G.R. No.

125339 June 22, 1998

CRESENCIA CRISTOBAL, ROBERTO MAKIMKIM, DAMASO MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES SALVADOR HERMALINO and
PONCIANA MAKIMKIM, MILAGROS MAKIMKIM, REMEDIOS MAKIMKIM, SPOUSES FRANCISCO ESTANISLAO and
FLORDELIZA MAKIMKIM, ERLINDA MAKIMKIM, JOSE MAKIMKIM and GINA MAKIMKIM, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR LEDESMA, INC., SPOUSES JESUS C. PACIONE and LERMA B. PACIONE, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of 16 January 1996 in CA-G.R. CV
Case No. 37273, "Cresencia Cristobal, et al. v. Cesar Ledesma, Inc., et al.,"   which affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC-
1

Br. 81, Quezon City,   dismissing herein petitioners' complaint for easement of right of way, and the Resolution of 14
2

June 1996 denying their motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners own a house and lot situated at No. 10 Visayas Avenue Extension, Quezon City, where they have been
residing from 1961 to the present. Respondent Cesar Ledesma, Inc., on the other hand, is the owner of a subdivision at
Barrio Culiat along Visayas Avenue which once included the disputed residential lots, Lot 1 and Lot 2, with areas of
164 square meters and 52 square meters, respectively, located adjacent to petitioners' property. Lots 1 and 2 were
originally part of a private road known as Road Lot 2 owned exclusively by Cesar Ledesma, Inc. Petitioners were using
Road Lot 2 in going to and from the nearest public road. When Visayas Avenue became operational as a national road
in 1979, Cesar Ledesma, Inc., filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City to be allowed to convert Road Lot 2 into
residential lots.   The petition was granted, hence, Road Lot 2 was converted into residential lots designated as lot 1
3

and lot 2. Subsequently, Cesar Ledesma , Inc., sold both lots to Macario Pacione in whose favor transfer Certificates of
Title were correspondingly issued. In turn, Macario Pacione conveyed the lots to his son and dauhter-in-law,
respondent spouses Jesus and Lerma Pacione.

When the Pacione spouses, who intended to build a house on Lot 1, Visited the property in 1987, they found out that
the lot was occupied by a squatter named Juanita Geronimo and a portion was being used a passageway by
petitioners to and from Visayas Avenue. Accordingly, the spouses complained about the intrusion into their property
to the Barangay Office. At the barangay conciliation proceeding, petitioners offered to pay for the use of a portion of
Lot 1 as passageway but the Pacione spouses rejected the offer. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement, the spouses started enclosing Lot 1 with a concrete fence.

Petitioners prostested the enclosure alleging that their property was bounded on all sides by residential houses
belonging to different owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue except through the property of
the Paciones. As their protests went unheeded, petitioners instituted an action for easement of right of way with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO).

On 3 June 1987 the trial court issued a TRO directing the Pacione spouses to cease and desist from fencing the
disputed property. The Paciones objected arguing that petitioners were not entitled to a TRO since they showed no
valid basis for its issuance, and that petitioners had no cause of action against respondents because there were
actually two (2) accessible outlets and inlets — a pathway right in front of their gate leading towards an asphalted 5-
meter road to the left, and across an open space to the right adjacent to respondents' lot likewise leading to Visayas
Avenue.

At the instance of the parties, the trial court ordered an ocular inspection of the property. A Board of Commissioners
was constituted for that purpose composed of representatives chosen by the parties, with Deputy Sheriff Florencio D.
Dela Cruz, Jr., as representative of the court.

On 3 January 1990 Deputy Sheriff Dela Cruz, Jr., submitted his Report   relative to the ocular inspection on the litigated
4

lots —

. . . there is another way from the Visayas Ave. to the plaintiffs' lot existing at the time of the ocular inspection.
Plaintiffs can use the street originating from Visayas Avenue, identified as Ma. Elena St., which is about 2.5 m. in width
and about 150 m. in length up to an intersection, meeting a private road, which is about 100 meters in length, that ends
at the lower portion of the right side of the adjacent vacant lot previously identified, and at the back of a lot with
concrete fence located at the back of the plaintiffs' properly. From that point the plaintiff must enter the adjacent
vacant lot (entry to the said lot is still possible during ocular inspection because the barbed wires were not properly
placed) to reach a gate at the side of the plaintiffs' lot, about 16 m. from the end of the private road, allegedly used by
the plaintiffs before the adjacent lot was enclosed by barbed wires. According to Atty. Mendoza, counsel for the
defendants, that gate no longer exist(ed) at the time of the ocular inspection.

As may be observed from the above report, only one outlet was indicated by Sheriff Dela Cruz, Jr. The other outlet
across an open space to the right referred to by the Pacione spouses was not reflected thereon. Howecer, on the basis
of the report as well as the testimonial an documentary evidence of the parties, the trial court dismissed the complaint
holding that one essential requisite of a legal easement of right of way was not proved,  i.e., the absence of an
alternative adequate way or outlet to a public highway, in this case, Visayas Avenue.  5

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals arguing that the trial court erred in finding that they failed to sufficiently
establish the essential fact that from their property no adequate outlet or access to a highway existed; and, that the
conversion of the Road Lot into two (2) residential lots by Cesar Ledesma, Inc., was violative of PD No. 957, hence
illegal, and the titles issued as a consequence of the conversion were null and void.
On 16 January 1996 the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed decision affirming the findings of the trial court —

The burden of proving the existence of the requisites of easement of right of way lies on the owner of the dominant
estate. In the case at bar, plaintiff-appellants failed to prove that there is no adequate outlet from their property to a
public highway. Convenience of the dominant estate is not a gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. The true
standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from
the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even if the outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient,
the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified. To justify the imposition of a easement of right of way,
there must be real, not ficitious or artificial necessity for it. A right of way is legally demandable, but the owner of the
dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one based on arbitrary choice. Art. 650 of the Civil Code provides for the
criteria in the establishment of such easement but it has been settled that the criteria of "least prejudicial" prevails
over shortest distance. Each case must be weighed according to its individual merits and judged according to the
sound discreation of the court (Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, 193 SCRA 333 [1991]).

The second assigned error has no legal leg to stand on since plaintiff-appellants cannot just introduce a new issue to
an already settled one, especially for the time on appeal.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners now come to us with the following assignment of
errors: First, the Court of Appeals erred in applying the doctrine in Costabella, considering that in the instant case the
four (4) requisites that must be complied with by an owner of the dominant estate in order to validly claim a
compulsory right of way have been clearly established by petitioners, contrary to the Decision appealed from, and that
the facts in Costabella are not the same as in the present case. Second, the Court of Appeals seriously erred in
holding that the question of legality or illegality of the conversion of Road Lot 2 into two (2) residential lots by the
Cesar Ledesma, Inc., is a new issue raised for the first time on appeal, because such issue appeared in the complaint
filed before the trial court.

Quite noticeably, petitioners' first assigned error is essentially factual in nature, i.e., it merely assails the factual
findings of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court. Basic is the rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing errors of law, the findings of
fact of the appellate court being conclusive.   We have emphatically declared that it is not the function of this Court to
6

analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that may have
been committed by the lower court.  7

Petitioners insist that their petition raises a question of law, that is, the correctness of the appellate court's ruling that
one who has an existing passageway, however inconvenient that passageway may be, is no longer entitled to an
easement of right of way.

We do not agree. Questions of law are those that do not call for any examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties.   In the instant case, petitioners' assignment of errors would have this Court go over the facts
8

because it necessarily entails an examination of the evidence and its subsequent re-evaluation to determine whether
petitioners indeed have no sufficient outlet to the highway.

Petitioners next claim that the findings of the appellate court are based on misapprehension of facts, which
circumstance warrants a review of the appellate court's decision. Yet, they failed to sufficiently demonstrate this
allegation in their pleadings. Absent a clear showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in
the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must
stand.

At any rate, even assuming that the first assignment of error may be properly raised before this Court, we find no
reversible error in the assailed decision. To be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the preconditions
provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These are: (1) that the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) that proper indemnity has been
paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed
is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.   The burden of proving the existence of these
9

prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate.  10

In the present case, the first element is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, an outlet
already exist, which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners' property and which is connected to a private
road about five hundred (500) meters long. The private road, in turn, leads to Ma. Elena Street which is about 2.5
meters wide and, finally, to Visayas Avenue. This outlet was determined by the court  a quo to be sufficient for the
needs of the dominants estate, hence petitioners have no cause to complain that they have no adequate outlet to
Visayas Avenue.

