ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR.

, Complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 8243               July 24, 2009

FACTS:

Rolando Pacana, Jr. (complainant) filed an administrative complaint against Atty.

Maricel Pascual-Lopez (respondent) charging the latter with flagrant violation of the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant worked for Multitel (later renamed as Precedent) and earned the ire of
investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent
and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos
(P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank.
Complainant sought the advice of respondent but no Retainer Agreement was
executed. Atty. Lopez gave regular advice, helped prepare standard quitclaims,
solicited money and properties from complainant to pay the creditors and even
discussed a collection case for the company.
Soon, complainant noticed that respondent began to avoid communicating with him.
Complainant then wrote to respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all
the money, documents and properties given to the latter but respondent failed to
provide a clear audited financial report of all the properties turned over by the
complainant to the respondent. Complainant filed an affidavit-complaint against
respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.

ISSUE: WON a lawyer-client relationship was created.

RULING: YES.

After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report
and Recommendation finding that a lawyer-client relationship was established between
respondent and complainant despite the absence of a written contract. The absence of
a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship
between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the
relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and
received in any matter pertinent to his profession.

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have
done was either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since
she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as
representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot
be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our
ethical rules on conflict of interest.
REBECCA J. PALM, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 8242, October 2, 2009

FACTS: Rebecca J. Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. as its
retained counsel. She filed a case of disbarment against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorney-client
privilege and conflict of interests.
The basis of the claim of breach of the lawyer-client relationship occurred during a meeting. Atty.
Iledan claimed that the stockholders’ meeting cannot take place via teleconferencing because they
have yet to amend the by-laws of the corporation to allow such mode of communications. Palm
claims this was a breach of the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality.
The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the counsel of Soledad who
was filed with an Estafa case by Comtech.
ISSUE: Whether or not (a) respondent violated the Confidentiality of Lawyer-Client Relationship; and
(b) respondent is guilty of representing an interest in conflict with that of a former client
RULING: No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may have
been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The amendment,
repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by “the board of directors or trustees, by a majority
vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a
majority of members of a non-stock corporation.” It means the stockholders are aware of the
proposed amendments to the by-laws. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-
laws is made, copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws. The
documents are public records and could not be considered confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.
The client must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the proposed amendments must
be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be
filed with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the
disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders’ meeting could not be considered a violation
of his client’s secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Court also finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by
Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech
against its former officer. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used
against Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was still Comtech’s retained counsel.
Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with
Comtech. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred
beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer
the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former
client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
The Court DISMISSED the complaint against Atty. Felipe Ileda, Jr. for lack of merit.
Villanueva v Gonzales 544 scra 410
Facts:
Sometime in 2000, complainant engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of transferring
the title over a piece of property located in Talisay, Cebu. Complainant, as mortgagee, wanted to
transfer the title to her name because the mortgagor failed to redeem the property within the
redemption period and the sheriff had already issued a sheriff's definite deed of sale in complainant's
favor. Complainant gave respondent P8,000 as acceptance fee, the property's TCT, and other
pertinent documents.1

After receiving the money, TCT, and other documents, respondent began to avoid complainant.
Whenever complainant went to respondent's, respondent's secretary would tell her that respondent
could not be disturbed because he was either sleeping or doing something important. After some time
and after complainant's daughter confronted him, respondent finally returned the money. However,
until now, respondent has not returned the TCT and other documents. Thus, complainant filed a
complaint against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

IBP Director for Bar Discipline Rogelio A. Vinluan ordered respondent to submit his answer to the
complaint. Respondent did not submit an answer. IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala ordered respondent to submit his answer to the complaint, and set the mandatory
conference. Respondent did not submit an answer or attend the mandatory conference. The
Commission on Bar Discipline considered the case submitted for resolution.

Issue: whether or not Gonzales is guilty of misconduct and negligent behavior

Ruling:

IBP Commissioner for Bar Discipline Caesar R. Dulay (Commissioner Dulay) found respondent guilty
of misconduct and negligent behavior: (1) he failed to perform any legal service to his client, (2) he
did not inform his client about the status of the case, (3) he returned the P8,000 acceptance fee
without any explanation, and (4) he was indifferent. Commissioner Dulay found that respondent
violated Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for one year.

