnesses must be present
when the testator signs the will or when the testator acknowledges that someone
else signed the will at the testator’s direction and in the testator’s presence. As in
Australia, the witnesses must both witness the same act, but they do not have to know
that the document was a will.119 Nor do the witnesses need to be in the presence of
each other when they attest and sign the will, but they must both sign in the presence
of the testator.120 Unlike the Australian statutes there is no statutory requirement
that the witnesses be able to see that the testator has signed the will. The common law
requirement presumably still applies, which leaves open the possibility that a blind
person may be able to witness a will written in Braille.121
New Zealand has also relaxed the witness-beneficiary rule beyond the super-
numerary rule along similar lines to the Australian jurisdictions, except that a gift
to the spouse, civil union partner, or de facto partner of the witness or anyone
claiming under such a person is also void, and not merely a gift to the witness or
anyone claiming under the witness. The gift can be validated if the persons who
would benefit from its avoidance consent in writing or electronically to the distribu-
tion and have legal capacity to consent, or the court is satisfied that the testator knew
and approved the gift and made it voluntarily.122
(d) Altering wills

As in Australia, a valid will may be changed by obliterating the words in such a way as
to prevent their effect being apparent, or by writing on the will and executing the
change in accordance with section 11(3) and (4) with the signatures written beside
or near the change.123 If a change does not comply with these requirements, it may
be validated by exercising the dispensation power, provided the change is made after
1 November 2007.124
117
Statutes Amendment Bill 2011 cl 93(5), (6).
118
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 11(4)(a).
119
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) ss 11(4) and 12.
120 121
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 11(4)(c). See n 34 above.
122 123
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 13. Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 15.
124
In Re Rejouis [2010] 3 NZLR 422, neither the deceased’s 2003 will nor his 2004 alteration to that
will could be validated because s 14 is not retrospective. However, the deceased’s 2008 unwitnessed
schedule of intentions to be read in conjunction with his 2003 will was validated and admitted to probate.
VI. Power to dispense with testamentary formalities
1. Overview of dispensing power

Despite the relaxation in the formal requirements and the publicly available infor-
mation about the will-making process through internet sites and will kits sold by
newsagents, mistakes are still made, even when the will is professionally drawn and
executed.125 In both Australia and New Zealand the court has the power to admit
documents to probate that do not satisfy the formal requirements for execution of a
will. South Australia initiated this change in 1975 to save wills from technical failure
and reduce the number of unintended intestacies.126 As originally worded, section
12(2) Wills Act 1936 provided:
A document purporting to embody the testamentary intentions of a deceased person shall,
notwithstanding that it has not been executed with the formalities required by this Act, be
deemed to be a will of the deceased person if the Supreme Court . . . is satisfied that there can
be no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the document to constitute his will.
The use of the criminal standard of proof in a civil jurisdiction was strange. While a
cautionary approach to this revolutionary jurisdiction was understandable, it could
have deprived the provision of much of its remedial purpose.127 However, the courts
did not allow that to happen. They adopted a bold approach, weakening the
standard to approximate the civil standard. The starting point was the testator’s
intentions, not the extent to which the formalities had not been met. This allowed
for an increasingly expansive approach. Cases in which the two witnesses were not
present at the same time were readily excused.128 That was an innocuous defect that
did not jeopardize the functions of the requirements. The absence of attesting
witnesses was more serious, because it affected the protective, cautionary, and
evidentiary functions. But that omission was also excusable, even where the testator
knew of the requirement and in spite of the high standard of intention imposed by
the section.129 Langbein’s review of forty-one cases decided in South Australia in the
first decade revealed that half involved witnessing defects and all were excused.130
The courts were slower to excuse the testator’s signature.131 Failure to sign could
signify uncertainty about the terms of the will or a change of mind.132 The testator’s
125
The websites of the Public Trust offices and the Law Societies in the various Australian states and
New Zealand provide information and guidance on how to make a will.
126
South Australian Law Reform Committee, Report 28, ‘Relating to the Reform of the Law on
Intestacy and Wills’ (1974) 11; John H Langbein, ‘Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A
Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law’ (1987) 87 Columbia LR 1.
127
Tasmania and Western Australia also adopted the criminal standard of proof, but only Tasmania
retains it.
128
Estate of Graham [1978] 20 SASR 198.
129
Estate of Crocker [1982] 30 SASR 321; Estate of Clayton [1982] 31 SASR 153; Estate of Kelly [1983]
32 SASR 413; Estate of Crossley [1989] WAR 227.
130
Langbein (1987) 87 Columbia LR 16–23.
131
Estate of Graham [1978] 20 SASR 198.
132
Baumanis v Praulin [1980] 25 SASR 423.
350 Nicola Peart
signature authenticates the will and distinguishes it from a mere draft.133 But when
in Estate of Blakely the court was faced with a case where the deceased and his wife
had accidentally signed each other’s wills, the court admitted the husband’s will to
probate despite his failure to sign it.134 That opened the door to other cases of
unsigned wills.135 The South Australian dispensing power could therefore be used to
cure any defect so long as the judicially weakened standard of intent was met.
Queensland’s experience contrasts sharply with that of South Australia. The
dispensing power that it adopted in 1981 required ‘substantial compliance’ with
the formalities. The formalities, rather than the testator’s intentions, were the
starting point.136 It limited the court’s ability to excuse technical failures to all but
the most minor ones.137 That prompted Langbein to describe Queensland’s
approach as ‘a flop’.138
When New South Wales adopted its dispensing provision in 1989, it was able to
benefit from the South Australian and Queensland experiences. Its provision was
similar to the South Australian one, but without the criminal standard. The court
merely had to be satisfied that the deceased intended the document to constitute his
or her will.139 That provision was then adopted by most of the other Australian
jurisdictions, including Queensland and South Australia.140 Tasmania has retained
the criminal standard of proof in its 2008 Act.141
Aside from Tasmania, the Australian provisions now differ only slightly in
wording and the major requirements are the same. New Zealand’s validation
power is worded differently and may result in different outcomes.142 The following
provision from Queensland’s Succession Act (section 18) is a representative example
of the Australian provisions:
(1) This section applies to a document, or a part of a document, that –
(a) purports to state the testamentary intentions of a deceased person; and
(b) has not been executed under this part.
(2) The document or the part forms a will, an alteration of a will, or a full or partial revocation
of a will, of the deceased person if the court is satisfied that the person intended the
document or part to form the person’s will, an alteration to the person’s will or a full or a
full or partial revocation of the person’s will.
133
Langbein (1987) 87 Columbia LR 23.
134
Estate of Blakeley [1983] 32 SASR 473.
135
Estate of Williams [1984] 36 SASR 432, where the court admitted the wife’s unsigned will as an
accidental omission.
136
Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 9.
137
Re Grosert [1985] 1 Qd R 513, Re Johnson [1985] 1 Qd R 516, and Re the Will Eagles [1990] 2 Qd
R 501 all failed for improper witnessing. There was later some relaxation, eg Re Deer [2006] QSC 278.
138
Langbein (1987) 87 Columbia LR 1.
139
Wills, Probate and Administration Act 1898 s 18A(1), as amended in 1989.
140
Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 12(2), as amended in 1994; Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 18(1), as amended
in 2006; Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 8(1); Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 32(2); Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 11A
(1); Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 9(1), (2); Wills Act 2000 (NT) s 10(2); Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 10(1).
141
Wills Act 2008 s 10(1).
142
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 14. The difference relates to the third requirement listed below.
(3) In making a decision under subsection (2), the court may, in addition to the document or
part, have regard to –
(a) any evidence relating to the way in which the document or part was executed; and
(b) any evidence of the person’s testamentary intentions, including evidence of statements
made by the person.
(4) Subsection (3) does not limit the matters a court may have regard to in making a decision
under subsection (2).
(5) This section applies to a document, or a part of a document, whether the document came
into existence within or outside the State.
This provision imposes three requirements. First, there must be a document that
does not comply with the formal requirements. Second, the document must purport
to state the testamentary intentions of the deceased, and, third, the court must be
satisfied that the deceased intended the document to constitute his or her will, or an
alteration or revocation of his or her will.
2. Meaning of ‘document’
The dispensing power can be exercised only in relation to a ‘document’, which is
defined very broadly in Australia to include any material on which writing appears
and anything from which sounds, images, or writings can be reproduced with or
without the aid of anything else.143 It thus captures not only standard paper wills,
but also computer files and discs,144 microfiches, photographs,145 text messages on
mobile phones, emails, as well as video and audio tapes.146 New Zealand’s definition
does not include visual images or sounds.147 Video or audio-taped wills can therefore
not be admitted to probate in New Zealand.148 A Maori ohaki, being an oral
declaration, can also not be validated. On the other hand, if someone had recorded
the ohaki in writing, that would open the gate to the validation power.
3. Document purporting to state testamentary intentions

The document must purport to state the deceased’s testamentary intentions or, in
New Zealand, appear to be a will. It must therefore dispose of property on death, or
appoint testamentary guardians, or exercise a power of appointment, or revoke or
143
Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 3; Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 32; Wills Act 1997 (Vic) s 9(6); Succession
Act 1981 (Qld) s 5; Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 10(4); Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 4.
144
Re Trethewey (2000) 4 VR 406.
145
Estate of Torr [2005] 91 SASR 17.
146
Treacey v Edwards (2000) 49 NSWLR 739 (audio tape); Estate of Cassie [2007] NSWSC 481 (video
tape not admitted because it merely explained the terms of a written will).
147
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 6 defines ‘document’ as any material on which there is writing. Interpreta-
tion Act 1999 (NZ) s 29 defines ‘writing’ as ‘representing or reproducing words, figures, or symbols in a
visible and tangible form or medium (for example, in print)’.
148
See further Nicola Peart, ‘Where There is a Will, There is a Way – A New Wills Act for New
Zealand’ (2007) 15 Waikato LR 26, 32–4.
352 Nicola Peart
change an existing testamentary document.149 In Australia there is nothing to

prevent the dispensing power from being exercised in respect of a document that
merely appoints an executor. But in New Zealand the definition of a ‘will’ would
appear to exclude that possibility.150 In Western Australia the dispensing power may
also be used in respect of a document that purports to revive a revoked will.151 The
document must be capable of having testamentary effect, even if subsequently it is
construed as not having that effect.152
4. Document intended to be testator’s will

This requirement is construed inconsistently across the Australian jurisdictions.
Most insist that the deceased must have intended the particular document or part
thereof to constitute his or her will.153 Thus, in Hatsatouris the New South Wales
Court of Appeal held that the question was:
. . . did the evidence satisfy the Court that, either, at the time of the subject document being
brought into being, or, at some later time, the relevant Deceased, by some act or words,
demonstrated that it was her, or his, then intention that the subject document should, without
more on her, or his, part operate as her, or his, Will?154
In that case the deceased had signed a codicil, substantially favouring one of his
children. Although two witnesses were present and witnessed the deceased signing
the will, a nurse intervened to prevent the witnesses from signing the codicil,
apparently acting on instructions from family members who were concerned that
the codicil would cause unhappiness in the family. Upset and confused by what had
happened, the deceased changed his mind and wanted to revoke the codicil he had
signed. His lawyer sent him a second codicil to revoke the first one, but the deceased
put it in a drawer and never executed it. Based on evidence of the circumstances
regarding the signing of the first codicil and the conversations the deceased had with
his family about his wish to benefit his daughter, the court found that at the time the
deceased signed that codicil he intended the document to change his will. As the
witnesses would have signed the codicil if they had not been prevented from doing
so, the court validated the codicil. Having upheld the first codicil as valid, it could
not be revoked except by executing the subsequent codicil in accordance with the
formalities or by doing an act in relation to that codicil that would allow the court to
149
Wills Act 1936 (SA) s 12(2), (3); Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 8(2)(b), (c); Wills Act 1970 (WA)
s 32(2)(b), (c); Wills Act 1968 (ACT) s 11A(1); Wills Act 1997 (Vic) ss 9(1)(b) and 9(2); Wills Act 2000
(NT) s 10(2); Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 18(2); Wills Act 2008 (Tas) s 10(1); Wills Act 2007 (NZ) ss 8,
14, 15, and 16.
150
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 8 does not include the appointment of an executor or trustee within the
definition of a will.
151
Wills Act 1970 (WA) s 32(2)(d).
152
Romano v Romano [2004] NSWCA 37.
153
Estate of Masters (1994) 33 NSWCA 446, affirmed in Hatsatouris v Hatsatouris [2001] NSWCA
408.
154
Hatsatouris v Hatsatouris [2001] NSWCA 408, para 56.
use its dispensing powers. Neither occurred: the unexecuted second codicil was
therefore invalid.
This approach has been followed in most Australian jurisdictions.155 The excep-
tion is Queensland, where some courts have focused on the testator’s intentions,
rather than whether the document in question was intended to constitute the
deceased’s will.156 For example, in Trust Company v Oates the court admitted
the deceased’s will instructions to probate, even though a formal will was to be
prepared for execution.157 The court was satisfied that there was a written document
that recorded the testamentary intentions of the deceased. While this approach
favours substance over form, it ignores the wording of the provision. The deceased
in that case did not intend the instructions to constitute his last will. By insisting on
the document in question being the deceased’s will, there is greater certainty that it
expresses the deceased’s actual testamentary intentions, rather than contemplated
intentions.
The wording of the New Zealand provision would justify the Queensland
approach. Its validation power merely requires the court to be satisfied that ‘the
document expresses the deceased person’s testamentary intentions’.158 This wording
appears to allow a more liberal interpretation. Not only could draft wills and will
instructions be validated, the power could also be used to prevent admission of a
non-compliant will that expressed the testator’s intentions at the time, but which the
testator later intended to revoke. The final codicil in Hatsatouris might then have
prevented the admission of the validated earlier codicil on the grounds that it no
longer expressed the testator’s intentions. Whether the New Zealand courts will go
that far remains to be seen. The jurisdiction is still in its infancy, as it can be invoked
only in respect of non-compliant wills executed after 1 November 2007.
In the few New Zealand cases where the validation power has thus far been used,
the court did not have to consider this issue, because there was sufficient evidence
that the testators intended the documents in question to constitute their last will.159
Re MacNeil, for example, concerned a handwritten suicide note, which was labelled
as the deceased’s last will and disposed of her property.160 Re Estate of Hickford
involved a professionally drafted will, which the deceased read and accepted as his
155
See Estate of TLB (2005) 94 SASR 450; Estate of Schwartzkopff (2006) 94 SASR 465; Re Estate of
Perriman [2003] WASC 191; Dalton v Dalton [2008] WASC 56; Re Yates; Ex parte the Public Trustee
[2008] WASC 211; Spencer v Spencer [2009] WASC 198; Re Pridmore [1996] 124 FLR 294; In the Estate
of Pischner [2004] ACTSC 129; Estate of Peter Brock [2007] VSC 415; In the Will of Skehan [2007] VSC
534; Application by Becroft [2009] VSC 481.
156
In the Will and one Codicil of Julia Lesley Cleland [2009] QSC 189; Hensler v Padget [2008] QSC
82. But note that Re Garris [2008] 2 Qd R 59 and Re Vogele [2009] 1 Qd R 291 follow Estate of Masters
(1994) 33 NSWCA 446 and Hatsatouris v Hatsatouris [2001] NSWCA 408.
157
Trust Company v Oates [2009] QSC 282.
158
Wills Act 2007 (NZ) s 14(2).
159
At the time of writing this chapter in March 2011, only nine cases had been decided, in all of which
the documents were declared valid wills. Four were not properly witnessed, one was also unsigned, and five
had defective attestation clauses.
160
Re MacNeil, HC Timaru, CIV-2008-476-612, 28 September 2009.
354 Nicola Peart
testamentary wishes, but which he left on the table unsigned and unwitnessed.161 He
showed the will to his partner and spoke to his daughter as if the will was finalized.
Based on that evidence, the court declared the will valid, satisfied that the deceased
thought he did not need to do anything further. In Re Rejouis the court validated an
unwitnessed schedule of intentions made in 2008, even though it was to be read in
conjunction with an unwitnessed 2003 will which could not be validated.162 The
2003 will only appointed an executor. The schedule of intentions appeared to be a
will by itself and expressed the deceased’s testamentary intentions. It disposed of the
deceased’s estate, taking into account the various possible scenarios, and it appointed
his wife’s sister as testamentary guardian of his children in case they should be
orphaned. Neither the deceased, a Haitian national who died in the earthquake
that devastated his country in 2010, nor his New Zealand widow were aware of the
formal requirements for making wills.163
The power to validate such documents may also redress any defects in the
requirements for incorporating unexecuted documents by reference in an executed
will. The schedule of intentions in Re Rejouis that the court admitted to probate
could not have been incorporated into the deceased’s will despite reference to such a
schedule, because it did not exist at the time when the deceased executed his will.
That would have been fatal under the common law doctrine of incorporation by
reference, but not necessarily under the new Wills Act, as the judgment in that case
reveals.
If the remedial purpose of the validation power is to give effect to a testator’s
ascertained intentions, then the nature of the document should not matter. But the
court is likely to insist on cogent evidence that the document does indeed express the
testator’s intentions, as the court did in Hickford. Even so, this approach may
undermine some of the functions of the formalities. Without the ceremonial ritual
the testator may not be alerted to the seriousness of making a will. The channelling
function that is intended to facilitate probate and efficient administration is also lost.
But those functions would appear to be less important than the protective and
evidentiary functions, which should be adequately safeguarded by insisting on cogent
evidence of testamentary intent.
5. Evidence and procedure

When exercising the dispensing power, all of the jurisdictions, except South Aus-
tralia, have been able to admit a wide range of extrinsic evidence, including state-
ments and conversations of the deceased before, during, and after the document was
made; evidence about the circumstances surrounding the making and execution of
the document; evidence of the testator’s intentions; the consequences of not uphold-
ing a document that appears to be a will; and any evidence that would raise suspicion
161
Re Estate of Hickford, HC Napier, CIV-2009-441-369, 13 August 2009.
162
Re Rejouis [2010] 3 NZLR 422.
163
In Re Zhu, HC New Plymouth, CIV-2010-443-21, 17 May 2010, the deceased’s unwitnessed will
in a Chinese language was validated.
that the document did not contain the deceased’s true intentions, voluntarily
expressed.164 This sort of evidence is needed if the court is to determine reliably
whether the document in question should be admitted as the testator’s will.
The various wills statutes are silent on procedure and on whether non-compliant
wills must inevitably go to court, even where the application is supported by those
who would be adversely affected if the will were validated. The procedures vary. In
New South Wales and South Australia, for example, the Supreme Court Rules set
out the procedure to be followed with regard to applications for dispensation from
the formal requirements and permit the Registrar of the Supreme Court to grant
probate to a non-compliant will if the affected persons are adult and have consented
to the order.165 New Zealand’s High Court Rules are silent on the procedure to be
followed in applications to validate a non-compliant will. As section 14 provides for
a court order, all applications must proceed to court. However, in Re Zhu the court
did say that, in keeping with the remedial purpose of the validation power, undue
expense and formality should be avoided.166 Where all persons affected are adult and
consent, the application could be made ‘ex parte’, that is, without formal notice to
affected persons. While this procedure does reduce time and expense, it is still a court
proceeding with all of the associated costs and delays. As the boundaries of this new
power are gradually established, a change in the High Court Rules might be expected
to give New Zealand Registrars the same powers as the Australian Registrars, thus
obviating the need for a court proceeding in many cases.
VII. Conclusion
Australia and New Zealand have modernized their wills statutes in an attempt to
facilitate the will-making process and give effect to testamentary wishes. Revolution-
ary when first introduced, the dispensing power is now firmly established and,
generally, responsibly applied. It has saved many documents that clearly expressed
the testator’s intentions from invalidity on mere technical grounds.167 It has not
resulted in a great flood of litigation, nor has it encouraged testators to abandon the
formal testamentary process. There is every incentive to comply with the require-
ments, because they facilitate the granting of probate and avoid the human and
financial cost of litigation.
164
South Australia retains the common law rules of admissibility of evidence, which are more
restrictive: Croucher and Vines (n 4) ch 10.
165
Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) rr 5 and 34E; the Probate Rules 2004 of the Supreme Court of
South Australia r 64.
166
Re Zhu, HC New Plymouth, CIV-2010-443-21, 17 May 2010.
167
Recent examples of the dispensing power being used include: Estate of Gall [2008] SASC 349 and
Smith v Oldham, HC Nelson, CIV-2010-442-239, 14 September 2010 (only one witness); Estate of Smith
[2009] NSWSC 907 (unsigned and unwitnessed will form); Re Tretheway (2002) 4 VR 406 (will on
computer); Quartermain Estate: Staggall v Quartermain [2009] NSWSC 553 (unsigned and unwitnessed
handwritten codicil in notebook); Estate of Johnston [2010] NSWSC 382 (unwitnessed informal will);
Clines v Johnston [2008] NSWSC 524 (lost codicil); Costa v Public Trustee of NSW [2008] NSWCA 223
(suicide note); Estate of Hennekam [2009] SASC 188 (switched wills).
356 Nicola Peart
Australia’s Uniform Succession Laws Project has completed its task of reviewing
the laws of succession and has recommended model national uniform laws.168 Most
of Australia’s jurisdictions have implemented the Model Wills Bill with regard to the
testamentary requirements and the dispensing power. The New Zealand Law Com-
mission drew heavily on the Australian Project in producing its draft Wills Act in
1997, seeing value in uniform laws in both countries. It is unfortunate that when
Parliament finally decided to adopt its own Wills Act a full decade later, it did not
revisit the Australian developments and model its legislation on the recommenda-
tions of the Uniform Succession Laws Project. It might have avoided the drafting
errors that have crept into New Zealand’s Wills Act, as well as providing a valuable
opportunity to harmonize the succession laws in the two countries. That would have
been welcomed by the many who migrate between Australia and New Zealand,
leaving property in both countries.
168
Rosalind Croucher, ‘Towards Uniform Succession in Australia’ (2009) 83 Australian LJ 1.
15
Testamentary Formalities in the
United States of America
Ronald J Scalise Jr
I. Introduction 358
II. Testamentary formalities 360
1. The signature: a requirement for all wills 362
2. Attested wills: the extra formalities 365
(a) The writing 365
(b) The witnesses 366
(c) The notary? 369
(a) Handwriting 371
(b) The date 372
4. Special wills 373
5. The movement away from strict compliance 374
III. Incorporation by reference and alterations 376
1. Incorporation 376
2. Alterations 378
IV. Conclusion 379
358 Ronald J Scalise Jr
I. Introduction
Will-making exists throughout the Western world.1 Solon, some time in the early
sixth century BC, is said to have introduced it into Greece.2 The Romans also
recognized the ability to make a will, testamenti factio, as one of the essential
components or rights of Roman citizenship.3 So, too, did early English law.4 In
fact, ‘the right to pass on property . . . has been part of the Anglo-American legal
system since feudal times’.5 Blackstone says that the English ‘have not traces or
memorials of any time when [testation] did not exist’,6 and thus will-making has
always been part of American law.7
The purpose of will-making may seem obvious – to transmit voluntarily one’s
property at death to certain specified individuals. In Roman times, however, will-
making was only partly about the distribution of property. Instituting an heir who
would not only serve as a universal successor, but also continue the testator’s
personality for the performance of religious duties, sacra, was essential to a Roman
will.8 Gaius has written that the institution of an heir was the very foundation of
a will.9 In addition, Roman wills were vehicles by which Roman citizens, in a
sometimes outspoken way, relayed their true opinion of others or their philosophy
of life.10 Indeed, the Roman definition of a will seems broader than the limited
Anglo-American conception of transmitting property. According to Modestinus,
‘a will is a lawful expression of our wishes concerning what someone wishes to
1
Antoni Vaquer, ‘The Law of Successions’, in Mauro Bussani and Franz Werro (eds), European
Private Law: A Handbook vol 1 (2009) 557; Marius J de Waal, ‘A Comparative Overview’, in Kenneth G
C Reid, Marius J de Waal, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Exploring the Law of Succession: Studies
National, Historical and Comparative (2007) 1. In fact, the voluntary transfer of property at the time of
death (although not will-making per se) existed in Biblical times: Genesis 48:21–2. For a discussion and
classification of this Biblical text as well as others, see Richard H Hiers, ‘Transfer of Property by
Inheritance and Bequest in Biblical Law and Tradition’ (1994) 10 Journal of Law and Religion (1994)
148. But see Ronald Chester, Inheritance, Wealth, and Society (1982) 11 ff (stating that the will was
‘unknown to the early law of Greece, India, Egypt, Babylon, and Israel’).
2
Plutarch, ‘The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans’ (trans Dryden), in Robert Maynard
Hutchins (ed), Great Books of the Western World vol 14 (1952) 72 ff.
3
Papinian D. 28, 1, 3, in Alan Watson (ed and trans), The Digest of Justinian vol 2 (1985) 357 ff
(stating that testamentary capacity was a matter of public law, not private law); Ulpian D. 28, 1, 18, 1,
in ibid, 358 (describing the status of an intestible as the punishment for writing defamatory verse).
4
Henry Swinburne, A Treatise of Testaments and Last Wills (7th edn, London, 1797) 74 ff (stating that
those who have committed ‘heinous crimes’, such as traitors, heretics, and apostates, cannot make wills).
5
Hodel v Irving 481 US 704, 716 (1987). In fact, it existed long before then. Although the Anglo-
Saxons did not have the strict concept of a will, they did employ methods that transferred property from
one person to another after death: Dorothy Whitelock (ed and trans), Anglo-Saxon Wills (1930, 1986
reprint).
6
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England vol 2 (ed Wayne Morrison, 2001) 491 ff.
7
Thomas E Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills (1937) 19 ff.
8
Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (1962) 236 ff. See also ch 1 above at 2.
9
Gai 2, 229, in S P Scott (trans), The Civil Law vol 1 (1932) 143 ff.
10
Edward Champlin, Final Judgments: Duty and Emotion in Roman Wills: 200 B.C. – A.D. 250 (1991)
5 ff.
Testamentary Formalities in the United States of America 359
be done after his death’.11 The satirist Lucian noted that ‘only once in his life
does . . . [a] Roman say what he means’ – in his will.12
The American law of wills, however, has always primarily been about transmitting
property. Largely a product of English law, the American law has never known the
ideas of instituting heirs or of universal successors. The closest functional analogy to
the idea of instituting an heir is the concept of an administrator or testamentary
executor – a person who is appointed by a court and often named in the will to
‘execute’ the wishes of the deceased.13 An administrator or executor, simply put,
administers the estate, pays creditors, and distributes legacies. His liability is not a
result of his status as an heir, but a function of the fiduciary role he has assumed vis-à-
vis the estate. In fact, an administrator may not be an heir at all.
Only recently has America begun to take note of the idea that a will might do
something other than dispose of property, namely, state one’s philosophy and views
on the proper way for one’s descendants to live their lives. This concept has given rise
to what some call an ‘ethical will’, which might often take the form of a letter, video
recording, or part of an actual will.14 In addition to the publication of several recent
books on this topic,15 estate planners have reported using ethical wills in their
practice,16 and do-it-yourself resources and guides are now easily available on the
internet.17
Although the functional advantages of a will seem obvious, the frequency of will-
making is surprisingly low. The debate about whether testation was the norm or the
exception in Roman times is well known.18 In the United States, empirical evidence
suggests that most individuals die without wills.19 There are many reasons why this
11
Modestinus D. 28, 1, 1, in Watson (n 3) 358 ff.
12
Lucian, Nigrinus, 30, in H W Fowler and F G Fowler (eds and trans), The Works of Lucian of
Samosata vol 1 (1905) 22 ff.
13
Ernest Metzger (ed), A Companion to Justinian’s Institutes (1988) 83 ff (comparing the Scottish and
English executor to the Roman heir).
14
Zoe M Hicks, ‘Is Your (Ethical) Will in Order?’ (2007) 33 ACTEC J 154; Andrew H Hook and
Thomas D Begley Jr, ‘Lawyering for Older Clients: A New Paradigm’ (2005) 1 National Academy of Elder
Law Attorneys Journal 269.
15
Barry K Baines, Ethical Wills: Putting Your Values on Paper (2002); Rachael Freed, Women’s Lives,
Women’s Legacies: Passing Your Beliefs and Blessings to Future Generations (2003); Jack Reimer and
Nathaniel Stampfer, So That Your Values Live On: Ethical Wills and How to Prepare Them (1999).
16
Susan T Bart and Daniel R Thies, ‘Ethical Wills: Preserving a Legacy’ (2010) (May/June) American
Bar Association Trust and Investments 16; Hicks (2007) 33 ACTEC J 154; Hook and Begley Jr (2005) 1
National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys Journal 269.
17
<http://www.ethicalwill.com>. Perhaps the best-known case of an ‘ethical will’ is that of Randy
Pausch, a computer science professor at Carnegie Mellon University. After being diagnosed with pancre-
atic cancer, he was asked to give a final lecture. The lecture was recorded for his children and has since been
watched by millions of viewers. In addition, the lecture was produced into a widely popular book: Randy
Pausch, The Last Lecture (2008).
18
David Daube, ‘The Predominance of Intestacy at Rome’ (1964) 39 Tulane LR 253; John Crook,
‘Intestacy in Roman Society’ (1973) 19 Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society 38; Jane Gardner,
Women in Roman Law and Society (1986); David Cherry, ‘Intestacy and the Roman Poor’ (1996) 64
Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 155; Champlin (n 10) 41 ff. See also ch 1 above at 2.
19
Joel C Dobris, Stewart E Sterk, and Melanie B Leslie, Estates and Trusts: Cases and Materials (2nd
edn, 2003) 62; Allison Dunham, ‘The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death’
(1963) 30 University of Chicago LR 248; Mary Louise Fellows, Rita J Simon, and William Rau, ‘Public
might be the case. Some have suggested that the fear of mortality dissuades indi-
viduals from writing wills; others posit that individuals unrealistically put off the
inevitable, always thinking that there will be time to write a will later; and still others
believe that the prevalence of intestacy is a function of a person’s view that he does
not need a will and that the law of intestacy will appropriately provide for the
disposition of his property. Certainly a combination of these factors, and others, are
at work.
Even individuals who try to and do make wills, however, may be affected by the
laws of intestacy. Unlike in Roman times, a person in the United States may die
partially testate and partially intestate simply by writing an effective will that fails to
distribute all of his property. Moreover, a person may attempt to write a will and do
so improperly, thus accidentally subjecting himself to the laws of intestacy. Unfor-
tunately, defective compliance is something that is ordinarily not realized until the
testator has died and it is thus too late to make corrections. In response to this
concern, a few states (motivated perhaps in part by influential academic commenta-
tors)20 enacted a type of ante-mortem probate in the 1970s.21 These statutes allow a
testator to submit his will to a court for a judgment declaring the will to be valid, but
they appear to be rarely used22 – perhaps in part because of the publicity drawn to an
otherwise private document.
II. Testamentary formalities
As difficult as choosing to write a will may be, actually writing one is not. Aside from
having the intent to make a will (animus testandi ), a testator need only comply with
Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States’
[1978] American Bar Foundation Research Journal 319, 337 ff (finding only about 45% of the sample
population had wills); Mary Louise Fellows, Rita J Simon, Teal E Snapp, and William D Snapp,
‘Empirical Study of the Illinois Statutory Estate Plan’ [1976] University of Illinois Law Forum 718 ff n
3; Monica K Johnson and Jennifer K Robbennolt, ‘Using Social Science to Inform the Law of Intestacy:
The Case of Unmarried Committed Partners’ (1998) 22 Law & Human Behavior 479 ff (finding only
40% of respondents with opposite-sex partners had wills, but finding a majority of those with same-sex
partners had wills); Edward H Ward and J H Beuscher, ‘The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin’ (1950)
1950 Wisconsin LR 393, 396 ff. But see Marvin B Sussman, Judith N Cates, and David T Smith, The
Family and Inheritance (1970) 64 ff (finding approximately 58% of the sample population had wills);
Lawrence W Waggoner, Gregory S Alexander, Mary Louise Fellows, and Thomas P Gallanis, Family
Property Law: Cases and Materials on Wills, Trusts, and Future Estates (2002) 35 ff (suggesting that the
conventional wisdom may be incorrect, and that perhaps ‘it’s more accurate to suggest that most people
who die prematurely die intestate’); John R Price, ‘The Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community
Property Jurisdiction’ (1975) 50 Washington LR 295 ff (finding that 59% of the respondents in the
Washington study were testate).
20
John H Langbein, ‘Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model’ (1978) 77 Michigan LR 63.
21
See, eg, Ohio Revised Code } 2107.081-.085; ND Century Code } 30.1–08.1–01; Arkansas Code
Annotated } 28–40–201. The most recent state to enact such legislation is Alaska, which passed an ante-
mortem probate statute in 2010: Alaska Statutes Annotated } 13.12.530.
22
William M McGovern Jr, Sheldon F Kurtz, and David M English, Wills, Trusts and Estates (4th edn,
2010) 173 ff.
certain minimal formalities. Compliance, however, is important; oral wills are not
allowed, nor is simply any documentary evidence of testamentary intent. With
regard to defectively executed wills, Papinian’s statement about Roman law is still
largely true today: ‘A will is said not to be lawfully made when the legal solemnities
have not been observed’.23
The law of testamentary formalities, however, has evolved greatly over time. At
common law only personal property could be transmitted by will and then most
frequently by oral means.24 The early English fear of writing wills seems to model the
current American reluctance to do so because of a concern that death would soon
follow. Much as the Romans viewed a will as a method of conveying one’s beliefs and
philosophies, so too the English deathbed oral will provided an opportunity to
confess and make donations, perhaps especially to the church and the attending
clergy during one’s last illness.25
Real property, the later subject of wills, could not be devised until the Statute of
Wills of 1540, although some customary law allowed for oral devises. Pursuant to
this statute, a freehold interest in real property could be transmitted by will if the
testator orally recited his wishes, which were then written down by another in
accordance with the testator’s desire.26 It was not until the enactment of the Statute
of Frauds of 1677 that further formalities, such as a signed writing, were imposed.27
Both the scope of application of this latter statute and its terms, however, soon
became the subject of heated debate. At least one English court in commenting on
the Statute of Frauds noted that ‘[m]any more fair wills have been overturned for
want of the form, than fraudulent have been prevented by introducing it’.28
The Wills Act of 1837 abolished the distinction between testaments of personal
property and wills of real property. It further added that wills had to be ‘signed at the
foot or end thereof by the testator’, as well as ‘made or acknowledged by the testator
in the presence of two or more witnesses present at the same time’, with such
witnesses attesting and subscribing in the testator’s presence.29 Although the law of
many American states was modelled on the Statute of Frauds, other states, however,
followed the Wills Act as a guide. Still others combined the two.30 Although
obviously influenced by English law, all American states today have enacted legisla-
tion regarding the validity of wills, and the execution of testaments is no longer a
matter of common law, but compliance with statutory law.31
23
Papinian D. 28, 3, 1, in Watson (n 3) 358 ff.
24
Page on the Law of Wills vol 2 (2nd edn by Jeffrey A Schoenblum, 2003) }19.3, 7 ff. See also ch 13
above at 308.
25
Page (n 24) } 19.3, 8 ff. See also ch 13 above at 308.
26
Statute of Wills 1540, 32 Hen 8, c 1. See also ch 13 above at 309.
27
Ch 13 above at 310–11. Oral wills, however, were still allowed for personal property in a number of
cases, particularly deathbed testaments.
28
Windham v Chetwynd [1757] 1 Burrow 414, 420 (Lord Mansfield).
29
Wills Act 1837 s 9. See also ch 13 above at 312–13.
30
Page (n 24) } 19.2, 6 ff.
31
Page (n 24) } 19.4, 11 ff.
In the United States, the types of allowable will, and thus the types of required
formalities, vary depending upon the state. Primarily, however, there are two types of
wills: attested (ie witnessed) wills and holograph ones. In either event, the formalities
imposed are required for a purpose. Although the strict observance of will formal-
ities has waned in recent times (as discussed below), the goal of the required
formalities has largely stayed the same. Formalities exist for the execution of wills
to serve at least four different functions.32 First, formalities serve a ritualistic purpose
and thus impress upon the testator the significance of what he is doing. This
function, often referred to as the ‘ritual’ or ‘cautionary’ function, helps to ensure
that the testator is sufficiently aware and careful in the dispositions he is making.
Second, and perhaps most obviously, will formalities serve an evidentiary function
and establish the reliability of evidence of a testator’s intent that can be supplied to a
court. If oral wills were allowed, conflicting testimony would undoubtedly be a
problem. Because all wills involve writing, the chance of inconsistent allegations as to
the testator’s desires is lessened. Third, will formalities (for example, the witness
requirement) serve a protective function and guard the testator against coercion or
undue influence at the time of the execution of the will. Finally, will formalities help
to ‘channel’ a testator’s wishes into a standardized form that can help prevent a court
from being presented with a document over which it must ‘puzzle’ to ascertain
‘whether the document was meant to be a will’.33
1. The signature: a requirement for all wills

While all wills to a greater or lesser extent serve all of the above four purposes,
different types of will emphasize different purposes in varying degrees. Attested wills
emphasize the ritualistic function, while the newly proposed notarial wills promote
the protective function more than other purposes. Holograph wills, however, sacri-
fice ritual and protection in the name of achieving an easy alternative to more formal
wills, while at the same time helping to demonstrate the evidentiary reliability of the
document through handwriting. To understand fully the purposes promoted by each
type of will, the requirements of each must be examined.
For both attested and holograph wills, one of the most important elements is the
signature of the testator.34 This requirement was adopted from the English Statute of
Frauds in the seventeenth century and is required by all states. Like all signatures to
documents, a signature on a will helps to identify the testator. Despite the import-
ance of identifying or ensuring that the writer is the party executing the act, almost all
states allow wills to be executed by others on behalf of the testator. Most states
have followed the direction of the Uniform Probate Code on this topic and allow a
32
Ashbel G Gulliver and Catherine J Tilson, ‘Classification of Gratuitous Transfers’ (1941) 51 Yale LJ
1. And see further ch 18 below at 468 ff.
33
John H Langbein, ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88 Harvard LR 489, 494 ff.
34
See generally McGovern, Kurtz, and English (n 22) 202 ff (stating that ‘[s]igning is required in all
states today’).
will to be signed ‘in the testator’s name by some other individual’.35 This represen-
tative signing can usually only occur if further safeguards are met. First, the person
signing must do so ‘by the testator’s direction’. Second, at the time of the signing, the
testator must be in the ‘presence’ of the person authorized to sign on his behalf.36
Some states are even more restrictive in the allowance of representative signing,
namely only if the testator is incapable.37
Partial or informal signatures are generally allowed. A testator need not write out
his full legal name.38 Nicknames are acceptable as long as they ‘sufficiently identify’
the testator as the author of the document.39 ‘Mother’,40 ‘Father’,41 and ‘Auntie’42
have been held to be sufficient signatures.43 In fact, several cases and statutes allow
for a testator to sign using only initials or even in some instances, such as illiteracy or
disability, with a mark or an ‘X’.44 For similar reasons, a testator’s hand may
permissibly be guided or assisted by another.45
Modern technology has given rise to the concept of pre-printed or electronically
produced signatures and has thus forced courts to rethink the purpose of the
signature requirement. One court has concluded that the use of cursive computer
typeface in a printed document could constitute a ‘mark [of the deceased] that was
intended to operate as his signature’.46 Another court, however, has held that a pre-
printed name in a letterhead does not constitute a signature,47 despite the existence
of widely applicable commercial law statutes that recognize the validity of signatures
in untraditional parts of documents such as letterheads.48 The court distinguished
commercial transactions from wills by noting that ‘[m]uch more formality has
historically been required in the execution of wills than in the execution of day-to-
day business and commercial papers’.49 Given the increasing use of computers and
word-processing programs, an outright ban on electronically produced signatures in
wills hardly seems logical if the signature can be shown to serve the same purposes as
a handwritten one. The federally enacted Electronic Signatures Act, nonetheless, has
expressly excluded from its applicability the ‘execution of wills, codicils, or testa-
mentary trusts’.50
35
UPC } 2–502.
36
The UPC here adopts the ‘conscious’ presence, rather than ‘visual’ presence, test discussed below.
37
See, eg, Louisiana Civil Code Arts 1578–80.1.
38
See, eg, Succession of Bacot 502 So2d 1118, 1122–3 (Louisiana Court Appeal 4th Circuit, 1987).
39
In re Succession of Caillouet 935 So2d 713 (Louisiana Court Appeal 4th Circuit, 2006).
40
In re Southerland’s Will 124 SE 632 (North Carolina, 1924).
41
In re Kimmel’s Estate 123 A 405 (Pennsylvania, 1914).
42
In re Succession of Caillouet 935 So2d 713 (Louisiana Court Appeal 4th Circuit, 2006).
43
Restatement (Third) of Property (1999) } 3.1 cmt j, 173 ff.
44
Louisiana Civil Code Arts 1578–80.1; Mitchell v Mitchell 264 SE2d 222 (Georgia, 1980).
45
Page (n 24) } 19.52, 107 ff.
46
Taylor v Holt 134 SW3d 830 (Tennessee Court Appeals, 2003).
47
Matter of Reed’s Estate 625 P2d 447, 452 (Kansas, 1981) (discussed in McGovern, Kurtz, and
English (n 22) 202 ff).
48
Uniform Commercial Code } 1–201(37).
49
Matter of Reed’s Estate 625 P2d 447, 452 (Kansas, 1981).
50
15 USC } 7003(a)(1) (discussed in McGovern, Kurtz, and English (n 22) 202 ff).
A signature, however, does more than establish identity. In fact, a signature is valid
even if it is not legible.51 In addition to establishing one’s identity, a signature on a
will helps ‘show finality’ and establishes the difference between ‘tentative scribbling
and a consummated product’.52 Because of the importance of ‘finality’, the English
Wills Act of 1837 required that the signature be the last words in the document.53
Although most states have abolished the rule, it still subsists statutorily in some states
and jurisprudentially in others.54 This rule had caused a number of problems when
language or writing appears after a signature, ‘unless the words below the signature
are purely formal and in no way dispository or testamentary in nature’.55 For
example, when testamentary words appear after the signature, ‘American courts
have generally refused to hold that just the part below the signature is invalid for
the reason that the non-compliance with the statute is one that involves defective
execution and improper execution is fatal to the entire document’.56 On the other
hand, if it can be proven that the words below the signature were added after the
original execution of the will, then the original will may be probated with only the
amendment or addition being disregarded.57
In the majority of jurisdictions without a requirement that the signature appear at
the end of the will, concern may still exist that a signature elsewhere in a document
does not sufficiently indicate that the will is complete and intended to be final. The
reason for the concern is simple: a testator’s name may be written in the body or
introduction to the will without intending it to be his signature.58 The comments to
the Restatement (Third) of Property indicate that ‘[i]f the testator’s name is not
written in freestanding form, then there should be other evidence that the testator
adopted the document as his or her will in order to count the handwritten name as a
signature’.59 As one commentator has noted, perhaps the best indication that a
testator who wrote his name in a place other than at the end of the will intended
for his written name to serve as his signature is by ‘express statement of such
intention in the will’, such as ‘signed by my own hand’.60
When wills contain multiple pages, as is often the case, savvy lawyers require
clients to sign or initial each page of the will,61 although few state statutes actually
require this.62 The concern, of course, is one of completeness and assurance that
unsigned pages were not secretly substituted later without the testator’s knowledge.
51
Restatement (n 43) } 3.1 cmt j, 173 ff. 52
Ibid. 53
54
Restatement (n 43) } 3.1 cmt j, 174.
55
Page (n 24) } 22.2, 617 ff.
56
Page (n 24) } 22.2, 617 ff. But see Louisiana Civil Code Art 1575 (stating for holograph wills that
‘[i]f anything is written by the testator after his signature, the testament shall not be invalid and such
writing may be considered by the court, in its discretion, as part of the testament’).
57
Page (n 24) } 22.2, 617 ff. 58
Page (n 24) } 19.54, 110.
59
Restatement (n 43) } 3.1 cmt j, 173 ff. 60
Page (n 24) } 19.55, 114.
61
McGovern, Kurtz, and English (n 22) 204 ff.
62
But see Louisiana Civil Code Art 1577 (requiring that in a notarial will, a testator ‘sign his name at
the end of the testament and on each other separate page’).
Flagrant violation of this concern, such as when some pages are signed and others are
not, may result in a court rejecting a will.63
2. Attested wills: the extra formalities

Although all wills must be signed, different types of will require different additional
formalities. For attested wills, separate requirements for both the writing and the
witnesses must be met. New proposals and technology, however, may soon produce
wills that look very different from those of today. The substitution of a notary in
place of witnesses and the possibility of video wills are only some of the changes
currently proposed.
(a) The writing

At present, however, the traditional requirement that attested wills must be in
‘writing’ continues to exist. What constitutes ‘writing’ is generally given a liberal
interpretation. Handwriting with a pen or pencil, printing by hand, typewriting, or
printing by computer have all been held acceptable methods of writing a will.64
Although this matter is generally not regulated by state statute, courts have applied
the ‘writing’ requirement loosely.
Modern technology has given rise to new questions regarding the writing require-
ment. Video or other electronic recording of a testator’s intent may arguably serve
the same purposes as writing. On the topic of the writing requirement, the Restate-
ment provides as follows:
The requirement of a writing does not require that the will be written on sheets of paper, but it
does require a medium that allows the markings to be detected. A will, for example, scratched
in the paint on the fender of a car would be in writing, but one ‘written’ by waving a finger in
the air would not be.65
To date, Nevada is the only state to have enacted a statute specifically allowing
electronic wills,66 although two other states have statutorily stated that video record-
ings of will execution ceremonies may be admissible to demonstrate compliance with
will formalities.67
63
McGovern, Kurtz, and English (n 22) 204 ff (citing Estate of Rigsby 843 P2d 856 (Oklahoma Civil
Appeals, 1992)).
64
Page (n 24) } 19.6 at 20.
65
Restatement (n 43) } 3.1 cmt j, 173 ff. For an account of a woman from New Jersey who wrote her
will on a piece of wooden shelving, see L B Whyde, ‘Johnstown Woman’s Will Recorded on Wood’
Newark Advocate 30 September 2010.
66
Nevada Revised Statutes } 133.085 (2008). See also Jesse Dukeminier, Robert H Sitkoff, and James
Lindgren, Wills, Trusts, and Estates (8th edn, 2008) 239 ff (arguing that ‘an electronic will might
nonetheless be allowed under substantial compliance or the harmless error rule’).
67
Louisiana Code Civil Procedure Art 2904; Indiana Code Annotated } 29–1–5–3. On the possibility
of admitting video recordings in other jurisdictions and on the general value and problems of video-
recording a will execution ceremony, see Gerry W Beyer, ‘Video-Recording the Will Execution Ceremony’
(April 2010) Estate Planning Studies 1.
(b) The witnesses

In an attempt to ensure the accuracy and validity of the execution of the will,
witnesses are required for its proper execution. The number of required witnesses
has now been established to be two.68 Although some New England as well as
southern states required three in the not-too-distant past,69 uniformity in American
law on this point has now been achieved.70
To be a witness one need not have special training or qualification. Very few states
specify age requirements for the witnesses to wills,71 and generally the standard of
capacity necessary to witness a will is the same for witnessing any other legal act,
provided the witness understands the significance of his oath.72
At a very general level, the witness requirement helps to ensure that the testator
signed a document that he intended to serve as his will. Thus, witnesses may not sign
the will and then leave before the testator signs without risking invalidity.73 If the
testator and the witnesses, however, sign ‘as part of a single (or continuous) transac-
tion’, then most states attach little significance to the order in which the testator and
witnesses sign.74 On the other hand, a significant minority of states have adhered to a
strict order of priority in which the testator must sign first, even if the entire
execution ceremony is conducted as part of one single transaction.75
Somewhat surprisingly, the states have ‘not achieved uniformity on . . . what the
witnesses must witness’.76 Some states require that the witnesses see the testator sign
the will.77 Other states allow the testator merely to acknowledge his will before
subscribing witnesses.78 The Uniform Probate Code provides that the ‘witnesses
witness one of three events: the testator’s act of signing the will, the testator’s act of
acknowledging his or her signature, or the testator’s act of acknowledging the will’.79
In other words, under statutes inspired by the Uniform Probate Code, the witnesses
need not be present to witness the execution of the will at all. The will or the
testator’s signature can merely be acknowledged before witnesses after the execution.
This ‘raises a question about whether there is any time limit on when the witnesses
68
Lawrence W Waggoner, ‘The Uniform Probate Code Authorizes Notarized Wills’ (2008) 34
ACTEC J 1.
69
Atkinson (n 7) 261 ff (stating that Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Georgia, and South
Carolina all required three witnesses); Restatement (n 43) } 3.1 cmt o (stating ‘[a]t one time, a substantial
minority of states required three attesting witnesses . . . ’).
70
Waggoner (2008) 34 ACTEC J 1. Vermont, the last holdout, changed its law in 2005: see,
eg Waggoner n 4 (citing Vermont Statutes Annotated title 14, } 5).
71
Restatement (n 43) } 3.1, cmt o, 175 ff.
72
73
Page (n 24) } 19.138, 242 ff. But see Bloechle v Davis 8 NE2d 247 (Ohio, 1937) (validating a will
signed by a testator several days after it was signed by the witnesses).
74
Restatement (n 43) } 3.1 cmt m; Page (n 24) } 19.139, 243 ff.
75
Page (n 24) } 19.139, 243 ff.
76
Waggoner (2008) 34 ACTEC J 1.
77
California Probate Code } 6110; Virginia Code } 64.1–49; Tennessee Code Annotated } 32–1–104;
78
Conway v Conway 153 NE2d 11 (Illinois, 1958).
79
Waggoner (2008) 34 ACTEC J 2 ff n 5; see also UPC } 2–502.
must sign the will after they have witnessed the testator’s signature or acknowledge-
ment of the signature or the will’.80 The Uniform Probate Code (as revised in 1990)
requires the witness to sign ‘within a reasonable time’ after they witnessed one of the
above acts.81
Although no American state requires that the witness know the contents of the
will, a small minority of states still do require that the testator ‘publish’ or declare to
the witnesses that the document they are signing is his will.82 In early Roman
times, the witnesses no doubt knew that they were witnessing the execution of a
will and may have even had knowledge of the will’s contents.83 The ‘publication’
requirement in some American states, however, is probably not a development from
Roman or English law, but is most likely a holdover from the Model Probate Code,
an early predecessor to the Uniform Probate Code.84
Even the states that do impose a publication requirement usually apply it very
forgivingly. For example, recent cases indicate that the purpose of publication is not
to inform the witnesses that the document is the testator’s will and thus a testator
need not actually declare to the witness that the document is ‘his will’.85 Rather the
purpose of the publication requirement is that the witnesses be ‘aware that the
testator knows he is about to execute a will’,86 and thus publication can be ‘inferred
from all the circumstances attending the execution of the will’.87 The requirement of
‘publication’ never appears to have been the majority rule in America, and the rule
appears to be fading as fewer states require it today than in the past.88
Although explicit attestation clauses are frequently used in wills,89 only Louisiana
requires that witnesses expressly sign an attestation clause indicating that the testator
80
Restatement (n 43) } 3.1 cmt p, 178 ff.
81
UPC } 2–502(a)(3)(A).
82
See Arkansas Code Annotated } 28–25–103; California Probate Code } 6110; Indiana Code
Annotated } 29–1–5–3; Louisiana Civil Code Art 1577; New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Code
} 3–2.1; Oklahoma Statutes Annotated title 84 } 55; Tennessee Code Annotated } 32–1–104.
83
See Gai 2, 101, in Scott (n 9) 124 ff (describing the Comitia Calata, which was called together twice
a year for the purpose of making wills); ibid 2, 104, in Scott (n 9) 124 ff (describing the mancipatory will
ceremony in which the testator stated, ‘I do give and bequeath, and declare that I do so, everything written
in these tablets and this wax, and do you, Roman citizens bear witness to my act’). See also Ulpian D. 28,
1, 20, 9, in Watson (n 3) 359 ff (stating that even if witnesses do not know Latin, ‘it is enough if someone
realizes . . . what the transaction in which he has been asked to take part is’); C. 6, 23, 28, in Scott (n 9) vol
13, 338–9 ff (stating that even in exceptional cases where witnesses must be brought in after the execution
ceremony has begun, they ‘shall be informed by the testator, as well as by the other witnesses of everything
that has taken place, before they were summoned’). See also ch 1 above at 3.
84
Neither the English Wills Act nor the Statute of Frauds contained such a requirement: Restatement
(n 43) } 3.1 cmt h and reporter’s note 3. See Wills Act 1837 s 13.
85
Fischer v Kinzalow 198 SW3d 555, 561 (Arkansas Court Appeals, 2004).
86
Outlaw v Danks 832 NE2d 1108 (Indiana Court Appeals, 2005); Arnold v Parry 363 NE2d 1055
(Indiana Court Appeals, 1977).
87
Fischer v Kinzalow 198 SW3d 555, 561 (Arkansas Court Appeals, 2004).
88
Compare n 82 above with Atkinson (n 7) 278 ff (listing the following states as imposing such a
requirement: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Utah).
89
requested they act as witnesses and declared the document subscribed to be his will.90
Despite the silence of many state laws on this issue, the use of an attestation clause in
a will is very common in practice. In fact, some have suggested that ‘it is almost
certainly professional malpractice not to include one’.91 The popularity of these
clauses is due, no doubt, to the function they serve and the benefit they confer. When
witnesses have attested in writing that the testator declared the document to be his
will and that it was duly executed, ‘such a clause gives rise to a presumption of due
execution’.92
Despite the divergence on what the witnesses must observe, the witnesses to the
will are often required to sign their name in the ‘presence of the testator’, although a
minority of states further requires that witnesses sign in the presence of each other.93
In any event, different states have interpreted and applied the word ‘presence’
differently. Some states require the witnesses be in the ‘visual’ presence of the
testator, and thus invalidate the will if the witnesses sign out of the ‘line of sight’
of the testator.94 Other states require only that the person signing be in the testator’s
‘conscious presence’ and uphold the will as long as the testator ‘through sight,
hearing, or general consciousness of events, comprehends that the witness is in the
act of signing’.95 The Uniform Probate Code (and thus about twenty states) requires
neither.96 Thus, a will may be valid even if signed by witnesses outside the presence
of the testator.
States also differ on how to treat witnesses who benefit under the will. The
existence of these so-called ‘interested’ witnesses has spawned three different ap-
proaches.97 The common law approach, which today is not followed by any
American state, disqualified the interested witness and resulted in the invalidity of
the entire will, if the interested witness was necessary.98
Probably the dominant approach in the United States, however, attempts to
ameliorate the harsh results of the common law rule by still giving effect to the
will, but eliminating the legacy to the interested witnesses.99 This approach, popular
among many states that have enacted so-called ‘purging statutes’, is modelled on an
English statute of 1752. In applying the ‘purging rule’, however, most state statutes
provide two further qualifications. First, a witness’s interested status is essential only
at the time of execution of the will. Thus, a disinterested witness who subsequently
acquires an interest (perhaps by codicil or amendment) after the execution of the will
is not purged. Second, most states with purging statutes create exceptions that allow a
90
Louisiana Civil Code Arts 1576–80.1.
91
Dukeminier, Sitkoff, and Lindgren (n 66) 233 ff.
92
Ibid. And see UPC } 3–406(3) (stating that ‘[a]n attestation clause that is signed by the attesting
witnesses raises a rebuttable presumption that the events recited in the clause occurred’); Restatement
(n 43) } 3.1, cmt q.
93
Restatement (n 43) } 3.1, cmt p. 94
Ibid.
95
Dukeminier, Sitkoff, and Lindgren (n 66) 233 ff; Restatement (n 43) } 3.1, cmt p.
96
UPC } 2–502(3)(A); Restatement (n 43) } 3.1, stat note 8.
97
Although generally witnesses are not considered interested if their spouse is a legatee, in some states
legacies to spouses of witnesses may also be ‘purged’ by statute: see, eg Louisiana Civil Code Art 1582.1.
See also Restatement (n 43) } 3.1, cmt o.
98
Restatement (n 43) } 3.1, cmt o. 99
Ibid.
witness to inherit from a testator if the witness is also an heir or legatee under a
previous will. In such cases, the witness is only purged of the additional legacy he
would have received under the attested will and is still allowed to receive the lesser of
his intestate share or disposition under the will. To the extent that the witness was a
supernumerary one, his signature was not essential to the validity of the will and thus
he may receive his full bequest, despite the existence of his interest.
The Uniform Probate Code (since its original enactment in 1969) endorses a
more permissive method and rejects both of the above approaches. Curiously and
perhaps unintentionally modelling Roman law,100 the Uniform Probate Code opts
to impose no penalty for the existence of interested witnesses.101 This approach,
followed in about 40 per cent of the states, is motivated by the idea that the existence
of a further penalty is unnecessary because the presence of interested witnesses
already constitutes a ‘suspicious circumstance’ that is likely to give rise to a suit for
undue influence.102
(c) The notary?