Further, no evidence was adduced by petitioners to prove that the easement they seek to impose on private
respondents' property is to be established at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. For emphasis, Lot 1 is only
164 square meters and an improvident imposition of the easement on the lot may unjustly deprive private respondents
of the optimum use and enjoyment of their property, considering that its already small area will be reduced further by
the easement. Worse, it may even render the property useless for the purpose for which private respondents
purchased the same.

It must also be stressed that, by its very nature, and when considered with reference to the obligations imposed on the
servient estate, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is
regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. Thus, it is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant
estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for
easement of right of way be granted. Petitioners miserably failed in this regard.
On the question of adequacy of the existing outlet, petitioners allege that the path walk is much longer, circuitous and
inconvenient, as from Visayas Avenue one has to pass by Ma. Elena St., turn right to a private road, then enter, then
vacant lot, and turn right again to exit from the vacant lot until one reaches petitioners' property.

We find petitioners' concept of what is "adequate outlet" a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in
order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way there must be a real, not ficititious or artificial, necessity
for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory
easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be
imposed.  11

Thus, in Ramos v. Gatchalian,   this Court disallowed the easement prayed for — even if petitioner therein "had to
12

pass through lots belonging to other owners, as temporary ingress and egress, which lots were grassy, cogonal an
greatly inconvenient due to flood and mud" — because it would run counter to the prevailing jurisprudence that mere
convenience for the dominant estate does not suffice to serve as basis for the easement.

Also, in Floro v. Llenado,   we refused to impose an easement of right of way over petitioner's property, although
13

private respondent's alternative routes admittedly inconvenient because he had to traverse several rice lands and rice
paddies belonging to different persons, not to mention that said passage, as found by the trial court, was impassable
during rainy season.

Admittedly, the proposed right of way over private respondents' property is the most convenient, being the shorter
and the more direct route to Visayas Avenue. However, it is not enough that the easement be where the way is
shortest. It is more improtant that it be where it will cause the least prejudice to the servient estate.    As discussed
14

elsewhere, petitioners failed to sufficiently demonstrate that the proposed right of way shall be at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.

The second assignment of error was likewise properly rejected by the appellate court. Primarily, the issue of legality or
illegality of the conversion of the road lot in question has long been laid to rest in LRC Case No. Q-1614    which 15

declared with finality the legality of the segregation subdivision survey plan of the disputed road lot. Consequently, it
is now too late for petitioners to question the validity of the conversion of the road lot.

Finally, questions relating to non-compliance with the requisites for conversion of subdivision lots are properly
cognizable by the National Housing Authority (NHA), now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
pursuant to Sec. 22 of PD 957   and not by the regular court. Under the doctrine of primary administrative
16

jurisdiction,   where jurisdiction is vested upon an administrative body, no resort to the courts may be made before
17

such administrative body shall have acted upon the matter.

WHEREFORE, Petition is DENIED. The 16 January 1996 Decision and the 14 June 1996 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals denying reconsideration thereof are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Jesus M. Elbinias and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon U. Mabutas and
Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.

2 Judge Celia Lipana-Reyes presiding.

3 Docketed as LRC Case No. Q-1614, "Petition for Issuance of Titles and/or Approval of Segregation Subdivision and
Technical Description."

4 Annex "F" and "F-1;" Rollo, pp. 35-37.

5 Rollo, pp. 395-401.

6 Remalante v. Tibe, G.R. No. 59514, 25 February 1988, 158 SCRA 138, citing Chan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-27488, 30
June 1970, 33 SCRA 737.

7 Santa Ana, Jr. v. Hernandez, No. L-16394, 17 December 1966, 18 SCRA 973.

8 Uniland Resources v. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 95909, 16 August 1991, 200 SCRA 751, 755.

9 Francisco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 63996, 15 September 1989, 177 SCRA 527, 533.

10 Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, 25 January 1991, 193 SCRA 333, 340.

11 Tolentino, Commentaries and Juisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1992 Ed., pp. 387-388.
12 G.R. No. 75905, 12 October 1987, 154 SCRA 703.

13 G.R. No. 75723, 2 June 1995, 244 SCRA 713.

14 See Quimen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112331, 29 May 1996.

15 See Note 3 and Annex "I;" Rollo, pp. 56-58.

16 "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree."

Sec. 22. No owner shall charge or alter roads, open spaces, infrastructures, facilities for public use and/or other form
of subdivision developments as contained in the approved subdivision plan and/or represented in its advertisements,
without the permission of the Authority and the written conformity or consent of the duly organized homeowners
association, or in the absence of the latter, by the majority of the buyers in the subdivision.

17 Brett v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74223, 27 November 1990, 191 SCRA 687.

G.R. No. 194488, February 11, 2015

ALICIA B. REYES, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES VALENTIN RAMOS, FRANCISCO S. AND

ANATALIA, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

This is a Rule 45 Petition1 of the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated August 12, 2010 and of the Court of Appeals
Resolution3 dated October 28, 2010.

On March 28, 2006, petitioner Alicia B. Reyes, through Dolores B. Cinco,4 filed a Complaint5 before the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, for  easement  of right  of way  against  respondents, Spouses Francisco S.
Valentin and Anatalia Ramos.6

In her Complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioner alleged that she was the registered owner of a 450-
square-meter parcel of land in Barangay Malibong Bata, Pandi, Bulacan, designated as Lot No. 3-B-12 and
covered by TCT No. T-343642-(M).7 The property used to be a portion of Lot No. 3-B 8 and was surrounded by
estates belonging to other persons.9

Petitioner also alleged that respondents' 1,500-square-meter property surrounded her property, and that it was
the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway.10 A 113-square-meter portion of respondents'
property was also the "point least prejudicial to the [respondents]." 11 The easement sought was the vacant
portion near the boundary of respondents' other lot.12

(please see image: G.R. No. 194488, page 2.)

Figure 1. Drawing showing the location of

petitioner's and respondents' properties in relation
to the proposed easement. Petitioner's property is
located on the leftmost part of the drawing.
Respondents' property and the proposed 113-square-
meter easement are located on the drawing's right
side that contains petitioner's property. Barangay
Malibong Bata Road can be seen on the rightmost part
of the drawing.
Petitioner insisted that her property was not isolated because of her own acts.14 When her mother gave the
property to her as part of her inheritance, there was no intention for the property to have no outlet.15

According to petitioner, her and respondents' lots were previously owned by her mother. Respondents' lot was
given to Dominador Ramos (Dominador) who allegedly was respondents' predecessor-in-interest. Dominador
was also her mother's brother and caretaker of properties.16

Only 500 square meters were given to Dominador. Part of the 1,500 square meters was intended as a right of
way. Dominador was tasked to prepare the documents. But, instead of limiting the conveyance to himself to
500 square meters of the property, he conveyed the whole 1,500 square meters, including that which was
supposed to be the access to the barangay road.17
Petitioner's mother only learned about what Dominador did when a meeting was called in 1989 regarding the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.18 She did not cause the recovery of her title
because at that time, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan was razed by fire, causing the destruction of the
documents covering the subject properties. Dominador was also her brother, whom she presumed would give
her a right of way to the main road. Instead of giving way, however, he closed the passage, causing
petitioner's property's isolation.19

Despite demands and willingness to pay the amount, respondents refused to accede to petitioner's claims.20

In their Answer,21 respondents contended that the isolation of petitioner's property was due to her mother's
own act of subdividing the property among her children without regard to the pendency of an agrarian case
between her and her tenants.22 The property chosen by petitioner as easement was also the most burdensome
for respondents.23 Respondents pointed to an open space that connected petitioner's property to another public
road.24

Upon agreement by the parties, the Branch Clerk of Court conducted an ocular inspection of the premises in
February 2007, in the presence of the parties.25

After an Ocular Inspection Report26 was submitted on March 2, 2007, the case was considered submitted for
decision.27

On April 11, 2007, the trial court issued its Decision,28 dismissing the Complaint for easement of right of way,
thus:29

WHEREFORE, finding the prayer for a grant of

compulsory easement of right of way on a 113 square
meter portion of defendants' property to be devoid of
merit, the same is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the
case is ordered DISMISSED with no pronouncements as
to damages and costs.30
The trial court found that petitioner's proposed right of way was not the least onerous to the servient estate of
respondents.31 It noted that the proposed right of way would pass through improvements, such as respondents'
garage, garden, and grotto.32 The trial court also noted the existence of an irrigation canal that limited access
to the public road.33 However, the trial court pointed out that "[o]ther than the existing irrigation canal, no
permanent improvements/structures can be seen standing on the subject rice land."34 Moreover, the nearby
landowner was able to construct a bridge to connect a property to the public road.35 Hence, "[t]he way through
the irrigation canal would . . . appear to be the shortest and easiest way to reach the barangay road."36

Petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court's Decision.37

On August 12, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed in toto the Regional Trial
Court's Decision.38 It found no reversible error in the trial court's decision to dismiss petitioner's
complaint.39 Petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of the requisites for the grant of
easement.40 The Court of Appeals also found that petitioner's property had an adequate outlet to the public
road.41

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated September 8, 2010 was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution promulgated on October 28, 2010.42

Petitioner filed this Petition on December 22, 201043 to assail the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.44

We are asked to determine whether petitioner has the compulsory easement of right of way over respondents'
property.

