FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 15870. December 3, 1919.]

VISAYAN REFINING COMPANY, DEAN C. WORCESTER, and FRED A.

LEAS , petitioners, vs . HON. MANUEL CAMUS, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Rizal and HON. QUINTIN PAREDES,
Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands , respondents.

Kincaid & Perkins for petitioner

Assistant Attorney-General Reyes for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. EMINENT DOMAIN; PUBLIC USE; MILITARY AND AVIATION PURPOSES. —

The use of land by the Government for military and aviation purposes is a public use
within the meaning of the provisions of law authorizing the Government of the
Philippine Islands to acquire real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right of
eminent domain.
2. ID.; JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS; AUTHORITY OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL TO
DIRECT INSTITUTION OF PROCEEDINGS. — Judicial proceedings for the condemnation
of land for public use can be maintained in the name of the Government of the
Philippine Islands pursuant to the directions of the Governor-General, without any other
special legislative authority than that expressed in subsection (h) of section 64 of the
Administrative Code, in relation with section 3 of the Jones Act.
3. ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATION. — The existence of a legislative
appropriation especially destined to pay for land to be acquired by the Government
through the exercise of the power of eminent domain is not an essential prerequisite to
the institution and maintenance of judicial proceedings for the expropriation of such
land. All that can be required of the Government is that it should comply with the
conditions laid down by law as and when those conditions arise.
4. ID.; RIGHT TO EXERCISE POWER; INHERENT IN SOVEREIGNTY. — The
power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty, being essential to the
existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most primitive forms. No
law, therefore, is ever necessary to confer this right upon sovereignty or upon any
Government exercising sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers.
5. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS OF LAW JUST COMPENSATION. — The power of
eminent domain, with respect to the conditions under which the property is taken, must
be exercised in subjection to the restraints imposed by constitutional or organic law,
and in these Islands especially with reference to section 3 of the Jones Act which
declares that no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of property
without due process of law and that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
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 6. ID.; ID.; METHOD OF EXPROPRIATION. — If the Legislature prescribes a
method of expropriation which provides for the payment of just compensation and
such method is so conceived and adapted as to fulfill the constitutional requisite of due
process of law, any expropriation accomplished in conformity with that method is valid.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION. — There is no organic or
constitutional provision in force in these Islands requiring that compensation shall
actually be paid prior to the judgment of condemnation.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION AS PREREQUISITE TO
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY. — The system of expropriation prescribed by laws in
force in these Islands affords absolute assurance that no piece of land can be finally
and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. In this
connection our courts are directed to make such final order and judgment as shall
secure just compensation for the land taken, and the right of the expropriator is finally
made absolutely dependent upon the payment of compensation by him.
9. ID.; ID.; GIVING OF PROVISIONAL POSSESSION TO GOVERNMENT; OFFICE
OF PRELIMINARY DEPOSIT. — Where provisional possession is given to the
Government in an expropriation proceeding, upon the making of the deposit required by
Act No. 2826 of the Philippine Legislature, the owner of the land is fully protected from
any loss that might result from the temporary occupation of the land by the
Government in the event that the Legislature should finally fail to appropriate any
additional amount necessary to satisfy the award of the court; for such preliminary
deposit serves the double purpose of prepayment upon the value of the property, if
finally expropriated, and as an indemnity against damage in the eventuality that the
proceeding should fail of consummation.