Historically, American states have not provided for notarized wills.103 Although this
may seem odd in a civilian jurisdiction with a highly trained notarial profession, the
American notary is a ‘frail imitation of his European counterpart’.104 As a result, not
all of the functions of formalities can be achieved by the American notary, not the
least of which is the protective function that civil law notaries are all but essential for.
In fact, ‘[i]n the hundreds of years since the enactment of the English Statute of
Frauds, notarization has [never] been adopted as an alternative to attestation by
witnesses’.105
Nevertheless, in 2008 the Uniform Probate Code was amended to allow for the
validity of a will that was not witnessed but which was ‘acknowledged by the testator
before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledg-
ments’.106 The rationale for this amendment is that even an American notary (who
certainly does not ensure capacity or that the will is free from undue influence,
coercion, or forgery) can achieve some of the desired purposes of will formalities,
100
Ulpian D. 28, 1, 20, 1, in Watson (n 3) 358–9 ff. (‘A person instituted heir in a will cannot be a
witness to the same will. The opposite is held in the case of a legatee and someone appointed a tutor; for
they can be used as witnesses, if there is nothing else to prevent them, as, for example, if he is impubes or in
the power of the testator.’) See also C. 6, 22, in Scott (n 9) vol 13, 325–9 ff.
101
UPC } 2–505 and cmt.
102
Restatement (n 43) } 3.1, cmt o.
103
Exceptions to this are, once again, Louisiana which provides specifically for a ‘notarial’ will
(see Louisiana Civil Code Art 1576) and the international will, as adopted by UPC }} 2–1003 and
2–1009. See also ch 3 above at 65 ff.
104
Langbein (1978) 77 Michigan LR 70 ff. On the general distinction between American and
European notaries in the context of wills, see ibid. And see Ronald J Scalise Jr, ‘Undue Influence and
the Law of Wills: A Comparative Assessment’ (2008) 19 Duke Journal of Comparative and International
Law 41, 91 ff.
105
Waggoner (2008) 34 ACTEC J 2 ff.
106
UPC } 2–503(a)(3)(B) (2008 amendment).
most notably ensuring the identity of the party executing the will.107 Moreover, in
professional estate-planning transactions, notarization is already required for other
essential documents (for example, health-care powers of attorney, revocable trusts),
and allowing its use in the execution of the will would both ‘reduce confusion and
the chance for error if all of the documents could be executed with the same
formality’.108 Finally, in so far as the ‘public is accustomed to thinking that a
document is made “legal” by getting it notarized’, this proposed new practice will
now comport better with prevailing public sentiment and expectations.109
Although no state has yet adopted the newly endorsed ‘notarized’ will, notariza-
tion as part of the will transaction is not uncommon in the United States. Notariza-
tion has been widely used not in fulfilment of an essential testamentary formality, but
as an important part of the creation of a self-proved will. Spearheaded, although not
originated, by the Uniform Probate Code, the self-proved will is ‘routinely used by
estate-planning professionals’ and involves nothing more than the execution of a
separate affidavit – either simultaneous with the will or after the fact – that is signed
by the testator, the witnesses, and a notary.110 A self-proved will satisfies the
execution requirements for wills, unless fraud or forgery is proved, and can be
‘admitted to probate . . . without the testimony of any attesting witnesses . . . ’.111
Under the proposal of the Uniform Probate Code, a will notarized, but not self-
proved, would receive a rebuttable presumption of due execution and thus be treated
similar to a will in which witnesses signed an attestation clause.112
3. Holograph wills
Although the attested will has deep roots in American legal history, the holograph
will does not. It is recognized only in ‘slightly over half of the states, primarily in the
South and the West’,113 and it seems to have ‘found its way into the Code Napoleon,
and thence to the New World, where it initially surfaced in Louisiana and Vir-
ginia’.114 Academic disagreement still exists over the wisdom of this type of will.115
Some suggest that holograph wills are ‘more trouble than they are worth’ because
107
Waggoner (2008) 34 ACTEC J 5 ff. Some have also argued that a ‘notarized will would almost
always be upheld under the Uniform Probate Code’s harmless-error rule’: see ibid 4–5.
108 109
Waggoner (2008) 34 ACTEC J 6. Ibid.
110
Waggoner (2008) 34 ACTEC J 2 ff; UPC } 2–504. 111
UPC } 2–504, cmt.
112
UPC } 3–406. 113
114
Gail Boreman Bird, ‘Sleight of Handwriting: The Holographic Will in California’ (1981) 32
Hastings LJ 606 ff; R H Helmholz, ‘The Origin of Holographic Wills in English Law’ (1994) 15 Legal
History 98 ff. See also Adam J Hirsch, ‘Inheritance and Inconsistency’ (1987) 57 Ohio State LJ 1072 ff n 44
(expressing the view that the holographic will ‘was first received into the statute book of colonial Virginia as
early as 1748’). Some have argued that the Virginia statute ‘did not actually create a distinct type of will but
merely made proof of execution easier by dispensing with the formality of attesting witnesses’. See L H H
Jr, ‘Holographic Wills in Virginia: Problems at Probate’ (1959) 45 Virginia LR 614 ff. Others suggest that,
although some states followed the Virginia statute, others adopted the civil law holograph will made
popular in the United States by the Code Napoleon and Louisiana. Ibid.
115
Richard Lewis Brown, ‘The Holographic Problem – The Case Against Holographic Wills’ (2006) 4
Tennessee LR 93 ff (arguing that holograph wills are problematic ‘on several different levels’); Stephen
Clowney, ‘In Their Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking’ (2008)
they often present problems of non-compliance with the required formalities, in

addition to presenting interpretative problems due to the inartful and unskilled use
of language.116 Others contend that despite ‘small errors’, ‘holographs continue to
offer unmistakable benefits to testators who are either unable or unwilling to execute
a traditional will’.117 Despite the debate, the popularity of holograph wills seems to
be slightly on the rise.118 This trend is likely only to increase, given the recognition of
this method of testation by the Uniform Probate Code.119
(a) Handwriting
In addition to the signature requirement (discussed above), holograph wills – unlike
attested or notarized wills – must be in the handwriting of the testator. Although
holograph wills may sacrifice the evidentially important witnesses, the fact that the
entire will, rather than just the signature, is in the handwriting of the testator helps to
offset this deficiency with greater proof of the testator’s identity through a more
extensive sample of his handwriting. Moreover, the relaxation of the formalities at
the time of execution necessarily requires greater proof of the validity of the
instrument at the time of probate. Holograph wills must be proven by evidence or
affidavits and do not benefit from any presumptions of validity that accompany other
types of wills.120
Other than the bare requirements of handwriting and a signature, no consensus
exists among states as to other requisites. In fact, different approaches exist among
the states on questions as basic as whether a holograph will must be written entirely
in the testator’s handwriting. Only about ten states maintain such a rule,121 and the
requirement has been the source of much litigation. Under some of these statutes,
wills have in the past been held invalid if the will contains any typewritten material or
any material not in the hand of the testator. For example, a holograph will has been
held invalid where the testator used a rubber stamp to insert the name of his ‘country
place’.122 Few states, however, would employ such an approach today. Most states
that require a will to be ‘entirely’ in the testator’s handwriting now simply ignore the
pre-printed language and attempt to uphold the will. Thus, a pre-printed letterhead
referencing the place at which the will was executed could be disregarded as inessen-
tial to the will.123 Under this more permissive approach, a holograph will might only
be invalid if the pre-printed material is essential to the writing or the establishment of
testamentary intent.124
43 Real Property Trusts and Estates LJ 27 ff (arguing that holographic wills are ‘indispensible’ and ‘low-cost
alternative[s] to intestacy’).
116
Brown (2006) 4 Tennessee LR 126 ff; Bird (1981) 32 Hastings LJ 606 ff.
117
Clowney (2008) 43 Real Property Trusts and Estates LJ 122 ff.
118
In the 1930s, Atkinson writes, only nineteen states allowed holograph wills: Atkinson (n 7) 305 ff.
119
UPC } 2–502(b); Helmholz (1994) 15 Legal History 97 ff.
120
See UPC }} 3–405 and 3–406.
121
122
In re Thorn’s Estate 192 P 19 (California, 1920).
123
Succession of Heineman 136 So 51 (Louisiana, 1931).
124
Blankenship v Blankenship 124 SW2d 1060 (Kentucky Court Appeals, 1939).
Second, a more progressive approach was given popular support when the original
version of the Uniform Probate Code in 1969 adopted a holograph will provision
that required only that ‘material provisions’ of the will be in the handwriting of
the testator.125 The laws in eight states contain such ‘material provisions’ require-
ments.126 States with these statutes face similar interpretative problems in deciding
whether pre-printed words can be given any effect, but the intent of this change was
to allow both the will to stand and for pre-printed material to be given effect,
provided at least the signature and material provisions are in the testator’s
handwriting.127
Finally, a third approach to holograph wills – that of the 1990 revision to the
Uniform Probate Code – is followed by nine states and requires only that the
signature and ‘material portions’, rather than ‘provisions’, of the document be in
the testator’s handwriting.128 Under these statutes, a holograph will ‘may be valid
even though immaterial parts such as date or introductory wording are printed,
typed, or stamped’.129 Moreover, if specific ‘provisions’ are pre-printed, the will may
still be valid if the important ‘portions’ of that provision are in the handwriting of the
testator. For example, a ‘will form that contains printed language such as “I give,
devise, and bequeath to ________” does not disqualify the document as a holo-
graphic will, as long as the testator fills out the remaining portion of the dispositive
provision in his or her own hand’.130 In addition, the 1990 version of the Uniform
Probate Code allows for testamentary intent to be established by ‘extrinsic evidence’,
including non-handwritten portions of the document.131
(b) The date

Four states (Louisiana, Oklahoma, Nebraska, and Nevada) require that the holo-
graph will be dated.132 The purpose of the date is to determine not only priority
among multiple wills but also the time at which testamentary capacity is required.133
Although the date requirement has given rise to much litigation, some states insist on
its necessity, even if the date of the will is unimportant.134 Abbreviated or ‘slash’
dates are generally allowed, but the date must be complete enough to ‘sufficiently
125
UPC } 2–503 (1969).
126
Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated } 14–2503; California Probate Code } 6111; Idaho Code } 15–
2–503; Maine Revised Statutes Annotated title 18-A, } 2–502; New Jersey Statutes Annotated } 3B:3–3;
Tennessee Code Annotated } 32–1–105; Nebraska Revised Statutes } 30–2328; Nevada Revised Statutes
} 133.090.
127
Restatement (n 43) } 3.2, reporter’s note 1.
128
UPC } 2–502(b).
129
Restatement (n 43) } 3.2, reporter’s note 1.
130
UPC } 2–502, cmt (b).
131
UPC } 2–502(c) and cmt (c).
132
Louisiana Civil Code Art 1575; Nebraska Revised Statutes } 30–2328; Nevada Revised Statutes
} 1330.090; Oklahoma Statutes Annotated title 84, } 54.
133
In re Estate of Wells 497 NW2d 683 (Nebraska, 1993).
134
McGovern, Kurtz, and English (n 22) 213 ff (stating that a date may be important in some
instances to prove capacity at the time of making the will and to determine which of multiple conflicting
wills was executed last).
indicate . . . the day, month, and year’.135 Extrinsic evidence is often allowed to
clarify ambiguous dates, such as whether 1/2/73 meant 2 January 1973 or 1 February
1973.136 Some states, however, will not allow extrinsic evidence to supply a date
when none is present,137 but others allow such evidence to supply an absent date.138
The date must ordinarily be in the testator’s handwriting,139 although a will may still
be valid even if the date is incorrect.140
4. Special wills
Seventeen American jurisdictions provide for a final, yet rarely used, type of oral or
nuncupative will,141 the origins of which can be traced to Roman law.142 Few recent
cases exist under these statutes, and modern approaches to wills, as exemplified in the
Restatement and the Uniform Probate Code, do not allow for oral or nuncupative
wills. Recently, some states have even begun to repeal old statutes allowing for these
types of will.143
Nuncupative wills are often limited either to soldiers or sailors,144 or at least to
those in the imminent throes of death or last illness.145 Most statutes allow for the
disposition of movable or personal property only,146 and even then some statutes
135
See, eg, Louisiana Civil Code Art 1575.
136
Succession of Miller 479 So2d 1035 (Louisiana Court Appeal 3rd Circuit, 1985). See also Succession
of Boyd 306 So2d 687 (Louisiana, 1975); Succession of Bacot 502 So2d 1118 (Louisiana Court Appeal 4th
Circuit, 1987).
137
Matter of Estate of Collins 714 P2d 1006 (Nevada, 1986) (stating that a holograph will that does not
contain a date handwritten by the testator is ‘void on its face’).
138
See, eg, Nebraska Revised Statutes } 30–2328.
139
Succession of Heinemann 136 So 51 (Louisiana, 1931).
140
Estate of Hand 684 A2d 521 (New Jersey Superior Court Chancery Division, 1996).
141
See, eg, District of Columbia Code Annotated } 18–107; Indiana Code Annotated } 29–1–5–4;
Kansas Statutes Annotated } 59–608; Massachusetts General Laws Annotated chapter 191, } 6; Mississippi
Code Annotated } 91–5–15; Missouri Revised Statutes } 474.340; New Hampshire Revised Statutes
} 551:16; New York Law } 3–2.2; North Carolina General Statutes } 31–3.5; Ohio Revised Code
Annotated } 2107.60; Oklahoma Statutes Annotated 84, } 46; Rhode Island General Laws } 33–5–6;
Tennessee Code Annotated } 32–1–106; Vermont Statutes Annotated title 14, } 6; Virginia Code
Annotated } 64.1–53; Washington Revised Code } 11.12.025; West Virginia Code } 41–1–5.
142
D. 29, 1, in Watson (n 3) 409 ff.
143
See, eg, Georgia Code Annotated } 53–2–47 (repealed); Louisiana Civil Code Arts 1578 and 1583
(repealed); Nevada Revised Statutes } 133.100 (repealed); Texas Probate Code Annotated } 64, 65
(repealed).
144
See, eg, District of Columbia Code Annotated } 18–107; Massachusetts General Laws Annotated
chapter 191, } 6; New York Law } 3–2.2; Oklahoma Statutes Annotated 84, } 46; Rhode Island General
Laws } 33–5–6; Virginia Code Annotated } 64.1–53.
145
Kansas Statutes Annotated } 59–608; Mississippi Code Annotated } 91–5–15; Missouri Revised Statutes
} 474.340; New Hampshire Revised Statutes } 551:16; North Carolina General Statutes } 31–3.5; Ohio
Revised Code Annotated } 2107.60; Oklahoma Statutes Annotated 84, } 46; Tennessee Code Annotated
} 32–1–106; Vermont Statutes Annotated title 14, } 6; Washington Revised Code } 11.12.025; West
Virginia Code } 41–1–5.
146
See, eg, Indiana Code Annotated } 29–1–5–4; Massachusetts General Laws Annotated ch 191, } 6;
Missouri Revised Statutes } 474.340; New Hampshire Revised Statutes } 551:16; Ohio Revised Code
impose a monetary limit on how much property may be transferred by oral will.147
A further requirement of two witnesses is not uncommon,148 and some states even
require that a newer will either be written down within a relatively short number of
days149 or that the will be probated within six months.150
5. The movement away from strict compliance

Although compliance with the above formalities may seem a daunting task, the law
has in recent times made execution of a will an easier chore. Historically, ‘almost any
mistake in the execution invalidated the will’.151
Writing in the 1930s, Atkinson unequivocally stated as follows:
The provisions of the applicable statute[s] are mandatory – there can be no valid will without
compliance therewith. The courts will not consider the fact that the testator intended to
comply if he did not do so. The fact that the will contains worthy or commendable provisions
is no excuse for failure to follow the statute.152
Roman law faced similar problems. The Digest tells of Lucius Titius who wrote a will
on his own ‘following the promptings of his own heart rather than excessive and
small-minded pedantry’. Titius’ will, having presumably fallen ‘short of legal or
learned form’, received the same treatment at Roman law that it would have received
in early American law – invalidity.153 Many courts, when evaluating relatively minor
mistakes or transgressions, emphasized the importance of will formalities in prevent-
ing fraud and the danger that accomplishing ‘equity and justice in [a] particular case’
could lead to ‘the Wills Act becom[ing] a meaningless, although well intentioned
Annotated } 2107.60; Tennessee Code Annotated } 32–1–106; Vermont Statutes Annotated title 14, } 6;
Virginia Code Annotated } 64.1–53; Washington Revised Code } 11.12.025.
147
See, eg, Indiana Code Annotated } 29–1–5–4; Mississippi Code Annotated } 91–5–15; Missouri
Revised Statutes } 474.340; New Hampshire Revised Statutes } 551:16; Oklahoma Statutes Annotated 84,
} 46; Tennessee Code Annotated } 32–1–106; Vermont Statutes Annotated title 14, } 6; Washington
Revised Code } 11.12.025.
148
Kansas Statutes Annotated } 59–608; Missouri Revised Statutes } 474.340; New Hampshire Revised
Statutes } 551:16 (three witnesses required); North Carolina General Statutes } 31–3.5; Ohio Revised
Code Annotated } 2107.60; Oklahoma Statutes Annotated 84, } 46; Tennessee Code Annotated } 32–1–
106; Washington Revised Code } 11.12.025.
149
Kansas Statutes Annotated } 59–608; Missouri Revised Statutes } 474.340; New Hampshire Revised
Statutes } 551:16; Ohio Revised Code Annotated } 2107.60; Tennessee Code Annotated } 32–1–106;
Vermont Statutes Annotated title 14, } 474.340; Virgnia Code Annotated } 64.1–53; Washington Revised
Code } 11.12.025.
150
See, eg, Indiana Code Annotated } 29–1–5–4; Kansas Statutes Annotated } 59–608; Mississippi
Code Annotated } 91–5–15; Missouri Revised Statutes } 474.340; New Hampshire Revised Statutes
} 551:16; Ohio Revised Code Annotated } 2107.60; Tennessee Code Annotated } 32–1–106; Vermont
Statutes Annotated title 14, } 6; Washington Revised Code } 11.12.025.
151
152
Atkinson (n 7) 247 ff.
153
Scaevola D. 31, 1, 88, 17, in Watson (n 3) vol 3, 68–9 ff.
scrap of paper . . . ’.154 Despite the strict compliance to which many courts adhered,
other courts pioneered a move to uphold wills, provided ‘substantial’, but not strict,
compliance with the formalities of the Wills Act was achieved.155
The latter approach has clearly become the dominant one in recent years. States
have moved away from strict compliance in different ways. Some states have
judicially abandoned rigid adherence to formalities by finding that wills not comply-
ing with the requisite formalities may still be validly probated if they ‘substantially
comply’ with the statutory formalities. As one court has noted, the purpose of the
doctrine of substantial compliance is not to open the door to ‘carelessness or
chicanery’, but to ‘remove procedural peccadillos as a bar to probate’.156 Although
the doctrine of substantial compliance has been percolating in the jurisprudence for
decades, this change in American jurisprudence was popularized by a law review
article written in 1975 by John Langbein.157 In that article he advocated the probate
of wills that substantially complied with the statutory formalities, provided ‘clear and
convincing’ evidence existed that the will served the purposes of testamentary
formalities.
In addition to the permissive approach adopted by courts, other states have
legislatively adopted a ‘harmless error’ rule or legislatively granted the court the
power to ‘dispense’ with minor formalities. This approach was also advocated by
Langbein in a 1987 law review article in which he revised his ‘substantial compliance’
approach based upon his observance of South Australia’s experience with a recently
adopted ‘harmless error’ rule.158 This approach was adopted by the influential
Uniform Probate Code,159 Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other
Donative Transfers,160 and thus by a variety of states thereafter.161
As one might expect, the result of this process of liberalization has been an increase
in the probate of a number of wills that otherwise might have been held invalid. Few
formalities are considered sacrosanct, other than perhaps a bare ‘writing’ and some
evidence of a signature. Otherwise, courts, under either a substantial compliance
approach or a harmless error analysis, have probated wills that contain all variety
of defects, including deficiencies in the witness requirement162 and the signa-
ture itself.163 Although most commentators have enthusiastically supported this
154
In re Pavlinko’s Estate 148 S2d 528 (Pennsylvania, 1959).
155
Atkinson (n 7) 247 ff; Robertson v Robertston 24 SW2d 282 (Kentucky Court Appeals, 1930).
156
In re Will of Ranney 589 A2d 1339 (New Jersey, 1991).
157
Langbein (1975) 88 Harvard LR 489 ff.
158
John H Langbein, ‘Excusing Harmless Error in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia’s
Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law’ (1987) 87 Columbia LR 1 ff. For more discussion of the Australian
experience, see ch 14 above at 349 ff.
159
UPC } 2–503. 160
Restatement (n 43) } 3.3.
161
See, eg, Hawaii Revised Statutes Annotated } 560:2–503 (Michie 1999); Michigan Compiled Laws
} 700.1101 (2001); Montana Code Annotated } 72–2–523 (2003); South Dakota Codified Laws } 29A-
2–503 (Michie 2004); Utah Code Annotated } 75–2–503 (Supplement 2003); 2004 New Jersey Laws
132.
162
Alleged Will of Ranney 589 A2d 1339 (New Jersey, 1991).
163
Hickox v Wilson 496 SE2d 711 (Georgia, 1998) (holding a signature on a self-proving affidavit was
a sufficient signature of the will); but see Allen v Dalk 826 S2d 245 (Florida, 2002) (holding the contrary).
liberalization trend,164 some have expressed concern that the more formalities are
excused the more the beneficial purposes of the formalities are thwarted.165
III. Incorporation by reference and alterations
1. Incorporation
Despite the formalities required for the execution of wills, surprisingly few formal-
ities are required for documents that are incorporated into or referenced by validly
and properly executed wills. Three different doctrines, prevalent but not universally
accepted in the United States, make this possible. The first is the ‘incorporation
by reference’ doctrine, which merely allows a writing that is referenced in a validly
executed will – but which does not itself comply with the formalities for wills – to be
incorporated into a will.166 For example, in Gifford v Estate of Gifford, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that a validly executed 1986 will that directed a testator’s
executor to distribute her personal property in accordance with the ‘provisions of
the handwritten [note] . . . prepared by [her] in June of 1986’ incorporated by
reference both a handwritten 1986 memorandum regarding her personal property
and a 1980 note attached thereto, neither of which were witnessed or bore the
requisite testamentary formalities.167 Similarly, in Shulsky v Shulsky, the Kansas
Supreme Court concluded that a properly executed will that referenced an improp-
erly executed land deed served to incorporate the provisions of the deed into the will,
thus giving it effect as part of the will.168
For this incorporation doctrine to apply, however, several requirements must be
met. First, the document or writing incorporated into the will must be in existence at
the time the will is executed.169 Documents that are executed after the will may not
be incorporated under this doctrine.170 Implicit in the above requirement is that the
disposition incorporated into the will must itself be ‘in writing’:171 ‘[o]ral statements
cannot be incorporated by reference’.172 Second, the will must demonstrate an intent
to incorporate the writing.173 To satisfy this requirement, the court looks to the
164
Stephanie Lester, ‘Admitting Defective Wills to Probate, Twenty Years Later: New Evidence for the
Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule’ (2007) 42 Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 577 ff.
165
See, eg, Lloyd Bonfield, ‘Reforming the Requirements for Due Execution of Wills: Some Guidance
from the Past’ (1996) 70 Tulane LR 1893 ff; John V Orth, ‘Wills Act Formalities: How Much Compliance
Is Enough?’ (2008) 43 Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal 73.
166
Restatement (n 43) } 3.6; UPC } 2–510.
167
Gifford v Estate of Gifford 805 SW2d 71 (Arkansas, 1991).
168
Shulsky v Shulsky 157 P 407 (Kansas, 1916).
169
Page (n 24) } 19.18, 41 ff.
170
Hackensack Trust Co v Hackensack Hospital Ass’n 183 A 723, 726 (New Jersey Court Chancery,
1936) (finding that two documents that postdate the will ‘cannot be read as parts of the will’).
171
Restatement (n 43) } 3.6, cmt a; UPC } 2–510.
172
Restatement (n 43) } 3.6, cmt a. Even then, however, jurisdictions have developed ways in which to
‘incorporate’ oral promises or directives to a legatee into wills by the concept of a ‘secret’ trust. See, eg
Restatement (Third) Trusts }18, cmt b.
173
Page (n 24) } 19.18, 41 ff.
entirety of the will.174 Third, the will must identify the writing to be incorporated
with ‘reasonable certainty’.175
The doctrine of incorporation by reference has long been recognized in the United
States and has its roots in English court decisions.176 The modern American version
has not evolved much, other than to dispense with the early requirement that the will
itself make reference to the fact that the document being incorporated was ‘in
existence’ at the time of the will’s execution.177 Both the Uniform Probate
Code178 and the Restatement179 have labelled this requirement as ‘sometimes
troublesome’ and ‘intent-defeating’ and thus omitted it from their provisions.
As well recognized as this doctrine is, a small minority of jurisdictions, such as
New York,180 Connecticut,181 and Louisiana,182 have expressly rejected the doctrine
of incorporation by reference. The motivating concern of this minority is that
incorporating documents that do not manifest sufficiently minimal formalities
would increase the likelihood of fraud in the area of wills.183 These fears, however,
seem to be overplayed. The doctrine of incorporation by reference has relatively
infrequent application, and in the long history of the doctrine’s existence it has not
given rise to a floodgate of fraudulent claims, at least as evidenced by reported cases.
The second doctrine is known as ‘acts of independent significance’. Under this
doctrine, widely accepted in the United States, a testamentary provision in a validly
executed will may make reference to ‘an external circumstance referred to in the will,
unless the external circumstance has no significance apart from its effect upon the will’.184
For example, a provision in a will disposing of the contents of a building is a valid
disposition, even though the will does not specify the contents (and thus subject the
disposition to the protections against fraud provided by formalities), as long as the act or
fact referred to (for example, the existence of property in the building) itself has signifi-
cance apart from the will.185 As others have noted, dispositions as simple as a legacy to ‘my
wife’ who remains unnamed in the will is enforceable because of the doctrine of acts of
independent significance.186 Reference, however, to an unattested writing in a will is not
enforceable under this doctrine because the writing or list of assets has, on its own, no
174
Restatement (n 43) } 3.6, cmt c. 175
Ibid } 3.6.
176
Atkinson (n 7) 333 ff.
177
Restatement (n 43) } 3.6, cmt a. See also ch 13 above at 316.
178
UPC } 2–510, cmt.
179
Restatement (n 43) } 3.6, cmt a.
180
See, eg, Booth v Baptist Church 28 NE 238 (New York, 1891) (stating ‘an unattested paper, which is
of a testamentary nature, cannot be taken as part of the will, even though referred to as part of that
instrument’).
181
Hatheway v Smith 65 A 1058 (Connecticut, 1907).
182
Succession of Ledet 128 So 273 (Louisiana, 1930); Hessmer v Edenborn 199 So 647 (Louisiana,
1940).
183
See, eg, In re Ivie’s Will 149 NE2d 725, 726 (New York, 1958) (softening the prohibition in New
York and stating that ‘as long as adequate safeguards are employed, the rule against incorporation by
reference should not be carried to “a drily logical extreme”’).
184
Restatement (n 43) } 3.7; UPC } 2–512.
185
See, eg, Succession of Costello 811 So 2d 63 (Louisiana Court Appeal 3rd Circuit, 2002).
186
independent significance apart from the will.187 Thus, the doctrine of incorporation by
reference and others are still necessary.
The third and final doctrine, statutorily accepted by about half of the states, allows
for the disposition of items of tangible personal property pursuant to a writing
referenced by a will. Unlike the doctrines of incorporation by reference or acts of
independent significance, this doctrine is subject to none of the above formalities. In
other words, the writing on its own need not have any ‘independent significance’ and
need not exist at the time the will is executed.188 This third doctrine was introduced
into American law by the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code and is ‘part of [the
UPC’s] policy of effectuating a testator’s intent by reducing formalities’.189 The will
need only refer to the writing. The writing must ‘describe the items and the devisees
with reasonable certainty’ and may not dispose of money or property other than
tangible personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by will. The writing
may be altered or amended after its preparation. Some states (following the original
version of the Uniform Probate Code) do not even require that the writing be
signed190 as long as it is in the testator’s handwriting, but other states have enacted
the later revision to the Uniform Probate Code, which now requires a signed
writing.191 The rationale for the change is that an unsigned writing has too great a
chance of being a draft rather than a final list.192 The signature requirement, just as
with actual wills, adds an element of finality that the list is otherwise lacking.
Moreover, under the revised version of the Uniform Probate Code, even an unsigned
document might still be given effect under the harmless error or dispensing power if
it can be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the testator wanted the list to
have effect.
2. Alterations
Alterations made to existing wills have caused courts significant consternation. The
reason for the difficulty is due to the rule that allows for deletions to be made to the
will, but not additions. The general rule is that a testator or someone at his direction
may make deletions or a revocation of part of a will by ‘burning, tearing, canceling,
obliterating, or destroying the will or any part of it’.193
Adding legatees subsequent to a will’s execution, however, cannot be done without
re-executing the will.194 Thus, a subsequent scratching out on a properly executed
187
Restatement (n 43) } 3.7, cmt e.
188
UPC } 2–513.
189
Restatement (n 43) } 3.9, reporter’s note.
190
See, eg, UPC } 2–513 (original); Arkansas Code Annotated } 28–25–107; Delaware Code
Annotated title 12, } 212; Idaho Code } 15–2–513; Iowa Code Annotated } 633.276; Maine Revised
Statutes Annotated title 18-A, } 2–513; Minnesota Statutes Annotated } 524.2–513; Missouri Revised
Statutes } 474.333; Nebraska Revised Statutes } 30–2338; New Jersey Statutes Annotated } 3B:3–11;
South Carolina Code Annotated } 62–2–512; Washington Revised Code } 11.12.260; Wyoming Statutes
Annotated } 2–6–124.
191
See, eg, UPC } 2–513 (revised). 192
UPC } 2–513 (revised), cmt.
193
UPC } 2–507.
194
McGovern, Kurtz, and English (n 22) 259 ff; Page (n 24) } 22.2.
will may have the effect of deleting a legacy, but writing in the name of a different
legatee may not be an effective addition.195 Ironically, however, when a will is
partially revoked, ‘[t]he unavoidable byproduct . . . is usually to pass the revoked
devise to the residuary devisee’ – thus producing a kind of informal addition.196
Consequently, some states do not even allow partial revocations by act and allow for
deletions only by a second writing that meets all of the testamentary formalities.197
In other states that allow partial revocations, ‘it has sometimes been held that a
partial revocation by act is ineffective if its purpose and effect would be to rearrange
the shares within a single devise or otherwise to rewrite the terms of the will by
deleting selected words’.198 The Restatement has rejected this view and approves not
only of partial revocation by act, but also of ‘the natural consequences of doing so –
the giving effect to the will as if the deleted words were not present’.199 Even in a
jurisdiction that does not adopt the Restatement view, the deletion and indeed the
resulting addition may still be given effect if the testator merely signs (or signs and
dates, if required) the strike-out, thus giving effect to the amendment as a holograph
will. In fact, if the original will is a holograph, then amendments are often effective
even without the testator re-signing.200
Moreover, the timing of alterations is critically important because ‘[a]lterations
made in a will prior to execution . . . are [perfectly] valid’.201 Such changes, in fact, are
not considered changes at all because they ‘become, by execution, an integral part of
the will’.202 Thus, when a testator substituted a new fifth page of a five-page will
before execution, resulting in a will containing not only different type faces but also
different page colours, the court allowed the will to be probated as ‘[t]here is no
requirement in law that each page of a testament must be identical and typed at the
same time, only that the document be complete at the time it is signed’.203
IV. Conclusion
As in other areas of law, it is difficult to discuss the law of testamentary formalities in

the United States with a singular voice. Comprising fifty different jurisdictions, all
with their own state laws, American law on this topic may only be discussed as law is
often taught in America, notionally. The above discussion does not seek or purport
to describe or explain the actual law in any one particular state, any more than a
discussion of European wills would describe the law of testamentary succession in
any particular country. Rather, this contribution has endeavoured to discuss major
trends and significant minority positions, in addition to the philosophies and
historical explanations behind those laws.
195
Restatement (n 43) } 3.2, cmt f. 196
Restatement (n 43) } 4.1, cmt i.
197
Indiana Code } 29–1–5–6. 198
Restatement (n 43) } 4.1, cmt i.
199 200
Ibid. Ibid.
201
McGovern, Kurtz, and English (n 22) 259 ff. 202
Page (n 24) } 22.2.
203
Succession of Norton 451 So2d 1203 (Louisiana Court Appeal 5th Circuit, 1984) (quoted in
McGovern, Kurtz, and English (n 22) 259 ff).
Some countervailing forces of convergence lighten the task. One such factor is
history. America’s British colonial history has produced a law of wills that (as in
many other areas) was originally and still is to a large extent a product of English law.
The English Statute of Wills serves as the foundation of much of the law discussed
above. The dominance of this statute (and others) at a time when American law was
in its infancy means that the law of wills started from a common birthplace and
common cultural point of view.
The second factor of convergence is that of academic movements embodied in
such works as the Uniform Probate Code and the Restatement. Once again, these
works have provided a converging force in American succession law after the
historical pull of English legal history had died out and American law began to
splinter into multiple state variations. These works have served as testing grounds for
novel ideas and springboards for already successful ones. The movement away from
strict compliance with will formalities is probably the dominant trend in the last
several decades and the best example of the influence of these works. Although strict
adherence to formalities is no longer required, the purposes served by formalities are
still important. And only by studying the history of the above institutions, and
comparative ones from other jurisdictions, is a proper and successful balance likely to
be achieved.
16
Testamentary Formalities in South Africa
Marius J de Waal
I. Introduction 382
1. A ‘mixed’ system 382
2. The ambit of customary law 383
III. The scope of the Wills Act 385
1. Wills, codicils, and testamentary writings 385
2. Incorporation by reference 386
3. Electronic media 386
4. Antenuptial contracts 387
IV. The essential formalities 387
1. The statutory provisions 387
2. Form of signature 388
3. Place of signature 390
4. Witnesses 392
5. Illiteracy or physical disability 393
V. Procedure after death 395
VI. Condonation 395
1. Introduction 395
2. A ‘document’ 396
3. ‘Drafted or executed’ by the testator 397
4. ‘Intended to be his will’ 399
VII. Amendment 401
1. History 401
2. The position under the Wills Act 401
3. The effects of non-compliance 402
VIII. Concluding remarks 402
382 Marius J de Waal
I. Introduction
1. A ‘mixed’ system
The South African law of succession is a typical product of the country’s mixed legal
system – ‘mixed’ in the sense of a significant combination of civil law and common
law (English law) elements. This ‘mix’ is obvious in a number of areas, but only two
will be mentioned here. The Roman-Dutch law of succession that was introduced
into South Africa in the seventeenth century was, like other civilian systems, based on
the principle of universal succession. This meant that upon adiation (or acceptance)
and without any form of transfer, the heir succeeded to the deceased’s assets and
liabilities. The heir as universal successor was the person who had to wind up the
deceased’s estate by, for example, paying creditors and legatees. In South Africa all of
this changed when a Cape Ordinance of 18331 replaced the system of universal
succession with the English system of executorship. In due course this also became
the system in the other areas of South Africa. Under the system of executorship
the executor acts as an intermediary between the deceased and the beneficiaries. One
implication is that an heir or legatee does not become owner of an estate asset at the
moment of the deceased’s death, but has instead a personal right against the executor.
Only after the executor has administered the estate in terms of the Administration
of Estates Act,2 and assuming that the estate’s assets exceed its liabilities, will transfer
of particular assets to heirs or legatees take place. This is also the earliest moment at
which ownership can pass. The question as to who owns the estate assets in the
period between the deceased’s death and the transfer of assets to beneficiaries has not
yet been settled in South African law.
A second area where English law has exerted its influence is in the context of
testamentary formalities – the topic of this chapter. As will become clear, while the
forms of will that were initially received into South African law were Roman-Dutch,
the will that has survived is essentially English in character. On the other hand,
regarding the content of wills the picture is quite different. The vast majority of
typical testamentary institutions and provisions originate from Roman law and were
received as such into Dutch law and later South African law. But one Roman law rule
which was abolished in Roman-Dutch law,3 and which thus never formed part of
South African law, was that of the institutio heredis.4 The absence of internal
formalities regarding the content of wills remains a characteristic of modern South
African law.5 Testators can use any words they want provided that their intention can
be established with reasonable certainty. There are no prescribed formulas.
1 2
104 of 1833. Act 66 of 1965.
3
See Johannes Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas (Paris, 1829) 28.1.1, 28.5.1.
4
According to this rule the institution of an heir, using a specific formula, was necessary for the validity
of a will.
5
See in general M M Corbett, Gys Hofmeyr, and Ellison Kahn, The Law of Succession in South
Africa (2nd edn, 2001) 199 ff; M J de Waal and M C Schoeman-Malan, Law of Succession (4th edn, 2008)
127 ff.
Testamentary Formalities in South Africa 383
2. The ambit of customary law

When dealing with the South African law of succession an intriguing extra dimen-
sion – African customary law – must also be borne in mind. But first one must
remember that it is dangerous to generalize when writing about ‘customary law’.
There does not exist one single and uniform body of customary law in South Africa.
Rather, there are various systems of customary law, such as, for example, Xhosa,
Zulu, Tswana, and Sotho law. And even within each of these groups the law can
change from region to region and from tribe to tribe.6 However, common to all of
these systems is the fact that a ‘will’ – in its formal sense as used in this chapter – is
unknown. In addition to disposing of assets during his lifetime a family head may
give instructions on his deathbed as to the distribution of assets. But the latter power
is quite limited and is not comparable with the execution of a will in the normal sense
of the word.7
In customary law intestate succession is the natural state of affairs. However, the
customary law of succession is not concerned merely with the inheritance of a
deceased’s assets. Also involved is the succession to the status of the deceased
regarding his control of family property and family members, and the taking over
of the deceased’s liabilities. The process is thus, to a certain extent, like Roman
successio in universitatem in its original form. A person living under customary law
can exclude the rules of intestate succession by executing a will complying with the
formalities as set out in this chapter, and there is a growing trend among younger,
urbanized people to do so. On the other hand, older people living in the more
traditional rural communities still tend to adhere to the normal pattern of customary
intestate succession.
South Africa’s new constitutional dispensation has not left the customary law
of intestate succession unaffected. The now famous case of Bhe v Magistrate,
Khayelitsha8 concerned rules of the customary law of succession that prevented
extra-marital daughters inheriting from their father and a sister inheriting from her
brother. The case challenged the constitutional validity of two basic tenets underly-
ing these rules, that is, section 23 of the Black Administration Act9 (by which the
customary law of succession applied, with certain exceptions, to those living under a
system of customary law), and the principle of male primogeniture.10 The Constitu-
tional Court held that the principle of male primogeniture was unconstitutional,
being incompatible with sections 9 (the right to equality) and 10 (the right to human
dignity) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.11 Section 23 of the
Black Administration Act, as the provision underpinning the whole system, suffered
6
Lourens du Plessis, An Introduction to Law (1999) 70.
7
W du Plessis and C Rautenbach, ‘Indigenous Law: Law of Succession’, in W A Joubert, J A Faris,
and Joan Church (eds), The Law of South Africa vol 32 (2009) para 204.
8
2005 (1) SA 580 (CC).
9
Act 38 of 1927.
10
In terms of this principle the eldest male heir in a family had the first right to inherit. Women did
not participate in the intestate succession of deceased estates: see 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC), para 77.
11
Act 108 of 1996. See paras 91 and 92 (Langa DCJ).
the same fate.12 The court decided that the normal rules of the Intestate Succession
Act13 would henceforth apply to all intestate deceased estates formerly regulated by
section 23.14 In its order the court also formulated a number of guidelines that must
govern instances, not uncommon in customary law, where a deceased person is
survived by more than one spouse.15 It has been suggested that a consequence of the
Bhe decision could be an increase in the use of wills among those who want ‘to ensure
that the customary rules of succession remain alive’.16 This would be a somewhat
ironic twist, but the principle of freedom of testation in South African law would
certainly allow for it.
II. Historical background
With the reception of Roman law in the Netherlands during the fifteenth century,
the forms of will of the Justinianic period were introduced into Dutch legal practice,
but without replacing indigenous forms, which remained dominant in practice.17 All
of these diverse forms were introduced at the Cape with the arrival of the Dutch in
1652.18 However, some years into British rule, Ordinance 15 of 1845 (Cape) was
enacted. Based on the English Wills Act of 1837, it introduced the English statutory
or ‘underhand’ will,19 and in the ensuing years other regions followed with their own
legislation in emulation of the Cape. In this way the statutory will was introduced in
Natal, Transvaal, and the Orange Free State.20 The Roman-Dutch forms, however,
continued to exist alongside the new will: the open and closed notarial will; various
privileged wills, of which the will of a parent in favour of a child, the soldier’s will,
and the will made in times of pestilence were the most important; a form of oral will
(which survived only in Natal); and dispositions made in terms of a clausula
reservatoria.
12
Para 68. A further consequence of the Bhe decision was the eventual revocation of the whole of the
Black Administration Act: see Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of Certain Laws
Act 28 of 2005.
13
Act 81 of 1987.
14
Para 17 (Langa DCJ).
15
Para 136. One of the consequences of the decision in Bhe was the promulgation of the Reform of
Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009, which constitutes yet
another attempt at the broader reform of the customary law of succession. Its object is to bring the
customary law of succession in line with the decision in Bhe as well as to effect some other minor reforms.
16
Du Plessis and Rautenbach (n 7) para 211.
17
N J van der Merwe and C J Rowland, with M B Cronje, Die Suid-Afrikaanse Erfreg (6th edn, 1990)
119.
18
With regard to the historical background of the South African law of succession, see generally
M M Corbett, H R Hahlo, Gys Hofmeyr, and Ellison Kahn, The Law of Succession in South Africa (1980)
36 ff; François du Toit, ‘Succession Law in South Africa – a Historical Perspective’, in Kenneth G C Reid,
Marius J de Waal, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Exploring the Law of Succession: Studies National,
Historical and Comparative (2007) 67 at 73–5; Van der Merwe and Rowland (n 17) 119 ff.
19
It is interesting to note the extent of the impact that the English Wills Act 1837 has had on the
development of the law on testamentary formalities in jurisdictions where English law has exerted its
influence. See ch 18 below at 446 and 470.
20
See respectively Law 2 of 1868; Ordinance 14 of 1903; Ordinance 11 of 1904.
The existence of such a diverse variety of forms, each with its own set of require-
ments, was obviously problematic. And even in the context of the statutory will
there was not complete uniformity among the different regions, due to differences
in statutory wording and also divergent court interpretations. Only in 1953, with the
promulgation of the Wills Act,21 was uniformity throughout the country achieved.
This Act abolished the common law forms of will22 and repealed the statutes of
the different regions (and later provinces).23 By following the basic architecture
of the old statutes, the Act ensured that only the English statutory or underhand
will survived. There was one exception: the soldier’s will, one of the privileged wills
of the common law, was included in the new legislation. Although the Act achieved
its objective of uniformity, it was not, of course, retroactive. But while the law prior
to 1 January 1954 thus continues to apply to wills executed before that date, it is
unlikely that any wills executed under the old law can still be found in South Africa
today. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter only the regime under the Wills
Act is discussed.
In due course the Wills Act was to generate its own quota of problems, which in
some cases were sufficiently serious for the legislature to intervene. But by far the
most substantial and wide-ranging amendment came in 1992 with the Law of
Succession Amendment Act,24 the result of a thorough investigation by the South
African Law Commission into various problematic aspects of the law of succession
including, but not confined to, testamentary formalities. The Act came into oper-
ation on 1 October 1992 and applies to the wills of testators who died on or after that
date. One casualty of the legislation was the soldier’s will: after 340 years the last
Roman-Dutch form of will disappeared from South African law. The triumph of the
English statutory will was now complete.
III. The scope of the Wills Act
1. Wills, codicils, and testamentary writings

The Wills Act of 1953 does not say what a ‘will’ is, the definitions section (section 1)
merely stating that a ‘will’ also ‘includes a codicil and any other testamentary
writing’. In modern law the term ‘codicil’ carries no special significance and no
distinction is made between a will and a codicil, although the term ‘codicil’ is
normally used to indicate an addendum to an existing will. The important point is
that, in order to be valid, a codicil must comply with all of the normal testamentary
formalities.
21
Act 7 of 1953.
22
This was done indirectly by providing in s 2(1)(a) of the Act that ‘no will executed on or after the
first day of January, 1954, shall be valid’ unless it is executed in accordance with the formalities as set out in
the section.
23
This was done in a Schedule to the Act, listing the statutes being abolished.
24
Act 43 of 1992.
More problematic is ‘testamentary writing’. Again, this term is not defined in the
Act and it has been left to the courts to interpret it. The best example is Ex parte
Estate Davies.25 In bequeathing a sum of money, the testator did not identify the
beneficiary, but indicated that the person’s name would be ‘disclosed by me in a
separate note of hand addressed to my executors’.26 After the testator’s death an
informal note with the beneficiary’s name was indeed found. The court decided
that an effective testamentary disposition must identify: (a) the property bequeathed;
(b) the extent of the interest in that property; and (c) the beneficiary. In this
case the will identified elements (a) and (b), while the note contained ‘the sole
expression of the testator’s intention as to the identity of the beneficiary’ (in other
words, element (c)). It was therefore ‘testamentary in character and so . . . a testamen-
tary writing’.27 Because the note did not comply with testamentary formalities, it
was not possible to give effect to the bequest contained in it. The effect of this
decision is that every document which contains one or more of the above elements
is a ‘testamentary writing’ which must comply with the formalities set out in the
Wills Act.28
2. Incorporation by reference
In Roman and Roman-Dutch law a testator could provide for the nomination of an
heir or other beneficiary by referring in a validly executed will to an informal
(unattested) document, whether in existence at the time or not.29 However, in the
former South African provinces (excluding Natal) the statutes were worded in such a
way that incorporation by reference in this manner was not possible.30 The relevant
Natal statute31 followed more closely the English statute of the time, which did allow
incorporation by reference. The position in terms of the current Wills Act is the same
as it had previously been in the provinces other than Natal: in other words,
incorporation by reference is not possible.32 This is clearly illustrated by the facts
of and the decision in Davies (discussed above) and it has more recently been
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal.33
3. Electronic media
A further question is whether South African law allows for ‘modern’ forms of will,
such as videotaped or electronic wills. Although the Wills Act as such gives no
guidance in this regard, the main obstacle seems to be the requirement that a will
must be ‘signed’ by both the testator and witnesses.34 This implies that there must be
a ‘document’ which is capable of being signed. It is therefore generally accepted that
25 26 27
1957 (3) SA 471 (N). At 472H. At 474C (Broome JP).
28 29
See also Oosthuizen v Die Weesheer 1974 (2) SA 434 (O). Corbett et al (n 5) 66–8.
30 31
See Moses v Abinader 1951 (4) SA 537 (A). Law 2 of 1868 (Natal).
32 33
Corbett et al (n 5) 67. Wessels v Die Meester [2007] ZASCA 17.
34
See IV.2 and IV.4 below.
videotaped wills are not recognized in South African law,35 a view endorsed by the
South African Law Commission.36 Moreover, various provisions in the Electronic
Communications and Transactions Act37 specifically exclude wills with the result
that the Act does not authorize the execution of wills by electronic signature.38
However, this rather conservative approach is somewhat softened by the power of
the courts to condone formally defective wills, and there are already two examples
of cases where the court has used this power with regard to testators who died leaving
wills only in an electronic format.39
4. Antenuptial contracts
There is one case where a will need not be used. Testamentary provisions can be
included in an antenuptial contract. As this does not change the contract into a will,
it follows that it is not necessary to comply with testamentary formalities.40 How-
ever, the normal requirements for antenuptial contracts – notarial execution and
registration – are applicable.41
IV. The essential formalities
1. The statutory provisions