In a Resolution the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted and approved the Report with
modification. The IBP Board suspended respondent from the practice of law for six months and
ordered him to return to complainant the P2,000, TCT, and the other documents.

The Court sustains the findings and recommendations of the IBP with modification. Respondent
violated Canons 16, 17, and 18, and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent Refused to Account for
and Return His Client's Money. Respondent Refuses to Return
His Client's TCT and Other Documents. Respondent Failed to Serve His Client
with Fidelity, Competence, and Diligence. Respondent Did Not Keep His Client Informed
of the Status of Her Case and Refused to Respond
to Her Requests for Information. Respondent Did Not File an Answer or
Attend the Mandatory Hearing Before the IBP

Lawyers are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility because an attorney-client relationship is highly fiduciary in nature and demands
utmost fidelity and good faith.

the Court finds respondent Atty. Cornelius M. Gonzales GUILTY of violating Canons 16, 17, and 18,
and Rules 16.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,

the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective upon finality of this
Decision, 

ORDERS him to RETURN the TCT and all other documents to complainant within 15 days from
notice of this Decision, and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar offense, including the
failure to return the TCT and all other documents as required herein, shall be dealt with more
severely.
SALOMON, JR. v. ATTY. FRIAL

Facts:

A writ of preliminary attachment was issued in favour of Lucy Lo, the client of Atty. Frial, over
two cars – a black 1995 Volvo and a green 1993 Nissan Sentra. According to Atty. Salomon, the
attaching sheriff of Manila, instead of depositing the attached cars in the court premises, turned them
over to Atty. Frial.

The Nissan Sentra was spotted being used by unauthorized individuals on several occasions.
As for the Volvo, Atty. Salomon averred that during mediation, Atty. Frial deliberately withheld
information as to its whereabouts. As it turned out later, the Volvo was totally destroyed by fire, but
the court was not immediately put on notice of this development.

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found in its Report that while there is perhaps no direct
evidence tying up Atty. Frial with the use of the Nissan Sentra, the unyielding fact remains that it was
being used by other persons during the time he was supposed to have custody of it. As for the Volvo,
Atty. Frials could not explain the circumstances behind its destruction, but admitted not reporting the
burning to the court or sheriff. Thus, the Commission concluded that Atty. Frial committed acts clearly
bearing on his integrity as a lawyer, adding that he failed to observe the diligence required of him as
custodian of the cars. The Commission recommended that Atty. Frial be suspended from the practice
of law for 1 year.

Issue:

Is Atty. Frial guilty of grave misconduct in dealing with the 2 cars belonging to Luco Lo?

Ruling:

YES, Atty. Frial is guilty of grave misconduct arising from his violation of Canon 11 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics that states:

11. Dealing with trust property

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes
advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the
lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be
commingled with his own or be used by him.

Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the attached cars.
He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using it. He did
not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he
took custody of them without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority.

The Court, nevertheless, is not inclined to impose, as complainant urges, the ultimate penalty
of disbarment. The rule is that disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and moral character of a lawyer as an officer of the court and member of
the bar. Thus, the Court found that a year’s suspension from the practice of his legal profession will
provide him with enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his misconduct.
DOLORES C. BELLEZA, vs ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA, A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009

 Facts:
 
Chua, friend of Dolores referred Atty. Macasa, for legal servicesin connection with the arrest of her
son for Violation of RA 9165. Atty. Macasa agreed to handle the case for P30,000.00. Dolores made
3 partial payments on different occasions and P18,000 purpose of posting a bond to secure the liberty
of his son, however no receipt was issued by Atty. Macasa. Dolores found out that Atty. Macasa did
not remit the amount to the court supposed to be intended for the provisional liberty of her son. She
demanded the return of P18,000 several times but respondent ignored her. Moreover, Atty. Macasa
failed to act on the case of complainants son and complainant was forced to avail the services of a
PAO lawyer.
 
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Macasa grossly neglected his duties for the cause of his client.

Ruling:
Yes. Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. A lawyer
who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his time, knowledge, skills
and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him,
constantly striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from his client, save by the
rules of law legally applied.

