Swiss Social Report Switzerland Measured and Compared

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Christian Suter, Silvia Perrenoud, René Levy, Ursina Kuhn,
Dominique Joye, Pascale Gazareth
Swiss Social Report 2008: Switzerland Measured and Compared
Christian Suter, Silvia Perrenoud, René Levy,
Ursina Kuhn, Dominique Joye, Pascale Gazareth
Swiss Social Report 2008:

Switzerland Measured and
Compared
Published with financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Swiss
Foundation for Research in the Social Sciences FORS and the Faculté des Lettres et
Sciences Humaines of the University of Neuchâtel.
For details and up-to-date information on the Social Report 2008, please see:
www.social-report.ch
ISBN 978-3-03777-074-0
© 2008, Seismo Press, Social Sciences and Social Issues

Zähringerstrasse 26, CH-8001 Zurich
E-mail: [email protected]
http://www.seismoverlag.ch
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

retrieval system, transmitted or utilized in any form, or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of the Publishers.
English translation and checking: Rachel Matthey, Zurich

Graphics: Walo von Büren, Zurich
Cover: Gregg Skermann, Zurich
Contents
List of indicators 7
Abbreviations 11
General 11
Cantons 12
Countries 13
Political Parties 14
Acknowledgements 15
Switzerland measured and compared: an introduction 17
Distribution of social goods 25
Cultural diversity 57
Social integration 89
Political reshaping 121
Environment and society 153
Synthesis 185
Glossary 193
References 201
Notes on the authors 203
5
List of indicators
Distribution of social goods

Post-compulsory education 26
Educational attainment of the population 28
Educational inheritance and homogamy 30
Further education 32
Change of sectors and industries 34
Employment 36
Full-time and part-time employment 38
Entry into working life 40
Working conditions 42
Unemployment 44
Socio-demographic profile of unemployment 46
Long-term unemployment 48
Occupational earnings 50
Wage levels and wage differences 52
Household income 54
Cultural diversity
Profile of nationalities 58
Duration of stay and naturalisation 60
Opinions on foreigners 62
Subjective criteria of national affiliation 64
Pupils’ languages 66
Competence in foreign languages 68
Use of foreign languages 70
English at work 72
Denominations and non-religiousness 74
Religious beliefs 76
Use of the media 78
Interest in political news 80
Leisure activities 82
Style preferences in the home 84
Sport 86
7
List of indicators
Social integration
Marriage 90
Divorce 92
Role distribution in couples 94
Births 96
Age structure 98
Transition into adulthood 100
Living alone 102
Retirement and invalidity pensions 104
Poverty 106
Organised voluntary work 108
Informal voluntary work 110
Motivations for voluntary work 112
Crime suspects 114
Victims of crime 116
Feelings of insecurity 118
Political reshaping
Political opinions 122
Perception of problems 124
Political trust 126
Political activities 128
Political mobilisation 130
Labour union strength and industrial conflicts 132
Initiatives and referenda 134
Persons without party attachment 136
Strength of the political parties 138
Electorate of the parties 140
Women in politics 142
Consent/dissent of the governmental parties 144
Voter turnout 146
Governmental consent and voting results 148
Regional voting differences 150
8
List of indicators
Environment and society

Passenger traffic 154
Transportation of goods 156
Final energy consumption 158
Transformation of the countryside 160
Diversity of species and protection of the c ountryside 162
Water use 164
Air pollution 166
Climate and greenhouse gases 168
Evaluation of threats to the environment 170
Ecological awareness 172
Opinions on environmental policies 174
Ecological commitment 176
Ecological behaviour 178
Waste management and recycling 180
Ecological footprint 182
9
Abbreviations
General
AHV Old-age and survivors’ insurance (Alters- und Hinterlassenen
versicherung)
ES Employment Statistics
ESPOP Annual Population Statistics
ESS European Social Survey
ETHZ Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich
EU European Union
Eurostat Statistical Office of the European Communities
FE Further education
FOEN Federal Office for the Environment
FORS Swiss Foundation for Research in Social Sciences
Fr. Swiss Francs (CHF)
GDR German Democratic Republic (German: Deutsche Demo
kratische Republik, DDR)
GRA Foundation against Racism and Antisemitism
ICVS International Crime and Victimisation Survey
ILO International Labour Organisation
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISCED International Standard Classification of Education
ISSP International Social Survey Programme
IV Invalidity insurance (Invalidenversicherung)
linguadult.ch Linguistic Competence of Adult Population in Switzerland
LIS Luxembourg Income Study
LSE Wages Structure Survey
MOSAiCH ‘Measurement and Observation of Social Attitudes in
Switzerland’ Survey
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PETRA Statistic on Foreign Population
SBB Swiss Federal Railways
Sec. I Secondary level I
Sec. II Secondary level II
Seco State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
Selects Swiss Electoral Studies
SFSO Swiss Federal Statistical Office
SHP Swiss Household Panel
11
Abbreviations
SIDOS Swiss Information and Data Archive Service for the

Social Sciences
SILC Statistic on Income and Living Conditions
SKOS Swiss Conference on Social Assistance
SLFS Swiss Labour Force Survey
SNSF Swiss National Science Foundation
TREE Transitions from Education to Employment
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNO United Nations Organisation
US-CID U.S. ‘Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy’ Survey
Cantons
AG Aargau
AI Appenzell Innerrhoden
AR Appenzell Ausserrhoden
BE Bern
BL Basel-Landschaft
BS Basel-Stadt
FR Fribourg
GE Geneva
GL Glarus
GR Grisons
JU Jura
LU Lucerne
NE Neuchâtel
NW Nidwalden
OW Obwalden
SG Saint Gallen
SH Schaffhausen
SO Solothurn
SZ Schwyz
TG Thurgau
TI Ticino
UR Uri
VD Vaud
VS Valais
ZG Zug
ZH Zurich
12
Abbreviations
Countries
AT Austria
BE Belgium
BG Bulgaria
CA Canada
CH Switzerland
CL Chile
CZ Czech Republic
DE Germany
DK Denmark
ES Spain
FI Finland
FR France
GB Great-Britain (UK without Northern Ireland)
GR Greece
IE Ireland
IL Israel
IT Italy
JP Japan
LT Lithuania
LU Luxembourg
LV Latvia
MT Malta
MX Mexico
NL Netherlands
NZ New Zealand
PH Philippines
PL Poland
PT Portugal
RU Russia
SE Sweden
SI Slovenia
UK United Kingdom (England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland)
US USA, United States of America
13
Abbreviations
Political Parties
CSP Christian Social Party
CVP Christian Democratic Party of Switzerland
EDU Federal Democratic Union
EVP Evangelical People’s Party
FDP Radical Party of Switzerland/ Free Democratic Party
FGA Feminist und Green-alternative Groups
FPS Freedom Party of Switzerland
GLP Green Liberal Party of Switzerland
GPS Green Party of Switzerland
LdU Alliance of Independents
Lega Ticino League
LPS Liberal Party of Switzerland
PdA Party of Labour
Poch Progressive Organisations of Switzerland
PSA Partito socialista autonomo (TI); Parti socialiste autonome du
Sud du Jura
REP Republicans
SD Swiss Democrats
Sol Solidarity
SPS Social-Democratic Party of Switzerland
SVP Swiss People’s Party
14
Acknowledgements
The Social Report 2008 continues a project which started eight years ago and
aims to carry out scientific and systematic observation, visualisation, description
and analysis of fundamental tendencies in the development of Swiss society.
All commentaries in this Report are completely new, as are a large number of
the indicators – these have not only been brought up-to-date, but they now
deal with new topics and identify Switzerland’s position in comparison with
other selected countries. The Social Report 2008 was realised by a research
group of six from the Sociological Institutes of the Universities of Neuchâtel
and Lausanne in a two-year phase of preparation. This team is responsible for
the conception, collection, preparation, analysis, documentation and inter-
pretation of the data and indicators, for formulating the short commentaries,
definitions and comments, the introduction, synthesis and various lists, as
well as for the arduous task of editing and proof-reading.
Many people and institutions have contributed to the realisation of this
volume. First and foremost, we should like to thank the authors of the detailed
reviews which have been included in the German and French editions. With
their specialised knowledge, their suggestions and critical comments, they have
accompanied the progress of the Social Report over the two years of prepara-
tion and enhanced and formed it with their reviews. A large thank-you is due
to Walo von Büren for the graphical representation of the 75 indicators. His
commitment and the professional design of the diagrams have contributed
greatly to the successful production of the Social Report.
The data and indicators presented in the Social Report 2008 stem from
large Swiss and international comparative population surveys (particularly
repeated cross-sectional and panel surveys), European or international and
Swiss time series, as well as individual studies on specific themes. For provid-
ing us with data, advice and help with evaluation, we should like to thank
the various institutions now united under the umbrella of the Swiss Foun-
dation for Research in the Social Sciences – FORS (i.e. SIDOS, the Swiss
Information and Data Archive Service for the Social Sciences, which among
others is responsible for the European Social Survey and the International
Social Survey Programme; the Swiss Household Panel, and the Swiss Elec-
toral Studies, Selects, in particular Georg Lutz); the Swiss Federal Statistical
Office (especially André Farine, Matthias Graber, Werner Haug, Claude
Maier, Thierry Murier, Werner Seitz); the Federal Social Insurance Office (in
particular François Donini and Stefan Müller); the Bertelsmann Foundation
(especially Stefan Huber); Voxit (especially François Lorétan); the GfS Research
Institute; the WEMF/REMP Corporation for Advertising Media Research
15
Acknowledgements
(especially Nadine Bracher); those responsible for the TREE Study at the
University of Basle (Transitions from Education to Employment; especially
Thomas Meyer); the research team studying the Linguistic Competence of
the Adult Population in Switzerland, linguadult.ch, at the University of Bern
(especially Jachin Baumgartner and Iwar Werlen); the research team and those
responsible for the Swiss Volunteering Monitor (especially Isabelle Steffen-
Stadelmann and Markus Freitag from the University of Constance, as well as
Herbert Ammann from the Schweizerische Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft); the
research team of the Swiss Survey on the Environment at the Swiss Federal
Institute of Technology Zurich (ETHZ, especially Reto Meyer and Andreas
Diekmann); Sven Hutter and Marco Giugni (for the data on the events of
protest in Switzerland) as well as Simon Hug and Ioannis Papadopoulos (for
the data on party recommendations in popular votes). For technical advice and
support on the graphic software and cartography we are indebted to Daniel
von Burg and Thomas Schulz from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
Sarah Widmer and Dominique Auderset Joye have also made a valuable
contribution to the project. They supported the editing team of the Social
Report in actualising the data series and in checking the Glossary. Our
thanks also go to Grégoire Métral, responsible for design and navigation of
the CD-ROM and Fredy Kuhn for helping with the programming of the
CD-ROM.
The Social Report 2008 is being published in two national languages, Ger-
man and French, as well as in English. We should like to thank the translators
for their demanding work and for the linguistic quality of the translations:
Marie-Claude Brulhardt carried out the French translation, Jörg Ohnacker
undertook the German translation and Rachel Matthey was responsible for
the English translation and for checking the English texts.
We are very grateful to the Swiss National Science Foundation for pro-
viding the necessary financial support for the preparation and publication
of the Social Report 2008 (Application No. 10FI13-111478). In addition, a
generous contribution to the printing costs was made by the Swiss Founda-
tion for Research in the Social Sciences FORS, as well as by the Faculté des
Lettres et Sciences Humaines at the University of Neuchâtel.
Christian Suter, Silvia Perrenoud, René Levy, Ursina Kuhn,

Dominique Joye, Pascale Gazareth
Neuchâtel and Lausanne, Switzerland
August 2008
16
Switzerland measured and compared:
an introduction
Goal and orientation of the Social Report 2008

What kinds of inequality shape Swiss society? How has the cultural face of
Switzerland changed – for example, with regard to multilingualism? Is there
social solidarity in Switzerland – for instance, in the form of voluntary work?
To what extent has political life in Switzerland become polarised? What
about the relation between environment and society – has awareness for the
environment and environmentally friendly behaviour diminished in the Swiss
population over the past few years? These and similar questions will be raised
in this report and dealt with in detail.
The goal of the Social Report is to inform about the current social situa-
tion and social change in Switzerland on the basis of systematically collected
data and indicators. The Social Report is an instrument for regular and com-
prehensive social reporting on Swiss society on a scientific basis.1 For this,
reliable time-referenced data on various important areas of life are required,
covering both aspects of ‘objective’ living conditions and life chances, as well
as ‘subjective’ life-style, perception and evaluation of personal circumstances.
In addition, social change is illustrated both on the individual level – in the
sense of individual living conditions, evaluations and ways of behaviour, as
well as on the aggregate level, i.e. in relation to changes in institutions and
social structures. Finally, the Social Report 2008 describes and explains not
only the status of Swiss society and changes that have taken place, but it also
puts them into perspective both on the European and international level: i.e.
1 A detailed overview of Swiss social reporting can be found in Suter and Igle-
sias (2003) and Suter et al. (2004). Noteworthy, new or updated publications
on Swiss social reporting are: the Generation Report (Generationenbericht, cf.
Perrig-Chiello et al., 2008), which for the first time describes the relationship
between the generations in Switzerland as well as the changes in that relation-
ship; Mapping Spatial Change (Atlas des räumlichen Wandels, cf. Schuler et al.,
2007), a continuation of the Atlas of Regional Statistics (Strukturatlas) of 1985
and 1997; the national and cantonal statistics on social assistance by the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office (SFSO, 2008), and finally – an example of the recent
efforts to build up and institutionalise continuous social reporting on regional
and local levels – the Social Report of the Canton of Solothurn (Baumgartner et al.,
2005) as well as the population surveys of the City of Zurich (Stadtentwicklung
Zürich, 2007).
17
Switzerland measured and compared: an introduction
the economic, social, cultural, political and ecological situation in Switzer-

land is compared with that in other selected countries, including Germany,
France, Great Britain, Sweden and the USA. In contrast to its predecessors,
this Social Report presents for the first time a systematic temporal and spatial
analysis of Swiss society.
The Social Report contains 75 indicators in all and these are divided into
five core areas which cover the basic fields or subsystems in human society,
namely: distribution of social goods, cultural diversity, social integration,
political shaping, environment and society (see Höpflinger and Wyss, 1997).
The indicators, or rather the developmental tendencies which they examine,
are presented graphically, with a short, one-page commentary, and inter-
preted and explained in a detailed analytical review. For the first time, the
Social Report is being published not only in German and French, but also
in English – the English version is, however, limited to the indicator section
(i.e. without the detailed reviews).
Initiated within the framework of a research programme in the social sci-
ences entitled ‘Demain la Suisse’ (Switzerland Towards the Future, 2000 and
2004 editions) and financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation, the
Social Report aims to act as a ‘window’ on to current social scientific research
and make important findings and results available to a broader public. For
this purpose, the data and indicators which we collected, prepared, controlled
and analysed have been visualised using easy-to-read diagrams. The enclosed
CD-ROM also contains all data and diagrams, in a form which will enable
readers to use the data for their own analyses.
This is the third edition of the Swiss Social Report. The Social Report 2008
builds on the two earlier Reports. It continues the thematic structure of the
five core areas and chapters, with subsections showing the indicator-based,
descriptive perspective (15 indicators per chapter, which are described and
presented in diagrams on double pages) and the problem-related, detailed
and explanatory perspective (per chapter one detailed review by an expert);
thus, it updates the various data and indicators first gathered in the Reports
from 2000 and 2004.
Through the new orientation towards comparison with other countries,
the Social Report 2008 distinguishes itself fundamentally from its predeces-
sors. Apart from the collection and preparation of the data and indicators
for the selected countries, a considerable part of the indicators (about one-
third) were conceived completely anew, partly for reasons of international
comparability of the data, partly as a result of the availability of new scientific
studies and surveys. Thus, the Social Report 2008 also contains new thematic
modules, like for instance the indicators on language use and competence in
18
foreign languages in the chapter on Cultural Diversity, or the indicators on

voluntary work in the chapter on Social Integration. Furthermore, the short
commentaries on the indicators have been rewritten. Finally, the detailed
reviews have been reorientated as regards topic and discipline: in the choice
of topics and experts, care was taken to fill any existing thematic gaps, to
make available any new data and analyses from similar comparative surveys
and, in contrast to the previous Reports, to include not only other authors,
but also new disciplines.
With the Social Report 2008, scientifically based social reporting in Swit-
zerland has been further institutionalised. The collection, preparation and
analysis of the data for this Report was carried out within the framework of
cooperation between the Sociological Institute of the University of Neuchâtel
and the Swiss Foundation for Research in Social Sciences FORS.
The Social Report 2008 is the result of a collective undertaking in which
all six members of the editing team were involved: review, selection, prepara-
tion, analysis, graphical preparation, interpretation and documentation of
the indicators were conceived, debated, worked out, modified and finalised
together. The individual authors responsible are Pascale Gazareth (Editing),
Dominique Joye (Synthesis, Editing), Ursina Kuhn (Abbreviations, Editing),
René Levy (Commentaries on the indicators, Glossary), Silvia Perrenoud
(Editing) and Christian Suter (Introduction, Editing).
International comparison
In what way does Switzerland vary from other countries? Various surveys
carried out in the last few years indicate that Switzerland has lost its often
claimed ‘status’ as a special case (if indeed it ever had it!). But how exactly
have the various differences changed in recent years – in which areas is there
convergence, in which divergence?
Methods of international comparison play an increasingly important
role in the social sciences – and particularly in sociology and political sci-
ence. In the international comparison a certain fact is examined in different
political, spatial and institutional contexts (cf. Przeworski and Teune, 1970;
Kohn, 1987; Ragin, 1987; Immerfall, 1994). In the case of Switzerland,
the international perspective appears to be particularly productive, not only
because of its cultural diversity and political peculiarity, but also on account
of the simultaneous linguistic and cultural relationships with the bordering
countries.
The choice of countries in the international comparison is orientated,
on the one hand, on their significance for Switzerland and their vicinity to
19
it (in the sense of their linguistic and cultural relationship). On the other
hand, international diversity and institutional variety is to be covered where
possible by ‘typical’ cases. Based on the country typologies developed within
comparative welfare state research, (see in particular Esping-Andersen 1990,
1998), it is advisable to take into consideration not only the central European
countries with the conservative welfare state type (e.g. Germany, France,
Austria, Belgium), but also representatives of the liberal model (e.g. Great
Britain, the USA), the comprehensive welfare state regimes influenced by
social democracy in the Scandinavian countries (e.g. Sweden) and the very
rudimentary welfare schemes in southern Europe (e.g. Spain).2
As the number of possible countries for comparison has to be limited for
reasons of presentation and space, the following six countries were selected
for the comparison: Germany, France, Great Britain, Sweden, Spain and
the USA. In individual cases and where appropriate as to content, further
countries were included. For example, for the indicators on language and
foreign-language use, Belgium was also considered as it provides an interest-
ing case for comparison because of its multilingualism.
Time framework
The Social Report 2008 covers the second half of the 20th century and the first
years after the turn of the century, with current data up to 2007. From the
economic viewpoint, this period includes the long boom in the fifties, sixties
and early seventies, the two short recessions of 1975–1976 and 1982–1983,
the economic high in the eighties, the long phase of recession and stagnation
in the nineties (for Switzerland the longest since the Second World War) and
the economic recovery from the end of the nineties.
The exact point in time denoting the beginning of an indicator depends
mostly on the availability of the respective data. Thus, some economic data
(e.g. economic sectors) and political data (e.g. election and voting participa-
tion) are available for the first half of the 20th century (or even earlier), and
diverse aggregate ‘objective’ indicators (like for instance statistics on marriage
and divorce) can also be traced back to the fifties and sixties. Such long time
periods are important for the analysis of social change, because social processes
of transformation often occur not abruptly, but continuously and in small,
almost unperceivable steps, so that they become visible only after several
2 Interestingly, the various typologies and authors do not classify Switzerland in
the same way – Switzerland appears to be a hybrid, or a mixture of a liberal and
a conservative model, whereby the conservative elements became stronger in the
eighties and nineties (cf. also Nollert, 2006).
20
years – or even decades – have passed. From the sociological viewpoint, the
indicators that reach back into the sixties are particularly useful, because the
processes of individualisation and pluralisation in society from the early seven-
ties brought about fundamental social transformation. Many individual data
– particularly the data from several large repetitive population surveys – are,
however, available only from the nineties. This applies especially to individual
data which were collected by international surveys. The combined analysis of
development over time and the international comparison is, therefore, usually
limited to the last 5–8 years. This means that only very short-term processes
of change can be presented in this combined analysis.
Data bases used

Scientifically based social reporting, which is the aim of the Social Report,
is dependent on a comprehensive data base which fulfils demanding criteria
as regards quality. Of central importance here are continuous investigations
and population surveys – only on this basis can reliable knowledge on social
change be gained. Apart from repeated, representative, cross-sectional sur-
veys, which are carried out at regular intervals, longitudinal studies are of
particular interest, for instance in the form of household panel surveys. For
an investigation that compares data over time and between countries, as is
the intention in the Social Report 2008, international comparative studies
are necessary in addition to the comparison over time. In the past few years
– thanks to Switzerland’s participation in various international surveys – the
situation regarding data has now considerably improved. A more complex,
simultaneous comparison over time and between countries on the basis of
individual data can, however, only be realised in exceptional cases, or merely
for the comparatively short time period from the late nineties onwards.
The selection of the data used in the Social Report 2008 was based on the
above-mentioned criteria, i.e. on the scientific quality of the data (quality of
the survey and of the instruments used, documentation, representativity, etc.),
the continuity and periodicity or regularity of the survey (long sequences),
the actuality (data on the newest developments) and the international com-
parability (data for the selected countries). Various criteria for each indicator
or theme had to be weighed against each other, in order to obtain optimum
data quality, continuity, actuality and international comparability.
In particular, five groups of surveys and data bases were used (for details,
see the notes in the indicator section and on the CD-ROM):
– Longitudinal and repeated cross-sectional surveys comparing countries on
21
the level of individual data, especially: the European Social Survey (ESS;
or the U.S. ‘Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy’ Survey, US-CID for
the USA) and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP);
– Time series comparing countries on the level of aggregate data, especially
data from: the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Eurostat, the International Labour Office (ILO), the United
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE);
– Swiss longitudinal studies and repeated cross-sectional data on the in-
dividual level, especially: the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), the Swiss
Labour Force Survey (SLFS), the Federal Population Census, the Swiss
Electoral Studies (Selects), the survey on Transitions from Education to
Employment (TREE), the surveys for Measurement and Observation of
Social Attitudes in Switzerland (MOSAiCH), the Survey on Income and
Consumption of Households, the Employment Statistics (ES);
– Swiss time series on the level of aggregate data, especially data from: the
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (Seco), the Federal Office for the
Environment (FOEN), the Federal Chancellery, the Swiss Federal Tax
Administration;
– Swiss studies on specific topics (detailed reviews), especially the following:
Linguistic Competence of the Adult Population in Switzerland (linguadult.
ch), the Swiss Volunteering Monitor, the Swiss Survey on the Environ-
ment.
Structure and organisation of the Report

Firstly, the Social Report 2008 is organised into five core areas, each cor-
responding to a chapter. Secondly, it reflects two varying perspectives: one
is indicator-driven and descriptive, the other problem-specific, detailed and
explanatory. For each of the five core areas – distribution of social goods,
cultural diversity, social integration, political shaping, environment and so-
ciety – the 15 indicators are presented on a double page with diagrams and a
short commentary. The detailed reviews by experts in the relative fields follow
immediately after the corresponding indicator section. These detailed reviews
focus on specific subtopics within the chapter concerned.
The chapter on the Distribution of Social Goods deals with the unequal
distribution of principal economic and social goods and chances in today’s
society – this includes particularly educational resources, occupational posi-
tioning and income. These three aspects are first described in the indicator
22
section showing the various data and characteristics. The detailed review3
by Thomas Meyer concentrates on specific aspects of educational inequality,
particularly the difficulties and barriers with which children and young people
are confronted on their way to an educational diploma at the Upper Second-
ary Level (Apprenticeship, Matura etc.). The review comes to the conclusion
that, among other things, the Swiss educational system is marked by a high
level of inequality and, because of the way it functions, the significance of
social origin for educational success is not diminishing, rather – just the op-
posite – it is being reinforced.
The chapter on Cultural Diversity deals with the ethnic, linguistic and
religious composition of the Swiss population, as well as their cultural and
leisure-time activities and the differences and inequalities connected with
these. The indicator section is divided into four groups: the first concerns
migration, the second multilingualism, the third religious affiliation and the
fourth leisure-time activities. The review4 by Georges Lüdi and Iwar Werlen
documents individual multilingualism in Switzerland based on the new
language survey linguadult.ch. The authors examine competence in and the
use of foreign languages in the Swiss population, including, among other
things, the role of the regional language in the integration of migrants and the
growing importance of English as a foreign language, which – as the authors
demonstrate – is not at the expense of French or German.
In the chapter on Social Integration, the degree and form of social integration
are described. In the indicator section, four aspects are distinguished: social
integration in the micro-area of partnership and family, social integration and
disintegration in the area of welfare state security, social integration within
the framework of voluntary work as well as disintegration or deviance in the
area of crime. The detailed review5 by Markus Freitag and Isabelle Stadelmann-
Steffen deals with voluntary commitment on the basis of the Swiss Volunteering
Monitor and documents the varying voluntary-work cultures in the different
language regions of Switzerland. The authors come to the conclusion that in
this respect the Swiss language regions differ from each other more strongly
than from the bordering language-related countries.
The chapter on Political Shaping looks at the way in which political
interests are articulated and organised and how the political processes and
institutions function. The political life of Switzerland is represented, firstly,
by three indicator groups: the subjective evaluations and opinions of the
population, the forms of political interest articulation of the population, and
3 This review is included in the German and French editions only.