Petitioner argued that the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that it was not her
property that was adjacent to the irrigation canal but her sister's. Her property was surrounded by other
estates belonging to other persons. Hence, she had to pass through other properties before reaching the
irrigation canal.45

Moreover, even if she traversed the other properties, she would only end up on the bank of the irrigation canal
without means to cross over.46 The fact that she had to construct a bridge over the irrigation canal supported
her position that there was indeed no adequate outlet from her property to the public road.47 In any case, a
bridge will necessarily be an obstruction on the public road.48

Petitioner further argued, citing Quimen v. Court of Appeals,49 that "[t]he owner of the dominant estate can
demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial
use of his property."50

In their Comment51 on the Petition, respondents argued that this case is already barred by prior
judgment.52 Petitioner's predecessor-in-interest and her children had already previously filed an action for
easement of right of way against respondents.53 That case had already been dismissed in favor of
respondents.54 The reason for the dismissal of the case was the possibility of constructing a bridge over the
irrigation canal.55 Respondents further argued that the easement must be real and not fictitious.56
The petition has no merit.

The issue of ownership is irrelevant

to the case; filing of a complaint for
easement is a recognition of the servient
property owner's rights

Petitioner points out that respondents' property was previously owned by her mother. She alleged that her
uncle who was her mother's caretaker of property fraudulently caused the titling of the whole 1,500-square-
meter property instead of just the 500-square-meter portion under his name.57

These allegations are relevant only if we are determining the issue of the property's ownership. However, this
is not an issue in this case. Petitioner does not question the ownership or the registration of respondents' title
over the property. We are limited to the issue of petitioner's easement rights. On that matter, petitioner's act
of filing a Complaint for easement of right of way is an acknowledgement that the property is owned by
respondents. It is tantamount to a waiver of whatever right or claim of ownership petitioner had over the
property.

II

Petitioner failed to satisfy the Civil

Code requirements for the grant of
easement rights 

The acts of petitioner's predecessor-in-interest necessarily affect petitioner's rights over the property. One of
the requirements for the grant of an easement of right of way is that the isolation of the property is not due to
the acts of the dominant estate's owners.

As shown in the pleadings submitted to the trial court, petitioner and respondents had conflicting claims on this
issue. Petitioner alleged that it was her uncle, Dominador, who caused the isolation of her property through his
act of appropriating for himself the whole property entrusted to him by her mother. Moreover, he closed the
passage from petitioner's property to the public road.

On the other hand, respondents alleged that the isolation was due to the acts of petitioner's predecessor-in-
interest. She allegedly subdivided the property in favor of her children, including petitioner, without regard to
the pending dispute over the property. If the latter is true, petitioner could not claim any right to compulsory
easement even if it was not she who caused the property's isolation. Petitioner is bound by her predecessor-in-
interest's act of causing the isolation of her property.

Assuming, however, that petitioner or her mother did not cause the isolation of petitioner's property, petitioner
still cannot be granted the easement of right of way over the proposed portion of respondents' property. This is
because she failed to satisfy the requirements for an easement of right of way under the Civil Code.

Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code provide the requisites of an easement of right of way:

ART. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a

real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which
is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
persons and without adequate outlet to a public
highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through
the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
indemnity.

Should this easement be established in such a manner

that its use may be continuous for all the needs of
the dominant estate, establishing a permanent
passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of
the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused
to the servient estate.

In case the right of way is limited to the necessary

passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded
by others and for the gathering of its crops through
the servient estate without a permanent way, the
indemnity shall consist in the payment of the damage
 caused by such encumbrance.

This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of

the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts.

ART. 650. The easement of right of way shall be

established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to
a public highway may be the shortest.
Based on these provisions, the following requisites need to be established before a person becomes entitled to
demand the compulsory easement of right of way:58

1. An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is without

adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the surrounded immovable;

3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner's acts; and

4. The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.

An easement of right of way is a real right. When an easement of right of way is granted to another person, the
rights of the property's owner are limited.59 An owner may not exercise some of his or her property rights for
the benefit of the person who was granted the easement of right of way. Hence, the burden of proof to show
the existence of the above conditions is imposed on the person who seeks the easement of right of way.60

We agree with the Regional Trial Court's and the Court of Appeals' findings that petitioner failed to establish
that there was no adequate outlet to the public highway and that the proposed easement was the least
prejudicial to respondents' estate.

There is an adequate exit to a public highway.

This court explained in Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos61 that the convenience of the dominant estate's owner is not the
basis for granting an easement of right of way, especially if the owner's needs may be satisfied without
imposing the easement.62 Thus:

Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what

is required by law as the basis of setting up a
compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity,
if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement,
the same should not be imposed.

Also in Flow v. Llenado, we refused to impose a

right of way over petitioner's property although
private respondent's alternative route was admittedly
inconvenient because he had to traverse several
ricelands and rice paddies belonging to different
persons, not to mention that said passage is
impassable during the rainy season.

And in Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., this

Court refused to grant the easement prayed for even
if petitioner had to pass through lots belonging to
other owners, as temporary ingress and egress, which
lots were grassy, cogonal, and greatly inconvenient
due to flood and mud because such grant would run
 counter to the prevailing jurisprudence that mere
convenience for the dominant estate does not suffice
to serve as basis for the easement.63 (Citations
omitted)
Access to the public highway can be satisfied without imposing an easement on respondents' property.

The Ocular Inspection Report reads, in part:

Upon reaching the said place, pictures were taken in

the presence of both parties and their respective
counsel. The undersigned observed that fronting the
lot where the house of the defendant is erected, is
Brgy. Malibong Bata public road. The property of the
plaintiff is located at the back of defendant's lot.
Plaintiff, through her counsel, requested that the
side portion of defendants' lot where the latter's
garage and a grotto are erected or a portion of
defendants' newly acquired adjacent lot be the right
of way. This was objected to by Atty. Batalla arguing
that to grant the same is more prejudicial to the
defendants considering that the improvements thereon
will be affected and that there is another existing
public road which is nearer to the plaintiff's
property. Atty. Sali admitted that there is another
existing public road but the right of way cannot be
done as there is more or less four-meter wide
irrigation before reaching the said public road.

In order to confirm if there is indeed another

existing public road which is nearer to plaintiff's
property, the undersigned together with the above-
mentioned court personnel and the parties and their
respective counsel, proceeded to the said place. True
enough, there is a public road also named Brgy.
Malibong Bata public road, fronting plaintiff's
property. However, there is more or less four-meter
wide irrigation before reaching the said public road.
It was also confirmed that the two properties of the
plaintiff are between the public road which is
adjacent to the irrigation. Atty. Sali manifested
that they already requested before the officers of
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) for the
grant of the right of way but the same was
disapproved. Atty. Batalla pointed out that there are
already some concrete bridges nearby the properties
of the plaintiff.64
Based on the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioner's property had another outlet to the highway. In between her
property and the highway or road, however, is an irrigation canal, which can be traversed by constructing a
bridge, similar to what was done by the owners of the nearby properties.

There is, therefore, no need to utilize respondents' property to serve petitioner's needs. Another adequate exit
exists. Petitioner can use this outlet to access the public roads.

The outlet referred to in the Ocular Inspection Report may be longer and more inconvenient to petitioner
because she will have to traverse other properties and construct a bridge over the irrigation canal before she
can reach the road. However, these reasons will not justify the imposition of an easement on respondents'
property because her convenience is not the gauge in determining whether to impose an easement of right of
way over another's property.65

Petitioner also failed to satisfy the requirement of "least prejudicial to the servient estate."

Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that in determining the existence of an easement of right of way, the
requirement of "least prejudice] to the servient estate" trumps "distance [between] the dominant estate [and
the] public highway." "Distance" is considered only insofar as it is consistent to the requirement of "least
prejudice."

This court had already affirmed the preferred status of the requirement of "least prejudice" over distance of the
dominant estate to the public highway.66 Thus, in Quimen, this court granted the longer right of way over
therein respondent's property because the shorter route required that a structure of strong materials needed to
be demolished.  This court said:

[T]he court is not bound to establish what is the

shortest distance; a longer way may be adopted to
avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when
there are constructions or walls which can be avoided
by a round about way, or to secure the interest of
the dominant owner, such as when the shortest
distance would place the way on a dangerous decline.