The essential formalities required for the execution of a valid will are set out in
section 2(1)(a) of the Wills Act 1953 (as amended). These are unique to wills and are
not based on or derived from formalities required for other legal acts.
Section 2(1)(a) provides that:
. . . no will executed on or after the first day of January, 1954, shall be valid unless –
(i) the will is signed at the end thereof by the testator or by some other person in his presence
and by his direction; and
(ii) such signature is made by the testator or by such other person or is acknowledged by the
testator and, if made by such other person, also by such other person, in the presence of
two or more competent witnesses present at the same time; and
35
Corbett et al (n 5) 57; De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (n 5) 55. But see J C Sonnekus, ‘Videotes-
tamente naas Skriftelike Testamente’ [1990] Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 114, who argues strongly
in favour of the opposite conclusion.
36
‘Report on Project 22: Review of the Law of Succession’ (1991) para 2.167.
37
Act 25 of 2002. See s 4(3) read with sch 1 and s 4(4) read with sch 2.
38
Michael Cameron Wood-Bodley, ‘Wills, Data Messages, and the Electronic Communications and
Transactions Act’ (2004) 121 SALJ 526, 527. See also De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (n 5) 55 n 16;
Julien Hofman, ‘The Meaning of the Exclusions in Section 4 of the Electronic Communications and
Transactions Act 25 of 2002’ (2007) 124 SALJ 262, 265.
39
See VI.2 below.
40
Corbett et al (n 5) 35; De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (n 5) 56, 219.
41
Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 s 87.
(iii) such witnesses attest and sign the will in the presence of the testator and of each other
and, if the will is signed by such other person, in the presence also of such other
person; and
(iv) if the will consists of more than one page, each page other than the page on which it ends,
is also signed by the testator or by such other person anywhere on the page; and
(v) if the will is signed by the testator by the making of a mark or by some other person in the
presence and by the direction of the testator, a commissioner of oaths certifies that he has
satisfied himself as to the identity of the testator and that the will so signed is the will of
the testator, and each page of the will, excluding the page on which his certificate appears,
is also signed, anywhere on the page, by the commissioner of oaths who so certifies:
Provided that –
(aa) the will is signed in the presence of the commissioner of oaths in terms of
subparagraphs (i), (iii) and (iv) and the certificate concerned is made as soon as
possible after the will has been so signed; and
(bb) if the testator dies after the will has been signed in terms of subparagraphs
(i), (iii) and (iv) but before the commissioner of oaths has made the certificate
concerned, the commissioner of oaths shall as soon as possible thereafter make or
complete his certificate, and sign each page of the will, excluding the page on which
his certificate appears . . .
2. Form of signature
The first basic formality, stipulated in section 2(1)(a)(i) of the Wills Act, is that the
will must be signed by the testator or by some other person in the testator’s presence
and by his direction.42 This makes it clear that there must be a document containing
either typescript or handwriting (not necessarily of the testator), so that neither oral
wills43 nor videotaped or electronic wills44 are possible. It is surprising that much of
the case law on section 2(1)(a) of the Act is concerned with the supposedly simple
matter of what the legislature meant with the requirement that the testator must
‘sign’ the will. For a considerable time the most controversial issue was whether or
not a person’s initials constituted a signature for purposes of the section. This
question arose both for the testator and for witnesses. The reason for the controversy
was the absence of a definition of ‘sign’ or ‘signature’ other than the declaration, in
section 1, that in the case of the testator it included the making of a ‘mark’.45 Two
broad approaches developed from the cases: a so-called ‘liberal’ and a ‘strict’
approach.
A typical example of the ‘liberal’ approach is Ex parte Singh.46 In this case a
husband and wife executed a joint will comprising six pages. At the husband’s death
the Master of the High Court47 refused to accept the will for purposes of the
administration of the estate on the ground that on the second page both testators
had signed only by initials. The widow applied for an order directing the Master to
accept the will as valid. A striking feature of Singh is the court’s willingness to trace
42
See IV.5 below for the possibility that someone else may sign on behalf of the testator.
43
Louw v Engelbrecht 1979 (4) SA 841 (O); Mdlulu v Delarey [1998] 1 All SA 435 (W).
44 45 46
See III.3 above. See IV.5 below. 1981 (1) SA 793 (W).
47
See V below for an explanation of the basic functions of this official.
the interpretation of the signing requirement back to the old Cape Ordinance.48 It
pointed out that in the Ordinance, as in the present Act, the legislature did not
prescribe a specific form which the signing should take.49 Reliance was then placed
on In re Trollip,50 the leading case on the interpretation of the Cape Ordinance on
this point, where the court said that:
The requirement is that the testator and witnesses shall ‘sign’, not write, their names. What is
the original meaning of the term ‘sign’? It is a ‘mark’, from the Latin signum. To sign one’s
name, as distinguished from writing one’s name in full, is to make such a mark as will represent
the name of the person signing the document. For that purpose it is no more necessary to write
one’s surname in full than it is to write one’s Christian names in full.51
Because the Cape Ordinance and the modern Wills Act both followed the wording
of the English Wills Act of 1837, the court in Singh thought that the interpretation of
the signing requirement in English cases was ‘of assistance’.52 The court referred in
particular to the decision of the House of Lords in Hindmarsh v Charlton53 where
Lord Chelmsford stated that such a ‘subscription’ should be made ‘as is descriptive of
the witness, whether by a mark or by initials, or by writing the full name’.54 The
conclusion in Singh was to allow a testator or witness to sign by initials ‘provided he
intends it to be his signature’. The qualification is important and led to the liberal
approach also being referred to as the ‘subjective’ approach. In other words, a court
would be willing to accept initials as a signature if it was convinced that the testator
or witness had the intention that the particular mode of writing should represent his
signature. In Singh the court was indeed convinced, on the facts of the case, that the
testator had such an intention and it granted the order as requested.
However, in another line of cases the courts did not find favour with this liberal or
subjective approach. In Mellvill v The Master,55 for example, decided only three years
after Singh, both the testator and the witnesses signed some pages of two different
wills with initials only. The court declined to follow the liberal approach. There was
nothing in the Act to suggest that the word ‘sign’ should be construed ‘otherwise
than in its ordinary or popular sense’, and on the basis of standard dictionaries the
ordinary or popular sense meant to ‘write one’s initials and surname’.56 The court
also stressed that the purpose of the formal requirements was ‘to eliminate as far as
possible, the perpetration of fraud’,57 and that initials were easier to forge than a
complete signature. The court concluded: ‘Having regard to the manifest purpose of
the Act, there is accordingly no reason to construe the word “signature” contrary to
its popular and normal meaning so as to incorporate unnaturally within its ambit
initials which do not normally constitute a signature.’58 The court was highly critical
of the emphasis put in Singh on the intention of the person appending the signature,
because intention ‘cannot make a signature of something which is not a signature’.59
48 49
15 of 1845. At 797H (Vermooten J).
50 51
(1895) 12 SC 243, 246 (De Villers CJ). At 796A–B.
52 53
796E (Vermooten J). (1861) 8 HL Case 160.
54 55
At 171, as quoted in Singh at 796H. 1984 (3) SA 387 (C).
56 57
At 394H (Friedman J). At 395H (Friedman J).
58 59
395I–396A (Friedman J). 396F (Friedman J).
The proper criterion was not the subjective intention of the signatory, but the
objective appearance of the letters in the document.
The confusion regarding this rather simple issue came to an abrupt, if unexpected,
conclusion. All of the decisions referred to above were at the provincial level and
there was always the hope that the Appellate Division (then the country’s highest
court)60 would have the opportunity to pronounce on the matter. This eventually
did happen in 1993 with the decision in Harpur NO v Govindamall.61 Here the
Appellate Division conducted a thorough review of English and South African
decisions and, once again, consulted standard dictionaries. Its conclusion was that
initials could not be accepted as a signature. Ironically, however, the decision came a
year too late, for in the previous year the Law of Succession Amendment Act62
became law and one of its provisions was to amend the definition of ‘sign’ in section
1 of the Wills Act to include the ‘making of initials’. And so despite the clear
pronouncement to the contrary by the highest court, the liberal approach triumphed
through legislative intervention.
Strangely enough, even this intervention of the legislature did not end all contro-
versy regarding the signing requirement. What remains uncertain is whether the
writing of a person’s name in printed or capital letters would constitute a ‘signature’.
Again there are conflicting decisions. In Jhajbhai v The Master 63 this was accepted,
but more recently in Ricketts v Byrne 64 the court reached the opposite conclusion.
Once again both decisions are at provincial level and the final word on the issue has
thus not yet been spoken.
A testator who is illiterate or physically disabled, or who chooses for some other
reason not to sign in the normal way, is allowed to sign by a mark or through the
signature of another person. The special provision on this subject is considered
later.65
3. Place of signature
The Wills Act requires that the testator sign at the ‘end’ of the will, but does not say
where the ‘end’ is. Once again it has been left to the courts to give practical content to
this requirement. To date there has only been one case dealing with the issue, but it is
seen as authoritative. In Kidwell v The Master,66 the testator signed at the foot of the
last page, leaving a blank space of some seventeen centimetres between the signature
and the final words of the will. The Master refused to accept the will on the basis that
it was not signed at the ‘end’. The testator’s only heir, his daughter, then applied for
an order directing the Master to accept the will as valid. In the absence of previous
case law, the court looked as usual for guidance in the old provincial Ordinances and
60
Now the Supreme Court of Appeal, the highest court in non-constitutional matters.
61 62
1993 (4) SA 751 (A). Act 43 of 1992. See II above.
63 64
1971 (2) SA 370 (D). 2004 (6) SA 474 (C).
65 66
See IV.5 below. 1983 (1) SA 509 (E).
the English Wills Act of 1837. At first the corresponding words in the English Act
(‘at the foot or end thereof’) had been strictly interpreted,67 but an amendment in
1852 provided that the validity of a will would not be affected ‘by the circumstances
that the signature shall not follow or be immediately after the foot or end of the will,
or by the circumstance that a blank space shall intervene between the concluding
word of the will and the signature’. In Kidwell the court found it significant that this
amendment was not incorporated into the old provincial Ordinances. Further, in
enacting the Wills Act in 1953, the legislature gave no indication that the words ‘at
the end thereof’ should be given anything but their ‘ordinary and accepted meaning’.
The court thus concluded that these words mean that the testator’s signature should
be appended ‘as close to the concluding words [of the will] as is reasonably
possible’.68
The ‘end’ of a will therefore means the concluding words and not the end
of the document itself. Of course, as the court in Kidwell stressed, the purpose
behind this requirement is the prevention of fraud, the preferred interpretation
making it difficult for anyone to insert material between the last words and the
testator’s signature. As it was clear in Kidwell that no such fraud had been com-
mitted, the court conceded that its conclusion was ‘unfortunate’ for the applicant
(the only testamentary heir) and that it ‘may frustrate the testator’s intention’.69
However, this was the consequence of a failure to observe a peremptory statutory
requirement. Not surprisingly, some commentators have criticized the Kidwell
decision as overly formalistic.70 Nonetheless, the 1992 Amendment Act did not
change the law on this point, partly no doubt because today Kidwell would be exactly
the kind of case where a court could exercise its power of condonation (discussed
below).71
As well as signing at the ‘end’, a testator must sign on every other page (if there are
such pages). An early controversy was whether these other pages had also to be signed
at ‘the end’, an affirmative answer being given in one case and a negative in
another.72 In the end, the spectacle of two provincial divisions of the court contra-
dicting each other on such a fundamental issue was too much for the legislature,73
and section 2 was amended in 1964 to the effect that the signature could be
‘anywhere on the page’.74
67
As an example the court referred to Smee v Bryer (1848) 6 Moore PC 404.
68
At 513G (Kannemeyer J).
69
At 514F (Kannemeyer J).
70
See, eg, Ian B Murray, ‘Law of Succession (Including Administration of Estates)’ [1983] Annual
Survey of South African Law 254; J C Sonnekus, ‘Kidwell v The Master 1983 1 SA 509 (OK)’ [1983]
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 188.
71
See VI below.
72
Comley v Comley 1957 (3) SA 401 (E); Methodist Church of South Africa v The Master 1962 (1) SA
144 (O).
73
As expressed by Van der Merwe and Rowland (n 17) 158.
74
By s 20(a) of the General Law Amendment Act 80 of 1964.
4. Witnesses
Section 2(1)(a)(ii) of the Wills Act requires that the testator’s signature be ‘made’ or
‘acknowledged’ in the presence of two or more competent witnesses present at the
same time. ‘Competent witness’ means ‘a person of the age of fourteen years or over
who at the time he witnesses a will is not incompetent to give evidence in a court of
law’,75 a definition based on the old Cape, Orange Free State, and Transvaal
Ordinances. At the time of the coming into operation of the Act in 1953 these
requirements for witnesses were criticized as insufficiently strict,76 but they do not
seem to have caused difficulty in practice.
The Act requires a minimum of two witnesses, but no maximum number is set.
Normally the testator will ‘make’ his signature (in other words, sign) in the presence
of the witnesses, but the Act does not require this, allowing instead for the possibility
that the testator signs alone and later ‘acknowledges’ this signature in the witnesses’
presence.77 The witnesses must be ‘present at the same time’ when the testator makes
or acknowledges his signature, a requirement that is sometimes overlooked in
practice, resulting in the invalidity of the will.78 They then ‘attest’ and ‘sign’ the
will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The meaning of ‘sign’ was
discussed above with reference to the testator,79 and what was said there applies
equally to the witnesses. The meaning of ‘attest’ is more difficult, and again the
Act does not assist. In Sterban v Dixon,80 the court gave an interpretation which is
still regarded as authoritative. In attesting, said the court, the witnesses testify that the
signature is that of the testator. That means that a will cannot be valid if the witnesses
sign first. Another implication is that it is not necessary that the witnesses know the
contents of the document, or even that the document is a will.81
Whereas the Act makes clear that the testator must sign at the end, it is silent as to
where the witnesses must sign and it was only in the 1990s that the issue was finally
determined. In Liebenberg v the Master,82 the testator signed at the end, but the
witnesses signed at the top of the page. The court’s point of departure was that the
purpose of the prescribed formalities was ‘to curtail opportunities for malpractice
and fraud’.83 That being the case, it was ‘noteworthy’ that the Act contained no
mention of the place where the witnesses were to sign, from which it followed that
the legislature considered it to be a sufficient safeguard against fraud for the testator to
sign at the end of the will, for this would prevent further clauses from being
‘surreptitiously added’. ‘There is therefore’, the court concluded, ‘no warrant for
75
Section 1.
76
B Beinart, ‘Testamentary Form and Capacity and the Wills Act, 1953’ (1953) 70 SALJ 179 and 280,
285.
77
For a case where this practice was challenged, unsuccessfully, see Bosch v Nel 1992 (3) SA 600 (T).
78
See the facts of, eg Van der Merwe v Die Meester 1967 (2) SA 714 (SWA); Harlow v Becker NO 1998
(4) SA 639 (D).
79
See IV.2 above.
80
1968 (1) SA 322 (C). See also Ex parte Suknanan 1959 (2) SA 189 (D).
81 82 83
At 324–5 (Van Zijl J). 1992 (3) SA 57 (D). At 58J (Shearer J).
interpreting the Act so as to make it peremptory for the attesting witnesses to sign at
the end of the will. Such a requirement would serve no purpose.’84
The Act and its predecessors have always been interpreted to mean that the
witnesses who sign the will must be the same witnesses who were present when
the testator signed or acknowledged his signature.85 And when, in its original form,
section 2 required that witnesses must also sign on each page, this was interpreted
to mean that the same witnesses must sign throughout.86 The requirement was
removed by the 1992 Amendment Act so that, today, only the testator need sign all
of the pages of a will.
5. Illiteracy or physical disability

Section 2(1)(a)(v) of the Wills Act makes provision for two unusual possibilities: that
the testator signs ‘by the making of a mark’ or that the will is signed ‘by some other
person in the presence and by the direction of the testator’. The object of this
provision is obviously to enable will-making by illiterate or physically disabled
persons, although, importantly, incapacity is not a formal requirement. In either
case the intervention of a commissioner of oaths87 is needed. This is another
provision which, in its present form, differs decidedly from the version which was
first enacted in 1953.88
An initial question is the identification of a ‘mark’. Obvious examples include a
cross, a thumbprint, a rubber stamp, or a seal-ring impression. A failed signature
would also be a mark, for example a signature using block capitals.89 Once the
provision is activated, the basic requirement is that a commissioner of oaths must
certify ‘that he has satisfied himself as to the identity of the testator and that the will
so signed is the will of the testator’. The exact content of the commissioner’s
certification, simple as it may appear, has caused considerable difficulty. As first
enacted the section required the commissioner to certify that the testator was known
to him, but as early as 1958 this was reduced to a certification that the commissioner
had satisfied himself as to the testator’s identity.90 Regarding the wording of the
84 85
Ibid. De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (n 5) 63.
86
See, eg, The Leprosy Mission v The Master of the Supreme Court 1972 (4) SA 173 (C); Oosthuizen v
Die Weesheer 1974 (2) SA 434 (O). Much was made of the words ‘such witnesses’ in the section, the basic
question being whether they referred merely to the competence of the witnesses or also to their identity.
The courts opted for the last interpretation.
87
This is an official designated in terms of the Justices of the Peace and Commissioners of Oaths
Act 16 of 1963. Commissioners of oaths count among their number practising attorneys, magistrates,
certain police officials, employees of post offices, etc.
88
For an account of the legislative history, see Corbett et al (n 18) 50–2; De Waal and Schoeman-
Malan (n 5) 64–7; Van der Merwe and Rowland (n 17) 159–73.
89
But not by initials which, owing to legislative amendment, are now treated as a proper signature. See
IV.2 above and, especially, Harpur v Govindamall 1993 (4) SA 751 (A), 764B where Nicholas AJA stated:
‘[I] do not agree that initials are not marks . . . ’. However, in the earlier case of Ex parte Goldman and
Kalmer 1965 (1) SA 464 (W) (in which the ‘liberal’ or ‘subjective’ approach was followed), the court
decided that the word ‘signature’ should be interpreted widely and the word ‘mark’ narrowly.
90
By s 1(a) of the Wills Amendment Act 48 of 1958.
certificate, the courts initially followed a very literalist approach, in effect requiring
that the exact wording of the section be used.91 However, in In re Jennett92 the
Appellate Division stated that ‘it would be straining at gnats to insist on a peremp-
tory compliance with the formalities in the sense that the ipsissima verba of the
section should have been adhered to by the commissioner in writing his certificate’.
All that was needed was ‘substantial compliance’ with the section.93 In order to
assist commissioners the 1992 Amendment Act inserted a specimen certificate in a
schedule to the Act,94 although its use is not mandatory.95
Unfortunately, the pragmatic approach of the Appellate Division in Jennett has
not been followed in all subsequent cases. In Jeffrey v The Master,96 where an illiterate
testatrix signed her will by thumbprint, the commissioner identified himself in the
certificate as a ‘practising attorney’. Despite the fact that all practising attorneys are
automatically commissioners of oaths, the court rejected the certificate and declared
the will invalid. It concluded that it must appear from the certificate ‘that it was in his
capacity as commissioner of oaths and not in his capacity as attorney that he signed
the certificate’.97
Other problematic aspects of certification were dealt with by the 1992 Amend-
ment Act. First, the requirement that the certificate must be attached at ‘the end’ of
the will was deleted. Previously this had generated considerable speculation, espe-
cially as to whether the ‘end’ of the will was the same place for the commissioner of
oaths as for the testator.98 The section now stipulates that the commissioner can
attach his certificate on any page of the will.99 Second, it is now provided that the
commissioner need only append his certificate ‘as soon as possible’ after the will is
signed,100 thus removing doubts as to the application of the unus contextus rule of
Roman law.101 Finally, the Amendment Act also neutralized the somewhat imprac-
tical decision of the Appellate Division in Radley v Stopforth102 that certification had
to be completed before the testator’s death. The Act now makes it clear that the
commissioner can indeed ‘make or complete’ his certificate after the testator’s death,
provided that it is done ‘as soon as possible’.103
91
See, eg, Soobramoney v Moothoo 1957 (3) SA 707 (D); Ex parte Naidu 1958 (1) SA 719 (D); Ex
parte Sookoo: in re Estate Dularie 1960 (4) SA 249 (D).
92
1976 (1) SA 580 (A).
93
At 582H–583A (Van Blerk ACJ). See also Oldfield v The Master 1971 (3) SA 445 (N).
94
Sch 1.
95
See O’Connor v The Master 1999 (4) SA 614 (NC).
96
1990 (4) SA 759 (N).
97
At 762H (Page J).
98
See Stemmet v Die Meester 1957 (3) SA 404 (C); Volschenk v Die Meester 1958 (2) SA 404 (C);
Tshabalala v Tshabalala 1980 (1) SA 134 (O); Philip v The Master 1980 (2) SA 934 (D); Gantsho v
Gantsho 1986 (2) SA 321 (Tk).
99
Note, however, that the commissioner must also sign every other page of the will ‘anywhere on the
page’.
100 101
Wills Act 1953 s 2(1)(a)(v)(aa). Corbett et al (n 5) 53 n 31.
102 103
1977 (2) SA 516 (A). Section 2(1)(a)(v)(bb).
V. Procedure after death
A formal system of ‘probate’ is unknown to South African law. But, of course, there
is a procedure in place which caters for the formal acceptance of a will at a testator’s
death. Central to this procedure is the Master of the High Court, who carries out his
functions in terms of the Administration of Estates Act.104 This Act provides that
anyone who has a document ‘being or purporting to be a will’ in his possession at the
time of a person’s death must ‘transmit or deliver’ the document to the Master.105
The Master then registers the will in a ‘register of estates’.106 The Act continues: ‘If it
appears to the Master that any such document, being or purporting to be a will, is
for any reason invalid, he may, notwithstanding registration thereof in terms of
subsection (3), refuse to accept it for the purposes of this Act until the validity thereof
has been determined by the Court’.107 Thus, only the court, and not the Master, can
make a final pronouncement on whether or not a will complies with the formal
requirements set out in the Wills Act.
The Master’s point of departure is the well-established principle that a will which
appears to be formally valid on the face of it is presumed to be valid unless its
invalidity has been established by the court. And the burden of proving invalidity
rests on the person who alleges it.108 Even after the Master accepts a will as valid, the
acceptance may be challenged in court by an interested party (for example, a
potential intestate heir).109 The opposite is also possible: if the Master rejects a will
as invalid, his decision can be challenged by an interested party. Notwithstanding
registration and acceptance by the Master, therefore, all questions of validity of a will
fall to be determined by the court.110
VI. Condonation
1. Introduction
One of the basic purposes of testamentary formalities is the prevention of fraud and,
as can be seen from the exposition above, this fundamental point has often been
stressed by South African courts. This may explain the somewhat literalist tendencies
that courts have at times displayed when dealing with the application of the formal
requirements. Ironically, this has sometimes led to the frustration of a particular
testator’s intention – exactly what the formalities aim to prevent – even when no
question of fraud was involved. In order to address this dilemma, the 1992
104
Act 66 of 1965. The Master is a state official who oversees, amongst other things, the administra-
tion of deceased estates and the sequestration of insolvent estates.
105 106 107
Section 8(1). Section 8(3). Section 8(4).
108
Corbett et al (n 5) 89; De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (n 5) 89.
109
This, of course, explains why so many of the cases on testamentary formalities referred to in this
chapter cite ‘the Master’ as defendant or respondent.
110
See also Henriques v Giles NO: In Re Henriques v Giles [2009] 4 All SA 116 (SCA) 116 at 124a–b.
Amendment Act introduced a radical innovation in the context of the South African
law of succession. This came by way of a new provision in the Wills Act – section 2(3) –
granting the court the power to condone formally defective wills under certain
circumstances.111 ‘The purpose of the section’, it has been said, ‘is clear. The formal
requirements for the execution of a valid will remain. The court is, however, given the
power to make the order in question so as to avoid invalidity, the consequent
frustration of the testator’s intention and, frequently, inequitable results.’112 Unfor-
tunately the new provision soon caused problems of its own and a considerable
body of case law has already been generated.113
Section 2(3) is in the following terms:
If a court is satisfied that a document or the amendment of a document drafted or executed by
a person who has died since the drafting or execution thereof, was intended to be his will or an
amendment of his will, the court shall order the Master to accept that document, or that
document as amended, for the purposes of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965, as a will,
although it does not comply with all the formalities for the execution or amendment of wills
referred to in subsection (1).
While this provision deals with the failure to comply with formalities in both the
execution and the amendment of wills, the focus here will be on the former.114 As the
wording makes clear, there are three basic requirements: there must be a document;
the document must have been drafted or executed by a person who has since died;
and that person must have intended that the document be his will. These require-
ments will now be dealt with in turn.
2. A ‘document’
Without a ‘document’ containing either typescript or handwriting (not necessarily of
the testator),115 condonation is not possible. To date this requirement has not caused
practical difficulties, although case law discloses some unusual sets of facts. So
in Macdonald v The Master,116 a person drafted a will on his computer at work,
but failed to print it. Later he committed suicide at home leaving a note next to his
body which stated that ‘my last will and testament can be found on my PC at IBM
under directory C:WINDOWS/MYSTUFF/MYWILL/PERSONAL’. Through a
standard procedure at his work, access was gained to the computer and the will
was printed. The court granted an order for the condonation of the document as the
testator’s will.
Van der Merwe v The Master117 concerned a situation where two friends decided
that they would each execute a will in which the other would be the sole
111
Similar powers also exist in Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America. See ch 14
above at 349 ff and ch 15 above at 375.
112
Corbett et al (n 5) 58.
113
For a detailed analysis with extensive references, see Corbett et al (n 5) 57–66; De Waal and
Schoeman-Malan (n 5) 67–79.
114
For the amendment of wills, see VII below.
115 116 117
But see VI.3 below. 2002 (5) SA 64 (O). 2010 (6) SA 544 (SCA).
beneficiary. The proposed terms were set out in an e-mail and confirmed by
telephone. But while the recipient of the e-mail drafted and executed a will in the
agreed terms, the sender died before he could do likewise. An application to have
the e-mail condoned as the deceased’s will was rejected by the High Court, but
allowed by the Supreme Court of Appeal.
As previously mentioned,118 these cases show that condonation can be used to give
effect to a will existing only in an electronic format. But it should be borne in mind,
first, that in each case it was possible to print out a ‘document’ in the conventional
sense and that it was this printed version which formed the basis of the court order,
and, second, that the court had to be satisfied that the other two requirements for the
application of section 2(3), discussed below, were also complied with.
3. ‘Drafted or executed’ by the testator

Section 2(3) stipulates that a document can only be condoned if it was ‘drafted or
executed’ by the testator. ‘Execution’ in this context means signed, but controversy
has arisen as to the correct interpretation of ‘drafting’. Once again, both ‘liberal’ and
‘strict’ approaches emerged.
Back v Master of the Supreme Court119 is the case most often cited as representative
of the first of these. An attorney drafted a will at the testator’s request and, in a
subsequent discussion, the testator declared: ‘This is how I want it’. He then died
before he could sign. As it was clear that the testator had not ‘executed’ the
document, the crisp question for decision was whether he had ‘drafted’ it. In the
court’s view:
The reality of the situation is that computers and word processors have become as pedestrian as
pen and ink. Another reality is that many would-be testators give full instructions as to their
final wishes to their attorneys or bankers and the attorneys or bankers have draft wills prepared
in accordance with such instructions. If a draft will is subsequently perused and approved in
every detail by a testator, he then . . . associates himself with and adopts it as his own. On a
flexible interpretation of section 2(3), it may be regarded as having been drafted by him
personally.120
Consequently, the court was satisfied that, although the document in this case ‘was
not literally drafted by the deceased in his own hand’, it had to be ‘regarded as
such’.121 As the court was also convinced that the testator had indeed intended the
document to be his will – the third requirement – it upheld the will as requested.122
In an earlier case, however, the court had come to the opposite conclusion on similar
118 119
At III.3 above. [1996] 2 All SA 161 (C).
120 121
At 174a–b (Van Zyl J). At 175d (Van Zyl J).
122
For other cases in which the liberal approach was followed, see, eg Ex parte Laxton 1998 (3) SA 238
(N); Ex parte Williams: in re Williams’ Estate 2000 (4) SA 168 (T); Ndebele v The Master 2001 (2) SA 102
(C); Ramlal v Ramdhani’s Estate 2002 (2) SA 643 (N).
facts on the basis that section 2(3) ‘requires that the document be drafted by such
person [the testator] personally’.123
Of course, this state of legal uncertainty was untenable. It came as a relief,
therefore, when in 2003 the Supreme Court of Appeal124 decided the case of Bekker
v Naude,125 in which a person died before he could sign a will which had been
prepared on his behalf by a bank official. Three considerations swayed the court in
opting for a strict approach. Words in a statute were to be given their ordinary,
grammatical meaning unless it would result in an absurdity, inconsistency, hardship,
or anomaly.126 But a normal, literal interpretation of the words ‘drafted by’ would
not lead to an absurd result. The court also pointed to section 2A(c), the condona-
tion provision dealing with revocation, which distinguishes between a document
‘drafted by’ a testator and one ‘caused to be drafted by’ him. This, the court said, was
an indication that the legislature knew the difference between the two concepts and
deliberately chose the narrower one for purposes of section 2(3).127 Then there was
the simple matter of the purpose of testamentary formalities, namely the prevention
of fraud and of disputes after a testator’s death. In the court’s view a requirement of
personal draftsmanship ensures a ‘measure of reliability’.128 Finally, a close analysis
of the legislative history showed that personal draftsmanship was a deliberate choice
by the legislature.129
Although the logic in Bekker is persuasive, not everyone was happy with the result.
For example, it has been said that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation
could result in discrimination against physically disabled, blind, and illiterate persons
who cannot draw up wills for themselves.130 Indeed, this was a factor which was
emphasized in a number of cases in which the liberal approach was followed.131 On
the other hand, the court gave an obiter indication that personal drafting could be
achieved by dictating a will for someone else to write down.132 And the fact that
section 2(3) has not been amended following Bekker suggests that the strict approach
is in line with the legislature’s original intention.
123
Webster v The Master 1996 (1) SA 34 (D), 41B (Magid J). For other cases in which the strict approach
was followed, see, eg Olivier v Die Meester 1997 (1) SA 836 (T); Bekker v Naude 2002 (1) SA 264 (W).
124
The erstwhile Appellate Division.
125
2003 (5) SA 173 (SCA).
126
Para 12 (Olivier JA).
127
128
Para 16 (Olivier JA). Translation by the author: the original Afrikaans reads ‘’n mate van
betroubaarheid’.
129
130
Mohamed Paleker, ‘Bekker v Naude: the Supreme Court of Appeal Settles the Meaning of
“Drafted” in Section 2(3) of the Wills Act, but Creates a Potential Constitutional Problem’ (2004) 121
SALJ 27. See also J C Sonnekus, ‘Kondonering van Vormgebrekkige Testamente? Vergeet Dit!’ (2003) 14
Stellenbosch LR 337.
131
See, eg, Back v Master of the Supreme Court [1996] 2 All SA 161 (C); Ex parte Laxton 1998 (3) SA
238 (N).
132
4. ‘Intended to be his will’

Whereas the first two requirements for condonation are formal and objectively
determinable, the third concerns the crucial issue of the testator’s subjective inten-
tion. From the start the courts have followed a ‘strict’ approach in the application of
this requirement.133 This is best illustrated in a line of cases on testamentary wishes
expressed in the form of letters. The earliest case, and still a leading one, was Ex parte
Maurice.134 Here a person drafted instructions as to the distribution of his assets on
his death. He sent this document, which was handwritten but unsigned, to a friend
with a covering letter asking the friend to ‘knock it into shape, if necessary’ and then
to request an attorney acquaintance of them both to finalize it in ‘legal jargon’.
However, he died before any of this could be done. The handwritten document was
not, the court concluded, intended as a will:
A document which was intended to convey information about what a testator wishes to have
included or has already included in his/her will does not suffice. Written instructions to an
attorney or other adviser so as to enable the recipient to draft the testator’s will are not
intended by such testator to constitute his/her will albeit that they record the author’s intended
testamentary dispositions.135
This approach was followed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in De Reszke v
Maras,136 where the instructions formed part of a letter addressed to the deceased’s
attorney. The letter was typed by a secretary but signed by the deceased (thus
satisfying the second requirement). The court was not convinced that the deceased
had intended the letter to be his will, and refused to grant a condonation order. On
the other hand, the use of a letter does not of itself exclude condonation. So in Van
Wetten v Bosch,137 the Supreme Court of Appeal indicated that it is not the format of
the document which is decisive, but whether the testator intended the document to
be his will. And this enquiry entails ‘an examination of the document itself and also
of the document in the context of the surrounding circumstances’.138 After con-
ducting a thorough factual analysis of the letter in question and the circumstances
under which it saw the light of day, the court felt able to issue a condonation order.
The decision in Van Wetten set the scene for the application of section 2(3) in
perhaps the most dramatic set of facts to date. In Smith v Parsons NO,139 the testator
executed a will in 2003 in which he instituted his son and only child as his sole heir.
Shortly after his wife’s death the previous year the testator had started a relationship
with the applicant which continued off and on until his own death, by suicide, in
2007. A note, apparently written shortly before the suicide, was found near his body
and was addressed to ‘Heather’ (the applicant). In it the testator expressed his love for
the applicant and his son and he asked both for forgiveness. The note also contained
133
See also M J de Waal, ‘The Courts’ Power of Condonation in Respect of the Execution and
Revocation of Wills: Unfortunate New Elements of Uncertainty’ (2004) 121 SALJ 529.
134 135
1995 (2) SA 713 (C). At 716E (Selikowitz J).
136 137
2006 (2) SA 277 (SCA). 2004 (1) SA 348 (SCA).
138 139
Para 16 (Lewis JA). 2009 (3) SA 519 (D).
the following ‘bequests’ to the applicant: (a) ‘Heather you can have this house’; (b)
‘I authorize Standard Bank to give you immediate access to Plusplan – there is
R579 000 which will not leave you battling’; and (c) ‘there is also several thousand
Rands in the bottom drawer of safe’. The note concluded with the words ‘Bless you –
Wally’ (a familiar form of the testator’s first name, Walter), followed by the date. As
the evidence showed that it was indeed the testator who had drafted the note and
which was in his own handwriting,140 the only remaining question was whether he
had the intention that the note should be his will. The court focused on the two
criteria identified in Van Wetten, namely the note itself and the circumstances under
which it was written. Regarding the former, the court looked at factors such as
format, structure, content, and wording; regarding the latter, the court considered
the testator’s health, the stress he was experiencing at the time, his relationship with
the applicant, his bouts of depression, and his apparently irrational behaviour in the
hours leading up to his suicide. The conclusion was that:
All factors considered, I do not think that the suicide note clearly and unambiguously shows
that it was the intention of the deceased that the applicant should benefit in respect of the
house and money in the bank and in the safe. Even if there were such an intention to benefit
the applicant, it does not seem to me that the deceased unequivocally intended the suicide note
itself to be an amendment to his will.141
The court therefore dismissed the application.
The decision was appealed, and the Supreme Court of Appeal, using the same Van
Wetten criteria, came to the opposite conclusion.142 Especially regarding the note
itself (the first criterion), the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal was
pragmatic and straightforward. For example, the statement that the appellant
could ‘have this house’ was viewed as a ‘clear instruction’ containing ‘no ambiguity’
that the house would devolve on her.143And while the judge in the High Court had
agonized over whether the testator could have thought that Standard Bank would act
on the informal and unusual authorization that the appellant be given ‘immediate
access’ to the money in the account,144 the appeal court dismissed the worry,145
treating the instruction rather as evidence which ‘clearly demonstrates his wish as to
what should happen to the money’.146
140
As explained above, the testator also signed ‘Wally’ at the end of the note – his ‘nickname’ or
‘affectation’ as the court referred to it. The court apparently accepted that by doing this the deceased did
not formally execute the document. However, because the testator had in any event ‘drafted’ the document
within the meaning of s 2(3), it was not necessary for the court to go into this issue.
141
Para 32 (Luthuli AJ).
142
Smith v Parsons NO [2010] 4 All SA 74 (SCA).
143
Para 15 (Seriti AJA).
144
See para 33 of the High Court’s judgment.
145
It ‘does not come into the picture’ (para 16).
146
Para 15 (Seriti AJA).
VII. Amendment
1. History
South African law allows for the amendment of wills. In other words, a testator does
not need to make a new will every time he changes his mind as to the contents of an
existing will. With the exception of the legislation in Natal, the old provincial
Ordinances left the Roman-Dutch common law on this topic untouched.147 That
meant that different rules applied depending on the category into which the particu-
lar amendment fell. No formalities were required for amendments effected before
execution, a rule which has survived into the modern law. Regarding amendments
effected after execution, a distinction between additions and deletions was import-
ant. Additions were seen as a matter of execution and had to comply with normal
formalities in order to be effective. Deletions, on the other hand, were treated as
partial revocations which did not have to comply with any formalities for their
effectiveness.
2. The position under the Wills Act

The current rules for the amendment of wills are set out in the Wills Act of 1953. In
line with the common law position, amendments made before execution need not
comply with any formalities. The obvious practical difficulty of whether a particular
amendment was made before or after execution is addressed by section 2(2), which
provides that, unless the contrary is proved, amendments are presumed to have been
made after execution. The formalities for post-execution amendment broadly follow
those for execution itself and need not be discussed in detail here.148 Thus, the
amendment must be ‘identified’ by the signature of the testator made or acknow-
ledged in the presence of two or more competent witnesses who are present at the
same time. The amendment must also be ‘identified’ by the signatures of the
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. ‘Amendment’ means a
‘deletion, addition, alteration or interlineation’,149 and for some time there was
a measure of controversy regarding the scope of ‘deletion’. Certain commentators
maintained that the word was confined to deletions made with a writing instrument
and that it was not wide enough to cover the ‘erasure, cutting out, or pasting over’ of
words.150 This view was probably influenced by section 21 of the English Wills Act
of 1837 and section 10 of Act 2 of 1868 (Natal), where these matters were expressly
excluded.151 However, this issue was effectively addressed by the 1992 Amendment
Act, which inserted a definition of ‘deletion’ as ‘a deletion, cancellation or oblitera-
tion in whatever manner effected’.
147
Corbett et al (n 5) 69 n 4.
148
Section 2(1)(b). For the rules of execution, see IV above.
149
Wills Act 1953 s 1.
150
See, eg, Beinart (1953) 70 SALJ 282.
151
See De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (n 5) 83 n 241.
The Act does not define or explain in what manner an amendment must be
‘identified’ by the signatures of the testator and witnesses. The idea seems to be that
by signing they confirm that the amendment was made by or in accordance with the
testator’s wishes. This would seem to require that the signatures be as close as possible
to the amendment, although it has been suggested that a signature anywhere on the
will is sufficient ‘provided that it is clear that the signature was appended in order to
identify the amendment in question’.152
‘Signature’ with reference to the testator does, of course, include the making of a
mark. Section 2(1)(b) also allows for the possibility of some other person signing
in the presence of the testator and by his direction. However, in both cases the
additional requirement of certification by a commissioner of oaths also has to be
complied with.153
3. The effects of non-compliance

If an amendment is made after the execution of a will and the above requirements are
not complied with, the amendment is invalid. Effect is given to the original wording
to the extent that it is still legible; if it is not legible, the particular provision fails.
There is, however, always the possibility of the amendment being saved by condon-
ation. As applied to amendments, the requirements for the application of section
2(3) of the Wills Act are the following: (a) there must be an amendment of a
document; (b) the document must have been drafted or executed by a person who
has since died; and (c) that person must have intended that it be an amendment of his
will.
There has yet to be a reported case on the application of section 2(3) with regard
to an invalid amendment of a provision in a valid will. In Smith v Parsons NO,
discussed above,154 reference was made to the suicide note as being ‘an amendment
to the last will and testament’ of the deceased.155 This, however, is somewhat
misleading. The suicide note was not an ‘amendment’ to the first will, but rather
a later will (or codicil) which simply had to be read with the existing will.
VIII. Concluding remarks
The topic of testamentary formalities can only be properly understood if it is viewed

against the background of the ‘mixed’ character of the South African law of
succession and, indeed, South African law in a broader sense. And for this one
should start with a historical perspective in order to explain how this ‘mix’ came
152
Corbett et al (n 5) 72. See also De Waal and Schoeman-Malan (n 5) 82.
153
See IV.5 above. In order to assist commissioners in fulfilling the requirements of the section, the
1992 Amendment Act inserted a specimen certificate as sch 2 to the Wills Act.
154
At VI.4 above.
155
2009 (3) SA 519 (D), para 1 (Luthuli AJ). See also the cases discussed in De Waal and Schoeman-
Malan (n 5) 84–5.
about and in which part of the ‘mix’ the topic of testamentary formalities is situated.
For a considerable period of time a rich kaleidoscope of Roman-Dutch and English
forms of will co-existed in South African law. But in the end only the English
statutory or underhand will survived. However, this does not mean that modern law
resembles modern English law on the point. As is so often the case with South
African legal institutions, the final product is very much a home-grown one.
The statutory will was introduced into South African law by way of legislation.
But in typical common law fashion the courts have played a leading role in
developing the law by way of interpretation and re-interpretation of the statutory
wording. While, however, the courts were always mindful of the purpose of testa-
mentary formalities, namely the prevention of fraud, disputes after the testator’s
death and, in the final analysis, the frustration of the testator’s intention, they did not
always go about their task in the same fashion. That is why, as could have been
expected, approaches veered between the strict (or literalist) and the liberal. Unfor-
tunately, strict interpretations sometimes bordered on the absurd, as illustrated by
the measuring of open spaces in wills and the ignoring of practical realities regarding
the capacity of certifying officers.
Discontent with the outcome of some of these cases must have played a role in the
introduction of the court’s power to condone formally defective wills, by any
standards a startling innovation. From the very beginning, however, the courts
have understood and accepted the limited scope of their power. The normal
formalities for the execution of wills remain firmly in place, but under certain
circumstances a court can condone non-compliance to give effect to a testator’s
true intention. As could have been expected, the provision has generated its own
quota of interpretation problems over the years, and once again a tension between
strict and liberal approaches has come to the fore. But it does not seem too optimistic
to conclude that most of the important issues have now been settled. True, the fact
that the Supreme Court of Appeal has opted for a strict interpretation of the
requirement that a document must have been ‘drafted by’ the testator has come as
a disappointment to many. However, the same court has recently shown a refresh-
ingly pragmatic approach to the decisive requirement that the testator must have
intended the document to be his will. And perhaps, between these two decisions, an
appropriate balance has now been struck.
17
Testamentary Formalities in Scotland
Kenneth G C Reid
I. Conveyances and testaments 405

1. Introduction 405
2. Heritable property: transmission by de praesenti
conveyance 406
3. Moveable property: transmission by testament 409
4. The fall and rise of the testament 410
II. Seals, signatures, and witnesses 412
1. Attested wills 412
(a) Authentication statutes 412
(b) Applicability to wills 413
(c) Provenance 414
(d) Constitution or proof ? 414
3. Probativity 417
1. Introduction 419
2. Formal validity: the subscribed will 421
(a) A ‘written document’ 421
(b) Method of signature 422
(c) Place of signature 423
(d) Signature where testator blind or unable to write 423
(e) Alterations, incorporation, and enfranchising clauses 424
3. Probativity: the attested will 424
(a) Formal requirements 424
(b) Conferral of probativity 425
4. Internal formalities 426
5. Practicalities 427
(a) Making a will 427
(b) Finding a will 428
(c) Confirmation of executors 428
IV. Form and formalism 429
Testamentary Formalities in Scotland 405
I. Conveyances and testaments
1. Introduction
For much of its history, succession law in Scotland treated moveable and immove-
able property separately and differently.1 ‘The channel of succession’, wrote Vis-
count Stair, ‘is with us divided into two currents, by the one whereof all heritable
rights, and by the other all moveable rights, are conveyed from the dead to the
living.’2 ‘Heritable rights’ or ‘heritage’ – the name reflects prospective inheritance by
the deceased’s heir3 – were, more or less, the same as immoveable property and were
the subject of universal succession. The identification of the heir was determined by
primogeniture, a rule justified or at least explained on the basis that, land being held
on feudal tenure, only a single person was capable of performing what might be an
exacting range of feudal services.4 Moveable property, by contrast, was the subject of
an equal distribution among direct descendants,5 and there was no liability for the
deceased’s moveable debts over and above the value of the assets themselves.6 With
some modifications, this divided system survived until 1964, almost as long as the
feudalism on which it was based.7 Since 1964 the rules of intestate succession have
favoured the spouse (or civil partner)8 of the deceased over the children, although in
the case of large estates the children too receive a substantial inheritance.9 Further
adjustments to the law have been proposed by the Scottish Law Commission.10
The rules just described were, and are, default rules only, for forced heirship has
only a limited role to play in Scottish succession law, especially in relation to
heritable property. On the whole, people are free to determine the distribution of
1
For a historical overview, see W David H Sellar, ‘Succession Law in Scotland – a Historical
Perspective’, in Kenneth G C Reid, Marius J de Waal, and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Exploring the
Law of Succession: Studies National, Historical and Comparative (2007) 49.
2
James Dalrymple, Viscount Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland (6th edn, by David M
Walker, 1981) III, 4, pr. This is based on the 2nd edition of 1693.
3
Stair (n 2) III, 4, 23.
4
Henry Home, Lord Kames, Essays upon Several Subjects concerning British Antiquities (Edinburgh,
1747) 131–2; Andrew McDouall, Lord Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights
(Edinburgh, 1751–3; reprinted by the Stair Society, vols 41–3, 1993–5) III, 4, 9; Sir John Dalrymple, An
Essay towards a General History of Feudal Property in Great Britain (London, 1759) 201–2.
5
John Erskine of Carnock, An Institute of the Law of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1773) III, 9, 2. This can
most conveniently be consulted in the 8th edn (Edinburgh, 1871, reprinted 1989) by James Badenach
Nicolson.
6
Bankton (n 4) III, 4, 7.
7
The feudal system of land tenure was abolished on 28 November 2004: see Abolition of Feudal
Tenure etc (Scotland) Act 2000 s 1.
8
The Civil Partnership Act 2004 makes provision for the registration of same-sex relationships as civil
partnerships. For the purposes of the law of succession a civil partner is treated in the same way as a
husband or wife.
9
Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 ss 1–13. For an account of what are rather complex rules, see,
eg, D R Macdonald, Succession (3rd edn, 2001) ch 4.
10
Scottish Law Commission, Report on Succession (Scot Law Com No 215, 2009, available at <http://
www.scotlawcom.gov.uk>).
406 Kenneth G C Reid
property after their deaths, although only a bare majority take the trouble to do so.11
Until modern times, however, the way in which this could be done depended on
whether the property in question was heritable or moveable.
2. Heritable property: transmission by de praesenti conveyance

When in Guy Mannering (1815) a funeral is followed by a search for the will, Sir
Walter Scott has the lawyer, the smug and uncommunicative Mr Protocol, quieten
the mourners – now aspirant beneficiaries – with these words:
A moment’s patience, if you please – she was a good and prudent woman, Mrs Margaret
Bertram – a good and prudent and well-judging woman, and knew to chuse friends and
depositaries – she will have put her last will and testament, or rather her mortis causa settlement
as it relates to heritage, into the hands of some safe friend.12
As an advocate, Scott knew his law, and even as late as 1815 it was not competent to
dispose of heritable property by means of a will (or ‘testament’). Instead, Mrs Bertram
would have needed to use a ‘mortis causa settlement’ – a deed containing a present (de
praesenti ) conveyance of the property and which, to all appearances, was to take effect
at once, during the lifetime of the granter. Further, such a deed could not be signed –
and the heir deprived of his inheritance – when the granter was in his last illness and so
vulnerable to the ‘importunity of friends’.13 Instead, by an elaborate doctrine known
as the law of deathbed, a granter had to be in good health (‘in liege poustie’) at the time
of signing or, if ill, have demonstrated subsequent recovery either by surviving for
sixty days or by going to kirk or market unsupported.14
The origins of this ‘most ancient law’ can be traced back to Regiam Majestatem,
a work on Scots law of the fourteenth century,15 and indirectly to Glanvill’s De
Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Anglie, which was written around 1200 and on
which the relevant passages in Regiam Majestatem are based.16 Later writers, not
always convincingly, attributed the exclusion of testaments to feudalism.17 A mere
11
The most recent study, based on a sample of 1,009 adults, found that 37% had a will, but that this
figure rose to 69% for those aged 65 and above: see Scottish Consumer Council, ‘Wills and Awareness
of Inheritance Rights in Scotland’ (2006, available at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20090724135150/http://scotcons.demonweb.co.uk/publications/reports/reports06/rp10wrep.pdf>).
12
Chapter 17. The quotation can be found at p 219 of the text as printed in the Edinburgh Edition of
the Waverley Novels (1999). In fact the lawyer has it in his pocket all the time.
13
Erskine (n 5) III, 8, 95.
14
For detailed accounts of what were complex rules, see Stair (n 2) III, 4, 26–31; Bankton (n 4) III, 4,
32–53; Erskine (n 5) III, 8, 95–100; Baron David Hume, Lectures 1786–1822 vol V (ed G Campbell
H Paton; Stair Society vols 5, 13, 15–19; 1939–58) 26–53; George Joseph Bell, Principles of the Law of
Scotland (4th edn, Edinburgh, 1839, reprinted 2010) }} 1786–1816. See also Hector McKechnie, ‘Notes
on Death-Bed and Dying Declarations’ (1929) 41 Juridical Review 126 and 238.
15
Erskine (n 5) III, 8, 95. See Lord Cooper (ed), Regiam Majestatem Stair Society vol 11 (1947) II, 18,
7; II, 37.
16
Glanvill, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Anglie (ed G D H Hall, 1963) VII, 1; VII, 5.
17
Thomas Craig of Riccarton, Jus feudale II, 1, 25. This work was written around 1600 and first
published in 1655; a translation by Lord Clyde was published in 1934. See also Erskine (n 5) III, 8, 20;
Hume (n 14) vol V, 13.
vassal, it was said, had no power to transmit land without the interposition of the
feudal superior; nor could he breach unilaterally the provision made as to heirs in the
original feudal grant. In any event, a testament did not admit of the sasine18 that was
needed to complete the intended beneficiary’s title. The conclusion was inescapable:
if land was to be transferred away from the heir whom the law had selected to
succeed, this could only be done by an ordinary conveyance granted and completed
in the ordinary way and in the lifetime of the granter. A testament would not do.19
Although the rule just described was feudal in origin, and although it was accepted
more generally that ‘all succession in heritage with us is founded in the feudal
customs’,20 the writers of the institutional period,21 schooled in the Corpus Iuris
Civilis, found traces of Roman law wherever they looked.22 The attributions were of
varying plausibility. Bankton thought that:
The law of death-bed was introduced with us upon the same principle as the Querela inofficiosi
testamenti among the Romans. The party who makes the settlement in prejudice of his heir on
death-bed, is holden incapable on account of the disease; in the same manner as one, without
cause, disinheriting his children by his testament, was supposed non compos by the civil law, on
account of his unnatural settlement.23
According to Erskine, liege poustie – the state of health required for disposing of
heritage – ‘gets its name because persons in health have the legitima potestas, or lawful
power of disposing of their property at pleasure’.24 And in the idea that heritage
could only be transmitted by de praesenti conveyance, the writers found echoes of the
mancipatory will (testatum per aes et libram) of Roman law.25 Indeed, the preserva-
tion of that rule, several centuries after it had been abandoned in England,26 was
attributed to ‘respect to the Roman law and the feudal notions’, in that order.27
18
A required solemnity for the transfer of land until 1845, ‘sasine’ was the giving of possession by
means of the delivery of a symbol representing the land. The ceremony took place on the land itself in the
presence of a notary public and two witnesses.
19
This conclusion was also supported by the traditional maxim that it is for God not man to make an
heir: see Hume (n 14) vol V, 17; James Watson, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland respecting Succession as
depending on Deeds of Settlement (Edinburgh, 1826) 49. The maxim can be traced to Glanvill (n 16) VII, 1.
Of the equivalent rule in England, it has been argued that the true reason was not feudalism, but the desire
to protect the heir from deathbed gifts: see Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The
History of English Law before the Time of Edward I vol II (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1898) 326–30.
20
Bankton (n 4) III, 4, 4. See also Stair (n 2) III, 4, 25 (‘succession in moveables is more near to the
course of natural succession, and to the civil law of the Romans, especially their ancient and middle laws;
but the succession in heritable rights agreeth more to the recent feudal customs of most nations’); Erskine
(n 5) III, 8, 3.
21
ie 1681–1839, the period of the publication of the ‘institutional’ works of Stair, Bankton, Erskine,
Hume, and Bell.
22
The first book published on succession law – Watson (n 19) – devotes two full chapters to Roman
law. For a parallel development in property law, see Grant McLeod, ‘The Romanization of Property Law’,
in Kenneth Reid and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland vol I (2000) 220.
23
24
25
Hume (n 14) vol V, 14; Watson (n 19) 46–7, 69–70.
26
By the Statute of Wills 1540: see Sir John Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England vol VI
(2003) 679–83.
27
Watson (n 19) 48.
The evolution of the de praesenti conveyance is a fascinating study in the adapt-

ability of legal institutions.28 In principle the deed employed, an inter vivos disposi-
tion, was hopelessly ill-suited to the transmission of property on death, for it took
effect at once, during the granter’s lifetime, and could not be revoked. Yet in practice
a form of disposition was developed which, while satisfying the strict requirements of
the law, nonetheless operated in a manner which was often indistinguishable from a
testament. There were two basic models. One was to convey the land in the normal
way, with sasine and registration, but under reservation of a usufruct,29 of a power to
burden, and a right of revocation. So nominal, even fictitious, was the ownership
thus conferred that the grantee did not satisfy the property requirement for a right to
vote.30 The other method, soon to become the dominant one, did not even go so far.
The disposition was signed, but, containing a clause dispensing with delivery, was
retained by the granter and not activated until his death. In a cautious spirit it too
reserved a usufruct and a right of revocation.31 This method had the advantage of
allowing a ‘general’ conveyance – a conveyance of the granter’s whole property
without further specification – and so would carry future property as well as the
property owned by the granter at the time of signing.32 The disadvantage was that
sasine was not given, meaning that this would have to be done after the granter’s
death. That was straightforward enough if, as often, the grantee was the person who
would in any case be heir under the general law, but if he was not, the cooperation of
that person was still needed and, albeit with difficulty, could be insisted on.33
In the course of the eighteenth century the law became more relaxed about form so
that, as Lord Kames observed, ‘the difference betwixt this deed and a testament in
point of form, is so slight, that it is not to be understood, except by those who are
daily conversant in the forms and solemnities’.34 Although the position was main-
tained that a testator of heritage ‘must conceal his true purpose under a disguise’,35
that disguise was increasingly threadbare. Thus, it was competent and common to
combine the de praesenti conveyance with words which disposed of the moveable
estate on death and appointed an executor;36 it no longer mattered what name was
given to the deed; and any pretence that the grant was inter vivos had now been
abandoned.37 In Welsh v Cairnie,38 for example, a deed was upheld which assigned
28
For details, see: Hume (n 14) vol V, 13–26; Watson (n 19) Pt I, ch III; Erskine Douglas Sandford,
A Treatise on the Law of Heritable Succession in Scotland vol I (Edinburgh, 1830) 59–72.
29
Known in Scotland as a (proper) liferent.
30
Hume (n 14) vol IV, 16.
31
Cautious because, if the deed did not take effect until death, a usufruct (liferent) could never arise.
32
Thus achieving something which was not possible in England until 1837: see Pollock and Maitland
(n 19) vol II, 315.
33
Robert Bell, A System of the Forms of Deeds used in Scotland vol III (Edinburgh, 1804) 65–6 (‘a profusion
of troublesome forms’). At one time, the precept warranting the giving of sasine lapsed with the granter’s death,
but the position was changed by an Act of 1693: see ‘Records of the Parliament of Scotland to 1617’ (available
at <http://www.rps.ac.uk>; henceforth ‘RPS’) 1693/4/138. See also Watson (n 19) 47.
34
Henry Home, Lord Kames, Historical Law Tracts (4th edn, Edinburgh, 1792) 124.
35
Watson (n 19) 5.
36
Executors could only act in respect of moveable property: see I.3 below.
37
The shift from an inter vivos to a mortis causa deed can be seen in Erskine (n 5) III, 8, 20.
38
28 June 1809 FC.
and disponed every ‘moveable and immoveable subject of whatever denomination

the same, that presently pertaining or belonging, or shall be pertaining or belonging
to me at my death’, appointed an executor, omitted the usual mandate for comple-
tion of title, and was called a ‘latter will and testament’.
If, however, matters had become straightforward for those with access to legal
advice, the fact that the Scottish rule was out of step with the rest of Europe could
make life difficult for those who owned land in Scotland but lived abroad. The law
reports record a number of cases involving wills made in accordance with the law of
England,39 Ireland,40 or the Netherlands41 and which, omitting a de praesenti
conveyance, were held ineffective to carry heritage in Scotland.
3. Moveable property: transmission by testament