A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his
client with competence and diligence. He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from such
relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following
representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers
similarly situated possess; that he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the
litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill
and in the application of his knowledge to his clients cause; and that he will take all steps necessary
to adequately safeguard his clients interest.

A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel
and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant,
particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers
lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and unethical.
 
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his
attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal
assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on
account of respondents continued inaction, complainant was compelled to seek the services of the
Public Attorneys Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son
was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his
constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to him for posting a
bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent unduly impeded the latters
constitutional right to bail.

ELMER CANOY vs. ATTY. JOSE MAX ORTIZ (PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS)
[A. C. No. 5485. March 16, 2005]

FACTS:

Atty. Ortiz’s services were engaged by Canoy, who was illegally dismissed by his former employer.
Canoy filed the complaint against his former employer with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) Regional Arbitration Board VI of Bacolod City.
The labor arbiter holding the said case ordered Canoy and the Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines to
submit their respective position papers. Canoy thereafter submitted pertinent documents to Atty.Ortiz
for the preparation of the said position paper. Canoy made several trips to respondent’s law office to
follow-up the status of the position paper required by the labor arbiter. After many visits Canoy failed
to meet Atty. Ortiz, so he decided to go to NLRC to follow-up the case himself. He found out that the
complaint was already dismissed couple of years ago because of failure to prosecute and that no
position papers were submitted.
Thereafter, Canoy filed a complaint with the Bar Confidant accusing Atty. Ortiz of misconduct and
malpractice.
In his defense, Atty. Ortiz said that he already prepared the position paper of Canoy but failed to
submit it until the labor arbiter issued an order to dismiss the case. Atty. Ortiz said that he was not
able to comply with the requirement of the labor arbiter because he was too busy being a newly
elected Councilor of Bacolod City while practicing law at the same time.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Ortiz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by abandoning the cause
of
his client.
HELD:

The IBP, in their investigation, found out that Atty. Ortiz clearly showed that he failed to exercise that
degree of competence and diligence required of him.
He should have filed the position paper on time owing his duty as Canoy’s counsel. Or he should
have resorted to other means like asking for an extension to comply with the said requirement if his
busy schedule would not allow him to file the pertinent document on time. Lastly, he should have
informed his client that he would not be able to make a timely filing to give his client more time to look
for remedies.
**Atty. Ortiz was suspended for 1 month and is warned.

Plus Builders Inc. vs. Revilla, Jr. 578 SCRA 431

Facts:
The Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a decision in favor of Plus Builders,
Inc. and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et.al, who were the clients of respondent,
Atty. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondent’s clients were mere tenants and not rightful
possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was elevated all the way up to the Supreme Court,
with this Court sustaining Plus Builders Inc.’s rights over the land.
Respondent was found to have committed intentional falsehood; and misused court processes
with the intention to delay the execution of the decision through the filing of several motions, petitions
for temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the
decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law –
holding themselves out as his partners/associates in the law firm. Respondent maintains that he did
not commit the acts complained of and that the courses of action he took were not meant to unduly
delay the execution of the DARAB Decision.

Issue: WON respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Held:
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his full attention,
diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for
a fee or for free.  A lawyer’s devotion to his client’s cause not only requires but also entitles him to
deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is justly due him or to present every
defense provided by law to enable the latter’s cause to succeed.  In this case, respondent may not be
wanting in this regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the respondent’s acts complained of were
committed out of his over-zealousness and misguided desire to protect the interests of his clients who
were poor and uneducated. Taking the cudgels from the former lawyer in this case is rather
commendable, but respondent should not forget his first and foremost responsibility as an officer of
the court.
 In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the
expense of truth and justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a
case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.
However, the Court also knows how to show compassion and will not hesitate to refrain from
imposing the appropriate penalties in the presence of mitigating factors, such as the respondent’s
length of service, acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family
circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, and respondent’s advanced age, among
other things, which have varying significance in the Court’s determination of the imposable penalty.
Therefore, a suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law is sufficient in this case.