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient

estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of judicial
appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily
imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when
there are permanent structures obstructing the
shortest distance; while on the other hand, the
longest distance may be free of obstructions and the
easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other
words, where the easement may be established on any
of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate,
the one where the way is shortest and will cause the
least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere
stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur
in a single tenement, the way which will cause the
least damage should be used, even if it will not be
the shortest.68 (Citation omitted)
Petitioner would have permanent structures — such as the garage, garden, and grotto already installed on
respondent's property — destroyed to accommodate her preferred location for the right of way.

The cost of having to destroy these structures, coupled with the fact that there is an available outlet that can
be utilized for the right of way, negates a claim that respondents' property is the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate.

An easement is a limitation on the owner's right to use his or her property for the benefit of another. By
imposing an easement on a property, its owner will have to forego using it for whatever purpose he or she
deems most beneficial. Least prejudice, therefore, is about the suffering of the servient estate. Its value is not
determined solely by the price of the property, but also by the value of the owner's foregone opportunity for
use, resulting from the limitations imposed by the easement.69

Imposing an easement on the part of respondents' property for petitioner's benefit would cost respondents not
only the value of the property but also the value of respondents' opportunity to use the property as a garage or
a garden with a grotto.

Petitioner may use another outlet, which may provide longer access from her property to the public highway,
but is free from obstructions. The four-meter wide irrigation canal may be traversed upon construction of a
bridge. As noted by the trial court:
 A neighboring land owner was able to construct a
short concrete bridge wide enough even for vehicles
to pass through the irrigation canal from his
property to the barangay road. The Court sees no
reason why plaintiff could not do the same and why it
would not be allowed if carried in accordance with
the requirements set by NIA.70
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, a reading of the August 17, 2005 National Irrigation Administration Letter-
Response71 to petitioner's query regarding the possibility of constructing a concrete bridge over the irrigation
canal shows that petitioner was not really disallowed from constructing a bridge. She was merely given certain
conditions, thus:

Wherefore, this office could not negate such

decision.72 However, request for grant of right of
way for the construction of bridge over an irrigation
canal could be granted subject to the following
conditions[:] (1) that the landowner will shoulder
the cost of construction subject to the design and
specifications approved by this office[;] (2)
construction schedule must be informed for
inspection[;] (3) subject construction will not
impede the free flow of irrigation water[;] (4)
distance between bridges will not hamper our
mechanical equipment to move freely within the area
during clearing schedule; (5) active participation of
the landowner in the clearing and maintenance of the
canal for continuous water flow; (6) any violation of
the above conditions will mean revocation of the
permit and any damage to the canal structures will
mean restoration of the landowner at his own cost.73
It is true that an easement of right of way may be granted even if the construction of the bridge was allowed.
However, in determining if there is an adequate outlet or if the choice of easement location is least prejudicial
to the servient estate, this court cannot disregard the possibility of constructing a bridge over the four-meter-
wide canal. This court must consider all the circumstances of the case in determining whether petitioner was
able to show the existence of all the conditions for the easement of right of way.

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals also considered the aspect of necessity for an easement in
determining petitioner's rights.

The trial court found that there is still no necessity for an easement of right of way because petitioner's
property is among the lots that are presently being tenanted by Dominador and Filomena Ramos'
children.74 Petitioner is yet to use her property. The Complaint for easement was found to have been filed
merely "for future purposes." 75 Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, "[a]dmittedly, there is no immediate
and imperative need for the construction of a right of way as the dominant estate and its surrounding
properties remain as agricultural lands under tenancy."76

The aspect of necessity may not be specifically included in the requisites for the grant of compulsory easement
under the Civil Code. However, this goes into the question of "least prejudice." An easement of right of way
imposes a burden on a property and limits the property owner's use of that property. The limitation imposed on
a property owner's rights is aggravated by an apparent lack of necessity for which his or her property will be
burdened.

III

The case is not barred by prior judgment

Respondents argued in their Comment that the case was already barred by prior judgment because petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest and her siblings had already filed an action for easement against respondents in 2004.
This case, according to respondents, had already been dismissed because of the existence of another public
road or highway, which can be accessed after the construction of a bridge over the irrigation canal.77

Respondents alleged that petitioner's predecessor-in-interest not only subdivided her property among her
children, which included petitioner. Petitioner's predecessor-in-interest also converted her property from
farmland to home lots. This, respondents argued, is prohibited under Section 73(c) and 73(e), and Section 74
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.78 Hence, the conversion was illegal, and this case still involves the
predecessor-in-interest's property prior to its subdivision.79

In her Reply,80 petitioner argued that the property was not barred by prior judgment because she was already
the registered owner of her property before the complaint for easement was filed by her mother and her
siblings.  She was not a party to that case.81

Dismissal of a case on the ground of res judicata requires that a final judgment must have been rendered
between the same parties over the same subject matter and cause of action.82

Even if it is true that this and the alleged previous case involve the same issue, there can be no res judicata if
there is no identity of parties and/or subject matter. For purposes of determining if there is identity of parties,
two different persons may be considered as one identity if they represent the same interest or cause.83

Based on the records, petitioner's certificate of title was issued in her name on April 12, 1999.84 If as admitted
by respondents, the previous case for easement was filed in 2004 and petitioner was not represented in the
case, then there could have been no identity of the parties and subject matter. Petitioner's interest could not
have been represented by her predecessor-in-interest or by her siblings because none of them were the
owners of petitioner's property in 2004.

Respondents' insistence that the cases involve the same interests because the alleged conversion of
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest's property from farmland to home lots was illegal involves the
determination of whether there was such conversion. The determination of whether there was conversion may
be relevant to the issue of the validity of petitioner's title but is not relevant to the issue of the existence of
petitioner's easement rights. This determination needs proper reception and assessment of evidence, which is
not the province of this court. That issue should be threshed out in a separate case directly attacking
petitioner's certificate of title.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision promulgated on August 12, 2010 and its Resolution promulgated
on October 28, 2010 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco Jr. J.,* Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

*
 Designated Acting Member per S.O. No. 1910 dated
January 12, 2015.
1
Rollo, pp. 11-62.
2
 Id. at 64-75. The Decision was penned by Associate
Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by
Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and
Samuel H. Gaerlan of the Special Fourth Division.
3
 Id. at 16-11. The Resolution was penned by
Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and
concurred in by Associate Justices Mariflor P.
Punzalan Castillo and Samuel H. Gaerlan of the Former
Special Fourth Division.
4
 Id. at 78.
5
 Id. at 78-81.
6
 Id. at 65, 78, and 80.
7
 Id. at 65 and 163.
8
 Id.
9
 Id. at 15.
10
 Id. at 79 and 163.
11
 Id. at 79.
12
 Id. at 163.
13
 Id. at 88.
14
 Id. at 65.
15
 Id. at 65-66 and 163.
16
 Id. at 66 and 163.
17
 Id.
18
 Id. at 250.
19
 Id. at 66 and 250.
20
 Id. at 250.
21
 Id. at 96-100
22
 Id. at 66 and 250.
23
 Id.
24
 Id. at 66.
25
 Id. at 67 and 250.
26
 Id. at 134.
27
 Id. at 67 and 250.
28
 Id. at 249-254.
29
 Id. at 254.
30
 Id. at 168.
31
 Id. at 252.
32
 Id.
33
 Id.
34
 Id.
35
 Id. at 253.
36
 Id. at 252.
37
 Id. at 64.
38
 Id. at 74.
39
 Id. at 71.
40
 Id.
41
 Id.
42
 Id. at 76-77.
43
 Id. at 11.
44
 Id. at 58.
45
 Id. at 48^9.
46
 Id.
47
 Id. at 52.
48
 Id. at 56.
49
 326 Phil. 969, 977 (1996) [Per J. Bellosillo,
First Division].
50
Rollo, p. 47.
51
 Id. at 333-340.
52
 Id. at 336-337.
53
 Id. at 336.
54
 Id. at 337.
55
 Id.
56
 Id. at 338-339, citing Costabella Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 271 Phil. 350, 359 (1991) [Per J.
Sarmiento, Second Division].
57
 Id. at 18 and 65-66.
58
 See Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., et al. v.
Capitol Subdivision, Inc., et al., 124 Phil. 128,
132-133 (1966) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
59
 See Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil.
318, 328 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
60
Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 318, 327
(1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division],
citing Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
271 Phil. 350, 358 (1991) [Per J. Sarmiento, Second
Division], which in turn cited Locsin v. Climaco,
G.R. No. L-27319, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 816, 836
[Per J. Castro, En Bane], Angela Estate, Inc. v.
Court of First Instance ofNegros Occidental, 133
Phil. 561, 574 (1968) [Per J. Castro, En Banc],
and Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., et al. v.
Capitol Subdivision, Inc., et al., 124 Phil. 128,
133 (1966) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Banc].
61
 G.R. No. 180282, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 495 [Per
J.Nachura, Second Division].
62
 Id. at 504.
63
 Id. at 504-505. See also Cristobal v. Court of
Appeals, 353 Phil. 318, 328-329 (1998) [Per J.
Bellosillo, First Division].
64
Rollo, p. 134.
65
Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos, G.R. No. 180282, April 11,
2011, 647 SCRA 495, 504 [Per J. Nachura, Second
Division].
66
Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 318, 329
(1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division]. Quimen
v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 969, 979 (1996) [Per
J. Bellosillo, First Division].
67
Quimen v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 969, 981
(1996) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
68
 Id. at 973-979.
69
 PAUL A. SAMUELSON AND WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS,
ECONOMICS 13 (18th ed., 2005). Opportunity cost is
defined as "[t]he cost of the forgone alternative[.]"
 70
Rollo, p. 161.
71
 Id. at 120.
72
 The said Decision refers to the Regional Trial
Court Decision dated August 4, 2005, "denying the
request of the Cinco family for easement of right of
way from the Valentin family, stating that the
adequate and shorter way to the barangay road is the
irrigation canal." (Rollo, p. 120.)
73
Rollo, p. 120.
74
 Id. at 167.
75
 Id. at 167-168.
76
 Id. at 72.
77
 Id. at 336-337.
78
 Id. at 337.
79
 Id. at 336-337.
80
 Id. at 349-352.
81
 Id. at 351.
82
 See Archbishop of Manila v. Director of
Lands, 35 Phil. 339, 351 (1916) [Per J. Torres, En
Banc]; University of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 97827, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA
728, 737 [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
83
See also University of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 97827, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA
728, 737-738 [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
84
Rollo, p. 84.