Until modern times a will (or ‘testament’) could only be used in respect of moveable
property. Its original function was to nominate the person – known as the ‘execu-
tor’42 – who was to ‘execute’ the deceased’s testamentary intentions, and a deed
which distributed the deceased’s property without naming an executor, although
legally effective, was not a testament.43 By the start of the nineteenth century,
however, this usage was no longer insisted on,44 and long before that testaments
had routinely contained legacies disposing of moveable property. The law of death-
bed did not apply.
For legacies writing could sometimes be avoided.45 Although the privileged wills
of Roman law, such as the testamentum militare, seem never to have been adopted,46
oral legacies were allowed provided that the value of each such legacy – and there
could be more than one47 – did not exceed £100 in the old Scottish currency.48 The
£100 limit – attributable to a rule of the general law that prevented more valuable
obligations from being proved by witnesses alone49 – was later justified on the basis
that, in the agitation of a final illness, ‘the mind is too much engrossed to pay a
minute attention to verbal expressions; and the real intention of the party would
often be in danger of being misunderstood or misrepresented, if left entirely to the
39
Crichton’s Executor v Crichton’s Trustee (1795) Mor 4489; Robertson’s Creditors v Mason (1795) Mor
4491.
40
Burgess v Stantin (1764) Mor 4484.
41
Crawfurd v Crawfurd (1774) Mor 4486.
42
For a historical study, see A E Anton, ‘Medieval Scots Executors and the Courts Spiritual’ (1955) 67
JR 129.
43
Bankton (n 4) III, 8, 1 drew a parallel with the nomination of heirs in Roman law. See also Stair
(n 2) III, 8, 33–4; Erskine (n 5) III, 9, 1 and 5; Hume (n 14) vol V, 195–9.
44
Bell (n 14) }} 1862 and 1869.
45
A nuncupative will could not, however, appoint an executor.
46
Although, strictly, the question was left open in Stuart v Stuart 1942 SC 510. The military will was
received in English law: see ch 13 above at 322.
47
Bell (n 14) } 1868. It could also be used for a universal legacy of all moveables: see Erskine (n 5)
III, 9, 7.
48
£8.33 sterling. Hume (n 14) vol V, 193 would extend the exception to ‘wearing apparell’ without
financial limit.
49
memory of interested relatives’.50 When the law was re-cast in 1995, the nuncupative
will was discarded and writing became necessary in all cases.51
4. The fall and rise of the testament

Today the testament is the dominant instrument for allocating property on death.
But that has been true for less than 100 years. Until as recently as 1868, testaments
could not be used for heritable property at all,52 and even in respect of moveable
property they were for a long time ‘scarcely to be met with in practice’.53 For
the latter the main reason was financial.54 Executors, whose role was confined to
the deceased’s moveable property, took title by grant of confirmation from the
Commissary Court. Confirmation, however, was expensive – 5 per cent of the
confirmed estate until 1701 and between 1 and 3.5 per cent thereafter – and in
the Confirmation Act of 169055 a means of avoiding it was supplied. In acknow-
ledgement of ‘the great vexatione’ created by the cost of confirmation, the Act
provided, in respect of moveable property, ‘that where speciall assignations and
dispositions are lawfully made by the defunct, tho neither intimate nor made publick
in his lifetime, they shall be yet good and valid rights and titles to possess, bruike,
enjoy, pursue or defend, albeit the soumes of money or goods therein contained be
not confirmed’. This was a signal to abandon the testament in favour of a de praesenti
conveyance – as a ‘speciall assignation and disposition’ – and so to adopt for
moveables the practice which was already in use for heritage.56 And it then
made practical sense to combine the conveyances of moveables and heritage in a
single deed, which came to be known as a (general) disposition and settlement. Once
abandoned, the testament was slow to revive, even after the reforms of 1868.
Evolving practice can be traced in the pages of the leading styles book of the
period, Juridical Styles, which was published in six editions between 1794 and
1907.57 The (general) disposition and settlement contained a general conveyance
of both heritable and moveable property and also a special conveyance, often by
reference to a subsequently prepared inventory, of particular items of moveable
50
Watson (n 19) 318.
51
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 1(2)(c). This implemented a recommendation of
the Scottish Law Commission: see Report on Requirements of Writing (Scot Law Com No 112 (1998))
para 2.49.
52
The law was changed by the Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 s 20. The abolition of
the law of deathbed followed three years later: see Law of Deathbed Abolition (Scotland) Act 1871.
53
Bell (n 33) vol III, 13.
54
For details, see James G Currie, Confirmation of Executors in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1884) 92–7.
55
RPS 1690/4/117.
56
It quickly came to be accepted that a special legacy, although overtly testamentary, could nonetheless
qualify as a special conveyance under the 1690 Act, although it does not seem to have been much used in
practice. See Erskine (n 5) III, 9, 30, citing Gordon v Campbell (1729) Mor 14384.
57
Although always known as Juridical Styles, the proper title is A Complete System of Conveyancing
adapted to the Present Practice of Scotland by the Juridical Society of Edinburgh. Bell (n 33) vol III also
contains styles as well as a helpful commentary.
property.58 Confirmation could be avoided only in respect of the latter. A variant was
the trust disposition and settlement in which the property was conveyed to trustees
rather than to heirs; by the fourth edition of Juridical Styles in 1865, this was said to
be ‘now almost universally adopted where the succession is not likely to be insignifi-
cant in amount’.59 As both versions of the disposition and settlement were inter vivos
deeds, they contained the usual clauses reserving a usufruct and a right of revocation
and dispensing with delivery,60 and that remained true even of the styles given in the
fifth edition of Juridical Styles in 1883, a full fifteen years after the pretence of a de
praesenti conveyance had ceased to be necessary for immoveables.61 It was only with
the final edition, published in 1907, that the clauses were dropped, that, in some but
not all of the styles, words of bequest (‘do hereby leave and bequeath’) replaced
words of conveyance (‘assign and dispone’),62 and that the disposition and settle-
ment was re-born as a mortis causa deed.63 Surprisingly, a style for the special
assignation of moveables survived, despite the fact that the charges for confirmation
which it was designed to avoid had been abolished almost a century before.64
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the configuration of deeds had largely
assumed its modern form.65 As estates became simpler, and testators less controlling
of their heirs, so the testament revived and began to replace the (general) disposition
and settlement. But the trust disposition and settlement remained in use where there
were continuing purposes – for example, money to be held for unborn children or
minors – which required the setting up of a trust.66 To the layman, and often to
lawyers too, both deeds are ‘wills’, and this convenient term is therefore also used in
the present chapter.67
58
See, eg, Juridical Styles (n 57) vol II (4th edn, Edinburgh, 1865) 558–61. A style of special
assignation of moveables can be found at 556–7.
59
Juridical Styles (n 57) vol II (4th edn, Edinburgh, 1865) 562–3. Styles are given on 564–72.
60
After 1858 it was possible for the grantee to complete title without the heir’s cooperation by means
of a notarial instrument: see Titles to Land (Scotland) Act 1858 s 12, later replaced by the Titles to Land
Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 s 19.
61
Juridical Styles (n 57) vol II (5th edn, Edinburgh, 1883) 576–93. This was not simply a failure to
update. As late as 1903, John Philp Wood, the recently retired Professor of Conveyancing at Edinburgh
University, seemed unperturbed by the obsolete clauses in Juridical Styles, commenting merely that ‘in
name and outward appearance this deed differs from a will or testament; in substance and effect it is
precisely the same’: see Lectures delivered to the Class of Conveyancing in the University of Edinburgh (1903)
723.
62
The use of words of bequest for immoveables was an innovation expressly permitted by s 20 of the
Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868. They were treated as words of conveyance (‘equivalent
to a General Disposition’). For the continuing use of ‘dispone’, see W P M B, ‘That Indispensable Word
“Dispone”’ (1894) 10 Scottish LR 160.
63
Juridical Styles (n 57) vol II (6th edn, 1907) 596–611.
64
Juridical Styles (n 57) vol II (6th edn, 1907) 595–6. This seems likely to have been no more than
editorial fatigue because Currie (n 54) 96–7, writing in 1884, said that special assignations ‘are now
unknown in practice’, although the legislation on which they were based – the Confirmation Act 1690 –
remains in force even today. The main charges for confirmation were abolished by s 1 of the Commissary
Courts (Scotland) Act 1823.
65
Wood (n 61) 717–26.
66
See, eg, Archibald H Elder, Forms of Wills in accordance with the Law of Scotland (1947) ch XVII.
67
For styles, see, eg, Alan Barr et al, Drafting Wills in Scotland (2nd edn, 2009).
The testament’s slow and uncertain progress had implications for the rules as to
authentication. For if succession was regulated mainly by inter vivos deed, then a
separate body of law for testaments, little used and confined to moveables, would
have been an unnecessary complication. Thus it was that testaments, with minor
exceptions, were made subject to ‘the ordinary solemnities of other writings’68 – the
same rules as applied to, for example, conveyances of heritable property, contracts in
relation to land, and unilateral promises – and so to rules which had rarely been
formulated with testaments in mind. For the most part, therefore, an account of how
wills are authenticated is an account of the authentication of all juridical acts for
which writing is a constitutive requirement.69
II. Seals, signatures, and witnesses
1. Attested wills
(a) Authentication statutes
In medieval Scotland, as in many other countries at that time, a person authenticated
a document by impressing on it a seal which incorporated his coat of arms or
initials.70 The drawbacks were obvious and widely acknowledged: neither initials
nor even coats of arms were unique to a particular person, and the seals themselves
could be copied, doctored, or stolen.71 To improve the security of deeds72 an Act of
154073 – the first of the ‘authentication’ statutes – required that the seal be
supplemented by a signature, either of the granter of the deed, if he could write, or
of a notary, if he could not. Abolished in one type of case in 1584,74 sealing soon
disappeared from practice altogether.
Normally, sealing, or later signing, was carried out in the presence of witnesses,
and early deeds often contain lengthy, if unreliable, witness lists.75 The witnesses,
however, did not sign, and it was not until an Act of 1681 that signing became
compulsory. In setting out the rules for attestation by witnesses, the Subscription of
Deeds Act 168176 laid the foundations of the modern law. Witnesses were required
to sign, ‘seing writting is now so ordinary’, and the deed must ‘design’ (that is, name
and identify) the witnesses and also the person who had written out the words (the
68
69
A list of such juridical acts is set out in s 1 of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995.
70
For the history of authentication, see Robert Bell, Lectures on the Solemnities used in Scotland in the
Testing of Deeds (Edinburgh, 1795) 29–42; Walter Ross, Lectures on the History and Practice of the Law of
Scotland Relative to Conveyancing and Legal Diligence vol I (2nd edn, Edinburgh, 1822) 121–34.
71
Stair (n 2) IV, 42, 5; Bankton (n 4) I, 11, 37; Erskine (n 5) III, 2, 7; Bell (n 70) 17.
72
In Scotland ‘deed’ is not a technical term, and there is no requirement, as there is in England, that
certain types of juridical act must be accomplished by deed.
73
Subscription of Deeds Act 1540 (RPS 1540/12/92).
74
Act of 1584 (RPS 1584/5/85).
75
G W S Barrow, ‘Witnesses and the Attestation of Formal Documents in Scotland, Twelfth-
Thirteenth Centuries’ (1995) 16 Journal of Legal History 1.
76
RPS 1681/7/27.
‘writer’). Further, the witnesses must either have seen the granter sign or heard him
acknowledge his signature, ‘otherways the saids witnesses shall be repute and pun-
ished as accessorie to forgerie’. Although the number of witnesses was not specified,
the requirement was universally understood as being two.77 The 1681 Act, and the
Acts that preceded it, remained in force until 1995 when, as we will see, the law was
fundamentally re-cast.
(b) Applicability to wills

In Crichton Petitioner (1802),78 it was argued in support of a will which had been
signed and witnessed but had no designations that it was wrong to suppose that the
authentication statutes applied to wills. On the contrary, it was pointed out, the
1681 Act referred only to ‘instruments of sasine, instruments of resignation ad
remanentiam, instruments of intimation of assignations, translations or retrocessions
to bands, contracts or other writs’ and made no mention of wills; and English law
was prayed in aid as allowing wills ‘destitute of the solemnities requisite to the
authenticity of contracts and obligations . . . if there exist sufficient proof of inten-
tion’. By 1802, however, it was far too late for arguments of this kind. It was plain
that the authentication statutes applied to wills. The only question was whether they
might apply in a modified way.
The case for a less stringent application of the statutes was easy to make.
‘Testamentary deeds’, wrote Erskine, ‘are so much favoured, that if the testator’s
intention appear sufficiently, they are sustained, though not quite formal, especially
if they be executed where men of business cannot be had’.79 Yet where the authen-
ticity of a signature was at stake, formalism was thought to have its merits. ‘The strict
observance of the statutory solemnities’, it was argued in one case, are ‘particularly
necessary with regard to a deed executed mortis causa. Indeed, one great object of
their introduction was to protect dying persons from the frauds of those around
them.’80 In the event, both types of argument were reflected in the rather modest
departures from the general law which were allowed for wills. On the one hand, the
cumbersome requirement that only ‘twa famous notaris befoir foure famous wit-
nesses’81 could sign on behalf of a person unable to write was modified in the case of
wills to two witnesses and a single notary – or even a parish minister, on the basis that
ministers ‘are obliged, by their office, to be frequently with dying persons, where
notaries cannot easily be got’.82 On the other hand, when, in 1970, it ceased to be
77
A requirement of two witnesses for wills can be traced as far back as the Regiam Majestatem (n 15) II,
38, 1.
78
(1802) Mor 15952.
79
Erskine (n 5) III, 2, 23. The two cases which he cites in support were, however, concerned with
holograph wills which were not, therefore, subject to the authentication Acts.
80
Frank v Frank (1795) Mor 16824, 16825.
81
Act of 1579 (RPS 1579/10/33).
82
Erskine (n 5) III, 2, 23. See also Stair (n 2) III, 8, 34.
necessary for a granter to sign on each separate sheet of a deed, the requirement was
retained for wills to prevent the substitution of sheets by would-be beneficiaries.83
(c) Provenance
In the first treatise on solemnities in deeds in Scotland, published in 1795, Robert
Bell devoted an introductory chapter to the subject’s history, beginning with the law
of Rome, proceeding into the Dark Ages, and ending with developments in France
and England. It might have been expected, Bell said, that Scotland would have
adopted the public or quasi-public deed favoured in France and attributable to
the influence of Rome. That it did not do so was due to ‘the low state into which
the order of notaries fell in this country’84 – to which might be added that notaries
did not exist in significant numbers until around 1400.85 Instead, Scotland favoured
private deeds, as did England, although Bell did not argue for direct influence.86
Within the realm of private deeds some Roman influence might be detected, at least
by those who wished to find it.87 Later one judge was to make the implausible claim
that the 1681 Act was ‘almost a literal transcript’ of Novel 73.88
What is missing from this account, of course, is any special consideration of wills,
reflecting the absence of a distinct doctrine in Scots law.89 Bell’s complacent
conclusion – ‘that our own law joins to a sufficient degree of security, a facility
and ease in the execution of our deeds, admirably fitted for the purposes of a rich and
commercial people’90 – takes no account of the needs of wills.
(d) Constitution or proof ?

In signing a deed the granter was both performing a juridical act and also at the same
time providing evidence to others that the act had taken place. In other words, the
signature was necessary both for constitution and for proof. Whether the former was
also true of the witnesses’ signatures was at first controversial. For if, as the 1681 Act
stated, the purpose of having witnesses sign was in case ‘by their forgetfulnes’ they
‘dissowne ther being witnesses’, it was possible to argue that the matter went to proof
83
Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 s 44. The modern law is, in effect, the same:
see Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 3(2); and see below III.3(a).
84
See Bell (n 70) 26. See, in a similar vein, Craig (n 17) II, 7, 7 (‘the capacity for wickedness’); Stair
(n 2) II, 3, 19.
85
J Durkan, ‘The Early Scottish Notary’, in I B Cowan and D Shaw (eds), The Renaissance and
Reformation in Scotland (1983) 22.
86
That the principal statutes in the two jurisdictions – the (English) Statute of Frauds of 1677 and the
(Scottish) Subscription of Deeds Act 1681 – were so close in time is of interest, but there is no sign of
mutual influence. For the interest in solemnities in the seventeenth century, see Ernst Rabel, ‘The Statute
of Frauds and Comparative Legal History’ (1947) 63 LQR 174.
87
eg McBeath’s Trustees v McBeath 1935 SC 471, 491 (Lord Murray) (‘founded on the civil law’).
88
Duff v Earl of Fife (1826) 2 W & S 166, 176 (Lord Alloway). Novel 73 is discussed (although not by
name) in Bell (n 70) 10–11. The point of resemblance is perhaps merely that it sought to support
comparatio literarum with the evidence of (three) witnesses.
89
But see Bankton (n 4) III, 8, 2, which draws a parallel between Scots law and Canon law in respect of
the number of testamentary witnesses (‘the canon law . . . requires two witnesses for testaments, whereas by
the civil law, seven were necessary’).
90
Bell (n 70) 4.
alone. The relative informality of attestation seemed to point in the same direction.
Thus, under the 1681 Act witnesses need not observe the actual signing provided the
signature was acknowledged to them later; they need not be present, or sign, at the
same time as each other; and, unlike the position in England,91 there was no
requirement that they sign in the granter’s presence. In short, witnesses added so
little to either the solemnity or the security of the occasion that it was not clear why
their participation should be invested with special status. And if that was correct, it
was a short step to saying that a deed was valid so long as the granter had signed and
his signature could be proved, whether by witnesses or by some other means.92 In
this extreme form the argument did not prosper, for it was never seriously doubted
that there must be witnesses and that the witnesses must sign. But as late as 1822
Baron Hume was still suggesting that a deed might be valid even if a witness had
neither seen the granter sign nor heard him acknowledge his signature.93 That
particular idea was quashed by a decision of the House of Lords in 1826,94 and in
1915 the House of Lords settled the matter beyond doubt by holding that attestation
was a matter of solemnity, not merely of evidence.95 Yet in the long run, as we shall
see, this approach has not prevailed.
2. Holograph wills
That it was the signature and not the attestation which was the essential formal
requirement might seem borne out by the acceptance of holograph deeds. This had
happened by the beginning of the seventeenth century, at latest,96 and extended to all
juridical acts for which writing was required and not merely to wills. But wills were
included without restriction.97 A holograph deed was one written in the hand of the
granter and signed by him. There was no need to include the place and date of
signing, even for wills, although the issue was initially controversial.98 There was also
91
Under the Statute of Frauds. The difference between this rule in the two jurisdictions was
emphasized in Frank v Frank (1809) 5 Pat 278, 283 (LP Campbell). The modern law in England is the
same: see Wills Act 1837 s 9.
92
That indeed was the rule for wills under Canon law: see ch 2 above at 36.
93
Hume (n 14) vol VI, 14. Read literally, the 1681 Act did not provide for nullity in respect of this
particular shortcoming.
94
Duff v Earl of Fife (1826) 2 W & S 166. The opinions of the judges of the Court of Session, given in
full, are of great value.
95
Walker v Whitwell, 1916 SC (HL) 75 especially at 79–82 (Lord Dunedin). In this case the second
witness to a will had signed after the testator’s death. The will was held to be void.
96
‘It is impossible to say when holograph writings came first to be recognised in the law of Scotland’:
McBeath’s Trustees v McBeath 1935 SC 471, 480 (LJC Aitchison). Their privileged status arose ‘by usage’:
see George Joseph Bell, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland and on the Principles of Mercantile Jurispru-
dence vol I (7th edn, by John McLaren, Edinburgh, 1870) 341. In Titill (1610) Mor 16959, a holograph
will was found to be ‘a solemn and lawful testament’. Oddly, it was unsigned. The imposition of a reduced
prescriptive period in respect of ‘hollograph missive letters and hollograph bands’ by an Act of 1669 (RPS
1669/10/27) shows that by then the holograph deed was well established.
97
Stair (n 2) III, 8, 34; Watson (n 19) 336–42.
98
For the arguments, which were partly founded on the civil law, see Pennycuick v Campbell (1709)
Mor 16970. Scotland thus avoided the difficulties over missing or pre-printed dates and places encoun-
tered by countries such as Germany: see ch 8 above at 188.
no need for witnesses, despite the Subscription of Deeds Act 1681. This was
explained on the basis that, by making reference to the ‘writer’, the Act excluded
the case where the deed was written out by the granter himself.99 But the real reason
was probably the practical one that, a whole deed being harder to forge than the
signatures of two witnesses,100 a holograph deed was better evidence of authenticity
than one which had been written out in another hand and then attested by witnesses.
Holograph writs, Stair said, ‘are unquestionably the strongest probation by writ, and
the least imitable’.101
Over time this advantage came to be eroded. Especially in the context of wills,
there was a growing impatience with requirements of form if they seemed likely to
defeat the clear intention of the granter. A first step, already explicit in Stair’s
Institutions,102 was to require that no more than the essential words be in the
granter’s hand. The rest could then be treated as holograph by legal fiction. In the
case of wills, this could have the happy result of rescuing those who, rather than incur
the expense of a lawyer, had bought a will form (usually designed for the English
market) in a shop and filled in the blanks in their own handwriting.103
Next came acceptance of the curious practice of adopting a deed, typed or written
by another, as holograph of the granter. In the leading case, decided in 1883,104 a
person had signed a document, written by a third party, and then added in his own
hand the words ‘adopted as holograph’. It appears that he thought that ‘holograph’
was a French word meaning that parties were to stick to their bargain. The court held
that the deed was validly executed. The basis of this, and later, decisions was unclear.
On one view, the handwritten words ‘adopted as holograph’ were themselves the
deed, into which the non-holograph part was deemed to be incorporated.105 On
another, the three words – whether by magic or by an application of the principle of
party autonomy – had the effect of changing words typed or written by another into
words written by the granter.106
Finally, in McBeath’s Trustees v McBeath (1935), a bare majority of a seven-judge
court accepted as valid a will which had been typed by the testator and then signed,
on the basis that the law must ‘keep pace with the march of science’,107 that
‘typewriting is a modern form of handwriting’,108 and that a typewritten will is
99
Bankton (n 4) I, 9, 33; Macdonald v Cuthbertson (1890) 18 R 101, 107 (Lord McLaren).
100
Erskine (n 5) III, 2, 22; Callander v Callander’s Trustees (1863) 2 M 291, 301 (Lord Cowan).
101
Stair (n 2) IV, 42, 5.
102
Stair (n 2) IV, 42, 6: ‘Writs are accounted holograph, where large sentences are written with the
party’s hand, though not the whole writ’.
103
See, eg, Gillies v Glasgow Royal Infirmary 1960 SC 438.
104
Gavine’s Trustees v Lee (1883) 10 R 448. The doctrine can be traced back as far as McIntyre v
McFarlane’s Trustees 1 March 1821 FC.
105
McBeath’s Trustees v McBeath 1935 SC 471, 477 (LP Clyde). For incorporation, see III.2(e) below.
An obvious difficulty with this view is that the writing thus incorporated is not itself holograph.
106
McBeath’s Trustees v McBeath 1935 SC 471, 491 (Lord Murray) (‘holograph constructively’).
107
At 485 (Lord Anderson).
108
At 489 (Lord Morison). Venturing into the realms of science fiction, Lord Morison went on to
suggest that: ‘It may in future be easy for particular typewriting machines to operate with special
characteristics’.
hardly less secure than one containing the words adopted as holograph, ‘however
illegibly written’.109
These changes did not go unopposed. In respect of the recognition of adopted as
holograph, for example, Lord McLaren was later to complain that ‘the Court came
dangerously near to legislation’,110 while in McBeath’s Trustees the minority resorted
to a floodgates argument:
[I]f a deed may be typewritten, why not also a signature? If a deed be typewritten, why may it
not also be dictated to a gramophone, where there is at least the check of the sound of the
individual voice, for what that is worth?111
At bottom, the objection concerned authenticity and the risk of forgery. There was
little evidential value in a deed in which the only handwritten words were ‘adopted as
holograph’ and a signature. To allow such startling informality was to move from a
system of written evidence to one where almost everything was periled on the
‘lubricity of oral testimony’.112
3. Probativity
The suspicion of oral testimony was indeed long-standing. ‘In other nations’, Stair
noted, ‘writs are not fully probative by the subscription of parties’.113 In Scotland,
however, the position was different, for, by requiring witnesses at the time of the
signing, the 1681 Act was thought to have made them unnecessary later on. And in
the course of the eighteenth century this thought ripened into the formal presump-
tion that a deed which appeared to comply with the Act, by being apparently signed
by the granter and by two (designed) witnesses, was taken to be ‘a genuine and
authentic writing’.114 At one stage the law threatened to go even further, for if no
evidence was needed to support an attested deed, then it might be that no evidence
was competent at all. The issue came to a head in the mid-1790s in the great
litigation concerning the settlement of Charles Frank.115 Mr Frank had signed
while ill in bed. One of the witnesses, a servant, had ‘from modesty, stood near to
the door’. Although he signed the deed as a witness, the servant was later to claim that
he had neither seen Frank sign nor heard him acknowledge his signature. In an action
to reduce the settlement, the question arose whether this evidence might be admit-
ted. The unanimous view of the Court of Session was that it might.116
109
At 485 (Lord Anderson).
110
Harvey v Smith (1904) 6 F 511, 521.
111
1935 SC 471, 492 (Lord Murray).
112
McBeath’s Trustees v McBeath 1935 SC 471, 493 (Lord Murray).
113
Stair (n 2) IV, 42, 7.
114
Hume (n 14) vol VI, 28. And see also Erskine (n 5) III, 2, 20; Bell (n 96) vol I, 341.
115
Frank v Frank (1795) Mor 16824 affirmed (1809) 5 Pat 278.
116
Decision of 9 July 1793. An account of the opinions of individual judges is given in Bell (n 70)
235–9 and, in summary form, in (1809) 5 Pat 278, 281.
Yet the approach to oral evidence remained one of considerable suspicion. It was
necessary to bear in mind, Hume said, ‘how wavering and inaccurate the memory of
witnesses, especially those of the lower rank, is apt to be, at any distance of time . . .
and also how open such witnesses may often be to favor and influence of different
kinds’.117 The presumption of authenticity was thus a powerful one and not easily
rebutted, and contrary evidence ‘must be very strong and decisive, as it would be very
dangerous to cut down deeds ex facie regular upon doubtful or equivocal testimony,
whether of instrumentary witnesses or others’.118 So in Frank itself the court had
little difficulty in dismissing the recollections of the bashful servant,119 and in later
cases the result was often the same.120 It was only in relation to other types of
extrinsic evidence – comparatio literarum, for example, or the fact of a deed having
been written on paper ‘industriously sullied as to appear to be old’121 – that the court
showed much in the way of sympathy.
Although terminology has varied, a deed which carries a presumption of authen-
ticity is, in modern usage, known as ‘probative’. Thus, a deed which appeared to
be attested in accordance with the 1681 Act was a probative deed. Whether the
presumption extended to holograph deeds was for a long time uncertain and
contested. The initial view was in favour of probative status, at least where the
deed contained a statement to the effect that it was written by the granter,122 but
during the nineteenth century the position came to be doubted, with authorities
supporting both sides.123 The matter was not finally resolved until 1937 when the
Court of Session decided that a holograph but unwitnessed deed could not be
probative and that, unless its authenticity was admitted or otherwise not at issue,
the onus of showing validity rested on the person seeking to rely on it.124
117
Hume (n 14) vol VI, 15.
118
Frank v Frank (1809) 5 Pat 278, 282 (LP Campbell).
119
Decision of 2 December 1794. An account of the opinions of individual judges is given in Bell
(n 70) 256–71 and, in summary form, in (1809) 5 Pat 278, 282. LJC Braxfield is reported by Bell as saying
(at 257): ‘In balancing two testimonies, the one arising from the deliberate attestation of the witness in
writing, the other from his deposition, I would rather suppose a failure of memory on the part of the
witness, than that he was guilty of a criminal act’ (ie false witnessing under the 1681 Act).
120
See, eg, Cleland v Cleland (1838) 1 D 254; Baird’s Trustees v Murray (1883) 11 R 153; Sutherland v
W M Low & Co Ltd (1901) 8 SLT 395. For a case in which the presumption of validity was overcome,
see Young v Paton 1910 SC 63.
121
Stair (n 2) IV, 42, 19.
122
Erskine (n 5) III, 2, 22, relying on Earl of Rothes v Leslie (1635) Mor 12605; Bell (n 96) vol I, 341.
Bell explained the special status on the basis of compliance with the requirement, first imposed by
an Act of 1593 (RPS 1593/4/44) and later confirmed by the 1681 Act, that the writer of a deed be
named and designed.
123
The last clear authority in favour of probativity was Robertson v Ogilvie’s Trustees (1844) 7 D 236.
A different view was suggested in Anderson v Gill (1858) 3 Macq 180 and Cranston Petitioners (1890) 17
R 410. Hume (n 14) vol VI, 28 thought that holograph deeds were improbative.
124
Harper v Green 1938 SC 198. Even so, one judge (Lord Carmont at 205) was willing to cede
probative status if: (i) the authenticity of the signature was proved or admitted; and (ii) the deed contained
the statement that it was written ‘by my hand’ or equivalent. This was an attempt to reconcile the previous
authorities.
III. The modern law
1. Introduction
When the rules of authentication came to be re-examined by the Scottish Law
Commission in the late 1980s, they had remained largely unchanged for 300
years. Two types of deed – the attested and the holograph – were available for
wills, as for other juridical acts for which writing was needed. The first was signed by
the granter and attested by two witnesses in accordance with the authentication
statutes and in particular the Subscription of Deeds Act 1681. The second was signed
by the granter and either substantially written out by him or containing in his hand
the words ‘adopted as holograph’. Only the first was ‘probative’ in the sense of being
self-proving; in respect of the second, it was necessary to prove that the writing and
signature were those of the granter. These rules, the Scottish Law Commission
concluded, were ‘most unsatisfactory’.125 The law rested on ancient legislation
supplemented by an ‘encrustation of case law’.126 In places it was obscure or illogical
or plain out of date. And it was overly formalistic. There was, the Commission
thought, little merit in formality for its own sake:
Our general approach to this question is to favour the reduction of formal requirements to a
safe and acceptable minimum. It is, we think, an affront to people’s sense of justice if genuine
writings are denied effect because of unnecessary technical requirements.127
Particular scorn was reserved for the holograph deed, long rendered obsolete, it was
said, by the invention of the typewriter, to say nothing of the computer. ‘Most
people regard a handwritten document as less formal than a typed one. To say that a
subscribed typed document is invalid but a subscribed holograph writing is valid
seems perverse.’128 The evidential value of handwriting was acknowledged, but
dismissed with the thought that authenticity, if in dispute, could be proved by
other means.
The key to reform lay in the existing concession for deeds containing the hand-
written words ‘adopted as holograph’. The words themselves added little either to
formality or authenticity and could readily be dispensed with. But if this were to be
done, the only requirement left would be the granter’s signature. In the Commis-
sion’s view, there was much to be said in favour of such a reduced requirement – of a
rule that a deed is valid simply by being signed.129 On the one hand, no one could be
surprised by the idea that they were bound by things that they signed. On the other
hand, the proposed rule was simple, elegant, and unlikely to cause trouble in
practice.
That left the question of probativity. If this was to be retained, as the Commission
thought that it ought to be, there was still a place for attested writings, for a deed that
was merely signed could hardly be given the status of self-proving. But the number of
125 126
Report on Requirements of Writing (n 51) para 4.12. Report, para 4.10.
127 128 129
Report, para 4.1. Report, para 4.16. Report, para 4.19.
witnesses could be reduced from two to one, in line with the recent abolition of
corroboration in civil actions.130
The overall result was to retain the dual character of the existing law. Attested
writings were to continue as before and, apart from the reduction in witnesses, to
be subject to virtually the same rules. But holograph writings were to be replaced
by subscribed writings, that is, writings which could be written by anyone and in
any way, including by typewriter or computer, and then ‘subscribed’ – signed at the
end – by the granter. As before, only the former were to be probative. These
recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission were accepted by the govern-
ment and implemented by the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. The
current law is thus to be found in that Act.
A key advantage of the new law is structural. Under the rules previously in force, a
deed which failed as an attested deed usually failed altogether. A modern example is
Williamson v Williamson.131 Mrs Williamson signed her will on 11 April 1988. The
witnesses were a Mr and Mrs Wilson. Unhappily, when Mr Wilson, a solicitor, came
to sign, he confused his own surname with that of the testator and signed ‘D C R
Williamson’. As is usual in such cases, the mistake was not discovered until after the
testator’s death. The will was held by the Court of Session to be invalid. With the
signature of only one witness, it could not be an attested deed; nor could it be a
holograph deed because it was typed and, naturally enough, lacked the words
‘adopted as holograph’. The new law would produce a different result. The will
would be valid from the moment that Mrs Williamson signed, and the only purpose
of attestation would be to procure probativity.132 Hence, even if the witnessing is
defective, the deed – provided it is subscribed – is still valid. An attested deed thus
carries within it a subscribed deed – it is simply a subscribed deed with the addition
of a witness.
Viewed more broadly, the 1995 reform can be seen as a well-judged blend of
continuity and change. The change was indeed a radical one, reducing the require-
ments of formal validity to what must be almost the lowest possible level. But the
continuity was no less striking: the requirements for a probative deed under the Act
would have caused little surprise to legislators of the seventeenth century. And it was
partly for that reason that, after some initial grumbling, the legal profession came to
terms with the new law. Today it is regarded with the indifference which is the
hallmark of success.
It would, of course, have been possible to exempt wills from the new informality
of the subscribed writing, and indeed this issue was specifically considered by the
Scottish Law Commission.133 But while conceding that it was not ‘an easy question’,
the Commission decided against any such exemption. To have ‘different require-
ments for different classes of writings’, contrary to the long tradition in Scotland,
would be confusing and lead to error. And if it was desirable to allow people to make
130 131
Report, paras 5.1, 5.2, 5.9. 1997 SC 94.
132
As only one witness is now needed, it would be probative as well.
133
Report, paras 4.32–4.35.
wills on their own, without legal advice, as the Commission thought it was, then it
must follow that the rules should be as simple as possible.
The Commission took for granted that writing should continue to be needed for
wills, and indeed recommended the abolition of the existing exception, rendered
irrelevant by inflation, which allowed oral wills of £100 Scots (£8.33).134 There was
no consideration of such new media as video recording or electronic documents. As
restated by the 1995 Act, writing is required for ‘the making of any will, testamentary
trust disposition and settlement or codicil’.135 In Scotland a codicil is simply an
addition to an existing will and it has always been subject to the same formalities.
In practice, most wills are drawn up by solicitors and are attested in order to gain
the benefit of probativity. Home-made wills, however, are almost invariably sub-
scribed without witnesses. Both types of will must now be considered in greater
detail.
2. Formal validity: the subscribed will

The United Kingdom has yet to ratify the Washington Convention on the Form of
an International Will (1973), although framework legislation has been in place since
1982.136 Consequently, the entire law of testamentary formalities in Scotland is
contained in the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995. The Act makes only
two requirements of a will: it must be in a ‘written document’ and the document
must be subscribed by the testator.137 Nothing else, the Act explains, ‘shall be
required’.138 So it does not matter whether the document is handwritten or typed
or written in some other way, and there is no need for witnesses or for a statement of
the date or place of signing.
(a) A ‘written document’

‘Document’ suggests paper, but without excluding other media. The definition in
the Oxford English Dictionary139 carries the enticing suggestions of tomb-stones,
coins, and pictures, although the first of these, at least, is likely to come too late to be
of service. But while a castaway on a Hebridean island could write his will in the
sand, and hope for gentle tides, data contained in an electronic medium are not a
‘written document’ and, even if they were, could not be signed in the manner
required by the Act.140
134
Report, para 2.49.
135
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 1(2)(c).
136
Administration of Justice Act 1982 ss 27 and 28 (not in force).
137
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 ss 1(2)(c), 2(1). In this section I refer only to wills,
but it should be recalled that the same rules apply to all juridical acts for which writing is needed, including
contracts and deeds in respect of real rights in land.
138
1995 Act s 2(1).
139
2nd edn, 1989 (online version).
140
The 1995 Act, as amended, is careful to distinguish a ‘written document’ from the ‘electronic
document’ which is now available for electronic conveyancing in respect of land. See s 1(2A), (2B).
(b) Method of signature

The normal method of signing is by a combination of forename (or forenames) and
surname, although an initial will do instead of a forename, and familiar forms of
forenames are permitted.141 The Act also allows informal signatures, as in many
other countries, provided they can be shown to be the testator’s usual way of signing
or are otherwise intended as a signature. So, especially in cases where testamentary
provisions are found in a letter to a relative or friend, a person can sign by forename
alone (‘Connie’)142 by description (‘lots of love, Mum’)143 or even by initial or
mark.144 Usually a signature is written by pen, but it is sufficient to sign by pencil or
other less permanent materials such as chalk.145 However, the signature must be
written, and it is not permitted to use words which have been typed, cyclostyled,
affixed by stamp, or ‘drawn’ on a computer screen.146 Digital signatures are not
recognized.147 The writing need not be by hand, and a person may sign using a foot
or mouth or in some other way.148 There is no requirement that a signature be
legible.149 A blind person can sign, although the will may be open to challenge on the
ground that the testator was misled as to what was being signed150 and it is usually
better to use a ‘notarial’ signature in the manner described below.151
Normally a testator must sign unaided. So when, for example, in November 1707,
George Moncrieff was too weak to write more than ‘George’ and ‘Mon’, and a
bystander ‘boldly took him by the wrist, and led his hand till he had added “crieff ” ’,
the will was held to be invalid.152 More limited assistance is, however, allowed. Thus,
it is permissible to support the testator’s body or even the testator’s arm or wrist so
long as the pen is not actually guided.153 Tracing letters in advance with a pin or a
pencil is regarded as guidance for this purpose.154 But it does not invalidate the
141
1995 Act s 7(2)(b). So the following are all valid: James Andrew Murray, James Murray, J A
Murray, J Murray, Jimmy Murray, and Jas Murray. Note also s 7(2)(a), which permits signature by the full
name by which the person is identified in the document.
142
Draper v Thomason 1954 SC 136.
143
Rhodes v Peterson 1971 SC 56.
144
1995 Act s 7(2)(c).
145
Stirling Stuart v Stirling Crawfurd’s Trustees (1885) 12 R 610, 617 (Lord McLaren).
146
Stirling Stuart v Stirling Crawfurd’s Trustees (1885) 12 R 610; Whyte v Watt (1893) 21 R 165;
McBeath’s Trustees v McBeath 1935 SC 471.
147
Although they can be used for certain documents involved in electronic conveyancing: see 1995
Act s 2A.
148
Scottish Law Commission, Report on Requirements of Writing (n 51) para 6.14.
149
Stirling Stuart v Stirling Crawfurd’s Trustees (1885) 12 R 610. As LP Inglis points out (at 625),
illegible signatures are usually the product of infirmity, and ‘the infirmity of affectation is perhaps, of all
others, most productive of illegible signatures’.
150
1995 Act s 9(7).
151
See III.2(d).
152
Moncrieff v Monypenny (1710) Mor 15936. Among the authorities cited in support of this view was
Ulrich Huber’s De Testamentis (Franequeræ, 1688).
153
Noble v Noble (1875) 3 R 74.
154
Bankton (n 4) I, 11, 38; Crosbie v Picken (1749) Mor 16814.
signature if the testator copies, in her own handwriting, from a style of signature
provided by an assistant, ‘merely to keep her right in her spelling’.155
(c) Place of signature

Unlike some other countries,156 Scotland has persevered with the requirement that
the testator subscribe, that is, sign at the end, as evidence of ‘deliberate and final
testamentary intention’.157 The statutory phrase is that the testator must sign ‘at the
end of the last page’, by which seems to be meant on the same page as and
underneath the final lines of the will.158 Perhaps uncharacteristically, the courts
have approached this requirement with formalistic zeal. Thus, on the one hand,
words will be disregarded if they appear underneath the signature;159 on the other,
the whole will is invalid if the signature is on a different page.160 In the unexpectedly
common case of a person putting an unsigned will into an envelope but signing the
envelope, usually accompanied by words such as ‘my last will’, the courts have
repeatedly refused to uphold the will.161 The position might possibly be different
if the envelope contained words which could plausibly be viewed as a continuation of
the will,162 or if the words on the envelope could be regarded as the will into which
the unsigned deed had somehow been incorporated.163
(d) Signature where testator blind or unable to write

Special provision is made for a testator who is blind or who, whether for temporary
reasons (such as a broken wrist) or due to some permanent disability, is unable to
write. Under the previous law, a signature was appended on behalf of the testator by
a notary public.164 The 1995 Act abandons notaries – today an unimportant
category – in favour of solicitors, advocates, justices of the peace, and sheriff
clerks.165 After reading the will to the testator and receiving due authorization, the
solicitor or other functionary signs with his own name. The signatory must not
benefit from the will, directly or indirectly, and any provision which would confer
such benefit is void.166
155
Watson (n 19) 323. The case is Wilson v Raeburn (1800) Hume 912.
156
eg, Australia: see ch 14 above at 342.
157
McLay v Farrell 1950 SC 149, 152 (Lord Birnam). As has been observed, to sign at the end is no
more than ‘ordinary human practice’: see Ashbel G Gulliver and Catherine J Tilson, ‘Classification of
Gratuitous Transfers’ (1941) 51 Yale LJ 1, 5.
158
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 7(1).
159
McLay v Farrell 1950 SC 149.
160
Baird’s Trustees v Baird 1955 SC 286.
161
See, eg, Stenhouse v Stenhouse 1922 SC 370. The cases are collected and discussed in James
G Currie, The Confirmation of Executors in Scotland (8th edn by Eilidh M Scobbie, 1995) para 3.69.
In Germany the courts have been more indulgent: see ch 8 above at 201–2.
162
Ferguson 1959 SC 56 (concerning an additional page).
163
For incorporation, see III.2(e) below.
164
See II.1(b) above.
165
1995 Act s 9.
166
1995 Act s 9(4). This is a considerable improvement on the previous law, which was that the entire
will fell.
(e) Alterations, incorporation, and enfranchising clauses

Where the text of a will is altered, for example by deleting or adding words, the status
of the alteration depends on when it was carried out. Now embodied in statute, the
rule is just as one would expect: an alteration made before the testator signed is part
of the will and so must be given effect whereas one made later is disregarded.167 The
difficulty, of course, lies in knowing when the alteration was made. In the case of
attested wills, a statement in the will or testing clause that the change was made
before subscription is taken to be true unless the contrary is shown;168 but as changes
are rarely made to attested wills this is of little help in practice. More important is the
rule for subscribed wills, which is that an alteration is not counted unless it can be
proved to have been added before subscription – often an impossible task given that
the person who is most likely to know (that is, the testator) is dead.169
The alterations discussed so far appear above the testator’s signature. But where
words are added beneath the signature, they are disregarded altogether, for reasons
already considered,170 except where separately subscribed so as to make a formal
codicil to the will. Words on a separate sheet of paper are likewise disregarded unless
subscribed or, being already in existence at the time of the will, are referred to in and
so incorporated as part of that will.171 The latter in particular is virtually never
encountered in modern practice.
At one time it was common for wills to contain a clause which authorized
future legacies, however informal in character, the idea being to facilitate that
favourite sport of the elderly – the drawing up of lists of small and usually personal
items of property which indicate, often with many scorings-out, their intended
recipients. Such ‘enfranchising clauses’ were effective if the list in question was
signed and, probably, even if it was not.172 Today, enfranchising clauses are un-
necessary in the first case (for signing is sufficient for formal validity) and, arguably,
ineffective in the second (because the 1995 Act requires subscribed writing for all
wills and codicils).
3. Probativity: the attested will

Although valid from the moment of subscription, a will is not probative unless or
until it is attested by a witness. To put the same point in a different way, the only
function of attestation in the modern law is to achieve probativity.
(a) Formal requirements

An attested will is one which has been subscribed by the testator and signed by a
single witness. The rules as to the testator’s subscription have already been described,
and only one thing need be added. If a will extends to more than a single sheet of
167 168
1995 Act s 5(1). 1995 Act s 5(4), (5).
169 170
1995 Act s 5(6). At III.2(c) above.
171
See, eg, Inglis v Harper (1831) 5 W & S 785; Fraser’s Executors v Fraser’s CB 1931 SC 536.
172
Compare Waterson’s Trustees v St Giles Boys’ Club 1943 SC 369 with Baird v Jaap (1856) 18
D 1246 and Crosbie v Wilson (1865) 3 M 870.
paper, the testator must sign on each sheet as well as signing, in the usual way, at the
end of the last.173 In fact, as clients rather enjoy signing wills, the practice of solicitors
is to have them sign, not only on every sheet, but on every page (ie on both sides of
the sheet). These additional signatures are needed only for attested wills (and indeed
only for wills): if the testator neglects to sign on each sheet, the will is still valid, as a
subscribed will, provided it is signed at the end.
The witness must be at least sixteen and of full mental capacity.174 There is no
requirement of good character.175 A bar on female witnesses was removed in
1868.176 The question of whether a beneficiary can be a witness remained contro-
versial for several centuries and was only finally settled, in the affirmative, by a seven-
judge decision in 1883, in which Roman law was invoked on behalf of the winning
side.177
Either the witness must see the testator sign or the testator must acknowledge the
signature to the witness.178 Acknowledgement can be by gesture, but is almost always
by words.179 The witness then signs – in practice at the end of the deed, although this
is no longer a formal requirement180 – and must do so at once or after only a short
interval of time, to avoid the risk of substitution of documents.181 There is no reason
why the witness should know the nature or content of the document,182 but the
witness must know the testator at least in the limited sense, as the Act puts it, of
having ‘credible information’ as to identity.183 It seems implicit that the witness signs
with the consent of the testator, although this is not spelled out in the statute.
Attestation is not complete until a note of the witness’s name and address has been
added to the will, normally in a special clause (the ‘testing clause’) which comes at the
end.184
(b) Conferral of probativity

Yet the formalities just described scarcely matter. Suppose that they are not complied
with – suppose that the witness is a six-year-old child who has never met the testator
173
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 3(2). The requirement is to sign rather than to
subscribe.
174
1995 Act s 3(4)(c).
175
Hume (n 14) vol VI, 18 had doubted whether ‘an infamous person’ could be a witness.
176
Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 s 139. Hume (n 14) vol VI, 17–18 had thought
women disqualified ‘on account of their ignorance of business’.
177
Simsons v Simsons (1883) 10 R 1247, 1250: ‘By the Roman law the heir or any other interested
party could be a witness, and Cicero stated in his oration Pro Milone that he himself had taken an interest
under a will which he had signed as a witness’. The authorities cited were Gai 2, 108; J Inst II, 10, 10; and
Marcianus D. 34, 5, 14.
178
1995 Act s 3(4)(e), (7).
179
For gestural acknowledgement, see Lindsay v Milne 1995 SLT 487.
180
A purely informal signature is not allowed: see 1995 Act s 7(5).
181
The 1995 Act s 3(4)(e) requires that the witness’s signature is ‘one continuous process’ with the
testator’s signature or acknowledgement. For a case where a delay of 45 minutes was allowed, see Thomson
v Clarkson’s Trustees (1892) 20 R 59.
182
Hume (n 14) vol VI, 17; Ferguson 1959 SC 56, 61 (Lord Mackintosh).
183
1995 Act s 7(5).
184
1995 Act s 3(1)(b). This can be done later: see s 3(3).
far less seen him sign the will, or that the witness’s signature is forged, or even that the
witness is a figment of the testator’s imagination. As long as the testator has
subscribed, the will is perfectly valid. More than that, as long as the will appears to
have been subscribed and attested, the will is also probative and hence self-proving.
No supplementary evidence, written or oral, is needed.185 At first sight, this easy
conferral of probativity may seem surprising. Yet it is perfectly logical. To be of
practical use, probativity must be capable of being determined by visual inspection.
As the Scottish Law Commission put it: ‘It is self-contradictory to say “This
document proves itself if certain extrinsic facts are proved”.’186 Extrinsic facts are
relevant, if at all, not to the establishment of probativity, but to its rebuttal.
If a will is probative, it is presumed to have been subscribed by the testator and
hence – since only subscription is needed for formal validity – to be valid in respect
of formality.187 That presumption can of course be overcome by contrary evidence,
but the onus of proof, it has repeatedly been said, is heavy.188 There are two separate
routes to rebuttal. One is to prove that the testator did not subscribe; the other is to
prove that the witnessing was defective.189 The consequences of success are not the
same in each case: in the first the will is cast down as a forgery, in the second the will
survives, at least for the time being, but ceases to be probative, so that the onus of
proof passes to those who would propose its validity.190
4. Internal formalities
For as long as heritable property was transmitted by de praesenti conveyance and not
by will, the use of words of transfer – normally the word ‘dispone’ – was a
prerequisite of validity.191 But once the law changed, in 1868, to allow wills for
heritage, the need for special words disappeared.192 Neither particular words nor
particular content had ever been required for moveable property, and although it was
normal for wills to appoint an executor, even this was not a condition of validity.193
Already by the time of Bankton the rule for wills was that ‘any words capable to shew
the deceased’s mind are sufficient’,194 and it has since been made clear that such
185
Compare the position under the Uniform Probate Code (USA) } 2–504 which requires additional
affidavits, whether prepared at the time of execution or later.
186
Scottish Law Commission, Report on Requirements of Writing (n 51) para 5.4.
187
1995 Act s 3(1).
188
Cleland v Cleland (1838) 1 D 254; Baird’s Trustees v Murray (1883) 11 R 153; Sutherland v W M
Low & Co Ltd (1901) 8 SLT 395. And see II.3 above.
189
The list of possible defects is set out in s 3(4) of the 1995 Act.
190
1995 Act s 3(4) (‘then for the purposes of those proceedings, there shall be no presumption that the
document has been subscribed by that granter’).
191
See I.2 above.
192
Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 s 20. Admittedly, s 20 makes its own internal
requirement, only allowing wills of heritage if they purport to ‘convey or bequeath lands’ at least in the
sense of using words which would be sufficient to legate moveables. But the requirement is so easily
satisfied – see John McLaren, The Law of Wills and Succession as Administered in Scotland vol 1 (3rd edn,
Edinburgh, 1894) ch 17 – that it is rarely referred to in the modern law.
193
See I.3 above.
194
Bankton (n 4) III, 8, 2. See also McLaren (n 192) vol 1, para 508.
words need not include ‘a verb expressing conveyance or transfer or bequest’.195 The
main concern of case law has been to distinguish completed expressions of testamen-
tary intention from a person’s provisional thoughts and jottings, and in making that
distinction the use of particular words has rarely been important.196
5. Practicalities
(a) Making a will
Most wills are prepared by solicitors.197 What typically happens is that the
testator meets with the lawyer and, prompted by questions and explanations, gives
instructions as to what is wanted; the solicitor then drafts the will and sends it to the
testator with an explanatory letter; the testator signs, if satisfied, or has further
discussions with the lawyer if not. The signing takes place either in the solicitor’s
office or, without professional supervision, at the testator’s home. Attestation is
invariable. The solicitor retains the will or at least a copy of it. The cost is often
quite modest, for solicitors hope that, by making the will, they may ultimately
receive the legal work associated with winding up the estate. Some effort is made
to encourage will-making and so to reduce the incidence of intestacy. For example,
there are periodic ‘Wills Weeks’ or ‘Free Wills Months’ during which participating
solicitors offer to make a will at a discount or in exchange for a legacy to a charity or
even free of charge. And a person consulting a solicitor for some other reason – house
purchase, for example, or divorce – may be treated to a homily on the importance of
providing for one’s family and the value of tax planning.
While solicitors dominate the market, anyone can offer a will-making service.
Readily discoverable on the internet, such services usually undercut the charges made
by solicitors. Under new legislation, will writers are to be regulated by approved
professional bodies which must make provision for training, a code of practice, and
for professional indemnity.198
For those who decide to make a will on their own – and few do – there are
instruction manuals and online programmes.199 Apart from a wish to save money, a
person might use a home-made will as a modest supplement to a professionally
prepared document or in an emergency where there is no time to consult a
professional.
195
Colvin v Hutchison (1885) 12 R 947, 955 (LP Inglis).
196
For a review of the main cases, see Macdonald (n 9) paras 8.36–9.
197
For a solicitors’ perspective on the process, see Barr et al (n 67) ch 9.
198
Legal Services (Scotland) Act 2010 ss 101–18.
199
eg, Scotwills (<http://www.scotwills.co.uk>) offers the opportunity to make one’s own will ‘using
our interactive, expert system, designed by a Solicitor’. The advertisement continues: ‘The fee is fixed at
£45 – there are no hidden extras. Compare that with the cost of a Solicitor-made Will which usually costs
between £90 and £150 and can cost much more!’
(b) Finding a will