23
various indicators on the relation between the political elite and the popula-
tion. The detailed review6 by Marco Giugni and Pascal Sciarini examines two
important changes which appear to be taking place at present in Swiss politics,
i.e. polarisation and politicisation, against the background of new political
cleavages (like those between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in globalisation). The
authors demonstrate various aspects of growing polarisation, both in the
population as well as in the political elite. As regards politicisation, no clear
empirical tendencies can be observed according to their analyses.
The chapter on Environment and Society considers people’s dealings with
their natural environment and natural resources. The indicator section de-
scribes, on the one side, the ‘objective’ pressure on the environment through
human beings (traffic, energy, countryside, water, air) and, on the other side,
the ‘subjective’ perception of problems in the Swiss population and commit-
ment to environmental concerns. The detailed review7 by Andreas Diekmann
and Reto Meyer examines the changes over time in environmental awareness
and behaviour from 1994 to 2007, based on the Swiss Survey on the Environ-
ment. The authors show that environmental awareness has not diminished
in recent years and that a high level of awareness results in environmentally
friendly behaviour and support for environmental measures.
In the last chapter, the most important results and conclusions of the
Social Report are brought together in the form of a synthesis.
Finally, there are various lists which aim to help readers find direct ac-
cess to a specific topic. At the beginning there is a List of all 75 indicators
(grouped according to the chapter concerned) and a list of the Abbreviations
used. Thematic and statistical terms are explained in the Glossary at the end.
Comments, definitions and sources for the indicators used can be found in
the indicator section below the short commentaries – for reasons of space,
however, these are partly in shortened form – the enclosed CD-ROM contains
all details. The References can be found at the end of the book.8

8 At the end of the detailed reviews in the German and French editions, there are
three or four additional references, with brief comments, for further reading.
24
Indicators
Unequal distribution of social goods is a fundamental characteristic of social
structure, whatever the nature of those goods – material (consumer goods,
capital), symbolic (knowledge, cultural competencies), relational (network of
social relationships) or positional (hierarchical position in organisations, e.g.,
in a firm). The processes that strengthen or diminish inequalities are among
the most important and controversial, especially in democratic societies, be-
cause they are directly related to having and exercising power. Theoretically,
a great number of social goods may be of particular importance. However, a
small selection is enough to give an adequate idea of social structure, since the
main goods are distributed not in an independent way, but, on the contrary,
in one that links them together – thus creating the phenomenon of social
stratification. This is particularly obvious for those goods that are part of the
nucleus of stratification in contemporary societies: social origin, education,
occupational position, income and wealth. Thus, the social condition of a
person, of a family or group, is largely fixed by the set of social goods they
have at their disposal.
The indicators in this chapter, therefore, concentrate on the ‘hard core’
of this nucleus, i.e., the triad of: firstly education (Post-compulsory education,
Educational attainment of the population, Educational inheritance and homogamy,
and Further education), secondly occupational positioning (Change of sectors
and industries, Employment, Full-time and part-time employment, Entry into
working life, Working conditions, Unemployment, Socio-demographic profile of
unemployment, and Long-term unemployment), and thirdly income and wealth
(Occupational earnings, Wage levels and wage differences, and Household income,
the latter including the distribution of household wealth).
25
Indicators
Post-compulsory education
Continuing one’s education after compulsory schooling is actually considered
a prerequisite for good opportunities when entering the job market. People
with no post-compulsory education or training are poor in educational
terms; they have to face precarious working conditions and a higher risk of
unemployment.
The percentage of young women and men who have post-compulsory-
schooling diplomas is quite high and is rising again after a period of reduction.
Vocational training without the ‘matura’ (the university entrance qualifica-
tion) principally consists of an apprenticeship, which prevails numerically
although its proportion is on the decrease. Attendance at higher vocational
schools as well as non-vocational, general schools of upper secondary level
is increasing. During the eighties, women practically caught up with men
on the apprenticeship level and even surpassed them in the ‘matura’ classes.
The main gender difference that remains is that a higher proportion of men
completes vocational training, whereas women choose more general forms
of education. In the younger generations, almost two-thirds of the women
and slightly more than three-quarters of the men attain the level of qualified
worker or employee, about a fifth gets the ‘matura’ which is the entry ticket
to university. The educational and work-entry trajectories of the young men
and women who completed their compulsory education in 2000 diverge
more with each subsequent year; a longer period of education results in a
more favourable labour-market entry.
In the international comparison, the level in Switzerland is relatively
modest, only the United Kingdom reports an even smaller proportion of
20–24 year olds who still participate in the educational system; the figures
for Germany, which has the same dual system of vocational training as Swit-
zerland, are higher.
Definitions/comments
Upper diagram: Post-compulsory education attainment: education attainment after compulsory schooling
(lower secondary level or 9th school year). Details: see CD.
Middle diagram: cohort which completed compulsory schooling in 2000: students who completed compul-
sory schooling in 2000.
Educational levels: upper secondary (ISCED 3–4): vocational (apprenticeship, vocational matura), gene-
ral: (matura, other general education); tertiary: ISCED 5–6 (university, other tertiary).
Sample size: TREE: 5532 (2001) to 4138 (2006); weighted data.
Source: upper diagram: SFSO, indicators of education; middle diagram: TREE 2001–2006; lower dia-
gram: OECD, Education at a Glance 2005.
26
Post-compulsory educational attainment of 20 year-old women and men 1990–2005

Women Men
100%
'Matura' 80% 'Matura'

General education
General education (without 'Matura') Professional
(without 'Matura') Professional 60% 'Matura'
'Matura'
40%
Vocational training Vocational training
(without prof. 'Matura') (without prof. 'Matura')
20%
0%
1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005
Educational status of the cohort which completed compulsory schooling

in 2000 by sex in %
Women Men
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
No longer in education No longer in education Gap year, practical In education: In education: upper In education:
without upper sec. att. with upper sec. att. training, other upper sec. general sec. vocational tertiary level
20 to 24 year-olds by educational status, sex and country 2003

60%
Still in education No longer in education, Women
without upper sec. attainment Men
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
FR SE ES DE US (2002) CH UK
Source: SFSO, TREE, OECD
27
Indicators
Educational attainment of the population

One simple measure of educational inequalities is the proportion of the
population that achieves a high level of education (university, university of
applied sciences). According to this criterion, the international differences are
considerable, along with differences according to age and sex. In the ranking
based on the percentage of women who achieve the highest educational level,
Sweden’s score is twice as high as that of Germany. Differences between the
sexes are particularly strong in Germany and Switzerland; in all countries the
educational level increases from one age group to the next.
One of the important factors of success at school is closeness to the major-
ity culture in the context where one lives, as well as the duration of school
attendance and residence in the country of immigration. The age differences
in education level, therefore, vary according to pupils’ nationality, and the
proportion of people with a low level of schooling falls with decreasing age;
for the Swiss and the immigrants from ‘northern’ countries it is low among
the older groups as well. Among immigrants from Italy and Spain, this per-
centage comes close to that of the Swiss and the ‘northern’ immigrants with
decreasing age, whereas for Portuguese and Turkish immigrants and those
from the former Yugoslavian countries it diminishes only little between
consecutive age groups. Measured by their school achievements, integration
seems to have succeeded with the first group of immigrants, less so with the
second, but given the shorter period of residence and school attendance in
Switzerland, it is likely that this will change in the future (most immigrants
from Portugal arrived more recently than those from Spain and the propor-
tion of adolescents who continue their education in Switzerland after having
attended school abroad is greater).
Educational levels: low: ISCED 0–2 (compulsory schooling, pre-vocational education);
high: ISCED 5–6 (university, other tertiary).
Sample size: SLFS 2006: 48313; weighted data.
Source: upper diagram: OECD, Education at a Glance 2005; lower diagram: SFSO, SLFS.
28
Proportion of women and men with high education by age and country 2004
Women Men
25–34 years
35–44 years SE
45–54 years
55–64 years
ES
US
FR
UK
CH
DE
50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Percentage of the resident population in Switzerland with low education

by nationality and age 2006
80%
Portugal,
70% Turkey,
Former Yugoslavia
60% Italy,
Spain
50%
40%
30%
20%
Switzerland
Schweiz
Germany,
10% Austria,
France
0%
65 years and over 55–64 years 40–54 years 25–39 years
Source: OECD, SFSO
29
Indicators
Educational inheritance and homogamy

As in other countries, education is the most consequential ‘distributor’ of
young people in the Swiss system of inequalities. That is why the question
as to what extent the educational success of one generation depends on the
educational level of its parents is so important. The Swiss educational system
has been regularly extended over the past decades. Nevertheless, educational
inheritance is not receding: the higher the educational level of the parents,
the higher is, as ever, that of their children.
In all countries, reproduction of educational inequalities prevails, i.e., most
people attain the same level as their parents. The expansion of the educational
system is reflected solely by the fact that upward mobility is more frequent
than downward mobility. Men climb to educational heights more often than
women (except in France and Sweden). Consequently, educational gender
inequality still exists on the higher levels, although women have caught up
with men on the lower and middle levels.
Some countries show large differences between age groups, especially
Spain, where the younger age groups are more often upwardly mobile than
the older ones. The situation is similar in the United Kingdom and France;
in Switzerland and Germany age differences are insignificant, whereas in
Sweden, the intermediate age group shows most educational advancement.
In all countries educational decline is rare.
Another mechanism that transfers unequal social positions from one
generation to another is homogamy, marriage between people with the same
social positions. Similar to intergenerational reproduction, homogamy pre-
vails in all countries in this comparison. Second is usually female hypergamy
(except in France and Sweden), i.e., marriage of a woman with a man who
has a higher educational level.
Upper and middle diagrams: ascending mobility: person is better educated than the parent (father or
mother) with the higher education.
Lower diagram: hypergamy: the woman has a lower educational level than her partner; hypogamy: the
woman has a higher educational level than her partner; homogamy: the woman and her partner have
the same educational level.
All diagrams: calculations are based on the comparison of three educational levels: low: ISCED 0–2
(compulsory schooling, pre-vocational education); intermediate: ISCED 3–4 (apprenticeship, matura);
Sample size: ESS 2006: 1804–2916; weighted data, only people 25 and older.
Source: ESS 2006.
30
Educational inheritance 2006

By sex and country
100%
Stability Women
Ascending mobility Men
80% Descending mobility
60%
40%
20%
0%
ES DE CH UK FR SE
By age and country

100%
Stability 25–39 years
Ascending mobility 40–59 years
80% Descending mobility 60+ years
60%
40%
20%
0%
ES DE CH UK FR SE
Educational homogamy of women who live with a partner by country 2006

100% Hypo-
gamy
Hyper-
80% gamy
60%
40%
Homo-
gamy
20%
0%
ES DE CH UK FR SE
Source: ESS 2006
31
Indicators
Further education
The permeability of an educational system can be measured in various ways:
firstly, by the extent to which the initial educational level of one generation
depends on that of its parents (indicator of Educational inheritance and
homogamy), and, secondly, by the opportunities available to increase that
initial level through further education. The past few years show that there is
a decreasing tendency to make use of these possibilities.
Most of those who participate in further education (FE) are in employment,
a similar proportion is unemployed, but only few are non-employed (married
women and retired people). This is true particularly for vocational FE; other
kinds of FE are significantly less common and show fewer differences.
FE is clearly more popular among better educated people and is particu-
larly rare among those with no more than the compulsory schooling. On
higher levels, something like a ceiling appears: there are almost no differences
between people with the ‘matura’, a university degree or a higher vocational
qualification – they all show roughly the same, maximal frequency of FE.
However, the tendency to make use of these opportunities is decreasing here
as well.
Differences according to further education exist in all countries (com-
parison restricted to employed people), and almost everywhere there is a
difference between informal (maximum) and formal (minimal) FE. France,
Switzerland and Sweden have about the same frequency, in Spain FE is
particularly rare.
Overall, then, FE seems to be deeply embedded in the occupational area.
Moreover, it is acquired according to a cumulative logic, i.e., it does not serve
to compensate low educational levels, but to reinforce higher ones already
achieved. Thus, contrary to expectations, FE appears to be instrumental in
the reproduction of inequalities.
Further education: in the last 12 months.
Lower diagram: formal: complete (new) course of education or training; non-formal: isolated courses or
modules, conferences, other taught activities; informal: self-learning without teacher/pupil relationship
(autodidact, reading, etc.).
intermediate: ISCED 3–4 (apprenticeship, matura); high: ISCED 5–6 (university, other tertiary).
Sample size: SLFS: minimum 16000 per year.
Source: upper four diagrams: SFSO, SLFS; lower diagram: Eurostat, NewCronos.
32
Further education 1996–2006 Further education by purpose 2006

Population aged 20–74 years Population aged 20–74 years
by economic activity status by economic activity status
70% 70%
Employed
60% 60%
Unemployed
50% 50% Econ. inactive
Employed
40% 40%
Unemployed
30% 30%
20% 20%
Econ. inactive
10% 10%
0% 0%
1996 1999 2003 2006 Professionnal Professionnal Non professionnal
only and non prof. only
25–64 year-olds in employment 25–64 year-olds in employment

by education by education
70% 70%
'Matura', etc. Higher
vocational Low education
60% 60%
training Intermediate
University
50% University of applied science 50% High education
40% Apprenticeship 40%
30% 30%
20% 20%
Compulsory schooling
10% 10%
0% 0%
1996 1999 2003 2006 Professionnal Professionnal Non professionnal
only and non prof. only
Further education of 25–64 year-olds in employment by type, education and country 2003
100%
Informal Low education
Non-formal Intermediate
Formal High education
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
FR SE CH DE ES UK
Source: SFSO, Eurostat
33
Indicators
Change of sectors and industries

In the course of the twentieth century there was a massive change in the
sectorial structure of Switzerland’s economy. Starting early in the nineteenth
century, the industrial sector developed rapidly, at the expense of the agricul-
tural sector. During the fifties of the twentieth century, the strong upswing
in the service sector began; its growth lasts to the present day and justifies
talk of a post-industrial society. The decline in employment in industry (its
proportion plunged below that of services in the early seventies) has been
largely compensated by the increase in tertiary employment. It must be added
that industry’s contribution to the gross domestic product has diminished
much less than its proportion of employment, as at the same time consider-
able advances were made in productivity through rationalisation. Thanks to
the generalised introduction of computers since the late eighties, the same
is true for services.
During the past fifteen years, the decrease in employment was not the same
in all subdivisions of the secondary sector (industry). It was less important,
for example, in the publishing and printing industry than in the machine
industry or in construction. Equally, the increase in the service sector is not
identical in all subsectors, thus the educational system expanded considerably
less than health and social services or sectors like real estate or computers.
All the countries in this comparison have developed along similar lines
since 1950, but not synchronically: until the middle of the twentieth century,
industry and services grew in parallel at the expense of agriculture (also of
fishing and forestry in some countries). In the second stage, the employment
rate in industry started to decrease while that of services still continues to
grow. In Switzerland, the importance of industry in employment terms had
become particularly striking (at its maximum second only to Germany and
the United Kingdom); the present increase in services is also significant.
Source: upper diagram: SFSO: Employment statistics (ES), SLFS, Swiss Wage Index; Seco: unemploy-
ment statistics; middle two diagrams: SFSO, ES; lower left diagram: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics
1954 (14th edition), 1958 (18th edition) und 1968 (28th edition); ILO, Laborsta; Kneschaurek (1964);
lower right diagram: ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 5th edition.
34
Percentage of employees in the three economic sectors 1960–2006

80%
Services
70%
60%
50%
40%
Industry
30%
20%
10% Agriculture and forestry
0%
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Increase and decrease in employment in certain economic subsectors 1991–2006

Industry Services
15% 15%
Health and social work
10% 10%
Building industry
Real Estate, Rental, IT
Teaching
5% 5%
Machine industry
Publishing/printing trade, photocopying

0% 0%
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05
Employees in industry and services in % by country

1950–2005 (CH from 1800) 2005
80% 80%
2005
Services
60% 60%
UK (without North.
SE Ireland)
Services
(from 1965) 1950

40% 40%
1950 DE (before 1991
only West G.)
20%
CH 20%
Industry
1800
0%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 0%
Industry US UK SE CH FR DE ES
Source: SFSO, ILO, Kneschaurek
35
Indicators
Employment
The employment rates for men and women seem to be converging. That for
men is slowly sinking from a high level, that for women is rising quickly, but
from a low starting point. Today, the female rate lies 15 percent lower than
the male one. Foreign men and in a larger part foreign women are employed
to a higher degree than the Swiss; working migrants make up a large part of
the immigration to Switzerland.
The prohibition of child labour and compulsory schooling, on the one
hand, and the official retirement age on the other tie people’s occupational
involvement to their age, but that is not so surprising. More important are the
gender differences in these trajectories. They reflect the fact that the burden
of family work (especially childcare) is still largely carried by women. Inter-
rupting or even completely withdrawing from paid employment are regular
ingredients of women’s occupational trajectories, but are rare exceptions in
men’s. Between 1990 and 2006, the employment rate for women increased
considerably and women began to withdraw from the labour force again at
a later age, although still earlier than men. The differences according to the
family situation confirm that the amount of childcare required (established by
the presence of children in a household and by their age) is a decisive factor
for the differing sex-specific occupational trajectories and rates.
The international comparison allows us to identify three patterns in female
occupational trajectories: firstly, incompatibility of marriage and employ-
ment (early and lasting reduction in female employment – Spain), secondly,
incompatibility of maternity and employment (reduction in the rate during
the years when childcare is particularly important – United Kingdom, France,
Germany, Switzerland), thirdly, compatibility (same trajectories for men and
women – Sweden).
Upper and middle right diagrams: employment rate: proportion of people in employment in the perma-
nent resident population aged 15 to 64 years old.
Middle left and lower diagrams: activity rate: proportion of economically active persons (in employment
and unemployed) in the permanent resident population aged 15 years old and over.
Lower diagram: 5-year age categories (15–19, 20–24, …, 60–64, 65–69, 70 years and over).
Sample size: SLFS: minimum 16000 per year.
Source: upper diagram: SFSO: Employment statistics, SLFS; middle right diagram: SFSO, SLFS; middle
right and lower diagrams: UNECE.
36
Employment rate by sex and nationality 1980–2007

100%
Foreign men
80%
Swiss men
60%
Foreign women
40%
Swiss women
20%
0%
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Activity rate by sex and age Employment rate by sex

1990 and 2006 and family situation 1991 and 2007
100% 100%
Men
Men 2006 1990
80% 80%
Women 2006
60% 60%
Women 1990
40% 40%
20% 20%
Men 1991
Women 2007
0% 0%
15–19 25–29 35–39 45–49 55–59 65–69 With children With children Without children
20–24 30–34 40–44 50–54 60–64 0–6 years old 7–14 years old under 15
Activity rate by sex, age and country 2006

100%
Men Men Men
80%
Women Women Women
60%
40% CH
70+
20%
15–19
25–29
35–39
45–49
55–59
0% DE FR
100% Men Men Men
80%
Women Women Women
60%
40%
20%
0% ES SE UK
Source: SFSO, UNECE
37
Indicators
Full-time and part-time employment

Standard employment conditions (i.e. full-time employment, an unlimited
labour contract, a fixed work schedule without night-work or work at week-
ends) still prevail numerically, but in recent decades employment outside this
norm has grown substantially.
The proportion of full-time employees is steadily decreasing. The curve
for men (with no difference between Swiss and foreigners) lies clearly above
that for women, although foreign women are more often employed full-time
than Swiss women. The advance in part-time work hardly concerns men at
all, but more than half of Swiss female employees work part-time.
With increasing age the proportion of full-time employment decreases,
particularly among women. The reason for this is twofold: women do the
bulk of family work (see the indicators of Role distribution in couples and
Employment) and the combination of employment and family work is only
rarely supported by extra-familial institutions in Switzerland. The transition
to retirement is another important reason for part-time work.
The relationship between part-time employment and age exists for women
particularly in Switzerland and Germany, in the other countries women
more often return to full-time employment. Nevertheless, the proportion of
women’s part-time work is clearly higher than men’s everywhere.
The problems relating to work-family compatibility are experienced by
many. Employment is more often felt to be a disturbance for the family rather
than the reverse; this is the case more frequently among men than women;
the exception is Sweden, which has oriented its labour and family policies
more consistently towards gender equality than other countries.
Proportion of people working full-time or part-time (min. 1 hour per week) as a percentage of the
people in employment in the respective population groups.
Upper left diagram: full-time employment: minimum 90% of a full-time job.
Middle diagram: part-time employment: 1–30 hours per week.
Lower diagram: question wording: ‘How often do you feel that the demands of your job interfere with
your family life?’; ‘How often do you feel that the demands of your family life interfere with your
job?’ Percentages correspond to respondents who indicated ‘always’ or ‘often’ (other answer categories:
‘sometimes’, ‘hardly ever’, ‘never’).
Sample size: SLFS: minimum 16000 per year; ISSP: 913–1701; weighted data.
Source: upper two diagrams: SFSO, SLFS; middle diagram: OECD, OECD. Stat; lower diagram: ISSP
2005.
38
Full-time employment by sex Women's level of employment

and nationality 1991–2007 by age 2007
100% 80%
Men (Swiss and foreigners) 90–100%
70%
60%
80% Men and women (Swiss and foreigners)
50%
40%
30%
60% 50–69%
Foreign women
20%
20–49%
70–89%
10%
Swiss women < 20%
40% 0%
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 15–24 40–54 65+
25–39 55–64
Part-time employment by sex, age and country 2006

60% Women 15–24 years
Men 25–54 years
50% 55–64 years
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
CH UK DE SE US ES FR
Work-life balance by sex and country 2005

30% Job interferes with family life Women
Family life interferes with job Men
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
*without Northern Ireland
0%
FR UK* DE SE US CH ES
Source: SFSO, OECD, ISSP 2005
39
Indicators
Entry into working life

After the period of compulsory schooling, many young people (more than
ninety percent of a cohort) continue their education, so that entry into work-
ing life sets in progressively from the third post-compulsory year onwards.
Even after six years, only slightly more than half of the cohort has realised
its entry into the job market, and a small percentage continues some educa-
tion parallel to main employment. Nine percent are jobless (unemployed or
neither in employment nor in education or training).
In the international comparison, the French case is exceptional; men and
women in the youngest age group are very rarely employed because education
lasts longer. Moreover, even in the young age groups that are considered here,
female employment rates are systematically below men’s, although women
do not remain longer in education. Finally, the trajectories of the 25–29
year-olds indicate that in most countries entry into working life has become
more difficult for the young; this was especially the case between 1991 and
2001 (see indicator Transition into adulthood).
Upper left diagram: young people are considered as being in employment when they are mainly or
exclusively in employment (without students with a job alongside their studies).
Lower diagram: employment: minimum one hour per week in employment.
Sample size: TREE: 5532 (2001) to 4138 (2006); weighted data.
Source: upper two diagrams: TREE 2001–2006; lower diagram: OECD, OECD.Stat.
40
Transition from school to work for the cohort which completed compulsory schooling in 2000
Number of years after compulsory schooling By economic activity status 2006

(2001–2006)
100% Neither in Unemployed
employment Only in
nor in employment
80% education
6%
In education/ 3%
training
60%
Only in
education 48%
27%
40%
11% 5%
20%
In education,
In employment partly in In employment,
employment partly in education
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6
Year
Employment of 15 to 29 year-olds by sex and country 1991–2006*

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40% Women Men

25–29 y.
30% 20–24 y.
15–19 y.
20%
10%
* Years 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006
0%
UK CH FR US ES SE DE
Source: TREE, OECD
41
Indicators
Working conditions
The quality of life at work is a central aspect of both the general quality of
life and human dignity. Security and satisfaction are two especially impor-
tant elements, and they have improved considerably in recent years. This is
rather less pronounced in the other countries in this comparison – a similar
improvement can be found only in the United Kingdom, and France even
shows signs of regression.
Both elements are strongly related to hierarchical position: in all countries
they are significantly more favourable for people with supervisory functions
than for those without.
Simultaneous consideration of other criteria produces a more detailed
image of the changes. Hard physical work and dangerous working conditions
are rather on the increase (exception: United Kingdom), exhaustion after
work and stress increase in some countries (Spain, stress also in the USA)
and decrease in others (Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, exhaustion also in the
USA). For all four criteria, Switzerland’s values are rather low. Overall, then,
working conditions appear to be comparatively good in Switzerland.
Upper and middle diagrams: satisfaction at work: index from 0 (no satisfaction) to 100 (max. satisfac-
tion) based on various questions about satisfaction with work income, opportunities for advancement,
interest in work, relations with colleagues and with managers. Employment security: index from 0 (no
security) to 100 (max. security) based on various questions about employment security and unemploy-
ment risk. Question wording: see CD.
Lower diagram: difficult working conditions: percentages correspond to respondents who are always or
often confronted with such working conditions. Question wording: see CD.
Sample size: ISSP: 1011–2518 (1997), 913–1701 (2005); weighted data, employed persons only.
Source: ISSP 1997 and 2005.
42
Working conditions by country 1997 and 2005

75
Employment security (max. = 100)
1997 2005
SE CH
US
70 DE
UK*
65 ES
60
FR
*without
Northern Ireland
55
45 50 55 60 65 70 75
Satisfaction at work (max. = 100)
Working conditions by supervisory function and country 2005

DE US
75 Without supervisory function
Employment security (max. = 100)
With supervisory function SE

CH
70 US
UK*
DE
ES
65
60
FR
*without
Northern Ireland
55
45 50 55 60 65 70 75
Satisfaction at work (max. = 100)
'Difficult working conditions' in percent by country 1997 and 2005