DECISION

STREET , J : p

This is an original petition, directed to the Supreme Court, containing an

alternative prayer for a writ of certiorari or prohibition, as the facts may warrant, to stop
certain condemnation proceedings instituted by the Government of the Philippine
Islands, and now pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal. The
respondents have interposed what is called an answer, but which is in legal effect
merely a demurrer, challenging the su ciency of the allegations of the petition. The
matter having been submitted upon oral argument, the cause is now before us for the
decision of the question thus presented.
It appears that upon September 13, 1919, the Governor-General directed the
Attorney-General to cause condemnation proceedings to be begun for the purpose of
expropriating a tract of land of an area of about 1,100,463 square meters, commonly
known as the site of Camp Tomas Claudio. Said land is located in the municipality of
Parañaque, Province of Rizal, and lies along the water front of Manila Bay, a few miles
south of the city of Manila. It is stated in communication of the Governor-General that
the property in question is desired by the Government of the Philippine Islands for
military and aviation purposes.
In conformity with the instructions of the Governor-General, condemnation
proceedings were begun by the Attorney-General on September 15, 1919, by ling a
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 complaint in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Rizal. Numerous persons are named in the complaint as
defendants because of their supposed ownership of portions of the property intended
to be expropriated. In the list of persons thus impleaded appear the names of the three
petitioners herein, namely, the Visayan Re ning Co., Dean C. Worcester, and Fred A.
Leas, who are severally owners of different portions of the property in question.
In the communication of the Governor-General, the Attorney-General was
directed immediately upon ling the complaint to ask the court to give the Government
the possession of the land to be expropriated, after the necessary deposit should be
made as provided by law. Accordingly in the complaint itself the Attorney-General
prayed the court promptly and provisionally to x the sum of P600,000 as the total
value of the property and to put the Government in immediate possession when said
sum should be placed at the disposition of the court. An order was accordingly made
on September 15, 1919, by the Honorable Judge Manuel Camus, of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Rizal, xing the value of the property provisionally at the
amount stated and ordering that the plaintiff be placed in possession, it being made to
appear that a certi cate of deposit for the amount stated had been delivered to the
provincial treasurer.
At this stage of the proceedings in the Court of First Instance the three
respondents already mentioned, to wit, the Visayan Refining Co., Dean C. Worcester, and
Fred A. Leas, interposed a demurrer, questioning the validity of the proceedings on the
ground that there is no Act of the Philippine Legislature authorizing the exercise of the
power of eminent domain to acquire land for military or aviation purposes.
Contemporaneously with the ling of their demurrer, the same parties moved the
Court of First Instance to revoke its order of September 15, giving the plaintiff
provisional possession. This motion is based substantially on the same ground as the
demurrer, that is, the lack of legislative authority for the proposed expropriation, but it
contains one additional allegation to the effect that the deposit in court of the sum of
P600,000, had been made without authority of law. In support of this contention it was
shown, by means of an informal communication from the Insular Auditor, that the
money in question had been taken from the unexpended balance of the funds
appropriated by Acts Nos. 2784 and 2785 of the Philippine Legislature for the use of
the Militia Commission. This appropriation showed, upon the date said deposit of
P600,000 was made, an unexpended balance of P1,144,672.83
On October 3, 1919, the Judge of the Court of First Instance overruled the
demurrer interposed by the three parties mentioned and denied their motion to vacate
the order granting possession to the Government. The present proceeding was
thereupon instituted in this Court in the manner and for the purpose already stated.
General authority to exercise the power of eminent domain is expressly
conferred on the Government of the Philippine Islands, as now constituted, by section
63 of the Philippine Bill, which reads as follows:
"That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized,
subject to the limitation and conditions prescribed in this Act to acquire, receive,
hold, maintain, and convey title to real and personal property, and may acquire
real estate for public uses by the exercise of the right of eminent domain." (Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902.)
Section 3 of the Jones Act contains the further provision that "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." In addition to this there is
found in the same section the familiar provision, already expressed in section 5 of the
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 Philippine Bill, that no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of property
without due process of law, or deny any person the equal protection of the laws. (Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, sec. 3.)
Section 64 of the Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2711)
expressly confers on the Governor-General the power, among others:

