Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

(2)

Basis of Rule.

This rule of law is based upon the assumption that evasion of the law would be facilitated and the
successful administration of justice defeated if persons accused of crimes could successfully
plead ignorance of the illegality of their acts. (20 Am. Jur. 209, 210).

This rule applies in criminal as well as in civil cases. If ignorance of the law is a valid excuse for
its non-performance or compliance, then, it would be very easy for a person to escape scot-free
from liability for the commission of a wrong. The reason is founded on public policy.

Why the law proscribes ignorance of law as a defense.

If ignorance of the law is a valid defense, then, anyone can evade criminal and civil liability by
claiming that he does not know the law. It would create a chaotic society. It would invite
deception, pro-mote criminality.

It must, however, be remembered that mistakes in the application or interpretation of difficult or

doubtful provisions of law may be the basis of good faith. (Articles 526, 2155, NCC).

Ignorance of the law must not, however, be confused with mistake of facts. Ignorance of fact
may excuse a party from the legal consequences of his acts or conduct, but not ignorance of the
law.

Presumption of knowledge of the law.

Everyone is conclusively presumed to know the law. (U.S. vs. De la Torre, 42 Phil. 62). As
explained earlier, even if the people have no actual knowledge of the law they are presumed to
know it after the publication.

Foundation of law.

Being a general principle, founded not only on expediency and policy but on necessity, there is
no ground why Article 3, should be relaxed. If the rule were otherwise, the effect would involve
and perplex the courts with questions incapable of any just solution and would embarrass it with
inquiries almost interminable. (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254).
Ignorance of law distinguished from ignorance of fact.

A principle on which all the courts agree is that ignorance of the law is not an excuse for a
criminal act. The fact that a person honestly believes that he has a right to do what the law
declares to be illegal will not affect the criminality of the act. (U.S. vs. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 66
L. ed. 604, 42 S. Ct., 301). An intention of the accused to keep within the law, but to get as near
the line as possible, will not help him if in fact, he violates the law. It merely means that he
misconceived the law. (Horing vs. Dist. of Colombia, 254 U.S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 53). On the other
hand, since the criminal intention is of the essence of the crime, if the intent is dependent on a
knowledge of particular acts, a want of such knowledge, not the result of carelessness or
negligence, relieves the act of criminality. (Gordon vs. State, 52 Ala. 308, 33 Am. Rep. 575).
This rule-based on another rule of the common law, of a very general application, to the effect
that there can be no crime when the criminal mind or intent is wanting; and therefore, when that
is dependent on a knowledge of particular facts, ignorance or mistake as to these facts, honest
and real, not superinduced by the fault or negligence of the party doing the wrongful act,
absolves from criminal responsibility. (Dotson vs. State, 62 Ala. 141, 34 Am. Rep. 2).

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.

Waiver defined.

It is the relinquishment or refusal of a known right with both knowledge of its existence and an
intention to relinquish it. (Port-land & F.R. Co. vs. Spillman, 23 Or. 587; 32 Pac. 689).

When is there a waiver.

In practice, it is required of everyone to take advantage of his rights at a proper time; and
neglecting to do so will be considered as a waiver. Thus, failure of counsel, either in brief or oral
argument, to allude to an assignment of error, is a waiver thereof. (American Fibre-Chamois Co.
vs. Febre Co., 72 Fed. 508, 18 C.C. A. 662). In contracts, if after knowledge of a supposed fraud,
surprise, or mistake, a party performs the agreement in part, he will be considered as having
waived the objection. (Bro. P.C. 289; 11 B.L.D. 3418). If with the knowledge of the existence of
the insurance, contrary to the terms of the contract, the defendant insurance company elects to
continue the policy in force, its action amounts to a waiver of the right of cancellation. (Gonzales
Lao vs. Yek Tong Lim Fire, et. Co., 55 Phil. 386). There are matters of procedure that under the
Rules of Court are matters that are waivable or fall within the discretion of the courts. For
instance, venue of actions may be waived. (Manila Railroad vs. Atty. Gen., 20 Phil. 253). Rules
of evidence that merely protect the parties during trials may be waived by them. Thus, a contract
of insurance requiring the testimony of an eyewitness as the only evidence admissible
concerning the death of the insured person is valid. Likewise, a contract waiving the privilege
against the disclosure of confidential communications made by a patient to a physician is valid.
The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is a personal one and may be waived,
expressly or by implication. The right of the accused to be present at certain stages of the
proceedings may be waived; so also may his right to the assistance of counsel. (U.S. vs. Goleng,
21 Phil. 426; U.S. vs. Kilayco, 31 Phil. 371; U.S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil. 743).