Ceniza v. Atty. Rubia

AC. NO. 616

FACTS:

Maria Earl Beverly Ceniza filade a complaint against herein respondent Attorney Rubia for ignorance
of the law and falsification of public documents. It appears that Ceniza sought the legal services of
Atty Rubia with regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza.
Rubia allegedly filed her complaint in a court that has no jurisdiction over the subject properties in
question, forged the signature of Ceniza's husband in an affidavit and misrepresented to her
(Ceniza), that the complaint was already filed in court, when in fact, it was not. However, upon
investigation of the Integrated Bar of The Philippines, her allegations had no factual basis. However,
Rubia did commit acts which should be sanctioned, mainly the failure to maintain open
communication with her client regarding the status of the said complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Attorney Rubia's withdrawal of service was reasonable

HELD:

It was unreasonable. When she accepted to handle the case of Ceniza, she is expected to do her
duties with utmost attention, skill and competence, despite other workloads to do with her other
clients. This is a violation of Canon 22 of the CPR that states: "A Lawyer shall withdraw his services
only for good cause upon notice appropriate to the circumstances. Being an officer of the court, who
is tasked to assist in the administration of justice, a lawyer is not permitted to withdraw his services if
it will cause injustice to the client. Thus, the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months.

Fidela Vda. De Enriquez v. Atty. Manuel San Jose

Facts:
Complainant Vda. De Enriquez hired the services of respondent Atty. San Jose for the purpose
of filing an unlawful detainer case against Rugerio Alipante, complainant's lessee. According to her,
she paid P 2,000.00 to the respondent as attorney's fees but the latter failed to file the appropriate
case. As a result, she decided to withdraw the case from respondent and demanded the return of
pertinent documents but despite repeated demands, respondent refused and failed to return the
documents. Furthermore, complainant alleged that her daughter who worked for respondent did not
received any salary therefrom. Thus, complainant filed a disbarment case against respondent on the
ground of gross negligence.
On the other hand, respondent denied being negligent. He alleged that he received a letter
from the complainant informing him that the lessee had already agreed to vacate the premises, and
thus, the filing of an unlawful detainer case had become unnecessary.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of gross negligence and violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:
Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility in Rule 18.03 enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. A
lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter's
interest with utmost diligence. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and
diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of
his client. It is not enough that a practitioner is qualified to handle a legal matter; he is also required to
prepare adequately and give the appropriate attention to his legal work. In the instant case,
respondent fell short of the diligence required of a lawyer entrusted with a case. It is undisputed that
respondent was hired by the complainant on August 28, 1989, and that respondent sent the notice to
vacate to the lessee before the appropriate unlawful detainer case could be filed. However, after nine
months, respondent had done nothing further in connection with the case. Moreover, the respondent
failed to file the appropriate civil case after sending a demand letter. The failure to file a pleading is by
itself inexcusable negligence on the part of respondent.

Uy v Tansinsin

FACTS:
To defend her rights, complainant engaged the services of respondent who timely filed an Answer to
the complaint for ejectment. Required to file a Position Paper, respondent, however, failed to file one
for and on behalf of the complainant. Eventually, a decision was rendered by the MeTC against the
complainant. Complainant, through respondent, elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
by filing a Notice of Appeal. In an Order dated May 25, 2004, the RTC dismissed the appeal solely
because of the failure of respondent to file a memorandum on appeal. The motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied for having been filed out of time.

ISSUE:
Realizing that she lost her case because of the negligence of her counsel, complainant initiated the
disbarment case against respondent, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on
Bar Discipline (CBD). Complainant averred that she gave her full trust and confidence to respondent,
but the latter failed miserably in his duty as a lawyer and advocate.

RULING:
Respondent indeed violated Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only
upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.
Respondent ATTY. BRAULIO RG TANSINSIN is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.

PORMENTO V. PONTEVEDRA
(A.C. No. 5128) 31 March 2005

The Case: Complaint against Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra with malpractice and misconduct with prayer
for disbarment

Facts: Respondent was the Pormento family’s legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The family’s
relationship with the respondent extends beyond the mere lawyer-client relations.

The rift between complainant and respondent began when the complainant’s counterclaim in a
civil case filed with the RTC of Bacolod City was dismissed. Respondent failed to inform complainant
Pormento of the dismissal of his counterclaim which resulted to the latter being deprived of his right to
appeal. In order to recover his ownership over a parcel of land, Pormento was forced to hire a new
lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an action to recover the subject property.