Although wills are registered after death, in the court records,200 they are not
registered before. There is no register of wills in Scotland and no immediate prospect
of one being introduced. At least so far, the United Kingdom has not ratified the
Basle Convention on Registration of Wills (1972), although framework legislation
has been in place since 1982.201 Moreover, as registration would not – indeed could
not – be compulsory, not even the introduction of a register would eliminate the risk
that a will is overlooked. In most cases that risk is probably slight, because wills are
typically made and retained by solicitors. Even this, however, is not an infallible
safeguard, for wills are often made many years before death, clients lose touch with
their lawyers, and legal firms come and go. Advertisements inquiring as to the
whereabouts of a deceased’s will are a familiar feature of the legal press.
(c) Confirmation of executors

Following death, the testator’s estate is administered by an executor who must give
effect to the terms of the will. Typically, the executor is nominated in the will, but,
even so, the appointment must be confirmed by the court. Such confirmation is the
executor’s title to administer the estate and the rough equivalent of probate in
England.202 As part of the application for confirmation, the executor must prepare
a full inventory of the deceased’s property. In addition, where the will is unwitnessed
and improbative, its authenticity must be specially demonstrated.203 The procedure,
however, is undemanding: all that is needed is a sworn affidavit from a single person
to the effect that the person is ‘well acquainted with the signature’ of the deceased,
has ‘seen and examined the signature on the will’, and confirms that it is the
deceased’s signature.204 If the signature is an informal one (such as ‘Mum’), the
witness must also confirm that it was the deceased’s normal way of signing a writing
of the type in question (such as a letter).205 As it is highly unusual for affidavits to be
questioned by the court or for further inquiry to be made, an improbative will is
scarcely more troublesome in practice than one which has been fastidiously
witnessed.
200
This is part of the confirmation process discussed in the next section.
201
Administration of Justice Act 1982 ss 23–6 (not in force). For a brief discussion, see Michael
Brandon, ‘UK Accession to the Convention on the Establishment of a Scheme of Registration of Wills and
of the Convention providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will’ (1983) 32 ICLQ 742.
202
See generally: Currie (n 161); Macdonald (n 9) paras 13.29 ff.
203
Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 s 21A.
204
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 4(1), (3); Act of Sederunt (Requirements of
Writing) 1996, SI 1996/1534, para 4 sch form 1.
205
1995 Act s 7(2)(c). See further Currie (n 161) para 4.103. For informal signatures, see III.2(b)
above.
IV. Form and formalism
What formalities, then, should be required for wills? In Scotland, as in most other
countries, two at least have usually been regarded as indispensable. In the first place,
the will should be written (although not necessarily by the testator).206 And in the
second place it should be signed by the testator or, if he is unable to write, by some
responsible person acting on the testator’s behalf. The justifications are well known
and hardly controversial. Writing explains what is to happen to the testator’s
property when he is no longer there to give directions for himself.207 And a signature
serves both to connect the testator to the writing – to adopt its contents as his final
wishes – and also to demonstrate the authenticity of the juridical act. Although these
justifications can be characterized in different ways,208 their primary purpose is
evidential: the deceased’s estate can safely be distributed according to the written
instructions precisely because there is a reasonable assurance that that is what the
deceased intended.209
The difficult question is whether more is needed than writing and subscription.
Until recently, that was certainly the view taken in Scotland. In particular, attes-
tation, first introduced in 1681, was seen as promoting ‘the greater security of men’s
rights against falsehood’ as well as discouraging ‘unfair attempts on the weak or
ignorant’.210 Today there is a tendency to dismiss this sort of approach as a ‘historical
anachronism’.211 Whatever the position may once have been, we are told, ‘the
makers of wills are not a feeble or oppressed group of people needing unusual
protection as a class; on the contrary, as the owners of property, earned or unearned,
they are likely to be among the more capable and dominant members of our
society’.212 But even if this is true, it is hardly the whole story. Today, as in the
seventeenth century, wills continue to be made by the old, the sick, and the
enfeebled, who are or may be vulnerable to the pressure, or even the fraud, of
relatives, friends, and carers. Increasing longevity seems likely to add to the prob-
lem.213 And while it may be the case, as has been argued, that most wills are executed
206
With the trivial exception, now abolished, of wills of up to £100 Scots. It can, of course, be argued
that an insistence on writing is increasingly old-fashioned in view of the prevalence and reliability of other
media. See James Lindgren, ‘The Fall of Formalism’ (1991–2) Albany LR 1009, 1020–4, advocating
video-wills in particular.
207
Furthermore, the insistence on writing prevents testators from being ‘catched by rash expressions’
which they may later regret: see Erskine (n 5) III, 2, 2. In the influential terminology used by Gulliver and
Tilson (1941) 51 Yale LJ 6–9, this is known as the ‘ritual’ (or sometimes ‘cautionary’) function of
testamentary formalities.
208
For a discussion, see ch 18 below at 468 ff.
209
In the terminology used by Gulliver and Tilson (1941) 51 Yale LJ 6–9, this is known as the
‘evidentiary’ function.
210
Bankton (n 4) I, 11, 27; Hume (n 14) vol VI, 25. In the terminology of Gulliver and Tilson (1941)
51 Yale LJ 5–13, this is known as the ‘protective’ function of testamentary formalities.
211
John H Langbein, ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88 Harvard LR 489, 496.
212
Gulliver and Tilson (1941) 51 Yale LJ 9.
213
See, eg, J C Sonnekus, ‘Freedom of Testation and the Ageing Testator’, in Reid, De Waal, and
Zimmermann (n 1) 78.
by people in the prime of their lives and with appropriate legal and financial
advice,214 the fact remains that no will is final until death and that an earlier and
considered will can be displaced by a last-minute change of mind. Yet if the problem
of fraud and undue influence remains, it seems doubtful that attestation provides
much in the way of a solution.215 In Scotland, at least, the role of a witness is a
modest one. He need not see the actual signing or the circumstances leading up to it;
he need not know that the document is a will; and he can be a beneficiary – perhaps
indeed the very person who is most likely to put pressure on the testator.216 Only a
more demanding signing regime, such as signature before a notary, would be likely to
make much difference. But given Scotland’s long history of informality, it seems
doubtful if even an optional notarial procedure would command support.217
But where formalities do little to protect against fraud, then they should at least
facilitate the making of wills.218 What is to be avoided, wrote Robert Bell in 1795, is
‘a superfluity of form, which renders the execution of it dangerous, uneasy, and often
almost impossible’.219 Testamentary intention should not be defeated by innocuous
error. Formalities, in short, should avoid the trap of formalism. In recent years a
standard approach to this problem has been the introduction of some kind of
dispensing power allowing technical blemishes to be overlooked where the court is
satisfied that the document was truly intended as a will. Beginning with Israel in
1965,220 dispensing powers have since been introduced in many parts of the English-
speaking world, including the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and
South Africa.221 The possibility has also been canvassed in both Scotland and
England.222 But there is also another way. Instead of excusing a failure in attestation
or in the preparation of a holograph will, the requirement that a will be attested or
214
Gulliver and Tilson (1941) 51 Yale LJ 10.
215
See Scottish Law Commission, Report on Requirements of Writing (n 51) para 4.13: ‘Someone who
needs protection against foolishly signing also needs protection against foolishly signing in front of
witnesses.’
216
For a discussion of the issues in the context of English law, see: Roger Kerridge, ‘Wills Made in
Suspicious Circumstances: the Problem of the Vulnerable Testator’ (2000) 59 CLJ 310; Roger Kerridge,
‘Draftsmen and Suspicious Wills’, in Martin Dixon (ed), Modern Studies in Property Law vol 5 (2009) 159.
217
The Scottish Law Commission referred to notarial execution as an ‘extreme requirement’ where
‘the cost and inconvenience would be disproportionate to the advantages gained’: see Report on Require-
ments of Writing (n 51) para 4.13. For arguments in favour of an optional notarial system, see Lloyd
Bonfield, ‘Reforming the Requirements for Due Execution of Wills: Some Guidance from the Past’
(1995–6) 70 Tulane LR 1893, 1918–20. In the United States an optional notarial system was introduced
to the Uniform Probate Code by amendment in 2008: see } 2–503(a)(3)(B).
218
This is the ‘facilitative’ virtue described in ch 18 below at 468–9.
219
Bell (n 70) 27.
220
For a discussion, see Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, ‘Form and Formalism: A Case Study’ (1983) 31
AJCL 627.
221
For a summary, see ch 18 below at 465–8. The most influential voice has been John Langbein’s: see
Langbein (1975) 88 Harvard LR 489 and also John H Langbein, ‘Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution
of Wills: a Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law’ (1987) 87 Columbia LR 1.
222
Scottish Law Commission, Report on Succession (Scot Law Com No 124, 1990) paras 4.1–4.20;
Law Reform Committee, Twenty-second Report: The Making and Revocation of Wills (Cmnd 7902, 1980)
paras 2.4–2.6.
holograph could itself be dropped. A discretion, in other words, could be replaced by

a fixed rule. Perhaps characteristically, this is the solution which has been adopted in
Scotland.223 Since 1995 a will has been valid in respect of formalities provided it is in
writing and subscribed.224 The solution to formalism is, more or less, the abandon-
ment of form.
223
For enthusiastic advocacy of this approach, see James Lindgren, ‘Abolishing the Attestation
Requirement for Wills’ (1989–90) 68 North Carolina LR 541; Lindgren (1991–2) 55 Albany LR
1024–30. Lindgren was presumably unaware that this had already been recommended by the Scottish
Law Commission in 1988: see Report on Requirements of Writing (n 51) pt IV.
224
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 2(1), discussed at III.1 and III.2 above. A dispens-
ing power would still be needed if the law was prepared to countenance a will which had not been signed.
At one time that was the position favoured by the Scottish Law Commission (see Report on Succession (n
222), paras 4.15–4.16) but the Commission’s current view is opposed to the use of a dispensing power for
unsigned wills: see Report on Succession (n 10) paras 6.37–6.40.
18
Testamentary Formalities in Historical
and Comparative Perspective
Kenneth G C Reid, Marius J de Waal, and Reinhard Zimmermann
I. Wills and will-making 433

1. Wills 433
2. Will-making 435
3. Presumptions and proof 436
II. Holograph wills 437
1. An early start 437
2. Re-appearance 438
3. Reception 439
4. ‘Contemporary’ Roman law 440
5. England and the influence of Canon law 441
6. The modern law 441
7. The future 443
III. Witnessed wills 444
1. Oral wills and written wills 444
2. History 444
3. The modern law 446
1. History 448
2. Open notarial wills 449
3. Closed notarial wills 450
4. International wills 451
4. Codicils 454
VI. Shared features 455
1. Testator’s signature 455
2. Witnesses 457
3. Date 459
4. Unitas actus 459
5. Incorporation of informal documents 460
6. Wills by disabled persons 461
Testamentary Formalities in Historical and Comparative Perspective 433
VII. The flight from formalities 462

1. Introduction 462
2. Judicial interpretation 463
3. Legislative intervention 464
4. Dispensing powers 465
5. Other approaches 466
6. Evaluation 467
VIII. Some conclusions 468
1. Seven virtues 468
2. Causes of similarity and diversity 470
I. Wills and will-making
1. Wills
‘Unless provided otherwise, no form needs to be observed in legal dealings.’1 No
Western lawyer will doubt this rule, enunciated in the so-called Acquis Principles:2
formal requirements are today of an exceptional character.3 Yet there is at least one
legal act for which Western systems4 do establish form requirements, and that is the
testament or (last) will. The reason is not difficult to see. A will only takes effect, and
usually only becomes known, once the testator has died, when he can no longer be
questioned as to his intentions. The best evidence of content and authenticity having
thus ceased to be available, legal systems resort to three types of form device in order
to provide certainty about the deceased’s will: writing, reliance on witnesses, and the
involvement of a neutral institution or officer, such as a court of law or a notary.
These devices partly overlap; also they exist in a nearly infinite variety of shapes.
In the modern law, that near infinity of possibilities has resolved into a pattern
which is reassuringly simple. In fact in the jurisdictions covered by this book only
three types of will are commonly encountered. There is in the first place the
holograph will, a document handwritten by the testator and signed by him.5 Next
there is a will which need not be, and usually is not, in the testator’s hand, but which
is signed by him before (typically two) witnesses.6 Finally, to these ‘private’ wills – to
1
Research Group on the Existing EC Private Law (Acquis Group) (ed), Principles of the Existing EC
Contract Law (Acquis Principles): Contract II (2009) Art 1:304 (75 ff).
2
There is a certain irony in the fact that it is not at all clear where this principle is supposed to find a
basis in the acquis communautaire, particularly of consumer contract law, where there is a profusion of
formal requirements: see Nils Jansen and Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Restating the Acquis Communautaire?
A Critical Examination of the “Principles of the Existing EC Contract Law”’ (2008) 71 MLR 517 f.
3
For general background, see Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of
the Civilian Tradition (paperback edn, 1996) 82 ff.
4
Classical Islamic law, on the other hand, has traditionally recognized the principle of informality for
wills. This tradition still characterizes the law of succession in a number of countries in the Islamic world.
For details, see ch 12 at 296.
5 6
See II below. See III below.
434 Kenneth G C Reid, Marius J de Waal, and Reinhard Zimmermann
the holograph will and the witnessed will – can be added a will which is ‘public’ in
the sense of being authenticated by a public body or official. This is the notarial will,
a will which in its normal or ‘open’ form is declared by the testator to a notary public
by word of mouth, reduced to writing, and then signed by the testator, notary, and,
usually, by witnesses.7
As well as these three ‘ordinary’ wills, most countries recognize one or more special
or ‘extraordinary’ wills, such as wills by soldiers or wills made in an emergency.8
Other types of will can also sometimes be found. In accordance with the Islamic
principle of informality, the oral will, before witnesses, has survived in Pakistan and
elsewhere in the Islamic world.9 A different kind of informality is favoured in
Scotland with a will whose only requirement is that it be signed at the end.10 And,
at the other end of the range, public wills can sometimes be made before a judge
(Austria and Hungary)11 or a public official (Poland)12 and not just before a notary,
while, in those countries where it is recognized (France, Belgium, and Italy in our
survey), the international will serves, more or less, as an additional public will.13 But
these will-types are unusual even in the jurisdictions in which they are permitted, and
they are given a correspondingly brief treatment in this chapter.
Naturally, different will-types are available in the different jurisdictions surveyed
in this book. The Netherlands aside, all countries recognize at least one of the forms
of private will. Austria, Hungary, and around half the states in the United States of
America recognize both (ie holograph wills and witnessed wills). To the private
will civil law systems then add the notarial will, but no common law or mixed
system does so. Of the private wills, the holograph will is found in France and in
the countries influenced by France, including Argentina, Austria, Belgium, the
Dominican Republic, Germany, Haiti, Hungary, Iran, Italy, Morocco, Paraguay,
Poland, Spain, and parts of the United States. Apart from Austria and Hungary, the
witnessed will is the exclusive preserve of the common law and mixed systems.
Civil law systems (other than the Netherlands) thus offer a choice between notarial
wills and private wills (usually the holograph will). In the common law and mixed
systems – in England, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and many states
in the United States – testators must make do with the witnessed will alone. The
witnessed will is also the standard will in Scotland, but, as already mentioned, a mere
signature by the testator is sufficient to authenticate the document if no witness
happens to sign.14
The advantages and disadvantages of these will-types are well trailed elsewhere in
this book.15 Private wills are convenient, but prone to error or even fraud. Notarial
7
See IV below. There is also a ‘closed’ form of notarial will which is little used in practice: see IV.3
below.
8 9 10
See V below. See n 4 above. Ch 17 at 421 ff.
11 12
Ch 9 at 226; ch 10 at 265. Ch 11 at 278.
13 14
See IV.4 below. Ch 17 at 420.
15
In addition to the discussion in individual chapters, see VIII.1 below for an overall evaluation.
wills are safe, but cumbersome, as well as being the subject of a certain amount of,
often unwelcome, publicity. Hardly less important than this division by type,
however, is a division by practice – a division between those wills which are home-
made and those which are made with legal advice. The former are cheap but
potentially unsafe, the latter more expensive but made with due regard to the
expression of the testator’s intentions and to the requirements of form of the will-
type selected. In practice, wills are often made by a lawyer or at least with professional
advice. That must always be true of open notarial wills, of course, but in the common
law world it is generally the case with witnessed wills as well.16 And where such a will
is drafted by a lawyer, signed and witnessed in his presence, and retained in his office
for safe keeping, the result may be no less secure than a notarial will. It may also, of
course, be no less expensive. Finally, holograph wills are usually home-made and
without legal advice.
Notarial fees for a will range from around €500 in Italy to a bargain-basement €40
in Spain and even less in Poland.17 Austria, with fees of between €150 and €250, lies
somewhere in the middle.18 In Brazil, where each federal state sets rates of its own,
a notarial will costs €20 in the Federal District of Brasilia and €400 in the State of São
Paulo.19 Figures are not readily available for the common law world, where fees are
a matter for the market rather than state regulation, but for a straightforward will a
typical fee might be in the region of €100 to €200. Wills, indeed, are often seen as
loss-leaders, for by making and then retaining the will a lawyer hopes to gain the
lucrative business of winding up the client’s estate on death.20
2. Will-making
Most people die without a will. Although reliable figures are difficult to come by, it
appears that in civil law countries testacy rates are typically 30 per cent or lower.21 In
France and Belgium they are around 15 per cent and in Brazil a mere 6 to 8 per
cent.22 Only in Spain do testacy rates match those of common law countries which
often approach or exceed 50 per cent.23 One reason for the enthusiasm for wills in
Spain is doubtless the relatively low cost of making them. But cost by itself is unlikely
to explain low rates of testation. Fear of mortality is an obvious cause of reluctance to
make a will. So, more positively, is satisfaction with the rules of intestate succession,
which may apply in a perfectly acceptable way at least to those with the ‘standard’
family for which such rules are usually devised. Walter Pintens cites a Belgian study
from 1991 which found that those with children were far less likely to make a will
16
Ch 13 at 318 f; ch 17 at 427.
17
Ch 4 at 80; ch 6 at 125; ch 11 at 277.
18 19
Ch 9 at 227. Ch 5 at 104.
20
Ch 13 at 320.
21
For figures see ch 4 at 72.
22
Ch 3 at 57; ch 5 at 100.
23
Ch 13 at 316–17 (discussing the difficulty with the figures); ch 14 at 332; ch 15 at 359–60.
than those who were childless.24 Perhaps the most important factor of all is the size
of the estate. The poor have little incentive to make a will, which may help to explain
the extremely low rates in countries such as Brazil.25 But even those who are better
off may have relatively little to dispose of by will due, for example, to forced heirship,
or matrimonial property regimes, or to the tendency, in common law countries,
for the matrimonial home and bank account – often the only significant assets – to be
held as joint property which will pass automatically to the survivor.26 Intergener-
ational transfer during lifetime has also become more common, partly because of
increased longevity and partly for tax reasons; if need be, its effect can be postponed
to death, in imitation of a will, by the use of devices such as policies of life insurance,
donations with a reserved usufruct, and, in common law and mixed jurisdictions,
the trust.27
The decision to make a will is followed, in those countries where a choice is
available, by a further decision as to which will-type to use. Where the choice
is between a holograph will and a notarial will, as is usually the case in civil law
countries, it is the former which is most often selected. Only in Spain is the notarial
will the decisive favourite;28 elsewhere it either holds its own, as in France and
Germany,29 or is a poor second to the holograph will, as in Italy and Austria.30 This
has implications for access to legal advice. Whereas testators in common law
jurisdictions will usually consult a lawyer before making the only will which,
typically, is available to them (the witnessed will), their civil law counterparts will
often choose to make a holograph will and may do so without any legal advice at
all.31 Not only, therefore, are wills more numerous in common law jurisdictions, but
it may also be that they are more reliable and free from error.32
3. Presumptions and proof

A reason for preferring one type of will over another may be its probative status on
death. The issue is starkly presented by Jan Peter Schmidt in the context of the
witnessed will in Brazil.33 When the testator dies, all of the witnesses – and there are
three – must separately testify to their signatures before a judge. The difficulty is
more than one of time and cost, for if a witness refuses to testify, the will falls and
cannot usually be brought into effect. The position is the same if witnesses have died
24 25 26
Ch 3 at 57. Ch 5 at 101. Ch 13 at 306.
27
Ch 6 at 122–4. In New Zealand, however, the testation rate is over 50% despite there being a higher
use of trusts than in Australia or England.
28
Ch 4 at 80.
29
Ch 3 at 57; ch 8 at 204.
30
Ch 6 at 125; ch 9 at 225.
31
As in common law jurisdictions, however, the witnessed will in Austria may quite often be made
with legal advice: see ch 9 at 225.
32
On the other hand, when a witnessed will is made without legal advice, its complexity makes errors
more likely than in the case of the holograph will. See III.3 below.
33
Ch 5 at 107–8.
or disappeared, as is not uncommon, unless at least one survives and is able to testify.
This unpalatable result is avoided, in common law and mixed systems, by means of
an evidential presumption. A will is taken to be valid in respect of testamentary
formalities if it appears to have been properly witnessed, and it is for a person seeking
to challenge the will to establish the contrary.34 Challenges, in practice, are rare and
successful challenges rarer still. This presumption is taken even further in civil law
systems in respect of the notarial will.35 Not only is the notary presumed to have duly
officiated and signed, but, in the absence of evidence of forgery, the legal facts and
acts which the notary vouches for – the testator’s declaration and signature, the date
and place of signing, and so on – are conclusively deemed to be correct.36 Holograph
wills, however, are in a different position and their authenticity may require to be
demonstrated.
II. Holograph wills
1. An early start
Classical Roman law did not recognize holograph wills. By the time of Justinian,
however, an exception had established itself in the form of the testamentum parentum
inter liberos.37 An imperial constitution by Valentinian III introduced the holograph
will (testamentum holographa manu conditum) as an ordinary form of will,38 but
it was applicable only for the Western part of the Empire and just for the few
decades from its enactment (AD 446) until the demise of the Western Roman Empire
(AD 476). It was adopted by a number of the laws enacted by the Germanic
peoples settling in the formerly Roman territory (leges barbarorum): the lex Romana
Visigothorum (Breviarium Alarici), the lex Romana Burgundionum, and the lex
Visigothorum (the former two being applicable to the Roman population living
under Visigoth or Burgundian rule, the latter also to the Visigoths themselves).39
More importantly, however, Valentinian’s constitution did not become part of the
Corpus Juris Civilis.
34
Ch 13 at 315; ch 16 at 395; ch 17 at 425–6.
35
In the United States, } 2–504 of the Uniform Probate Code allows a will to be made ‘self-proving’ by
the addition of a notarial affidavit. See ch 15 at 370.
36
Ch 3 at 64; ch 7 at 161–2. This does not extend to matters beyond the notary’s expertise, such as a
statement giving his perceptions as to the testator’s mental capacity.
37
For details, see ch 1 at 22; Max Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, Zweiter Abschnitt (2nd edn, 1975)
483. Even in classical law, however, military wills could be made without prescribed formality; thus, while
an oral military will was valid, the same applied to a holograph military will. See ch 1 at 14–15; Max Kaser,
Das römische Privatrecht, Erster Abschnitt (2nd edn, 1971) 680 ff.
38
Novellae Valentiniani 21, 2; see ch 1 at 19; Kaser II (n 37) 481; Monika Beutgen, Die Geschichte der
Form des eigenhändigen Testaments (1992) 11 ff; Gunter Wesener, ‘Ephemere Besonderheiten des
spätrömischen Erbrechts: Zur Frage des Fortlebens rechtlicher Institute’, in Festschrift für Rolf Knütel
(2009) 1414 f.
39
Beutgen (n 38) 17 ff; Wesener (n 38) 1415 f.
2. Re-appearance
The holograph will then re-appeared in the coutumes of northern France from the
sixteenth century.40 Thus, for example, in the Coutume de Paris of 1510 we read
‘ . . . il est requis qu[e le testament] soit escrit et signé de la main et seign manuel du
testateur’.41 Whether there is a link between the holograph will in the leges barbar-
orum applicable in southern France and Burgundy, and its development in the
customary laws of northern France, has been a matter of scholarly dispute;42
the prevailing opinion today is that convincing evidence for such a link is lacking.43
The holograph will was perpetuated in the royal Ordonnances of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries and eventually became part of the Code civil (1804).44 This
applied not only in France (and Belgium and Luxemburg), but also in some western
parts of the German Empire,45 while the Badisches Landrecht was based on a
translation of the Code civil. These territories thus constituted a bridgehead for the
holograph will to be brought to Germany;46 indeed its incorporation into the
German Civil Code (BGB) of 1900, against protracted opposition and at the last
conceivable moment, has been referred to as the one really significant contribution of
Baden to the substance of the BGB.47 Yet, judicial experience with the holograph
will in Germany was at first anything but encouraging.48 Some of the requirements
turned out to be ill-conceived and gave rise to an endless series of legal disputes. The
problem was resolved, eventually, by legislative reform: the Testamentsgesetz (Wills
Act) of 1938 laid the foundations of the holograph will as an indispensable part of
modern German law.49
Northern France was not the only region in Europe where the holograph will
came to establish itself in medieval and early modern law. For Austria, a similar
custom ‘from ancient times’ is reflected in the Vienna Stadtordnung (City Statute) of
40
Beutgen (n 38) 39 ff; Helmut Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht vol I (1985) 572; Olivier Descamps,
‘Les formes testamentaires de l’époque médiévale jusqu’à la période présente en France’, in Mathias
Schmoeckel and Gerhard Otte (eds), Europäische Testamentsformen (2011) 47 ff, 52 ff.
41
See Beutgen (n 38) 39.
42
For a discussion, see Peter Breitschmid, Formvorschriften im Testamentsrecht (1982) 12 ff; Beutgen
(n 38) 26 ff.
43
R H Helmholz, ‘The Origin of the Holographic Wills in English Law’ (1994) 15 Journal of Legal
History 98; Wesener (n 38) 1417, 1418.
44
Descamps (n 40) 60 ff; Beutgen (n 38) 39 ff.
45
Hans-Jürgen Becker, ‘Rheinisches Recht’, in Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte vol IV
(1990) cols 1022 ff.
46
Eike Götz Hosemann, ‘Von den Bedenken gegen das Testieren “im stillen Kämmerlein”: Die
Geschichte des eigenhändigen Testaments in Deutschland, dargestellt aus Anlass des 200. Geburtstags
des Badischen Landrechts’ [2010] Rheinische Notar-Zeitschrift 520 ff.
47
Karlheinz Muscheler, Die Rolle Badens in der Entstehungsgeschichte des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs
(1993) 75. On the introduction of the holograph will into the BGB, see also Gerhard Otte, ‘Das
eigenhändige Testament als ordentliche Errichtungsform nach dem BGB – Gründe und Einwände’, in
Schmoeckel and Otte (n 40) 31 ff.
48
The story is told in ch 8 at 187 ff.
49
Cf also Otte (n 47) 38 ff.
1526 and in a number of other contemporary sources.50 It is hardly surprising, in

view of this long-established tradition, that the holograph will made its way into the
Civil Code of 1811 (ABGB), in spite of the reservations of one of its principal
draftsmen, Franz von Zeiller.51 As in Germany, the holograph will is today the most
popular type of will.52 The same is true of Switzerland, where the holograph will was
recognized in Article 505 of the Civil Code of 1907 even though relatively few of the
nineteenth-century cantonal laws had received the liberal solutions adopted in } 578
ABGB or Article 970 of the Code civil.53 Hungarian law is interesting in that it used
to recognize the holograph will – even before the introduction of the ABGB – but
then (in 1876) abolished it; it was only re-introduced in 1960.54 Usually, once the
holograph will has established itself, it is there to stay,55 or to pave the way towards
an even more liberal regime as was the case in Scotland.56 Holograph wills were
recognized in Scotland by the beginning of the seventeenth century, at the latest.57 In
1995 they were replaced by the subscribed will, the only requirement being that the
will should be in writing and that it should be signed by the testator.
3. Reception
The French holograph will was received in Italy (Article 775 of the Codice civile of
1865)58 and Spain (Article 688 of the Código civil of 1889, via a draft Civil Code
from 1851),59 in Louisiana and Virginia and, from there, in ‘slightly over half of the
states [comprising the United States], primarily in the South and the West’,60 partly
also in the Islamic world,61 but not in the Netherlands (other than for a brief initial
period)62 or Portugal. Concerning Spain, Sergio Cámara Lapuente refers to a ‘legal
50
See ch 9 at 231; Beutgen (n 38) 53 ff; Gunter Wesener, Geschichte des Erbrechts in Österreich seit der
Rezeption (1957) 129 ff; Wesener (n 38) 1417 ff.
51
Beutgen (n 38) 58 ff.
52
Ch 9 at 225; for Germany, see ch 8 at 176.
53
Eugen Huber, System und Geschichte des Schweizerischen Privatrechts vol II (Basel, 1888) 189 ff;
Breitschmid (n 42) 29.
54
Ch 10 at 261. Strictly, the holograph will survived between 1876 and 1960, but only on the basis of
having two witnesses.
55
Apart from Hungary, other exceptions are the Netherlands and, possibly, England: see, respectively,
II.3 and II.5 below.
56
Ch 17 at 415 ff, 419.
57
It is unknown whether that happened by usage, or perhaps as a result of the practice of the
ecclesiastical courts (in Scotland referred to as commissary courts) which had, at least in England,
recognized the holograph will from the late sixteenth century onwards.
58
Ch 6 at 126; Ugo Bruschi, ‘Old Questions, Old Answers?, Testamentsformen in Italy from the
Beginning of the Ars Notaria to the 1942 Civil Code’, in Schmoeckel and Otte (n 40) 177 ff.
59
Ch 4 at 77; Javier de los Mozos, ‘Testamentsformen in der spanischen Rechtsgeschichte’, in
Schmoeckel and Otte (n 40) 143 ff.
60
Ch 15 at 370.
61
Ch 12 at 300.
62
Ch 7 at 154. This was not the only important deviation from the model of the Code civil; cf
Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Erbunwürdigkeit’, in Festschrift für Helmut Koziol (2009) 488, and, generally,
Karl H Neumeyer, ‘Einheit in der Vielfalt – Bewegung und Bewahrung im Erbrecht der Nationen’, in
Konflikt und Ordnung: Festschrift für Murad Ferid (1978) 661. In the law of succession the daughter
systems of the Code civil have generally deviated more from their common model than in other areas.
transplant’ in view of the fact that the Leyes de Toro (1505) had previously abolished
even the holograph testamentum parentum inter liberos recognized in the Siete
Partidas (1256–65).63 Portuguese law, ‘carried away by Romanism’, had turned its
face against the holograph will from early on,64 and the tradition of the Visigoth
laws did not, in that respect, live on in the Iberian peninsula. This probably also
explains the reluctance among South American legislatures to accept the holograph
will. A prominent exception was Argentina (1869, relying on the experience of
French law); subsequently the holograph will was also recognized in the codes of
Paraguay (1876, 1985), Panama (1916), Mexico (1928), and Peru (1936, 1984).65
4. ‘Contemporary’ Roman law

The holograph will was thus introduced both by local custom and by statute. Wherever
it came to be accepted, it was accepted in deviation from the rules of Roman law as
prevailing during the various periods of the ius commune.66 And in the territories still
governed by the ius commune, the Roman testamentum tripertitum67 remained the only
ordinary ‘private’ will down to the end of the nineteenth century;68 in San Marino,
one of the last retreats of the unadulterated ius commune in the modern world, this was
the position until 1985.69 A number of exceptions, however, were recognized which
enabled testators to make dispositions mortis causa by means of an informal document,
written and signed by their own hand, the most important in practice being the will in
favour of descendants (the Roman testamentum parentum inter liberos, as applied and
partly extended under the ius commune),70 and the insertion of a provision into a will
reserving to the testator the right to make dispositions mortis causa in a private, written
document.71 Even though the latter device, in particular, was hardly in line with
the spirit of Roman law, it was widely welcomed as a means of overcoming the
bothersome formal requirements established in the Roman sources.72 Wills containing
only dispositions ad pias causas did not, at least according to the predominant view,
require any form at all, that is, they could also be made in holograph form.73
63 64 65
Ch 4 at 76. Ch 5 at 108. Ch 5 at 110.
66
On the ius commune, ie the European ‘common law’ based on the sources of Roman law and Canon
law, see, eg, Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe (trans Tony Weir, 1995).
67
For which see III.2 below.
68
For Germany, see Bernhard Windscheid and Theodor Kipp, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (3rd edn,
1906) } 541.
69
Michaela Reinkenhof, Die Anwendung von ius commune in der Republik San Marino (1997) 161 f.
70
See II.1 above. Also Gottfried von Schmitt, Entwurf des Rechtes der Erbfolge für das Deutsche Reich
(1879), reprinted in Werner Schubert (ed), Die Vorlagen der Redaktoren für die erste Kommission zur
Ausarbeitung des Entwurfs eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs, Erbrecht I (1984) 577 f; Windscheid and Kipp
(n 68) } 544, 4; R W Lee, An Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (5th edn, 1953) 359 f; Coing I (n 40) 570;
Wesener (n 50) 145; ch 2 at 42; ch 8 at 181.
71
von Schmitt (n 70) 564 f; Windscheid and Kipp (n 68) } 628 in fine; Lee (n 70) 361 f; Coing I (n 40)
570; ch 2 at 44; ch 8 at 181.
72
Ch 2 at 45.
73
von Schmitt (n 70) 557; Windscheid and Kipp (n 68) } 544, 5; Wesener (n 50) 146; Coing I (n 40)
595; Udo Wolter, Ius canonicum in iure civili (1975) 17; ch 2 at 41. This privilege was based on Canon
law, but appears to have been generally recognized.
5. England and the influence of Canon law

Canon law was particularly well disposed towards the making of wills, which it saw as
spiritual instruments.74 Thus, it relaxed the form requirements (as well as certain
other rules) of Roman law.75 One result was an apparently general recognition of
holograph wills before the ecclesiastical courts76 in England from the late sixteenth
century onwards77 – a remarkable instance of an inventive use by courts and legal
writers of the arsenal of arguments available under the ius commune in a country
whose law is usually seen to have flourished in isolation from the civilian tradition.
English law can, in this case, not only be regarded as a province of the ius commune,
but as a pioneer.78 If, however, England received the holograph will, the experiment
was relatively short-lived and did not survive the re-casting of the law of testamentary
formalities by the Wills Act of 1837.
6. The modern law

In the modern law a holograph will may be defined as one which is written out and
signed by the testator. Some jurisdictions require the testator to add the date;79 none
now insists on the place of signing, Germany having abandoned that requirement in
1938.80 With the exception of some states of the United States of America, mainly
in the south and west, holograph wills are confined to the civil law world.81 To an
extent not found in other will-types, the rules are everywhere much the same, partly
because French law was often a common source, as just seen, but mainly because
holograph wills are, by their nature, rather simple.
Obviously, only a person who is able to write can make a holograph will. It also
seems necessary, or at least strongly desirable, that the testator can read, although
Italy at least allows wills by those who are blind.82 In recognition of the perils of a
74
See, eg, Harold J Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983)
232 ff; Coing I (n 40) 593 ff; Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law, Contemporary Law, European Law:
The Civilian Tradition Today (2001) 161; Jan Hallebeek, ‘Dispositions ad pias causas in Gratian’s
Decretum: Should the portio Christi be restricted to the child’s share?’, in Reinhard Zimmermann (ed),
Der Einfluss religiöser Vorstellungen auf der Entwicklung des Erbrechts (2011, forthcoming).
75
Coing I (n 40) 571; Wolter (n 73) 17; Reinkenhof (n 69) 162 ff.
76
Which had assumed primary jurisdiction over wills: see R H Helmholz, The Oxford History of the
Laws of England vol I (2004) 387 ff; generally, see Coing I (n 40) 565.
77
Helmholz (n 76) 440 f. The entire story is told by R H Helmholz in his article in (1994) 15 Journal
of Legal History 97 ff; cf also Lloyd Bonfield, ‘Dying, Devising and Dispute in Early Modern England’, in
Richard H Helmholz and Vito Piergiovanni (eds), Relations between the Ius Commune and English Law
(2009) 38 f; Birke Häcker, ‘Testamentsformen in England – unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer
historischen Entwicklung’, in Schmoeckel and Otte (n 40) 114.
78
See, however, ch 13 at 325 where Roger Kerridge views the acceptance of holograph wills as
exemplifying the absence of any strict or consistent rules as to form in the period in question.
79
For further discussion, see VI.3 below.
80
Ch 8 at 195.
81
They were also recognized in Scotland from the early seventeenth century until 1996 when they were
replaced by something even simpler: a will (whether holograph or not) which is subscribed by the testator.
See ch 17 at 419 ff.
82
Ch 6 at 128. Compare } 2247 BGB, which disqualifies those who cannot read.
home-made product, a number of jurisdictions restrict holograph wills to those who

have reached the age of majority.83 The writing must be the testator’s own, and while
it is permissible to support a person’s hand, this cannot usually extend to guiding
the formation of letters.84 There is no objection to copying from a draft, even one
prepared by someone else, provided that the testator can read and understands what
he is doing.85 In at least two jurisdictions, carbon copies have been accepted.86
Although a number of codal provisions refer to writing ‘by hand’ (de la main,
eigenhändig),87 it seems to be accepted that a person who is disabled may also
write by mouth or foot.88 Except in Italy,89 the writing must be legible, although
the boundary between that which can be read and that which cannot is plainly
contestable. In practice, of course, a testator may often use his ‘best’ writing, and it is
no objection that this is not his ‘usual’ writing. But since the point of a holograph
will is to provide evidence of authenticity, the writing must be distinctive in some
degree, and jurisdictions are divided as to whether block capitals pass that test.90 The
Spanish Civil Code allows foreigners (los extranjeros) to write in their own language,
but apparently with no implication that citizens may only write in Spanish.91 In
other jurisdictions it is acceptable to use a foreign language, including a dead one
such as Latin or ancient Greek, but not a language of the testator’s own invention.92
Abbreviations and shorthand are allowed,93 and a will written in text language, the
argot of the young, would be perfectly valid even if only those below a certain age
were able to read it.94
In principle, the will can be written by any writing device and on any object, pro-
vided only that the result is reasonably permanent and allows the letters to be
sufficiently distinct and distinctive. It is easy to think of marginal cases – writing
on a blackboard, for example,95 or in the snow, or by digital pen on a computer
screen96 – but these tend to be imagined by jurists rather than tried out by real
testators.97 The very nature of some objects, such as a beer mat or menu, may suggest
an absence of testamentary intent. On the other hand, wills in the form of a letter,
83
That is the position, eg, in Spain (ch 4 at 84), Germany (ch 8 at 210–11), Austria (ch 9 at 227), and
Hungary (ch 10 at 265).
84
Ch 3 at 58; ch 6 at 127–8; ch 8 at 199; ch 9 at 237.
85
Ch 3 at 58; ch 6 at 127–8.
86
Germany (ch 8 at 198) and Austria (ch 9 at 237).
87
Art 970 C civ; } 2247 BGB.
88
Ch 8 at 200.
89
Ch 6 at 127.
90
Block capitals are accepted in Germany (ch 8 at 200) and Austria (ch 9 at 237), but rejected in
Poland (ch 11 at 275). The position in Italy is uncertain: see ch 6 at 127.
91
Art 688 CC.
92
Ch 3 at 58; ch 6 at 127; ch 8 at 200.
93
Ch 8 at 200.
94
eg ‘Whn i di i wnt all my fngs 2g2 my m8 Sharon’.
95
Ch 8 at 203.
96
See ch 4 at 84, where it is said that this would probably not be permissible in Spanish law.
97
Italian jurists have been much exercised over whether a will can be a written on a prison wall: see ch 6
at 127. The blackboard example, however, is real: see RG [1910] Juristische Wochenschrift 291.
typically to a beneficiary, have been frequently upheld and in a number of

jurisdictions.98
A will is not invalid only because the paper on which it is written contains printed
words – for example, headed notepaper or a pre-printed will form or even a
newspaper99 – but those words, not being holograph, are disregarded so that the
will cannot take effect unless the holograph words are intelligible in their own right
and evidence a settled testamentary intention.100 In those American states where it
has been adopted, the Uniform Probate Code offers a different solution.101 By
contrast to the usual Civil Code provision, which requires the will to be entirely
(en entier, todo)102 in the testator’s hand, the benign starting point of } 2–502(b) of
the UPC is merely that ‘the signature and material portions of the document are
in the testator’s handwriting’. Assuming this to be satisfied, the pre-printed words
(if relevant) can then be treated as part of the will. The official comment gives
the example of a will form with the pre-printed words, ‘I give, devise, and bequeath
to_______’. Provided the testator adds the legatee’s name in his own hand, the
legacy is valid.103
The required content of a signature is discussed later.104 In most jurisdictions –
Iran is an exception105 – the testator must sign at the end of the document. Belgian
law accepts a signature on the envelope in which the will is contained,106 as, in
certain circumstances, does German law.107 In the absence of the principle of unitas
actus,108 the will can be written over an extended period of time and it is permissible
to add material even after signature. Unless separately signed, however, any new
material must normally appear above the signature,109 although German law at least
has been willing to allow additions beneath the signature or on a different (but
attached) page where they relate closely to the existing text or, perhaps, where it is
obvious that the amendments were intended to be covered by the testator’s original
signature.110
7. The future
As compared to other forms of will, the holograph will has changed relatively little
over the years. But rapid changes in the world about it have altered its role and may
eventually call into question its usefulness. With the widespread availability first
of typewriters and now of computers, the use of handwriting is in serious decline.
98
See, eg, ch 6 at 130; ch 8 at 203; ch 11 at 276.
99
Ch 6 at 127.
100
Ch 8 at 200; ch 9 at 237–8; ch 10 at 261.
101
This is the version of the UPC following revisions made in 1990. For the earlier version, and for the
position in other states, see ch 15 at 371–2.
102
Art 970 C civ (France); Art 688 CC (Spain).
103
Scottish case law developed an identical solution: see ch 17 at 416.
104 105 106
At VI.1 below. Ch 12 at 301. Ch 3 at 61.
107 108
Ch 8 at 201–2. For which see VI.4 below.
109 110
Ch 3 at 61; ch 9 at 238; ch 10 at 259. Ch 8 at 199 and 202.
As early as 1935, a court in Scotland accepted a typewritten document as a holograph

will on the basis that the law must ‘keep pace with the march of science’ and that
‘typewriting is a modern form of handwriting’.111 So far no other jurisdiction
has followed this lead and indeed could not do so without endangering the
main evidential value of such wills. What, then, is the future for the holograph
will? From being the normal way of putting thoughts on paper, handwriting,
for some, is beginning to savour of hopeless antiquity. The situation is only likely
to get worse. There must be a danger that handwriting will in the end become so
unusual and unpractised as to be devoid of evidential value. But before then the
holograph will may have had to adapt or be replaced.112 Its tranquil past presages an
uncertain future.
III. Witnessed wills
1. Oral wills and written wills

The other type of private will known both in the past and in the present is the
witnessed will. It occurs in two forms: either the testator declares his will in speech
before witnesses, or it is set down in writing (not necessarily by the testator), signed
by the testator, and attested by witnesses. In theory, the borderline between these
models can be blurred, for the oral (‘nuncupative’) will may come to be set down in
writing, while the written will may be read, or even have to be read,113 to the
witnesses. In practice, however, only the written will is widely recognized in the
modern law.
2. History
The witnessed will is the oldest type of will still in existence. Its history reaches back
to Roman law, ultimately even to the testamentum per aes et libram of pre-classical
Roman law.114 A typical product of the Roman legal mind, it was what Ernst Rabel
has referred to as ‘nachgeformtes Rechtsgeschäft’ (a legal transaction conceived in
imitation, and according to the model, of another transaction),115 for the Roman
lawyers availed themselves of the device of mancipatio, a ritual otherwise employed
for the transfer of certain valuable items of property. Furthermore, the emphasis on
111
McBeath’s Trustees v McBeath 1935 SC 471, 485 (Lord Anderson), 489 (Lord Morison). The
decision was by a 4:3 majority.
112
It might, eg, be replaced by a will in which the only formality is the testator’s signature, as in
Scotland (Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 2), or by the electronic equivalent, as in Nevada
(Nevada Revised Statutes } 133.085 (2008)).
113
This is the case in Brazilian law: see ch 5 at 105 f.
114
Ch 1 at 4; Kaser I (n 37) 107 f, 678 f.
115
Ernst Rabel, ‘Nachgeformte Rechtsgeschäfte’ (1906) 27 ZRG (RA) 290 ff, (1907) 18 ZRG (RA) 311
ff; cf also Zimmermann (n 3) 89.
witnesses rather than a written document was in line with the general inclination of
the Roman lawyers towards oral forms.116
Justinian’s testamentum tripertitum requiring the presence of seven witnesses –
seven in view of the fact that, originally, a libripens (a man who held a scale) and the
familiae emptor (a ‘trustee’ to whom the testator transferred his property nummo uno,
that is, for a fictitious price) had to supplement the five witnesses needed for the
transfer of the inheritance – is a distant descendant of the testamentum per aes et
libram.117 It was available both as an oral will (testamentum nuncupativum) or in
writing (in scriptis) and became the ordinary private will under the ius commune.118
In spite of many disputes surrounding its details and many modifications by local
statute or custom, it survived wherever the ius commune survived, that is, in Germany
until the end of the nineteenth century.119 In many civilian codifications it was,
effectively, replaced by the holograph will: France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and
Switzerland provide prominent examples. Often, in the course of the centuries,
seven witnesses were found to be excessive. In the post-classical era, even before
Justinian, Roman law had recognized a will attested by five witnesses.120 Roman-
Dutch and Roman-Hispanic law also appear to have regarded five witnesses as
sufficient.121 Canon law was even more accommodating. Referring to Matthew
18:16 (‘in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established’),122
Pope Alexander III (1159–81) decreed that wills made in the presence of the parish
priest and two or three other ‘suitable’ persons were to be regarded as valid.123 This
canonical will124 provided an influential model also for secular legislatures.125
Today the witnessed will continues to exist, next to the holograph will, in Austrian
law. Three witnesses are required, and the will must be in writing.126 The witnessed
will in its oral form – its introduction in 1811 is regarded by Christiane Wendehorst as
a sign of ‘a certain naiveté’ on the part of the draftsmen of the Austrian Code127 – was
116
See ch 1 at 6; cf also Zimmermann (n 3) 68 ff, 78 ff.
117
Ch 1 at 20 f; Kaser II (n 37) 478 ff.
118
Ch 2 at 38; Coing I (n 40) 569.
119
Ch 8 at 179; for San Marino, see Reinkenhof (n 69) 158 ff.
120
Ch 1 at 18; Kaser II (n 37) 478 f.
121
Ch 2 at 35.
122
See also Deuteronomy 19:15 (‘One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for
any sin . . . : at the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter be
established’).
123
Decretales Gregorii IX, lib III, tit XXVI, cap X.
124
It was not recognized by the secular courts in Germany; cf ch 2 above at 40. For the nineteenth
century, see Windscheid and Kipp (n 68) } 540, who state that the canonical will was not accepted as part
of the ius commune. But for San Marino, see Reinkenhof (n 69) 162 ff, where the canonical will
(‘testamentum cum esses’, after the initial words of Alexander’s decretal) was indeed regarded as being
part of the ius commune and was only abolished in 1861. It lives on, as an emergency will, in Navarre: see
ch 4 at 81.
125
Ch 2 at 39; Coing I (n 40) 571 f; Descamps (n 40) 54 ff; ch 4 at 77.
126
} 579 ABGB. The will does not have to be handwritten, but, if it is, it has to be written by another
person (it is thus ‘allograph’); otherwise it would be a holograph will.
127
Ch 9 at 234.
abolished in 2004. Brazil, on the other hand, provides an example of a civilian legal
system where the written witnessed will is the only ordinary private will.128
But the stronghold of the (written) witnessed will is now the common law world
where it is typically the only will-type available. Its foundation is the English Wills
Act of 1837, which tidied up, and streamlined, the law relating to testamentary
formalities which had previously been overly complex and inconvenient.129 The
1837 Act is still in force today, its principal provision relating to formalities having
been amended only twice (in 1852 and in 1982) and then only in minor respects.
The Wills Act also applied, or was adopted, in Australia and New Zealand130 and
elsewhere in the British Empire (although not in Scotland).131 Its grip has remained
tenacious, so that when the various Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand came
to enact their own wills legislation they, essentially, perpetuated its tradition.
A witnessed will on the English model was also received in the United States.132
In South Africa the witnessed will was received by an Ordinance of 1845 in the Cape
of Good Hope, and subsequently also in Natal, Transvaal, and the Orange Free
State, but co-existed with traditional Roman-Dutch types of will until 1953, when
a new Wills Act established uniformity throughout the country on the basis of the
English form of will.133
3. The modern law