Scope of waiver.

When a constitutional provision is designed for the protection solely of the property rights of the
citizen, it is competent for him to waive the protection, and to consent to such action as would be
in-valid if taken against his will. In criminal cases this doctrine can be true only to a very limited
extent. (Cooley, Const. Lim. 219). The right of waiver while extending to almost all descriptions
of contractual, statutory, and constitutional privileges is nevertheless subject to control of public
policy, which cannot be contravened by any con-duct or agreement of the parties. Accordingly,
all agreements will be held void which seeks to waive objections to acts or defenses illegal at law
(Boutelle vs. Melendy, 19 N.H. 196; 49 Am. December 152; Rosler vs. Rheen, 72 Pa. 54), or
which are forbidden on the ground of morality or public policy. (Green vs. Watson, 75 Ga. 471,
473; Am. Rep. 479).

Waiver distinguished from ratification.

Ratification is the adoption of a contract made on one’s behalf by some one whom he did not
authorize, which relates back to the execution of the contract and renders it obligatory from the
outset. Waiver is the renunciation of some rule which invalidates the contract, but which, having
been introduced, for the benefit of the con-tracting party, may be dispensed with at his pleasure.
(Reid vs. Field, 83 Va. 26, S.E. 395). Waiver, being mixed question of law and fact, it is the duty
of the court to define the law applicable to waiver, but it is the province of the court or the jury to
say whether the facts of a particular case constitute waiver. (Nickerson vs. Nickerson, 80 Me.
100, 12 Astl. 880).

Thus, if a minor enters into a contract, the same can be ratified by the parents or guardians. Such
act of the parents or guardians shall cleanse the contract of its defect from the commencement of
the contract of the minor. (Art. 1396, NCC).

General rule and exceptions on waiver of rights.

The general rule is that rights may be waived. But this rule is not absolute. It admits of two
exceptions, such as:
 When the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs;
and

When the waiver is prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

An example of a waiver of right which is contrary to public policy and morals is the situation in
Cui vs. Arellano University, L-15127, May 30, 1961. A student was granted a scholarship but
agreed not to transfer to another school, unless he would refund all benefits he derived out of his
scholarship. The Supreme Court said that this is void.

The ruling in Cui vs. Arellano University is consistent with Article 1306 of the Civil Code where
the parties to a contract are given the liberty to stipulate on its terms and conditions, provided the
same are not contrary to law, public policy, public order, morals and good customs. Furthermore,
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states that contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are void.

Future inheritance.

Waiver of future inheritence is void. That is contrary to law. This is especially so if the waiver or
repudiation is intended to prejudice creditors. Hence, under Article 1052 of the Civil Code, if an
heir repudiates inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court
to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir. The acceptance is to the extent of their
credit.

Political rights.

Political rights cannot be the subject of waiver. If a candidate for mayor agrees to split his term
of office with the vice-mayor to prevent the latter from running against him, that contract is void
by reason of public policy. In fact, the Constitution says that a public office is a public trust. It is
not a property. It is beyond the commerce of man, hence, it cannot be the object of a contract,
otherwise, it is void ab initio.

Waiver contrary to law.

In Leal vs. IAC, G.R. No. 65425, November 5, 1986, a contract of sale with right to repurchase
was entered into by the parties with a prohibition against selling the property to any other person
except the heirs of the vendor a retro. This was held to be void because it is contrary to law. It
amounts to a perpetual restriction on the right of ownership.

What was declared void however, was the stipulation prohibit-ing the sale to any other person,
not the whole contract itself.
In the case of Gatchalian vs. Delim, et al., G.R. No. 56487, October 21, 1991, the Supreme Court
declared as void the waiver of the right of the injured passengers to prosecute the civil and crimi-
nal aspects of the liability of the carrier and the driver in a vehicular accident causing injuries to
them in consideration of a measly sum of money. It was held to be contrary to public policy. The
same ruling was enunciated in Carmelcraft Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 90634-35, June 6, 1990,
when there was a waiver of claims by workers for a measly sum of money. In Cui vs. Arellano
Univ., 2 SCRA 205, it was also said that the waiver of the right to transfer to another school by a
scholar was contrary to public policy.