In a separate incident, In 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at Negros Occidental.  The
Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized by respondent. 
Since there was another person who claims ownership of the property, complainant alleges that he
heeded respondent’s advice to build a small house on the property and to allow his (complainant’s)
nephew and his family to occupy the house in order for complainant to establish his possession of the
said property.  Subsequently, complainant’s nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the
former to file an ejectment case with the Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros Occidental. 
Respondent acted as the counsel of complainant’s nephew

Held/Ruling:
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
“A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.”
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in
any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test to
determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.

A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the
subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the
previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. Conversely, he may properly act as
counsel for a new client, with full disclosure to the latter, against a former client in a matter wholly
unrelated to that of the previous employment, there being in that instance no conflict of
interests. Where, however, the subject matter of the present suit between the lawyer’s new client and
his former client is in some way connected with that of the former client’s action, the lawyer may have
to contend for his new client that which he previously opposed as counsel for the former client or to
use against the latter information confided to him as his counsel.

Hadjula v. Atty. Madiana

FACTS:

[C]omplainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau
of Fire Protection (BFP), claimed that she approached respondent for some legal advice and further
alleged that in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential she
disclosed personal secrets only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would
refer the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have
refused handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.

[R]espondent denied giving legal advice to the complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the
existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them. Respondent also stated the observation that
the supposed confidential data and sensitive documents adverted to are in fact matters of common
knowledge in the BFP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Atty. Madiana breached her duty of preserving the confidence of a client and
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was reprimanded and admonished.

RATIO:

The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable
lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer
certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the profession. Among the burdens of the
relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep inviolate confidential
information acquired or revealed during legal consultations.
The seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Supreme Court feels that there is
room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without
meaning to condone the error of respondent’s ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former
friends becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using
whatever convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information
respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even the
score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to the Court that respondent was actuated by the urge to
retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she was
violating the rule on confidentiality.

Torres v. Rodellas

Facts:

Balligi (R) occupied a property in Occidental Mindoro in 1967, built a residential house thereon and
subsequently applied for a Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) with the DENR for the property.
She and her family left for Manila in 1989 and eventually went to Saudi Arabia. In the same year,
Edwino moved into R’s house, occupying the portion vacated by R’s sister, claiming that R sold him
the house and property (proof: Affidavit of Relinquishment/Sale of Right). Edwino also filed an MSA in
his name for the same property with the DENR. R’s MSA application was then rejected in favor of
Edwino’s application. When R’s son Eugenio returned and learned of Edwino’s claim he filed a
Protest with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) against Edwino’s
MSA on the ground that the Affidavit of Relinquishment was forged, as R was in Saudi Arabia at the
time.

PETITIONER COURT RESPONDENT

CENRO
DENR-REG OFF:
(Eugenio) PROTEST
DISMISSED
AMENDED PROTEST
(Eugenio without personality to
(with SPA)
represent R; NO ruling on allege
falsified Affidavit)
DENR-RO:
(Eugenio) REQUEST FOR EXTENSION TO
DENIED
FILE MR
(beyond 15-day period)
DENR-RO: (R Balligi) OPPOSITION/PROTEST
DISMISSED
(res judicata)
DENR SEC:
DENIED MR
(improper forum re: alleged falsified
Affidavit)
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
GRANTED APPEAL
(no res judicata)
OP:
DISMISSED
P’s counsel:
(out of time and lack of personality
MR + MANIFESTATION of R’s
of movant  death of client
Death
extinguished agency relationship w/
counsel)
P’s heirs executed a Letter of Appointment engaging services of deceased P’s counsel; P substituted by surviving children
in the appeal
CA:
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON DENIED
CERTIORARI (OP Decision already final due to
late MR; R’s counsel without
personality to file MR)