"To determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the right of

eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the Philippine Islands; and to
direct the Attorney-General, where such act is deemed advisable, to cause the
condemnation proceedings to be begun in the court having proper jurisdiction."
The procedural provisions relative to the conduct of expropriation proceedings
are contained in sections 241 to 253, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure,
supplemented as they are by various later Acts of the Legislature. Among the salient
features of the scheme of expropriation thus created are these: (1) If the court is of the
opinion that the right of expropriation exists, three commissioners are appointed to
hear the parties, view the premises, and assess the damages to be paid for the
condemnation (sec. 243 Code Civ. Proc.); (2) after hearing the evidence submitted by
the parties and assessing the damages in the manner prescribed by law (sec. 244), the
commissioners make their report to the court, setting forth all their proceedings; and it
is expressly declared that "none of their proceedings shall be effectual to bind the
property or the parties until the court shall have accepted their report and rendered
judgment in accordance with its recommendations" (sec. 245); (3) the court then acts
upon the report, accepting the same in whole or in part, or rejecting, recommitting, or
setting aside the same, as it sees t (sec. 246). It is further declared in section 246 that
—
"The court . . . may make such final order and judgment as shall secure to
the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his rights under the law, and
to the defendant just compensation for the land so taken; and the judgment shall
require payment of the sum awarded as provided in the next section (i. e., sec.
247) before the plaintiff can enter upon the ground and appropriate it to the
public use."
Sections 247 and 251 of the same Code are of su cient importance in this
connection to warrant quotation in their entirety. They are as follows:
"SEC. 247. Rights of Plaintiff After the Judgment. — Upon payment by
the plaintiff to the defendant of compensation as fixed by the judgment, or after
tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall
have the right to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the
same to the public use defined in the judgment. In case the defendant and his
attorney absent themselves from the court or decline to receive the same,
payment may be made to the clerk of the court for him, and such officer shall be
responsible on his bond therefor and shall be compelled to receive it."
"SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect. — The record of the
final judgment in such action shall state definitely by metes and bounds and
adequate description. the particular land or interest in land condemned to the
public use, and the nature of the public use. A certified copy of the record of the
judgment shall be recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds for the province
in which the estate is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff for the
public use stated the land and estate so described."
The provisions which deal with the giving of immediate possession when the
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 Government of the Philippine Islands is the plaintiff are found in Act No. 2826, which is
in part as follows:
"SEC. 2. When condemnation proceedings are instituted by or in favor
of the Insular Government . . . in any competent court of the Philippines, the
plaintiff shall be entitled to enter immediately upon the land covered by such
proceedings, after depositing with the provincial treasurer the value of said land in
cash, as previously and promptly determined and fixed by the competent court,
which money the provincial treasurer shall retain subject to the order and final
decision of the court: Provided, however, That the court may permit that in lieu of
cash, there may be deposited with the provincial treasurer a certificate of deposit
of any depository of the Government of the Philippine Islands, payable to the
provincial treasurer on sight, for the sum ordered deposited by the court. The
certificate and the sums represented by it shall be subject to the order and final
decision of the court, and the court shall have authority to place said plaintiff in
possession of the land, upon such deposit being made, by the proper orders and a
mandate, if necessary.
"SEC. 3. . . . Upon the payment by the plaintiff to the defendants of the
compensation awarded by the sentence, or after the tender of said sum to the
defendants, and the payment of the costs, or in case the court orders the price to
be paid into court, the plaintiff shall be entitled to appropriate the land so
condemned to the public use specified in the sentence. In case payment is made
to the court, the clerk of the same shall be liable on his bond for the sum so paid
and shall be obliged to receive the same."
In connection with the foregoing provisions found in laws enacted under the
American regime is to be considered the following provision of the Civil Code:
"ART. 349 No one may be deprived of his property unless it be by
competent authority for some purpose of proven public utility and after payment
of the proper compensation.
