FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

EX POST FACTO RULE

 The prohibition on ex post facto law applies solely to penal laws.

Basis: Article 21 of RPC
 It cannot prohibit the retroactivity of procedural laws such as one that
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice.
Basis: Article 22 of RPC (IRRETROSPECTIVITY RULE)

PRINCIPLE OF GENERALITY

 Penal law is binding on all persons who reside or sojourn in the Philippines
whether citizen or not.
Basis: Article 14 of NCC; Article III(1) of 1987 Constitution

PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIALITY

 The law is applicable to all crimes committed within the limits of Philippine
territory.
Basis: Artcile 2 of RPC

PRINCIPLE OF PROSPECTIVITY/PROSPECTIVITY RULE

 The law should have only prospective application, except if it is in favorable to

the offender.
Basis: Article 21 and 22 of RPC; Article III(22) of 1987 Constitution,
Article 4 of NCC
 Doctrinal application:
 It applies to:
 administrative rulings and circulars
 judicial decisions
Basis: Article 8 of NCC
Legis interpretatio legis uim obtinet
-In the construction and application of criminal
laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an
act be reasonably foreseen for guidance of society.
Lex pospicit, non respicit
-The law looks forward not backward.
 In case of doubt between the mala prohibita doctrine and the prospectivity
rule in the adjudication of cases, the latter should prevail because all doubts
must be resolved pro reo.

EQUIPOISE RULE

 When the evidence of the prosecution and the defense are equally balanced,
the scale should be tilted in favor of the accused because of the presumption of
innocence.
 In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance,
acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.

FINALITY OF ACQUITTAL RULEp

  The State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.

ARTICLE 2. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE CODE

PAR IN PAREM NON HABET IMPERIUM

 An equal has no power over an equal.

PRINCIPLE OF INTRA-TERRITORIALITY

 The RPC applies within the Philippines archipelago, including its atmosphere,
interior waters and maritime zone.

PRINCIPLE OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY

 The RPC may be given application even to those crimes committed outside
the Philippine territorial jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 3.

Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005

(An unlawful act was done with unlawful intent.)

Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003

(When the victim dies, intent to kill is conclusively presumed from the act of killing
which is clearly unlawful. But where the victim survives, intent to kill becomes a specific
criminal intent which cannot be presumed but must be proved.)

ACTUS NON FACIT REUM, NISI MENS SIT REA

 The act cannot be criminal unless the mind is criminal.

 This doctrine applies only to dolo.

Llamoso v. SB, G.R. No. L-63408 & 64026, August 7, 1985

 ARTICLE 4.

People v. Pinto, G.R. No. 39519, November 21, 1991

(Of the same gravity or severity, the penalty is not mitigated.)

People v. Flores, 252 SCRA 31

(Praeter intentionem does not apply to culpa; “intentionem” denotes intent.)

People v. Acuram, G.R. No. 117954, April 27, 2000

(The perceived delay in giving medical treatment does not constitute efficient intervening
cause since the victim’s death is still due to the injuries inflicted by the offender.)

People v. Matyaong, G.R. No. 140206, June 21, 2001

(To hold a person liable for the death of another, the evidence must establish beyond
reasonable doubt that accused’s criminal act was the proximate cause of such death.)

ARTICLE 5.

NULLUM CRIMEN NULLA POENA SINE LEGE

 There is no crime when there is no law that defines and punishes it.

People v. Glino, G.R. No. 173793, December 4, 2007

(It is the duty of the court, whenever it has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, to report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be
made the subject of legislation.)

Villorente Case

(The court can likewise recommend to the Chief Executive to exercise his authority to grant
executive clemency in the view of the harshness of the law.)
 ARTICLE 6.

People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 88043, December 9, 1996

(When the cause of the non-performance of all acts necessary for the commission of the
offense is other than the offender’s spontaneous desistance, the felony is attempted.)

People v. Mingming

(Without proof of penetration, the crime committed may still constitute attempted rape
or consummated acts of lasciviousness.)

People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 120988, August 11, 1997

(In the attempted phase, the overt act must be an external one which has a direct
connection with the felony.)

Valuenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007

(By the definition of Article 308, theft can only be attempted or consummated. Its
element is complete from the moment offender gains possession of the thing, even if he
has no opportunity to dispose it.)