MR DENIED
(letter of appointment cannot cure
counsel’s lack of authority in MR
with OP)
SC:
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
PARTLY GRANTED
CERTIORARI
CASE REMANDED TO CA
Edwino’s counsel retained the personality to file MR of the OP’s Decision; OP’s Decision not
yet final and executory
 A.O. No. 18, s. 1987 (appeals to the OP)  Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable
 Sec. 16, Rule 3, ROC  applies in this case (purpose: protection of due process right)
o Substitution of a deceased party by the heirs is allowed in actions that survive the
death of a party thereto, particularly, causes of action that affect primarily and
principally property and property rights, injuries to the person being merely
incidental
o Here, action survives death of Edwino as case involves the parties’ respective rights
to acquire property (MSA grant)
 Counsel did not mention Edwino’s exact date of death in MR filed before OP
o Assuming counsel belatedly notified OP of Edwino’s death, Sec. 16, Rule 3 merely
provides for disciplinary action against counsel in case of such failure to comply with
its duty; no mention that counsel would be w/o legal personality to appear for the
benefit of the client/heirs
 OP could have deferred any action on the MR until substitution had been effected and OP
has ascertained that Edwino’s heirs retained counsel’s services
o OP’s failure to act on information of Edwino’s death in accordance with Sec. 16,
Rule 3 is contrary to equity and fair play
 OP could not dismiss P’s MR to the prejudice of the heirs, as it is partly responsible for
the non-substituion of the heirs for Edwino

Saligumba v. Palanog

Facts:

On 28 February 1977, Spouses Palanogs, filed a complaint dated 28 February 1977 for Quieting of
Title with Damages against defendants, spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr.
(spouses Saligumbas), before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Kalibo, Aklan.

It was alleged in the complaint the spouses Saligumbas prevented them from entering and residing
on the subject premises and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land. Spouses Palanogs
prayed that they be declared the true and rightful owners of the land in question.

On 7 August 1987, RTC rendered a judgment declaring spouses Palanogs the lawful owners of the
subject land.

A motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed but the trial court, in its
Order dated 8 May 1997, ruled that since more than five years had elapsed after the date of its
finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion.

On 9 May 1997, Monica Palanog, filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the Decision dated
7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 which she claimed has not been barred by the statute of
limitations. She impleaded petitioners Generoso Saligumba and Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs and
children of the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants.

The defendants contend that since their parents spouses Saligumbas died while Civil Case No. 2570
was pending and no order of substitution was issued hence, the trial was null and void; and the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the heirs of the spouses Saligumbas and therefore, the judgment was
not binding on them.

The RTC rendered a decision ordering the revival of judgment in Civil Case No. 2570. The trial court
ruled that the non-substitution of the deceased spouses did not have any legal significance. The trial
court further found that when defendant Valeria Saligumba died, her lawyer, Atty. Miralles, did not
inform the court of the death of his client. The trial court thus ruled that the non-substitution of the
deceased defendant was solely due to the negligence of counsel.

Petitioners contend that the RTC-Branch 3 Decision of 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 is null
and void since there was no proper substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas despite the trial
courts knowledge that the deceased spouses Saligumbas were no longer represented by counsel.
They argue that they were deprived of due process and justice was not duly served on them.

Issue: WON the failure of the counsel to inform the court of the death of his client binds the latter’s
successors-in-interest.

Ruling:

Consequently, Atty. Miralles was responsible for the conduct of the case since he had not been
properly relieved as counsel of record. His acts bind his clients and the latters successors-in-interest.

It is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the death of his client. The failure of
counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to inform the court of the death of his client and the
non-substitution of such party will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the
action survives the death of such party. The decision rendered shall bind the partys successor-in-
interest.

Atty. Miralles continued to represent the deceased spouses even after the latters demise. Acting on
their behalf, Atty. Miralles even asked for postponement of the hearings and did not even confirm the
death of his clients nor his appointment as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge. These clearly negate
petitioners contention that Atty. Miralles ceased to be spouses Saligumbas counsel.

The counsel of record is obligated to protect his clients interest until he is released from his
professional relationship with his client. For its part, the court could recognize no other representation
on behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.

Ratio:

The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is in a better position
than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of his client and to inform the court of
the name and address of his legal representative.

Section 17 is explicit that the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir to appear
arises only upon proper notice. The notation Party-Deceased on the unserved notices could not be
the proper notice contemplated by the rule. As the trial court could not be expected to know or take
judicial notice of the death of a party without the proper manifestation from counsel, the trial court was
well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. Moreover, there is no showing that the
courts proceedings were tainted with irregularities.