"Unless this requisite has been complied with, it shall be the duty of the
court to protect the owner of such property in its possession or to restore its
possession to him, as the case may be."
Taken together the laws mentioned supply a very complete scheme of judicial
expropriation, deducing the authority from its ultimate source in sovereignty, providing
in detail for the manner of its exercise, and making the right of the expropriator nally
dependent upon payment of the amount awarded by the court.
As has already been indicated the petition before us proceeds on the idea that
the expropriation proceedings in question cannot be maintained by the Philippine
Government in the absence of a statute authorizing the exercise of the power of
eminent domain for military and aviation purposes; and while it is not urged that a
special legislative Act must be passed every time any particular parcel of property is to
be expropriated, it is claimed — and this really amounts to the same thing — that the
Government cannot institute and prosecute expropriation proceedings unless there is
already in existence a legislative appropriation especially destined to pay for the land to
be taken.
We are of the opinion that the contentions of the petitioners, in whatever way
they may be understood or expressed, are not well founded. There is one point at least
on which all must agree, namely, that if land can be taken by the Government for a
public use at all, the use intended to be made of the land now in question, that is, for
military and aviation purposes, is a public use. It is undeniable that a military
establishment is essential to the maintenance of organized society, and the courts will
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 take judicial notice of the recent progress of the military and naval arts resulting from
the development of aeronautics.
The question as to the abstract authority of the Government to maintain
expropriation proceedings upon the initiative of the Governor-General should not be
confused with that which has reference to the necessity for a legislative appropriation.
They really involve different problems and will be separately considered.
Upon the rst, we are of the opinion that in this jurisdiction at least expropriation
proceedings may be maintained upon the exclusive initiative of the Governor-General,
without the aid of any special legislative authority other than that already on the statute
books. Furthermore if the Government complies with the requirements of law relative
to the making of a deposit in court, provisional possession of the property may be at
once given to it, just as is permitted in the case of any other person or entity authorized
by law to exercise the power of eminent domain Special legislative authority for the
buying of a piece of land by the Government is no more necessary than for buying a
paper of pins; and in the case of a forced taking of property against the will of the
owner, all that can be required of the government is that it should be able to comply
with the conditions laid down by law as and when those conditions arise.
The contention that the authority to maintain such a proceeding cannot be
delegated by the Legislature to the Chief Executive, is in our opinion wholly erroneous
and apparently has its basis in a misconception of fundamentals It is recognized by all
writers that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being
essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most
primitive forms. Philosophers and legists may differ as to the grounds upon which the
exercise of this high power is to be justi ed, but no one can question its existence. No
law, therefore, is ever necessary to confer this right upon sovereignty or upon any
government exercising sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers.
As is well said by the author of the article on Eminent Domain in the
encyclopaedic treatise Ruling Case Law.
"The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a
specific grant in the constitution. It is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a
sovereign state without any recognition of it in the constitution. The provisions
found in most of the state constitutions relating to the taking of property for the
public use do not by implication grant the power to the government of the state,
but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit." (10, R. C. L., pp. 11, 12.)
In other words, the provisions now generally found in the modern laws or
constitutions of civilized countries to the effect that private property shall not be taken
for public use without compensation have their origin in the recognition of a necessity
for restraining the sovereign and protecting the individual. Moreover, as will be at once
apparent, the performance of the administrative acts necessary to the exercise of the
power of eminent domain in behalf of the state is lodged by tradition in the Sovereign
or other Chief Executive. Therefore, when the Philippine Legislature declared in section
64 of the Administrative Code, that the Governor-General, who exercises supreme
executive power in these Islands (sec. 21, Jones Act), should be the person to direct
the initiation of expropriation proceedings, it placed the authority exactly where one
would expect to nd it, and we can conceive of no ground upon which the e cacy of
the statute can reasonably be questioned.