Chapter 2
Human Relations

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give every-one his due and observe
honesty and good faith.

Article 19 of the Civil Code is a statement of principle that supplements but does not supplant a
specific provision of law.

Definition of Terms.

Right. Every well-grounded claim on others is called a right, and, since the social character of
man gives the element of mutuality to each claim, every right conveys along with it the idea of
obligation.

Duty. A human action which is exactly conformable to the laws which require us to obey them.
A moral obligation or responsibility. It differs from a legal obligation because a duty cannot
always be enforced by the law; it is our duty, for example, to be temperate in eating, but we are
under no legal obligation to be so; we ought to love our neighbors, but no law obliges us to love
our neighbors.

Justice. The constant and perpetual disposition to render to every man his due. The conformity
of our actions and our will to the law.

Good Faith. An honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, even though the forms or technicalities of law, together with an absence of all
information or belief of facts which would render the transaction unconscientious.
Coverage of the law.

The foregoing rule pervades the entire legal system, and renders it impossible that a person who
suffers damage because another has violated some legal provision, should find himself without
relief. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 39). It is a sound and just principle that where one
wrongfully or negligently does an act which in its consequences is injurious to another, he is
liable for the damage caused by such wrongful act. This rule applies to artificial, as well as to
natural, persons. It is submitted that to warrant the recovery of damages in any case, there must
be a right of action for a wrong inflicted by the defendant and damage resulting to the plaintiff
there-from. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of
action. (Civil Code of the Phils., Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Alba and Garcia, 1950 ed., p.
52).

That is why, if the injury was self-inflicted, there can be no recovery of damages. It would be a
case of damage without injury.

The necessity for the law.

It has been said that since law is the mode of regulating con-duct by means of sanctions imposed
by a politically organized society, and since law prescribes rather than describes, the codifiers, in
formulating these new provisions have seen fit to indicate the range of allowable conduct among
the citizens of the Philippines and they have done it in an imperative mode, form, and content.
This imperative character it possesses by virtue of its sanctions, which are threats of
consequences in case of disobedience. It is not, however, the normative aspect of this provision
that gives it a unique character. It is the fact that the sanction or the punishment of these
violations is applied exclusively by organized political government, for this draws the line of
distinction between law on the one hand, and religion, morals, and customs, on the other.

There can be no definiteness and certainty of the intention of these provisions unless they are so
written, for after all, the Latin maxim lex scripta dura lex holds true, unlike moral precepts
which, if not written into the law, however sublime and noble in purpose, are nevertheless
shifting and fluid, lacking in precision, definiteness and pains and penalties in case of violation.
(Civil Code of the Phils., Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Garcia and Alba, 1950 ed., pp. 51-
52).

Standards of Human Conduct are set forth by law.

In the exercise of a right and in the performance of an obligation, there are norms of conduct that
a person must observe. It is not because a person invokes his rights that he can do anything, even
to the prejudice and disadvantage of another. The same rule applies in case he performs his
duties. Article 19 of the Civil Code, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are: (1) to
act with justice; (2) to give everyone his due; (3) to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19, New Civil Code must be observed. For, a right although
by itself legal because it is recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. (Albenson Enterprises Corp., et al.
vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993).

“The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right
or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not
especially provide for their own sanction. (Tolentino, supra, p. 71). Thus, anyone who, whether
willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall
indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores,
and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to
morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure.

Principle of abuse of right.