June 27, 2016

G.R. No. 163157

SPOUSES BERNABE MERCADER, JR. and LORNA JURADO-MERCADER, OLIVER MERCADER, GERALDINE
MERCADER and ESRAMAY MERCADER, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES JESUS BARDILAS and LETECIA GABUYA BARDILAS, Respondents.
 DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same
in such manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement.1

The Case

This appeal seeks to undo and reverse the decision promulgated on March 18, 2003 "only insofar as Civil Case No. CEB-12783
is concerned," whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) partly affirmed the judgment rendered on October 10, 1995 by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case No. CEB-12783 and Civil Case No. CEB-13384. In so doing, the CA recognized the right of the
respondents as the owners of the servient estate to the road right of way.

Antecedents

The issue concerns the right of way between the owners of three parcels of land denominated as Lot No. 5808-F-l, Lot No.
5808-F-2-A and Lot 5808-F-2-B. The lots were portions of Lot No. 5808-F, situated in Barangay Punta Princesa in Cebu City
with an area of 2,530 square meters, and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 78424 of the Registry of Deeds in
Cebu City in the name of "Arsenia Fernandez, of legal age, married to Simeon Cortes, both Filipinos."  Another subdivision lot
2

derived from Lot No. 5808-F was Lot No. 5808-F-3

Lot No. 5808-F-l, which fronted a side street within the Clarita Village, contained 289 square meters, and was registered under
TCT No. 88156 in the names "OLIVER, 14 yrs. old, GERALDINE, 12 yrs. old, ESRAMA Y, 10 yrs. old, all surnamed
MERCADER, Filipino, minors, and single."  Such registered owners were the children of petitioner Bernabe Mercader, Jr. by his
3

first wife, Rebecca Gabuya Mercader, who had died in 1975.

Lot No. 5808-F-2-A, situated behind Lot No. 5808-F-l, had an area of 89 square meters. It was covered by TCT No. 107914 in
the names of "spouses BERNABE MERCADER AND LORNA JURADO, of legal age, Filipinos,"   and was particularly described
4

as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot 5808-F-2-A, Psd-07-018600, being a portion of Lot 5808-F-2, Psd-07-01-004579).
Situated in the Barrio of Punta Princesa, City of Cebu, Province of Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on
the North and East along lines 1-2-3 by Lot 5808-F-2-B, with existing Right of Way (3.00 meters
wide); of the subdivision plan; on the South along line 3-4 by Lot 5726, Cebu Cadastre; and on the
West, along line 4-1 by Lot 5808-F-1, Psd-07-01-004579. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan being
S. 50 deg. 59'W., 411.55 m. from BM No. 44, Cebu Cadastre; thence N. 60 deg. 34' E., 4.99 m. to point
2; thence S. 20 deg. 33' E., 17.95 m. to point 3; thence S. 60 deg. 34' W., 4.99 m. to point 4; thence N.
20 deg. 33' W., 17.94 m. to point of beginning; containing an area of EIGHTY NINE (89) SQUARE
METERS, more or less. x x x (Emphasis Supplied)

Lot No. 5808-F-2-B, situated behind Lot No. 5808-F-2-A, contained 249 square meters, and was covered by TCT No. 107915 in
the names of "spouses LETECIA GABUY A BARDILAS and JESUS BARDILAS, of legal age, Filipinos."  It was particularly
5

described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot 5808-F-2-B, Psd-07-018600, being a portion of Lot 5808-F-2, Psd-07-01-004579).
Situated in the Barrio of Punta Princesa, City of Cebu, Province of Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on
the SW., along line 1-2 by Lot 5808-F-1, Psd-07-01-004579; on the West along line 2-3 by Lot 5726,
Cebu Cad.; on the North along line 3-4-5 by Lot 5725, Cebu Cadastre; on the East, along line 5-6 by Lot
5808-F-3, Psd-07-01-004579; on the South along line 6-7 by Lot 5726, Cebu Cad. and on the West,
along line 7-8-1 by Lot 5808-F-2-A of the subdivision plan; with a Road Right of Way (3.00 meters
wide). Beginning at a point marked "1 "on plan being S. 50 deg., 59'W., 411.55 m. from BM No. 44,
Cebu Cadastre; thence S. 64 deg .. 87'W., 16.02 m. to point 2; thence N. 22 deg. 23'W., 3.01 m. to point
3; thence N. 64 deg. 10'E., 16.12 m. to point 4; thence N. 64 deg. 10'E., 14.00 m. to point 5; thence S.
21 deg. 20'E., 20.01 m. to point 6; thence S. 60 deg. 34' W., 9.40 m. to point 7; thence N. 20 deg. 33'W.,
17.95 m. to point 8; thence S. 60 deg. 34'W., 4.99 m. to the point of the beginning. Containing an area of
TWO HUNDRED FORTY NINE (249) SQUARE METERS, more or less. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The right of way mentioned in the TCT No. 107915 of the Spouses Bardilas (Lot No. 5808-F-2-B) exited into the Clarita
Subdivision and was roughly 300 lineal meters from Buhisan Road, a national road.

Behind Lot No. 5808-F-2-B was Lot No. 5808-F-3, registered under TCT No. 88158 in the name of"LETECIA GABUYA
BARDILAS, married to JESUS BARDILAS, both of legal age and Filipinos,"  particularly described as follows:
6

A parcel of land (Lot 5808-F-3, Psd-07-07-004579, bearing a portion of 5808-F, psd-07-07-003019);

situated in the District of Punta Princesa, Ciky (sic) of Cebu, Island of Cebu. Bounded on the Ne. and
NW. along lines 1-2-3- by lot 5808-F-4; on the NW., along line 3-4 by lot 5808-F-5; along line 4-5 by lot
5808-F-6, all of the subdivision plan; on the NW., along line 5-6 by Lot 5725, Cebu Cadatre; on the East
and SE., along lines 7-8-9 by lot 5808-B; on the SE., along line 9-1 by lot 5808-C; along 10-11-12 bylot
(sic) 5808-D; along line 12-13-14 by Lot 5808-E., all psd-0701003019; on the SE., along line 14-45 by
lot 5726, Cebu Cadastre; on the SW., along line 15-16 by Lot 5808-F-2 of the subdivision plan; and on
the NW, along line 16-1 by lot 5725, Cebu Cadastre. x x x

In relation to Lot No. 5808-F-3, there is another right of way about 40 lineal meters away from Buhisan Road. 7
On May 11, 1992, the Clarita Village Association erected a concrete perimeter fence to close the exit point of the right of way of
the Spouses Bardilas from Lot No. 5808-F-2-B to the existing road within Clarita Village. The closure forced the Spouses
Bardilas to use the second exit to Buhisan Road, which is from their Lot No. 5808-F-3.