50% Exhausted after work
1997
Stress 2005
40%
30% Hard physical work
20%
10%
Dangerous conditions *without
Northern Ireland
0%
FR DE UK* US ES SE CH
Source: ISSP 1997, 2005
43
Indicators
Unemployment
The three direct measures of unemployment show the same pattern. The reces-
sion in the early nineties is clearly reflected in the figures which, after a very
low period up to 1990, increase rapidly to a level not reached in Switzerland
since the post-war period. The maximal value in 1997 is rapidly followed by
a decrease which is then transformed into a new increase, although it does
not reach the high level of the early nineties. From 2005 onwards, the rate
of unemployment diminishes again. The regression at the end of the nine-
ties was not, however, accompanied by an equal drop in underemployment.
Hence, the quality of the newly created jobs has deteriorated in comparison
with those already existing. Moreover, the relationship between the business
cycle and employment has tightened over the past twenty years.
Partial unemployment remains quite stable, that is, it is hardly influenced
by the business cycle – it depends on other factors that vary little in time
(e.g., small children in the household).
The variations in unemployment in Switzerland are largely parallel to
those in other Western countries, but on a much lower level. In Switzerland
and France, the long-term variations are more limited than, for instance, in
Spain.
Accordingly, the experience of unemployment is not equally distributed
between the countries, due among others things to institutional differences
(unemployment regulations, possibilities of further education, etc.). Again,
the Swiss figures are the lowest in the comparison.
Unemployed persons (international definition: SFSO and OECD): Persons who have no work, are seeking
a job and are ready to begin working. Registered unemployed persons (definition Seco): persons who are
registered with a regional placement office (RPO), have no work and are available for job placement.
Part-time unemployed persons: registered unemployed persons who are seeking a part-time job. Regis-
tered job seekers: all unemployed and non-unemployed people who are registered with a RPO and are
seeking a job. Underemployed persons: people working part-time who want to work more than they do.
Details: see CD.
Sample size: SLFS: min. 16000 per year; ESS 2006: 1804–2916; weighted data.
Source: upper diagram: Seco and SFSO, SLFS; middle diagram: OECD, OECD.Stat; lower diagram:
ESS 2006.
44
Unemployed and underemployed in % of the econ. active population 1980–2007

10%
Underemployed persons (SFSO)
8%
Registred
job seekers
(Seco)
6%
4% Unemployed persons
(international definition)
2% Registred unemployed persons Part-time unemployed

(Seco) persons (Seco)
0%
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Unemployed in % of econ. active population by country 1980–2006 (internat. definition)

20%
ES
15%
UK FR
10%
US
DE*
5%
SE CH *DE: before 1991
only West Germnay
0%
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Experience of unemployment: people affected in % of total population by country

40%
Unemployed at least once (up to 2006)
35%
Unemployed at least once between 2002 and 2006
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
FR ES DE SE UK CH
Source: Seco, SFSO, OECD, ESS 2006
45
Indicators
Socio-demographic profile of unemployment

Unemployment varies between men and women, and this difference also
varies between countries. The difference between the sexes is particularly
large in Spain, intermediate in France and the United Kingdom, small in
Switzerland and the other countries. There is a tendency for this difference
to decrease everywhere, but it remains open as to whether this is due to an
improvement in the business cycle or to more effective policies of equality.
Giving up paid work in favour of motherhood, which is typical, for women
(see the indicator Employment), is not regarded as unemployment and is
therefore not reflected in these figures.
The relationship between unemployment and age varies greatly between
countries, age differences are large in Spain, France and Sweden, but small
in Switzerland and Germany. The younger age group is most threatened by
this fundamental social risk. This age group, which corresponds to the pe-
riod of job entry after initial training, seems also to be particularly affected
by market fluctuations, especially in France, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom, but increasingly in Switzerland too, and this turns job entry into
an unsettling experience. Differences according to education show the same
tendency in all countries: the higher the educational level, the lower the risk
of unemployment is.
Nationality influences this risk as well, with the same tendency every
where despite some differences: unemployment risk is lowest for nationals
(particularly in France) and highest for immigrants from outside the European
Union. The size of the difference between labour immigrants from within the
EU and those from outside varies between countries, most likely as a direct
function of the specific country’s labour market and social security laws.
Unemployment rate: using international definition (see indicator Unemployment).
Legend: in 1996 in Spain 30% of all women in the economically active population were unemployed.
Economically active population: people in employment and unemployed persons.
Lower diagram: EU countries: EU–15 (1996, 2001); EU–25 (2006).
Source: Eurostat, NewCronos.
46
By sex
50% 1996
Women
Men 2001
2006
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
ES FR SE DE UK CH
By age
50% 15–24 years 1996
25–49 years 2001
50–64 years 2006
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
ES FR SE DE UK CH
By nationality
50%
Nationals 1996
Non-nationals, from EU countries 2001
Non-nationals, from Non-EU countries 2006
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
ES FR SE DE UK CH
Source: Eurostat
47
Indicators
Long-term unemployment
Long-term unemployment develops, much like general unemployment, with
a lag of about one year, reflecting the way it is dealt with by the institutions.
The proportion of unemployed who have lost their right to benefits is quite
low, varies little, and seems to be relatively independent of the business cy-
cle. This proportion might well correspond to the unavoidable basic unem-
ployment postulated by many economists; its low level suggests that actual
unemployment, and especially its variation over time, cannot be explained
by this phenomenon.
Swiss figures are not particularly low in the international comparison;
Sweden and the USA with their very different systems of social security
have much lower numbers of long-term unemployed. The most spectacular
decreases in long-term unemployment can be found in Spain and the United
Kingdom.
The comparison of the two most important institutional definitions of
long-term unemployment shows that the restrictive (Seco) definition, based
on official registration, conceals considerable sex differences: for example,
the fact that women are more often affected by long-term unemployment
than men.
The age differences are hardly surprising, although the size of them is: long-
term unemployment is most frequent among older people and particularly
rare among the youngest. Obviously, the labour market places more weight
on being young and having fresh qualifications than on having experience.
Long-term unemployment: minimum one year unemployed, as a percentage of all unemployed persons.
Unemployed: definitions: see indicator Unemployment.
Out-of-payment (upper diagram): registered unemployed (definition Seco), whose right to unemploy-
ment benefits has expired.
Sample size: SLFS: min. 16000 per year.
Source: upper and middle diagrams: Seco and SFSO, SLFS; lower diagram: OECD, OECD.Stat.
48
Long-term unemployment in Switzerland

Development 1991–2007
50%
40% Long-term unemployed

in % of unemployed
(int. definition)
30% Long-term unemployed
in % of registered
unemployed (Seco)
20%
'Out-of-payment'
10% people in % of reg.
unemployed (Seco)
0%
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07
By sex 1991–2007 By age 1993–2006

50% 50%
Men Women 50 years and over
(int. (int.
definition) definition)
40% 40%
30% 30%
Men
(definition
Seco) 25–49 years
20% 20%
Women
(definition
10% Seco) 10%
15–24 years
0% 0%
91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 93 95 97 99 01 03 05
Long-term unemployment by country 1980–2005

70% *DE: before 1991
only West Germany
60%
ES
50%
DE*
40%
FR
30%
UK
20%
SE CH
10%
US
0%
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Source: Seco, SFSO, OECD
49
Indicators
Occupational earnings
The long-term comparison of nominal and real wage levels demonstrates the
usefulness of this distinction: during the almost 70 years since the start of the
series, the mean wage in francs has been multiplied by 21, whereas expressed
in terms of purchasing power its multiplicator is about three. Since the middle
of the seventies (‘oil crisis’) the increase in real wages has slowed down and
this development has been interrupted by three phases of stagnation. In the
international comparison, the average Swiss income (as regards purchasing
power) is today higher than in Sweden, France and Spain, but lower than in
the United Kingdom and Germany. In the United Kingdom particularly, a
considerable rise was recorded between 1998 and 2004. The often alleged
top position of Swiss wages exists only in nominal terms.
A similarly weak increase shows up in the comparison of income dis-
tribution for the self-employed (including farmers and artisans, but also
freelance professions etc.) between 1991 and 2007. The main concentration
lies in the low category of 40–50,000 francs per year. However, the very
wide range is characteristic of this heterogeneous social category that reports
incomes extending from less than ten thousand to several hundred thousand
and probably even millions. Global statistic do not show clear-cut changes.
In pharmaceuticals and banking, for instance, inequalities increased whilst
decreasing in other industries (e. g. publishing, hotels/restaurants) due partly
to successful union campains for a minimum wage-level.
The corresponding curve showing the wages of salaried people is much
more compact, with maximal frequency only slightly above that of the self-
employed.
Data on inequality between individual incomes ignore a more basic
tendency: the share of distributed economic value is being shifted from
labour to capital. With respect to the gross national income, the wage ratio
has decreased from 61 percent to 55 during the past 15 years, while capital
incomes (dividends etc.) have strongly increased.
Upper left diagram: real wages: wages of the respective year (adjusted for inflation; base 1939=100) as a
percentage of wages in 1939; nominal wages: wages (not adjusted for inflation) as a percentage of wages
in 1939.
Upper right diagram: full-time employees, industry and services only (without public sector).
Middle and lower diagrams: real annual net occupational earnings 1991, 1997, 2002 and 2007 in prices
of 1991 (adjusted with consumer price index).
Sample size: SLFS: min. 16000 per year.
Source: upper left diagram: SFSO, Swiss Wage Index; upper right diagram: Eurostat, NewCronos; middle
and lower diagrams: SFSO, SLFS.
50
Swiss Wage Index 1939–2006 Gross occ. earnings by country

1998 and 2004
2200 3500
Index Euro/month
1900 3000
1600 2500
1300 2000
Adjusted for purch. power 1998

Adjusted for purch. power 2004
1000 1500
Nominal
700 wages 1000
400 500
1939=100
100 Real wages 0
39 50 60 70 80 90 00 UK DE CH SE FR ES
Annual net occupational earnings in Switzerland 1991–2007 in francs of 1991
Self-employed (full-time)
30% 1991
% of self-employed incl. any
1997
25% collaborating
family member 2002
20% 2007
15%
10%
5%
0%
0
60 001–
00 –
00 –
00 –
0
00
00
11 001
16 001
21 001
0
00
00
00
10
50
00
50
0
1–
>2
10
15
20
Employees (full-time)
30% 1991
% of employees
1997
25%
2002
20% 2007
15%
10%
5%
0%
00
60 001–
00 –
00 –
00 –
00
11 001
16 001
21 001
0
0
0
00
00
00
10
50
00
50
0
1–
>2
10
15
20
51
Indicators
Wage levels and wage differences

Wage differences between men and women are not the same for all age groups;
the older the group, the larger the differences are. This may be partly due to
a decrease in gender-specific wage discrimination, but also to the historical
rise in women’s qualifications which increases their ability to get better-paid
positions, moreover to the fact that many initial jobs are located on lower
ranks and in strongly regulated positions leaving little room for sex-specific
wage differences, and finally to the life-course effect of occupational inter-
ruptions that lead women in the post-child stage to occupy lower positions
and to having little promotion opportunities.
The relationship between income and education is more or less the same
for men and women. Certain wage differences still exist on all educational
levels, indicating that the diminishing gender gap in qualification does not
suffice to explain the decrease in the wage gap. Moreover, this gap increases
in the higher positions of the hierarchy; in other words, the higher the oc-
cupational position, the larger the gender-specific wage gap is, despite the
same educational levels. Looking more closely at managerial positions (two
levels), there also appears to be a difference according to the type of diploma:
people with a ‘matura’ (non-vocational intermediate education qualification)
are better paid than those with higher vocational training – the latter, there-
fore, seems to have less market value.
The development of wage differences between men and women in the
international comparison shows a general tendency to decrease, especially in
France, but there the trend seems to have reversed in recent years. Switzerland
is among the countries with rather high gender-specific wage differences.
Upper four diagrams: wages: median of standardized monthly gross wages (full-time equivalent) in
francs. Median: 50% of wages are lower and 50% of wages are higher than the median wage.
Lower diagram: gender wage gap: difference between the median full-time wage of women and of men
expressed as a percentage of the median full-time wage of men.
Source: upper four diagrams: SFSO, LSE (wages structure survey); lower diagram: OECD, Society at a
Glance 2006.
52
Wage differences: median of monthly full-time gross wages 2006

All employees: Employees without management function:
by sex and age by sex and education
14000 14000
Fr. Fr.
12000 12000
10000 10000
8000 8000
Men
Men
6000 6000
Women Women
4000 4000
2000 2000
0 0
<20 years 30–39 50–64
20–29 40–49 65+ 1 2 3 4 5 6
Employees in lower management: Employees in middle and upper management:

by sex and education by sex and education
14000 14000
Fr. Fr.
12000 12000
10000 10000 Men

Men
8000 8000
Women
6000 6000
Women
4000 4000
2000 2000
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Without vocational qualification 4 Higher vocational qualif., technical college
2 With vocational qualification 5 University of applied sciences/college of education
3 'Matura' 6 University
Gender wage gap: Wage differences between men and women

in % of men's median wages 1980–2003
40%
US
35%
UK
30%
DE CH
25%
FR
20%
15%
SE
10%
5%
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003
Source: SFSO, OECD
53
Indicators
Household income
Inequality of income and wealth is a long-lasting source of conflict in modern
societies – not because mentalities are particularly focused on money, but
because, in a market economy, a person’s purchasing power is the dominant
factor for his or her well-being.
The curve reflects how unequally income and wealth are distributed; the
diagonal illustrates the fictitious situation of complete distributional equality.
As an example, the 25 percent of households with the lowest income have
about 10 percent of total income volume at their disposal. Wealth is distrib-
uted much more unequally than income, almost half of the households have
no significant wealth and the wealthiest five percent of households possess
about 40 percent of total wealth. Both distributions show no change during
the short period between 1997 and 2004 (but see indicator Occupational
earnings). There are considerable differences of inequality between some of
the cantons.
Income inequalities are related to other inequalities, such as those in
education (mediated by the occupational positions attainable on the basis of
one’s educational level, and their remuneration), and also to other elements
of a person’s situation, where (old) age, being a single parent, or a family with
several children, have a particularly negative effect on purchasing power.
In terms of income inequality, Switzerland is situated in the middle of
the range in this comparison. The tendency is towards higher inequality, but
the results of the two measures do not sufficiently coincide to make a clear
statement possible (the Gini index for Switzerland has decreased over the past
twenty years, while the quintile ratio is still increasing slightly) since they are
based on non-comparable data (see CD).
Net income and net wealth (natural persons): from Swiss federal tax administration.
Gini index: inequality measure varying between 0 (equality) and 1 (full inequality); see Glossary.
Equivalent household income: disposal household income (net income minus oblig. expences like taxes)
expressed as the equivalent of a one-person household. Details: see CD and Glossary.
Median: 50% of the incomes are lower and 50% of the incomes are higher than the median.
Sample size: EVE: 9295 (1998), 3087 (2005); weighted data.
Source: upper two diagrams: Swiss federal tax administration (SFTA); middle diagram: SFSO, EVE
(survey on income and consumption of households); lower two diagrams: LIS, Key figures.
54
Distribution of income Gini index of income and wealth

and wealth 2004 in eleven cantons 2003
100% 1.0
Net income
Wealth
Net wealth
Income/wealth cumulated
80% 0.8
60% 0.6
40% 0.4
Income
20% 0.2
0% 0.0
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% UR NE TI VD GR SZ
Tax payers cumulated AG BE ZH BS GE
Equivalent household income in percent of the median 1998 and 2005

By education By family situation
150%
1998
140% 2005
130%
120%
110%
100%
High education
90%
Couple (<65 years)

Single (<65 years)
Intermediate
80%
Family (1 child)
(3+ children)
(65+ years)
(65+ years)
70%
(2 children)
educ.
Couple
60%
Family
Family
parent
Single
Single
Low
50%
Gini index of net disposable Percentile ratio of household income:

household income richest 20% to poorest 20%
0.40 3.5
US
0.35
ES 3.0 US
0.30 UK
FR CH ES
UK
0.25 DE* SE 2.5
FR CH
0.20 DE*
2.0
0.15
SE
*before 2000 *before 2000
only West Germany only West Germany
0.10 1.5
Early 80's Early 90's 2000 Early 80's Early 90's 2000
Source: SFTA, SFSO, LIS
55
Cultural diversity
Indicators
Modern societies are increasingly marked by cultural diversity. Increased
migration and communication add new elements to those already existing,
as shown for example by the rising interest in non-European religions since
the seventies. This increasing ‘social biodiversity’ holds potential for both
enrichment and conflict, the latter being especially relevant if ethnic dif-
ferences are tied to social inequalities. It is, therefore, important to bear in
mind not only the various aspects of diversity, but also the possible correlates
of inequality.
We distinguish four groups of indicators. The first concerns the presence
of non-nationals (indicators: Profile of nationalities, Duration of stay and natu-
ralisations, Opinions on foreigners, Subjective criteria of national affiliation), the
second deals with multilingualism (indicators: Pupils’ languages, Competence
in foreign languages, Use of foreign languages, English at work), the third covers
religious affiliation (indicators: Denominations and non-religiousness, Religious
beliefs), the fourth refers to cultural and leisure activities (indicators: Use of
the media, Interest in political news, Leisure activities, Style preferences in the
home, and Sport).
57
Indicators
Profile of nationalities
It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that Switzerland became
an immigration country. Since then the volume of immigration, and with it
the proportion of non-nationals in the population, has depended above all
on the business cycle. During the twenty years of the post-war boom, it rose
steadily until official limitation was introduced in the seventies. After a slight
reduction, it rose again after 1980 and at present lies above twenty percent.
The number of second-generation foreigners who were born in Switzerland
has increased only slowly, partly because some have returned to the country of
origin, and partly because of naturalisation. Nevertheless, there is a significant
category of ‘secondos’, who grew up and went to school in Switzerland, but
who have not become Swiss citizens for various reasons. They represent five
percent of the population.
Countries of origin have changed, depending on the political and eco-
nomic situation. Immigrants come increasingly from more distant and less
industrialised countries; after important Italian immigration in the post-war
period, during which immigration from Germany, France and Austria di-
minished, the predominant country of origin was Spain, then Portugal, the
former Yugoslavian countries and Turkey, while the proportion of immigrants
from other parts of Europe varied little. In recent years immigration from
EU countries has increased again, especially from Germany.
The proportion of foreign-born residents in Switzerland has been one of
the highest in Europe for a long time, it is currently about twice as high as
the values shown for the next countries in our comparison. The trend is on
the increase in all of them.
Upper and middle diagrams: Foreign (resident) population: all residents in Switzerland without Swiss
nationality. Included are foreigners staying in Switzerland for at least 12 months (permits B, C and
partly L). Values 1980/1981 and 1990/1991 partially not comparable due to change of data source
(Census /PETRA).
Lower diagram: Including foreign-born nationals. Spain: percentage of people with foreign nationality.
Source: three upper diagrams: SFSO: Census, PETRA, ESPOP; lower diagram: OECD Factbook 2007.
58
Cultural diversity
Foreign population by country of birth in % of total population 1950–2007

25%
20%
Total
15%
Born in a foreign country
10%
5%
Born in Switzerland
0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2007
Foreign population by country of origin 1950–2006

(in % of total foreign population)
60%
Italy
50%
40%
Turkey and
Former
Germany, Yugoslavia
30%
Austria,
France
20%
Non-European
countries
Spain
10%
Other European
Portugal countries
0%
1950 60 70 80 90 00 1950 60 70 80 90 00
People born in a foreign country in % of total population by country 1995–2005

25%
1995
2000
20%
2005
15%
10%
5%
0%
CH DE SE US FR UK ES
Source: SFSO, OECD
59
Indicators
Duration of stay and naturalisation

Switzerland is one of the rare, highly industrialised countries that maintains
naturalisation laws based almost exclusively on the ius sanguinis, making
citizenship dependent upon descent, i.e., on parents’ nationality. Conse-
quently, naturalisation is difficult to obtain and frequently gives rise to
political dispute.
Two-thirds of non-national inhabitants are permanent residents, one
fourth are one-year residents (with renewable permits), and the remaining
tenth is composed of people covered by a great variety of legal situations.
The countries of origin of the permanent residents reflect Switzerland’s his-
tory with the different waves of immigration, which left differing numbers
of immigrants in the country. Considerable immigration from ‘northern’
neighbouring countries (mainly Germany) was followed by an Italian, then a
Spanish and finally by a Turkish influx, paralleled by a Portuguese and ‘West
Balkan’ (former Yugoslavian) wave. The overall proportion of long-term
resident foreigners has been quite constant since the eighties, more recent
waves of immigration being compensated partly by returning immigrants,
and partly by naturalisation.
Consequently, the number of naturalisations is increasing, but they still
concern only three percent of the resident foreigners per year. Here again, the
numeric weight of the countries of origin reflects the rhythm of immigration
waves: naturalisations tend mainly to involve members of the most recent
immigrant groups, i.e. those from Turkey, former Yugoslavia, and, in recent
years again, from European countries, as well as from non-European countries
(naturalisation is not particularly interesting for citizens of EU countries).
The international comparison confirms that the Swiss practice of naturali-
sation is more restrictive than that of other countries, and Sweden appears
to be particularly generous in this area.
Upper and middle diagrams: Foreigners: all residents in Switzerland without Swiss nationality. Included
are foreigners staying in Switzerland for at least 12 months (permits B, C and partly L).
Legend (upper diagram): In 2006, 16 percent of the foreigners living in Switzerland had been living in
Switzerland for at least 25 years. With regard to the Italians in the resident population, 39 percent had
been living in Switzerland for at least 25 years.
Source: upper and middle diagrams: SFSO: Census, PETRA; lower diagram: Eurostat, NewCronos.
60
Cultural diversity
Foreigners with duration of stay over 25 years

in total and by country of origin 1984–2006*
50% * in % of all foreigners
from the country
Italy concerned
40%
Germany,
France, Austria Spain
30%
Non-European
countries
20%
Total
Total Turkey
10% Other
European
countries
Portugal
0% Former Yugoslavia
1984 1990 1995 2000 2006 1984 1990 1995 2000 2006
Naturalisations in total and by country of origin 1991–2006*

6%
* in % of all foreigners Former Yugoslavia
from the country concerned Turkey
5%
Non-European
countries
4%
Total Total
3%
German, Italy
2% Austria, Spain
France
1%
Other European
Portugal countries
0%
1991 1995 2000 2006 1991 1995 2000 2006
Naturalisations by country 2006: in % of foreign population

12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
SE UK FR (2005) CH DE ES
61
Indicators
Opinions on foreigners
Two negative views about the presence of immigrants, i.e. those claiming
that immigrants are bad for the economy and that they subvert the host
society’s culture, are held in all countries in the comparison with consider-
able frequency. However, they are least popular in Switzerland despite the
fact that it has the highest proportion of foreign residents (with the partial
exception of Sweden, where fears for the country’s own culture are even less
common). In the short period from 2002–2006, criticism of the presence of
immigrants increased, with some inter-country differences that cannot be
commented on here.
Education has quite a strong influence on opinions about immigrants in
all countries: the higher the educational level, the rarer negative opinions are.
The largest educational differences can be found in France with a difference
of almost forty percent between the groups with the lowest and the highest
education levels.
Age is also of some importance. In general, older groups hold more nega-
tive opinions than the younger ones, but in Switzerland, it is the middle age
group (40 to 59 years) that is least negative, as in Sweden and Germany.
Question wording (Switzerland): Question 1: ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for Switzerland’s
economy that people come to live here from other countries?’ Answer categories: scale from 0 (bad for
the economy) to 10 (good for the economy). Question 2: ‘Would you say that Switzerland’s cultural
life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?’ Answer
categories: scale from 0 (cultural life undermined) to 10 (cultural life enriched). Percentages correspond
to respondents who indicated values from 0 to 4.
Sample size: ESS 795 (2002); 1014 (2004); 1200 (2006); US-CID: 1001; weighted data.
Source: ESS 2002, ESS 2004, ESS 2006; US-CID 2005.
62
Cultural diversity
'Immigrants are bad for the economy' and

'Immigrants undermine the country's culture'
Development by country 2002–2006

60%
2002
2004
50% 2006
40%
30%
20%
10% Bad for the economy

Undermine the country's culture
0%
UK DE FR SE ES CH US (2005)
By education and country 2006

60%
Low education
Intermediate
50% High education
40%
30%
20%

0%
By age and country 2006

60%
18–39 years
40–59 years
50% 60 years and over
40%
30%
20%

0%
Source: ESS 2002, 2004, 2006; US-CID 2005
63
Indicators
Subjective criteria of national affiliation

Scepticism towards foreigners can be based on two quite different criteria,
the first insisting on ‘nativeness’ (having ancestors in the country) and the
second on more culture-oriented conformity with the prevailing social order,
such as respecting extant political institutions. The first criterion acts as a
barrier and corresponds to the legal principle of ius sanguinis; non-nationals
cannot fulfil it by definition, whereas they can very well fulfil the second
which corresponds to the principle of ius soli.
Acceptance of these two criteria varies greatly between countries, but
tends to be most frequent in the USA, a classical immigration country, and
rarest in Switzerland, the country with the highest proportion of foreign resi-
dents. In all countries, the barrier argument is less popular than the cultural
adaptation argument; higher education weakens the insistence on descent,
but not on adaptation.
In all countries, there are age differences in the sense that older people
wish to set the barrier for foreigners higher than younger ones, but the dif-
ferences are not important everywhere.
The distinction according to political orientation shows a similar pattern,
with the left-right dimension being most important (especially in France and
Spain), but partially also the opposition of centre-extreme positions (United
Kingdom, and to some extent Sweden; in Switzerland and Germany only
with respect to the assimilation argument).
Question wording (Switzerland): ‘Some people say that the following things are important for being
truly Swiss. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?
To respect Swiss political institutions and laws. To have Swiss ancestry’. Answer categories: ‘very im-
portant’, ‘fairly important’, ‘not very important’, ‘not important at all’. The percentages correspond to
respondents considering the item to be (very/fairly) important.
Political orientation: Self-placement on scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right): left: Values 0–3; centre: values
4–6; right: values 7–10.
Sample size: ISSP: 873–1669; weighted data.
Source: ISSP 2003.
64
Cultural diversity
'What is important for being truly Swiss?' 2003