More intricate than holograph wills but simpler than notarial, the witnessed will is a
private will (like the former) which, nonetheless, is often made under legal supervi-
sion (like the latter). Witnessed wills thus occupy some of the middle ground
between holograph and notarial wills and, in common law jurisdictions at least,
may be treated as doing the work of both.
Oral wills having largely disappeared, they are not discussed further here. In the
modern law a witnessed will must be made in writing and be signed by the testator
and by witnesses. Only Brazil insists on the document being personally hand-
written, or typed, by the testator.134 The form of signature and the qualifications
for witnesses may be left for later discussion.135 Typically, the seven witnesses of
Justinianic law have diminished to just two, although Austria and Brazil require
three and Scotland is content with one. By their signatures the witnesses attest to
the signature of the testator, which must have been made, or acknowledged,136 in
128
That it is little used is hardly surprising in view of the problems associated with it: see ch 5 at 106 ff.
129
For details, see ch 13 at 312 ff; Häcker (n 77) 117 ff.
130
Ch 14 at 303 f.
131
Scots law used to recognize the holograph will; today it has moved towards even greater informality:
see ch 17 at 419 ff.
132
Ch 15 at 361 ff.
133
Ch 16 at 384 ff.
134
Ch 5 at 105.
135
See, respectively, VI.1 and VI.2 below.
136
In New Zealand acknowledgement is not available (Wills Act 2007 s 11(3)), but this was a mistake
in the legislation which is likely to be corrected: see ch 14 at 348.
their joint presence. But while the chronology thus implied is signature by
the testator followed by signature by the witnesses, most American states allow
witnesses to sign first provided this is part of one continuous process with the
testator’s signature.137 Later alterations to the will require repetition of the original
formalities.
The simple rules just described – signature or acknowledgement by the testator
before two competent witnesses, followed by signature by the witnesses themselves –
are the core requirements for a witnessed will. But most jurisdictions ask for more.
Thus, each page must be signed by the testator in South Africa, and by the testator
and witnesses in Hungary.138 Witnesses in common law jurisdictions must sign
in the testator’s presence139 and, in South Africa and some American states, in
the presence of each other as well.140 In New Zealand they are required to ‘state
in the document’, in the testator’s presence, that they were present when the testator
signed.141 Testators in Austria and a few American states must confirm to the
witnesses that the document is their will,142 although this can be accomplished by
gesture as well as by words, so that, in one case from Austria, smiling and nodding
was held to be sufficient.143 In Brazil, in imitation of notarial wills, the full will is
read out to the witnesses, thus removing what in other jurisdictions is often seen as
the benefit of secrecy.144 Finally, Austrian wills must indicate that the witnesses are
signing as such,145 and witnesses there and in Hungary and Scotland must verify the
testator’s identity.146 The value of some at least of these formalities seems question-
able. But even where they contribute meaningfully to the security of wills, they also
complicate what is, in essence, quite a simple procedure. By comparison with
holograph wills, which for the most part are intuitive and straightforward, witnessed
wills are easy to get wrong. To be used safely they require a set of instructions or,
better still, the supervision of a professional. The judicial dispensing power intro-
duced in a number of common law jurisdictions is a candid acknowledgement of the
difficulties.147
137
Ch 15 at 366.
138
Ch 10 at 260 and 262 (Hungary); Wills Act 1953 s 2(1)(a)(iv) (South Africa).
139
For England, the Wills Act 1837 s 9(d) allows witnesses to sign without the testator being present
provided that they then acknowledge the signature to the testator. The position is the same in South
Australia: see Wills Act 1936 s 8(e).
140
Wills Act 1953 s 2(1)(a)(iii) (South Africa). There has been discussion in the United States as to
whether ‘presence’ in this context means ‘visual’ or at least ‘conscious’ presence, or whether, on the
contrary, it is sufficient for a person to be physically present without seeing or knowing anything, an
interpretation which would seem to deprive the requirement of any value. On this point different states
have taken different positions: see ch 15 at 368.
141
Wills Act 2007 s 11(4)(b). Evidently this was unintended and the provision is to be amended: see
ch 14 at 347–8.
142
Ch 9 at 241–2; ch 15 at 367.
143
Ch 9 at 242. Whether smiling would suffice without nodding, or nodding without smiling, must
remain a matter of conjecture.
144 145
Ch 5 at 105–6. Ch 9 at 243.
146
Ch 9 at 241; ch 10 at 263; ch 17 at 425.
147
See VII.4 below.
IV. Public wills
1. History
Legal systems belonging to the common law world do not recognize a ‘public’ will.
Nor do the mixed jurisdictions of South Africa and Scotland,148 and the same is true
of the Islamic countries. By contrast, all of the legal systems of the civilian tradition
covered in this volume adopted the public will into their codifications. Typically, it is
available as a safe but less convenient alternative to the private will; in a few countries
(the Netherlands, Portugal) it is the only ordinary form.
The history of the public will reaches back to post-classical Roman law. Originat-
ing ‘from obscure beginnings’,149 it appeared in the light of history in an imperial
constitution dated AD 413.150 It had to be handed over to the files of a court
or municipal officer151 and, therefore, in later times came to be referred to as a
testamentum apud acta conditum. The same constitution stated that a will could also
be made by handing it over to the Emperor himself (testamentum principi obla-
tum).152 Both types of public will continued to be recognized under the ius commune,
although many details concerning the former were disputed and subject to local
modification,153 and the latter seems to have been rarely used in practice.154 There
was, however, another type of will, predominantly also regarded as a public will,
which was on the rise from medieval times: the ‘notarial’ will. It appears to have been
modelled on the Canon law will,155 and therefore also usually required at least two
witnesses as well as the notary. It was introduced in various parts of Europe by
custom or statute, for example in the Imperial Regulation on Notaries (Reichsnotari-
atsordnung) of 1512, and details differed from place to place.156
Predominantly it is the notarial will that has survived in civilian codifications.
Today the judicial will is only known in Austria157 and Hungary;158 in Germany it
was abolished in 1969 on the view that the proper business for courts is dispute
148
The mixed jurisdiction of Louisiana, however, does: see ch 15 at 369.
149
Max Kaser and Rolf Knütel, Römisches Privatrecht (19th edn, 2008) 358.
150
C. 6, 23, 19, 1 (Honorius et Theodosius).
151
‘Sicut . . . securus erit, qui actis cuiuscumque iudicis aut municipum aut auribus privatorum mentis
suae postremum publicavit iudicium . . . ’.
152
C. 6, 23, 19 pr. On the post-classical public will, see ch 1 at 23 and Kaser II (n 37) 481 f.
153
Ch 2 at 40; Coing I (n 40) 569; Wesener (n 50) 147 f; von Schmitt (n 70) 520 ff; Windscheid and
Kipp (n 68) } 544.
154
Coing I (n 40) 569.
155
Ch 2 at 40.
156
Ch 2 at 40; Coing I (n 40) 572; Descamps (n 40) 60 ff; ch 4 at 76; Lee (n 70) 357 f; ch 7 at 144 f;
von Schmitt (n 70) 523 ff. For a detailed discussion of the notarial will in Italian legal history, see Bruschi
(n 58) 155 ff. For a comparative history of the notarial profession in general, see the contributions to
Mathias Schmoeckel and Werner Schubert (eds), Handbuch zur Geschichte des Notariats (2009); cf also
Manfred Wenckstern, ‘Notariat’, in Jürgen Basedow, Klaus J Hopt, and Reinhard Zimmermann,
Handwörterbuch des Europäischen Privatrechts (2009) 1114 ff.
157
}} 577 ff ABGB; see ch 9 at 226.
158
Ch 10 at 265. The judicial will also survives in Chile: see ch 5 at 100, n 38.
resolution rather than non-contentious matters such as the taking down of wills.159
Like the witnessed will, the notarial will usually160 occurs in two different versions:
by an oral declaration minuted by the notary (the ‘open’ will) or, much less
commonly in practice, by handing to the notary a sealed or unsealed document,
written by the testator or by another person on the testator’s behalf (the ‘closed’,
‘secret’, ‘mystic’, or ‘deposited’ will).
2. Open notarial wills

Although there are differences in points of detail, the overall procedure for ‘open’
wills in the modern law is largely the same everywhere, and is determined as much by
general notarial law as by special rules for wills. Four stages may be distinguished.
First, the testator makes an oral declaration of the will to the notary and two
witnesses.161 Second, the notary (or an assistant) reduces the will to written form.
Third, after being read aloud by the notary,162 the will is signed by the testator,163
notary, and witnesses, with the notary adding information about the execution,
including, usually, its date and place and the names of the witnesses.164 Finally,
the will is retained by the notary and, in some countries, registered in a central
register.165 The notary presides over the whole procedure, verifying the identity of
the testator,166 forming a view as to his legal capacity,167 advising in relation to
succession and tax law, improving on the testator’s words in the course of reducing
them to writing,168 and ensuring that the will is properly signed and that all
formalities are fully complied with. If a notarial will is expensive, as often it is,169
it is also produced with care and attention to detail.
Some national variations may be mentioned. In certain countries the requirement
for witnesses has been dropped.170 Sometimes an oral declaration is not insisted on
and it is sufficient if the testator hands a written statement to the notary which, in
practice, may have been prepared by a lawyer.171 Germany has gone furthest in this
regard, allowing the testator to communicate even by such non-verbal means as
sounds, signs, and gestures.172 In countries where the oral declaration survives, for
159
Ch 8 at 208.
160
Switzerland is an exception: see Arts 499 ff ZGB.
161
Sometimes, as in France and Belgium, a second notary can replace the witnesses: see Art 971 C civ.
For witnesses, see VI.2 below.
162
In the Netherlands a selective reading suffices: see ch 7 at 151.
163
For how the testator signs, see VI.1 below.
164
The need for the place of execution was dropped in Germany in 1938: see ch 8 at 208.
165
For registration see, eg, ch 7 at 164–5; ch 9 at 228.
166
Typically by reference to the testator’s passport or national identity card.
167
See, eg, Arts 685 and 696 Spanish CC.
168
For the notary is not expected to produce an exact transcription, particularly in the case of an oral
declaration. See, eg, ch 3 at 63; ch 6 at 131 (recording a controversy on the point).
169
See I.1 above.
170
In Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain, other than for exceptional situations: see VI.2 below.
171
See, eg, Art 695 Spanish CC. The position in Brazil is contested: see ch 5 at 102.
172
This rule, which dates from 2002, was made with disabled persons in mind (especially those who
were both blind and mute), but it is not so confined. See ch 8 at 209–10.
example, France, Belgium, and Italy, the testator is allowed to refer to notes or even
to read out a full draft prepared in advance.173 In Brazil it is not uncommon for an
advocate to accompany the testator to the notary’s office.174 These relaxations are of
significance, and the overall trend is unmistakable. Nonetheless, taken as a whole, the
procedure for open notarial wills remains unrepentantly, and perhaps unavoidably,
intricate.
3. Closed notarial wills

A ‘closed’ will is a private document which, nonetheless, is presented to a notary for
authentication and, often, for safe keeping as well. The will can, but need not, be
holograph of the testator, but if it is not, some countries require that the testator
sign on each page as well as at the end, and that the pages be numbered.175 The will
is sealed by the testator,176 either before being presented to the notary or, if
preferred, in the notary’s presence. On the testator’s declaring that the document
contains his will, the notary notes the declaration as well as certain other matters,
such as the details of the seal. Two witnesses are needed except in those countries in
which a notarial will can be executed without witnesses.177 The notarial instrument
is signed by the testator, notary, and witnesses (if required). Usually the will is then
retained by the notary, but in some countries178 it is returned to the testator, with
the notary merely keeping a record of the instrument. If, in the former case, the
testator ultimately withdraws the will, it may cease to qualify as a closed will and so
fails altogether unless it is valid on some other basis, for example as a holograph
will.179
A private–public hybrid, the closed will is typically the will-type which commands
the least support in practice. It is not hard to see why. A person intent on a private
will is likely to resist the time and expense of employing a notary, while a person who
is willing to go to a notary is likely to prefer the full notarial service of the open will to
the truncated solemnities of the closed. In taking a middle path between private and
public wills, a closed will can easily be represented as combining the worst features of
both. If the closed will has a constituency anywhere, it might be expected to be in
those (few) countries where private wills are not available. Yet in the Netherlands, a
prominent example, only twenty-three closed (or deposited) wills were executed in
2009 as opposed to 320,000 open wills.180
173
Ch 3 at 62; ch 6 at 131.
174
Ch 5 at 102.
175
That is the position, eg, in Brazil (ch 5 at 104). In Italy (Art 604 C civ) and in the Netherlands (Art
4:95(2) BW) the testator must sign on each page.
176
Some countries give the option of not sealing.
177
See n 170 above. In Navarre the seven witnesses of Roman law are still needed: see ch 4 at 83.
178
Notably Spain (Art 710 CC) and Brazil (Art 1875 CC).
179 180
See ch 10 at 265. Ch 7 at 156.
4. International wills
Only three of the countries covered in this volume have adopted the international
will, as laid down in the Washington Convention of 26 October 1973:181 Italy,
France, and Belgium.182 This is a will that has to be in writing (although it need not
be written by the testator himself) and acknowledged as his will by the testator in the
presence of two witnesses and a person authorized to act in connection with
international wills (that is, in civilian legal systems, normally a notary). In addition,
the testator has to sign the will or, if he has previously signed, acknowledge his
signature, in the presence of the witnesses and the authorized person. In civilian
terms, this is a public will bearing some resemblance to the (open) notarial will, but
with the advantage, especially helpful for complicated disposals, that the will can be
written rather than dictated. Nonetheless the international will appears hardly to
be used.
V. Special wills
1. Emergency wills
Whenever the law establishes specific form requirements there will be situations
where it is difficult, or even impossible, for a testator to comply: witnesses, or a
notary, may not be available, and sometimes even a holograph will cannot be
made.183 Civilian – but not, on the whole, common law – systems have attempted
to accommodate testators in such situations. Even the progress from testamentum
calatis comitiis to testamentum in procinctu and then to testamentum per aes et libram
in archaic and pre-classical Roman law can be regarded in this light.184 Also dating
back to Roman law, although in this case to the post-classical period, is the device of
making available extraordinary or special forms of will. These were the testamentum
tempore pestis conditum and the testamentum ruri conditum – wills made during a time
of pestilence or in rural areas and which were subject to reduced requirements of
form.185 For in both types of case a testator might struggle to find the seven
witnesses, let alone seven witnesses capable of writing their name, that were required
for the ordinary private will in the days of Justinian.186 Over the centuries, some of
181
On which, see Kurt H Nadelmann, ‘The Formal Validity of Wills and the Washington Convention
1973 providing the Form of an International Will’ (1974) 22 American Journal of Comparative Law 365;
Jerome J Curtis, ‘The Convention on International Wills: A Reply to Kurt Nadelmann’ (1975) 23
American Journal of Comparative Law 119.
182
For a full account of international wills, see ch 3 at 65 ff.
183
A typical textbook example concerns the mountaineer who is trapped in a crevasse, but can still
shout his last will to the members of another rope team. More frequent, in practice, is the situation of
deathbed wills made in old-age homes or hospitals: see ch 8 at 220.
184
Ch 1 at 3.
185
For details, see ch 1 at 23; ch 8 at 212; Velten Kappeßer, Die Nottestamente des BGB (1995) 38 ff;
Kaser II (n 37) 482.
186
Ch 1 at 23.
the features of these wills were subject to both change and dispute, but essentially
they remained recognized down to the nineteenth-century German ius commune.187
And even though the draftsmen of many of the modern codifications attempted to
deprive testamenta ruri and tempore pestis condita of their historically contingent
features and to reconceptualize them under the auspices of the testator being unable
to make an ordinary will,188 the preservation of what amounts to an emergency
will appears, in retrospect, to have been a piece of excessive traditionalism. This is
true particularly of legal systems which still attempt to specify the emergency
situations (epidemic, contagious disease, public emergency, disaster, being cut off,
and so on).189 Other codifications contain a more generally worded provision
focusing on exceptional circumstances, or situations of imminent danger.190
Where they are allowed, special wills are usually time-limited, so that, once the
special circumstances have ceased, the will terminates after some fixed period, such as
three or six months.191
In some countries, emergency wills are conceived of as public wills but with a
substitute figure – a mayor, for example, or a clergyman or justice of the peace –
standing in for the notary who is assumed to be unavailable.192 In others, all form
requirements are more or less abandoned so that a will can be declared before
whoever happens to be available as a witness, resulting in a will which is purely
oral.193 Of course, emergency wills must be evaluated against the background of the
ordinary will forms available, and their rationale is particularly questionable wher-
ever the convenient holograph will has been introduced.194 But oral wills, at least,
continue to perform a distinctive role, extending the opportunity to testate almost to
its limits, so that virtually no one who wants to make a will need die intestate.195
Naturally, there are anxieties as well. An oral will is needed only where death is so
imminent that a written will is not possible. But can a testator in those circumstances
still make dispassionate and lucid provision for the disposal of his property? And is
the evidence of the witnesses reliable in respect of what may often be a stumbling and
muttered oral statement? In the light of the experience in Hungary, which has had
the oral form of emergency will since 1960, Lajos Vékás cautions that on many
187
Ch 2 at 41; ch 8 at 212.
188
For the BGB, see ch 8 at 212 f.
189
This is true for France (Art 985 C civ), Spain (ch 4 at 81), Italy (ch 6 at 134), Portugal (Art 2220
CC), Germany (ch 8 at 213), and the Netherlands (ch 7 at 159).
190
See, eg, Austrian law (ch 9 at 246), Hungarian law (ch 10 at 266), Swiss law (Art 506 Obligation-
enrecht), Polish law (ch 11 at 297); and Brazilian law (ch 5 at 113).
191
Arts 984 and 987 C civ (France); Arts 610, 615 and 618 C civ (Italy); Art 730 CC (Spain); } 2252
BGB; Art 4:107 BW. Controversially, the extraordinary holograph will in Brazil does not have a time
limit: see ch 5 at 114.
192
Art 985 C civ (France); Art 609 C civ (Italy); } 2249 BGB.
193
Art 700 CC (Spain); } 1033 CC (Chile); } 597 ABGB; } 634 CC (Hungary); } 2250 BGB; Art 296(2)
Mudawana (Morocco); ch 12 at 298.
194
Matters are different, eg, in the Netherlands where Wilbert Kolkman criticizes the provisions on
‘exceptional wills’ as being too strict: see ch 7 at 160.
195
Of course there are still cases where a will cannot be made, eg, where there are no witnesses or where
the witnesses are too young. Christiane Wendehorst gives the example of three seventeen year olds hiking
in the mountains in circumstances where one has a fatal accident in a secluded place: see ch 9 at 248.
occasions witnesses make contradictory presentations, and therefore the court is

often unable to determine the content of the will even after careful consideration
of the different testimonies.196

Wills made on board ship also enjoy a privileged position in a number of civilian
systems, with the ship’s captain or some other officer acting in place of a notary to
allow the making of a public will.197 This privilege cannot be traced back to Roman
law, but it can be found in the three great codifications at the turn of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries,198 and may originally have been a merchants’ privilege.199
In a spirit of relentless modernization, some jurisdictions have now extended it to
wills made on board aircraft.200 The need for a special dispensation for those on a
journey by sea or air is anything but obvious.201 Travellers suddenly infected by
testamentary zeal can express their feelings by means of a private will;202 those who
wish to make a public will should do so before packing their bags.
3. Military wills
In the common law world, only one type of extraordinary or special will is usually
allowed, and that in a half-hearted and intermittent fashion. In an isolated and
unexplained survival from the Statute of Frauds of 1677, English law allows oral wills
by those on active military service.203 That rule survives also in New Zealand,204 but
has been abandoned in South Africa and in many parts of Australia and the United
States.205 Military wills have never been recognized in Scotland,206 which indeed
does not allow special wills at all. Whether or not the English soldiers’ will was
derived, via the English ecclesiastical courts, from Roman law,207 Roman law had,
even in the classical period, also made special provision for soldiers, effectively
exempting them from most formal requirements for the making of a will.208
Justinian restricted this general privilege to soldiers in expeditione, ie in the course
196
Ch 10 at 267.
197
eg, Arts 987 ff C civ (France); Arts 611 ff C civ (Italy); Arts 722 ff CC (Spain); Arts 2214 ff CC
(Portugal); Art 953 CC (Poland). In Germany the will is declared before three witnesses: see } 2251 BGB.
198
See }} 205 ff I 12 PrALR; Arts 988 ff C civ; } 597 ABGB in its old, pre-2004, version (see ch 9 at
237). For further reference, see von Schmitt (n 70) 548.
199
Ch 2 at 41.
200
Art 616 C civ (Italy); Art 2219 CC (Portugal); Art 1889 CC (Brazil); Art 953 CC (Poland). So is
born a new form of in-flight entertainment: bored (or frightened) passengers can while away the tedium of
a long flight by summoning the captain to make a will.
201
See, eg, ch 5 at 112; ch 8 at 218.
202
Except of course in those few jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, where private wills are not
available. For special wills in the Netherlands, see ch 7 at 159.
203
Wills Act 1837 s 11. See ch 13 at 322 ff.
204 205
Ch 14 at 339. Ch 14 at 339; ch 15 at 373.
206 207 208
Ch 17 at 409. Ch 13 at 324. Ch 1 at 14.
of a military campaign.209 It still survives, in a variety of shapes, in some modern

civilian systems,210 but has been abandoned in others.211
4. Codicils
Special wills seek to cater for situations where testators may be unable to use any of the
ordinary forms of will. Historically, there was another device by which a testator could
express at least some of his last wishes without having to comply with the ordinary
forms: the codicil. In classical Roman law codicilli were written documents that could
contain testamentary dispositions, but not the appointment of an heir, which was
permissible only in an ordinary will.212 Justinian brought codicils close to wills by
requiring five witnesses.213 The distinction between wills and codicils was maintained
in the ius commune: an heir could only be instituted in a will (which had to be attested
by seven witnesses); other dispositions mortis causa could be made in a codicil (which
had to be attested by five witnesses).214 Crucially, a will was only valid if it contained
the institution of an heir,215 and the distinction was bound to break down once this
requirement was abandoned.216 In some parts of Europe, such as the Netherlands, that
had already occurred by the era of the ius commune,217 and it came to be generally
adopted in the codifications of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.218 But while
most modern legal systems have thus abandoned the codicil, it lives on in Austria
(where the distinction between wills and codicils is merely a terminological one, for
there is no longer any difference as far as the respective formalities are concerned),219 in
some parts of Spain (which still require the institution of an heir for a will to be
valid),220 in Brazil,221 and in the Netherlands (where a codicil does not have to comply
with the formal requirements for ordinary wills, but can only be used for a very limited
range of dispositions).222 Somewhat unexpectedly, therefore, the two most recent
codifications emulate classical Roman law most closely in this respect.
The term ‘codicil’ also lives on in common law and mixed legal systems where it is
used to describe a document amending, rather than replacing, a previously executed
will.223 It is subject to the normal requirements for the making of a will.
209
Ch 1 at 21.
210
Arts 981 ff C civ (France); ch 4 at 86 (Spain); ch 6 at 136 (Italy); Arts 2210 ff CC (Portugal); ch 5 at
112 (Brazil); ch 7 at 159 (the Netherlands); ch 11 at 280 (Poland).
211
For Germany, see ch 8 at 218, n 335.
212
Ch 1 at 15; Kaser I (n 37) 693 f.
213
Ch 1 at 24; Kaser II (n 37) 495 ff. For codicils ‘confirmed’ in a will (codicilli testamento confirmati) an
exception was often held to exist in that they were valid without any formality being required: cf ch 2 at 44.
214
Ch 2 at 33; Coing I (n 40) 570; Helmut Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht vol II (1989) 598 f;
Reinkenhof (n 69) 189 ff.
215
Ch 2 at 33; Coing I (n 40) 575; Coing II (n 214) 608; Reinkenhof (n 69) 164 ff.
216
Ch 2 at 34; Coing I (n 40) 570; Coing II (n 214) 609.
217
Ch 2 at 34; Lee (n 70) 354; Coing I (n 40) 576.
218
See, eg, Coing II (n 214) 609.
219 220
Ch 9 at 223; cf also Wesener (n 50) 155 ff. Ch 4 at 90.
221 222
Ch 5 at 116. Ch 7 at 157.
223
See, eg, Roger Kerridge, Parry & Kerridge: The Law of Succession (12th edn, 2009) para 3–03; David
Hay (ed), Words and Phrases Legally Defined vol I (4th edn, 2007) 398.
VI. Shared features
1. Testator’s signature
To sign is to be bound: in that simple and universally understood proposition lies the
significance of testamentary signatures. A testator signs a will because it is final and he
intends to be bound by its contents. And in the very need for a signature lies a
warning of the seriousness of the step that is being contemplated and of the need for
careful reflection. Later on, after the testator is dead, the signature’s function changes
from constitution to proof:224 it demonstrates finality of intention and, being in the
testator’s handwriting, provides proof of authenticity, connecting that particular
person to that particular document. Finally, if the testator is not named in the
will, the signature provides evidence of his identity.
Yet, important as it is, a signature is not always required. It is excused for notarial
wills if the testator is unable to write, whether due to temporary incapacity or
permanent disability; less expectedly, it is excused in common law jurisdictions
whenever the testator chooses to ask someone to sign on his behalf.225 The difference
invites comment. Without a dispensation as to signing, a person who cannot write
cannot make a will at all. The (slight) risk of fraud is thus justified by the need for
wills to be available to all who may wish to make them. The much wider rule of the
common law is harder to justify, except perhaps as avoiding the practical difficulty of
determining who can and who cannot write, or the uncertain consequences for a will
if the testator’s declaration of incapacity turns out to be false.226 In one case the
common law goes even further. In the exercise of their statutory dispensing power,
courts in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are able and, it seems, sometimes
willing to uphold a will even where it is signed neither by the testator nor by another
person on the testator’s behalf.227 In this way even the most fundamental of all
testamentary formalities can be done without.
As to the signature itself, most, naturally, are irreproachable, especially when made
under legal supervision. But signatures in private wills may test the outer limits of
what is acceptable even in respect of rules which are generally more indulgent than is
the case for notarial wills. The tone is well caught by Article 602(2) of the Italian
Civil Code, which provides in relation to holograph wills that, ‘even though not
done by indicating the name and surname’, a signature is still valid ‘if it designates
the person of the testator with certainty’. What is required, therefore, is something to
link testator and will – something, in other words, which ‘displays the natural lines of
the testator’s writing’228 and ‘individualizes the signatory’.229 The approach almost
224
This is a shift from the ‘cautionary’ to the ‘evidentiary’ function of testamentary formalities: see
VIII.1 below.
225
See VI.6 below.
226
For the difficulties arising out of this latter point, see ch 4 at 89–90.
227
Ch 14 at 353–4 ff. For the dispensing power, see VII.4 below.
228
The test in Poland: see ch 11 at 275.
229
The test in the Netherlands: see ch 7 at 166.
everywhere is markedly liberal. With the notable exception of Spain and Poland,
there is usually no objection to signatures by shortened forms of name, by first or
surname alone, by nick-name, or by reference to position in a family (‘Mum’).
Legibility is not usually insisted on. Initials alone, however, may not be sufficient to
identify the testator or to provide an adequate sample of his handwriting. Responses
here vary. On the whole, signature by initials is accepted,230 although it may be
necessary to show that the initials were intended as a signature or even, as in
Scotland, that this was the testator’s usual way of signing.231 The position in
South Africa has fluctuated, with the courts ultimately refusing to allow a mode of
signature which was viewed as an invitation to fraud, only for the legislature to
provide otherwise.232 With characteristic laxity, common law jurisdictions admit
even a signature by mark,233 although in South Africa at least this is allowed only
where a commissioner of oaths is in attendance to certify the identity of the
testator.234 On the other hand, electronic signatures are almost everywhere
disregarded.235
The traditional rule, in many countries, was for the testator to sign at the end,
partly to indicate that the will was finished and partly, by leaving no space above the
signature, to prevent later and unauthorized additions by another hand. But while
this rule largely survives in the civil law world, at least in the context of private
wills,236 it has been comprehensively abandoned in the countries of the common
law.237 The mixed jurisdictions of Scotland and South Africa have, however,
retained the requirement.238 Where the rule survives, an important question is:
what is meant by ‘the end’? In England, this was initially taken to mean immediately
at the end of the concluding words, but a legislative amendment of 1852 allowed a
blank space to intervene.239 The modern South African understanding is against
blank spaces,240 whereas in Scotland the statutory rule provides, not entirely without
ambiguity, that the signature must be ‘at the end of the last page’.241
230
eg, in Italy (ch 6 at 129) and in Germany (ch 8 at 201). The position in Austria is different: see ch 9
at 238 and 241.
231
Ch 3 at 61; Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 7(2)(c).
232
The legislation – the Law of Succession Amendment Act 43 of 1992 s 1 – actually preceded the
final, definitive decision, which is thus authoritative only in respect of the former law. For a discussion, see
ch 16 at ff. 388.
233
Ch 13 at 314; ch 15 at 363.
234
Wills Act 7 of 1953 s 2(1)(a)(v). For the difficulties which this provision has caused, see ch 16 at
393–4 ff.
235
Catalonia (Arts 421–14 to 421–16 Law 10/2008) and Nevada (Nevada Revised Statutes }133.085
(2008)) are exceptions. For an isolated display of sympathy towards a ‘signature’ produced on paper by a
cursive computer script, see Taylor v Holt 134 SW3d 830 (Tennessee Court of Appeals, 2003), discussed
in ch 15 at 363.
236
See II.6 above. France and Belgium are exceptions: see ch 3 at 61.
237
This has been achieved by legislation. See: ch 13 at 314; ch 14 at 342 and 346–7; ch 15 at 364. In
some states of the USA the requirement survives.
238
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 7(1); Wills Act 7 of 1953 s 2(1)(a)(i).
239
Ch 13 at 312–13.
240
Ch 16 at 390–1.
241
2. Witnesses
In many countries, witnesses continue to play a central role in the law of testamen-
tary formalities. They are needed for the witnessed will, of course, which is found in
all of the common law and mixed systems surveyed in this book, as well as in a small
number of civil law systems. And traditionally they were needed also for notarial
wills, although the position in this respect began to change in the course of the
twentieth century.
Who can be a witness – or, to ask the question in the way in which it is more
usefully put, who can not be a witness? Article 681 of the Spanish Civil Code gives a
typical exclusionary list focusing on legal incapacity:
1. Persons under age, except as provided in Article 701.242
2. Blind persons and those totally deaf or dumb.
3. Persons who do not understand the language of the testator.
4. Persons of unsound mind.
While, however, the young are everywhere unable to serve as witnesses, there is no
corresponding restriction on the old: a centenarian of unimpaired capacity is as good
a witness as anyone else despite the fact that he (or more usually she) is unlikely to be
available to give evidence in the event that the will comes to be contested.
The testator’s relatives are not usually ineligible as witnesses unless they are also
beneficiaries (a topic pursued below). Some civil law jurisdictions exclude the
relatives of notaries, or notaries’ employees.243 Other exclusions are also sometimes
found, but Brazil is surely unique in appearing to disallow both the ‘intimate friends’
and also the ‘arch-enemies’ of the testator, an exclusion which, in small communities
at least, may empty the pool from which witnesses can be drawn.244
Witnesses cannot usually take direct or even indirect benefit under a will or, to put
it another way, beneficiaries and their relatives are restricted in their ability to act as
witnesses. Article 682 of the Spanish Civil Code may be taken as typical of civil law
countries in barring ‘the heirs and legatees named in an open will, their spouses and
their relatives, within the fourth degree of consanguinity or the second of affinity’.
Common law jurisdictions are more relaxed, England for example confining the
restriction to beneficiaries and their spouse or civil partner;245 in a rare nod to
contemporary social mores, the (recent) legislation in New Zealand includes ‘de facto
partners’ within the list of prohibited relatives.246 If the prohibition is breached, it is
242
Art 701 provides that, in the case of an epidemic, a will can be executed without a notary and before
three witnesses over the age of sixteen.
243
Art 681 CC (Spain); Art 975 C civ (France). For difficulties of interpretation in respect of the first
of these, see ch 4 at 88. In the Netherlands, where the notary’s employees are competent witnesses, the
extent of their witnessing could amount to no more than carrying on working in an adjacent office with the
door left open. The practice did not survive a decision of the Supreme Court on 13 January 2006. See ch 7
at 172.
244
The relevant provision, however, is both troublesome and controversial: see ch 5 at 115–16.
245
Wills Act 1837 s 15.
246
Wills Act 2007 s 13(1)(b).
usually only the bequest to the witness or witness’s relative which falls and the will
is otherwise unaffected;247 in Australia and New Zealand even this penalty is
lifted where the court is satisfied that the testator knew and approved the bequest
and made it voluntarily.248 In a few jurisdictions – Scotland,249 and some states in
Australia and the United States250 – there is no bar to beneficiaries acting as
witnesses, although to do so might prompt a challenge to the will on some other
ground such as undue influence.
A witness to a notarial will must observe all or most of the process of authentica-
tion, from the initial declaration by the testator to the final act of signing by testator
and notary.251 With witnessed wills, by contrast, there is not much for the witness to
do. Often it is not even necessary to see the testator sign because, at least in the
common law world, it is usually sufficient if the testator acknowledges a signature
which has already been made.252 Only a few jurisdictions require more than witnes-
sing of the signing or acknowledgement.253 In South Africa and some states of the
United States of America, each witness must observe the signing by the other,254 and
in Austria, Hungary, and Scotland the witness vouches for the testator’s identity at
least in the limited sense that some evidence must be produced to the witness in that
regard.255 Only in Austria and a few American states, however, need the witnesses be
told that the document is a will (although they may often guess),256 and only in
Brazil are they required to be familiar with its contents.257
Perhaps surprisingly, it is the all-seeing witness of the notarial will, not his more
perfunctory common-law cousin, who has begun to be dropped (save for exceptional
situations) – in Germany in 1938,258 in Spain in 1991,259 and in the Netherlands in
2003.260 The reason, presumably, is that notaries are too far beyond reproach to
need monitoring by someone else. If the trend continues – if witnesses come to be
confined to the witnessed will – then, by a pleasing symmetry, each will-type will rely
on evidence of a different kind: the notarial will on the evidence of notaries, the
holograph will on the evidence of the testator’s hand, and only the witnessed will on
the evidence of witnesses. Of the three kinds of evidence, it is the last which seems of
least value.261 Witnesses die, or forget, or, in the all too typical case where they are
247
For one example among many, see Art 597 C civ (Italy).
248
Ch 14 at 344 and 348.
249
The point was decided in Simsons v Simsons (1883) 10 R 1247, partly on the basis of Roman law.
250
For the USA this is provided for by the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) } 2–505.
251
In Brazil it is no longer necessary for witnesses to be present when the will is being drawn up. By Art
1864 II of the Civil Code of 2002 it is sufficient if they attend when the will is read out.
252
Wills Act 1837 s 9(c) (England); Wills Act 1953 s 2(1)(a)(ii) (South Africa); Requirements of
Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 3(7); UPC } 2–502. The position is the same under Austrian law: see ch 9 at
241.
253
See III.3 above.
254
So in South Africa witnesses must sign ‘in the presence . . . of each other’: Wills Act 1953 s 2(1)(a)(iii).
255 256
Ch 9 at 241; ch 10 at 263; ch 17 at 425. Ch 9 at 241–2; ch 15 at 367.
257 258 259 260
See III.3 above. Ch 8 at 207–8. Ch 4 at 87–8. Ch 7 at 168–70.
261
At least at the present time. With the decline in the use of handwriting, the evidential value of
holograph wills seems likely to decline: see II.7 above.
employees of the presiding lawyer, are unable to distinguish one will from the
countless others they have signed. Such witnesses are likely to be of little help in
the event that a will is challenged and their oral testimony sought.
3. Date
There is no requirement, in common law and mixed jurisdictions, that a will be
dated.262 Yet a date may sometimes be of crucial importance, particularly if there are
competing wills, if there is a question as to the testator’s legal capacity, or if the
interpretation of a particular word (such as one denoting family members) is affected
by the date on which it was written. In the civil law world, matters are different, as
one might expect. The date is included in notarial wills as a matter of course. In
private wills, however, the position is more patchy. What was once a virtually
standard requirement of holograph wills,263 that the testator write in his own hand
the day, month, and year, is almost everywhere under attack. One reason is a
puzzling but persistent failure of testators to get the date right. In a seemingly endless
stream of litigation, courts have had to consider cases where the year was missing or
pre-printed, or where the day and month were described by reference to an external
event such as Christmas or Easter or even the mobilization of the German army in
1914.264 The result in France and Germany was to treat the date as a desirable, but
generally dispensable, extra,265 and in Italy to punish its omission by voidability
rather than nullity.266 Of course, even where the date is not required, it is usually
included as a matter of convenience and good practice. In Scotland there is even a
statutory incentive: a date in a will is presumed to have been correctly stated.267
4. Unitas actus
At least for notarial wills, traces remain in some jurisdictions of the Roman law
principle of unitas actus (unity of action) by which the testamentary process was to be
a single, uninterrupted act.268 Spanish law is particularly firm on this point, Article
699 of the Civil Code providing that all formalities ‘shall take place in a single act
starting with the reading of the will. No interruption shall be allowed except that
caused by a temporary incident’.269 This is partly a matter of ritual, but partly too the
262
Except, in relation to holograph wills, in four states of the United States: see ch 15 at 372.
263
Austria is an exception: see } 578 AGBG.
264
‘Im Augenblicke der Mobilmachung’: see OLG Colmar, 6 January 1915, OLGE 30, 211 f. The
German courts provided a particularly rich seam of cases: see ch 8 at 188 ff.
265
Ch 3 at 59; ch 8 at 195. In France this is the product of judicial decision, in Germany of legislation.
266
Ch 6 at 128.
267
268
Ch 1 at 6. For the survival of unitas actus in the ius commune, see ch 2 at 47.
269
The rule in Brazil is the same: see ch 5 at 103. And see also, eg the rules for closed notarial wills in
France (ch 3 at 64), Brazil (ch 5 at 104), and Italy (ch 6 at 134).
result of a practical concern that the document should not be substituted or inter-
fered with.270
In the case of witnessed wills, unitas actus, where it has survived at all, has done
so only in attenuated form. There is no requirement that the will be drawn up in
one go, nor even, in most cases, that it be signed in the presence of witnesses.271 But
some jurisdictions at least insist that witnesses sign promptly. The statutory rule in
Scotland – that the witness’s signature must be ‘one continuous process’ with the
signature or acknowledgement of signature by the testator272 – recalls an equivalent
rule in Justinianic law.273 Austrian law, while contested, is broadly to the same
effect.274 Common law jurisdictions, however, are innocent of unitas actus, although
the Uniform Probate Code in America takes the trouble to warn witnesses to sign
‘within a reasonable time’.275
Being free both of notaries and of witnesses, the holograph will is also free of the
unitas actus principle, and will-writing can be as leisurely, prolonged, and sporadic as
suits the convenience and tastes of the testator.276
5. Incorporation of informal documents

Where a will refers to some other document, such as a list of legacies, civil law
jurisdictions, departing from the ius commune,277 generally refuse to recognize the
document unless it too meets the solemnities required for one of the accepted forms
of will278 or it is of a supplementary nature.279 The common law, however,
accommodating as usual, treats the document as part of the will so long as it already
exists, is properly identified, and there is a clear intention that it is to be
incorporated.280 No requirements of form attach to the document, which could
for example be typewritten and unsigned; nor is there any restriction as to length, so
that the document might be many times longer than the will into which it is being
incorporated.281 It is easy to characterize such an approach as an evasion of the rules
of testamentary formalities as well as an invitation to fraud, and no doubt that is how
it is seen in the civil law world. Yet it is not without merit. In this as in other matters,
testators must be taken to know what they are doing, and if a testator chooses to
270
Ch 4 at 80.
271
Except in New Zealand: see ch 14 at 346. For other countries, see VI.2 above.
272
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 3(4)(e).
273
For which see ch 1 at 20–1.
274
Ch 9 at 243–4.
275
UPC } 2–502(a)(3)(A).
276
Ch 8 at 203; ch 10 at 259–60.
277
Ch 4 at 85.
278
Ch 7 at 151–3; ch 9 at 248–9.
279
Ch 8 at 200.
280
Ch 13 at 316; ch 15 at 376–7. In respect of the mixed jurisdictions, incorporation is allowed in
Scotland, but not in South Africa: see ch 16 at 386; ch 17 at 424.
281
As, in Scotland, with the (holograph) words ‘adopted as holograph’ into which there was
incorporated a (non-holograph) writing which actually contained the substance of the will: see ch 17
at 416.
incorporate a document which is informal, then that is both a reason for giving effect
to that choice as well as a guarantee of sorts that the document is authentic.
Furthermore, the doctrine can be explained as a response to structural inflexibility.
In civil law systems, the document in question may satisfy the requirements of a
holograph will and so have independent validity. In common law systems, which
usually recognize only the witnessed will, the document would fail unless incorpor-
ation is allowed.
A will cannot incorporate a document which is not yet written. But in a provision
which has been adopted in around half of the states in the United States of America,
the Uniform Probate Code allows a will to enfranchise future documents.282 There
are, however, limitations. Any such document must be signed by the testator; it can
only dispose of items of tangible personal property (not including money); and the
will itself must include an enfranchising clause such as the following:
I might leave a written statement or list disposing of items of tangible personal property. If I do
and if my written statement or list is found and is identified as such by my Personal
Representative no later than 30 days after the probate of this will, then my written statement
or list is to be given effect to the extent authorized by law . . . 283
6. Wills by disabled persons

An inability to read, to write, to hear, or to speak might each affect the making of
a will. The cause need not be physical or, if physical, permanent. An illiterate
person, for example, is as little able to read or write as someone who is blind or
paralysed.
Usually, the inability to read or write is seen an absolute bar to a holograph will.284
In many civil law jurisdictions this leaves as the only alternative the notarial will, in
practice in the ‘open’ version.285 Here too there are difficulties for those with a
disability. Three pressure points arise: the testator’s initial declaration, the reading of
the will by the notary, and the testator’s signature. The last of these is easily dealt
with: where the testator cannot write, either his signature is excused altogether or, in
some systems, a witness signs on the testator’s behalf.286 In either case the notary
records the reason why the testator cannot write.287 The reading of the will is more
problematic. If the testator is deaf, the testator reads it for himself instead of the will
being read out aloud by the notary.288 If, in addition, the testator is unable to read, a
person may be appointed to read on his behalf, at least in some jurisdictions,289 or
282
UPC } 2–513. See ch 15 at 378. A comparable rule can be found in Catalonia and Navarre
(see ch 4 at 94) and, it may be, in Scotland also (see ch 17 at 424).
283
Official Comment on UPC } 2–513.
284
See, eg, ch 3 at 58. But in Italy a holograph will can be made by a person who is blind: see ch 6
at 128.
285
Ch 6 at 132.
286
Ch 3 at 63; ch 5 at 103; ch 6 at 132; ch 7 at 168.
287
For the implications where the testator’s statement is false, see ch 4 at 89–90.
288
In Italy, the reading must be out loud unless the testator is also unable to speak: see ch 6 at 132–3.
289
Art 697.2 CC (Spain); Art 1866 CC (Brazil).
again an interpreter may communicate the will using sign language (assuming that
the testator can see and is familiar with such language).290 Finally, and for the reason
that communication by the testator is both more important and more delicate than
communication to him, the difficulties affecting the initial declaration cannot always
be overcome. A person who is unable to speak is also unable to make the oral
declaration required by many jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, the oral declar-
ation can be replaced by one in writing,291 but this presupposes that the testator can
read. If he cannot do so, then it seems that he cannot make a will at all. In Germany,
however, following a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court which turned on
the freedom to make a will and non-discrimination, the law was altered to allow non-
verbal declarations, for example, by sounds and gestures.292
These problems are largely avoided by the informal approach to will-making
found in the common law. Thus, a witnessed will can be made by anyone who is
capable of communicating his intentions, by any means; and if he cannot write his
name, the testator can sign by mark or can ask someone else to sign on his behalf.293
Matters are so straightforward that the issue is little discussed in the literature.
VII. The flight from formalities
1. Introduction
The slow but steady shift from strict formalism is a significant theme in this book. And
if such movement is a little unexpected in what is often seen as an arid and static topic,
it also has firm historical foundations. Thomas Rüfner describes the ease with which
the Romans abandoned old forms of will294 even before legal development reached its
apex in the classical era.295 Moreover, the central element of the testamentum per aes et
libram, the mancipatio ritual, became meaningless in the classical period, and the post-
classical period saw the introduction of a host of alternative will forms. Despite these
first signs of flexibility, however, the overriding impression of early modern law is still
one of the needless complexity of testamentary formalities. It is therefore not
surprising that, as Nils Jansen puts it, the usus modernus lawyers regarded the
Roman rules as ‘harsh’.296 Their solution was a ‘contrary principle’ in terms of
which wills, in cases of doubt, were taken to be valid, on the presumption that the
necessary formalities had been complied with (in dubio pro testamento). This allowed
them to deal flexibly with the ambiguities of the formal requirements, so that their
290 291 292

Ch 6 at 132–3. See IV.2 above. Ch 8 at 209–10.
293
So, eg, s 9(a) of the Wills Act 1837 provides, for England, that a will must be signed ‘by the
testator, or by some other person in his presence and by his direction’. Except in some parts of the USA
(for which see ch 15 at 363), signing through another person can be used regardless of whether the
testator can write. The mixed legal systems of Scotland and South Africa likewise allow a witnessed will
to be signed on behalf of the testator – see respectively, Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995
s 9 and Wills Act 1953 s 2(1)(a)(i) – although the former requires the use of a solicitor or equivalent.
For signature by mark, see VI.1 above.
294
The testamentum calatis comitiis and testamentum in procinctu.
295 296
Ch 1 at 25 ff. Ch 2 at 37.
description of testamentary formalities as ‘solemnities’ appears, in retrospect, as little

more than a ‘doctrinal façade’ giving no more than lip-service to the Roman sources.
According to Thomas Rüfner, the flexibility regarding formal requirements may
be explained by the importance of mortis causa gifts for the social texture of Rome.297
In other words, the jurists were ready to relax formalities in order to prevent well-
deserved gifts from failing. And here already lies the most important explanation,
both historically and in modern law, for the willingness to step away from formalism:
the desire to give effect to the intention of a testator as expressed in a document of a
testamentary nature.
In what follows, a brief overview of this liberalizing trend will be given with
reference to a number of the jurisdictions covered in this book. As will be seen, the
trend has played itself out within the context of each one of the three main types of
will (holograph, witnessed, and notarial), and a number of different techniques have
been employed, whether on their own or in combination.
2. Judicial interpretation
It comes as no surprise that judicial interpretation has been the technique most often
used in the ‘flight from formalities’, for testamentary acts can readily be ‘saved’ by a
lenient view of the rules on the part of the courts. It is also not surprising that this
technique has been particularly prominent regarding wills made by means of a
private act.
There is no shortage of examples. In our discussion of holograph wills, we drew
attention to the flexibility, in virtually all jurisdictions, in respect of matters such as
signature, language, style of writing, and so on.298 The experience in Germany seems
especially instructive.299 As originally enacted, } 2231 no 2 BGB allowed a will in the
form of ‘a declaration, specifying the place where, and the day when, it had been
made, and written and signed by the testator in his own hand’. On the basis that
these requirements were to be taken seriously, numerous wills were judged by the
courts to have failed – typically through errors in respect of the date or place – even
though they plainly reflected the intention of the testator. However, many of the
superior courts, including the Reichsgericht, were uneasy about this line of decisions
and, in a number of other cases, did their best to avoid a harsh result. A typical
example is where a testator in Berlin had instituted his wife in a will in which the
words ‘Berlin W. Nürnbergerstr. 21, den . . . . . . . . 190 ..’ had been pre-printed. That
will was upheld in view of the fact that the testator had repeated, this time in his own
hand, the street (but not the city) under his signature and that he had filled in the
date by adding ‘1. September’ as well as the figure ‘3’ in the space left for the year.
The court argued that the place where, and the year when, the will had been made
could be determined on the basis of what the testator had written in his own hand, as
interpreted in the light of the document as a whole (including its printed part).300
297 298
Ch 1 at 25. See II.6 above.
299
What follows is based on the account in ch 8 at 189 ff.
300
KG, 22 November 1909, OLGE 20, 428.
Later, even after most of the problems with holograph wills had been addressed by
legislation in 1938, the German courts continued to show willingness to interpret at
least some of the requirements in a spirit of accommodating indulgence.301
Some of the experiences of German law were replicated in other jurisdictions
where the holograph will was used. So, for example, in recent decades the signature
requirement has been eased in Belgium, France, and Italy.302 At one time the Belgian
Supreme Court insisted on the testator’s usual signature, but in 1986 the court
changed its position and accepted a different signature provided the judge was
satisfied on the facts that the testator had intended to sign the will. This decision
also reflects the position in French case law.
A broadly similar pattern of interpretation can be found with the witnessed will of
(or derived from) the English Wills Act of 1837. For example, while such a will must
be ‘in writing’, the courts have imposed no restrictions as to the materials on which,
or by which, it may be written. One case in England concerns a will written on an
empty egg-shell,303 while courts in Australia and New Zealand have accepted a wide
variety of materials, including walls, doors, and cloth.304 Signing was interpreted
with equal leniency. For example, the courts in Australia and New Zealand
have allowed marks, initials, printed names, an assumed name, or an incomplete
signature.305 In the United States, partial or informal signatures came generally to be
allowed.306
3. Legislative intervention
Judicial interpretation, of course, has both limits and drawbacks, including the
obvious drawback of legal uncertainty. It is not surprising, therefore, that a more
stable technique has been employed in many of the jurisdictions covered in this
book. This is the official lowering of formal requirements through legislative inter-
vention. Again, a brief overview will have to suffice.
Legislation in Germany in 1938 thoroughly revised the law of holograph wills,
abandoning the requirement to give the date and place, and liberalizing the rules as
to signature.307 The Italian Civil Code of 1942 admitted almost anything as
a signature provided that it identified the testator with certainty.308 In Hungary
the requirement that a holograph will be witnessed was abandoned.309 In the United
States the Uniform Probate Code of 1969 required that only the ‘material provi-
sions’ of a will be in the testator’s handwriting.310 These examples could be
multiplied.311
301 302
See ch 8 at 197 ff. See ch 3 at 61; ch 6 at 129.
303
Hodson v Barnes [1926] 43 TLR 71. Probate was refused, but not on that ground.
304
Ch 14 at 336. For the equivalent rules in respect of holograph wills, see II.6 above.
305
See ch 14 at 334 and, on signatures more generally, VI.1 above.
306 307
Ch 15 at 363. Ch 8 at 194 ff.
308
} 602(2) C civ. 309
See ch 10 at 261.
310
UPC } 2–503 (1969). See ch 15 at 372.
311
On holograph wills see II.6 above.
The same trend can be seen in notarial wills.312 Among the simplifications effected
by the German legislation of 1938 were dispensing with witnesses, at least in the
normal case, as well as significant reforms of the notarial minute, which no longer
had to record the place, the date,313 or the fact that the minute had been read out to
the testator and approved and signed by him.314 The need for witnesses was also
removed in Spain (1991) and the Netherlands (2003), although a similar move was
defeated when the 1942 Civil Code was being prepared in Italy.315 Witnesses in
Brazil were reduced from five to two (2002).316 By contrast, the formal requirements
for the witnessed will have remained largely unchanged,317 and reliance has been
placed instead on the innovative technique described in the next section.
Important as they are, the changes mentioned so far are incremental in nature,
taking the existing law for granted and proposing no more than modest adjustment
to it.318 In only one of the jurisdictions surveyed in this book has the law been
completely re-cast and a new will-type introduced. That jurisdiction is Scotland. In
1995 Scotland abolished the holograph will, reduced the witnesses in a witnessed will
to one, and introduced a completely new will-type in which the only formality was
subscription by the testator.319 The idea was for wills to be so simple that they could
never fail; and with the subscribed will in particular, liberalization of form may now
have reached almost its outer limits.
4. Dispensing powers
But there is also another way. Rather than reducing the formalities for all wills, as in
Scotland, it is possible to retain formalities at existing levels but allow the court to
overlook deficiencies, including those as serious as the absence of witnesses or even of
the testator’s signature. First introduced by Israel in 1965,320 this approach has since
been adopted in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and in some parts of the
United States of America.321 In England and Wales, the idea has been considered,
but, so far at least, rejected.322
The legislation in different countries has much in common. For example,
in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa it requires the existence of a
document intended to be the testator’s will; and although ‘document’ is not always
interpreted in the same manner – the Australian courts appear especially liberal in
312
See IV.2 above.
313
Provided the date could be worked out from the note made by the notary on the envelope in which
the will was placed.
314 315 316
Ch 8 at 208. Ch 6 at 131. Ch 5 at 99.
317
The main change has been to allow the testator’s signature in places other than the end: see VI.1
above. In South Africa the legislature has been a little more active: see ch 16 at 390 ff.
318
That, of course, had not been true a century earlier when a number of systems took the bold step of
introducing the holograph will: see II.2 and II.3 above.
319
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 ss 2 and 3. See ch 17 at 421 ff.
320
For a discussion, see Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, ‘Form and Formalism: A Case Study’ (1983) 31
American Journal of Comparative Law 627.
321
Ch 14 at 349 ff; ch 15 at 375 ff; ch 16 at 395 ff.
322
Ch 13 at 327.
this regard – courts everywhere emphasize the importance of proving that it expresses
the testamentary intentions of the deceased. But there are also differences. Courts in
South Africa have been troubled by the requirement, unknown in other jurisdictions,
that the document must have been ‘drafted or executed’ by the deceased. And
whereas South Africa requires a court hearing, even where the application is sup-
ported by those who would be adversely affected if the will were to be validated, in
Australia the applicable court rules permit the Registrar to grant probate, under
certain circumstances, without the need for a court order.323
5. Other approaches
Less frequently and more marginally, other approaches can also be found. Thus, in
jurisdictions such as Italy, Hungary, and the Netherlands, the idea has developed
that, for certain defects at least, a will should be voidable rather than void.324 On a
practical level this means that a formally invalid will can be treated as valid if no one
challenges its validity. This is justified on the basis that, if the purpose of the
provision violated is to protect one person against another, it is for the parties
themselves to decide whether to found on the invalidity.325
Rather different is the somewhat surprising approach used, for example, in respect
of the Polish notarial will326 and, more especially, the international will,327 where
only a failure in respect of the ‘core’ formalities results in invalidity. Regarding the
international will, for instance, ‘core’ requirements include the testator’s declaration
to the notary and witnesses, and the signing of the will by the testator, notary, and
witnesses. Not included are the signing of every sheet, the placing of signatures at the
end, the noting of the date, or even the preparation and attachment of the notarial
certificate itself. It would thus seem as if certain formalities are no more than
statements of good practice.
Another possibility can be termed loosely as ‘conversion’. In many jurisdictions in
which more than one type of will is accepted, a will which fails in the category for
which it was intended can nonetheless succeed in a different category if it happens to
comply with the formalities for that category. In Poland, for example, a failure to
comply with a formality in the context of allograph wills results, in principle, in
invalidity; but where the mistake was made by the presiding official, the will is
converted into an oral will.328 In Austria a witnessed will which fails because a
witness lacked the necessary capacity can be upheld as a holograph will if the relevant
parts have been handwritten by the testator.329 In Germany, an invalid will can be
upheld if the requirements of } 140 BGB are met, that is, if it satisfies the require-
ments of another transaction (including another form of will).330 Thus, for example,
it is conceivable that an invalid notarial will could be upheld as a holograph will. In
323
That, eg, is the position in New South Wales and South Australia: see ch 14 at 355.
324
Ch 6 at 138; ch 7 at 170; ch 10 at 267.
325 326 327
Ch 7 at 170. Ch 11 at 273. Ch 3 at 68.
328 329 330
Ch 11 at 278. Ch 9 at 251. Ch 8 at 177.
France and Italy failed notarial wills may qualify as international wills or, in the case
of secret (ie closed) wills, as holograph wills.331
Finally, even an invalid will may take effect if, after the testator’s death, the heirs
choose to accept and act on it.332 But this will depend, amongst other things, on the
nature of the invalidity and on the rules of ‘probate’ in the country in question. The
underlying principle – the venire contra factum proprium defence or, in common law
parlance, estoppel – is not, of course, a peculiarity of wills and need not be pursued
further here. Mention might, however, be made of Article 590 of the Italian Civil
Code, which, applying only to wills, prevents a challenge by a person who, having
been informed as to the cause of invalidity, nonetheless confirms the disposition or
voluntarily executes it after the testator’s death. This does not make the will valid as
such; it simply precludes the person who has confirmed or executed the will from
raising the question of its invalidity. Consequently, other interested persons can still
challenge the will.333
6. Evaluation
Difficult as it is to provide an overall evaluation of the complex processes that have
been described above, a number of general observations are nevertheless possible.
Probably the most important is that the motivation for the ‘flight from formalities’
has been the same everywhere: the desire that testamentary intention should be given
full effect rather than being defeated by innocuous technical error. But, of course,
different techniques can be employed to this end and with different degrees of
success. Liberalization by judicial intervention is, as mentioned earlier, an uncertain
and therefore often an unsatisfactory process. Yet even here some coherence is
possible. In the United States the courts have, over time, developed a ‘doctrine’ in
this regard, namely the ‘doctrine of substantial compliance’, which allows wills not
complying with the requisite formalities to be admitted to probate provided that
‘substantial’, although not ‘strict’, compliance with the prescribed formalities has
been achieved.334 And although the terminology of ‘substantial compliance’ is not
used in other jurisdictions – nor is there any reference to the application of a
‘doctrine’ – this approach nevertheless best describes the judicial technique.
Despite the relief that a doctrine of substantial compliance can provide, most
jurisdictions have also had recourse to legislation which, although often long delayed,
provides a more stable legal environment. Within the context of this technique one
sees, once again, a variety of approaches. In some jurisdictions the legislative inter-
ventions cannot be described as anything more than the mere tinkering with existing
formalities, but in others significant reforms have been introduced. In Scotland alone
has the law been transformed.
Found only in common law or mixed jurisdictions, the dispensing power is
often described as ‘revolutionary’ or ‘radical’. Yet this should not be overstated.
A dispensing power does not lead to the abolition of form, but to its preservation.
331 332
Ch 3 at 56; ch 6 at 139. Ch 3 at 56.
333 334
Ch 6 at 139. Ch 15 at 375 f.
Non-compliant documents, it must be stressed, are not ‘wills’, and they acquire
testamentary effect, if at all, only once further requirements have been satisfied. For
example, in South Africa the two most ‘radical’ examples of the condonation of
formally defective wills (that of an informal suicide note and a so-called ‘internet
will’) required orders from the Supreme Court of Appeal after an earlier refusal by
the High Court.335 And, as Nicola Peart points out, there is still every incentive
to comply with the normal form requirements in order to facilitate the granting
of probate and avoid the human and financial cost of litigation.336 No testator would
choose to peril the disposal of property after death on the dispensing power of a
court.
If the dispensing power can validate an invalid will, the application of principles of
voidability or ‘estoppel’ can ensure that, while remaining invalid, the will is given
effect to in practice. This serves as a reminder that formality is not all: as so often in
law, invalidity only matters if someone notices and, having noticed, decides to do
something about it.
VIII. Some conclusions
1. Seven virtues
Out of the diversity of material presented in this book one thing at least seems clear.
In the matter of testamentary formalities there is a firm dividing line between civil
law jurisdictions on the one hand and those from common law or mixed systems on
the other. In the former, testators typically have a choice between the staid formality
of the notarial will or the made-at-home excitement of the holograph; in the latter
the witnessed will is usually all that is on offer.337 Yet behind this profound
difference can be found a broad measure of agreement as to the purposes of
testamentary formalities – as to the ‘virtues’ which the law ought ideally to promote.
Seven such virtues can be identified.338 (1) Formalities should protect testators
against themselves by alerting them to the significance of what is being done. Drafts
or casual utterances should not be mistaken for the real thing. This is the cautionary
virtue of testamentary formalities. (2) But, in what may be characterized as a
protective virtue, testators should also be protected against others – against coercion
or undue influence on the part of those who assist with the testator’s will-making, or
against the fraud of those who would seek to pass off a forgery as the testator’s own.
A will must represent the authentic and unforced voice of the testator. (3) At the
same time, the rules of will-making should be capable of being readily complied
with. They should be clear and straightforward, and avoid needless formality or traps
335 336
Ch 16 at 395 ff. Ch 14 at 355.
337
See I.1 above.
338
Ashbel G Gulliver and Catherine J Tilson, ‘Classification of Gratuitous Transfers’ (1941) 51 Yale
LJ 1, 5–13 identify three ‘functions’ of testamentary formalities: the ritual (or cautionary), evidentiary, and
protective. In his ‘Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act’ (1975) 88 Harvard LR 489, 493–4, John H
Langbein adds a fourth (‘channeling’).
for the unwary. For without careful regard to this facilitative virtue, the law may
defeat even the clearest expression of testamentary intention. (4) Wills should have
the virtue of cheapness, for cost is an obvious deterrent to testation, especially for the
less well-off. (5) Equally, wills should have the potential for secrecy in the event that
the testator is reluctant to share with family and friends the contents of a will, or even
the fact that there is a will. Faced with publicity a person may choose not to make a
will at all. As will be evident, a presupposition of this and certain other of the virtues
is the view that, while intestacy may sometimes be a rational or at least a defensible
choice, the opportunity of making a will is an end which the law should seek to
promote.
To these virtues, which benefit the testator, must be added two others which
benefit those who must administer the testator’s estate after his death. (6) A will
should have the virtue of discoverability, for even the best-made will may fail if there
is no reliable method of finding it on the testator’s death. (7) Finally, a will should be
free from doubt as to content or authenticity. To the eyes of the administrator, the
testator’s wishes must be clear, and they must be clearly those of the testator. This
evidentiary virtue is perhaps the most important virtue of all.
To some extent, of course, these virtues are hard to reconcile. If a will is secret, it
may not be capable of discovery; if it is cheap, it may not protect the testator; if it is
simple to use, it may be of little evidentiary value. That these tensions may have
implications for the level of formality which the law requires is obvious. At the risk of
simplification, it may be said that four of the virtues (cautionary, protective,
discoverability, evidentiary) argue for a relatively high level of formality and three
(facilitative, cheapness, secrecy) for one which is relatively low. With that thought in
mind, it is instructive to set these virtues against the will-types which are most
commonly available.
The ‘open’ notarial will scores high on everything other than complexity, cost, and
secrecy. For safe and reliable will-making, it is without serious rivals. To some,
however, the complexity, and consequent cost, will seem a serious drawback. The
‘closed’ version, indeed, is so convoluted as to have few users,339 and, in Austria at
least, even the open will is often abandoned by notaries in favour of the much simpler
will with witnesses.340 Yet, complex as the open will may be, the supervision by
notaries ensures that it is rarely invalid for reasons of form. In that important sense if
not in others, the facilitative virtue is amply demonstrated.
In addition to notarial wills, many civilian systems offer a less formal alternative.
Holograph wills are easy to make and hard to forge. They can also be secret. But the
protective and cautionary virtues are largely absent – a holograph will, it has been
observed, ‘is obtainable by compulsion as easily as a ransom note’341 – and, like all
private wills, there are issues as to discoverability. As the sole option, holograph wills
might be unsatisfactory, but as an alternative to notarial wills there is much to be said
in their favour.
339
See, eg, ch 5 at 105; ch 6 at 134.
340
Ch 9 at 225.
341
Gulliver and Tilson (1941) 51 Yale LJ 14. See also Langbein (1975) Harvard LR 495–6.
In terms of formality, the witnessed will stands somewhere between the holograph
will and the notarial. As compared with the former, it displays the protective and
cautionary virtues, as compared with the latter the virtues of cheapness and secrecy.
Other virtues, however, may be strongly present only where the will is made by a
solicitor or other professional (as in practice it often is), and are under pressure where
it is not. That is true in respect of discoverability, for a witnessed will not lodged with
a professional may be hardly more visible than a holograph will made and kept in the
home; and it is also true of the facilitative virtue except in those jurisdictions where a
dispensing power exists to overlook the technical slips which it is all too easy for the
uninstructed layman to commit.342 It is in respect of evidentiary matters, however,
that the witnessed will has been criticized most strongly. In part the problem is the
reliability of witnesses’ evidence in relation to an event which may have taken place
many years before,343 although in practice a presumption of validity will usually
avoid the need for oral testimony.344 But the main difficulty is the risk of forgery,
particularly where, as in a recent scandal in Austria, the witnesses are part of the
plot.345 How significant this is depends on how common attempts at forgery are
likely to be. Writing of the position in England and Wales, Roger Kerridge acknow-
ledges that ‘it is hard to say how many forged wills, if any, obtain probate’, but
ventures the view that ‘some, and possibly many, do’.346
2. Causes of similarity and diversity