We would not of course pretend that, under our modern system of Government,
in which the Legislature plays so important a role, the executive department could,
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 without the authority of some statute, proceed to condemn property for its own uses;
because the traditional prerogatives of the sovereign are not often recognized
nowadays as a valid source of power, at least in countries organized under republican
forms of government. Nevertheless it may be observed that the real check which the
modern Legislature exerts over the Executive Department, in such a matter as this, lies
not so much in the extinction of the prerogative as in the fact that the hands of the
Executive can always be paralyzed by lack of money — something which is ordinarily
supplied only by the Legislature.
At any rate the conclusion is irresistible that where the Legislature has expressly
conferred the authority to maintain expropriation proceedings upon the Chief Executive,
the right of the latter to proceed therein is clear. As is said by the author of the article
from which we have already quoted, "Once authority is given to exercise the power of
eminent domain, the matter ceases to be wholly legislative. The executive authorities
may then decide whether the power will be invoked and to what extent." (10 R. C. L., p.
14.)
The power of eminent domain, with respect to the conditions under which the
property is taken, must of course be exercised in subjection to all the restraints
imposed by constitutional or organic law. The two provisions by which the exercise of
this power is chie y limited in this jurisdiction are found in the third section of the
Jones Act, already mentioned, which among other things declares (1) that no law shall
be enacted which shall deprive any person of property without due process of law and
(2) that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
The latter of these provisions is directly aimed at the taking of property under the
exercise of the power of eminent domain; and as this requirement, in connection with
the statutes enacted to make sure the payment of compensation, usually affords all the
protection that the owner of property can claim, it results that the due process clause is
rarely invoked by the owner in expropriation proceedings.
Nevertheless it should be noted that the whole problem of expropriation is
resolvable in its ultimate analysis into a constitutional question of due process of law.
The speci c provisions that just compensation shall be made is merely in the nature of
a superadded requirement to be taken into account by the Legislature in prescribing the
method of expropriation. Even were there no organic or constitutional provision in force
requiring compensation to be paid, the seizure of one's property without payment, even
though intended for a public use, would undoubtedly be held to be a taking without due
process of law and a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
This point is not merely an academic one, as might super cially seem. On the
contrary it has a practical bearing on the problem before us, which may be expressed
by saying that, if the Legislature has prescribed a method of expropriation which
provides for the payment of just compensation, and such method is so conceived and
adapted as to ful ll the constitutional requisite of due process of law, any proceeding
conducted in conformity with that method must be valid.
These considerations are especially important to be borne in mind in connection
with the second contention made by counsel for the petitioners, namely, that land
cannot be expropriated by the Government in the absence of a legislative appropriation
especially destined to pay for the land to be taken. To this question we now address
ourselves; and while we bear in mind the cardinal fact that just compensation must be
made, the further fact must not be overlooked that there is no organic or constitutional
provision in force in these Islands requiring that compensation shall actually be paid
prior to the judgment of condemnation.
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 If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are
attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this
jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute assurance that no piece of land can be nally
and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid. It is true that
in rare instances the proceedings may be voluntarily abandoned before the
expropriation is complete or the proceedings may fail because the expropriator
becomes insolvent, in either of which cases the owner retains the property; and if
possession has been prematurely obtained by the plaintiff in the proceedings, it must
be restored. It will be noted that the title does not actually pass to the expropriator until
a certi ed copy of the record of the judgment is recorded in the o ce of the register of
deeds (sec. 251, Code Civ. Proc.). Before this stage of the proceedings is reached the
compensation is supposed to have been paid; and the court is plainly directed to make
such nal order and judgment as shall secure to the defendant just compensation for
the land taken. (Sec. 246, Code Civ. Proc.) . Furthermore, the right of the expropriator is
nally made dependent absolutely upon the payment of compensation by him. (Sec. 3,
Act No. 2826; sec. 247, Code Civ. Proc.).
It will be observed that the scheme of expropriation exempli ed in our statutes
does not primarily contemplate the giving of a personal judgment for the amount of the
award against the expropriator: the idea is rather to protect the owner by requiring
payment as a condition precedent to the acquisition of the property by the other party.
The power of the court to enter a judgment for the money and to issue execution
thereon against the plaintiff is, however, unquestioned; and the court can without doubt
proceed in either way. But whatever course be pursued the owner is completely
protected from the possibility of losing his property without compensation.
When the Government is plaintiff the judgment will naturally take the form of an
order merely requiring the payment of the award as a condition precedent to the
transfer of the title, as a personal judgment against the Government could not be
realized upon execution. It is presumed that by appearing as plaintiff in condemnation
proceedings, the Government submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court and thereby
waives its immunity from suit. As a consequence it would be theoretically subject to the
same liability as any other expropriator. Nevertheless, the entering of a personal
judgment against it would be an unnecessary, as well as profitless formality.
In the face of the elaborate safeguards provided in our procedure, it is frivolous
to speculate upon the possibility that the Legislature may nally refuse to appropriate
any additional amount, over and above the provisional deposit, that may be necessary
to pay the award. That it may do. But the Government can not keep the land and
dishonor the judgment. Moreover, in the eventuality that the expropriation shall not be
consummated, the owners will be protected by the deposit from any danger of loss
resulting from the temporary occupation of the land by the Government; for it is
obvious that this preliminary deposit serves the double purpose of a prepayment upon
the value of the property, if nally expropriated, and as an indemnity against damage in
the eventuality that the proceedings should fail of consummation.
It appears that the money represented by the certi cate of deposit which was
placed at the disposal of the lower court, pursuant to the requirements of section 2 of
Act No. 2826, was taken from certain appropriations under the control of the Militia
Commission, a body created by section 29 of Act No. 2715, for the purpose, among
others, of advising the Governor-General upon measures relative to the organization,
equipment, and government of the National Guard and reserve militia. Counsel for the
petitioners say that money appropriated for the purposes of the Militia Commission
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 cannot be lawfully used to acquire the land which is now the subject of expropriation,
because no authority for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is to be found in
any of the Acts appropriating money for said Commission; from whence it is argued
that the certificate of deposit affords no protection to the owners of property.
The point appears to be one of little general importance, and we will not multiply
words over it. Su ce it to say that in our opinion the Insular Auditor was acting within
his authority when he let this money out of the Insular Treasury; and being now within
the control of the lower court, it will doubtless in due time be applied to the purpose for
which the deposit was made.
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that the action taken by the lower
court in the condemnation proceedings aforesaid was in all respects regular and within
the jurisdiction of the court. The writ prayed for in the petition before us, therefore, can
not be issued. The application is accordingly denied, with costs against ,the petitioners.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Araullo and Avanceña, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves the right to prepare a separate opinion.