(*German, American, English, Spanish, French, Swedish)
Answers 'very/fairly important' in % by education and country

100% To respect Swiss political institutions and laws Low education
To have Swiss ancestry Intermediate
80% High education
60%
40%
20%
*UK: without
Northern Ireland
0%
SE FR US UK* DE CH ES
Answers 'very/fairly important' in % by age and country

100% To respect Swiss political institutions and laws 18–39 years
To have Swiss ancestry 40–59 years
60 years and over
80%
60%
40%
20%
*UK: without
Northern Ireland
0%
Answers 'very/fairly important' in % by political orientation and country

100% To respect Swiss political institutions and laws Left
To have Swiss ancestry Centre
80% Right
60%
40%
20%
*UK: without
Northern Ireland
0%
Source: ISSP 2003
65
Indicators
Pupils’ languages
At first sight, the national languages largely prevail everywhere, but at second
glance, interesting differences appear. In purely German-, French- or Italian-
speaking cantons, the cantonal language is the mother tongue for just over
eighty percent of the pupils, but twenty to thirty percent have previously
spoken a non-cantonal language.
In linguistically mixed cantons, of course, the situation is different – with
less than twenty percent, Rhaeto-Romansh-speaking pupils are a minority
even in their own canton.
More precise differentiation of non-local languages shows that some migrant
groups preferred to settle in a specific language region, e.g., the Portuguese
in the French-speaking part and immigrants from former Yugoslavia (mostly
Kosovo) and Turkey in the German-speaking part of Switzerland. Overall,
schools are linguistically more mixed in the French-speaking part of the
country, and this diversity continues to increase.
In the urban cantons of Geneva and Basle, linguistic diversity is particu-
larly pronounced, again with different profiles: in Geneva, the proportion of
pupils with Portuguese or Spanish as their mother tongue is higher than in
Basle, where Turkish and Albanian are more frequent. Further differentiation
according to school level reveals the time of parents’ immigration and the
varying educational success of the different groups of immigrants. The latter
is due less to the culture of origin than to the duration of stay in Switzerland
and to the parents’ socio-economic status. Moreover, on higher educational
levels there are pupils who immigrated specifically for schooling purposes;
this is likely to explain an important part of the 23 percent of Anglophones
among the sixth-form (or matura) students in Geneva.
Upper and middle diagrams: purely German-speaking cantons: ZH, LU, UR, SZ, OW, NW, GL, ZG,
SO, BS, BL, SH, AR, AI, SG, AG, TG; purely French-speaking cantons: VD, NE, GE, JU; purely
Italian-speaking canton: TI.
Source: upper, middle and lower left diagrams: SFSO, Statistics on pupils and students; lower right dia-
gram: Statistical Office Basel-Town, Statistic on pupils and students.
66
Cultural diversity
Native language of pupils 2005/2006
Local languages by group of cantons

100%
Geman (ge) French (fr) Italian (it) Rhaeto-Romansh (rm)
80%
60%
40%
20%
0% Purely Purely Purely Majority: Majority: Majority:

German- French- Italian- German, French, German,
speaking speaking speaking Minority: Minority: Minority: Italian/
cantons cantons cantons French (BE) German (FR/VS) Rhaeto-R. (GR)
Non-local languages by language region and school level

40%
German South Slavonic
French Turkish
30% Italian Portuguese
Spanish Others
20%
10%
0%
Primary level Secondary level II Primary level Secondary level II
Purely German-speaking cantons Purely French-speaking cantons
Non-local languages Geneva Non-local languages Basel (city)

by language and school type by language and school type
100%
Others Others
80%
English Turkish
60% Arabic
Spanish South Slavonic
40%
Spanish
Portugese
Portuguese Portuguese
Portugese
Italian
20%
Italian Albanian
Albanian
0%
Primary Sec. Level I: Sec. Level I: 'Matura' Primary Sec. Level I: Sec. Level I: 'Matura'
level Basic Advanced classes level Basic Advanced classes
standard standard (6th Form) standard standard (6th Form)
Source: SFSO, Statistical Office BS
67
Indicators
Competence in foreign languages

Switzerland is one of the countries in Europe where competence in foreign
languages is most widespread – it is very close to Sweden – and there is a
small difference between the German- and the French-speaking parts of the
country (slightly less multilingualism in the French-speaking area). In all
countries compared here (the USA are replaced by bilingual Belgium), com-
petence in foreign languages is strongly related to educational level, which
means that the influence of schooling on individual multilingualism is very
high, independent of the country’s overall multilingualism.
Age differences are significant, although less pronounced than those ac-
cording to education: younger age groups are more multilingual than older
ones.
Focusing on competence in English, the results are the same except that
in monolingual countries (Sweden, France, Germany, and Spain) foreign
language competence is mainly competence in English, whereas in bi- or
multilingual countries, the other national languages also play a role, making
multilingualism more frequent than the sole command of English.
Question wording: ‘Is your … [first to fourth foreign language asked separately] … very good, good or
basic?’ Percentages indicated correspond to respondents with a very good or good level.
Linguistic region: assignment by majority language of the political community in which the respondent
lives.
Sample size: linguadult.ch: 1200; Eurobarometer 54Lan: 1000–2000.
Source: linguadult.ch, University of Berne 2006; Eurobarometer 54Lan 2000.
68
Cultural diversity
Good knowledge of foreign languages (CH 2006, EU 2000)
By education and country

100%
80% High education
60%
Intermediate
40%
Low ed.
20%
0%
SE CH: German- CH: French- BE DE FR ES UK
speaking speaking
By age and country

100%
80%
60%
15–24 years
25–39 years
40–54 years
55 years +
40%
20%
0%
SE CH: German- CH: French- BE DE FR ES UK
speaking speaking
Good knowledge of English (CH 2006, EU 2000)

100%
80%
High education
60%
Intermediate
40%
Low ed.
20%
0%
SE CH: German- CH: French- DE BE FR ES
speaking speaking
By age and country

100%
80%
60%
15–24 years
25–39 years
40–54 years
*10–30 people
55 years +
40% *
*
20%
0%
SE CH: German- CH: French- DE BE FR ES
speaking speaking
Source: linguadult.ch, University of Berne 2006; Eurobarometer 2000
69
Indicators
Use of foreign languages

Having knowledge of other languages and actually using them are two dif-
ferent things. Despite its national multilingualism, in Switzerland the main
reason for using another language is still going on holiday abroad – as in most
countries in the comparison. This is true mainly for the German-speaking part,
whereas for the French-speaking part, holidays are not much more important
than one’s job or circle of friends. The fact that people in Switzerland’s French-
speaking part are more likely to give professional reasons for speaking another
language than their German-speaking colleagues results mainly from the size
difference between these two linguistic and economic areas, but possibly also
from the fact that more jobs in the French-speaking area report to company
headquarters in the German-speaking part than vice-versa.
The difference between the two larger Swiss language groups remains the
same when considering either the other national language or English, with
the former being used somewhat more often than the latter, except during
holidays; German-speaking people travel more often to French-speaking re-
gions than the other way around. In one respect the differences are reversed,
corresponding to the above-mentioned principle of size: French-speaking
Swiss have to speak another region’s language (mostly German, probably) or
English more often than German-speaking Swiss.
Question wording: ‘When do you regularly use … [first and second foreign language]? Communica-
tion at work, either face-to-face or on the telephone. Reading at work. Writing e-mails/letters at work.
Travelling to other linguistic regions in Switzerland on business. Travelling abroad on business. While
studying languages. While studying something else. Communicating with members of your family.
Communicating with friends. On holidays in other linguistic regions in Switzerland. On holidays
abroad. Watching films/television/listening to the radio. Reading books/newspapers/magazines. On
the Internet. Other situations. None of these’. Percentages correspond to respondents using the first or
second foreign language on the respective occasion.
lives.
70
Cultural diversity
Use of foreign language by occasion and country (CH 2006, EU 2000)

80%
Holidays Work Family/Friends School/studies/training
60%
40%
20%
0%
CH: German- CH:French- SE DE BE FR UK ES
speaking speaking
Use of French and English in the Use of German and English in the
German-speaking part of Switzerland 2006 French-speaking part of Switzerland 2006
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 *
9
10 *
* **
11 *
** * 10–30 people
12 * ** 10 people
13
English * English
French 14 German
35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
1 Holidays abroad 6 Communicating 11 Studying languages

with friends
Holidays in other linguistic
2 regions in Switzerland 7 Communicating 12 Communicating
with family members
at work
Travelling abroad
3 Films, Television, Radio 8 Writing e-mails/letters 13 on business
at work
4 Internet 9 Reading at work 14 Travelling to other
linguistic regions in
Reading books, Switzerland on business
5 newspapers 10 Studying something
other than languages
71
Indicators
English at work
The frequency with which English is spoken at work differs internationally,
above all between Sweden and the other (non-Anglophone) countries in
our comparison, as in Sweden it is much higher than elsewhere. Everywhere
men find themselves in multilingual situations more often than women,
which is likely to be due mainly to hierarchical gender differences and to
gender-specific occupational profiles. Overall, about one fourth of those in
employment in Switzerland use English at work. In the German-speaking
part of Switzerland, English is used at work somewhat more often than in
the French-speaking part, where the sex difference observed in other places
is inversed, but is not very pronounced.
Education is very important for English use, which again points to the
fact that the use of foreign languages is more frequent in higher positions.
With some exceptions (Belgium, France, Spain, and partly also the French-
speaking part of Switzerland), there is also an age differentiation: younger
people more often speak English at work than older ones.
Question wording: ‘When do you regularly use English [if first or second foreign language]? Commu-
nication at work, either face-to-face or on the telephone. Reading at work. Writing e-mails/letters at
work. Travelling to other linguistic regions in Switzerland on business. Travelling abroad on business’.
Percentages correspond to respondents in the labour force using English (if first or second foreign
language) on at least one of the occasions mentioned.
works.
72
Cultural diversity
English at work by sex and country (CH 2006, EU 2000)

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
Women
10%
Men
0%
SE BE DE CH: German- CH: French- FR ES
speaking speaking
English at work by education and country (CH 2006, EU 2000)

60%
50%
40%
30%
High education
Intermediate
20%
Low ed.
10%
0%
speaking speaking
English at work by age and country (CH 2006, EU 2000)

60%
50%
40%
*
55 years and over
30% *
*10–30 people
*
15–24 years
25–39 years
40–54 years
20%
10%
0%
speaking speaking
73
Indicators
Denominations and non-religiousness

Historical change and large-scale migratory movements (Huguenots, USA)
have led to strong differentiation in the denominational composition of
the – mainly Christian – countries in our comparison. The proportions of
people declaring no confessional affiliation vary enormously (from a tenth
of the population in Spain to nearly seventy percent in Sweden). Switzerland
belongs to the countries with mixed denominations and counts a rather
small proportion of non-denominational persons. Recent immigration from
Muslim countries (Kosovo, Turkey; see indicator Profile of nationalities) has
given new demographic weight to the Islamic community. It now accounts
for four percent of the total population and is the largest non-Christian
religious group in Switzerland.
Religious non-affiliation can be expressed in various ways, for example,
by declaring oneself to be non-denominational, by non-participation in
religious service, or assessing oneself as non-religious. In all countries in
the comparison, these three aspects are clearly related to age (the younger
are less religious). In all countries as well, more people say they are non-
participant or non-denominational than non-religious – it is not so much
the basic principle of religion that has become questionable, but rather its
institutionalised forms.
Education is less consistently related to personal distance from religion
than age and not always in the same sense. In some countries – including
Switzerland – distance from religion goes together with higher education, in
others the opposite is true (United Kingdom, USA); religiousness is clearly
less dependent on education than the two institutional criteria.
Upper diagram: Percentages correspond to respondents considering themselves to belong to a particular
religion or denomination. Details: see CD.
Two lower diagrams: without denomination: respondents not considering themselves to belong to a
particular religion or denomination; no participation in religious services: respondents never attending
religious services, apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals; non religious: respond-
ents considering themselves to be not at all religious (value of 0 on a scale from 0 (not at all religious)
to 10 (very religious)). Details: see CD.
Sample size: ESS (2002, 2004, 2006 cumulated): 5268–8705; US-CID: 1001; weighted data.
Source: ESS 2002, ESS 2004, ESS 2006, US-CID 2005.
74
Cultural diversity
Most frequent religious denomination by country (2002–2006 cumulated)

80%
Roman Catholic
Protestant
Others
60%
40%
20%
0%
ES US (2005) CH DE UK FR SE
Non-religiousness (2002–2006 cumulated)

By age and country
80%
No religious denomination 18–39 years
No participation in religious services 40–59 years
Non-religious (self-judgement) 60 years and over
60%
40%
20%
0%
SE FR UK ES DE CH US(2005)

80%
No religious denomination Low education
No participation in religious services Intermediate
Non-religious (self-judgement) High education
60%
40%
20%
0%
SE FR UK ES DE CH US (2005)
Source: ESS 2002, 2004, 2006; US-CID 2005
75
Indicators
Religious beliefs
Religious beliefs are complex and do not necessarily result from deep reflec-
tion, therefore their measurement by way of surveys cannot give more than
a rough indication. The frequency of six concrete religious beliefs neatly
reflects the polarity between the dominant Christian theology (existence of
God, life after death) and alternative, minority ideas (‘superstitions’: astrology,
demons). The ranking is the same for both sexes, but men are more reluctant
to express their beliefs than women.
For the three most frequent beliefs, the same gradient exists for Catholics
and non-denominationals; for the rarer items, the differences are insignificant.
The influence of age is almost non-existent, whereas personal religiousness
makes a big difference.
What influence does religiousness have on behaviour in different areas of
practical life? Here again the ranking is clear and runs from areas strongly
marked by religion to others that are largely exempt from it. The first group
includes not only biographical transitions traditionally accompanied by re-
ligious intervention (birth, marriage, and death), but also, for instance, how
one deals with nature, with the meaning of life, or life crises. Conversely,
professional life, leisure, sexuality and political opinions are declared to be
largely isolated from religion.
Differences between the sexes and between religious denominations cor-
respond to those described above, i.e., religiosity has a stronger influence on
women and results in the same ranking of items. With the non-denominationals,
the influence of religiousness is rarer, but exists nevertheless (see indicator:
Denominations and non-religiousness).
Question wording: four upper diagrams: Legend: ‘To what extent do you believe in God or something
divine?‘ Details: see CD. Lower diagram: Legend: ‘To what extent do your religious beliefs affect
the following areas of your life: your dealings with vital events in your family like birth, marriage or
death?‘ Details: see CD.
Answer categories: ‘not at all’, ‘not very much’, ‘moderately’, ‘quite a bit’, ‘very much so’. Percentages
correspond to respondents with answers ‘quite a bit’ and ‘very much so’.
Religiosity: Centrality-Index of the Religion Monitor (see www.religionsmonitor.de).
Sample size: 1200.
Source: Religion Monitor 2008, Bertelsmann Foundation.
76
Cultural diversity
Religious beliefs 2007: All answers with 'very much so' and 'quite a bit' in %
1 Do you believe in God or something divine? 4 Do you believe in supernatural powers?
2 Do you believe in an afterlife? 5 Do you believe in astrology?
3 Do you believe in angels? 6 Do you believe in demons?
By sex By denomination
100%
Women Catholic
Men Protestant
80%
No denomination
60%
40%
20%
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
By age By religiosity
100%
18–39 years Not religious
40–59 years Religious
80%
60 years and over Very religious
60%
40%
20%
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
'To what extent do your religious beliefs affect the following areas of your life?'
All answers 'very much so' and 'quite a bit' in % 2007
By sex By denomination
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 Catholic
Women 10 Protestant
Men
11 No denomination
60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
1 Birth, marriage or death 5 Coping with illness 9 Leisure time
2 Attitude towards nature 6 Bringing up of your children 10 Attitude towards sexuality
3 Questioning the meaning of life 7 Relationship with your partner 11 Political views
4 Coping with life crises 8 Work/occupation
Source: Religion Monitor Bertelsmann Foundation
77
Indicators
Use of the media

Television is the most popular medium with respect to both frequency and
duration of use, but with considerable differences between age groups and
educational levels (the young watch television less than the old, the lesser
educated more than the better educated), whereas there is next to no dif-
ference between employed and economically inactive persons. International
differences are large, Switzerland appears to be a country with rather low
use of television.
Use of the radio is more modest in comparison and less differentiated with
regard to social categories, except for employment – ostensibly, listening to
the radio can go along with a whole series of occupational activities.
Reading the newspaper is clearly rarer among the young than among the
old, but education and employment make no significant difference. The
threshold used here (more than half an hour a day) excludes the consumers
of free newspapers, which are popular with the young and are based on the
principle that it takes no more than twenty minutes to read them. Including
these would probably eliminate the age difference.
The internet is used by the young much more than by the old, by the
highly educated and by the employed more than by the economically inac-
tive. It may be astonishing to see that Switzerland, along with Sweden, lies so
clearly ahead of the other countries, including the USA. This is probably due
to the country’s relative material wealth and the widespread use of computers
in school and families (more than three-quarters of Swiss households have
a personal computer).
Question wording: ‘On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend watching televi-
sion/listening to the radio/reading the newspaper? How often do you use the internet, the World Wide
Web or e-mail – whether at home or at work – for your personal use?‘ Answer categories: see CD.
Economic activity: Persons who indicated that they are mainly economically active.
Sample size: ESS 2006: 1804–2916; US-CID: 1001; weighted data.
Source: ESS 2006; US-CID 2005.
78
Cultural diversity
Use of the media 2006

More than one hour of television per day
100%
By age By education By occupation By country
(CH) (CH) (CH)
80%
60%
60 years and over
In employment
40% Low education
Economically
18–39 years
High ed.
inactive
20%
US UK DE FR ES SE CH
0%
More than one hour of radio per day

100%
80%
60%
60 years and over
In employment
Low education
40%
Economically
18–39 years
High ed.
inactive
20%
UK DE FR ES SE CH
0%
More than half an hour reading the newspaper per day

100%
80%
60%
60 years and over
In employment
Low education
40%
Economically
18–39 years
High ed.
inactive
20%
UK DE FR ES SE CH
0%
At least once a week in internet

100%
80%
60%
60 years and over
In employment
Low education
40%
Economically
18–39 years
High ed.
inactive
20%
US UK DE FR ES SE CH
0%
Source: ESS 2006, US-CID 2005
79
Indicators
Interest in political news

The media can be used for quite different reasons. Among these, political news
is of particular interest because it constitutes an indispensable link between
citizens and political life in complex contemporary societies.
Interest in political news on television clearly depends on age (greater
interest among older people), but not on education or employment. Aston-
ishingly Switzerland, with its particularly low television consumption, is at
the bottom of the international comparison.
Use of the radio for news is less differentiated, in the international
comparison as well. There are differences between age groups and between
educational levels though, but they are almost negligible.
Use of the newspapers for political information is the rarest among the
three forms considered and shows a profile similar to that of listening to
the radio: older and better educated people more often obtain information
through this medium; there are no differences between the employed and
the economically inactive, nor between countries.
Question wording: Example for television: ‘On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you
spend watching television? And again on an average weekday, how much of your time watching tel-
evision is spent watching news or programmes about politics and current affairs?’ Detailed question
wording and answer categories: see CD.
Economic activity: Persons who indicated that they are mainly economically active.
Sample size: ESS 2006: 1804–2916; US-CID: 1001; weighted data.
Source: ESS 2006; US-CID 2005.
80
Cultural diversity
Occupying oneself with politics and current affairs
More than half an hour per day on television

100%
(CH) (CH) (CH)
80%
60%
60 years and over
40%
High education
In employment
Low education
Economically
20%
inactive
18–39
years
US FR SE UK ES DE CH
0%
More than half an hour per day on the radio

100%
By By By By country
age education occupation
80%
60%
40%
Economically
In employ-
20%
education
60 years
education
and over
inactive
18–39
years
ment
High
Low
FR SE UK ES DE CH
0%
More than half an hour per day in newspapers

100%
By By By By country
age education occupation
80%
Economically
60%
In employ-
education
60 years
education
and over
inactive
18–39
years
ment
High
40%
Low
20%
FR SE UK ES DE CH
0%
Source: ESS 2006, US-CID 2005
81
Indicators
Leisure activities
Going to the cinema is the most frequent of the three activities considered
and it varies little between educational levels.
The two other activities, however, are clearly related to education, the
higher one’s level of education is, the more often one goes to the opera or
the theatre and the more rarely to the disco. Thus, here we find the classical
distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture.
All three leisure activities are related to age, but differently. Going to the
cinema, and even more so to the disco, decreases with advancing age whereas
going to the opera or the theatre varies only weakly with age. One could
speculate that the cinema and the disco, which belong to youth culture more
than the theatre and opera, also correlate with young age because employment,
parenthood or other commitments connected with adult status do not eas-
ily allow time for such leisure activities. This interpretation, however, seems
inconsistent with the observation that none of these activities become more
frequent again after retirement. It is unclear whether or not this reflects an
‘older people’s culture’ with different orientation.
Sex differences are very weak but there is a certain tendency for men to
‘go out’ more frequently than women, especially before the middle of life
(first two age groups) and particularly to the disco.
The comparison of people with and without children within the age group
of the 30 to 44 year-olds makes clear that parenthood leaves little room for
leisure activities outside the home. The only strong gender difference (disco
among the 30 to 44 year-olds) is not reinforced, but disappears.
Question wording: ‘I am now going to list a number of leisure activities. How frequently do you prac-
tice them?’ Details: see CD.
Family situation: children only considered if they are living in the same household.
Sample size: SHP und Silc-Pilot (combined) 2004: 11565; weighted data.
Source: SHP und Silc-Pilot 2004.
82
Cultural diversity
Leisure activities 2004

At least once a month to the cinema
80%
By sex, age and family situation By education
70%
60%
50%
40% *10–20
persons
30%
Intermediate
20% *
Women
Women
High
10%
Men
Men
Low
0%
<30 y. 30–44 y. 45–59 y. 60+ y. <30 y. 30–44 y. 45–59 y. Education
Without children 0–10 years of age With child(ren) 0–10 years
At least once a month to the opera or theatre

80%
70%
60%
50% *10–20 persons
**<10 persons
40%
30% *
20% Intermediate
Women
10%
Men
High
Low
**
0%
At least once a month to a disco

80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
Intermediate
**<10 persons
20%
Women
Women
10%
Men
Men
High
Low
0% **
Source: SHP 2004
83
Indicators
Style preferences in the home

Cultural preferences include such everyday features as one’s home and its
furnishings.
People’s wishes concerning their home largely reflect the traditional idea
of security and comfort: it should above all guarantee cosiness and cleanli-
ness, secondly it should be easy to maintain, and thirdly it should satisfy
aesthetic criteria like imagination and harmony. The differences between the
sexes confirm well-known stereotypes: women stress cleanliness/warmth and
imagination/harmony more than men, men are more interested in practical-
ity/low maintenance.
The significance of the two aspects associated with feeling safe are strongly
related to education: the higher the educational level, the lower the prior-
ity, as if their personal view of the outside world appears to be less loaded
with tension, and potentially less frustrating and in need of compensation.
The pragmatic aspects (low maintenance) are most important for those with
high education, probably because in this group both partners tend to be
employed and are therefore interested in limiting family work. ‘Imaginative
and harmonious’ are unrelated to education.
The family situation also has some influence on qualitative preferences
concerning one’s home. For younger and middle-aged singles, security is
least important, for older ones most important; whether one has children
or not is irrelevant. Low maintenance, however, is different, the presence of
children reinforces its importance. Aesthetic aspects attract mainly younger
and middle-aged singles.
Question wording: ‘Which three words [from the following list] describe your preferred style of living
most accurately? clean and neat, comfortable, well-designed, simple and unobtrusive, cosy, easy to
maintain, classic, harmonious, cultivated, imaginative, practical and functional, intimate’. Percentages
indicated correspond to respondents who named one of the following combinations: clean and cosy;
harmonious and imaginative; practical and easy to maintain.
Family situation: children only considered if they (sometimes) live in the same household.
Sample size: MOSAiCH: 1003; weighted data.
Source: MOSAiCH 2007.
84
Cultural diversity
Preferred styles in the home 2007
By sex
40%
30%
20%
10%
Women
Men
0%
Clean and Practical and Imaginative and
cosy easy to maintain harmonious
By education
40%
30%
20%
Low education
Intermediate
10%
education
High
0%
By family situation
40%
Single household: Household with several members:
18–59 years 18–59 years, no children
30% 60+ years 60+ years, no children
with children up to 10 years of age
with children over 10 years of age
20%
10%
0%
Source: MOSAICH 2007
85
Indicators
Sport
Physical leisure activities are so varied that it comes as a surprise to see that
some of them attain or even exceed the fifty-percent mark (hiking and skiing
in 1997). Over the last ten years, diversification has even increased: some
of the most popular forms are decreasing (except biking), other rarer ones
increasing (exceptions: tennis, cross-country skiing).
As we might expect, sport depends on age with regard to both the kind
of sport, as well as to the extent that it is practiced. Contrasting a particu-
larly young and a particularly old age group, activities with a strong physical
component appear to be markedly ‘young’ (swimming, football, basketball,
tobogganing, snowboarding), billiards seems to be an exception. Older people
typically turn to hiking, gymnastics and cross-country skiing, although with
lower frequency.
Apart from age (limited here to the group of 30 to 39 year-olds in order
to keep its influence constant), factors like gender and education also play
a role. Many forms of sport are sex-typed: women swim and do gymnastics
more often than men, and these more often play billiards or go mountain-
biking than women; football is ‘male’, dancing ‘female’, but other forms seem
to be more gender-neutral.
Educational differences are sometimes equally strong: the more highly
educated swim, bike and ski more often, the less educated more often play
billiards; gymnastics and athletics show no association.
Question wording: ‘Which of the sports mentioned below do you personally do – even if rarely?’ 1997:
squash is also included in the category tennis. Answer categories: ‘practically daily/several times a week’,
‘once a week’, ‘1–3 times a month’, ‘less often’. Percentages correspond to respondents who mentioned
the sport (without respondents not practicing any sport).
Sample size: Mach-Consumer 1977: 8200; Mach-Consumer 2007: 10304.
Source: Wemf AG für Werbemittelforschung, Mach-Consumer 1997 and 2007-2.
86
Cultural diversity
'What kind of sports do you do?'