Petitioner: Aristotel Valenzuela

Respondents: People of the Philippines and Hon. Court of Appeals
Ponente: J. Tinga
FACTS:
While a security guard was manning his post at the open parking area of a
supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with
cases of detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was
waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with
more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the
cartons inside. As the taxi was about to leave, the security guard asked Valenzuela for
the receipt of the merchandize. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were
subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and
Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of
Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not
able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision, thus the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of theft has a frustrated stage.
HELD: No. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is consummated
when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. In
the crime of theft, the following elements should be present: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. The Court held that theft is produced
when there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is
immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen
 since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the
owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated
stage, and can only be attempted or consummated.

Peoplev. Baco, G.R. No. 129676, June 23, 1999

(A mere attempt to commit a felony is subsumed in the full execution thereof. To attempt
is to commence the commission of a crime by overt acts.)

ARTICLE 7.
DEMINIMIS NON CURAT LEX

 The law does not concern itself with trifles.

ARTICLE 8.
 People v. Tilos, G.R. No. 138385, January 16, 2001

(When the proposal is accepted, it becomes conspiracy. The essence of conspiracy is

community of criminal intent.)

Bahilidad v. People, G.R. No. 185195, March 17, 2010

(Mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it,

without any active participation in the conspiracy, is not enough for conviction.)

People v. Bragaes, G.R. No. 62359, November 14, 1991

(Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or approval of the act without cooperation or

agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy absent
the intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.)

Subayco v. SB, G.R. No. L-65017, August 22, 1996

(Implied conspiracy is one that is deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was committed.)

Pagalasan, G.R. Nos. 131926 & 138991

(Secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.

Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose
and design.)

People v. Caraang, G.R. No. 148424-27, December 11, 2003

(Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree expressly or impliedly,
to commit the felony and forthwith to pursue it actually.)

People v. Maranion, G.R. No. 90672-73, July 18, 1991

(The degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial in

conspiracy.)

People v. Tiguman, G.R. Nos. 130502-03, May 24, 2001

(As long as the acquittal of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a change of
conspiracy, other conspirators may be found guilty of offense.)

People v. Cabillan, G.R. No.131808, February 6, 2002

(A conspirator may be liable differently if there is present a circumstance personal to

him.)

Bustillo v. People, G.R. No. 160718, May 12, 2010

(For conspiracy to exist, there must be a conscious design to commit offense.)

 ARIAS DOCTRINE

 All heads of offices have to rely to reasonable extent on their subordinates

and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter
into negotiations. Any executive head of even small government agencies
can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed.

People v. Desoy, G.R. No. 127754, August 16, 1999

(In the absence of previous conspiracy, unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately
before the commission of the crime, or community of criminal design, the criminal
responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual
and not collective, and each of the participants is liable only for the act committed by him.)

ARTICLE 10. Special Laws

 Lim vs. CA, G.R. No. 100311, May 18, 1993

(Dolo is not required in crimes punished by a special statute because it is the act alone,
irrespective of the motives which constitute the offense.)

People v. Abay, G.R. No. 177752, February 24, 2009

(A felony cannot be complex with an offense penalized by a special law.)

People v. De Paz, G.R. 104277

(In entrapment, it is necessary that a buy-bust operation occurred; otherwise it will be

considered in case of doubt an instigation which is an absolutory cause.)

People v. Mateo, G.R. No. 179478, July 28, 2008

(Police officers involved in a buy-bust operation are presumed to have performed their
duties regularly. But this presumption can be overturned if clear and convincing evidence
is presented.)
 ARTICLE 11. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 177302, April 16, 2009

(Unlawful aggression must be such as to put in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself or of others being defended and not an imagine threat.)

People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 130708, October 22, 1999

(The presence of large number of wounds inflicted on the victim and the severity thereof
disapprove self-defense; they belie the claim of incomplete defense and indicate not the
desire to defend but a determined effort to kill and belies the reasonableness of the
means adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggression.)

People v. Gutual, G.R. No. 115233, February 22, 1996

(The proportionateness of self-defense does not depend upon the harm done, but rests
upon the imminent danger of such injury.)

“STAND GROUND WHEN IN THE RIGHT”

 Applies when aggressor is armed with weapon and is especially more liberal
if the person attacked is peace officer in the performance of his duty.
 This superseded the PRINCIPLE OF “RETREAT TO THE WALL” which makes it
a duty of a person assailed to retreat as far as he can before he meets the
assault with force.