It is beyond denial that a person has the right to exercise his rights, but in so doing, he must be
mindful of the rights of other people. Hence, if he exercises his rights and causes damage to
another, he can be liable for damages. An example is the right of Meralco to cut electric
connections of people who do not pay their electric bills. In Meralco vs. CA, L-39019, January
22, 1988, the Supreme Court observed that Meralco cut the electric connections of one customer
without complying with the 48-hour notice before doing so. The Supreme Court, in holding the
electric company liable for damages, said that it must give a 48-hour notice to its customers
before cut-ting the latter’s electric supply even if they failed to pay their bills. Electricity
becomes a necessity to most people, justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory powers
over the business of supplying electric service to the public. Before disconnecting service to the
delinquent customers, prior written notice of at least 48 hours is required under PSC regulations.
Failure to give such notice amounts to a tort. The Supreme Court further said that disconnection
of elec-tricity without prior notice constitutes breach of contract. It was said that:

“x x x petitioner’s act in disconnecting respondent Ongsip’s gas service

without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting to an
independent tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to
 cause additional mental and moral suffering to private respondent. This is a
clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that any person
who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages. This is reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code.
Moreover, the award of moral damages is sanctioned by Article 2220 which
provides that ‘willfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.’” (Manila Gas Corp. vs. CA,
100 SCRA 602).

Whether default in the payment of electric bills is a ground to defeat or nullify the claim for
damages in case of disconnection of electric supply, the Supreme Court said:

“Likewise, we find no merit in petitioners’ contention that being in arrears in

the payment of their bills, the pri-vate respondents are not entitled to moral
damages under the doctrine that ‘he who comes to court in demand of eq-uity,
must come with clean hands.’ We rejected this argu-ment in the Manila Gas
Corporation case, supra, wherein we held that respondents’ default in the
payment of his bills ‘cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or nullify the
claim for damages.’ At most, this circumstance can be considered as a
mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which respondent x
x x is entitled.”

Elements of abuse of right.

The elements of right under Art. 19 are the following: (1) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for their own sanction; while Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the
following elements: (1) there is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) and it is done with intent to injure.

Verily then, malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19, 20 and 21. Malice or bad faith
implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence.

Case:

Relosa, et al. vs. Pellosis, et al., G.R. No. 138964, August 9, 2001
Facts:

A lease contract was entered into where the lessee has been in possession of the premises for
more than 20 years. The lessee constructed a house on the land leased. The lessor sold the land to
an-other who after obtaining a title, filed a petition for condemnation of the house. After due
hearing, the Office of the Building Official is-sued a resolution ordering the demolition of the
house of the lessee. She was served with a copy of the resolution on December 7, 1989 and the
following day, the new owner hired workers to commence the demolition. It was stopped due to
the intervention of police offic-ers, but during the pendency of the appeal, she again hired
workers to demolish the house. An action for damages was filed but it was dismissed. The CA
reversed the order and made the defendant liable for damages. On appeal, it was contended that
she cannot be made liable because the order of condemnation was eventually upheld by the
Department of Public Works where the house was considered dangerous and could be abated to
avoid danger to the public. In holding the defendant liable for damages, the Supreme Court ––

Held:

The defendant is liable for damages because she abused her right. Under the law, every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. (Article 19, NCC). This provision in our
law is not just a declaration of principle for it can in itself constitute, when unduly ignored or
violated, a valid source of a cause of action or defense.

It is true that there was a condemnation order which was eventually affirmed by the Department
of Public Works, but five (5) days after the defendant received a copy of the order which has not
yet become final and executory, she caused the precipitate demolition of the plaintiff’s house.
The fact that the order was eventually affirmed by the Department is of no moment. The act of
obtaining an order of demolition is not condemnable but implementing it unmindful of the
plaintiff’s right to contest is utterly indefensible.

A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional

law, or recognized as a result of long usage (Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., p. 1324),
constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against another.

The defendant might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy (Article 428, NCC),
and to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof (Article 429, NCC), but the
exercise of these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in Article
19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due, and to
observe honesty and good faith. (Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs. CA, 217 SCRA 16).
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable. In this instance,
the issue is not so much about the existence of the right or validity of the order of demolition as
the question of whether or not petitioners have acted in conformity with, and not in disregard of,
the standards set by Article 19 of the Civil Code.

Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another’s property
was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be
liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.

What is contemplated by Article 23 is an involuntary act or an act which though unforeseen

could not have been avoided. This is based on equity.

The Code Commission gave an example of a situation covered by this rule, thus:

“Without A’s knowledge, a flood drives his cattle to the cultivated highland of B. A’s cattle are
saved, but B’s crop is destroyed. True, A was not at fault but he was benefited. It is but right and
equitable that he should indemnify B.” (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 41-42).