14 sports 1997 and 2007
60%
1997 2007
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Hiking Cycling Jogging/ Gymnastics Mountain Football Tennis
Nordic Walking bike
Swimming Downhill skiing Weight training/ Tobogganing Dancing Basketball/ Cross-country
incl. Carving Fitness Volleyball/Handball skiing
16 sports by age 2007

60%
14–29 years 65 years and over
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Swimming Football Basketball/ Downhill skiing Hiking Snowboard Gymnastics Tennis
Volleyball/Handball incl. Carving
Cycling Weight training/ Billiards Tobogganing Jogging/ Dancing Mountain Cross-country
Fitness Nordic Walking bike skiing
Four different sports by sex and education 2007

Swimming Mountain bike
60%
40%
High education
Low education
30–39 years
30–39 years
30–39 years
30–39 years
20%
Women
Men
0%
Gymnastics Billiards
60%
40%
20%
0%
Source: WEMF/REMP (Advertising Media Research)
87
Social integration
Indicators
The degree and form of social integration and disintegration, i.e., participa-
tion in and exclusion from social life, are key topics of social cohesion in
every country. Their special importance derives from the reinforced tendency
towards competitive individualism, from the structural change in the cur-
rent acceleration of globalisation, and also from the fact that Switzerland has
become a typical immigration country over the past few decades.
The indicators in this chapter are partly organised according to the life-
course perspective, and partly according to the specific forms of participation
or exclusion:
The first group of indicators describes aspects of integration and disintegra-
tion in the microsphere of the couple and family life, as well as the relative
importance of age groups (indicators: Marriage, Divorce, Role distribution in
couples, Births, Age structure, Transition into adulthood, and Living alone).
The second group deals with the themes of poverty and social security,
which are not only related to integration, but also to the distribution of social
goods (indicators: Retirement and invalidity pensions, Poverty).
The third group captures various forms of voluntary commitment, an
important component of social integration for the volunteers as well as for
the beneficiaries (indicators: Organised voluntary work, Informal voluntary
work, Motivations for voluntary work).
Finally, the fourth group concerns classical aspects of deviant behaviour that
cannot be simply equated to ‘disintegration’ but are nevertheless a legitimate
part of this subject (indicators: Crime suspects, Victims of crime, and Feelings
of insecurity in the population).
89
Indicators
Marriage
After the sixties, the Swiss marriage rate fell from its particularly high level
after the Second World War (85% to 90% between 1942 and 1967) in two
stages to its current level of about 60%. Since 1960, it has been lower for
men than for women, which implies that more men than women remain
unmarried.
The Swiss figures are intermediate in the international comparison. The
other countries show the same trends, with two exceptions – the Swedish rate
decreases earlier than in the five other countries, the Spanish one later. Since
the eighties, however, all seven countries have followed the same pattern. The
particularly high Swedish figure for 1989 can be explained by a change in the
law regulating entitlement to a widow’s pension as of 1990.
The age at first marriage has steadily increased everywhere since the middle
of the seventies; for women in Switzerland from 24.1 years of age in 1970
to 29.1 in 2005. For men, the means are somewhat higher (26.5 and 31.3
years of age respectively), corresponding to the mean age difference in couples
found in all countries in this comparison.
Views on three aspects of marriage reveal intermediate attitudes in Swit-
zerland when compared to the other countries; there is a more conservative
stand in the USA and the opposite in liberal Sweden. In all countries, men
evaluate marriage more positively than women. The attitude to marriage seems
to be influenced by one’s own experience, since positive judgements are more
frequent everywhere among people who are living as a couple, or who are
widowed, than among singles. Equally, younger people are more detached
about marriage everywhere than older persons. This is another expression of
the trend towards a more pragmatic, ‘secularised’ view of the family that can
be seen in the demographic tendencies towards more divorce (see indicator
Divorce), remarriage and unofficial forms of cohabitation.
Upper diagram: Total first marriage rate: details: see CD.
Lower diagram: Question wording: ‘People who want children ought to get married’; ‘Married people
are generally happier than unmarried people’; ‘It is all right for a couple to live together without in-
tending to get married’. Answer categories: see CD. Percentages correspond to respondents who agreed
(strongly) with the statement (First get married, then children; Married people are happier) or who disa-
greed (strongly) with the statement (Against non-married couples living together).
Sample size: ISSP 2002: 1008–2471; weighted data.
Source: upper and middle diagrams: Eurostat, NewCronos; lower diagram: ISSP 2002.
90
Social integration
Total first marriage rate* for women by country 1960–2005

100%
FR CH ES
90%
80%
DE* UK US
70%
60%
SE
50% *average % of people
who will get married DE* before 1991
in the course of their life only Western Germany
40%
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Average age of women at first marriage by country 1960–2005

32
Years
30
FR
28
CH ES SE DE*
26
UK
24
DE* before 1991
US only Western Germany
22
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Views on marriage in % by country 2002

70%
First get married, then children
60% Married people are happier
Against non-married couples living together
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
without
US UK Northern Ireland DE CH FR ES SE
Source: Eurostat, ISSP 2002
91
Indicators
Divorce
It is well-known that more marriages end in divorce than ever before, but the
trend is not continuous. The divorce rate began to rise in the late sixties in
Switzerland, more or less simultaneously with Germany, but earlier than in
France. Roughly half of all present couples will get divorced at some time in
the future according to statistical probability. The countries in the comparison
have very similar figures, only those for Spain are lower, but even they seem
to be catching up in recent years. In Spain, which is particularly conservative
in family matters, the legal possibility of divorce was not introduced until
1981. The astonishing upswing in divorce in some countries (Switzerland in
1999/2000) results from legal changes affecting the family, e.g., divorce laws
or regulations concerning pension claims.
The mean duration of divorced marriages has long remained constant at
about 12 years, but since the early nineties it has tended to increase, in Swit-
zerland as well as in France and Germany. This indicates that most reasons for
divorce seem to appear later in couples’ histories and a considerable, statisti-
cally invisible, portion of divorce-prone couples wait until their children have
grown up. Late divorces are initiated more often by the female than by the
male partner. The fact that in earlier decades more divorces occurred in the
early years of marriage may also be explained by the increase in unmarried
cohabitation, trial marriage as it were, and to the frequent postponement of
marriage until childbirth. The trend towards a more pragmatic attitude in
matters of marriage and the family has resulted in unstable couples breaking
up before marriage.
Divorcing in order to resolve serious problems is largely accepted in all
countries in this comparison, although least of all in the USA, and it is in-
teresting to note that with few exceptions (Spain and Germany, the countries
with the highest acceptance) the older – and probably most experienced – age
groups accept this idea to a greater degree than the younger ones.
Lower diagram: Question wording: ‘Divorce is usually the best solution when a couple can’t seem to
work out their marriage problems’. Answer categories: see CD. Percentages correspond to respondents
who agreed (strongly) with statement.
92
Social integration
Total divorce rate* by country 1960–2005

60% *Average % of marriages
which will break up over time
50%
SE
40%
UK
30%
20% CH
10% FR DE* ES DE* before 1991

0% only Western Germany
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
Average duration of marriages at divorce in years by country 1960–2005

18
Years ES
16
UK
FR
14
12
SE
CH
10 DE*
DE* before 1991
8 only Western Germany
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
'Divorce is the best solution when marriage problems can't be solved'

in % by age and country 2002
90%
18–39 years
40–59 years
80%
60 years and over
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
ES DE CH UK without
Northern Ireland FR SE US
93
Indicators
Role distribution in couples

The distribution of roles by couples is one of the fundamental elements of
gender differentiation in contemporary societies. Ideals have changed mas-
sively in recent decades, partnership or equality between men and women has
become the most-prized model – and interestingly this is mostly so in Spain.
However, the traditional role pattern has far from disappeared, it is still rec-
ognised by many, even if implicitly, and more so by men than by women.
Age differences are considerable, but do not always point in the same
direction. In all countries in the comparison, the traditional assumption that
women ‘want’ above all to care for children and the home is more popular
among older people than among the young. The opposite postulate that men
should show a stronger commitment to housework is more frequent among
the young only in Spain; in Sweden and the United Kingdom it is more often
approved by the older ones.
Everyday life does not correspond to these ideals: everywhere, women put
in more working hours for the family than men. This means that women carry
out more unpaid work, men more paid work. The macro-economic value of
unpaid family work has been estimated by the Federal Statistical Office to be
42% of the Swiss gross domestic product. The imbalance is sufficiently large
to be perceived by the cohabiting partners: in all countries in the compari-
son men and women alike see a big difference between the male and female
engagement in the household (this is especially clear in Spain).
Although the extent of the tasks assumed by men and women varies between
countries, the fundamental typification is the same everywhere: the (repeti-
tive) tasks of laundering, cooking, cleaning, caring for the sick and shopping
are ‘female’, the (irregular) small repairs are ‘male’. Spain is first in matters of
sex-typing, egalitarian Sweden last, and Switzerland is intermediate.
Question wording: upper diagram: ‘A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and
children’; ‘Men ought to do a larger share of household work than they do’. Answer categories: see CD.
Percentages correspond to respondents who agreed (strongly) with one statement and who disagreed
(strongly) with the other statement. Middle diagram: without childcare and leisure time activities.
Details: see CD. Lower diagram: ‘In your household who does the following things?’ Answer categories:
see CD. Percentages correspond to women who responded with ‘always me’.
Source: ISSP 2002.
94
Social integration
Opinions on division of work in the household in % by age and country 2002

100%
More engagement from men
Women want home & children
80%
60%
40%
18–39 years
20%
40–59 years
*without Northern
Ireland 60+ years
0%
ES CH DE UK* US SE FR
Average hours of housework per week by sex and country 2002

35 Men: 'My partner'
Hours
Men: 'I myself'
30 Women: 'I myself'
Women: 'My partner'
25
20
15
10
5 *without Northern
Ireland
0 ES CH DE UK* US SE FR
Housework: proportion of women who 'always' do it,

by occupation and country 2002
80%
FR
70% ES
DE
60% CH
UK*
50%
SE
40% US
30%
20%
10% *without Northern
Ireland
0%
Laundry Cooking Cleaning Caring for Shopping Small
the sick repairs
Source: ISSP 2002
95
Indicators
Births
Switzerland’s birth rate follows the same pattern as that of other countries in
this comparison: after maximal values in the sixties, it decreases sharply and
stabilises in the middle of the seventies at around 1.5. Spain is an outsider in
the sense that the marked decrease did not set in there until the end of the
Franco dictatorship; by the end of the nineties, it had reached the lowest level
in the comparison. Sweden and the USA are the only countries where the birth
rate reaches the level of demographic reproduction again after 1990 (2.1),
but Sweden only temporarily. Up to the middle of the nineties, Switzerland’s
proportion of extramarital births was stable at around six percent, since then
it has been slowly rising to reach sixteen percent today; many parents only
marry on or after the birth of their first child.
Between the Second World War and the beginning of the seventies, the
age of parents at the birth of their first child decreased from 27 to 25 years
(mothers), since then it has been rising again steadily and is now approaching
30 years. Although the figures for the other countries are incomplete, they
reveal the same pattern. Among others, the postponement of childbirth is
one of the major reasons for the low birth rates.
As for other aspects of the family, a certain pragmatism is discernible:
although in all countries adults agree to a large extent that seeing one’s chil-
dren grow up is a particular pleasure, the more pronounced statement that
life without children would be empty is shared by far fewer respondents.
Childlessness is no longer considered by women to be a stroke of fate and
even less so by men.
Upper diagram: Total fertility rate: average number of children per woman based on the number of live
births and on the woman’s age in the year under observation.
Lower diagram: Question wording: ‘Watching children grow up is life’s greatest joy’; ‘People who have
never had children lead empty lives’. Answer categories: see CD. Percentages correspond to respondents
who agreed (strongly) with the statement.
96
Social integration
Total fertility rate by country 1950–2005: children per woman

3.5
Number of
children
3.0
2.5
ES US UK FR
2.0
CH
SE
1.5
DE*before 1991
1.0 only Western Germany DE*
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Average age of mothers at first birth by country 1950–2003

30
Years
28
CH
SE
26
FR
24
UK DE* ES
DE*before 1991
only Western Germany
22
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Importance of children for adults: views in % by country 2002

100%
80%
Kids are the greatest joy in life
60%
40%
*without
Northern
Life is empty
without kids
Ireland
20%
0%
DE ES FR SE CH US UK*
97
Indicators
Age structure
Population ageing, or changes in age distribution resulting in a decreasing
proportion of young and an increasing proportion of aged, has become a
platitude which lies at the heart of the debate about the financial future of
the state pension scheme. Mostly, attention is fixed solely on the development
of the ‘old-age dependency ratio’ ignoring the opposite development of the
‘young-age dependency ratio’. This is not the only perspective in which the
changing age structure of the population is important, the social profile of
generations living together and their relationships change as well. For instance,
the rapid social change in many areas of everyday life creates a situation where
the older can often learn from the younger, rather than the other way round.
Another historically new feature is the fact that the increasing group of people
who have finished working for reasons of age can, on average, look forward
to a period of at least twenty years in good physical condition before they
have to reckon with the serious afflictions of old age.
The proportion of people over sixty as a percentage of those of working
age (20 to 59 years old), i.e., the ‘old-age dependency ratio’, has increased
steadily from 25 to almost 40 percent since the middle of the twentieth
century; by that criterion, however, Switzerland is still located at the low
end of the international comparison. The temporary decrease in the German
figures reflects the retirement of the war generation, which was ‘thinned-out’
especially with regard to men.
On the opposite side of the age distribution, the analogous proportion
of the young (0 to 19 years old as a percentage of the 20 to 59 years old, the
‘young-age dependency ratio’) has decreased to 38 percent after having reached
a high point of 63 percent in the middle of the sixties. This development
reflects the decrease in the mean birth rate per mother. So, to some extent,
the decreasing proportion of financially dependent young people compensates
for the increasing proportion of financially dependent old people, in the sense
that both sections of the population have to be financially supported by the
intermediate group of working age.
With respect to these two rates, the countries compared show some dif-
ferences, but the basic pattern is the same.
Source: Eurostat, NewCronos.
98
Social integration
Old-age dependency ratio* by country 1950–2006

80%
*Population of 60 years of age and over
in % of the 20–59 year-olds
70%
60%
50%
SE UK DE*
40%
FR
30%
CH
ES
20%
10%
DE* before 1991
only Western Germany
0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Young-age dependency ratio* by country 1950–2006

80%
ES
70%
FR
UK
60%
50%
SE
40%
DE* CH
30%
20%
10%
*Population of 0–19 years of age
DE* before 1991
in % of the 20–59 year-olds only Western Germany
0%
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Source: Eurostat
99
Indicators
Transition into adulthood

Leaving the parental household is an important transition in young people’s life
courses, together with other elements of autonomy and self-responsibility.
All countries in the comparison show the same sequence: first occupational
position – leaving the parental household – couple formation – first child.
Women go through these transitions about two years earlier than men, except
in the case of the first job which occurs earlier for men.
The differences between the age groups are practically the same everywhere:
except for Switzerland, which shows no age differences, the younger generations
enter the sector of paid work later than the older ones did. This results partly
from the prolonged period of education, and partly from increasing difficulties
in entering the labour market. Everywhere, the young generations leave their
parents’ house earlier than their predecessors and also start to cohabit with
a partner earlier. The first child, however, arrives later (cf. indicator Births);
the associations vary between countries and are rather weak.
The four transitions considered here are generally viewed to be major
components of becoming adult, with few international differences. Hav-
ing one’s own fully paid job is an important criterion everywhere, except in
Sweden where it is replaced by having one’s own home. In that country, this
transition happens earlier than in the other countries, and in recent times even
earlier than labour market entry. With whom one lives (parents or partner)
is of least importance for being considered an adult.
Upper and middle diagrams: Years correspond to people’s ages when the four following transitions took
place: paid job: first paid employment or paid apprenticeship of 20 hours or more per week (for at least
3 months); leaving parents’ home (for 2 months or more); living with a partner (3 months or more);
birth of first child. Detailed question wording: see CD.
Lower diagram: Question wording: ‘To be considered an adult how important is it for a man/a woman
… to have left the parental home? … to have a full-time job? … to have lived with a spouse or partner?
… to have become a father/mother?’ Answer categories: see CD. Percentages correspond to respondents
who considered the role to be a (very) important one.
Sample size: ESS 2006: 1804–2916; weighted data.
Source: ESS 2006.
100
Social integration
Becoming an adult: average age 2006

By sex and country
30
Years
28
26
24
22
20
18
16 Men
Birth of first child Leaving parens' home
14 Living with a partner for the first time First paid job Women
CH ES SE UK DE FR
By generation and country

30
Years
28
26
24
22
20
18
18–39
16 Birth of first child Leaving parens' home 40–59
Living with a partner for the first time First paid job 60 +
14
CH ES SE UK DE FR
What is important for being considered an adult?

By country 2006
80%
Living with a partner Becoming mother/father
70% Leaving parents' home Having a full-time job
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
CH ES SE UK DE FR
Source: ESS 2006
101
Indicators
Living alone
The proportion of singles is on the increase in all countries. This increase is
largely due to the rising percentage of older age groups (see indicator Age
structure) although the proportion of singles among these is not necessarily
higher than twenty or thirty years ago. Older men live alone only slightly
more often than the general population, older women much more often.
This difference mainly results from the coincidence of women’s higher life
expectancies and the frequent age difference between married partners. For
this reason, there are more widows than widowers among the older population.
Moreover, men tend to remarry after a divorce more often than women.
Being a single is not necessarily tantamount to being isolated. In Ger-
many, France and Switzerland, there are no differences between singles and
people living in households with several members with regard to frequency
of contacts. In Sweden and the United Kingdom, singles less often claim to
have few contacts. As to the quality of contacts, the situation varies: in all
countries, singles are more likely to have no confident, but there are large
international differences.
Age and sex are not associated with isolation in the same way everywhere;
in some countries, women over 60 are more isolated than men, in France
isolation varies inversely with sex depending on the criterion used, whereas
in Switzerland there is practically no gender difference.
Upper diagram: People living alone: as a percentage of the respective population group.
Middle and lower diagrams: few contacts: people who meet socially with friends, relatives or work col-
leagues once a month or less often; no-one to confide in: people who don’t have anyone with whom they
can discuss intimate and personal matters.
Source: upper diagram: UNECE; middle and lower diagrams: ESS 2006.
102
Social integration
People living alone by sex, age and country 1980–2000

60%
1980 1990 2000 Women 65 and over
Men 65 and over
50%
Total population
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
SE DE FR CH US ES (2001) UK (2001)
Social isolation by household type and country 2006

35%
One person Household with No-one to confide in
30% household several members Few contacts
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
ES DE UK SE FR CH
Social isolation for 60 year-olds and over by sex and country 2006
35%
Men No-one to confide in
30% Women Few contacts
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
ES DE UK SE FR CH
Source: UNECE, ESS 2006
103
Indicators
Retirement and invalidity pensions

Thanks to the fact that they are index-linked, the pensions from the state
retirement pension scheme (AHV – Switzerland’s most important social insur-
ance), have increased somewhat since 1975 not only in nominal but also in
real terms, after a period of considerable fluctuation during the eighties and
nineties. The difference between minimal and maximal pensions has hardly
changed (the minimal pensions fluctuate a bit less than the maximal ones), the
mean pensions for men and women are not very different, those for women
even slightly surpassed those for men at the end of the nineties. Interestingly,
the mean pension – unlike the minima and the maxima – reached an apex
during the second half of the nineties. Their subsequent decrease is, however,
a purely calculatory effect, due to the transformation of couple rents into
simple rents; the effectively paid amounts have not diminished.
The proportion of people entitled to a disability pension has been increasing
slowly but steadily since the seventies, it rose somewhat more quickly after the
middle of the nineties, but became stable around 2005. Men are more often
invalid than women, but the difference between them has diminished during
recent years. This is less because of a rise in the women’s rate than because
of the flattening of the men’s curve. Men more often do physically harmful
jobs, but security measures have been steadily improved. The displacement
of employment from the industrial to the service sector (see indicator Change
of sectors and industries) might lead us to expect a decrease in the proportion
of disabled persons, since service jobs are less likely to involve potentially
dangerous physical work. However, this is counteracted by the reinforcement
of psychological handicaps, which the pension scheme also has to cover, and
the latter are less sector-specific.
Disability is strongly related to age, the percentage for 55 to 64 year-old
men is sixfold that for the 30 to 34 year-old group. For women, the increase
with age is weaker.
Two upper diagrams: Minimal and maximal ordinary simple pensions (full pensions): Legally regulated
minimal and maximal state retirement pension (AHV, i.e., old-age and survivors’ insurance) per month
for a single pensioner. Average ordinary pension: Average of monthly pensions paid to all single pension-
ers. Real retirement pension: Calculated on the basis of the consumer price index.
Two lower diagrams: Number of people per 1000 (of the permanent resident population) with a state
disability pension (IV, i.e., invalidity insurance) in Switzerland.
Source: SFSO, social security.
104
Social integration
State retirement pension
Nominal 1975–2007 Real 1975–2007 (in prices of 1977)

2400 1200
Fr./Mt.
Fr./Mt. Maximum
2200
Maximum
1100
2000
1800 Average 1000

women
1600
Average men 900 Average men
1400
1200 800
Average women
1000
Minimum 700
800
600 600
400 Minimum
500
200
0 400
75 80 85 90 95 00 05 75 80 85 90 95 00 05
Invalidity pensions: rate per 1000 people
By sex 1977–2006 By sex and age 2006

140 140
130 130
120 120
110 110
100 100
90 90
80 80
70 70
60 60
50 50
40 40
Men
30 30
20 20
Women
Women
10 10
Men
0 0
77 80 85 90 95 00 05 30–34 45–49 50–54 55–64
Source: SFSO
105
Indicators
Poverty
Since the year 2000, the proportions of poor and working poor have fluctu-
ated little and in parallel; after a slight decrease up to 2002 they began to
rise again. In the middle of the nineties, both rates – which in the meantime
are calculated on the basis of other thresholds and can for that reason not be
compared as to level, but only as to tendency – rose to a higher level but this
did not make up for the decrease after 2000. This suggests that the newly
created jobs after the recession in the early nineties have not compensated
for the impoverishment of the unemployed, because many of these jobs
are precarious and belong to the low-pay segment (see also the indicator
Unemployment).
Differences are particularly big between people of different national origin
(poverty is lowest among immigrants from the ‘Northwest’, highest among
those from outside of Europe), between different types of households (lowest
among singles and families without children, highest among single parents
and families with three or more children), and between different occupational
situations (occupational interruptions and employment with fixed duration
increase the poverty risk distinctly, and work as private domestic employee
even more).
In the international comparison, the Swiss poverty rate is very low, only
Sweden’s is even lower; in the USA, it is 2.5 times higher. The differences
between age groups are not the same everywhere; in Switzerland, the retired
are still most exposed to the risk of poverty, the same holds for the USA, the
United Kingdom and France.
Four upper diagrams: Poverty rate: Percentage of people who live under the poverty line. Poverty line:
Amount of money which gives right to social assistance according to the directives of the SKOS (Swiss
conference for social assistance) for the respective year. Working poor rate: economically active persons
(min. 1h/week) who live in a poor household, whose members work at least 36 hours per week all to-
gether, as a percentage of all economically active persons. Precise definitions: cf. SFSO (2007), Armut
von Personen im Erwerbsalter, Neuchâtel, SFSO.
Lower diagram: Median disposal equivalent income: see indicator Household income.
Source: four upper diagrams: SFSO, SLFS; lower diagram: OECD, Society at a Glance 2006.
106
Social integration
Working poor rate in Switzerland
Development 2000–2006 By nationality 2005

10%
EU: Northern and Western
8%
Poverty rate (total of
20–59 year-olds under Switzerland
Schweiz
6% poverty line)
4% EU: Southern
Working poor rate
(working 20–59 year-
2% olds under poverty line)
Others
0%
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
By type of household 2005 By various 'risk' situations 2005
Single Occupational
interruption
Couple without children Limited contract
Couple Hotel and restaurant

with 1 child trade
Couple with No post-compulsory
2 children education
Self-employed without
Single parent employees
Couple with 3+ children Employed in a
private household
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20%
Poverty rate* of 18–64 year-olds by country 2000

15%
*Portion of people with income under the poverty line
(50% of median disposal equivalent income)
10%
5%
0%
US DE (2001) UK FR CH (2001) SE
Source: SFSO, OECD
107
Indicators
Organised voluntary work