At the instance of the Clarita Village Association, and the Spouses Bardilas, Engr. Edgar T. Batiquin of the Office of the Building
Official of Cebu City, conducted his verification/investigation of the vicinity of the disputed right of way. Engr. Batiquin later on
reported to the Building Official the following findings in his letter dated June 15, 1992,  to wit:
8

Per verification/investigation conducted in connection with the above subject the findings are to wit:

1. That the fence constructed by the association should have the

necessary permit;

2. Said fence encroached a small portion of the road right-of-way of Ms. Bardilas (please see attached
sketch plan, color red);

3. That a fence and portion of the redidential house owned by Mr. Bernabe Mercader have also
encroached the road right-of-way (please see attached sketch plan, color green);

4. Total area encroached on the right-of-way is 14.00 square meters.

Subsequently, on July 1, 1992, Barangay Chairman Jose F. Navarro of Punta Princesa, Cebu City convened a meeting among
the interested parties at the Chinese Temple inside the Clarita Village. In attendance were officers of the Clarita Village
Association, including petitioner Bernabe Mercader, Jr., and barangay officials. The Clarita Village Association explained that its
closure of the right of way had been for the purpose of preventing individuals of "questionable character" from using the right of
way to enter the area to steal from the residents of the Clarita Village. The meeting resulted in the discussion and agreement of
the following matters, to wit:
9

1) The villagers/Clarita Village Association WILL HAVE NO OBJECTION for the spouses: Jesus and
Letecia Bardilas (on their own expense) (sic) demolish a portion of the wall fence erected on a portion of
Clarita Village side street blocking the said spouses' right of way; - and replace with IRON GATE so that
they can use it anytime. Buying cost of the iron gate - as well as labor cost in replacing the knocked out
portion of the said wall fence with iron gate will be shouldered by spouses: Jesus and Letecia Bardilas.

2) KEYS TO THE IRON GATE. - One (1) key will be given to the spouses MR. & MRS. BERNABE
MERCADER so that at anytime they can open the gate in going thru their residence. ONE (1) key will be
kept by spouses: Jesus and Letecia Bardilas for their usage in opening the iron gate anytime they may
open it.

3) All parties present were in accord that the contents of items 1 to 3 STAND as their agreement in
solving this instant case, and also in accord to implement the agreement as soon as possible. THEY
ALSO AGREE THAT IN VIEW OF THIS AGREEMENT, - THEY ALL CONSIDER THIS CASE
AMICABLY SETTLED.

By letter dated August 14, 1992, 10 the Spouses Bardilas, through Atty.

Alfredo J. Sipalay, informed the Spouses Mercader of the encroachment by about 14 square meters of the latter's residential
house and fence on the right of way. Hence, they wrote that they were giving the latter two alternatives, namely:

1. Pay THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00) for the 14 square meters which your house and wall
fence have encroached (the amount represents ₱2,000.00 per square meter, which is the fair market
value of the property plus P2,000.00 for the expenses the Spouses Bardilas have incurred as a result of
the encroachment of your property); or

2. Demolish the wall fence and the portion of your house which encroached my clients' property.

On August 19, 1992, the Spouses Mercader, through Atty. Rolindo A. Navarro, responded by insisting that as the owners of Lot
No. 5808-F-2-A they were equally entitled to the right of way; and that they were proposing to buy the equivalent portion of the
right of way to which they were entitled at a reasonable price, viz.: 
11

Dear Compañero:

Your letter dated August 14, 1992 addressed to Mr. Bernabe Mercader has been referred to me for
appropriate response.

In this connection, please be informed that my said client is equally entitled to the use of the road-right-
of-way subject of your letter having bought Lot No. 5808-F-2-A which is one of the two dominant estates
entitled thereto. The other estate is Lot No. 5808-F-2-B owned by your clients. Incidentally, this road-
right-of-way has not been used for its purpose as the exit to Clarita Village has been closed. Attached
herewith is copy of TCT No. 107914 for Lot No. 5808-F-2-A as Annex "A".
 However, if your client is willing, my client proposes to buy the equivalent portion of the road-right-of-way
to which they are entitled to at a reasonable price.

Please feel free to communicate with me on this matter.

In their reply of August 24, 1992,   the Spouses Bardilas rejected the claim of the Spouses Mercader that they were entitled to
12

the use of the right of way, and reiterated their demand for ₱30,000.00 as the fair market value of the property, stating:

Dear Atty. Navarro:

This is in reply to your letter dated August 19, 1992 which our office received on August 20, 1992.

My clients, Spouses Jesus and Letecia Bardilas, disagree with Mr. Bernabe Mercader's claim that he is
entitled to the use of their road right of way. Attached as Annex "A" is a photocopy of my clients' TCT
No. 107915 of the property in question which clearly states that my clients' property is subject to three
(3) meters wide right of way. Mr. Mercader's TCT No 107914, which was issued on the same day and
time as my clients' TCT on March 30, 1989 at 10:10 a.m., don't (sic) have the same provision regarding
the use of a right of way. This is because Mr. Mercader's property is fronting the street while my clients'
property is situated at the back of Mr. Mercader's property; hence, the provision regarding the right of
way on my clients' TCT.

It is true that my clients' road right of way has been closed since June, 1992 due to a wall constructed by
the Clarita Village Association resulting in much inconvenience to my clients since they have to pass
through a circuitous and muddy road. However, in a meeting with their Barangay Captain, the officers of
the Clarita Village Association already agreed to let my clients pass through the wall provided they will
put up a gate between the walls. My clients already have a three (3) meter wide gate ready to be put up
only to discover that it won't fit because Mr. Mercader has encroached their road right of way. Hence, my
letter to Mr. Mercader on August 14, 1992, informing him to pay ₱30,000.00 to my clients or to
demolished (sic) his wall fence and portions of his house which encroached my clients' road right of way.

Since Mr. Mercader opts to pay my clients, we reiterate our demand for ₱30,000.00 which is the fair
market value of my clients' property.

We hope we could settle this matter within this week.

Civil Case No. CEB-12783

Finding the demand for payment of ₱30,000.00 by the Spouses Bardilas to be unlawful, unwarranted and unfounded, the
Spouses Mercader commenced on September 8, 1992 their action for declaratory relief, injunction and damages against the
Spouses Bardilas in the RTC in Cebu City (Civil Case No. CEB-12783). The case was assigned to Branch 20.

The Spouses Mercader alleged that they were the lawful and registered owners of adjoining lots, to wit: Lot No. 5808-F-1 and
Lot No. 5808-F-2-A where their residential house stood; 13 and that their Lot No. 5808-F-2-A and the Spouses Bardilas' Lot No.
5805-F-2-B were portions of Lot No. 5808-F-2 that had been subdivided and sold separately to each of them; 14 that Lot No.
5808-F-2-A was bounded on the North and the East by Lot No. 5808-F-2-B; that in 1989, they had used a negligible portion 8f
the easement to build their fence and a portion of their residential house, without impairing the use for which it was established
and without any objection, protest or complaint from the respondents; that they retained the ownership of the portion of the
property on which the easement was established pursuant to Article 630 of the  Civil Code; that the non-user of the easement
had extinguished it pursuant to Article 631, paragraph 3, of the  Civil Code; that the rights of the dominant and servient estates
had merged in them; and that there was a need to declare their rights to that portion of their property on which the easement of
right of way had been established vis-a-vis the unlawful demands of the Spouses Bardilas.

The Spouses Mercader prayed that they be declared as having retained the ownership of the 63.33 square meters where the
easement of right of way had been established; that the merger of the rights of the servient estate owner and dominant estate
owner be declared their favor;   and that the Spouses Bardilas be made to pay damages.
15

In their answer,   the Spouses Bardilas averred that Lot No. 5808-F-2-A and Lot No. 5808-F-2-B used to be parts of Lot No.
16

5808-F-2; that the right of way in question was a part of Lot No. 5808-F-2-B that they owned as borne out by the technical
descriptions of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A  and Lot No. 5808-F-2-B   as well as the subdivision plan of the properties;   that they
17 18 19

learned of the encroachment on the portion of their property being used as right of way only from the survey conducted by Engr.
Batiquin of the Office of the Building Official in June 1992;  and that they then referred the matter to their lawyer for appropriate
20

action.

The Spouses Bardilas stated as affirmative defense that although the property of the Spouses Mercaders had a gate fronting
the side street within the Clarita Village, they had allowed the latter to use the right of way only because Bernabe Mercader, Jr.
was the husband of the elder sister of Letecia Gabuya Bardilas; that the Spouses Mercader abused the favor by using the right
of way as their garage; that they requested the Spouses Mercader to move their vehicles out but they got angry and instigated
the closure of the right of way by the Clarita Village Association, where he was a ranking officer at the start of the dispute; that
the Spouses Mercader were wrongly claiming the extinguishment of the right of way; and that the Spouses Mercader had no
cause of action against them, and should be held liable for damages in their favor.