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar
acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause
of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family re-lations of another;

Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his

friends;

Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly

station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

The rule emphasizes that a person’s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind must be
respected. This can be traced from the Roman principle that a man’s home is his castle and even
the king could not enter without his permission.

The Code Commission rationalized the law by saying:

“The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant of every plan for human amelioration.
The touchstone of every system of laws, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how
far it dignifies man. If in legislation, inadequate regard is observed for human life and safety; if
the laws do not sufficiently forestall human suffering or do not try effectively to curb those
factors or influences that wound the noblest sentiments; if the statutes insufficiently protect
persons from being unjustly humiliated; in short, if human personality is not properly exalted —
then the laws are indeed defective.

Title I

CIVIL PERSONALITY

Chapter 1

General Provisions

Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
may be lost. (n)

Concepts.

Juridical capacity is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations. It is inherent in every
natural person.

Capacity to act is the power to do acts with legal effect. It may be acquired and it may
also be lost. It is acquired upon the attainment of the age of majority.

Person is a physical or legal being susceptible of rights and obligations or of being the
subject of legal relations.

Right is the power which a person has to demand from another a prestation or the power
to do or not to do, or to demand something.

Elements of a right.
There are three (3) basic elements of a right. They are:

Subject. Rights exist in favor of persons. Every right in-volves two persons, one who may
demand its enforcement, being consequently designated as the active subject, and the other must
suffer or obey such enforcement and is therefore called the passive subject. The former has a
right; the latter owes a duty. (S.R.I. 41).

Object. Rights are exercised over things, or services, for the satisfaction of human wants,
physical or spiritual. Things and services constitute the object of rights. (S.R.I. 43).

Efficient cause. This is the tie that binds the subject and the object together. It produces all legal
relations. It springs mainly from acts of violation. (S.R.I. 44).

Juridical capacity distinguished from capacity to act.

The first term as defined in this article is the fitness of man to be the subject of legal relations.
Capacity to act, on the other hand, is the power to do acts with juridical effect. The first is an
inherent and ineffaceable attribute of man; it attaches to him by the mere fact of his being a man
and is lost only through death. The second, that is capacity to act, is acquired and may be lost.
The former can exist without the latter, but the existence of the latter always im-plies that of the
former. The union of these two is the full civil capacity. (Sanchez Roman, 112-113; 1 Vaverde,
212).

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,

prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and
do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the
latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

There are persons who have restricted capacity to act, like minors, insanes, imbeciles, deaf-
mutes, prodigals, or those under civil interdiction. Such conditions merely restrict their capacity
to act. They, however, have juridical capacity and are susceptible of rights and even of
obligations, when the same arise from their acts or from property relations. These persons are not
exempted from their obligations. Their parents or guardians may still be liable.

Article 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit

capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and
trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this
Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act is
not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in
cases specified by law. (n)

The law enumerates certain circumstances that limit or modify capacity to act of some persons.
These incapacitated persons may incur liability when these obligations arise from their acts or
property relations.

Age.

The age of majority is now 18 years. (R.A. No. 6809). As a rule, a minor may not give consent to
a contract, but look at Article 1403 of the Civil Code which provides that one of the classes of
unenforceable contracts is where both parties to the same are incompetent to give consent. The
contract can, however, be cleansed of its defect if their parents or guardians would ratify the
same. (Art. 1407, New Civil Code). Or, if one of the parties to a contract is incapable of giving
consent, the contract is voidable. (Art. 1390, New Civil Code). But if the parents or guardian of
said incompetent ratify the same, it is cleansed of its defect from the moment of the signing or
perfection of the contract of the minor. (Art. 1396, New Civil Code).

Illustration:

A and B are both minors. A sold his car to B for P400,000.00. A delivered it and B paid. The
contract is unenforceable, but if the parents or guardians of A and B would ratify it, then, it is
cleansed of its defect from the moment of perfection of the contract; not from the ratification.

A, a minor sold his car to B, a person of age. B paid A and A delivered the car to B. This
contract is voidable, but it can be ratified by the parents or guardians of A.

In both cases, there is restriction of capacity to act, yet the law recognizes effects of the said
contracts.

In Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215, minors stated that they were of legal age
when they entered into a contract of sale. The truth is that they were not of age. They could not
be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of their obligation. This is so because of
the principle of estoppel. (Bambalan vs. Maramba and Muerong, 51 Phil. 417). In the same
manner, the minor in Uy Soo Lim vs. Tan Unchuan, 38 Phil. 552, did not ask for annulment of
his contract upon attainment of majority age. The Supreme Court said that knowing his rights, he
should have promptly disaffirmed his contract after attaining the age of majority but instead,
permitted the other party to continue making payments.
Sickness.

An insane or demented person or a deaf-mute who does not know how to read and write may not
give consent to a contract. (Art. 1327[2], New Civil Code).

In Standard Oil Co. vs. Codina Arenas, 19 Phil. 363, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial
court that monomania of wealth does not really imply that a person is not capable of executing a
contract. The Supreme Court said that in our present knowledge of the state of mental alienation,
such certainly has not yet been reached as to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that
he who suffers the monomania of wealth, believing himself to be very wealthy when he is not, is
really insane and it is to be presumed, in the absence of a judicial declaration, that he acts under
the influence of a perturbed mind, or that his mind is deranged when he executes an onerous
contract. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been
declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not
proved, that is, at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind. It
was said that it was necessary to show that such monomania was habitual and constituted a
veritable mental perturbation in the patient; that the contract executed by him was the result of
such monomania and not the effect of any other cause and that monomania existed on the date
when the contract was executed.

Penalty.

In the commission of certain offenses, accessory penalties are imposed by law, like perpetual or
temporary disqualification to hold office, suspension from public office, curtailment of the right
to vote or be voted for and the right to exercise a profession or calling, or even civil interdiction.

Civil interdiction deprives the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental
authority and guardianship, either as to person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of
the right to manage his property and the right to dispose of such property by any act or
conveyance inter vivos. (Art. 34, Revised Penal Code). A person under civil interdiction cannot
therefore make a donation inter vivos, but he can make a will as the latter shall take effect after
death.

A person under civil interdiction is subject to guardianship (Rule 93, Sec. 2, Rules of Court); he
may be disinherited if he is a child or descendant, legitimate or illegitimate. (Art. 919[8], New
Civil Code). It may also be a ground for separation of properties during the marriage (Art. 135,
Family Code); it may cause the termination of agency. (Art. 1919, Civil Code).

Prodigality.
It has been held that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a disposition to
spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of
support, or to deprive the compulsory heirs of their legitime. (Martinez vs. Martinez, 1 Phil.
182). Prodigals are subject to guardianship. (Rule 93, Sec. 2, Rules of Court)

A spendthrift is a person who, by excessive drinking, gambling, idleness, or debauchery of any

kind shall so spend, waste or lessen his estate as to expose himself or his family to want or
suffering, or expose the town to charge or expense for the support of himself and his family.

Alienage.

Aliens cannot acquire land in the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution provides that save in cases
of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. (Sec. 7, Art.
XII, 1987 Constitution). The rule cited above is not however absolute as the Constitution further
provides that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands,
subject to limitations provided by law. (Sec. 8, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution). The limitation
provided by law is that if such former natural-born citizen acquires land in Metro Manila, he can
do so but not exceeding 5,000 square meters. If outside, the limit is three (3) hectares. It can be
acquired for all purposes.

Aliens cannot practice their professions in the Philippines, as the 1987 Constitution says that the
practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases
provided by law. (Sec. 14, Art. XII). They cannot also operate public utilities. (Art. XII, Sec. 11).
In the case of Cheesman vs. CA, it was said that if a foreigner marries a Filipino and out of
conjugal funds, a private land is acquired by them, the same cannot form part of their community
of property because the foreigner is disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines. Note
that this may be harsh, but that is the law. Dura lex sed lex.

Absence.

Under Article 381 of the Civil Code, when a person disappears from his domicile, his
whereabouts being unknown, he is considered as absent. The court can appoint an administrator
at the instance of an interested person, a relative or a friend. His continued absence can even
result in the presumption of his death (Art. 390, NCC); hence, his successional rights may be
opened. It must be recalled that the presumption of death is not conclusive, for he may be alive
and can still dispose of his properties. In fact, under Article 389 of the Civil Code, if someone
can prove that he acquired title over his properties under administration, the administration
would cease.
Insolvency and Trusteeship.