People’s participation in various sectors of society can include, among other
things, voluntary work. It can take place within the framework of associations
or organisations (organised or formal voluntary work) or without such struc-
tures (informal voluntary work). Simple membership of an association is very
frequent, but varies between countries: figures are highest for Sweden, lowest
for Spain, and Switzerland – along with Germany and the United Kingdom –
is among the countries with a high level of activity in associations. Voluntary
work and financial contributions correspond to high and intermediate degrees
of commitment respectively and are consequently rarer.
Voluntary activity in leisure or sport clubs or associations is particularly
frequent; it is mainly based on membership and rarely on collaboration or
financial contributions. Voluntary work oriented towards service or con-
sumer interests (automobile clubs, consumer organisations) is based even
more exclusively on membership. Its lobby-like character brings it close to
labour union membership. Voluntary participation in church or other reli-
gious groups is somewhat less frequent, but belongs nevertheless to the more
popular activities; apart from membership, donations and voluntary work also
play an important role in this area (the high figures for the USA reflect the
particular importance of the conviviality aspect of religious activities there).
Commitment to the environment, nature, or peace more often takes the form
of financial support along with membership and voluntary work, whereas
engagement in political parties is rare and mostly limited to membership; in
this case, voluntary work and donations are less important.
In most countries in this comparison, voluntary commitment is strongly
related to education and the middle age groups are more often involved than
younger or older people.
Percentage of respondents for whom a voluntary organisation is of importance, or has been so in the
last 12 months. Respondents were asked about 12 types of organisation and had to differentiate be-
tween member, participation in activities, donations and voluntary work. Details: see CD. Member
and participation were merged because they refer to a similar level of commitment.
Sample size: ESS 2002: 1503–2995, ESS 2004: 2141, US-CID 2005: 1001; weighted data.
Source: ESS 2002, ESS 2004 (CH), US-CID 2005 (US).
108
Social integration
Commitment by type of participation, type of organisation and country 2002*

50% Sport/outdoor Consumer/ Religion/ Peace/ Political
activity automobile church environment/ party
animal
40% Member
Donations
30% Voluntary work
*(CH 2004,
US 2005)
20%
10%
0%
SE CH FR ES SE CH FR ES SE CH FR ES SE CH FR ES SE CH FR ES
DE UK US DE UK US DE UK US DE UK US DE UK US
Commitment to at least one organisation 2002

By type of participation, sex and country
100%
Men Women Member
Donations
80% Voluntary work
60%
40%
20%
0%
SE CH (2004) DE UK FR US (2005) ES
By type of participation, education and country

100% Low Member
Intermediate Donations
High Voluntary work
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
SE CH(2004) DE UK FR US(2005) ES
Source: ESS 2002, 2004 (CH); US-CID 2005 (US)
109
Indicators
Informal voluntary work

Voluntary commitment can also be found outside organised structures,
namely, in the form of informal help for neighbours or kin. As in the case
of organised voluntary work, regular commitment is rarer than occasional
commitment. Sweden has the highest figures; informal networks seem to be
particularly close-knit there, and this is confirmed by the fact that Swedes are
more often convinced than other nations that they can rely on others in the
case of need. A well-developed welfare state does not seem to reduce people’s
readiness to help others. Swiss figures concerning potential reliance on others
are almost as high. Other data show that in all countries in the comparison,
helping non-kin is more frequent than helping kin.
In all countries except Spain, intensive commitment is more frequent
among women, less intensive commitment among men. Age differences do
not exist in all countries; where they exist, the intermediate age groups are
most active in informal help.
Education is especially related to non-intensive commitment, fewer to
intensive forms which are less frequent. Possibly the more intensive variant
results more from a direct obligation than from personal values and therefore
depends on factors other than educational level.
Question wording: ‘Not counting anything you do for your family, in your work, or within voluntary
organisations, how often, in the past 12 months, did you actively provide help for other people?’; ‘And
if you needed help, is there anyone outside your household you can count on to give you unpaid help
with childcare, other care, housework or home maintenance?’ Answer categories: see CD.
Less than once a week: ‘at least once a month’ to ‘less often’ (without ‘never’).
Sample size: ESS 2004: 1663–2870, ESS 2006: 1804–2916; weighted data.
Source: ESS 2004 and ESS 2006.
110
Social integration
Giving and counting on informal help in % by country 2004/2006

100% Giving unpaid help: at least 1x/week
Giving unpaid help: less often
Can count on unpaid help
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
SE DE CH FR UK ES
Giving informal help 2006

By sex and country
100%
Less than once a week Men
At least once a week Women
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
SE DE CH FR UK ES

100%
Less than once a week Low education
At least once a week Intermediate
80% High education
60%
40%
20%
0%
SE DE CH FR UK ES
Source: ESS 2004, 2006
111
Indicators
Motivations for voluntary work

Voluntary work does not primarily follow from an uninspired sense of duty,
it should above all convey a feeling of satisfaction and indeed it does: moti-
vations like taking pleasure in a certain activity or meeting nice people play
a major role. The desire to help other people is almost as important, and
religious motives or, more generally, personal values form a second group of
motivations. Third, and maybe less easy to admit, are considerations such
as usefulness for one’s own career or for resolving one’s own problems. If
voluntary work increases the integration of its beneficiaries, it does so also
for its actors.
There are almost no differences between the sexes, these appear only
with regard to religious motives which are slightly more frequent among
women.
Again, there are only small differences as to education, unlike many
other indicators where this factor plays an important role. Weak tendencies
can be seen for the two less important groups of motivation, usefulness and
personal values (Religious motives), in the sense that these are mentioned
less by people with higher education, be that because they are less motivated
by such considerations, or because their answers are more influenced by
considerations of political correctness.
Question wording: ‘Now I will read you some statements about your motivation for voluntary work.
Please tell me in each case to what extent they apply to you. Please use the response scale of 0 to 10. 0
means ‘not at all true’ and 10 means ‘totally true’. With values between you can grade your response’.
True: values 9–10; rather true: values 6–8. Details: see CD.
Sample size: 7410; weighted data.
Source: Swiss volunteering monitor 2006.
112
Social integration
Motivations for voluntary work 2006

General
Activity Meeting Religious Helping Usefulness Managing
gives nice motives others for one's one's own
pleasure people own career problems
100%
Rather true
80% True
60%
40%
20%
0%
Pleasure and sociability Own values Own benefit
By sex
100%
Rather true
True
80%
60%
40%
Women
20%
Men
0%
Activity gives Religious motives Usefulness for
pleasure one's own career
By education
100%
Rather true
True
80%
60%
High education
Low education
40%
Intermediate
20%
0%
Activity gives Religious motives Usefulness for
pleasure one's own career
Source: Swiss volunteering monitor 2006
113
Indicators
Crime suspects
Respect for social norms, or lack of it, comes under the topic of social inte-
gration although it cannot be considered as an immediate expression of the
latter – too diverse are the reasons for the various forms of deviance from legal
norms. For certain forms of deviance from majority norms, the main reason
is conformity with other norms, held by a reference group that is closer to
the actor than the dominant group. Delinquency and crime lie at the focus
of public attention because in these cases there is concrete harm to others,
but also as a result of their political magnification.
According to the statistics on crime reported to the police, there are two
large categories that develop differently. Crimes against property (fraud,
embezzlement, burglary, theft) have been relatively constant since the begin-
ning of the eighties, only simple theft (without burglary) – by far the form
of delinquency most frequently reported to the police – has fluctuated more
strongly and seems to be influenced by the business cycle (higher incidence
during the two periods of depression at the beginning of the nineties and
after 2000). Crimes of violence or other crimes directed against human
beings have tended to increase since the nineties, especially crimes against
personal freedom (threat, coercion, blackmail, deprivation of liberty, kidnap-
ping) and murder, whereas rape and robbery have increased more slowly.
Certainly, crimes against property have been more systematically reported
to the police for a long time for insurance reasons; this is much less the case
for other types of crime. Comparing reported crime with victimisation (see
indicator Victims of crime), the figures indicate that in Switzerland the rate
of crime reported to the police is high, despite the rather low rate of being
directly affected by criminal acts.
Compared to other countries, Switzerland has high figures for burglary,
low figures for assault. Assault is on the increase everywhere, burglary shows
a slight tendency to decrease.
Suspects: Every suspect person registered in preliminary proceedings by the police.
Source: upper and middle diagrams: Fedpol (Federal Office of Police), Crime statistics; two lower dia-
grams: European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics 2003 & 2006.
114
Social integration
Crimes against property in Switzerland: suspects 1982–2006

30000
25000 Theft
(without burglary)
20000
15000
Burglary Theft of a motor vehicule
10000
Fraud
5000
0 Embezzlement
1982 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Crimes of violence in Switzerland: suspects 1982–2006

12000 *Threat, coercion,
Crimes against
blackmail, deprivation personal freedom*
of liberty, kidnapping
10000
8000
6000
Rape, offences
4000 Murder, assault against sexual
integrity
2000
Robbery
0
1982 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Burglaries: suspects by country Assault: suspects by country

1995–2003 1995–2003
150 600
per 100 000 per 100 000
persons CH persons
500
120 DE
400
UK*
UK*
90 300
*England
ES DE and Wales
200 FR
FR SE
60
100
*England SE CH
and Wales ES
30 0
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Source: Fedpol, European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics 2003 and 2006
115
Indicators
Victims of crime
Systematic studies of victimisation, i.e., the proportion of crime victims
in various groups of the population, have been sufficiently generalised to
allow international comparisons. It is interesting to note that in all of the
countries considered, this rate remains under ten percent. The Swiss figures
are particularly low, the largest differences between countries concern assault
and threats, which are the most frequent crimes in some countries (United
Kingdom, temporarily also the USA and France), whereas in Switzerland,
theft is far ahead. Subtler differences cannot be interpreted because the fig-
ures are so low (e.g., the apparently rapid increase in robbery in the United
Kingdom between 1989 and 1996 actually reflects no more than an increase
from two to six percent).
Additional information can be derived from the statistics based on con-
sultations at the advisory centres for crime victims in Switzerland. During
the (short) period 2002–2004, there was no great change in the various types
of attacks that motivated people to seek advice, with the exception of assault
which is the most frequent reason and is still increasing. It should be noted
that this covers the introductory period for this type of service and its exist-
ence is only just becoming well-known.
Among the victims who consult such centres, women predominate, es-
pecially for crimes against sexual integrity, but also with regard to incidents
that seem gender-neutral at first sight, like road accidents. Adults are more
frequently found among the clients than children or adolescents, except for
crimes against the sexual integrity of children. Swiss nationals use these centres
more often than non-nationals, a difference that has probably nothing to do
with foreigners being less often victimised (the contrary is probably true),
but more with their lack of information and also possibly with their greater
distrust of Swiss institutions.
Upper diagram: Question wording: see CD.
Four lower diagrams: Crime victims (or in some cases indirect victims, like the widow of a murdered
man) who consulted an Advisory Centre. Also included are crimes which were not reported to the
police.
Sample size: ICVS: 1000–4234 per country and year; weighted data.
Source: upper diagram: Van Dijk (2007), ICVS; four lower diagrams: SFSO, Statistics on assistance to
crime victims.
116
Social integration
'Over the past 12 months, have you been a victim of…?'

8%
Theft of personal property 1989
Burglary 1996
Assault, threats 2000
Sexual offence (women) 2005
6%
4%
2%
0%
FR ES CH UK US
Consultations at advisory centres for victims in Switzerland 2006

By type of offence By sex*
12000 100%
Consul-
Men
tations 80%
8000
60%
6000
40%
4000
Women
2000 20%
0 0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Assault 4 Road accidents

2 Offences against sexual integrity of children 5 Murder (incl. attempted murder)
3 Offences against sexual integrity 6 Other legal offences
By age* By nationality*
100% 100%
>30 y.
Foreigners
80% 80%
60% 60%
18–29 y.
40% 40%
<18 years
20% 20%
Swiss
*of the
consulting
0% person 0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Source: ICVS, SFSO
117
Indicators
Feelings of insecurity
People can feel insecure for many reasons, among these are the actual prevalence
of the events feared, personal experience, and also the treatment of such topics
in the media and in politics. This feeling can have very concrete consequences,
for instance, on political decisions; therefore, it is an important component
of a society’s self-perception. The Swiss feel more secure (or less insecure)
than people in most other countries, or at least as secure as the citizens of
countries in the comparison. But the differences between countries depend
on the specific threat: in France and Spain, people feel particularly exposed to
the threat of burglary and the like, whereas in the United Kingdom, the fear
of darkness – probably meaning personal attacks – is particularly frequent. It
comes as no surprise that in all countries compared the feeling of insecurity
is higher among women and older people than among men and the young.
It is more astonishing that, at first sight, higher education reduces the
feeling of insecurity, probably because it increases the capacity to interpret
media reports about insecurity with caution. Moreover, people with higher
education tend to live in more secure neighbourhoods. Factual experience of
crime – in this case burglary or assault – reinforces the feelings of insecurity.
Interestingly, this effect varies greatly between countries: there is no such effect
in Sweden, in Switzerland it is very small, unlike in France and Spain, where
it is particularly strong. These country differences seem to coincide with those
concerning trust in the various public agencies (see indicator Political trust),
with the Swiss expressing particularly high trust in the police and Switzerland,
together with Sweden, showing the highest trust in parliament.
Feelings of insecurity: Person feels (very) unsafe when walking alone in local neighbourhood after dark.
Worrying about being burgled/assaulted: Person worries ‘all or most of time’ or ‘some of time’. Question
wording: see CD.
Educational levels: low: ISCED 0–2 (compulsory schooling, pre-vocational education); high: ISCED
5–6 (university, other tertiary).
Source: ESS 2006.
118
Social integration
Feelings of insecurity and fear of crime by country 2006

50%
Worry about being burgled
Worry about being assaulted
40% Feeling unsafe walking alone after dark
30%
20%
10%
0%
FR ES UK SE DE CH
'I feel (very) unsafe walking alone in the area where I live after dark' 2006
By sex and country By age and country

50%
40%
30%
60 years and over
20%
18–39 years
Women
10%
Men
0%
FR ES UK SE DE CH FR ES UK SE DE CH
By education and country By experience as a victim and country

50%
Victim of burglary or assault
over the past 5 years
40% No burglary or assault
over the past 5 years
30%
20%
10%
High
Low
0%
FR ES UK SE DE CH FR ES UK SE DE CH
Source: ESS 2006
119
Political reshaping
Indicators
The political realm differs from other social sectors by virtue of two peculiari-
ties: its ‘object’ is the whole society, and its operation is subject to democratic
rules. It is the instrument by which people can influence their societal envi-
ronment. The chapter Political reshaping describes changes in Swiss political
life with the help of four groups of indicators:
Firstly, subjective evaluations and opinions of the population, more spe-
cifically political concerns that can be interpreted as wishes for the future
of Switzerland (Political opinions), problems and issues considered to be of
particular importance (Perception of problems), and the legitimacy accorded
to major political agencies (Political trust).
Secondly, forms of articulating political interest in the population, be it
individually (Political activities), in the form of social movements and mobi-
lisation (Political mobilisation), as part of industrial relations (Labour union
strength and industrial conflicts), or by making use of citizens’ political rights
on the federal level (Initiatives and referenda).
Thirdly, relationship between power elites and the population: sympathies
for the political parties or, the opposite, distance from them, i.e., Persons
without party attachment, the Strength of the political parties resulting from
elections, the social profile of the Electorate of the parties and women’s political
participation (Women in politics).
Fourthly, national government and its relation with the population:
Consent/dissent of governmental parties, Voter turnout in elections and other
votes, the relationship between Governmental consent and voting results, and
Regional voting differences.
121
Indicators
Political opinions
Opinions on seven important topics in Swiss politics hardly changed at all
between 1999 and 2006, including their order of importance. These topics
deal with various dimensions of political orientation during past years and
all are localised on the left-right axis.
Therefore, respondents’ self-positioning on this axis strongly influences
their opinions, along with education and age. Longitudinal changes and age
differences do not coincide systematically, which indicates that age does not
reflect opinion differences between consecutive generations, but rather dif-
ferences between life-course positions.
In all countries in the comparison a majority accepts the principle of
state intervention in order to diminish income inequalities, and in all of
them this acceptance is reinforced by a lower educational level, although to
varying degrees.
Similarly, all countries reject unequal treatment of men and women in
the labour market, especially Sweden and those with higher education. Swiss
values are intermediate.
Definitions/Comments
Question wording: four upper diagrams: Example: ‘Are you in favour of an increase or a decrease in tax
on high incomes?’ Percentages correspond to respondents who are in favour of an increase. Two lower
diagrams: Example: ‘The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels’.
Percentages correspond to respondents who (strongly) agree with the statement. Detailed question
wording and answer categories: see CD.
Educational levels: low: ISCED 0–2 (compulsory schooling, pre-vocational education); high: ISCED
5–6 (university, other tertiary).
Political orientation: Self-evaluation on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right): left: values 0–3; right: values
7–10.
Sample size: SHP 1999: 7799; SHP 2006 (only refreshment sample): 2747; ESS 2004: 1663–2870;
US-CID: 1001; weighted data.
Source: four upper diagrams: SHP 1999 and 2006; two lower diagrams: ESS 2004; US-CID 2005.
122
Political reshaping
Political opinions in Switzerland

Development 1999–2006 By education 2006
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
1999 Low education
7 2006 7 High education
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
1 Increase tax on high incomes 5 In favour of Switzerland joining the EU
2 Same opportunities for Swiss citizens and foreigners 6 In favour of increasing
3 Against nuclear energy social security spending
4 Protection of the environment is more important 7 For Switzerland without an army
than economic growth
By age 2006 By political orientation 2006
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
18–39 years Left
7 60 years + 7 Right
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Political opinions by education and country 2004

The government should take measures When jobs are scarce, men have more right
to reduce differences in income levels to a job than women
100% 50%
Low education Low education
High education High education
80% 40%
60% 30%
40% 20%
20% 10%
0% 0%
FR ES SE CH US UK DE FR ES SE CH UK DE
Source: SHP 1999, 2006; ESS 2004; US-CID 2005
123
Indicators
Perception of problems
Perceived political priorities have varied quite substantially, but in different
ways, over the past twenty years.
The salience of unemployment co-varies with the curve for effective
unemployment.
The health area rose during the nineties in priority – even if only tem-
porarily – probably because of increasing costs and the concomitant rise in
health insurance premiums. The state pension scheme and new poverty have
also gained attention.
The issues of the environment, drugs and Europe have lost some of their
priority. The reinforced public discussion on climate and greenhouse gases in
2007 succeeded in reversing the declining trend for this problem.
The topic of asylum seekers and refugees varies without a clear tendency,
but runs partly in parallel to the actual number of asylum requests; the debate
about foreigners has gained more attention in recent years, probably in response
to efforts aiming at its politisation by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP).
Question wording: ‘On these cards you see some issues that have been intensely discussed and written
about lately. Please look carefully at all of the cards and select those showing what you consider to be
the five most important problems in Switzerland’. Percentages correspond to the proportion of re-
spondents who selected the issue. Due to a change in the concept, data before and after 1995 are only
partially comparable.
Sample size: 1000 per year.
Source: Swiss Worry Barometer, Credit Suisse; 1989 to 1994 Isopublic, 1995 to 2007 gfs.bern.
124
Political reshaping
'Which do you think are the five most important problems in Switzerland?' 1988–2007
Unemployment Health service State retirement pension
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
88 92 96 00 04 07 88 92 96 00 04 07 88 92 96 00 04 07
Refugees/asylum Foreigners (New) poverty

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
88 92 96 00 04 07 88 92 96 00 04 07 88 92 96 00 04 07
Drugs Environment Europe

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
88 92 96 00 04 07 88 92 96 00 04 07 88 92 96 00 04 07
Source: Swiss Worry Barometer Credit Suisse/gfs.bern
125
Indicators
Political trust
Trust is a central component of legitimacy. Without it, normal functioning
of democratic institutions is difficult to conceive. The Swiss trust the various
agencies of public life to varying degrees: the police to a remarkably high
degree, the media least of all. After a decrease between the seventies and the
nineties, trust in all agencies increased again between 1995 and 2006, except
in the media where it further decreased (from 35 percent in 1997 to 27percent
in 2006). Maybe the recent multiplication of free newspapers and private TV
channels with their simplified mode of journalism and their dependency on
ads has made citizens suspicious.
Only the Swedish show more trust in parliament than the Swiss. In all
countries, people with higher education are more trustful, be it because their
education helps them to understand the often complex political processes,
or because, as part of a privileged group, their interests are better served by
prevailing policies.
Trust in the national legislative body is also related to one’s political
orientation. In four of the seven countries, supporters of the political centre
are the most reserved on this question, possibly because the centre is not in
power in these countries. In Sweden, France and the USA, where right-wing
parties ruled in the period considered, supporters of the right show more
trust than those of the left. Thus, people’s trust in political institutions seems
to go along with their ideological proximity to those in power.
Question wording: upper diagram: ‘I will now read out the names of some the institutions in public life
in Switzerland and would like to know whether you trust them or not’. Middle and lower diagrams:
‘Please say how much you personally trust parliament’. Percentages correspond to the respondents who
indicated values between 6 and 10 on a scale from 0 to 10. Details: see CD.
Political orientation: Self-evaluation on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right): left: values 0–3; centre: values
Sample size: Security survey 795 (1995); 1014 (1997); 1200 (2006); ESS 2006: 1804–2916; US-CID:
1001; weighted data.
Source: upper diagram: Security survey 1995, 1997, 2006 ETH Zurich, details: see CD; middle and
lower diagrams: ESS 2006; US-CID 2005.
126
Political reshaping
Trust in institutions 1995 and 2006: proportion of population with trust

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
1995
2006
0%
Police Army Tribunals Swiss Federal Federal Media*
*Values 1997 economy* Council Parliament
Trust in parliament 2006: proportion of population with trust

80%
Low education Intermediate High education
60%
40%
20%
0%
SE CH ES US (2005) FR UK DE
By political orientation and country

80%
Left Centre Right None
60%
40%
20%
0%
SE CH ES US (2005) FR UK DE
Source: Security Survey ETHZ 1995, 1997, 2006; ESS 2006; US-CID 2005
127
Indicators
Political activities
The various possibilities for political activity are used to varying degrees,
depending, as it seems, on the amount of personal commitment they imply.
The highest frequency pertains to signing initiatives and referenda, middle
frequencies to attending a political meeting, giving money to a political
organisation, collecting signatures, and participating in demonstrations.
Active participation in citizens’ initiatives or in a political party is the rarest
form of activity.
All these forms are more frequent among those with higher education.
The better educated may understand political problems more easily or feel
they are politically more effective, because of their higher social position. In
underprivileged social milieus, the feeling of powerlessness is more prevalent.
The relationship with age is mostly weak, but generally, the intermediate age
groups participate a little more, except in demonstrations.
The international comparison, which uses a global measure of political
activity (at least two types of activity from a list of seven), shows that in all
countries the middle age group is the most active. In this comparison, Swit-
zerland – self-defined as particularly high on political participation – lags
clearly behind Sweden.
Question wording: three upper diagrams: ‘Please tell me whether you took part in each of the following
political activities for one reason or another during the last five years’. Lower diagram: ‘During the last
12 months, have you done any of the following? Contacted a politician, government or local govern-
ment official? Worked in a political party or action group? Worked in any other organisation or asso-
ciation? Worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker? Signed a petition? Taken part in a lawful public
demonstration? Boycotted certain products?’ Answer categories: ‘Yes’, ‘No’. Details: see CD.
Sample size: Selects 1995: 1900; Selects 2007: 4410; ESS 2006: 1804–2916; US-CID: 1001; weighted
data.
Source: upper and middle diagrams: Selects 1995, 2007; lower diagram: ESS 2006; US-CID 2005.
128
Political reshaping
'Have you participated in the following political activities in the past 5 years?'
Development 1995–2007
80%
60%
40%
20%
1995
2007
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
By education 2007
80%
60%
High education
Intermediate
40%
Low ed.
20%
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
By age 2007
80%
60%
18–39 years
40–59 years
40%
60 years +
20%
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Signed an initiative/referendum 5 Took part in a demonstration
2 Attended a political meeting 6 Was active in the preparation
3 Donated money to a political organisation of a popular initative
4 Collected signatures 7 Was active in a political party
Participated in at least 2 (of 7) political activities in the past 12 months,

by age and country 2006
60%
40%
18–39 years
40–59 years
60 years +
20%
0%
SE CH FR UK US (2005) DE ES
Source: Selects 1995, 2007; ESS 2006; US-CID 2005
129
Indicators
Political mobilisation
If institutional politics do not deal satisfactorily with important social con-
cerns, events involving political mobilisation become more likely.
This form of political activity was on a much higher level in the late sixties
than during the preceding twenty years which followed the Second World
War. The five thematic areas distinguished here mobilise to a similar degree,
but have evolved differently. The movement against nuclear power stations
largely lost its mobilising capacity in the course of the past thirty years (in part
probably due to a nuclear moratorium that is now coming to an end). The
autonomy movement, strongly youth-based, shows a tendency to decrease,
after having reached an apex in the early eighties, but has not disappeared.
The degree of mobilisation for the peace and solidarity movements, both with
a strongly international orientation, varies little, at least with respect to the
number of events. Similarly, the ecological movement that appeared after the
sixties has held the number of its events quite stable.
The evolution of the number of participants largely resembles that of event
frequency for four of the five movements, the exception being the environ-
mental area. This issue clearly mobilised a greater number of participants in
its early phases, although the number of events has not decreased. This finding
gives at least some credit to the idea that part of this movement and its energy
have been absorbed by its gaining entry into the institutions (e.g., election
of members into the national and some cantonal parliaments and even some
executive bodies), so that its activities take place in a different arena. The
solidarity and peace movements have mobilised rather more participants in
recent years, although the number of events has also remained stable; this
can probably be explained by the increasing topicality of globalisation issues
(among others, the war in Iraq).
Indicated: events of protest (e.g. petitions, demonstrations, blockages and attacks). Not included are
popular initiatives and referenda, purely communicative actions and the foundation of organisations.
Data are based on the coverage of such events in the most important newspapers (Monday edition).
Anti-globalisation events have only been coded separately since 2000, for former years they are in-
cluded in other categories (mostly the solidarity and peace movements).
Source: University of Geneva, Département de science politique; Research project ‘Nationaler poli-
tischer Wandel in entgrenzten Räumen’ (Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich und University of
Zurich).
Data preparation: Sven Hutter.
130
Political reshaping
Number of protests by five social movements 1976–2005