Likewise, the plaintiff or his attorney or representative could not be expected to know of the death of
the defendant if the attorney for the deceased defendant did not notify the plaintiff or his attorney of
such death as required by the rules. The judge cannot be blamed for sending copies of the orders
and notices to defendants spouses in the absence of proof of death or manifestation to that effect
from counsel

Barbasa v. Tuquero

Facts
 Petitioner avers that he is the president of Push-Thru Marketing, Inc., which leases 3
commercial stalls in Tutuban Center, owned by Tutuban Properties, Inc., (TPI).
 Angelina Hipolito, merchandising officer of Push-Thru Marketing, received a notice of
disconnection of utilities from private respondent Grace Guarin, the Credit and Collection
Manager of TPI, for failure of Push-Thru Marketing to settle its outstanding obligations for
Common Usage and Service Area (CUSA) charges, utilities, electricity and rentals.
 Petitioner settled the charges for CUSA, utilities and electricity
o payment was accepted by private respondent Guarin, but petitioner failed to pay the back
rentals
 Thus, private respondents Guarin, Nestor Sangalang, engineering manager of TPI, and Victor
Callueng, TPI head of security, together with several armed guards, disconnected the electricity
in the stalls occupied by Push-Thru Marketing.
 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for Grave Coercion against TPI and its
officers, David Go, Robert Castanares, Buddy Mariano, Art Brondial, and herein private
respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila 

 The complaint alleged that

o TPI and its officers cut off the electricity in petitioner’s stalls "in a violent and intimidating
manner" and

o by unnecessarily employing "several armed guards to intimidate and frighten" petitioner

and his employees and agents.

 The respondents in the criminal complaint filed separate counter-affidavits which presented a

common defense that

o cutting off of electrical supply was done peacefully;

o it was an act performed in the lawful performance of their assigned duties, and in
accordance with the covenants set forth in the written agreements previously executed
between petitioner and TPI;

o petitioner was not present when the alleged acts were committed; and

o petitioner had outstanding accumulated unpaid rentals, CUSA billings, electrical and water
bills, unpaid interest and penalty charges (from June 1998 to May 1999) in the amount
of P267,513.39 for all his rented stalls, as reflected in three Interest-Penalty Reports duly
sent to him.

o Gave demand letter-notices in writing at least three times wherein it was stated that if he
did not settle his arrears in full, electricity would be cut. 

o Of the total amount due from him, petitioner paid only P127,272.18 after receipt of the third
notice.

o proceeded with the power cut-off, but only after sending a "Notice of Disconnection of
Utilities” to petitioner’s stalls informing him of the impending act.

 Private respondents also pointed out that aside from the above arrears, petitioner has outstanding
accountabilities with respect to "Priority Premium Fees" in the amount of P5,907,013.10.11

 They likewise stressed that their Agreement12 with petitioner contains the following stipulations:

o They likewise stressed that their Agreement with petitioner contains the following
stipulations:
 In cases where payments made by the LESSEE for any given month is not
sufficient to cover all outstanding obligations for said period, the order of priority in
the application of the payments made is as follows:
 Penalties, Interests, Insurance, CUSA Charges, Rent, Priority Premium
 PENALTY CLAUSE: It is also expressly agreed that in case the LESSEE fails to
pay at any time the LESSOR is hereby granted the option to cut off power and
 other utility services to the LESSEE until full payment of said charges, expenses,
penalty and interest is made,
 Petitioner filed his Reply Affidavit:
o Go, Castanares, Mariano, Brondial, Guarin and Sangalang, while not personally present at
the scene at the time, were to be held liable as the authors of the criminal design since
they were the ones who ordered the cutting off of petitioner's electricity.
o Petitioner admitted that none of the armed personnel drew his gun, much more aimed or
fired it, but insisted that he was unduly prevented from using electricity to the detriment of
his business and his person.
o He claimed that the officers of TPI were unable to show the amount and extent of his
unpaid bills; that as to the electric bills, the same were paid;
o Ongoing negotiation with respect to the matter of rentals and for reformation of the lease
agreements.
 Prosecutor: Dismissed the complaint against David Go, Roberto Castanares, Buddy Mariano and
Art Brondial but found probable cause against private respondents Grace Guarin, Nestor
Sangalang and Victor Callueng.
 On January 13, 2000, an Information for grave coercion was filed in court, but proceedings
therein were deferred when the private respondents filed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice.
 On August 23, 2000, the Secretary of Justice reversed the City Prosecutor's Resolution, as
follows: Move for the dismissal
 Petitioner assailed the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice before the Court of Appeals through
a petition for certiorari, which was, however, dismissed by the appellate court for lack of merit.
The appellate court likewise denied his motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES: Whether private respondents' act of disconnecting the supply of electricity to petitioner's
stalls and the manner by which it was carried out constitute grave coercion? (NO)