If one has been declared insolvent, he cannot just dispose of his properties existing at the time of
the commencement of the proceedings for insolvency. No payments of property or credit can be
made to him. (Secs. 18 and 24, Act No. 1956).

Family Relations.

A husband and wife cannot donate to one another. The prohibition, extends to common-law
relationship. (Art. 87, Family Code). The reason is public policy; the possibility that one may
exert undue influence over the other. They cannot also, as a rule, sell to one another, except in
cases where they are governed by the complete separation of property regime or when there is
separation of properties during the marriage. (Art. 1490, New Civil Code). Husband and wife
cannot also enter into a universal partnership of all properties. (Art. 1782, NCC). The law also
declares as void marriages among relatives in the direct line, whether legitimate or illegitimate
(Art. 37, Family Code); or those in the collateral line up to the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity by reason of public policy. (Art. 38, Family Code).

Deaf-Mute.

A person who is blind or deaf or dumb cannot be a witness in a will. (Art. 820, New Civil Code).
But a deaf-mute may execute a will (Art. 807, New Civil Code) or a blind person can execute a
will. (Art. 808, New Civil Code).

Political or religious belief.

These two things do not affect capacity to act. In fact, under the 1987 Constitution, no religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. (Art. III, Sec. 5, 1987
Constitution).

The last paragraph of Article 39 of the Civil Code has been repealed by the Family Code and
R.A. No. 6809. The age of majority now is 18 years.

Natural Persons

Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided, it be born
later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)
Person defined.

In a juridical sense, by “person” is meant any being, physical or moral, real or juridical and legal,
susceptible of rights and obliga-tions, or of being the subject of legal relations. (2 Sanchez
Roman 110). The term person is more extensive than the term man or hu-man being. (1 Falcon,
103) Falcon maintains that there is no differ-ence between person and man and defines “person”
as “man and all associations formed by man.” (1 Falcon 103). The term “person” in-cludes
entities which have no physical existence such as corpora-tions and associations. (People vs.
Com.’rs. of Taxes, 23 N.Y. 242).

Persons are the subject of rights and duties.

Persons are the subject of rights and duties; and, as a subject of a right, the person is the object of
the correlative duty, and conversely. The subject of a right has been called by Professor Holland,
the person of inherence; subject of a duty, the person incidence. “En-titled” and “bound” are the
terms in common use in English and for most purposes they are adequate. Every full citizen is a
person; other human beings, namely, subjects, who are not citizens, may be persons. A person is
such, not because he is human, but because rights and duties are ascribed to him. The person is
the legal subject or substance of which the rights and duties are attributes. An individual human
being considered as having such attributes is what lawyers call a natural person. (Pollock, First
Book Jurispr. 110; Gray, Nature & Sources of Law, Ch. II).

Birth determines personality.

It must be noted that personality is determined by birth. Without it, there is no human being;
there is no natural person fit to be the subject of legal relations. But a conceived child may be
considered born for purposes favorable to it. The following laws provide for favorable situations
for an unborn fetus:

Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those who would
legally represent them if they are already born. (Art. 742, Civil Code).

Every donation inter vivos, made by a person having no children or descendants,

legitimate or legitimated by a subsequent marriage, or illegitimate, may be revoked or reduced as
provided in the next article, by the happening of any of these events:

If the donor, after the donation, should have legitimate or legitimated or illegitimate
children, even though they be posthumous.

xxx xxx x x x. (Art. 760, New Civil Code).

 The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious. (Art. 854, New Civil Code).

Persons classified.

Persons are of two classes, namely: (1) human beings or men, called natural persons, and (2)
associations and corporations having legal existence, called juridical or artificial persons.

Personality and capacity not identical.

Personality and capacity are intimately related, but are not identical. Personality is the aptitude to
be the subject of rights and of obligations. It is a product of capacity in law, a necessary
derivation from its existence, and is the external manifestation of that capacity.

Personality, its general and specific sense.

Personality in a general sense cannot be limited, because it is the consequence of juridical

capacity, which in turn is merely a consequence of human nature. On the other hand, personality,
in a specific sense, or personality for specific and concrete rights, may suffer limitations because
it is merely the result of capacity to act. (2 Sanchez Roman 114-117).