People v. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, Aprl 20, 1983

(In defense of property, killing is not justified. There must be, in addition, the necessity to save
another life.)

DOCTRINE OF “SELF-HELP”

 Justifies the act of owner or lawful possessor of a thing to use force

necessary to protect his proprietary or possessory rights. He must
however exercise this right at the very moment that he is being deprived
of his property. When possession has already been lost, he must resort
to judicial process in reclaiming his property; otherwise, he could be
liable for coercion.

Tabuena v. SB, G.R. Nos. 103501-03, February 17, 1997

(Even if the order of the superior is illegal, if it appears to be legal, and the subordinate is not
aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable.)

ARTICLE 12. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

 People v. Danao, G.R. No. 96832, November 19, 1992

(Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.)

*Read R.A. 9344 in relation to minority

Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008

(What is controlling with respect to the exemption from criminal liability is not he age at
the timeof the promulgation of judgment but his age at the time of the commission of the
offense.)

*Read People v. Agliday in Article 3 (accident)

DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE

 One who has a full control of the situation has the last clear chance
of avoiding the accident.

ARTICLE 13. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

 People v. Pagal, 79 SCRA 570

(Provocation is immediate if no interval of time elapsed between the provocation and the
commission of the crime.)

People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 75508, June 10, 1994

(When an offended party flees from his aggressor, the latter has no reason to pursue and
attack him.)

People v. Ignas, G.R. No. 140514-15, September 30, 2003

(The benefit of immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot be considered in favor of

the accused when he had sufficient time to recover his serenity.)

People v. CA, G.R. No. 103613, February 23, 2001

(The acts of the accused were done in the spirit of revenge and lawlessness, for which no
mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation can arise.)

Taraya, G.R. No. 135551, October 27, 2000

(Added a fourth requisite of voluntary surrender that there is no pending warrant of

arrest or information filed.)

FACTS: Accused-appelants Ampie Taraya, Jonar Estrada and Arly Cantuba, all are
relatives, were charged for the crime of murder qualified by treachery for the death of
Salvador Reyes. Salvador Reyes was killed on the night of September 24, 1995.
Prosecution witnesses Mariano Adillo, David Angeles and Gregorio Reyes testified
against the accused appellants. Their statements were countered by Armando Bilara,
Domingo Decena, SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez and the accused appellants themselves.
Prosecution witness Mariano testified that he saw the three accused approach
Salvador the night Salvador was killed. Prosecution witness David Angles swore to have
seen the actual killing and positively identified the three accused. Gregorio Reyes, the
victim’s father, said that his son had an altercation with Arly. The defense countered
their claims. Barangay Tanod Armando Bilara stated that David Angeles’ brother had a
fistfight with Jonar, implying that there might be a different reason as to David Angeles’
insistence on Jonar’s involvement in the killing. Domingo Decena also testified that on
the night of the killing he saw Salvador hit Ampie with a pipe which Ampie luckily
avoided. Domingo added that Ampie, to defend himself hacked Salvador and ran away.
Domingo stated that he also ran back home out of fear and only found out of
Salvador’s death the next morning. SPO2 Emmanuel Martinez testified that Ampie did
surrender himself at the police station on Octiber 9, 1997. Ampie admitted on killing
Salvador but contended that he did so out of self-defense and said that his cousins had
nothing to do with it. Jonar and Arly both had alibis. Trial Court ruled against accused
appellants for murder and appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Accused appellants appealed, arguing that Ampie should not be charged with murder
since he have done so only out of self-defense plus Salvador was also armed with a
pipe that night, which disqualifies treachery in the case. They further asserted that Arly
and Jonar were not co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador Reyes. They were
implicated by David Angeles, Jr claims which were not supported by clear evidence.
Furthermore, they insisted that Ampie be allowed to avail of a mitigated sentence since
he surrendered himself at the police station at his own will.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Jonar and Arly were co-conspirators in the killing of Salvador.

2. Whether or not Ampie’s voluntary surrender made him eligible for a

mitigated sentence.