Total number of protests Ecologist movement Solidarity movement
300
250
200
150 Anti-
globalisation
100 movement
50
Solidarity movement
0
76-80 86-90 96-00 76-80 86-90 96-00 76-80 86-90 96-00
Anti-nuclear energy movement Autonomy movement Peace movement

300
250
200
150
100
50
0
76-80 86-90 96-00 76-80 86-90 96-00 76-80 86-90 96-00
Number of participants at protests by five social movements 1976–2005

Participants in total Ecologist movement Solidarity movement
in thousands
800
600
400 Anti-
globalisation
movement
200 Solidarity movement
0
76-80 86-90 96-00 76-80 86-90 96-00 76-80 86-90 96-00
Anti-nuclear energy movement Autonomy movement Peace movement

in thousands
800
600
400
200
0
76-80 86-90 96-00 76-80 86-90 96-00 76-80 86-90 96-00
Source: University of Geneva, University of Zurich, University Ludwig-Maximilian Munich
131
Indicators
Labour union strength and industrial conflicts

For Switzerland’s employees, the degree of organisation in labour unions is
intermediate. In Sweden it is much higher, one of the reasons probably being
that its labour unions have a strong legal status and are directly involved in
dealing with unemployment. The Swiss path towards industrialisation allowed
no place for heavy industry with its correspondingly strong urban labour-force
concentrations; development was decentralised and took place mainly in the
textile sector. Moreover, the recent structural changes in the economy have
reduced traditionally unionised sectors and, since the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, Swiss employers have partly lost interest in maintaining the
social partnership and, hence, in the existence of efficient labour unions.
The frequency of strikes is very low internationally speaking, which is due,
on the one hand, to the deep-rooted tradition of contracts between the social
partners, and on the other hand to the relative weakness of the unions. Most
impressive in the international comparison is the rise of strikes in Spain after
the collapse of the Franco regime.
Immediately after the Second World War, strike activity was relatively
intensive in Switzerland (peaking in 1946). It virtually disappeared during
the post-war boom, with the exception of two massive strikes in Zurich (the
painter strike in 1954 and the plasterer strike in 1963). In the face of the
economic reactions to the ‘oil crisis’ at the beginning of the seventies, strike
activity rose temporarily, as it did again after the recession in the early nineties.
The strike phases immediately after the Second World War and in the nineties
mainly concerned collective labour agreements; once these came into force,
further strikes became superfluous (most recent example: construction).
Upper diagram: Union density: Proportion of union members among the employed (without unem-
ployed, self-employed, full-time students, retired, handicapped or economically inactive).
Middle and lower diagrams: Days of strike due to strikes and lockouts. France: estimated values 1997–
2005 (Eurostat). Moving average: see Glossary.
Source: upper diagram: Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000), Visser (2006); middle and lower diagrams: Seco;
ILO; Eurostat, NewCronos.
132
Political reshaping
Degree of organisation in Labour Unions 1970–2003 by country

100%
80%
SE
60%
UK
40% DE*
US CH
20%
*DE before 1991
ES FR
0% only West Germany
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003
Number of strike days per 1000 workers 1960–2006
Switzerland in the international comparison: sliding mean (5 years)

1200
ES
Days
1000
800
SE DE*(before 1993
only West Germany)
US
600 UK
400 FR
CH
200
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Switzerland
30
Days No. of strike days
25
20
15
No. of strike days:
10 moving average
over 5 years
5
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Source: Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000, Visser 2006; Seco; ILO; Eurostat
133
Indicators
Initiatives and referenda

Similar to extra-institutional political mobilisation, initiatives and referenda
(apart from compulsory referenda, required by the constitution) also bear
protest potential: they express dissent with the outcome of the official political
processes, moreover they are ‘weighted’ by the necessity to attract a sufficient
number of signatures in order to be valid. These ‘material’ political rights
have been used increasingly ever since their introduction in the last quarter
of the 19th century. This increase was reinforced between the sixties and the
nineties; since then their number has somewhat diminished, but it remains
on a substantially higher level than, for instance, in the post-war period. It
is interesting to note that only a small proportion of all parliamentary deci-
sions are contested by referendum (between 3 percent and 13 percent). This
is due to the tradition of political concordance according to which most legal
projects are negotiated by the stakeholders capable of launching and win-
ning a referendum until all are in agreement, prior to the formal decision.
The successful launching of popular initiatives (successful not in the sense
of being accepted by the voters, but in obtaining enough signatures to bring
about a vote) has increased since the sixties.
Since the introduction of this almost unique possibility for citizens to
directly influence political decisions on the national level (1891–2007), 350
popular initiatives have been launched, 258 of them have attained enough
signatures to be validly handed in, 162 have been submitted to the popular
vote, but only 15 have been accepted. The others were withdrawn for various
reasons, often because they provoked governmental or parliamentary coun-
terproposals that went far enough to satisfy the proponents.
Initiative: A proposal for a constitutional amendment or a new constitutional article is subject to
popular vote if the proposal is signed by at least 100000 Swiss citizens with the right to vote. Since
1977, signatures have to be collected within a period of 18 months.
Referenda: Federal laws, certain other federal decisions and treaties with an unlimited period of validity
are subject to a facultative referendum: a popular vote takes place if 50000 signatures of Swiss citizens
are collected within 100 days of the publication of the enactment. The number of required signatures
was increased from 30000 to 50000 in 1977.
Successful referendum: required quorum of signatures achieved and approved in popular vote.
Not successful referendum: required quorum of signatures not achieved or rejected in popular vote by
Swiss citizens.
Source: Federal Chancellery, political rights.
134
Political reshaping
Number of popular initiatives by parliamentary term 1960–2007

50
Number
40
30
20
10
0
60–63 68–71 76–79 84–87 92–95 00–03
64–67 72–75 80–83 88–91 96–99 04–07
Insufficient signatures or withdrawn for reasons other than a counterproposal
Sufficient signatures or withdrawn because of counterproposal
Initiated referenda as % of all potential referenda 1960–2007

15%
12%
9%
6%
3%
0%
60–64 70–74 80–84 90–94 00–04
65–69 75–79 85–89 95–99 05–07
% not successful (referendum refused)

% successful (referendum accepted)
Source: Federal Chancellery
135
Indicators
Persons without party attachment

A growing proportion of Swiss citizens do not opt for a single political party
when questioned in surveys. The differences according to education have
increased, respondents with the lowest educational level are most often quite
distant from the parties. At the beginning of the eighties, the proportion of
non-attached amounted to about 40 percent and there were no important
differences, it rose to over 50 percent at the end of the nineties. Since then,
it has decreased again and lies roughly around the level at the beginning of
the observation period, except for the least educated. This recent decrease is
likely to be an expression of the right-left polarisation, also confirmed by other
indicators. It is, however, difficult to distinguish between possible explana-
tions for non-attachment, such as subjective distance to the institutions, the
feelings of powerlessness, or the lack of intelligibility.
Citizens with low income and education, i.e., those located in the lower
ranks of social stratification, turn out to be particularly distant from the
political parties. Moreover, age plays an important role: older people are less
reluctant to declare with which party their sympathies lie. This relationship
holds in all countries compared, but least of all in Spain. Switzerland’s pro-
portion of non-attached is intermediate.
There is also a systematic gender difference: in all countries women are
less likely to decide in favour of one particular party than men. This differ-
ence is not very large, but cannot be explained, for instance, by educational
gender differences.
Question wording: upper diagram: ‘Which one of the political parties currently represented in the
Federal parliament has goals and demands that are closest to your own views and wishes?’ Indicated:
proportion of respondents not naming any party; middle and bottom diagrams: ‘Is there a particular
political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?’ Answer categories: ‘Yes’, ‘No’. Percentages
correspond to proportion of ‘No’ answers.
Sample size: Voxit: 1410–4032 per year; ESS 2006: 1804–2916; weighted data.
Source: upper diagram: Voxit cumulated data 1981–2005; middle and lower diagrams: ESS 2006.
136
Political reshaping
Distance from parties by education 1981–2006:

people without party attachment in %
70%
Low education
60%
50%
Intermediate
40%
30%
High education
20%
10%
0%
1981 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 2006
Distance from parties in the international comparison 2006

By age and country
70%
60%
50%
40%
60 years and over
30%
18–39 years
40–59 years
20%
10%
0%
DE UK ES FR CH SE
By sex and country

70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
Women
10%
Men
0%
DE UK ES FR CH SE
Source: Voxit, ESS 2006
137
Indicators
Strength of the political parties

During the past thirty years, the electoral strength of the parties on the federal
level has changed significantly, although less radically than often suggested by
the media. This change is most conspicuous in the case of the governmental
parties. The small non-governmental parties lost ground during the past
twenty years and some even disappeared altogether, usually to the benefit of
their ideological counterparts among the governmental parties.
The main change has taken place within, but not between the two ma-
jor political sides. On the one hand, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) moved
considerably to the right and won substantially more votes at the expense of
other right-wing and central parties (the Christian Democratic Party CVP, and
the Radical Party FDP), to a smaller degree also at the cost of more extreme
rightist parties. On the other hand, the Green Party of Switzerland (GPS)
won votes at the expense of the Social-Democratic Party (SPS) and of some
of the small centrist parties. Moreover, the federal elections have become ‘na-
tionalised’ as more local or regional orientations decline. Overall, the changes
since the end of the nineties add up to greater left-right polarisation in the
federal legislative body, especially in the National Council.
The governmental parties received nearly 80 percent of all votes and this
has varied little over the past 35 years. This relative stability is one expression
of the wide party-political basis of the Swiss coalition government. Further-
more, the number of political parties has varied only little during the last 40
years. In the seventies several new parties were founded – a few survived the
nineties, but the others disappeared or were absorbed by the big parties.
Parties: see list of abbreviations. Attribution left-right following Hug and Schulz (2007).
Source: SFSO, political statistics; Federal Chancellery.
138
Political reshaping
Parties in Switzerland: National Council elections 1971–2007
Strength of left-wing and central parties Strength of right-wing parties

(percentage of votes) (percentage of votes)
30% 30%
SPS
25% 25%
FDP
20% 20%
CVP
15% 15%
EVP/LdU/ SVP
GLP/CSP Extreme
10% 10% right
Extreme left parties**
parties*
5% 5%
GPS LPS
0% 0%
71 75 79 83 87 91 95 99 03 07 71 75 79 83 87 91 95 99 03 07
*PdA/PSA/Poch/FGA/Sol ** REP/SD/EDU/FPS/Lega
Cumulated voter percentage Number of parties

of the governmental parties
100% 20
80% 16
60% 12
40% 8
20% 4
0% 0
71 75 79 83 87 91 95 99 03 07 71 75 79 83 87 91 95 99 03 07
Source: SFSO, Federal Chancellery
139
Indicators
Electorate of the parties

Who votes for which party in Switzerland? The Social-Democratic Party
(SPS) and the Green Party of Switzerland (GPS) are more popular with the
young, the Christian-Democratic Party (CVP), the Radical Party (FDP) and
the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) with the old (CVP: vanishing age differences
in 2007, SPS: declining support by the young). The age gap is particularly
noticeable for the SVP. Differences also exist between the sexes, men vote
more for the SVP, women more for the SPS and the GPS.
The SPS and GPS, but also the FDP are favoured by the more highly
educated, the SVP and CVP by those low on education, but this is more
irregular: the association weakens in the case of the CVP whereas the well
educated have recently turned their backs on the SVP (2007). For the SPS,
CVP and GPS, there are hardly any differences as to income, but the higher
one’s income, the more one votes for the FDP and the less for SVP.
All in all, none of the governmental parties corresponds clearly to a social
class or category; voter support does not fit the model of class parties. Re-
fined analyses show, however, that the SPS and GPS find their constituents
particularly among well-educated, social and cultural specialists (with occupa-
tions in teaching or the social and health service areas, etc.) where working
with symbols, cultural items and human relationships plays a major role and
requires corresponding reflexive and interpersonal competencies. Thus, the
social basis of the former workers’ party, the SPS, has shifted considerably, as
has that of the SVP which took off as a farmers’ and artisans’ party. The FDP
continues to find support among managers and the self-employed.
Question wording: ‘Which party has received most of your votes?’ Parties: see list of abbreviations.
Income: ‘How would you rate your household’s income relative to the Swiss average?’ (answer categories:
‘below average’, ‘about average’, ‘above average’).
Sample size: Selects 1900 (1995), 2000 (1999), 5891 (2003), 4410 (2007). Data are – apart from usual
weights – weighted according to the official electoral outcome, because the electorate of the SPS espe-
cially is overrepresented in the survey.
Source: Selects 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007.
140
Political reshaping
Electorate of the parties 1995–2007

By age
40%
1995 18–39 years
35% 1999 40–59 years
2003 60 years +
30% 2007
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
SVP SPS FDP CVP GPS
By education
40%
1995 Low education
35% 1999 Intermediate
2003 High education
30% 2007
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
SVP SPS FDP CVP GPS
By income (own estimate)

40%
1995 Below average
35% 1999 Average
2003 Above average
30%
2007
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
SVP SPS FDP CVP GPS
Source: Selects 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007
141
Indicators
Women in politics
With regard to the proportion of women in the national parliament, Swit-
zerland occupies an intermediate position compared to other countries. In all
the countries considered here the development towards equal representation
is still underway, only Sweden has virtually reached the fifty percent mark.
Since the institution of political equality for women in Switzerland (1971),
their representation on all political bodies has been rising, although slowly.
However, the current federal government, elected at the end of 2007, is
exceptionally close to parity, with three women and four men as ministers
and a female chancellor.
All governmental parties participate in this rising trend, at least concern-
ing their representation on the National Council. The Swiss People’s Party
(SVP) boasts the lowest rate of females among its members of parliament,
the Green Party (GPS) the highest with over fifty percent. Interestingly, dur-
ing the phase of its greatest electoral success, the SVP displayed a decreasing
proportion of women.
For almost all parties, the proportion of women on the election lists is
greater than the proportion of women who are elected. This reduction in
ratio by voters’ decision has various reasons, e.g., parties wishing to show that
they are pro-women employ a ‘window-dressing’ strategy, leading them to put
women who have little chance on their lists, but also the direct resistance of
voters. So the electoral process comprises mechanisms that slow down and
hinder more rapid levelling of male/female representation. After 1999, the
number of women on the SPS and CVP lists fell to the (albeit increasing)
level of women who are elected; this can be explained by the introduction
of separate male and female lists and similar tactics (such as ‘zebra lists’ with
men and women alternating), aimed at achieving more equal distribution.
Upper diagram: Share of women elected in last election; UK: lower house 2005; US: House of Repre-
sentatives 2004; CH: National Council 2007; DE: 2005; FR: 2007; SE: 2006; ES: 2004.
Six lower diagrams: National Council. Political parties: see list of abbreviations.
Source: upper diagram: UNECE; middle diagram and six lower diagrams: SFSO, political statistics.
142
Political reshaping
Proportion of women in the national parliaments by country 1990–2007

50%
1990
40% 2000
2007
30%
20%
10%
0%
SE ES DE CH UK FR US
Proportion of women in the national and cantonal parliaments

and executive councils in Switzerland 1971–2007
50%
1971
40% 1983
1995
30%
2007
20%
10%
0%
Federal National Council of Cantonal par- Executive cantonal
Council (n=7) Council (n=200) States (n=46) liaments (n=~2850) councils (n=~162)
Proportion of women on voting lists and elected

by party in Switzerland 1971–2007
FDP CVP SVP
60%
40% On a list
On a list
On a list
20%
Elected Elected
0% Elected
71 79 87 95 03 07 71 79 87 95 03 07 71 79 87 95 03 07
SPS GPS Others
60%
On a list On a list
40%
On a list
Elected
20%
Elected
0% Elected
71 79 87 95 03 07 71 79 87 95 03 07 71 79 87 95 03 07
Source: SFSO, UNECE
143
Indicators
Consent/dissent of the governmental parties

To what extent do the governmental parties agree? The de-facto coalitions,
formed to support the parties’ voting recommendations, show that the three
bourgeois parties (FDP, CVP and SVP) most often form an alliance to counter
the Social-Democratic Party (SPS), but also that during the seventies and
nineties quite often all four governmental parties agreed; this pattern has
become rarer since the middle of the nineties. Another pattern has now be-
come more prominent: a coalition of Radicals (FDP), Christian-Democrats
(CVP) and Social-Democrats (SPS) against the Swiss People’s Party (SVP).
Other constellations remain rather marginal, although they have increased
somewhat.
A more detailed, pairwise comparison of the recommendation coalitions
shows:
first, a high degree of agreement between the bourgeois parties FDP, CVP
and SVP, that tended to decrease over the past 35 years – especially in the
case of SVP;
second, more modest – and rapidly decreasing – agreement between the SPS
and the three bourgeois parties, especially between the SPS and SVP, but after
a minimum of consensus at the end of the eighties, there is a trend towards a
more frequent alliance between the SPS, FDP and CVP against SVP;
third, extremely rare agreement between SPS and SVP, especially in the
most recent legislative period.
Overall, then, two cleavages appear, a major one between left and right
(SPS vs. bourgeois parties), and a minor one among the bourgeois parties, but
also located along the left-right dimension (SVP vs. the other two bourgeois
parties). Thus, on the level of voting recommendations too, the left-right
polarisation in Swiss politics has become more obvious.
Referenda: Include (Swiss) referenda and popular initiatives (see glossary).
Source: Simon Hug and Ioannis Papadopoulos, Résultats des votations fédérales et prises de position
des partis politiques et des groupes d’intérêt, SIDOS/FORS; Institut für Politikwissenschaft, University
of Berne; SFSO, political statistics.
144
Political reshaping
Constellation of governmental parties at national referenda 1972–2007

100%
80%
FDP/CVP/SVP/SPS
FDP/CVP/SVP vs. SPS
60%
40% FDP/CVP/SPS
vs. SVP
20%
SPS/CVP vs.
FDP/SVP
0%
72–75 76–79 81–83 84–87 88–91 92–95 96–99 00–03 04–07
Consensus between the governmental parties on national referenda

in the parliamentary terms 1972–2007
Consensus Consensus Consensus
FDP and CVP FDP and SVP CVP and SVP
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
72–75
80–83
88–91
96–99
04–07
72–75
80–83
88–91
96–99
04–07
72–75
80–83
88–91
96–99
04–07
Consensus Consensus Consensus

FDP and SPS CVP and SPS SVP and SPS
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
72–75
80–83
88–91
96–99
04–07
72–75
80–83
88–91
96–99
04–07
72–75
80–83
88–91
96–99
04–07
Source: Hug and Papadopoulos; University of Berne, SFSO
145
Indicators
Voter turnout
For a long time, a persistent cliché had it that Swiss voter participation was
on the decline. In the long term, participation in the federal elections did
decline from about 80 percent at the beginning of the 20th century, with 70
percent in the early fifties, to only 50 percent thirty years later. The mini-
mum (42.2 percent) was reached in 1995; since then the trend shows a slight
increase again, most likely as a result of the growing party polarisation. For
a long period voting participation in popular votes remained below that in
elections and varied strongly according to the individual issues (although
big variations did not start until the end of the sixties and were rather rare).
The two kinds of voting participation converged in the eighties and vary in
parallel since then.
Nevertheless, the differences in turnout between the cantons remain large
(elections: between 20 percent and 65 percent). Schaffhausen, where a voter’s
failure to participate is traditionally sanctioned by a fine (albeit rather a sym-
bolic one), is the undisputed leader. The particularly low participation rates
in the two cantons of Appenzell, in Uri and Glaris result most likely from
the fact that pre-election party agreements are particularly frequent in these
cantons and these reduce the decisional value of such elections.
An international comparison in this area is only possible with respect to
elections, but even there it is problematic. The coexistence of elections, ref-
erenda and other votes, exist in no other country (despite scattered referenda
in some countries and systematic voting on the state level in parts of the
USA). Furthermore, the strong federalism, implying the equal importance
of cantonal and federal elections, diminishes the perceived importance of the
latter. It comes, therefore, as no surprise that electoral participation is lower
in Switzerland than in most comparable countries.
Upper diagram: Referenda: average, maximal and minimal turnout per legislative period. Include (Swiss)
referenda and popular initiatives (see glossary).
Elections: Turnout at the elections for the National Council.
Middle diagram: without NW (silent vote). Names of cantons: see list of abbreviations.
Lower diagram: election years (for national parliament): see CD. Countries: see list of abbreviations.
Source: upper and middle diagrams: SFSO, political statistics; lower diagram: International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).
146
Political reshaping
Voter turnout in elections and referenda in Switzerland 1948–2007

100%
Maximal Elections for National Council
turnout Referenda
80%
60%
40%
20% Minimal
turnout
0%
48–51 56–59 64–67 72–75 80–83 88–91 96–99 04–07
Voter turnout 2007 by canton (National Council)

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
SH ZG LU SZ NE BS FR AG SG CH VD AR UR
OW VS ZH SO BL TI GE TG BE JU GR GL AI
Voter turnout at last national elections by country (National parliaments)

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
MT BE AT SE DE ES PT UK FR LT
LU DK IT NL GR FI IE US CH PL
Source: SFSO, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
147
Indicators
Governmental consent and voting results

Consent or dissent among the governmental parties ostensibly influences
the acceptance rates in popular votes. If all the governmental parties agree
to recommend acceptance, a large majority can be expected to follow this
recommendation, if they agree to recommend refusal, a maximum of negative
votes is likely. If the situation is mixed, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) carries
more weight than the Social-Democratic Party (SPS): if the SVP goes against
a coalition of the three other governmental parties, it exercises more influence
on the vote than if the SPS is in the same position. Moreover, recommending
a ‘deviant No’ when the three other parties say ‘Yes’ is more likely to be heard
than a ‘deviant Yes’ against three parties who say ‘No’. However, one should
also consider that the parties tend to recommend deviant stands only if they
feel the odds are on their side.
At the beginning of the eighties and nineties, and again since 2004, the
refusal rate encountered by the SPS resembled that of the bourgeois parties.
In the period between, the two sides were farther apart in the voters’ favour.
These temporal variations coincide largely with those in the ‘bourgeois parties
vs. SPS’ recommendation pattern.
Overall, the voters tend to follow the recommendations of the govern-
mental parties less than in the past – which contrasts with the trend towards
growing trust in various political bodies (indicator Political trust).
Governmental parties: FDP, CVP, SPS, SVP (Names of parties: see list of abbreviations).
Voting defeats: Percentages correspond to the proportion of defeats in all referenda.
Source: Simon Hug and Ioannis Papadopoulos, Résultats des votations fédérales et prises de position
des partis politiques et des groupes d’intérêt, SIDOS/FORS; University of Berne, Institut für Poli-
tikwissenschaft; SFSO, political statistics.
148
Political reshaping
Voting results by disagreement constellation between the governmental parties:

average proportion of 'Yes' votes at referenda 1981–2007
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10% Majority of governmental parties in favour Majority of governmental parties against
0%
All yes 3 Yes, 3 Yes, 3 Yes, 3 No, 3 No, 3 No, All no
SPS free* SPS No SVP No SVP Yes SPS Yes SPS free*
* No voting recommendation
Defeats FDP Defeats CVP

80% 80%
60% 60%
40% 40%
20% 20%
0% 0%
72–75 80–83 88–91 96–99 04–07 72–75 80–83 88–91 96–99 04–07
Defeats SVP Defeats SPS

80% 80%
60% 60%
40% 40%
20% 20%
0% 0%
72–75 80–83 88–91 96–99 04–07 72–75 80–83 88–91 96–99 04–07
Source: Hug and Papadopoulos; University of Berne, SFSO
149
Indicators
Regional voting differences

In most voting results, there are considerable differences between cantons and
between municipalities. The underlying logic of these differences depends on
the interests involved in the issues at stake.
Chronologically speaking, these differences do not evolve linearly. Larger
differences between the German- and French-speaking parts of the country
were more frequent in the nineties than before or after (especially since 2000).
This may be due to the fact that the political preferences of these two parts
of the country develop along diverging lines. But it may also result from the
variety of issues voted on in the different periods – matters where the diver-
gence of interests is particularly related to language-specific cultures may not
have been equally distributed. Large differences appeared, for example, when
voting on the relation with the European Union and on private traffic; both
of these took place in the nineties.
Large urban-rural differences have become more and more rare. The
population composition in most rural localities has become ‘rurbanised’ in
the past thirty years. Many rural municipalities have been integrated into the
commuting zones around the larger cities, and urbanites tend to move to the
periurban fringes, especially when they have children. Therefore, rural condi-
tions proper exist very rarely and only in weakly populated peripheral regions
that do not weigh heavily in the voting. This implies that the urban-rural
distinction used here tends to be blurred and expresses numerical relationships
rather than qualitative differences between the two types of social context.
Middle diagram: Distinction urban/rural according to definition SFSO. Details: see CD.
Source: SFSO, political statistics.
150
Political reshaping
Divergent voting behaviour at national referenda