Precautions.

The purpose of this provisions is to prevent simulation of birth for hereditary or successional
rights. The fraudulent intention may be attained or facilitated either when the father has died or
was absent for a considerable time. (1 Manresa, 6th ed., 267).

Objective sought.

The law fixes the intra-uterine life of a fetus with three objects in view, namely:

o to assure its existence;

o to facilitate and protect its free development; and

o to give or accord to him certain rights in law. (1 Manresa, 6th ed. 267).

It must be remembered that even an unborn fetus has rights protected by law.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus
had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it
dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal
womb. (30a)

The fetus is considered born after its complete separation from the maternal womb, that is, the
cutting of the umbilical cord.

It has been said that the second sentence in the law avoids an abortion of a six-month fetus from
being considered as birth. If the child is already seven months, it is already well-formed and may
live. It may have grown up to maturity; hence, he may now be viable.

The provisions of Articles 40 and 41 of the Civil Code have cross reference to the law on
succession, for under Article 1025 of the Civil Code, the law says that in order to be capacitated
to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except
in case of representation, when it is proper.

A child already conceived at the time of the death of the decedent is capable of succeeding
provided it be born later under the conditions prescribed in Article 41.

Illustration:

A executed a will instituting the fetus inside B’s womb. At the time of the child’s birth, he had
an intra-uterine life of 8 months. In order to succeed, he must be considered born; and if he is
born alive, he succeeds and he would transmit successional rights to his heirs if he should die
after his birth. Note that the fetus can be considered born for purposes of the institution in the
will because it is favorable to it. But the taking of the property is conditioned on his birth.

Suppose the child had an intra-uterine life of 6-l/2 months or less than 7 months, he must have to
live for at least 24 hours from the complete separation from the maternal womb, otherwise, if he
dies within 24 hours from his complete separation from the maternal womb; then, he would not
inherit and transmit successional rights to his heirs. The reason is that, he did not comply with
the requirement of Article 41. The child here did not have juridical capacity.

Suppose A and B are married. They have a son C, who is married to D, and they have a son E. A
executed a will instituting C, but the latter predeceased his father, A. E can inherit by right of
representation.
Note that no less than the Constitution affords protection to the unborn, when it says that the
State recognizes the sanctity of the family and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. (Art. II, Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution).

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by
contract and by will. (32a)

Death defined.

The cessation of life. The ceasing to exist. (Philip, Sleep & Death, Dean, med. Jur., 413).

Civil death defined.

Civil death is the state of a person who, though possessing a natural life has lost all his civil
rights, and as to them, is considered as dead. A person convicted and attained of felony and
sentenced to the state prison for life is, in the state of New York, in consequence of the act of
29th of March, 1799, and by virtues of the conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life, to
be considered as civilly dead. (Platner vs. Sherwood, 6 Johns, Ch. [N.Y.] 118).

The law refers to physical death and not presumed death. In case of presumed death, the person
is merely presumed dead because of his absence. But in case of reappearance, he can recover his
prop-erties or the price thereof if they have been distributed.

The second paragraph in the law recognizes the fact that some rights and obligations survive the
death of a person. It must be recalled that the rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent. (Art. 777, New Civil Code). Upon the moment of death,
there is dissolution of the absolute community of properties and the conjugal partnership. (Arts.
99 and 126, Family Code). In case of death, there is extinguishment of parental authority, hence;
substitute parental authority shall be exercised. (Arts. 214 and 220, Family Code). If a person
constitutes another as an agent, the death of the principal or the agent extinguishes the agency.
(Art. 1919, New Civil Code). If penalty has been imposed upon a person, his death extinguishes
such penalty (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code); but this is without prejudice to the liability of the
estate in case the obligation arose out of other sources of obligations. (People vs. Bayotas,
supra).

Inspite of the fact that the law provides that death extinguishes civil personality, it has been said
that the estate of a decedent is in law regarded as a person (Limjoco vs. Intestate Estate of Pedro
Fragante, L-770, April 27, 1948); that the supervening death of a person does not extinguish his
civil personality. (Florendo, Jr. vs. Coloma, et al., 129 SCRA 304; Republic vs. Bagtas, 6 SCRA
262; Vda. de Haberer vs. CA, 104 SCRA 534).