HELD: NO.
 The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that a person is prevented by another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it
right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material
force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will
of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no
right to do so; in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the
exercise of any lawful right.

 The records show that there was no violence, force or the display of it as would produce
intimidation upon petitioner's employees when the cutting off of petitioner's electricity was
effected.

o On the contrary, it was done peacefully and after written notice to petitioner was sent.
o The guards were there to prevent any untoward or violent event from occurring in the
exercise of TPI's rights under the lease agreements. If the respondents desired a violent
result, they would have gone there unannounced or cut petitioner's electricity through less
desirable and conspicuous means

 There could be no grave coercion in the private respondents' act of exercising in behalf of
TPI a right afforded to TPI under the solemn and unequivocal covenants of a contract to which
petitioner had agreed and which he did execute and sign.

o Penalty clause in the Contracts of Lease entered into by the parties that TPI is given the
option to cut off power and other utility services in petitioner's stalls in case petitioner fails
to pay at any time
o Contracts constitute the law between the parties. They must be read together and
interpreted in a manner that reconciles and gives life to all of them. The intent of the
parties, as shown by the clear language used, prevails over post facto explanations that
find no support from the words employed by the parties or from their contemporary and
subsequent acts showing their understanding of such contracts.

 We could not see how the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, through Prosecutor Venus D.
 Marzan, could have made a finding of probable cause to file a criminal case for grave coercion
against private respondents, in light of the evidence then and now prevailing, which will show that
there was a mutual agreement, in a contract of lease, that provided for the cutting off of
electricity as an acceptable penalty for failure to abide faithfully with what has been covenanted.

 Although the propriety of its exercise may be the subject of controversy, mere resort to it may not
so readily expose the lessor TPI to a charge of grave coercion. Considering that petitioner owed
TPI the total amount of more than P5 million, which was undisputed, we find that the resort to the
penalty clause under the lease agreements was justified.

 A penal clause is "an accessory obligation which the parties attach to a principal obligation for
the purpose of insuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special prestation
(generally consisting in the payment of a sum of money) in case the obligation is not fulfilled or is
irregularly or inadequately fulfilled."

 Quite common in lease contracts, this clause functions to strengthen the coercive force of the
obligation and to provide, in effect, for what could be the liquidated damages resulting from a
breach. There is nothing immoral or illegal in such indemnity/penalty clause, absent any showing
that it was forced upon or fraudulently foisted on the obligor.

Yu v. Tajanlangit
Facts:
An administrative complaint for disbarment was filed by complainant Avito Yu against respondent
Atty. Cesar R. Tajanlangit. Complainant had engaged the services of respondent as defense counsel
in a criminal case that resulted to his conviction. Complainant averred that respondent had violated
Rule 16.01 of the CPR for failing to return the bailbond to him in the amount P195,000.00 after having
withdrawn the same. Respondent, however, contended that complainant had authorized and
instructed him to withdraw the cash bond in order to apply the amount as payment for legal fees and
reimbursement for expenses.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 16.01 of the CPR.

Ruling:
The SC ruled in affirmative. It was not at all improper for respondent to have withdrawn the
cash bonds as there was evidence showing that complainant and respondent had entered into a
special fee arrangement. But, however justified respondent was in applying the cash bonds to the
payment of his services and reimbursement of the expenses he had incurred, the Court agrees with
the IBP that he is not excused from rendering an accounting of the same. The highly fiduciary and
confidential relation of attorney and client requires that the lawyer should promptly account for all the
funds received from, or held by him for, the client. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney’s
fees on the money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to
make a prompt accounting.
Therefore, the SC admonished the respondent and held that commission of a similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.