Separate Opinions
MALCOLM , J., concurring :

I agree with the conclusion arrived at in the majority decision. I am clearly of the
opinion that the alternative application for a writ of certiorari or prohibition should not
be granted. An analysis into their simplest elements of the various questions presented
may easily be made as follows: 1. The power of the Philippine Government in eminent
domain; 2. The constitutional prohibition that (A) private property (E) shall not be taken
for public use (C) without just compensation; and 3. The constitutional prohibition that
no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by
law.

1. The power of eminent domain is expressly vested in the Government of the

Philippine Islands by section 63 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, commonly
known as the Philippine Bill. The Philippine Legislature has, in turn by section 64 (h) of
the Administrative Code of 1917, expressly delegated to the Governor-General the
speci c power and duty to determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise
the right of eminent domain in behalf of the Government of the Philippine Islands. This
delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General was authorized in view of the
nature of eminent domain, which necessitates administrative agents for its execution, in
view of the previous attitude assumed by the Judiciary with relation to similar
delegations of power, and in view of the undeniable fact that the Governor-General is a
part of the same Government of the Philippine Islands to which was transferred the
right of eminent domain by the Congress of the United States. (See Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Municipality of Binangonan [1916], 34 Phil. 518.) When; therefore,
the Governor-General directed the Attorney-General to cause condemnation
proceedings to be begun in the Court of First Instance of Rizal with the object of having
the Government obtain title to the site commonly known as "Camp Tomas Claudio," the
Governor-General was merely acting as a mouthpiece of American sovereignty,
pursuant to a delegated power transmitted by the Congress of the United States to the
Government of the Philippine Islands and lodged by this latter Government in the Chief
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 Executive. Any other holding would mean that section 64 (h) of the Administrative Code
is invalid, a result to be avoided.
2. In the existing Philippine Bill of Rights (last sentence, paragraph 1, section
3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916) is a provision that "private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation." It seems undeniable ( A) that Camp
Claudio was "private property," and ( B) that it was being "taken for public use," namely,
for military and aviation purposes. The only remaining point concerns "just
compensation," which can better be discussed under our division 3.
3. Another provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights (paragraph 15, section 3,
Act of Congress of August 29, 1916) is, "that no money shall be paid out of the treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation by law." The same Organic Act provides
(paragraph 1, section 24) for an Auditor who shall "audit, in accordance with law and
administrative regulations, all expenditure of funds or property pertaining to, or hela in
trust, by the Government." His administrative jurisdiction is made "exclusive." The
Philippine Legislature could, of course, have speci cally appropriated an amount for the
purchase of the Camp Claudio site just as it could have speci cally enacted a law for
the condemnation of such site, but instead it preferred to include in the general
Appropriation Acts, under the heads of The Philippine National Guard or Philippine
Militia, a large amount to be expended in the discretion of the Militia Commission,
which may "use the funds appropriated for other purposes, as the e ciency of the
service may require." This transfer of power to the Militia Commission, like the
delegation of some of the general legislative power to the Governor-General, raises no
constitutional bar. The Insular Auditor has stated that there is in the treasury over a
million pesos available for the condemnation of Camp Claudio, and this decision for
present purposes must be taken as nal and conclusive. The six hundred thousand
pesos deposit is merely the provisional determination of the value of the land by the
competent court, and in no way jeopardizes the nancial interests of the owners of the
property. No additional security is required since the sovereign power has waived its
right to be sued, has pledged the public faith, and cannot obtain title until the owners
receive just compensation for their property. (See Sweet vs. Rechel [1895], 159 U. S.,
380.)
In resume, therefore, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands had the right
to authorize the condemnation of this land for military and aviation purposes, and no
constitutional provision has been violated. The Court of First Instance of Rizal has
merely acted in strict accord with law, and its action should, consequently, be
sustained.

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