Finally, it seems worth saying something about the reasons for similarity and
diversity. In the matter of testamentary formalities, why are some legal systems
different and some the same? And why do jurisdictions divide with such apparent
neatness into common law and mixed systems on the one hand and those of the civil
law on the other?
One reason is historical. In different countries there were different patterns of
reception of Roman law and Canon law or, later on, of French law and English law.
So while French influence carried the holograph will to Italy, Spain, Germany, and
parts of North and South America, English influence brought the witnessed will to
the British Empire, including to countries like South Africa where the earlier
tradition had been completely different.347 Of course, these streams might not
have been so distinct. If French law (like Austrian law) had recognized the witnessed
will, or English law (like Scots law) the holograph, the commonalities in modern-day
law might be more pronounced than the differences.
General formality rules provide a second reason. If only in Scotland could it be
said that the rules for wills were identical to those for other juridical acts for which
342
See, eg, the English case of Re Groffman [1969] 1 WLR 733 where, at a social function, the testator
acknowledged his signature before two witnesses separately instead of simultaneously as the law requires.
The will had in fact been prepared by a solicitor, but even in such cases it is common for the actual
signatures to be added privately and without the solicitor’s supervision.
343
See VI.2 above.
344 345 346
See I.3 above. Ch 9 at 244–5. Ch 13 at 321.
347
See II.2, II.3, and III.2 above.
writing is needed,348 the influence of the general rules was palpable elsewhere.
Nowhere was this more true than in those civilian systems, such as the Netherlands,
where the will was seen as just another notarial deed.349 Conversely, it was the
very failure of common law jurisdictions to develop a distinctive notarial profession,
and therefore a class of notarial deeds, which explains the virtual absence there of
public wills.
Finally, there is the conservatism of the law. Legal development in this area has
been slow and incremental, amounting, usually, to a liberalization of existing rules
rather than an open-minded consideration as to whether new rules might be
required. The international will, conceived as a compromise between the civil and
the common law, has attracted little in the way of support and even less in the way of
actual usage.350 So far as concerns these dominant legal traditions, at least, there has
been no gradual convergence of the law of testamentary formalities.
348 349 350