HELD: 1. No. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It does not require that
such agreement occurred for an appreciable period prior to the commission of the
crime; it is sufficient that at the time of the execution thereof, all accused had the same
purpose and were united therein. The Court ruled that David Angeles’ testimony was
not persuasive as to the participation of Arly and jonar in the crime. There had been no
certainty as to their action to show a deliberate and concerted cooperation on their
part as to likewise render them liable for the killing of Salvador. Prosecution evidence
failed to convince the court as to its sufficiency with moral certainty that there indeed
had been conspiracy among accused-appellants. Thus, The Court acquitted Jonar and
Arly. The Court also ruled that, there being no positive and direct evidence to show
that the attack was sudden and unexpected, treachery as a circumstance to qualify the
killing to murder cannot be appreciated against AMPIE. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance requires that the offender deliberately employs
means of execution which deprives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or
retaliate. Ampie thereforecould only be charged with homicide.

2. Yes. As to the issue of Ampie’s voluntary surrender, the court emphasized

that for one to avail of mitigating circumstance for voluntary surrender, the following
requisites must be present: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the
offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; (3) the
surrender was voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or information
filed. When Ampie surrendered, a pending warrant of arrest had already been issued.
His arrest by that time was already imminent.

De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009

(Contrary to Taraya Case: Classified that the mere filing of information and/or the
issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender involuntary.)

FACT: Petitioner, Rosario T. de Vera, filed a bigamy case against her spouse Geren A. de
Vera and Josephine F. Juliano after allegedly contracting a second marriage with the
latter, which likewise has previous knowledge that accused he is still validly married to
petitioner. Accused Geren pleaded guilty on arraignment but prayed on a latter motion
that he be allowed to withdraw it in order to avail of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. Said motion was opposed by petitioner arguing that it shouldn’t
be entertained for the case is already for promulgation and that not all the elements of
voluntary surrender is present. The RTC granted the motion and held the accused guilty
of bigamy but likewise appreciated the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and plea of guilty in the determination of the penalty to be imposed. Petitioner moved
 for the partial reconsideration of the case which was denied. In 2005, Geren applied for
probation which was favorably acted upon and referred to the probation office of San
Juan. Petitioner filed a special civil action in the appellate court which affirmed the
decision of the RTC and ruled that all the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender were present.

ISSUE: Whether the court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of
the accused.

HELD: The mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will
not automatically make the surrender "involuntary. As distinguished from the earlier
cases, upon learning that the court had finally determined the presence of probable
cause and even before the issuance and implementation of the warrant of arrest,
Geren already gave himself up, acknowledging his culpability. This was bolstered by his
eventual plea of guilt during the arraignment.

People v. Amaguin, G.R. Nos. 54344-45, January 10, 1994

(Voluntary surrender can be appreciated even if the accused turned themselves one week after
the crime. The fact is they voluntarily surrendered to the police before arrest could be effected.)

People v. Acuram, G.R. No. 117954, April 27, 2000

(The offender himself should surrender. If it was his superior who surrender him to the custody
of the court, such is not the voluntary surrender contemplated by law.)

FACT:
The appellant shot the victim who later died. After charges were filed and his
commanding officer was told of the incident, he was ordered not to leave camp, where
he surrendered.
ISSUE: Whether the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
HELD:
The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused
to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because
he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense
necessarily incurred in his search and capture. In this case, it was appellant’s
commanding officer who surrendered him to the custody of the court. Being restrained
by one’s superiors to stay within the camp without submitting to the investigating
authorities concerned, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by
law.

People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-80845, March 14, 1994

(The accused must be acquitted if the only evidence of guilt is his improvident plea due to the
prodding of his lawyer.)
 ARTICLE 14 AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

People vs Gano, G..R. No. 134373, Feb. 28, 2001

No law provides that the excess rape or homicide should be aggravating circumstance.

People vs Feran, Oct. 1992

Conspiracy is neither aggravating nor qualifying but is a manner of incurring collective criminal liability
among every co-conspirators in an equal degree such that the act of one becomes the act of all.

Rodrigues 19 Phil 150, Siojo 61 Phil. 307

Public authority covers not only persons in authority but also agents of persons in authority
and other public officers.

People vs Ursal, 121 SCRA 409

The circumstance of sex is not sustained solely by the fact that the victim was a woman. It must
further appear that in the lawful taking of her life, there was some specific insult or disrespect
shown to her womanhood.

People vs Dacibar, G.R. No. 111286, Feb 2000

It is not necessary that the accused enters the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough
that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means to
perpetrate the assault from outside the house.