During the pre-trial on September 29, 1993, the trial court required the Spouses Mercader to amend their petition to include the
children of Bernabe Mercader, Jr. by his first wife, Rebecca Gabuya Mercader, due to their being the registered owners of Lot
No. 5808-F-1. The amended petition, dated October 25, 1993, was filed on November 4, 1993. 21
Civil Case No. CEB-13384

In view of the encroachment by the Spouses Mercader on a portion of the road right of way, the Spouses Bardilas could not fit
their 3-meter wide iron gate. Another meeting with the officers of the Clarita Village Association was held on November 11,
1992.  When the efforts of the parties to amicably settle the issue failed, the Spouses Bardilas brought on December 24, 1992
22

their own suit for specific performance with preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction against the Clarita Village
Association and the Spouses Mercader (Civil Case No. CEB-13384) in the RTC in Cebu City. The case was raffled to Branch
10 of the RTC.

On October 5, 1993, the Spouses Bardilas moved for the consolidation of Civil Case No. CEB-13384 with Civil Case No. CEB-
12783. The RTC (Branch 10) granted the motion for consolidation. 23

Judgment of the RTC

On October 10, 1995, the RTC rendered its consolidated decision in Civil Case No. CEB 12783 and Civil Case No. CEB-13384,
disposing:24

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner
Mercader's (sic) as against spouses Bardilas in Civil Case No. 12783:

(a) DECLARING the EXTINGUISHMENT of the easement of road right of way

passing through the real properties of petitioners spouses Mercader's (sic) and
Bernabe Mercader, Jr. and his children and the cancellation of the annotation of
said easement from TCT No. 107914 and TCT No. 88156;

(b) DECLARING petitioner Mercader's (sic) as owners of said extinguished

easement of right of way;

(c) GRANTING to petitioner Mercader's (sic) the right to use and occupy the
extinguised easement which adjoins the Mercader's properties;

(d) ORDERING respondents spouses, Jesus and Letecia Bardilas to pay

petitioners the following amounts:

a) The sum of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages;

b) The sum of ₱35,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

c) The sum of ₱20,000.00 as costs of suit;

and in Civil Case No.13384:

(a) DISMISSING the amended complaint filed by plaintiffs spouses Bardilas;

(b) DECLARING the road network of the Clarita Village still as private properties

and not public;

(c) DECLARING that the closure of OUTLET NO. 1 of said easement of right of

way by the Clartita Village as lawful and valid;

SO ORDERED.

On October 19, 1995, the Spouses Bardilas moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence,  representing
25

that they had obtained the certification dated August 24, 1995 by Antonio V. Osmeña, the developer of the Clarita Village and
the attorney-in-fact of Carmen and Elena Siguenza, the owners of the Clarita Village,  to the effect that the road network of the
26

Clarita Village had been donated to Cebu City. "hey appended to the motion the  Deed of Donation of Road Lots and the 27

certification dated July 5, 1995   by Antonio B. Sanchez, Department Head III of the Office of the City Engineer, Department of
28

Engineering and Public Works of Cebu City, stating that the road network within the Clarita Village "has been used as part of
the road network of the City of Cebu and as such was asphalted by the city thru F.T. Sanchez Construction in 1980." These
documents, according to the Spouses Bardilas, were newly discovered evidence that they "could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced at the trial." 29

On November 13, 1995,   the RTC denied the motion for new trial because: (a) the Deed of Donation of Road Lots had been in
30

the possession of the movants' counsel, and had been in fact shown to the court, but had neither been offered nor marked as
evidence during the trial; (b) the certifications (Annexes A and C of the motion for new trial) had derived their existence from
the Deed of Donation of Road Lots, and could not be considered as newly discovered evidence; (c) the Deed of Donation of
Road Lots did not bear the signature of then Acting City Mayor Eulogio Borres as the representative of the donee; and (d)
the Deed of Donation of Road Lots had not been notarized. It noted that the failure to comply with the legal requirements for
donations under the Civil Code rendered the donation void and invalid, and could not alter the result of the litigation.

With the denial of their motion for new trial, the Spouses Bardilas appealed to the CA. 31
Decision of the CA

In their appeals, the Spouses Bardilas insisted that the RTC committed reversible errors in declaring: 32

I. That the Mercaders are the owners of the easement of right of way in question.

II. That the easement of right of way in question has been extinguished.

III. In granting the Mercaders the right to use and occupy the extinguished easement which adjoins the
Mercaders' properties.

IV. In awarding moral damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit to the Mercaders in Civil Case No.
CEB-12783.

V. In dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-13384 and in declaring the closure of the road right of way in
question by Clarita Village as lawful and valid.

On March 18, 2003, the CA promulgated the now assailed decision,  modifying the judgment of the RTC and disposing as
33

follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20 in Civil Case Nos. CEB-12783 and CEB-13384 is
hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of respondents Spouses Jesus and Letecia Bardilas as against
the petitioners Spouses Bernabe and Lorna Mercader, Oliver Mercader,
Geraldine Mercader and Esramay Mercader in Civil Case No. 12783:

1) DECLARING respondents Jesus and Letecia Bardilas as owners of the three

(3) square meter wide road in question;

2) GRANTING to respondents Jesus and Letecia Bardilas the right to use and
occupy the said three (3) square meter wide road; and

3) ORDERING petitioners to pay the respondents the sum of ₱20,000.00 as and

for attorney's fees;

4) ORDERING the petitioners to pay the costs of suit;

and in Civil Case No. 13384:

1) DISMISSING the amended complaint filed by plaintiffs Spouses Jesus and

Letecia Bardilas; and

2) DECLARING the road network of the Clarita Village still as private properties

and not public.

SO ORDERED.

On April 28, 2003, the Spouses Mercader sought the reconsideration of the decision,  stating that the CA had "erred in
34

awarding the 3 meter road right of way to the [Spouses Bardilas] and in ordering the respondent Mercader spouses, et al. to
pay attorney's fees."  They argued that because Lot No. 5808-F-2-A and Lot No.5808-F-2-B used to be one lot denominated as
35

Lot No. 5808-F-2 that had the same right of way leading to the Clarita Village, they "are also legally entitled to the other half of
the right of way" as owners of one of the subdivided lots;  that, as shown in their Exhibit H,  Lot No. 5808-F-3 of the Spouses
36 37

Bardilas "has another 3 meter road right of way towards another point of Buhisan Road which is only about 40 lineal
meters"  from their property; and that the award of attorney's fees was "not proper there being no legal basis to grant the
38

award. " 39

On March 16, 2004,   however, the CA denied Spouses Mercader's motion for reconsideration.
40

Hence, this appeal only insofar as Civil Case No. CEB-12783 was concemed. 41

Issues

The Spouses Mercaders raise the same issues aired in their motion for reconsideration in the CA.  They contend that the
1âwphi1

technical description of their property contained the phrase "with existing Right of Way (3.00 meters wide)," which signified that
they were equally "entitled to the road-right-of-way being conferred upon them by TITLE pursuant to Article 622 of the New Civil
Code." They submit that:
 Hence,

they too should equally share in its retention for uses other than the easement after its non-user brought
about by the closure of the exit point by Clarita Village Association. As borne out by the evidence, the
respective properties of petitioners Sps. Bernabe and Lorna Mercader, on one hand, and Sps. Jesus
and Letecia Bardilas, on the other hand, used to be a whole Lot 5808-F-2 with an area of 338 square
meters before the same was subdivided into Lot 5808-F-2-A with an area of 89 square meters for the
petitioner spouses and Lot 5808-F-2-B with an area of 249 square meters for the respondents. Before
the subdivision, there was already a 3-meter wide road right of way leading towards Clarita Village.
Thus, after the subdivision, the subject easement was annotated in both certificates of title as earlier
stated. Very clearly, petitioners Bernabe and Lorna Mercader, and respondents Jesus and Letecia
Bardilas, should equally share in the area of the easement. Consequently, the petitioners cannot be
ordered to return the portion of easement on which part of petitioners' house and fence stand.  42

Ruling of the Court

We cannot sustain the petitioners' claim that they acquired their right to the road right of way by title.