Ch 17 at 412 ff. Ch 7 at 147. See ch 3 at 65–8.
Index
aboriginal people of Australia 337 Argentina
accidents see disasters and accidents holograph wills 97, 109–10, 434, 440
Acquis Principles 433 Latin America and Brazil 97, 109–10, 434
ad pias causas, wills 41, 440 assistance with wills
agreements/contracts Austria 237
Austria 224, 251 disabled persons 461–2
early modern Europe 31 France and Belgium 58, 64–5
France and Belgium 52 holograph wills 442
Hungary 255, 267 Hungary 257, 264
Italy 122–3, 124, 140–1 Italy 128, 132, 137, 140
Netherlands 152–3, 165 Latin America and Brazil 118
South Africa 387 Scotland 422–4
Spain 72, 93, 95 signatures 455–6
aircraft, wills made on board United States 363
Italy 125, 134, 135–6, 140 Atkinson, Thomas E 374
Latin America and Brazil 110–12 attestation
Netherlands 159 Australia and New Zealand 333, 335, 342, 344,
Poland 272, 280 347–9
public wills 453 Austria 245
Alexander III, Pope 32, 77, 78 early modern Europe 42
Alfonso X, King 76 England and Wales 315
Ali Ibn Abi Talib 282–3 France and Belgium 62, 66
allograph wills see also witnessed wills Germany 178, 180–1, 209
Austria 224, 232–4, 230 Hungary 260, 268–9
Netherlands 154–5, 163 Islamic law 290–5
Poland 278, 281, 466 Italy 137
alterations Latin America and Brazil 104–5, 108, 115–16,
Australia and New Zealand 344–5, 118
349, 352 Netherlands 150–1
Austria 224, 227, 239–40, 244–5 Scotland 412–15, 418–19, 424–7, 429–31
early modern Europe 49–50 South Africa 392
England and Wales 325–6 United States 362, 365–70
France and Belgium 58–9, 63 audio wills
Germany 201–2, 443 Australia and New Zealand 351
holograph wills 443 Hungary 255
Hungary 262–3, 265 Latin America and Brazil 99
Islamic law 289 Spain 84
Italy 130, 137 Augustus, Emperor 17
Latin America and Brazil 106 Australia and New Zealand, formalities in 329–56
Netherlands 151 aboriginal people 337
Roman law 16–17, 24 alterations 344–5, 349, 352
Scotland 424 appointment, powers of 334, 342, 345, 351
South Africa 396, 400–2 attestation 333, 335, 342, 344, 347–9
United States 378–9 audio wills 351
ambassadors 41 Australian Capital Territory 333, 339–42, 344
amendments see alterations beneficiaries as witnesses 335, 344
appointment, powers of blind persons 348
Australia and New Zealand 334, 342, capacity 335, 338–9, 344
345, 351 children 335, 337–8
England and Wales 311–12 codicils 334, 342, 345, 352–3
474 Index
Australia and New Zealand, formalities in (cont.) standard of proof 349–50
cohabitants 332, 338, 345, 348, 457–8 statistics 332
colonialism 330–4, 337, 339–40 Statute of Frauds 1677 330–1, 333–4
common law 330, 348, 354 substantial compliance, doctrine of 350
co-ownership 332 surviving spouse 332
custom 336–7 Tasmania 340, 342–3, 350
declarations 337, 351 Treaty of Waitangi 330
defects/invalidity 331, 335, 337–8, 343, 354 trusts 331–2
deposit of wills 336 undue influence 336
discrimination 344 uniformity 340
dispensing power 331–2, 341, 343, 348–56 Victoria 340, 343–4
document, definition of 351 video recordings 351
electronically, wills made 340, 348–9 Western Australia 333, 338, 340, 342–3, 352
emergency wills 337–9 Wills Act 1837 331–9, 346–7
England 330–1, 334–5 Wills Act 2007 334, 345, 354, 356
evidence 336, 352–5 witnesses 334–6, 339, 342–9, 352, 354, 434,
execution of wills 334–5, 338, 340, 342, 446–7, 457–8
346–9, 353–5 writing 333, 335–7, 339
executors 335, 345, 352 Austria, formalities in 221–53
family provision legislation 331, 342 16th to 18th centuries 228–35
forgery 336 19th and 20th centuries 236
fraud 330–1, 333–4, 336, 339, 342 2004 reforms 236–7
historical background 333–6 accidents 248
holograph wills 353–4 agreements/contracts 224, 251
imminent, where death is 337 allographs 224, 232–4, 240
incorporation by reference 336, 354 alterations 224, 227, 239–40, 244–5
indigenous peoples 330, 336–7, 351 assistance with wills 237
initials 347 attestation 245
intention 331, 336, 340, 342–7, 350–5 Austrian Jurists’ Forum 2009 251–2
internet wills 349 beneficiaries as witnesses 250
interpretation 231, 244, 249, 250, 353 blind persons 242
intestacy 331–2, 338, 349 Canon law 229, 253
joint tenancies 332 capacity 227, 235, 243, 248–52
legal advice 336 charities 222, 223–4
Maoris 330, 336–7, 351 children 227, 246
maritime wills 333, 339 Civil Code 222–51, 256, 262, 439
marks 464 closed wills 469
materials used in wills 336, 351, 464 codicils 34, 35, 223–4, 234
military wills 333, 339, 453 company law 224
mistakes 339–40, 346 conversion 251, 466
New South Wales 333 , 338, 340–3, 350, 355 customs 229–31, 253, 438–9
Northern Territory 333, 340, 342–3 declarations 242
oral wills 333, 339, 351 defects/invalidity 241–4, 247–52
personalty 330–1, 333 deposits of wills 222, 227–8
privileged wills 333, 339 destructions of wills 232
procedure 354–5 dictation 240
qualifications of witnesses 335, 457–8 disabled persons 236, 249
Queensland 333, 340, 343, 350, 353 discrimination 228, 236
realty 330–1, 333 disease, times of contagious 226, 233–4, 237,
reform 339–41, 345, 355–6 245–6
retrospectivity 341, 345 donations mortis causa 222, 223–4
revocation 351–3 Dornbirn scandal 252–3
shift from formalism 464, 465–6 electronic form, wills in 224, 237, 240, 252
signatures 333, 334–5, 340, 342–50, 352, electronic signatures 224
354, 455 emergency wills 226–7, 230, 237, 245–8, 253
South Australia 333, 339–40, 343–4, 349–50, employees of notaries as witnesses 224
354–5 fees 227
Index 475
females 229 secret wills 232, 243
forced heirship 251 sequences of events 243–4
forgery 234–5, 244–5, 470 shift from formalism 228–30, 466
fraud 227, 234, 236, 244–5, 248, 252 signatures 234, 236, 238–41, 243–4, 247, 251
freedom of testation 248 statistics 227–8
functional equivalents 224 undue influence 240–1, 249
Germany 179–80, 188, 195 unilateral dispositions 223–4
heir, institution of an 235 unity of act 229, 239, 243–4, 460
historical background 228–37, 438–9 video wills 252
holograph wills 43, 225–6, 230–40, 243–4, Westgalician Code 233, 235, 253
251, 434, 436, 438–9 witnesses 224–7, 230–6, 240–53, 434, 445–6,
Hungary 256, 262 458
identification of testator 237–8, 241, 247 writing 224, 229–32, 240, 249
illiteracy 229, 235, 241–2
imminent, where death is 226, 230, 246–8 Bankton, Lord (McDouall, Andrew) 407, 427–8
incorporation by reference 248–9 Bartolus de Saxoferrato 85
initials 238, 241 Beaumanoir, Philippe de 53
intention 238 Beekhuis, CH 158
intestacy 250–1 Belgium see France and Belgium, formalities in
Italy 121 Bell, Robert 414, 430
ius commune 228–9 Bello, Andrés 109
joint wills 249 beneficiaries as witnesses 457–8
Josephinian Code 233 Australia and New Zealand 335, 344
judicial wills 226–7, 434, 448 Austria 250
Justinian law 228–32, 235, 253 early modern Europe 38–9
language 238 England and Wales 328
life insurance 224 France and Belgium 62
local laws and customs 229–30, 253 Latin America and Brazil 115–16
machinery, wills made by 237, 240 Roman law 20
maritime wills 226, 233–4, 237, 245–6 Scotland 425, 430
Martini Draft 233 United States 368–9
materials used 238 Bevilaqua, Clovis 111, 113, 116
military wills 226, 234, 237, 246 Blackstone, William 358
mistake 247 blind persons
modern doctrine 237–51 Australia and New Zealand 348
mutual wills 223 Austria 242
names, use of proper 238, 243 early modern Europe 42
natural law 232–3 France and Belgium 65
non-verbal communications 242, 447 Germany 200, 207
notaries 225–8, 253 holograph wills 441–2
number of witnesses 228, 231, 235–6, 242, Hungary 265
244, 247, 446 Italy 128, 132, 133, 441
oral wills 226, 228, 230, 232, 234–6, 241–8, Latin America and Brazil 114
250–2 Roman law 20, 28
Poland 271–2 Scotland 422, 423
previous convictions, persons with 236 Spain 79, 88
private wills 107, 224–30, 233–4, 236–52, 434 body language see non-verbal communications
procedure 237–51 Brazil, formalities in see Latin America, formalities in
public wills 222, 224–8, 230, 233–4, 237,
253, 448 Calle, Juan José 110
qualifications of witnesses 247, 458 Canon law
registration 227–8 Austria 229, 253
religious discrimination 236 Bavaria 39–40
revocation 247 Belgium 39
Roman law 228–34, 243 early modern Europe 31–2, 34–5, 39–41,
rural areas, people in 230 46, 48
seals 231 France and Belgium 53–4
476 Index
Canon law (cont.) incorporation by reference 460–1
holograph wills 441 international wills 451
Hungary 267 legal advice 436
Netherlands 39–40 making wills 436
Poland 276–7 maritime wills 453
private or public wills, as 39–41 notaries 434
public wills 448 private wills 434
Saxony 34, 39 public wills 448–9
similarity and diversity, causes of 470 seven virtues 469
Spain 76–8 signatures 456
Thuringia 39 similarity and diversity, causes of 471
witnesses 445 South Africa 382
capacity witnesses 445–6
Australia and New Zealand 335, 338–9, 344 close relatives, rights of 49
Austria 227, 235, 243, 248–52 closed wills see also private wills
date of wills 459 Austria 469
England and Wales 314, 328 declarations 450
France and Belgium 59–60, 62, 68 definition 450
Hungary 257, 259, 263, 267 France and Belgium 54–5, 61, 64–6, 69
Islamic law 288 Netherlands 450
Italy 124, 132 notaries 450
Netherlands 162, 168, 169–70 private wills 450
Scotland 425 public wills 450
South Africa 392, 393 seals 450
Spain 79–80, 88 seven virtues 469
United States 366, 372 signatures 450
Cato the Elder 2 Spain 76, 78, 80, 82–5, 89, 94–5
cautionary virtue 468, 470 witnesses 450
charities codicils
Austria 222, 223–4 Australia and New Zealand 334, 342, 345,
early modern Europe 31–2 352–3
Islamic law 285 Austria 34, 35, 223–4, 234
Roman law 23 Bavaria 33–4, 46
cheapness 469–70 common law systems 454
children see also parental wills early modern Europe 33–5, 44–6
Australia and New Zealand 335, 337–8 emergency wills 454
Austria 227, 246 England and Wales 320–1
France and Belgium 54 France 35
Germany 210–11 Germany 34–5
holograph wills 442 heir, institution of an 454
Hungary 263, 265, 267 ius commune 454
qualifications of witnesses 457 Latin America and Brazil 116–17, 454
Roman law 4, 16, 411, 425–6 Netherlands 34–5, 162, 168, 169–70, 454
South Africa 392 Roman law 15–17, 23–4, 28–9, 33, 35,
Chile 99, 109–10 44–5, 454
Church see also Canon law; priests, wills made Romano-Dutch law 34–5
before San Marino 34
early modern Europe 31–2 Saxony 34–5
England and Wales, ecclesiastical courts in 309, Scotland 421, 424
313, 321, 324, 453 South Africa 385–6
Netherlands 143, 149 Spain 34–5, 76, 77, 90–1, 95, 454
Roman law 23 United States 363
civil law systems see also individual countries cohabitants (Australia and New Zealand) 332,
common law systems 468–9 338, 345, 348
date of wills 459 colonialism
emergency wills 451 Australia and New Zealand 330–4, 337,
holograph wills 434, 441, 469 339–40
Index 477
Latin America and Brazil 97–8, 100, 108–10 Austria 229–31, 253, 438–9
common law systems see also particular countries early modern Europe 34, 38, 39, 43
civil law systems 468–9 England and Wales 311
codicils 454 France and Belgium 53–4, 438
date of wills 459 Hungary 255–6, 262
disabled persons 462 public wills 448
dispensing powers 467 Saxony 34
electronic signatures 456 Scotland 407
evidence 437 South Africa 383–4
fees 435 Spain 93
incorporation by reference 460–1
making wills 435–6 date of wills
military wills 453 capacity 459
mistakes 436 civil law systems 459
presumptions 437 common law systems 459
public wills 448 France and Belgium 58, 59–60, 66, 68, 70,
qualifications of witnesses 458 129, 459
reliability 436 Germany 189–90, 459
shift from formalism 465–8 Hungary 259
signatures 455–6 Islamic law 301
similarity and diversity, causes of 471 Italy 127, 128–9, 137–8, 459
South Africa 382, 385, 403, 434 Latin America and Brazil 106
statistics 435 Netherlands 150, 158, 171–2
unity of act 460 notaries 459
witnesses 434–5, 437, 446–7 Poland 275–6
compulsory succession and forced heirship presumptions 459
Austria 251 Roman law 9
early modern Europe 29 Scotland 459
Hungary 255, 257–8 shift from formalism 465
Islamic law 284–5 Spain 79, 82–4, 92
Italy 123 United States 372–3
making wills 436 de Groot, Hugo 39, 144
Netherlands 146 deaf persons
Scotland 405–6 disabled persons 461–2
Spain 72 Germany 207–8
condonation see also dispensing power interpreters 461–2
South Africa 395–400, 403 Italy 133
conjugal wills see married couples Latin America and Brazil 114–15
Constantine, Emperor 21, 27–8 Spain 80, 88
consular officials death or disappearance of witnesses 8, 107,
ambassadors 41 436–7, 458–9
early modern Europe 41 deathbed wills 452–3
Germany 176 Australia and New Zealand 337
Spain 82 Austria 226, 230, 246–8
contagious diseases see disease, times of England and Wales 309
contagious Germany 215, 217, 220
conversion Hungary 266
Austria 251, 466 Islamic law 288, 293–4
France and Belgium 66, 467 Latin America and Brazil 111, 113
Germany 177, 213 Poland 279–80
Italy 159, 467 Roman law 4, 14–15
Poland 278, 280, 466 Scotland 406–7, 409–10
Roman law 24 Spain 85–6, 94
shift from formalism 466–7 defects/invalidity
Cromwell, Oliver 310 Australia and New Zealand 331, 335, 337–8,
custom 343, 354
Australia and New Zealand 336–7 Austria 241–4, 247–52
478 Index
defects/invalidity (cont.) disabled persons see also blind persons; deaf
early modern Europe 29, 34, 38, 49 persons
England and Wales 310, 325–6 assistance 461–2
France and Belgium 56, 58–60, 64, 68 Austria 236, 249
Germany 177, 180, 184, 188–92, 198–200, common law systems 462
203, 208, 215–17 deaf persons 461–2
Hungary 257–8, 260, 262–3, 265–9 declarations 461–2
Islamic law 286, 288, 290–1, 293, 299–300, discrimination 462
304 early modern Europe 42
Italy 138–40 France and Belgium 65–6
Latin America and Brazil 105, 111, 117–19 Germany 181, 200, 207–10, 462
Netherlands 148, 153, 154, 156–8, 160–1, holograph wills 442, 461
167, 169–73 illiteracy 461–2
Poland 273–4, 277–8 interpreters 462
Roman law 6, 9–11, 16, 24, 361 Italy 128, 132–3
shift from formalism 467–8 Latin America and Brazil 102, 106, 114–15
South Africa 393, 395–400, 402–3 marks 462
Spain 87, 89, 91 non-verbal communications 462
United States 360, 365, 371, 374–5, 378 open wills 461
delegation oral wills 462
Hungary 257 Poland 275–6
Italy 124, 131 Scotland 422, 423
Latin America and Brazil 119 signatures 461
Netherlands 152–3 South Africa 390, 393–4, 398
Poland 273–4 Spain 80, 88, 89–90
Spain 82, 95 United States 363
deposit of wills disasters and accidents
Australia and New Zealand 336 Austria 248
Austria 222, 227–8 Italy 125, 134, 135, 140
early modern Europe 43 Netherlands 159
England and Wales 320 Spain 82
France and Belgium 69 discoverability virtue 469–70
Hungary 258, 264–5 discrimination
Islamic law 287 Australia and New Zealand 344
Italy 123, 125–6, 134, 136 Austria 228, 236
Latin America and Brazil 110 disabled persons 462
Netherlands 146, 153–6, 163–4, 174 Germany 209–10, 462
open wills 449 South Africa 398
Roman law 23 Spain 79
Spain 83 disease, times of contagious
destruction of wills Austria 226, 233–4, 237, 245–6
Austria 232 early modern Europe 41, 48
England and Wales 320–1 France and Belgium 66
France and Belgium 61 Hungary 265
Germany 219–20 Italy 125, 134, 135
Italy 137 Roman law 28
Netherlands 163 Spain 81–2, 85–6, 94
Roman law 17, 24 disinheritance
Dickens, Charles 310 early modern Europe 29, 41, 44, 49
dictation Hungary 257–8
Austria 240 Islamic law 284–5
France and Belgium 62–4, 68 Roman law 11, 18, 21–2, 25, 28
international wills 451 dispensing powers see also condonation
Italy 128, 131 Australia and New Zealand 331–2, 341, 343,
Latin America and Brazil 102, 118 348–56
South Africa 398 common law systems 467
Diocletian, Emperor 23 England and Wales 323, 327
Index 479
Italy 140 internal formalities 46–9
Scotland 408, 411, 419, 430 interpretation 37, 40, 46, 48, 50
shift from formalism 465–6, 467–8 intestacy 42, 49
United States 377–8 ius commune 33–7, 42, 46
diversity and similarity, causes of 470–1 kings and princes 42
document, definition of married couples’ (conjugal) wills 48
Australia and New Zealand 351 military wills 30, 41
South Africa 396–7 morality, principles of public 29
Domat, Jean 50 mutual wills 31
donations mortis causa names, use of proper 49
Austria 222, 223–4 natural law 30, 39, 43, 48
early modern Europe 48 Netherlands 143–4
France and Belgium 52–4 notaries 32, 45
Germany 196, 198 number of witnesses 29, 35, 37, 42, 44
Hungary 256–7 oral wills 38, 46–8
Islamic law 283 parental wills 28, 41–4, 46–7
Italy 122, 124 participate, interests of family to 29
Netherlands 143, 160–1 parts of estate, acquisition on death of
Roman law 25, 440, 463 different 31
Scotland 406, 413 presumptions 37, 50
shift from formalism 463 private wills 32, 35–41, 44
Spain 74–5, 91, 93, 95 professional writers 32
drafts see notes and drafts, informal public wills 28, 36–41, 48, 50, 448
qualifications of witnesses 32, 38–9
early modern Europe, formalities in 27–50 Roman law 27–38, 42, 44–6, 49–50, 440
ad pias causas, wills 41, 440 rural wills 34, 41
agreements/contracts 31 shift from formalism 28, 34–7, 41–2, 45–8, 50
alteration of testamentary dispositions 49–50 signatures 42, 44, 467–8
ambassadors 41 testamentum mysticum 38
analogous rules and principles 41–2 ultima voluntas non debet ex alieno arbitrio
attestation 42 pendere 47–8
beneficiaries as witnesses 38–9 undue influence 47
blind persons 42 universal succession 31
Canon law 31–2, 34–5, 39–41, 46, 48 witnesses 29, 32, 35, 37–9, 41–2, 44, 46–7
Catholic Church 31–2 writing 38, 41–7, 50
charities 31–2 ecclesiastical courts (England and Wales) 309,
close relatives, rights of 49 313, 321, 324, 453
compulsory portion, right to a 29 Egypt 296, 299–301
codicils 33–5, 44–6 electronic signatures
custom 34, 38, 39, 43 Austria 224
declarations 47–8 common law systems 456
defects/invalidity 29, 34, 38, 49 England and Wales 315
deposit of wills 43 Hungary 260
disabled persons 42 Netherlands 166–7
disease, times of contagious 41, 48 Scotland 422
disinheritance 29, 41, 44, 49 signatures 456
donation mortis causa 48 South Africa 387
drafts and notes, distinguishing 46–7 Spain 83–4
evidence 36, 44 United States 363
executors 30 electronically, wills made see also electronic
females 31 signatures; internet wills
formal privileges and modifications 41–2 Australia and New Zealand 340, 348–9
fraud 47 Austria 224, 237, 240, 252
heir, institution of the 33–4 France and Belgium 55–7
holograph or handwritten wills 32, 35, 42–7, Germany 116, 205, 220
50, 438–9 holograph wills 443–4
intention 47 Hungary 255, 260
480 Index
electronically, wills made (cont.) Common Pleas 309
Italy 127, 133 Court of Probate 313, 321
Latin America and Brazil 101–2, 116, 119 customary freeholds 311
Netherlands 156, 166–7 defects/invalidity 310, 325–6
Poland 275, 281 deposit of wills 320
Scotland 421–2, 427 destruction of wills 320–1
South Africa 386–7, 396 dispensing power 323, 327
Spain 83–4 ecclesiastical courts 309, 313, 321, 324, 453
textspeak 442 electronic signatures 315
United States 359, 363, 365 evidence 321, 327
eligibility of witnesses see qualifications of Exchequer 309
witnesses execution of wills 307–8, 315–16, 325–8
emergency wills 451–3 see also aircraft, wills executors 309, 319
made on; deathbed wills; maritime wills; fees 318–20
military wills feudal incidents 308–10
Australia and New Zealand 337–9 forgery 321–2, 470
Austria 226–7, 230, 237, 245–8, 253 formal wills 307–12
civil law countries 451 fraud 310–11, 323–5
codicils 454 guardians, appointment of 311
definition 434 historical background 307–13
Germany 176, 183, 188, 212–18, 220, 452 holograph wills 43, 325, 441
holograph wills 452 imminent, where death is 309
Hungary 258, 265–7, 452–3 incorporation by reference 316
imminent, where death is 452–3 inheritance tax 307
Islamic law 302–3 intention 326
Italy 124–6, 134–6, 139–40 interpretation 310, 312–16, 324
Latin America and Brazil 97–8, 109, 110–14 intestacy 306, 309, 317–18, 326
Netherlands 159–60 joint tenancies 306
oral wills 452–3 jointly owned property 306, 317
Poland 272, 279–80 King’s Bench 309
public wills 452 life estates 311
Roman law 3, 25, 451 life insurance 307
Scotland 427 maritime wills 311, 322–5
Spain 76–82, 85–6, 89, 93 materials used 314, 464
traditionalism 452 Middle Ages 307–8
United States 373–4 military wills 311, 322–5, 453
witnesses 452–3 money in the funds 311
employees of notaries as witnesses negligence 319, 328
Austria 224 nomination 306, 316–18
Italy 131 notaries 319, 327
Latin America and Brazil 101–2, 116, 119 oral wills 308, 322–5, 453
qualifications of witnesses 457, 458–9 pension fund nomination 306, 307, 316–17
Spain 88–9 personal representatives 309, 318, 320
enfranchising clauses 424, 461 personalty 308–11, 313, 318, 323
England and Wales, formalities in 305–28 preparation 318–21
19th century 311–12 preservation of wills 320
administration of estates 317–18 presumptions 315, 320, 325
administrators 309 privileged testators 314, 324–5
alterations 325–6 probate, admission to 316, 319, 321–3, 327
appointment, powers of 311–12 Probate Division 313
attestation 315 Real Property Commissioners 311–12
beneficial ownership 306, 317 realty 308–13
beneficiaries as witnesses 328 reform 326–8
capacity 314, 328 registration of wills 318–21
Chancery 310 revocation 326–7
codicils 320–1 Roman law 318, 324, 441, 453
common law courts 309–10, 313 secret trusts 316
Index 481
severance 306 early modern Europe 30
shift from formalism 323–4, 464–5 England and Wales 309, 319
signatures 312–15, 321–2, 326–7 Germany 183
similarity and diversity, causes of 470 Latin America and Brazil 117
small estates 323 Netherlands 143–4, 159
solicitors, monopoly of 319 Scotland 409–10, 413, 428
statistics 316–17 South Africa 382
Statute of Frauds 310–11, 322–4, 453 Spain 74, 75
Statute of Wills 308–10, 323–5 United States 359, 361
statutory nominations 306 extraordinary wills see emergency wills
statutory wills 313
survivorship 306 facilitative virtue 468–70
tax 307, 308–9 family provision legislation (Australia and New
tenancies in common 306 Zealand) 331, 342
uses 308–10 fees
Wills Act 1837 311–16, 318, 323–4, 326, 441, Austria 227
446, 464 common law 435
witnesses 315, 326–8, 434, 446 England and Wales 318–20
writing 309–10 Germany 211–12
epidemics see disease, times of contagious Italy 125, 137, 435
error see mistake Latin America and Brazil 104, 435
Erskine, John 407, 413 Poland 274, 277–8, 435
estoppel 467–8 Scotland 427
EU law 124 Spain 435
evidence females
Australia and New Zealand 336, 353–5 Austria 229
common law systems 437 early modern Europe 31
early modern Europe 36, 44 Islamic law 294
England and Wales 321, 327 Roman law 4, 11
France and Belgium 58, 60–1, 63, 68 Saxony 31
Islamic law 291–2, 294, 296, 298, 300–1, 303–4 South Africa 383
Italy 137, 141 feudalism
Netherlands 146, 148–50, 153, 156, 161–3 England and Wales 308–10
Roman law 17 Scotland 405, 406–7
Scotland 414, 417–18, 426, 428–9 fideicommissum (limited gifts) 12–14, 15, 20–4,
seven virtues 469–70 30, 35, 45
signatures 455 finding wills
South Africa 400 discoverability virtue 469–70
Spain 85 France and Belgium 69
United States 361–2, 364, 372–3, 375, 378 Scotland 428
exceptional circumstances, wills made in see Spain 85
emergency wills fingerprints
execution of wills Latin America and Brazil 103, 110
Australia and New Zealand 334–5, 338, 340, Netherlands 16
342, 346–9, 353–5 Spain 84, 89
England and Wales 307–8, 315–16, 325–8 flight from formalities see shift from formalism
France and Belgium 69 forced heirship see compulsory succession and
Islamic law 289–90, 299 forced heirship
Italy 139 forgery
Netherlands 145–6, 149–51, 159, 162, 165, Australia and New Zealand 336
171–4 Austria 234–5, 244–5, 470
Scotland 429–30 England and Wales 321–2, 470
South Africa 383, 387, 396–8, 401 France and Belgium 57, 64
Spain 75, 78, 81–3, 85–6 Germany 183
United States 362–4, 367–70, 376, 378–9 Hungary 269
executors Islamic law 295, 303–4
Australia and New Zealand 335, 345, 352 Italy 127
482 Index
forgery (cont.) identification of testator 57, 59, 63
Poland 277 illegibility 58
Scotland 417, 426 illiteracy 55, 58, 63
seven virtues 470 inability to sign wills 63
Spain 87, 91 incorporation by reference 59
United States 369–70 initials 61, 63, 66
France and Belgium, formalities in 51–70 international wills 55, 56–7, 59, 65–9, 70, 136,
age 57 434, 451
agreements/contracts 52 interpretation 61, 63–4, 68, 70
alterations 58–9, 63 intestacy 53–5, 69
assistance with wills 58, 64–5 Islamic law 303
attestation 62, 66 Italy 121–2, 124, 126, 130, 140
bailiffs 53 joint wills 56
Basle Convention on Registration of judges, wills made before 208–9
Wills 1972 68–9 laicization of wills 54
beneficiaries as witnesses 62 language 58, 62, 65
blind persons 65 legal advice 57, 61, 64
burden of proof 61 life insurance 52
cancellations 58 maritime wills 55
Canon law 39, 53–4 marriage 52
capacity 59–60, 62, 68 married couples’ wills 56, 62
Central Register of Wills 69 mechanical means, wills made by 57, 63
certificates 65–8 military wills 55
children 54 mistake 58–9
chronology 59 modern law 55–7
close relatives, rights of 49 names, use of proper 61, 63
closed wills 54–5, 61, 64–6, 69 Netherlands 145–6, 149, 157, 174
Code Civile 52, 438 notaries 53–4, 57, 62–9, 131, 436
Code Napoléon 52, 54–5 nullity 56, 63, 68–9, 70
codicils 35 number of witnesses 53–4, 62
conversion 66, 467 oral wills 55–6, 66
custom 53–4, 438 Poland 271
date of wills 58, 59–60, 66, 68, 70, 129, 459 preservation of wills 67
death, procedure after 69 presumptions 50, 58, 60
declarations 63, 65–8, 450 priests 55
defects/invalidity 56, 58–60, 64, 68 private wills 65
delivery, requests for 69 probative force 68
deposit of wills 69 procedure 62–3, 69
destruction of wills 61 public wills 53–6, 59, 61–4
dictation 62–4, 68 qualifications of witnesses 62
disabled persons 65–6 registration 64, 68–9
disease, times of contagious 55 revocation 53
donatio mortis causa 52–4 Roman law 52–4, 56
electronic wills 55–7 seals 53, 64
evidence 58, 60–1, 63, 68 secret or closed wills 54–5, 61, 64–6, 69
exceptions 180–2 shift from formalism 70, 464, 467
execution of wills 69 signatures 53, 56, 58, 60–1, 63–4, 66, 68, 70
finding wills 69 similarity and diversity, causes of 470
forgery 57, 64 Southern Low Countries 54
freedom of testation 54–6, 58, 62, 70 statistics 57, 435
French Revolution 54–5 supplementary wills 59
Germany 206, 208–9, 219 surviving spouse 52
heir, designation of 53–6 types of will 55–6
historical background 53–5, 438 undue influence 58
holograph wills 43, 53–61, 69–70, 109–10, unity of the act 58, 60
126–7, 130, 179, 231, 434, 438–41 universal legatees 69
identical wills 56 Washington Convention 1973 55, 65–6, 70, 451
Index 483
witnesses 53–4, 56, 62–8, 445 defects/invalidity 177, 180, 184, 188–92,
writing 53, 55, 59, 63 198–200, 203, 208, 215–17
fraud destruction of wills 219–20
Australia and New Zealand 330–1, 333–4, disabled persons 181, 200, 207–10, 462
336, 339, 342 discrimination 209–10, 462
Austria 227, 234, 236, 244–5, 248, 252 donations mortis causa 196, 198
England and Wales 310–11, 323–5 East Germany 197
Germany 186 electronically, wills made 205, 220
holograph wills 469 emergency wills 176, 183, 188, 212–18,
Hungary 264–5 220, 452
incorporation by reference 460–1 employees of notaries as witnesses 116
Islamic law 303 executors 183
Italy 137 fees 211–12
Latin America and Brazil 104, 110, 111 foreigners, wills of 184–5
Netherlands 150 forgery 183
Poland 434 France 206, 208–9, 219
Scotland 429–30 fraud 186
seven virtues 469 freedom of testation 186, 210, 219
signatures 455–6 Hamburg 209
South Africa 389, 391, 392, 395–6, 398 heir, institution of an 182
Spain 89 Hesse 180
United States 361–2, 369, 377 historical background 177–80
freedom of testation holograph wills 43–5, 176–207, 211–20, 434,
Austria 248 437–443, 464
France and Belgium 54–6, 58, 62, 70 identification of testator 178–9, 181, 201
Germany 186, 210, 219 illegibility 200
Hungary 254, 257, 266 imminent, where death is 215, 217, 220
Islamic law 284–6 initials 201, 203
Italy 123 intention 186, 188, 197–8, 203, 220
Latin America and Brazil 100–1 interpretation 185–92, 199–200, 203, 211,
Poland 272 216, 463–4
Scotland 405–6 intestacy 186, 190
South Africa 384 ius commune 179–82, 212, 445
Spain 93 judges, wills made before 182–3, 206, 208–9,
211–14, 216, 220
Gaius 4, 358 legal advice 211, 220
Germany, formalities in 175–220 local government officials, wills made
19th century 177–80 before 206
Academy for German Law 193–6, 216 making wills 180–2
agreements/contracts 204 maritime wills 176, 183, 218, 220
Alsace and Lorraine 179, 187 materials used in wills 194, 203
alterations 201–2, 443 mayors, wills made before 176, 212, 215
attestation 178, 180–1, 209 military wills 183
Austria 179–80, 188, 195 mistakes 184, 189–92, 208, 215–17
Baden 438, 179, 184, 185, 188, 209, 438 names, use of proper 189, 200–1
Bavaria 32–4, 38–40, 46, 179–80, 185, 209 national socialism 191–6, 219
blind persons 200, 207 non-verbal communication 210, 449
children 210–11 notaries 176–7, 182–3, 185, 204, 206–8,
Civil Code (BGB) 176–220, 438, 463, 466–7 210–20, 436
close relatives, rights of 49 notes, use of informal 182, 184
codicils 34–5 nullity 188–91
consular officials 176 number of witnesses 176, 179, 182–3, 212,
conversion 177, 213 214, 217–18, 220
date of wills 189–90, 459 open wills 449
deaf persons 207–8 oral wills 181, 206–7, 209–11, 213–14,
declarations 182, 187, 193, 195, 206–7, 216–18
209–11, 213–14, 218 particular laws 178
484 Index
Germany, formalities in (cont.) historical background
pastors, wills made before 206 Australia and New Zealand 333–6
Poland 271–2 Austria 228–37, 438–9
preservation of wills 211 early modern Europe 27–50
presumptions 208 England and Wales 307–13
private wills 177–84, 216 France and Belgium 53–5, 438
Prussia 32, 178, 206 Germany 177–80
public wills 178, 180, 182–5, 204–14, Hungary 254–7, 262
448–9 Latin America and Brazil 97–100
qualifications of witnesses 458 Netherlands 143–6
Rhineland 179, 185, 187 Poland 270–2
Roman law 179, 184, 205, 212, 437 public wills 448–9
rural areas, people in 180–1 Roman law 1–26
Saxony 31, 34–5, 39, 180–2, 206 Scotland 405
Schleswig 179 South Africa 384–5, 401, 402–3
seals 210 Spain 72, 73–8, 85, 92
secret wills 181–2 witnesses 444–5
shift from formalism 185–92, 197–201, Hitler, Adolf 192
207–8, 463–7 holograph wills 433–4, 437–44
signatures 183, 187, 198–202, 205 alterations 443
similarity and diversity, causes of 470 Argentina 97, 109–10, 434, 440
statistics 203–4 assistance 442
Thuringia 39 Australia and New Zealand 353–4
undue influence 181, 184, 187, 211 Austria 43, 225–6, 230–40, 243–4, 251, 434,
unity of act 203, 443 436, 438–9
video recordings 200 blind persons 441–2
Visigoths 437 Canon law 441
witnesses 116, 176–83, 206–7, 210–18, 220, Castile 109
445, 465 children 442
writing 181, 183, 187 Chile 109–10
gestures see non-verbal communications civil law systems 434, 441, 469
gifts on contemplation of death see donations custom 438–9, 440
mortis causa definition 433, 441
girls see females disabled persons 442, 461
Gomes, Orlando 99, 116 early modern Europe 32, 35, 42–7, 50, 438–9
Gregor IX, Pope 77 electronic means, wills made by 443–4
Grundmann, Stefan 205 emergency wills 452
Gürtner, Fritz 192 England and Wales 43, 325, 441
France and Belgium 43, 53–61, 69–70,
handwritten wills see holograph wills 109–10, 126–7, 130, 179, 231, 434, 438–41
heir, institution of an fraud 469
Austria 235 future 443–4
codicils 454 Germany 43–5, 176–207, 211–20, 434,
France and Belgium 53–6 437–443, 464
Germany 182 Hungary 261–2, 264–5, 434, 439, 464
Hungary 257–8 illiteracy 441–2, 461
Islamic law 284–5 intention 443
Netherlands 145 Islamic law 287–9, 291–3, 296, 298–303, 439
Poland 274 Italy 125–30, 132, 133–41, 436, 439, 441
Roman law 9–11, 15–18, 21, 23–5, 28, 33, ius commune 440–1
358, 454 language 442
Scotland 405 Latin America and Brazil 97, 98, 105, 108–10,
Spain 76, 90–1 113, 119, 434, 440
United States 359 legal advice 435, 436
Helmholz, RH 325 materials used 442
Henry VIII, King 309 mechanical means, wills made by 442, 443–4
Hippel, Fritz von 191, 194–6 Mexico 110, 440
Index 485
modern law 441–2 heir, institution of an 257–8
Netherlands 146, 153–5, 157–8, 163, 174, 439 historical background 254–7, 262
notaries 468–70 holograph wills 261–2, 264–5, 439, 434, 464
Panama 110, 440 identification of testator 261–3, 266–7, 447
Paraguay 440 illiteracy 255, 263, 265, 267
Peru 110, 440 imminent, where death is 266
Poland 272–8, 281, 434 inability to write 265
Portugal 108, 439, 440 intention 255, 257, 259, 269
pre-printed words 443 interpretation 255, 259, 266–7, 269
presumptions and proof 437 intestacy 256, 264, 268
qualifications of witnesses 458 judges, wills made before 434, 448
reception 439–40 Justinian’s law 256
Roman law 19, 22, 28, 42, 437, 440–1 language 259, 260, 266–7
Scotland 43, 415–19, 430–1, 439, 444, 465 local laws and customs 256
seven virtues 469–70 making wills 258–60, 265, 267–8
shift from formalism 464–6 maritime wills 265
signatures 443 materials used in wills 261
South Africa 399–400 mechanical means, wills made by 264
Spain 76–85, 89–94, 108, 434, 439–40, 442 military wills 265–6
Switzerland 439 mistakes 262, 267–9
textspeak 442 names, use of proper 261, 262
United States 362, 370–3, 379, 434, 439, 441, 443 notaries 256, 258, 259, 261, 264–5
unity of act 443, 460 notes, use of informal 266
Uruguay 110 number of witnesses 262, 265–6
witnesses 445, 446–7, 458 oral wills 258, 263, 265–7
Hume, David 415 partial invalidity 268
Hungary, formalities in 254–69 Poland 271
agreements/contracts 255, 267 private wills 258–61, 264–5, 268
alterations 262–3, 265 public wills 256, 258, 263, 265, 448
assistance with will 257, 264 qualifications of witnesses 458
attestation 260, 268–9 Roman law 255, 257–8, 263
audio wills 255 secret wills 261–2
Austrian Civil Code 256, 262 shift from formalism 261, 268–9, 464, 466
blind persons 265 signatures 259–65
Canon law 256 statistics 256–7
capacity 257, 259, 263, 267 video wills 255
children 263, 265, 267 void or voidable wills 267–8
Civil Code 257–60, 265–6, 268 witnesses 260, 261–6, 268, 447, 458
common requirements 257–60 writing 258, 268
compulsory portion 255
custom 255–6, 262 identification of testators
date of wills 259 Austria 237–8, 241, 247
declarations 257, 260, 262, 267 France and Belgium 57, 59, 63
defects/invalidity 257–8, 260, 262–3, 265–9 Germany 178–9, 181, 201
delegation 257 Hungary 261–3, 266–7, 447
deposit of wills 258, 264–5 Islamic law 288
disease, times of contagious 265 Netherlands 166–7
disinheritance 257–8 Poland 275, 277
donations mortis causa 256–7 Roman law 10
electronic form, wills made 255, 260 South Africa 393–4
electronic signatures 260 Spain 79, 82, 84, 86–8, 90
emergency wills 258, 265–7, 452–3 United States 362–3, 370
forced heirship 257–8 illiteracy
forgery 269 Austria 229, 235, 241–2
fraud 264–5 disabled persons 461–2
free royal towns 256 France and Belgium 55, 58, 63
freedom of testation 254, 257, 266 holograph wills 441–2, 461
486 Index
illiteracy (cont.) insurance see life insurance
Hungary 255, 263, 265, 267 intention
Islamic law 292, 301 Australia and New Zealand 331, 336, 340,
Italy 128, 132, 133 342–7, 350–5
Latin America and Brazil 106, 114–15 Austria 238
Netherlands 168 early modern Europe 47
Scotland 423 England and Wales 326
signatures 455 facilitative virtue 469
South Africa 390, 393–4, 398 Germany 186, 188, 197–8, 203, 220
Spain 80 holograph wills 443
United States 363 Hungary 255, 257, 259, 269
inability to sign see also illiteracy Islamic law 283, 286, 287–8, 290, 295, 302
France and Belgium 63 Italy 127, 130–7, 141
Hungary 265 Latin America and Brazil 103, 105, 119
Italy 132 legal advice 435
Latin America and Brazil 103 Netherlands 148
Netherlands 168 neutral institutions 433
Spain 88–90, 92 Poland 273, 275–6
incapacity see capacity Roman law 36–7
incorporation by reference Scotland 413, 423, 426–7, 430
Australia and New Zealand 336, 354 shift from formalism 463, 467
Austria 248–9 signatures 455
civil law systems 460–1 South Africa 382, 386, 389–91, 393–4, 396,
common law systems 460–1 399–400
enfranchising clauses 461 Spain 80, 85, 91
England and Wales 316 United States 360–1, 371–2, 376–8
France and Belgium 59 witnesses, reliance on 433
fraud 460 writing 433
informal documents 460–1 internal formalities
Latin America and Brazil 106 early modern Europe 46–9
Netherlands 151–3 Islamic law 289–90, 303
Poland 273 Roman law 9
Scotland 424 Scotland 426–7
South Africa 386 Spain 90–1
Spain 85, 94 international wills
United States 376–8, 461 civil law countries 451
India 297–8, 304 dictation 451
indigenous people France and Belgium 55, 56–7, 59, 65–9, 70,
Aboriginals 337 136, 434, 451
Australia and New Zealand 330, 336–7, 351 Italy 122, 125, 136–9, 434, 451
Maoris 330, 336–7, 351 Scotland 421
informal notes see notes and drafts, informal signatures 451
initials Washington Convention 1973 55, 65–6, 70,
Australia and New Zealand 347 125, 136, 451
Austria 238, 241 witnesses 451
France and Belgium 61, 63, 66 writing 451
Germany 201, 203 internet wills
Italy 129 Australia and New Zealand 349
Latin America and Brazil 103 Netherlands 156, 157–8
Netherlands 150–1, 167–8 Scotland 427
Poland 276 shift from formalism 468
Scotland 422 United States 359
signatures 456 interpretation
South Africa 388–90 Australia and New Zealand 231, 244, 249,
Spain 72 250, 353
United States 364 early modern Europe 37, 40, 46, 48, 50
Innocent III, Pope 32 England and Wales 310, 312–16, 324
Index 487
France and Belgium 61, 63–4, 68, 70 emergency wills 302–3
Germany 185–92, 197–200, 203, 211, 216, evidence 291–2, 294, 296, 298, 300–1, 303–4
463–4 execution of the will 289–90, 299
Hungary 255, 259, 266–7, 269 females 294
Islamic law 283, 286–9, 295 foreign law, reception of 295–6
Italy 127, 131–3, 139 forgery 295, 303–4
Latin America and Brazil 106, 116–18 France 303
Netherlands 156, 158 fraud 303
Poland 273–6 freedom of testation 284–6
shift from formalism 463–4 Hanafi law 287, 288, 291
South Africa 385–6, 389, 391–3, 397–8, 403 Hanbalis school 287–8, 291
Spain 79–82, 85–9 heir, institution of an 284–5
United States 365, 368, 371–2 holograph wills 287–9, 291–3, 296,
interpreters 298–303, 439
disabled persons 461–2 identification of testator 288
Italy 132–3 illiteracy 292, 301
Spain 80–1 imminent, where death is 288, 293–4
intestacy India 297–8, 304
Australia and New Zealand 331–2, 338, 349 informality, principle of 286, 288–9, 291,
Austria 250–1 295–6, 299–300, 304
early modern Europe 42, 49 intention 283, 286, 287–8, 290, 295, 302
England and Wales 306, 309, 317–18, 326 internal formalities 289–90, 303
France and Belgium 53–5, 69 interpretation 283, 286–9, 295
Germany 186, 190 intestacy 284–6, 293
Hungary 256, 264, 268 Iran 296, 301–3
Islamic law 284–6, 293 Iraq 300–1
Italy 122 judges, wills made before a 293
Latin America and Brazil 100 Maliki schools 288–91, 299
making wills 435–6 maritime wills 302
Netherlands 163 marks 324
Roman law 2, 7, 9, 11, 16–17, 22, 24 military wills 302
secrecy 469 modern laws 295–303
Scotland 405, 427 Morocco 290, 298, 302–3
South Africa 383–4 non-Muslims as witnesses 294
Spain 72, 85, 90 non-verbal communication 286, 288–9, 297, 299
United States 360 notaries 300–3
invalidity see defects/invalidity number of witnesses 291, 293–5
Iran 296, 301–3 oaths 294
Iraq 300–1 oral wills 282–3, 286–7, 290–4, 296–304, 434
Islamic law, formalities in 282–304 Pakistan 296, 297–8, 303–4, 434
agents 287 private wills 302
alterations 289 professional witnesses 292–4
attestation of will 290–5 public wills 301–3
capacity 288 qualification of witnesses 292, 293–5
charities 285 Qur’an 283, 284, 286, 290–1, 293, 295
classical Islamic law 284–95, 299, 302 registration 301
codifications 295–6, 303 religious formula 290
compulsory succession 284–6 restrictions 284–5
date of wills 301 revocation 299
declarations 296–9 schools of Islamic law 283–4, 286–92,
defects/invalidity 286, 288, 290–1, 293, 296, 299
299–300, 304 secret wills 289, 291, 301–2
disinheritance 284–5 Shafi’is 284, 288, 290–1
diversity of opinion 290–2 Shiites 282–4, 286, 288–9, 294, 296, 302
documentation of the will 298–300 signatures 288, 291, 297–9, 301
donations mortis causa 283 Sunni Muslims 283–5, 294
Egypt 296, 299–301 Tunisia 303
488 Index
Islamic law, formalities in (cont.) interpreters 132–3
usufructs 283 intestacy 122
witnesses 286, 289–96, 298, 302, 434 interventions by third parties 128, 140
writing 287–9, 291–5, 297–303 joint or mutual wills 124
Italy, formalities in 120–41 language 127, 132–3, 137
accidents, wills made in cases of 125, 135, 140 life insurance 122–3
agreements/contracts 122–3, 124, 140–1 Lombardy-Venice 121
aircrafts, wills made on board 125, 134, 135–6, 140 Lucca 121
alterations 130, 137 making wills 133, 136
annuities 123 maritime wills 125, 134, 135–6
assistance with wills 128, 132, 137, 140 materials used 127
attestation 137 mechanical means, wills made by 133
Austria 121 military wills 134, 136
blind persons 128, 132, 133, 441 mistake 140
businesses 123, 124 name of testator, proper 129, 132
capacity 124, 132 non-verbal communications 131–3
Civil Code 121–2, 124–7, 130–1, 133–40, notaries 125–7, 130–8, 140
439, 464 nullity 128
conversion 159, 467 number of witnesses 131, 136, 139
date of wills 127, 128–9, 137–8, 459 oral wills 125–6, 139–40
deaf or deaf-mute persons 133 ordinary wills 124–5, 130–4, 139
declarations 133–5, 137–8, 450 Papal States 121
defects/invalidity 138–40 Parma 121
delegation 124, 131 Piedmont 121
deposit of wills 123, 125–6, 134, 136 preservation of wills 133
destruction of wills 137 private wills 126
dictation 128, 131 procedure 126, 133–4
disabled persons 128, 132–3 public wills 125–6, 130–5, 137–8, 140
disasters or accidents 125, 134, 135, 140 publication of wills 126
disease, times of contagious 125, 134, 135 qualifications of witnesses 131
dispensing power 140 registration 121, 126
donation mortis causa 122, 124 revocation 132, 140
electronically, wills written 127, 133 Roman law 121, 136
emergency wills 124–6, 134–6, 139–40 San Marino 121
employees of notaries as witnesses 131 Sardinia 121
EU law 124 seals 133–4
evidence 137, 141 secret wills 125–6, 133–4, 137–40
execution of wills 139 shares 123, 124
family pacts 124 shift from formalism 139–40, 464, 466–7
fees 125, 137, 435 Sicily 121
forced heirship 123 signatures 127–30, 132–6, 138, 455, 464
forgery 127 similarity and diversity, causes of 470
France 121–2, 124, 126, 130, 140 substitutes for wills 122–4, 134, 141
fraud 137 tax 124
freedom of testation 123 third parties 123, 127–8, 130, 138, 140
Genoa 121, 130 trusts interni 123
Hague Trusts Convention 123 unification 121
historical background 121–2 usufructs 123
holograph wills 125–30, 132, 133–41, 436, void and voidable wills 138–40, 459
438–9, 441, 443 Washington Convention 1973 125, 136, 451
identification of testator 127 witnesses 125–6, 131–2, 134–6, 139, 445
illiteracy 128, 132, 133 writing 125–34
inability to sign 132
initials 129 joint and mutual wills
intention 127, 130–7, 141 Austria 223, 249
international wills 122, 125, 136–9, 434, 451 early modern Europe 31
interpretation 127, 131–3, 139 France and Belgium 56
Index 489
Italy 124 employees of notaries as witnesses 101–2,
Latin America and Brazil 99 116, 119
Netherlands 165–6 executors 117
Poland 273 extraordinary wills 97–8, 109, 110–14
Spain 77, 84, 94 falsification 105–7
judiciary, wills made before the fees 104, 436
Austria 226–7, 434 fingerprints 103, 110
France 208–9 fraud 104, 110, 111
Germany 182–3, 206, 208–9, 211–14, freedom of testation 100–1
216, 220 historical background 97–100
Hungary 434, 448 holograph wills 97, 98, 105, 108–10, 113, 119,
Islamic law 293 434, 440
Latin America and Brazil 107, 114 illiteracy 106, 114–15
imminent, where death is 111, 113
Kames, Lord (Home, Henry) 408 inability to sign 103
Khomeini, Ayatollah 292 incorporation by reference 106
initials 103
Langbein, John H 349–50, 375 intention 103, 105, 119
Lange, Heinrich 193–4, 196, 214–16 interpretation 106, 116–18
language intestacy 100
Austria 238 ius commune 97, 116–17
France and Belgium 58, 62, 65 joint or mutual wills 99
holograph wills 442 judge, confirmation by 107, 114
Hungary 259, 260, 266–7 language 102
Italy 127, 132–3, 137 life insurance 100
Latin America and Brazil 102 making wills 100–1, 436
Netherlands 150–1 maritime wills 110–12
Roman law 9, 10, 12–16, 21 married couples’ wills 99
Spain 75, 81, 88, 442 mechanical means, wills made by 103–4
United States 364 Mexico 110
Latin America, formalities in 96–119 military wills 110–13
aircraft, wills made on 110–12 mistake 111, 118
alterations 106 names, use of proper 102–3
Argentina 97, 109–10, 434 notaries 98, 101–5, 112, 114–19
assistance with wills 118 nullity 105, 115, 117
attestation 104–5, 108, 115–16, 118 number of witnesses 99–100, 107, 118,
audio recording 99 446, 465
background 97–8 oral wills 102, 111, 112–13
beneficiaries as witnesses 115–16 ordinary wills 97–9, 111–14
blind persons 114 Panama 110
Chile 99, 109–10 Peru 110
civil codes 97–100, 102, 105, 107–13, 116–18 Portugal 97–101, 108, 111–12, 115
codicils 116–17, 454 preservation of wills 103
colonialism 97–8, 100, 108–10 private wills 98–9, 103–8, 110, 118
culture 100, 119 probative status 436–7
date of will 106 procedure 117–19
deaf persons 114–15 pseudonyms 103
death or disappearance of witnesses 107 public wills 98, 101–4, 112, 114, 116, 118–19
declarations 102, 111, 115 qualifications of witnesses 115
defects/invalidity 105, 111, 117–19 Roman law 97–8, 109, 111, 115–17
delegation 119 seals 98, 103–5, 112, 114–15, 118
deposit of wills 110 secret wills 104, 447
dictation 102, 118 shift from formalism 98, 99–100, 117–19, 465
disabled persons 102, 106, 114–15 signatures 102–3, 106–7, 111, 118, 119
drafts or notes 102 Spain 97–8, 108–10
electronic means, wills made by 103, 104 statistics 435
emergency wills 97–8, 109–14 unity of the act 103, 104, 118
490 Index
Latin America, formalities in (cont.) England and Wales 311, 322–5
Uruguay 110 France and Belgium 55
Visigothic law 98 Germany 176, 183, 218, 220
witnesses 98–107, 112–19, 436–7, 446, 465 Hungary 265
writing 98, 117–18 Islamic law 302
lawyers see legal advice; notaries and notarial wills; Italy 125, 134, 135–6
solicitors Latin America and Brazil 110–12
legal advice Netherlands 159
Australia and New Zealand 336 Poland 272, 280
civil law countries 436 Portugal 112
France and Belgium 57, 61, 64 public wills 453
Germany 211, 220 Roman law 453
holograph wills 435, 436 Spain 79, 86, 94
intention 435 United States 373–4
Netherlands 148, 156, 166, 173 marks see also fingerprints
Scotland 409, 421, 430 Australia and New Zealand 464
witnesses 436 disabled persons 462
legatum per damnationem 12–13, 20–4, 30, 35 Islamic law 314
legatum per vindicationem 11–14, 20–4, 30, 35 Netherlands 168
life insurance Scotland 422
Austria 224 shift from formalism 464
England and Wales 307 South Africa 388–90, 393, 402, 456
France and Belgium 52 Spain 84
intergenerational transfer 436 United States 363
Italy 122–3 married couples
Latin America and Brazil 100 early modern Europe 48
limited gifts 12–14, 15, 20–4, 30, 35, 45 France and Belgium 56, 62
Lucian 359 Latin America and Brazil 99
Luijten, EAA 163 Netherlands 165–6
Roman law 19
Maitland, FW 309 Spain 72–3
making wills Maximilian I, Emperor 32, 33–4, 38, 40
choice of type of will 436 mayors, wills made before
civil law countries 436 Germany 176, 212, 215
common law 435–6 Poland 271, 434
forced heirship 436 mechanical means, wills made by see also audio
Germany 180–2 wills; electronically, wills made; video wills
Hungary 258–60, 265, 267–8 Austria 237, 240
intestacy 435–6 France and Belgium 57, 63
Italy 133, 136 holograph wills 442, 443–4
Latin America and Brazil 100–1, 436 Hungary 264
Netherlands 147, 154–6 Italy 133
professional writers 8, 32 Latin America and Brazil 103–4
Scotland 427–8 Netherlands 154
size of estate 436 Poland 275
South Africa 396–7 Scotland 416–17, 419, 444
Spain 72–3 Spain 82–4
statistics 435–6 Menger, Anton 184–5
substitutes for wills 436 mental capacity see capacity
tax 436 Messick, Brinkley 292
mancipatio 4, 6–8, 18, 20–1, 25, 407, 444–5, 462 Mexico 110, 440
manumissions 13–14, 15 military wills
Maoris 330, 336–7, 351 Australia and New Zealand 333, 339, 453
maritime wills Austria 226, 234, 237, 246
Australia and New Zealand 333, 339 common law 453
Austria 226, 233–4, 237, 245–6 early modern Europe 30, 41
civil law systems 453 England and Wales 55, 311, 322–5, 453
Index 491
Germany 183 Canon law 39–40
Hungary 265–6 capacity 162, 168, 169–70
Islamic law 302 certified deeds 161–2
Italy 134, 136 Church 143, 149
Latin America and Brazil 110–13 Civil Code 145–69
Netherlands 159 closed wills 450
oral wills 453 codicils 34–5, 144, 146, 157–9, 163–4,
Poland 271, 280 174, 454
Roman law 3–4, 14–15, 21–2, 28, 30, 453–4 date of wills 150, 158, 171–2, 459
Scotland 409 death, registration of 165
South Africa 453 declarations 145–8, 154–5, 160, 168
Spain 75, 78, 86, 94 deeds 144–54, 159, 161–5, 167–8, 170–4
United States 373–4 defects/invalidity 148, 153, 154, 156–8,
minors see children 160–1, 167, 169–73
mistake delegation 152–3
Austria 247 deposit of wills 146, 153–6, 163–4, 174
common law systems 436 destruction of wills 163
France and Belgium 58–9 disaster wills 159
Germany 184, 189–92, 208, 215–17 disciplinary action against notaries 153,
Hungary 262, 267–9 169–70, 172
Italy 140 donation mortis causa 143, 160–1
Latin America and Brazil 111, 118 donatio post mortem 143–4
Netherlands 156–8, 169–73 early Middle Ages 143–4
Poland 278 electronic means, wills made by 156, 166–7
United States 370–1, 374–5, 378 electronic signatures 166–7
Modestinus, Herennius 358 emergency wills 159–60
Mohammed, the Prophet of Islam 282–3 European network of registers of wills 165
Mommsen, Friedrich 180 evidence 146, 148–50, 153, 156, 161–3
morality 29, 72, 359 execution of wills 145–6, 149–51, 159, 162,
Morocco 290, 298, 302–3 165, 171–4
move from formalism see shift from formalism executors 143–4, 159
mutual wills see joint and mutual wills fingerprints 166
mystical wills see secret wills forced heirship 146
foreigners, wills of 165
names, use of proper form books 144–5
Austria 238, 243 France 145–6, 149, 157, 174
early modern Europe 49 fraud 150
France and Belgium 61, 63 heir, institution of the 145
Germany 189, 200–1 historical background 143–6
Hungary 261, 262 holograph wills 146, 153–5, 157–8, 163,
Italy 129, 132 174, 439
Latin America and Brazil 102–3 identification of testator 166–7
Poland 276 illiteracy 168
Roman law 10 inability to sign 168
Scotland 422 incorporation by reference 151–3
signatures 456 informal wills 144, 158–9
Spain 83 initialling 150–1, 167–8
United States 363 intention 148
natural law 30, 39, 43, 48 internet wills 156, 157–8
Netherlands, formalities in 142–74 interpretation 156, 168
agreements/contracts 152–3, 165 intestacy 163
aircraft, wills made on board 159 joint wills 165–6
allographs 154–5, 163 language 150–1
alterations 151 late Middle Ages 144–5
ancient period 143–4 legal advice 148, 156, 166, 173
attestation 150–1 Lombardy 149
Belgium 157 making of wills 147, 154–6
492 Index
Netherlands, formalities in (cont.) notaries and notarial wills see also employees of
maritime wills 159 notaries as witnesses; legal advice; solicitors
marks 168 Austria 225–8, 253
married couples’ wills 165–6 Bavaria 32
materials used 150 civil law systems 434
mechanical means, wills made by 154 closed wills 340
military wills 159 declarations 449
mistake 156–8, 169–73 early modern Europe 32, 45
money laundering 167 England and Wales 319, 327
mutual wills 165 France and Belgium 53–4, 57, 62–9,
notaries 144–59, 162–74 131, 436
nullity 161, 170–2 Germany 176–7, 182–3, 185, 204, 206–8,
number of witnesses 144–5, 151, 168–9, 210–20, 436
173–4 holograph wills 458, 469–70
old Dutch period 144–5, 151 Hungary 256, 258, 259, 261, 264–5
oral wills 144–5, 168 Islamic law 300–3
preservation of wills 159 Italy 125–7, 130–8, 140
presumptions 162–3 Latin America and Brazil 98, 101–5, 112,
private deeds 154, 156, 162 114–19
private wills 37, 155, 157, 168–70 Netherlands 144–59, 162–74
procedure 154–6 open wills 449–50, 469
public wills 147 Poland 274, 277–8, 281
quasi-legacies 160 presumptions 437
registration 149, 155, 161, 164–5 qualifications of witnesses 458–9
revocation 151–2, 163, 166 safety 435
Roman law 143–6, 148–9, 157, 168, 445 secret wills 449, 450–1
sanctions 153, 154, 170, 172–4 shift from formalism 465, 466–7
seals 144–6, 155 signatures 455, 457
secret wills 145, 153 South Africa 384
shift from formalism 170–4, 465, 466 Spain 72–3, 76–80, 82–5, 87–9, 91–3, 436
signatures 145, 147–8, 151, 154, 158–9, United States 362, 365, 369–70
161–3, 166–8, 170 unity of act 459
similarity and diversity, causes of 471 witnesses 446, 457
statistics 156, 450 notes and drafts, informal
surviving spouses 146 early modern Europe 46–7
tax 148 Germany 182, 184
terminology 147, 153–4, 157 Hungary 266
terrorism, financing 167 Latin America and Brazil 102
third parties 156 Scotland 427
undue influence 160–1 South Africa 386, 399–400, 402
unity of the act 150 nullity
video-taped wills 167 France and Belgium 56, 63, 68–9, 70
void or voidable wills 170–4 Germany 188–91
witnesses 144–5, 151, 159–60, 163, 168–9, Italy 128
172–4, 445, 465 Latin America and Brazil 105, 115, 117
writing 148, 168–9 Netherlands 161, 170–2
New Zealand see Australia and New Zealand Poland 274
non-verbal communications, formalities in Spain 80, 91–2
Austria 242, 447 number of witnesses
disabled persons 462 Austria 228, 231, 235–6, 242, 244, 247
Germany 210, 449 early modern Europe 29, 35, 37, 42, 44
Islamic law 286, 288–9, 297, 299 France and Belgium 53–4, 62
Italy 131–3 Germany 176, 179, 182–3, 212, 214,
open wills 449 217–18, 220
Roman law 13 Hungary 262, 265–6
Spain 80 Islamic law 291, 293–5
witnesses 447 Italy 131, 136, 139
Index 493
Latin America and Brazil 99–100, 107, parental wills
118, 465 early modern Europe 28, 41–4, 46–7
Netherlands 144–5, 151, 168–9, 173–4 Roman law 4, 22, 24, 28
Poland 279 Spain 76
Roman law 4–5, 7, 18, 20–5, 29, 445 Peltier, Frédéric 293
Saxony 35 pension fund nominations (England and
Scotland 413 Wales) 306, 307, 316–17
shift from formalism 465 Peru 110, 440
South Africa 392 Pinto, Alfredo 109
Spain 74, 75–7, 87–8, 91 Planiol, Marcel 109
United States 366, 374 Poland, formalities in 270–81
nuncupative wills see oral wills aircraft, wills made on 272, 280
allographic wills 278, 281, 466
open wills Austria 271–2
declarations 449–50 capacity 276–7
deposit of wills 449 Civil Code 271–2, 281
disabled persons 461 conversion 278, 280, 466
Germany 449 date of wills 275–6
non-verbal communications 449 declarations 273, 278–80
notaries 449–50, 469 defects/invalidity 273–4, 277–8
oral wills 449–50 delegation 273–4
procedure 449 disabled persons 275–6
registration 449 electronically, wills made 275, 281
seven virtues 469 emergency wills 272, 279–80
signatures 449 fees 274, 277–8, 435
South Africa 384 forgery 277
Spain 78, 79–82, 86, 88, 94 France 271
witnesses 449 freedom of testation 272
writing 449 Germany 271–2
oral wills heir, institution of an 274
Australia and New Zealand 333, 339, 351 historical background 270–2
Austria 226, 228, 230, 232, 234–6, 241–8, holograph wills 272–8, 281, 434
250–2 Hungary 271
disabled persons 462 identification of testator 275, 277
early modern Europe 38, 46–8 imminent, where death is 279–80
emergency wills 452–3 incorporation by reference 273
England and Wales 308, 322–5, 453 independence 271–2
France and Belgium 55–6, 66 initials 276
Germany 181, 206–7, 209–11, 213–14, 216–18 intention 273, 275–6
Hungary 258, 263, 265–7 interpretation 273–6
Islamic law 282–3, 286–7, 290–4, 296–304, 434 joint wills 273
Italy 125–6, 139–40 maritime wills 272, 280
Latin America and Brazil 102, 111, 112–13 mayors, wills made before 271, 434
military wills 463 mechanical means, wills made by 275
Netherlands 144–5, 168 military wills 271, 280
Poland 271–2, 278–80 mistakes 278
Roman law 6, 8, 15, 17, 23, 24, 25, 445 modern law 272–4
Scotland 410 names, use of proper 276
South Africa 388 notaries 274, 277–8, 281
Spain 74, 75–7, 84, 89, 93–4 nullity 274
United States 361–2, 373–4 number of witnesses 279
witnesses 444, 445–6 oral wills 271–2, 278–80
ordinary wills 272
Pakistan 296, 297–8, 303–4, 434 preservation of wills 277
Panama 110, 440 publication after death 274
Papinian, Aemilius 361 Roman law 272
Paraguay 440 Russia 271
494 Index
Poland, formalities in (cont.) France and Belgium 65
secret wills 281 fraud 434
shift from formalism 273, 466 Germany 177–84, 216
signatures 275–6, 278, 456 Hungary 258–61, 264–5, 268
witnesses 271, 278–9 Islamic law 302
writing 275–6, 278–81 Italy 126
Pontes de Miranda, Francisco Cavalcanti 107 Latin America and Brazil 98–9, 103–8, 110,
poor, gifts to the (Roman law) 23 118
Portugal Netherlands 37, 155, 157, 168–70
holograph wills 108, 439, 440 Portugal 107
Latin America and Brazil 97–101, 108, Prussia 32
111–12, 115 recognition 434
maritime wills 112 signatures 455
private wills 107 Switzerland 216
Roman law 111, 115 United States 434
Visigoths 440 privileged wills see also aircraft, wills made on
powers of appointment see appointment, board; emergency wills; maritime wills;
powers of military wills
praetorian wills 5–14 Australia and New Zealand 333, 339
preservation of wills England and Wales 314, 324–5
England and Wales 320 South Africa 385
France and Belgium 67 probativity see also attestation; evidence
Germany 211 France and Belgium 68
Italy 133 Latin America and Brazil 436–7
Latin America and Brazil 103 Scotland 417–20, 424–6
Netherlands 159 proper names see names, use of proper
Poland 277 protective virtue 468
Spain 80, 83 public wills 448–51 see also notaries and notarial
presumptions wills
common law systems 437 Austria 222, 224–8, 230, 233–4, 237,
date of wills 459 253, 448
early modern Europe 37, 50 Canon law 39–41, 448
England and Wales 315, 320, 325 civil law countries 448–9
France and Belgium 50, 58, 60 closed wills 450
Germany 208 common law 448
holograph wills 437 custom 448
Netherlands 162–3 definition 434
notaries 437 early modern Europe 28, 36–41, 48, 50, 448
Roman law 10–11 emergency wills 452
Scotland 417–18, 426, 459 France and Belgium 53–6, 59, 61–4
shift from formalism 462–3 Germany 178, 180, 182–5, 204–14, 448
South Africa 395 historical background 448–9
United States 368, 370–1 Hungary 256, 258, 263, 265, 448
witnesses 436–7 international wills 451
priests, wills made before Islamic law 301–3
France and Belgium 55 Italy 125–6, 130–5, 137–8, 140
Germany 206 judicial wills 448
Spain 74, 77–8, 93, 95 Latin America and Brazil 98, 101–4, 112, 114,
private wills 433–4 see also closed wills; 116, 118–19
holograph wills; witnesses and witnessed maritime wills 453
wills Netherlands 147
Austria 107, 224–30, 233–4, 236–52, 434 public bodies or officials, authentication by 434
Canon law 39–41 Roman law 23, 28, 40–1, 50, 448
civil law systems 434 Scotland 448
closed wills 450 South Africa 448
costs 435 Spain 75, 77–80
early modern Europe 32, 35–41, 44 witnesses 448
Index 495
qualifications of witnesses 457–8 see also alteration of testamentary dispositions 16–17, 24
beneficiaries as witnesses archaic and pre-classical law 2, 3–5, 451
Austria 247, 458 assembly of people 3–4
Australia and New Zealand 335, 457–8 Austria 228–34, 243
beneficiaries 457–8 Bavaria 38
children 457 beliefs and philosophies, transmission
common law 458 of 358–9, 361
death or disappearance 458–9 beneficiaries as witnesses 20
early modern Europe 32, 38–9 blind testators 20, 28
employees of notaries 457, 458–9 bonorum possessor 7, 17–18
exclusions, list of 457 charitable gifts 23
France and Belgium 62 children, handing over of 4, 16
Germany 458 church, gifts to the 23
holograph wills 458 civil law (ius civile) 6–14, 17, 18, 20, 24, 28, 437
Hungary 458 classical law 2, 5–18, 437, 462
Islamic law 292, 293–5 codicilli 15–17, 23–4, 28–9, 33, 35, 44–5, 454
Italy 131 common requirements of civil and praetorian
Latin 457 law 8–14
notaries 458–9 consent of people 3–4
Roman law 8, 20 conversion 24
Scotland 425–6, 458 date of will 9
South Africa 392, 458 death or disappearance of witnesses 8
Spain 87–9, 457 debts, payment of 9
United States 366, 368–9, 458 declarations 4, 6, 13, 24
defects/invalidity 6, 9–11, 16, 24, 361
Rabel, Ernst 444–5 deposit of wills 23
Reale, Miguel 113 destruction of wills 17, 24
reference, incorporation by see incorporation by disease, times of contagious 28
reference disinheritance 11, 18, 21–2, 25, 28
registration donation mortis causa 25, 440, 463
Austria 227–8 early modern Europe 27–38, 42, 44–6,
England and Wales 318–21 49–50, 440
France and Belgium 64, 68–9 emergency wills (testamentum calatis comitiis) 3,
Islamic law 301 25, 451
Italy 121, 126 England and Wales 318, 324, 441, 453
Netherlands 149, 155, 161, 164–5 evidence 17
open wills 449 familiae emptor 4, 8, 16, 20
Scotland 428 females 4, 11
South Africa 393 fideicommissum (limited gifts) 12–14, 15, 20–4,
Spain 85 30, 35, 45
relatives, rights of close 49 forms of will 35–46
revocation France and Belgium 52–4, 56
Australia and New Zealand 351–3 function of will 2, 25
Austria 247 Germany 179, 184, 205, 212, 437
England and Wales 326–7 guardianship 16
France and Belgium 53 heir, institution of the (heredis institutio) 9–11,
Islamic law 299 15–18, 21, 23–5, 28, 33, 358, 454
Italy 132, 140 holograph wills 19, 22, 28, 42, 437, 440–1
Netherlands 151–2, 163, 166 Hungary 255, 257–8, 263
qualifications of witnesses 49–50 identification of testator 10
Roman law 16–17, 24 imminent, where death is 4, 14–15
Scotland 408, 411 incomplete wills 16
South Africa 398 inner form of certain clauses 9
Spain 85 intention 36–7
United States 379 intestacy 2, 7, 9, 11, 16–17, 22, 24
Roman law, formalities in 1–26 Italy 121, 136
actio ex testamento 12–13 ius commune 2, 18, 25, 33, 35–7, 42, 46, 440
496 Index
Roman law, formalities in (cont.) testamentum parentum inter liberos 22, 24, 28
ius honorarium 6–7, 11, 20, 24 testamentum per aes et libram 4–14, 16, 18, 25,
Justinian’s codes 2, 18–29, 38, 437, 445, 444–5, 451, 462
451–2, 446, 453–4 testamentum principi oblatum 23, 28, 448
Kaser’s model 2 third parties 7, 12–13, 17, 30
language 9, 10, 12–16, 21 trustees, conveyance to 4–5, 445
Latin America and Brazil 97–8, 109, 111, 115–17 United States 373–4
legatum per damnationem 12–13, 20–4, 30, 35 unity of the act 6, 20–1, 459–60
legatum per vindicationem 11–14, 20–4, 30, 35 witnesses 4–5, 7–8, 15, 18–25, 29, 444–6,
limited gifts 9–14, 15, 20–4, 30, 35, 45 451–2
maritime wills 453 words, use of certain 9, 10, 12–16
mancipatio 4, 6–8, 18, 20–1, 25, 407, 444–5, 462 writing 5, 8–9, 20–2
manumissions 13–14, 15 rural areas, persons in
married couples’ wills 19 Austria 230
materials used 9 early modern Europe 34, 41
military wills (testamenta militaria) 3–4, 14–15, Germany 180–1
21–2, 28, 30, 453–4 Roman law 23, 28
names, use of proper 10 Russia 271
Netherlands 143–6, 148–9, 157, 168, 445
new wills, revocation by 16–17, 24 Saad ibn Abı̄ Waqqās 285
non-verbal communications 13 San Marino 34, 121, 440
number of witnesses 4–5, 7, 18, 20–5, 29, Satyro, Ernani 117
445–6 Schmitt, Gottfried von 178, 182–4, 186, 205–6,
nuncupationes 4–5 212–13
opening of wills 17–18 Scotland, formalities in 404–31
oral wills 6, 8, 15, 17, 23, 24, 25, 445 affidavits 428
parental wills 4, 22, 24, 28 alterations 424
Poland 272 assistance 422–4
pontifices 3 attestation 412–15, 418–19, 424–7, 429–31
poor, gifts to the 23 authentication statutes 412–13, 419
Portugal 111, 115 Basle Convention on Registration of
post-classical period 2, 18–25, 76, 448, 451 Wills 1972 428
praetorian wills (testamentum iure praetorio) 5–14 beneficiaries as witnesses 425, 430
presumption of validity 10–11 blind persons 422, 423
probate 17–18 capacity 425
professional will writers (testamentarius) 8 children 411, 425–6
public wills (testamentum principi oblatum) 23, codicils 421, 424
28, 40–1, 50, 448 confirmation 410–11, 428
purpose of wills 358–9, 361 constitution 414–15
qualifications of witnesses 8, 20 customs 407
remedies 7, 12–13, 17 date of wills 459
revocation of wills 16–17, 24 de praesenti conveyance, transmission by 406–9,
rural people 23, 28 427
San Marino 440 deeds 406–20
Scotland 407, 409, 414, 425 disabled persons 422, 423
seals 5, 7, 8, 15, 17–23 dispensing power 408, 411, 419, 430
shift from formalism 6, 19, 23–6, 462–3 donations mortis causa 406, 413
signatures 8, 19–23, 28 electronic signatures 422
similarity and diversity, causes of 470 electronically wills made 421–2, 427
sizes, shares of different 9–10 emergency wills 427
slaves, freeing of 13–14, 15 enfranchising clauses 424
sons 9, 11, 20 evidence 414, 417–18, 426, 428–9
South Africa 382, 383–4, 386, 394, 403 execution of wills 429–30
Spain 74, 75–8, 80, 83, 85, 87, 90–2, 445 executors 409–10, 413, 428
substitute heirs 8–9 fees 427
testamentum apud acta conditum 23, 448 feudalism 405, 406–7
testamentum in procinctu 3–4, 5, 22, 25, 451 finding wills 428
Index 497
forced heirship 405–6 testing clauses 425
forgery 417, 426 undue influence 429–30
formal validity 421–4 universal succession 405
fraud 429–30 usufructs 408, 411
freedom of testation 405–6 Washington Convention 1973 421
heir, institution of an 405 witnesses 412–19, 421, 424–5, 430, 434, 446–7
heritable property 405–12, 427 writing 412, 417, 421, 429–31, 439
historical background 405 Scott, Walter 406
holograph wills 43, 415–19, 430–1, 439, seals
444, 465 Austria 231
identification of witnesses 447 closed wills 450
illegibility 417 France and Belgium 54–5, 61, 64–6, 69
illiteracy 423 Germany 210
imminent, where death is 406–7, 409–10 Italy 133–4
immovable property 405, 409 Latin America and Brazil 98, 103–5, 112,
incorporation by reference 424 114–15, 118
initials 422 Netherlands 144–6, 155
intention 413, 423, 426–7, 430 Roman law 5, 7, 8, 15, 17–23
internal formalities 426–7 Scotland 412–13
international wills 421 Spain 75, 77, 82, 94
internet wills 427 secret wills
intestacy 405, 427 Austria 232, 243
legal advice 409, 421, 430 early modern Europe 38
making wills 427–8 England and Wales 316
marks 422 Germany 181–2
materials used in wills 421 Hungary 261–2
mechanical means, wills made by 416–17, intestacy 469
419, 444 Italy 125–6, 133–4, 137–40
military wills 409 Latin America and Brazil 104, 447
modern law 419–31 Netherlands 145, 153
moveable property 405–6, 408–11 notaries 449, 450–1
names, use of proper 422 Poland 281
notaries 413–14, 422, 430 seven virtues 469–70
notes, use of informal 427 Spain 76, 78, 80, 82–5, 94–5
number of witnesses 413, 446 shift from formalism 462–8
oral wills 410 Australia and New Zealand 464, 465–6
presumptions 417–18, 426, 459 Austria 228–30, 466
probativity 417–20, 424–6 common law systems 465–8
proof 414–15 conversion 466–7
provenance 414 date of wills 465
public wills 448 defects/invalidity 467–8
qualifications of witnesses 425–6, 458 dispensing powers 465–6, 467–8
realty 408, 412 donations mortis causa 463
reform 405, 419 early modern Europe 28, 34–7, 41–2, 45–8, 50
registration of wills 428 England and Wales 323–4, 464
revocation 408, 411 estoppel 467–8
Roman law 407, 409, 414, 425 France and Belgium 70
sasine 408, 413 Germany 185–92, 197–201, 207–8, 463–4,
seals 412–13 465, 466–7
self-proving wills 426 England and Wales 465
shift from formalism 429–31, 465, 467 France and Belgium 139, 464, 467
signatures 406, 408, 412–19, 421–6, 428–30, holograph wills 464–6
434, 456 Hungary 261, 268–9, 464, 466
similarity and diversity, causes of 470–1 intention 463, 467
solicitors 427–8 internet wills 468
styles book 410–11 interpretation 463–4
subscribed wills 421–4, 439 Italy 139–40, 464, 466–7
498 Index
shift from formalism (cont.) Scotland 406, 408, 412–19, 421–6, 428–30,
Latin America and Brazil 98, 99–100, 117–19, 434, 456
465 South Africa 386–93, 398, 401–2, 455–6
legislative intervention 464–5 Spain 79, 83–4, 88, 89–90, 92, 456, 457
marks 464 United States 361–8, 372, 375, 378, 447, 464
materials used 464 unity of act 460
Netherlands 170–4, 465, 466 slaves, freeing of 13–14, 15
notaries 465, 466–7 solicitors see also legal advice; notaries and notarial
number of witnesses 465 wills
Poland 273, 466 England and Wales 319
presumptions 462–3 Scotland 427–8
Roman law 6, 19, 23–6, 462–3 Solon 358
Scotland 429–31, 465, 467 South Africa, formalities in 381–403
signatures 464–5 agreements/contracts 387
South Africa 465, 468 alterations 396, 400–2
Spain 91–3, 465 antenuptial contracts 387
United States 362, 367, 371, 374–8, 380, 464, attestation 392
465, 467 capacity 392, 393
witnesses 465 certification 393–4, 402, 403
signatures 433, 455–6 see also electronic children 392
signatures; inability to sign; initials civil law 382
assistance 455–6 codicils 385–6
Australia and New Zealand 333, 334–5, 340, common law 382, 385, 403, 434
342–50, 352, 354, 455 condonation 395–400, 403
Austria 234, 236, 238–41, 243–4, 247, Constitution 383–4
251 custom 383–4
chronology 446–7 defects/invalidity 393, 394–400, 402–3
civil law systems 456 dictation 398
closed wills 450 disabled persons 390, 393–4, 398
common law systems 455–6 discrimination 398
disabled persons 461 document, definition of 396–7
early modern Europe 42, 44, 467–8 drafting by testator 397–8
electronic signatures 456 electronic signatures 387
England and Wales 312–15, 321–2, 326–7 electronically, wills made 386–7, 396
evidence 455 English law 382, 384, 390, 401, 403
France and Belgium 53, 56, 58, 60–1, 63–4, evidence 400
66, 68, 70 execution of wills 383, 387, 396–8, 401
fraud 455–6 executors 382
Germany 183, 187, 198–202, 205 females 383
holograph wills 443 fraud 389, 391, 392, 395–6, 398
Hungary 259–65 freedom of testation 384
illiteracy 455 historical background 384–5, 401, 402–3
initials 456 holograph wills 399–400
intention 455 identification of testator 393–4
international wills 451 illiteracy 390, 393–4, 398
Islamic law 288, 291, 297–9, 301 incorporation by reference 386
Italy 127–30, 132–6, 138, 455, 464 initials 388–90
Latin America and Brazil 102–3, 106–7, 111, intention 382, 386, 389–91, 393–4, 396,
118, 119 399–400, 403
names, use of proper 456 internal formalities 382
Netherlands 145, 147–8, 151, 154, 158–9, interpretation 385–6, 389, 391–3, 397–8, 403
161–3, 166–8, 170 intestacy 383–4
notaries 455, 457 marks 388–90, 393, 402, 456
open wills 449 Master of the High Court 393
Poland 275–6, 278, 456 military wills 453
private wills 455 mixed system 382, 402–3
Roman law 8, 19–23, 28 notaries 384
Index 499
notes, use of informal 386, 399–400, 402 defects/invalidity 87, 89, 91
number of witnesses 392 delegation of faculties of election/distribution 95
open wills 384 disabled persons 80, 88, 89–90
oral wills 388 disease, times of contagious 81–2, 85–6, 94
presumptions 395 disasters or accidents 82
privileged wills 385 disqualified witnesses 88–9
procedure 385 donations mortis causa 74–5, 91, 93, 95
public wills 448 electronic signatures 83–4
qualifications of witnesses 392, 458 electronically, wills made 83–4
reform 385, 387 emergency wills 76–82, 85–6, 89, 93
registration of wills 393 employees of notaries as witnesses, exclusion
revocation 398 of 88–9
Roman law 382, 383–4, 386, 394, 403 encumbrances 72
Romano-Dutch law 382, 384, 386, 401, 446–7 evidence 85
shift from formalism 465, 468 execution of wills 75, 78, 81–3, 85–6
signatures 386–93, 398, 401–2, 455–6 executors 74, 75
statutory or underhand wills 384–5 false declarations 89–90
substantial compliance, doctrine of 394 fees 435
uniformity 385 finding wills 85
universal succession 382 fingerprints 84, 89
video recordings 386, 388 forced heirship 72
Wills Act 385–93, 396, 401, 446 foreign countries, wills in 78, 94
witnesses 389, 392–3, 401–2, 434, 446, 458 forgery 87, 91
writing 385–6, 389 fraud 89
Spain, formalities in 71–95 freedom of testation 93
3rd to 8th centuries 74 Galicia 73, 87, 89, 93
8th to 13th centuries 75–6 Gothic law 74, 75–6
13th to 19th centuries 76–7 heir, institution of an 76, 90–1
age 84, 88 historical background 72, 73–8, 85, 92
agents 82, 95 holograph wills 76–85, 89–94, 108, 439–40,
agreements/contracts 72, 93, 95 434, 442
Aragon 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 84, 87, 89, 93 humanitarian assistance, missions of 86
archiving wills 83 identification of testator 79, 82, 84, 86–8, 90
audio-visual wills 84 illiteracy 80
Autonomous Communities 72–81, 84, 86–95 imminent, where death is 85–6, 94
Balearic Islands 73, 87–9, 93 inability of testator to sign 88–90, 92
Basque Country 73, 87, 93 incorporation by reference 85, 94
blind persons 79, 88 initials 72
Canon law 76–8 intention 80, 85, 91
capacity 79–80, 88 internal formalities 90–1
Castile 49, 75–7, 90, 109 interpretation 79–82, 85–9
Catalonia 73, 74, 75–8, 83–4, 87, 89, 90, interpreters 80–1
92, 93 intestacy 72, 85, 90
cautela socini 72 joint wills 77, 84, 94
certification 78 Justinian’s codes 75–6, 90
Ceuta 73 knows how to sign, whether testator 88–90, 92
Civil Code 73, 76–81, 83–91, 93–4, 439, 457, language 75, 81, 88, 442
459–60 Latin America and Brazil 97–8, 108–10
closed wills 76, 78, 80, 82–5, 89, 94–5 Leon 74
Code of Eurico 74 long-term partners 72–3
codicils 34–5, 76, 77, 90–1, 95, 454 Majorca 90–1
common wills 78 making wills 72–3
consular or diplomatic agents 82 maritime wills 79, 86, 94
custom 93 married couples 72–3
date of will 79, 82–4, 92 materials used 83–4
deaf persons 80, 88 mechanical means, wills made by 82–4
declarations 79, 89–92 Melilla 73
500 Index
Spain, formalities in (cont.) Tacitus 143
Menorca 91 tax
military wills 75, 78, 86, 94 Italy 124
modern law 77–9 legal advice 436
moral and religious duty 72 making wills 436
names, use of proper 83 Netherlands 148
Navarre 73, 74, 75, 77–8, 83, 87, 89, 93 testamentum apud acta conditum 23, 448
non-verbal communications 80 testamentum in procinctu 3–4, 5, 22, 25, 451
notaries 72–3, 76–80, 82–5, 87–9, 91–3, 436 testamentum parentum inter liberos 22, 24, 28
nullity 80, 91–2 testamentum per aes et libram 4–14, 16, 18, 25,
number of witnesses 74, 75–7, 87–8, 91 444–5, 451, 462
open wills 78, 79–82, 86, 88, 94 testamentum principi oblatum 23, 28, 448
oral wills 74, 75–7, 84, 89, 93–4 textspeak 442
ordinary notarial wills 79–80 Theodosius II, Emperor 20
parental wills 76 titanic testaments see maritime wills
per relationem rule 85 trusts
preservation of wills 80, 83 Australia and New Zealand 331–2
priest, wills formalized before a 74, 77–8, 93, 95 Italy 123
Probate Registry 85 Roman law 4–5, 445
public wills 75, 77–80 Spain 77
qualification of witnesses 87–9, 457 United States 363
registration 85 Tunisia 303
religious discrimination 79 typewriters see mechanical means, wills made by
revocation 85
Roman law 74, 75–8, 80, 83, 85, 87, 90–2, 445 undue influence
sailors’ wills 79, 86 Australia and New Zealand 336
seals 75, 77, 82, 94 Austria 240–1, 249
secret or closed wills 76, 78, 80, 82–5, 94–5 early modern Europe 47
shared features of wills 86–90 France and Belgium 58
shift from formalism 91–3, 465 Germany 181, 184, 187, 211
signatures 79, 83–4, 88, 89–90, 92, 456, 457 Netherlands 160–1
similarity and diversity, causes of 470 protective virtue 468
statistics 92, 435 Scotland 429–30
Toledo 74 Spain 84–5
trusts 77 United States 362, 369
undue influence 84–5 United Kingdom see also England and Wales;
unity of act 80, 92, 459–60 Scotland
usufructs 72, 74 United States, formalities in 357–80
voice recordings 84 alterations 378–9
witnesses 74–8, 81–3, 85–9, 91–2, 445, 465 assistance 363
writing 75, 80, 82–3 attestation 362, 365–70
special wills see emergency wills beneficiaries as witnesses 368–9
spouses see married couples capacity 366, 372
Stair, Viscount (Dalrymple, James) 405, 415 codicils 363
Statute of Frauds common law 361, 368
Australia and New Zealand 330–1, 333–4 date of wills 372–3
England and Wales 310–11, 322–4, 453 defects/invalidity 360, 365, 371, 374–5, 378
United States 361–2, 369 disabled persons 363
Stryk, Samuel 50 dispensing power 377–8
substantial compliance, doctrine of 350, 375, electronic signatures 363
394, 467 electronically, wills made 359, 363, 365
substitutes emergency wills 373–4
Italy 122–4, 134, 141 English law 359, 361, 364, 368–9, 374–5,
legal advice 436 377, 380
making wills 436 ethical wills 359
succession agreements see agreements/contracts evidence 361–2, 364, 372–3, 375, 378
Switzerland 216, 439 execution 362–4, 367–70, 376, 378–9
Index 501
executors 359, 361 Germany 203, 443
fiduciary relationships 359 holograph wills 443, 460
forgery 369–70 Latin America and Brazil 103, 104, 118
fraud 361–2, 369, 377 Netherlands 150
heir, institution of an 359 notaries 459
holograph wills 362, 370–3, 379, 434, 439, Roman law 6, 20–1, 459–60
441, 443 Scotland 460
identification of testator 362–3, 370 signatures 460
illiteracy 363 Spain 80, 92, 459–60
incorporation by reference 376–8, 461 United States 460
independent significance, doctrine of acts witnesses 460
of 377–8 universal succession
initials 364 early modern Europe 31
intention 360–1, 371–2, 376–8 France and Belgium 69
internet wills 359 Scotland 4–5
interpretation 365, 368, 371–2 South Africa 382
intestacy 360 Uruguay 110
language 364 usufructs
maritime wills 373–4 Islamic law 283
marks 363 Italy 123
military wills 373–4 Scotland 408, 411
mistakes 370–1, 374–5, 378 Spain 72, 74
names, use of proper 363
Nevada 365 Valentinian III, Emperor 19, 20, 28, 108,
notaries 362, 365, 369–70 230, 437
number of witnesses 366, 374 validity see defects/invalidity
oral wills 361–2, 373–4 van Bynkershoek, Cornelis 41–2
personalty 361, 373–4, 378 van Groenewegen, Simon 39
presumptions 368, 370–1 van Oven, JC 161
private wills 434 Vélez Sarsfield, Dalmacio 109–10
publication 367 Verstappen, RTG 173
purging rule 368–9 Victoria, Queen 312
qualifications of witnesses 366, 368–9, 458 video wills
realty 361 Australia and New Zealand 351
revocation 379 Austria 252
Roman law 373–4 Germany 200
self-proved wills 370 Hungary 255
shift from formalism 362, 367, 371, 374–8, Netherlands 167
380, 464, 465, 467 South Africa 386, 388
signatures 361–8, 372, 375, 378, 447, 464 Spain 84
Statute of Frauds 361–2, 369 United States 365
Statute of Wills 361, 380 Vinnius, Arnold 39
substantial compliance, doctrine of 394, 467 Visigothic law 98
trusts 363 Voet, Johannes 37, 39, 40
undue influence 362, 369 Vogels, Werner 194–5
Uniform Probate Code 366–72, 375, 377–8,
380, 443, 460–1, 464 Wales see England and Wales, formalities in
unity of act 460 Welser, Rudolf 251–2
video wills 365 Werbőczy, István 255
Wills Act 1837 331, 364, 374–5 wills, materials used
witnesses 365–9, 371, 374, 434, 446, 447 Australia and New Zealand 464
writing 364–5, 375–8 Austria 238
unitas actus see unity of act England and Wales 314, 464
unity of act Germany 194, 203
Austria 229, 239, 243–4, 460 holograph wills 442
common law systems 460 Hungary 261
France and Belgium 58, 60 Netherlands 150
502 Index
wills, materials used (cont.) open wills 449
Roman law 9 oral wills 444, 445–6
Scotland 421 Poland 271, 278–9
shift from formalism 464 presumptions 436–7
Spain 83–4 public wills 448
witnesses and witnessed wills 433–7, 444–7 see Roman law 5, 7–8, 15, 18–25, 29, 444–6,
also beneficiaries as witnesses; employees of 451–2
notaries as witnesses; number of witnesses; Scotland 412–19, 421, 424–5, 430, 434, 447
qualifications of witnesses seven virtues 470
Australia and New Zealand 334–6, 339, shift from formalism 465
342–9, 352, 354, 434, 446–7 signatures 446–7
Austria 225–7, 230–6, 240–53, 434, 445–6 South Africa 389, 392–3, 401–2, 434, 446–7
Canon law 445 Spain 74–8, 81–3, 85–9, 91–2, 445, 465
chronology 446–7 United States 365–9, 371, 374, 434, 446, 447
civil law countries 445–6 writing 444, 446
closed wills 450 women see females
common law 434–5, 437, 446–7 writing see also fingerprints; initials; marks;
death or disappearance 8, 107, 436–7, 458–9 signatures
declarations 444 Australia and New Zealand 333, 335–7, 339
early modern Europe 29, 35, 37–9, 41, 44, Austria 224, 229–32, 240, 249
46–7 early modern Europe 38, 41–7, 50
emergency wills 452–3 England and Wales 309–10
England and Wales 315, 326–8, 434, 446 France and Belgium 53, 55, 59, 63
France and Belgium 53–4, 56, 62–8, 445 Germany 181, 183, 187
Germany 176–83, 206–7, 210–18, 220, Hungary 258, 268
445, 465 intention 433
historical background 444–5 international wills 451
holograph wills 445, 446–7 Islamic law 287–9, 291–5, 297–303
Hungary 260, 261–6, 268, 447 Italy 125–34
intention 433 Latin America and Brazil 98, 117–18
international wills 451 Netherlands 148, 168–9
Islamic law 286, 289–96, 298, 302, 434 open wills 449
Italy 125–6, 131–2, 134–6, 139, 445 Poland 275–6, 278–81
Latin America and Brazil 98–107, 112–19, Roman law 5, 8–9, 20–2
436–7, 446–7 Scotland 412, 417, 421, 429–31, 439
legal advice 436 South Africa 385–6, 389
modern law 446–7 Spain 75, 80, 82–3
Netherlands 144–5, 151, 159–60, 163, 172–4, United States 364–5, 375–8
445, 465 witnesses 444, 446
non-verbal communication 447
notaries 446 Zeiller, Franz von 233, 439

Comparative Succession Law. Testamentary Formalities

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How have testamentary formalities evolved over time according to the document?

How have testamentary formalities evolved over time according to the document?

COMPARATIVE SUCCESSION LAW

1. Testamentary Formalities in Roman Law 1

II. Private wills in nineteenth-century Germany 177

13. Testamentary Formalities in England and Wales 305

III. The modern law 419

Drafts of the chapters were discussed at a closed conference held in Hamburg

A Atlantic Reporter (USA)

BVerfGE Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (decisions of the Federal

EEC European Economic Community

KG Kammergericht (Regional Appeal Court, Berlin)

RJCatalunya Revista Jurı́dica de Catalunya

T Transvaal Provincial Division (South Africa)

II. Archaic and pre-classical law

1. Testamentum calatis comitiis

3. Testamentum per aes et libram

III. Classical law

1. Testamentum per aes et libram and testamentum iure praetorio

(b) Testamentum iure praetorio

2. Common requirements of civil and praetorian wills

(b) Further general requirements

(c) Heredis institutio

(d) Limited gifts

on guardianship.120 Of course, the use of certain words was as obligatory as in the

5. Alteration of testamentary dispositions

IV. Post-classical law

(b) Holograph wills

(c) Married couples’ wills

Most importantly, Justinian formally abolished the distinction between the

(b) Wills with seven witnesses

149 150 151

(c) Military wills

(d) Testamentum parentum inter liberos

(e) Other forms

(g) Alteration of testamentary dispositions

It is difﬁcult to sum up the evolution of the Roman law relating to testamentary

importance. Here, ﬁve witnesses were regarded as sufﬁcient.18 As a result, it became

II. Wills and codicils

III. The forms of will

illam condita aeque valebunt, ac si secundum formam a jure Romano praescriptam

1. Private and public wills

have amounted to a sin (peccatum). In the context of formalities, however, this

2. Formal privileges and modiﬁcations

to consider the interests of intestate heirs.152 Conversely, stricter formalities applied

3. Holograph and written wills

overcome the bothersome formal requirements of the Roman sources;188 hence, it

IV. Internal formalities

1. Ultima voluntas non debet ex alieno arbitrio pendere

2. The rights of close relatives

II. Historical development

2. The Southern Low Countries

3. The French Revolution and the Code Napoléon

extent and created a new order of (intestate) succession.18 Testamentary formalities

III. The modern law

2. Validity as a will of a different type

IV. Holograph wills

1. Notaries and witnesses