People vs Ong, Jan. 30 , 1975

Nighttime is absorbed in treachery if it is part of the treacherous means to insure execution of crime.

People vs Manansala, G.R. No. 88752, July 3, 1992

Evident premeditation is not inherent in robbery with homicide. In such an offense, the permediattion
must relate to the killing and not to the robbery.

People vs Rebamontan, G.R. No. 125318, April 13, 1999

The essence of treachery and the unexpectedness of the attack upon the unsuspecting and unarmed
victim who does not give the slightest provocation.

People vs Alacar, G.R. Nos. 64725-26, July 20,1992

When it is shown that the attack was not made with alevosia the number of the assailants and
simultaneity of the attack upon a defenseless person may constitute abuse of force.

People vs Landicho, G.R. No. 116600, July 3, 1996

Treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was warned of the danger to his persons, for what
is decisive is that the execution of the attack was made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself or retaliate.

People vs Costelo, G.R. No. 134311, Oct. 13, 1999

The retaliation relevant in the appreciation of treachery must come from the victim,
not from anyone else.
 People vs Binondo, G.R. No. 97227, Oct. 20, 1992

No greater outrage, insult or abuse can a person commit upon a corpse than to severe its head.

ARTICLE 17 PRINCIPALS
Doctrine of Implied Conspiracy

The voluntary and indispensable cooperation of the offender is a concurrence of the criminal
act to be executed. Consequently, he is a co-conspirator by indispensable cooperation, although the
common design or purpose was never bottled up by previous undertaking

People vs Parungao, G.R. No. 125812, Nov. 28, 1996

Where the words uttered did not make any great dominance or influences on the offenders were
already determined to commit the offending acts, the utterance will not make the utterer an inducer.

Sotto G.R. No. 106083-84, March 29, 1996

The participation of the cooperator must be indispensible to the commission of the crime. If his
participation is dispensable, that is, with or without his participation, the offense will be committed, the
liability is that of an accomplice.

People vs Tabuso, G.R. No. 113708, Oct. 26, 1999

Mere presence at the crime scene or sole relationship with the other accused does not make one
a co-conspirator.

ARTICLE 18 ACCOMPLICES
 People vs De Vera, G.R. No. 128966, Aug. 18, 1999

A lookout who was not part of the conspiracy but participated only after such decision was reached
incurs criminal liability as an accomplice.

People vs Lacao, SR.

Conspiracy is not a requirement as the accomplice is not a principal, but supplies material or
moral aid to the principal in an efficacious way.

ARTICLE 21-22
Nullum crimen nulla poene sine lege

No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
Unless there is a law penalizing an act or omission, the offender cannot be penalized, no matter how
reprehensible the act may be.

Prospectivity Rule mandates that penal laws shall have only prospective application.

ARTICLE 81-85
 People vs Ballabare, G.R. No. 108871, Nov. 19, 1996

An affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the accused’s defenses, not the sole
consideration that can result in acquittal.

Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans vs OMB, G.R.No. 135482, Aug. 14, 2001

The prescription shall be interrupted or suspended when the proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting jeopardy.

ARTICLE 95 CONDITIONAL PARDON

 Tesoro vs Dir. Of Prisons, 68 Phil 154

The pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the
power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be
upon which his recommitment was ordered.

Torres

A final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to
determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of conditional pardon.

ARTICLE 100-113
 People vs Teehankee, Jr. G.R.Nos.111206-08, Oct. 6, 1995

The indemnities for loss of earning capacity and for moral damages are recoverable separately from
and in addition to the fixed sum corresponding to the indemnities from the sole death.

People vs Victor, G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998

Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of
higher penalties.

People vs Malapo, G.R. No. 123115, Aug. 25, 1988

The civil indemnity which, by reason of the added repugnance of the bestial act being committed on a
pregnant woman in the presence of her husband, is increased for each rape committed.

People vs Carpo, G.R. No. 132676, April 4, 2001

Without a special power of attorney, the counsel for the accused cannot bind nor compromise
his client’s civil liability.

People vs Luchico, 49 Phil. 689; People vs Namayan, G.R. No. 106539, July 18, 1995

Rape carries with it, among others, the obligations to acknowledge the offspring if the character of its
origin does not prevent it and to support the same.

Fernando vs Ocampo, 37 SCRA 311

The employer’s liability for the criminal negligence of his employee is subsidiary in nature
and is limited only to civil indemnity.