Easement or servitude, according to Valdez v. Tabisula, is "a real right constituted on another's property, corporeal and
43

immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on
his property for the benefit of another thing or person." "It exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong to two
different owners. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an
acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another. " 44

It is settled that road right of way is a discontinuous apparent easement  in the context of Article 622 of the Civil Code, which
45

provides that continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by
virtue of title. But the phrase with existing Right of Way in the TCT is not one of the modes of acquisition of the easement by
virtue of a title. Acquisition by virtue of title, as used in Art. 622 of the Civil Code, refers to "the juridical act which gives birth to
the easement, such as law, donation, contract, and will of the testator." 46

A perusal of the technical description of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A indicates that the phrase  with existing Right of Way (3.00 meters
wide) referred to or described Lot No. 5808-F-2-B,  which was one of the boundaries defining Lot F-2-A. Moreover, under the
47

Torrens system of land registration, the certificate of title attests "to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner
of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or
reserves. The objective is to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the registered owner
complete peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right
over the covered land."  The Torrens certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the particular property
48

described therein. 49

What really defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as
enclosing the land and indicating its limits.  As shown in the subdivision plan of Lot No. 5808-F-2,  and based on the technical
50 51

description of Lot No. 5808-F-2-B as appearing in TCT No. 107915,  the right of way in dispute, which is "(B)ounded on the
52

SW., along line 1-2 by Lot 5808-F-J, Psd-07-01-004579; on the West along line 2-3 by Lot 5726, Cebu Cad.; on the North along
line 3-4-5 by Lot 5725, Cebu Cadastre" was part of Lot No. 5808-F-2-B of the Spouses Bardilas.

It is noteworthy that an encumbrance "subject to 3 meters wide right of way" was annotated on TCT No. 107915, which covers
Lot No. 5808-F-2-B of the Spouses Bardilas.  As the owners of the servient estate, the Spouses Bardilas retained ownership of
53

the road right of way even assuming that said encumbrance was for the benefit of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A of the Spouses
Mercader. The latter could not claim to own even a portion of the road right of way because Article 630 of the Civil
Code expressly provides that "[t]he owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is
established, and may use the same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement."

With the right of way rightfully belonging to them as the owners of the burdened property, the Spouses Bardilas remained
entitled to avail themselves of all the attributes of ownership under the Civil Code, specifically: jus utendi, jus fruendi, jus
abutendi, jus disponendi and jus vindicandi. Article 428 of the Civil Code recognizes that the owner has the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.   In that regard, the CA cogently pointed out:
54 55

Moreover, as owners of the three (3) square meter wide road in dispute, the appellants (referring to the
Bardilas spouses) may rightfully compel the petitioners-appellees to pay to them the value of the land
upon which a portion of their (petitioners-appellees) house encroaches, and in case the petitioners-
appellees fail to pay, the appellants may remove or demolish the encroaching portion of the petitioners-
appellees' house. xxxx

The second issue concerns the award of attorney's fees. Relying on Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, (Special Sixth Division), the 56

petitioners argue that the CA erred "in awarding attorney's fees to the appellants after eliminating or refusing to award moral
and exemplary damages;"  that the CA did not make any finding to the effect "that the appellants were compelled to litigate with
57

third persons or to incur expenses to protect their interest;"  and that, consequently, the grant of attorneys' fees to the Spouses
58

Bardillas lacked legal basis.

The award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is governed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages is awarded;

 (2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or incur
expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil case or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly
valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. APAC Marketing Corporation,  the Court opined that whenever attorney's
59

fees are granted, the basis for the grant must be clearly expressed in the judgment of the court. It expounded on why this is so:

In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CA, this Court had the occasion to expound on the policy behind the
grant of attorney's fees as actual or compensatory damages:

(T)he law is clear the in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees may be
recovered as actual or compensatory damages under any of the circumstance
provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the
court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and
equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be
awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's
persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of
his cause.

In Benedicto v. Villaflores, we explained the reason behind the need for the courts to arrive upon an
actual finding to serve as basis for a grant of attorney's fees, considering the dual concept of these fees
as ordinary and extraordinary:

It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the
general rule; counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
Attorney's fees, as part of damages, are not necessarily equated to the amount
paid by a litigant to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he
has rendered to the latter; while in its extraordinary concept, they may be
awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to
the prevailing party. Attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the
instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for
the court to make findings of fact and law that would bring the case within the
ambit of these enumerated instances to justify the grant of such award, and in all
cases it must be reasonable.

We can glean from the above ruling that attorney's fees are not awarded as a matter of course every
time a party wins. We do not put a premium on the right to litigate. On occasions that those fees are
awarded, the basis for the grant must be clearly expressed in the decision of the court.

In awarding attorney's fees, the CA relied on Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code. The exercise of the discretion to allow
attorney's fees must likewise be justified. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union,   the Court said:
60

Insofar as the present case is concerned, the lower court made no finding that it falls within any of the
exceptions that would justify the award of attorney's fees, such as gross and evident bad faith in refusing
 to satisfy a plainly valid, just and demandable claim. Even under the broad eleventh exception of the
cited article which allows the imposition of attorney's fees "in any other case where the court deems it
just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses in litigation should be recovered," the Court
stressed in Buan, supra, that "the conclusion must be borne out by findings of facts and law. What is just
and equitable in a given case is not a mere matter of feeling but of demonstration . . . . Hence, the
exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorney's fees under Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code
demands a factual, legal or equitable justification upon the basis of which the court exercises its
discretion. Without such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being
improperly left to speculation and conjecture." The summary award of counsel's fees made in the
appealed judgment must therefore be set aside.

Considering that the decision of the CA does not express any justification other than stating that attorney's fees were being
awarded to the respondents "pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article 2208 of the New Civil Code," the award by the CA must be set
aside; otherwise, attorney's fees would be turned into a premium on the right to litigate, which is prohibited. Moreover,
attorney's fees, being in the nature of actual damages, should be based on the facts on record and the Court must delineate the
legal reason for such award. 61

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the judgment promulgated on March 18, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 53153 with respect to
Civil Case No. CEB-12783 subject to the MODIFICATION that the portion "ordering petitioners to pay the respondents the sum
of ₱20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees" is DELETED; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
 Article 630, Civil Code.

2
 Records, Civil Case No. CEB-13384, p. 33.

3
 Records, Civil Case No. CEB-12783, p. 59.

4
 Id. at 61.

5
 Id. at 63.

6
 Records, Civil Case No. CEB-13384, p. 35.

7
 Rollo, p. 29.

8
 Records, Civil Case No. CEB-12783, p. 39.

9
 Rollo, p. 86.
10
 Records, Civil Case No. CEB-12783, p. 65.

11
 Id. at 66.

12
 Id. at 67.

13
 Id. at 1.

14
 Id. at 2.

15
 Id. at 4.

16
 Id. at 22-34.

17
 Id. at 37.

18
 Id. at 36.

19
 Id. at 68.

20
 Id. at 24.

21
 Id. at 81.

22
 Records, Civil Case No. CEB-13384, p. 18.

23
 Id. at 49.

24
 Records, Civil Case No. CEB-12783, pp. 190-191.

25
 Id. at 192-196.

26
 Id. at 198.

27
 Id. at 199-200.

28
 Id. at 201.

29
 Id. at 192.

30
 Id. at 204-206.

31
 Id. at 207-208.

32
 CA rollo, pp. 33-34.

 Id. at 37-38; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tirona (retired), and concurred in by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios
33

(retired/deceased), and Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam (retired/deceased)..

34
 Id. at 41.

35
 Id. at 43.

36
 Id. at 44.

37
 Records, Civil Case No. CEB-12783, p. 108.

38
 CA rollo, p. 43.

39
 Id. at 44.

40
 Id. at 46.
41
 Id. at 19.

42
 Id. at 20-21.

43
 G.R. No. 175510, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 332, 337-338.

44
 Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124699, July 31, 2003, 407 SCRA 518, 526.

 Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80511, January 25, 1992, 193 SCRA 333, 339; Ronquillo v. Roca, 103
45

Phil. 84 (1958); Cuaycong v. Benedicto, 37 Phil. 781 (1919).

46
 II Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992, p. 361.

47
 Exhibit "2" for respondents, RTC records for Civil Case No. CEB-12783, p. 37.

48
 Casimiro Development Corporation v. Renato L. Mateo, G.R. No. 175485, July 27, 2011, 654 SCRA 676, 685-686.

49
 Id.

 Notarte v. Notarte, G.R. No. 180614, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 378; Heirs of Anastacio Fabela v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
50

No. 142546, August 9, 2001, 362 SCRA 531.

51
 Records, Civil Case No. CEB-12783, p. 38.

52
 Id. at 61.

53
 Exhibit "C" for Petitioners (Also Exhibit "14" for Respondents), RTC Records of Civil Case No. CEB-12783, p. 63.

54
 Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., G.R. No. 152440, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 315, 325.

55
 Rollo, p. 36.

56
 G.R. No. 106153, July 14, 1997, 275 SCRA 413, 432.

57
 Rollo, p. 21.

58
 Id.

59
 G.R. No. 190957, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 441, 449-450.

 No. L-31087, September 27, 1979, 93 SCRA 257, 262; The Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. Court of
60

Appeals, G.R. No. 126363, June 26, 1998, 291 SCRA 385; Refractories Corporation of the Philippines v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70839, August 17, 1989, 176 SCRA 539.

 Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 138088, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 404,
61

414.