Voting differences between the German- and French-speaking regions
by 'Yes' voting differences in % of all referenda
Referenda 1981–1989 15– over
under 10% 10–15% 20% 20%
Referenda 1990–1999
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Voting differences between town and country over

by 'Yes' voting differences in % of all referenda 20%
Referenda 1981–1989 under 10% 10–15% 15–

20%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Referenda with Referenda with

• 'Yes' in French-speaking region (over 50%) • 'Yes' in German-speaking region (over 50%)
• 'No' in German-speaking region Difference • 'No' in French-speaking region Difference
'Yes' 'Yes'
Obligatory seat belts

Speed-limit initiative (89) 24% 42%
in motor vehicles (80)
1980– Stamp duty: abolition

National Sugar Industry (86) 16% 1989 of cantonal portion (80) 26%
Redistribution of revenues
Risk Guarantee (86) 16% from duty on alcohol (80) 26%
Maternity Benefit Motorway vignette

34% (94) 24%
Scheme (99)
European Economic Duty on goods

Area (92)
33% 1990– traffic (94) 22%
1999
Constitutional Article: Financing of unemployment
Agriculture (95) 22% benefits (97) 22%
Change in the law on Law on the electricity

income compensation (04) 28% market (02) 17%
Easier naturalisation for 2000– Against abuse of

3rd generation foreigners (04) 24% 2007 the right to asylum (02) 11%
Easier naturalisation for Obligatory unemployment insurance

2nd generation foreigners (04) 24% and insolvency compensation (02) 10%
Source: SFSO
151
Indicators
Every society is involved in a complicated ‘metabolism’ with its natural environ-
ment – this fact is obvious enough nowadays to need no specific explanation.
Since the inception of industrialisation, this basically indispensable process
of material exchange has evolved into a unilateral plundering of resources
by human societies at the expense of nature, so much so that the return to
a more sustainable, ‘egalitarian’ model of exchange has become ever more
vital, but also more difficult. However, the public’s perception of ecological
problems and the interests of the body politic do not necessarily coincide
with scientifically established priorities for change. The documentation of
developments in this area is, therefore, an integral part of any overview of
major societal structures and processes.
Four groups of indicators are considered: Firstly, the actual burden on the
environment concerning Passenger traffic, Transportation of goods, Final energy
consumption, Transformation of the countryside, Diversity of species and protection
of the countryside, Water use, Air pollution, and Climate and greenhouse gases.
Secondly, the perception of environmental problems, more exactly,
Evaluation of threats to the environment, Ecological awareness and Opinions
on environmental policies.
Thirdly, behaviour with regard to the environment: Ecological commitment,
Ecological behaviour, Waste management and recycling.
Fourthly, a comprehensive measure of environmental overexploitation,
i.e., the Ecological footprint of society.
153
Indicators
Passenger traffic
Since the middle of the 20th century overall traffic volume has increased,
although the increase has somewhat weakened since the eighties. Between
1960 and 2005 the volume of passenger traffic has multiplied fourfold. The
temporary reduction at the beginning of the nineties may be due to the reces-
sion in that period, but this is questionable, as the method of measurement
for private (road) traffic was changed in 1994 and for rail traffic in 1995. The
growth is largely attributable to private traffic, above all to motor vehicles,
its most important form. The regular increase in commuting (from about
ten percent at the beginning of the 20th century to roughly two-thirds of the
employed population today) is the major motor of this development.
Overall, the proportion of public transport remains constant, but shows
a slight tendency to increase since the middle of the eighties, especially with
regard to rail travel. This is probably due to the expansion of services by
the Federal railway company, particularly the introduction of the so-called
‘S‑Bahn’ (fast local trains) in the large agglomerations, and also the extension
of tram and bus services in some larger cities (Geneva, Lausanne, Zurich); in
contrast to big cities abroad, however, there are no real underground systems
in Switzerland. Despite its relative modesty, the proportion of public transport
in Switzerland is among the highest internationally.
With respect to the traffic volume per person and its modal mix, i.e., the
combination of the means of transport used daily, Switzerland is ahead of all
other countries except the USA; the proportion of public transport (buses,
railway) is higher than in all other countries in our comparison, even though
the differences between European countries are quite small.
Upper and middle diagrams: Data on passenger kilometres are not based on surveys, but on modelling.
In 1995, the SBB implemented a new method of data collection for rail traffic. From 1994 onwards,
the method for private motor traffic was adapted to new data sources.
Billion = thousand million.
Source: upper and middle diagrams: SFSO, Swiss transport statistics; lower diagram: OECD Environ-
mental Data Compendium.
154
Passenger kilometres in total and for rail and road 1960–2005

120
Billion
p-km Total
100
80
Private motor traffic
60
40
Public transport Rail traffic

20 (road)
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Percentages of total passenger kilometres for rail and road traffic 1960–2005
100%
80%
Private motor traffic
60%
40%
Public transport Rail traffic

20% (road)
0%
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Passenger traffic 2005: km per person and country

30000
Private cars
Buses and coaches
25000
Rail
20000
15000
10000
5000 *without
Northern
Ireland
0
US (2004) CH FR UK* SE ES DE
Source: SFSO, OECD
155
Indicators
Transportation of goods
The increase in goods traffic is even greater than in passenger traffic, it is has
multiplied fivefold in the same period, but it varies more, parallel with the
business cycle.
Over a long period, road and rail transport developed inversely, so that at
the beginning of the eighties the proportion of road traffic overtook that of
rail. Since the nineties the proportion has remained stable, but new forms of
combined road and rail traffic (the so-called ‘piggyback’ system, containers
etc., not visible in our diagram) are steadily increasing. The near future will
show whether the more ecological railway can improve its share vis-à-vis the
road. As in other areas, not only the availability of various options is crucial,
but also their relative price and other regulations.
Concerning the intensity of goods traffic, Germany is the leader among the
countries in this comparison, Switzerland is in third place. The proportional
importance of Swiss rail transport is higher than elsewhere. Except in the
USA, the proportion of road transport is greater than that of rail.
Upper and middle diagrams: Data in tonne kilometres refer to inland transportation of goods and are
not based on surveys, but on modelling.
Billion = thousand million.
Source: upper and middle diagrams: SFSO, Swiss transport statistics; lower diagram: OECD Environ-
mental Data Compendium.
156
Goods transport: tonne kilometres in total and for rail and road 1960–2005
30
Billion t-km
25
Total
20
15 Road transport
10
Rail transport
5
0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Percentages of total tonne kilometres for rail and road transport 1960–2005
80%
70%
Road transport
60%
50%
40%
Rail transport
30%
20%
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Goods transport in thousand tonne kilometres per km2 and country 2005
1000
Road transport
in 1000
t-km/km2 Rail transport
800
600
400
*without
200 Northern
Ireland
0
DE UK* CH ES US (2004) FR SE
Source: SFSO, OECD
157
Indicators
Final energy consumption

Since 1950, total energy consumption has multiplied more than four times.
Coal and wood were the main sources of energy in the immediate post-war
period, then they decreased significantly, but did not entirely disappear. The
proportion of electricity has steadily increased, although the growth of three
sources of energy that produce CO2, i.e., gas, petrol and oil, is even greater.
Renewable sources of energy started to develop in the eighties, but remain
marginal. Hydroelectric power contributes to about half of Swiss electricity
production, nuclear power to two-fifths, and this is still increasing.
In the international comparison of energy sources, the Swiss combination
relies rather heavily on petrol, as well as on hydroelectric power (only Sweden
is higher), with an intermediate proportion of nuclear power. The energetic
dependency of the country is considerable, about four-fifths of the total pri-
mary energy consumed has to be imported (petrol, gas, nuclear fuel).
Energy consumption per capita, compared to that of other highly indus-
trialised countries, is rather low and has stabilised since the middle of the
eighties, similar to the USA, Sweden, and Germany. Only France and, to an
even greater extent, Spain (backlog demand in industrialisation?) show an
uninhibited increase over the same period.
Upper diagram: Final energy consumption is mostly composed of secondary energy sources such as
electricity, fuel or heating oil and is net of own consumption of the energy sector, transformation and
distribution losses. One tonne of oil-equivalent is defined as 107 kilocalories (41.868 gigajoules).
Middle and lower diagrams: Total primary energy supply (TPES) refers to primary energy sources and
equals production plus imports minus exports plus/minus stock changes.
Source: upper diagram: Swiss Federal Office of Energy, overall energy statistics; middle and lower dia-
grams: OECD Factbook 2007.
158
Final energy consumption by energy source 1950–2006

1000 District heating,
Mio. waste, other renewable
Gigajoules
energy sources
800
Heating oil
600
Motor fuel
400
200 Electricity
Gas
0 Coal, Wood
1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 2006
Energy consumption for five energy sources in percent by country 2005

100%
Others
Natural
80% gas Hydro-
power
60% Petroleum
40%
Coal Nuclear
20%
energy
0%
US SE DE FR UK CH ES
Energy consumption per capita by country 1975–2005

8
Tonnes oil 1975
equivalents 1985
1995
6 2005
1
US SE DE FR UK CH ES
Source: SFOE, OECD
159
Indicators
Transformation of the countryside

The pressure of civilisation on the natural environment results basically
from the latter’s subordination to societal priorities, particularly those of an
economic kind. How do those parts of the countryside survive that have no
immediate socioeconomic usefulness? Hedges were strongly recommended
for ecological reasons after the seventies and effectively increased until the
1984–1995 period, after having almost been systematically eliminated be-
fore, because of lack of profitability. The existence of ‘small structures’, i.e.
single or groups of trees and fruit trees, has been more directly affected by
the pressure of civilisation.
Other elements of the countryside have grown again since the eighties
despite their lack of commercial interest. This is only slightly true for marshes
(humid habitats) – more so for forests, with an uneven, but uninterrupted
increase. This latter development is due to a variety of – sometimes conflict-
ing – reasons (e.g. legal protection of forests and the natural reforestation of
unused pastures).
Most non-agricultural uses (roads, buildings, etc.) dissect the countryside.
The mean size of non-dissected areas measures changes of this kind; since
1935 dissection has been steadily on the rise. The Swiss plateau and Jura
regions are traditionally so dissected by dense infrastructure that a further
increase is hardly possible. In the mountain regions (the Alps) this process
developed quite rapidly in recent decades, but slowed down somewhat after
1980. Dissection of the countryside reduces, among others things, the habitat
of wildlife and their chances of meeting and reproduction.
Upper and middle diagrams: Transformation of the countryside has been analysed based on the changes
in maps (sample survey of surface areas). Periods of observation correspond to the rhythm with which
Swiss maps have been renewed (e.g. the 1972–1977 edition is compared to 1978–1983 edition; in the
diagrams, however, only the last year is shown). Single trees: detached trees, trees in a group or array which
are not part of the open forest or hedges. Hedges: striking array of trees or bushes.
Lower diagram: territories below 2100m. The geometry of dissection is based on the criteria of possible
settlement, i.e. areas such as glaciers and lakes have been excluded. The following are considered as barriers
or elements of dissection: motorways, roads (classes 1–3), tracks, settlements, rivers, lakes and mountains
(territories above 2100m).
Source: upper and middle diagrams: Countryside under pressure, 3rd update. Period of observation
1989–2003. FOEN 2007; lower diagram: Jaeger et al. (2007).
160
Transformation of 'small structures' and stream courses 1977–2003

200000
Hedges (m) Stream courses (m) Single trees and Fruit trees
groups of trees (number)
150000 (number)
100000
50000
0
1977–1983
1983–1989
1989–1995
1995–2003
–50000
–100000
Transformation of the countryside in hectares 1977–2003

2000
ha
1750
1500
1250
1000
750
1977–1983
1983–1989
1989–1995
1995–2003
500
250
0
–250
Forests Bushes Lakes, ponds Marshes
Dissection of the countryside 1935–2002:

average size of a non-dissected area in km2
700 North of Alps South of Alps
in km2
600
500
Central Alps
400
Switzerland
300
200
100 Central Plain Jura

0
1935 1960 1980 2000
Source: FOEN
161
Indicators
Diversity of species and protection of the

countryside
For a long time it has been predicted that the increasing pressure of civilisation
(not only through climate change) will threaten nature and even eliminate
an increasing number of species; there now exist systematic inventories to
quantify and confirm this. The various groups of species are threatened to
different degrees: reptiles are an endangered species, but of the endemic mam-
mals half are still judged to be non-threatened and a sixth ‘only’ potentially
threatened. It is among the fish that the highest number of species has already
disappeared. Some of the reasons for this development are highlighted by the
indicator Transformation of the countryside.
Defining protected areas is a particularly effective measure of protection.
The distinction between various degrees of protection shows that the increase
in strongly protected areas is much slower than in less protected ones.
Nevertheless, Switzerland belongs to the leading group of countries in
this realm, along with the United Kingdom and Germany, whereas countries
like Sweden or Spain, and also France, have been less active. It goes without
saying that protection is more urgent in a densely populated country like
Switzerland.
Upper diagram: Status 1994 to 2007 by species. Threat categories indicate the estimated risk of a spe-
cies becoming extinct over a specified period (see www.bafu.admin.ch).
Middle and lower diagrams: land in protected areas as a percentage of total land area.
Source: upper and middle diagrams: FOEN; lower diagram: OECD Environmental Data Compendium.
162
Biodiversity: endangered species in percent of all known species 2007

80%
Potentially endangered
70% Endangered and vulnerable
60% Disappeared or extinct
50%
(snails and mussels)

40%
flowering plants
Breeding birds
30%
Amphibians
Ferns and
Mammals
20%
Molluscs
Reptiles
Mosses
Lichens
Insects
rooms
Mush-
10%
Fish
0%
National nature reserves: as a percentage of total area
Switzerland 1961–2005
35%
*Water fowl and migratory bird sanctuaries,
30% areas with federal shooting bann, countryside Nature reserves
and natural monuments of national importance (incl. strongly
25% **National parks, moors and fens, meadows, protected areas)*
amphibian spawning grounds, marshland
20%
15%
10%
5% Strongly protected areas**

0%
1961 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 2005
Nature reserves by country 2004

35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
DE UK CH US FR ES SE
Source: FOEN, OECD
163
Indicators
Water use
The use of drinking water seems to have become less wasteful: despite popula-
tion growth, the volume from the three different forms of water abstraction
has remained stable since the seventies.
Water consumption per capita (households/manual trades as well as trade/
industry) has decreased over the past thirty years, during a period when not
only the population but also economic activity have increased – another indi-
cation of the growing thriftiness in the use of this environmental resource.
Water quality was one of the first topics to get into the public debate after
the sixties and this led to the appropriate measures (like the general installa-
tion of sewage works). These measures became effective during the seventies
and the phosphate content of nearly all Swiss lakes improved, therefore, from
the eighties onwards.
The international comparison shows Switzerland to be a country with
relatively low intensity of water abstraction (per capita and day).
Lower diagram: Freshwater abstraction (surface and groundwater). Freshwater is mainly used for public
water supplies, irrigation, industrial processes and cooling of electric power plants. Definitions and es-
timation methods employed may vary considerably between countries. Switzerland: values from 2002,
USA: values from 2000. Details: see CD.
Source: two upper diagrams: Association of Swiss Water and Gas Producers (SVGW); upper lower dia-
gram: FOEN; lower diagram: OECD Environmental Data Compendium.
164
Fresh water abstraction 1945–2005

1200
Million m3
1000 Lake water
800
Ground water
600
400
200 Spring water

0
1945 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 2005
Fresh water consumption 1975–2005

300
Litres per
person
and day
Households and manual trades
200
150
Trade and industry
100
50
1975 80 85 90 95 00 2005
Phosphate level in Swiss lakes 1951–2006

300
250
Lake of Hallwil
200
Lake of Lake of Zug
150 Lucerne
Lake of
Neuchâtel Lake of
100 Constance
50
0
1951 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 2005
Fresh water abstraction by country 2002

5000
Litres per
person
and day
3000
2000
1000
0
US (2000) ES FR DE (2004) CH SE UK (2003)
Source: SVGW (Association of Swiss Water and Gas Producers), FOEN, OECD
165
Indicators
Air pollution
Today, humans, animals and plants no longer breathe ‘pure air, but a polluted
mixture of varying strength’ (Federal Office for the Environment). The emis-
sion of some dangerous air pollutants has been reduced by various measures
(periodic measurement, definition of threshold values, compulsory filters,
etc.). This is most clearly the case for volatile organic compounds and carbon
monoxide, as well as for nitrous oxide and sulphur dioxide, but does not
apply to respirable dust. Emissions of carbon dioxide (see indicator Climate
and greenhouse gases) and ozone, however, are still increasing.
Sulphur dioxide is released into the environment mainly by industry and
trade, carbon monoxide principally by road traffic. The latter is also mainly
responsible for the emission of nitrous oxide, even if its contribution has
slowed down in the past 15–20 years. Industry and trade reduced emissions
over a long period, but these have stagnated since the eighties. Nowadays,
volatile organic compounds stem only to a small degree from traffic, the
proportion of industry and trade increased over a lengthy period but has
decreased again over the last ten years.
Emissions of the different pollutants vary considerably, and the most im-
portant contributors differ as well. There are first signs that general controls
will be introduced for this particularly vital form of environmental damage,
but as yet no results are visible.
For detailed explanations of pollutants see glossary.
Source: FOEN, SFSO.
166
Emission of air pollutants in thousand tonnes 1950–2005

Sulphur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, non-methane Carbon monoxide
volatile organic compound, particulate matter
350 1500
in 1000 t Non-methane volatile in 1000 t
organic compound
300
1200
250
Oxides
200 of nitrogen
900
150
Carbon monixide
100
Sulphur 600
50 dioxide
Particulate matter
0 300
50 60 70 80 90 00 05 50 60 70 80 90 00 05
Principal emitters of four air pollutants in percent 1950–2005

Sulphur dioxide (SO2) Oxides of nitrogen (NOx)
80% 80%
Industry Transport
60% 60%
40% 40%
20% 20%
Industry
Transport
0% 0%
50 60 70 80 90 00 05 50 60 70 80 90 00 05
Non-methane volatile organic compound Carbon monoxide (CO)

(NMVOC)
80% 80%
Transport
60% 60%
Industry
40% 40%
Transport
20% 20%
Industry
0% 0%
50 60 70 80 90 00 05 50 60 70 80 90 00 05
Source: FOEN, SFSO
167
Indicators
Climate and greenhouse gases

The emission of carbon dioxide (CO2) in Switzerland has been on the increase
for a long time, but this increase has slowed somewhat since the early seventies,
compared to the twenty years before. The curve showing the total volume of
greenhouse gases – measured since 1990 – lies slightly higher than that of
CO2 and is parallel to it, underscoring the decisive role of this specific gas.
Road traffic is the leading contributor to greenhouse gases. Households
and industry follow with nearly the same proportions, whereas on the whole,
the (large) service sector and the (small) agricultural sector cause less damage
to the climate. Between 1990 and 2005, these proportions hardly changed.
Emission intensity of CO2 varies greatly for the countries in this com-
parison and has also evolved differently in the individual countries since the
seventies. The USA are mostly the number one, Germany was very near to
them up to the seventies, but dropped to a significantly lower level when
abandoning coal mining (which continued to play an important role in the
German Democratic Republic). Switzerland, with no domestic coal, has the
lowest figures. Except for Spain, where the figures are continuously climbing,
and for Switzerland with stable values, the CO2 intensity for the countries
compared tends to diminish, but only some of the EU countries are likely to
attain their reduction goals prescribed by the Kyoto protocol.
After years of revisionist campaigns, there can be no doubt about the
anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases being a direct motor of global
warming, and even less that this warming is having observable and (poten-
tially) damaging consequences. One of these consequences is the acceleration
or earlier appearance of various biological processes. The cherry blossom is
one example among many – for twenty years, it has been appearing earlier
and earlier.
Upper two diagrams: Greenhouse gases: Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O),
synthetic gases. In 1990, the method of measuring CO2 was changed. CO2-equivalents: sum of all
greenhouse gases; Non-CO2 emissions have been converted according to their global warming poten-
tial (IPCC 1999).
Middle diagram: CO2 emissions from energy use.
Lower diagram: Moving average, see glossary.
Source: two upper diagrams: FOEN; SFSO; middle diagram: OECD Environmental Data Compen-
dium; lower diagram: Meteo Switzerland.
168
Greenhouse gas emissions 1950–2005 Greenhouse gas emissions by sector

60 1990 and 2005
Million tonnes Total greenhouse gases
CO2-
equivalents Waste
Agriculture Industry
6%
11% 22%
40 5%
CO2 Emissions 13% 22%
30 29% 28% 1990 10% 10% Services
22%
20 Transport 22%
2005 Households
10
1950 60 70 80 90 2005
CO2-Emissions 1974–2004 by country

25
Tonnes
per capita 1974
1984
20
1994
2004
15
10
0
US DE UK SE FR ES CH
Flowering dates of cherry trees in Liestal 1950–2005

Number of days from the beginning of the year.
140
Days
10-year moving
average
120
100
80
Annual values
60
40
1950 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 2005
Source: FOEN, OECD, Meteo Switzerland
169
Indicators
Evaluation of threats to the environment

The Swiss population evaluates the degree of danger connected with nine
environmental problems very differently. The first place goes to the greenhouse
effect and global warming (between 1994 and 2007 the frequency of their
mention in surveys rose from 54 percent to 82 percent). Only slightly behind
this is the diminishing biodiversity, whereas antennas for mobile phones, the
personal use of these phones, genetic engineering in human medicine and
science, and high-voltage power lines appear to be least dangerous.
Education has a weak and variable influence on the perception of dan-
ger. For seven out of the nine examples of environmental problems, higher
education reduces the perceived threat potential, the exceptions being the
greenhouse-gas effect and road traffic, which are more often seen as important
sources of danger.
Personal positioning on the left-right dimension appears to be more im-
portant for threat perception than education; leftist respondents see greater
threats than centre- or rightist-oriented ones in all cases. However, the dif-
ferences are very small for the four least ‘dangerous’ items.
There is some variation between the linguistic regions, but this is smaller
than popular wisdom would have it – in the media, for instance – and does
not really correspond to current stereotypes. The perception of danger is high-
est for all nine items in the Ticino; differences between the German- and the
French-speaking parts of the country do not always exist, but where they do,
some dangers are feared more strongly by the German-speaking population
(e.g. road traffic), others by the French-speaking (nuclear power stations).
Question wording: Example: ‘How dangerous do you think the greenhouse effect and global warming
are for humans and the environment? Answer categories: scale from 1 (not dangerous at all) to 5 (very
dangerous). Percentages correspond to respondents who indicated values 4 and 5. Detailed question
wording: see CD.
Political orientation: Self-placement on scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right): left: values 0–3; centre: values
Sample size: Swiss Survey on the Environment 2007: 3369; weighted data.
Source: Swiss Survey on the Environment 2007, ETH Zurich.
170
Evaluation of threats to humans and the environment 2007

Answers with 'high' in %
By education
100%
80%
60%
High education
Low education
40%
Intermediate
20%
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
By political orientation
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
Centre
Right
Left
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
By linguistic region
100%
80%
German-speaking part of Switzerland
French-speaking part of Switzerland
Italian-speaking part of Switzerland
60%
40%
20%
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Greenhouse effect and global warming 6 Mobile phone masts

2 Loss of biodiversity 7 Use of mobile phones
3 Atomic and nuclear power stations 8 Genetic engineering
4 Genetic engineering in food production in medicine and research
5 Environmental pollution and accidents through motor traffic 9 High tension lines
Source: Swiss Survey on the Environment 2007
171
Indicators
Ecological awareness
Two aspects of ecological awareness are widely accepted in Switzerland: the
necessity for restricting the living standard and the idea of an impending eco-
logical catastrophe (about two-thirds of the population). Correspondingly few
people feel that, on the contrary, ecological problems are being exaggerated,
and this proportion has continued to decrease since 1994. The proportion
of those who consider there is a fundamental connection between economic
growth and environmental hazard, however, has diminished even more.
Education and political orientation affect awareness considerably – in
the case of education in an apparently contradictory way. Respondents with
higher education are less likely to believe that ecological problems are exag-
gerated, but they also seem to agree less with the necessity for restrictions
– however, there is so little difference that it seems more correct to conclude
that there is no association. The relationship with left-right orientation is
more straightforward: leftist respondents agree more often with restrictions
and disagree more strongly with the exaggeration claim.
International differences in ecological awareness are relatively large, es-
pecially for the idea of restrictions, which is best accepted in Switzerland,
whereas the exaggeration claim is more evenly distributed internationally.
In all countries, there is a coherent relationship with age: older people more
often find arguments regarding environmental hazard exaggerated and are
less ready to accept the idea of restrictions on the living standard.
Question wording: upper and middle diagrams: ‘I will now read you a series of statements. Please tell me,
for each statement, how far you would agree’. Statements: see legend below diagram; lower diagram: for
exact question wording, see CD.
Answer categories: see CD. Percentages correspond to respondents who (mostly) agreed or were very/
fairly willing to accept the statement.
Sample size: Swiss Survey on the Environment 1994: 2900; Swiss Survey on the Environment 2007:
3369; ISSP 2000: 958–1501; weighted data.
Source: Swiss Survey on the Environment 1994 and 2007, ETH Zurich; ISSP 2000.
172
Ecological awareness: Agreement with statement in %

Development in Switzerland 1994–2007
80%
60%
40%
20%
1994
2007
0%
1 2 3 4
Switzerland by education 2007 Switzerland by political orientation 2007

80% 80%
60% 60%
40% 40%
Intermediate
20% 20%
Centre
Right
High
Low
Left
0% 0%
1 2 1 2
1 Everyone should accept cuts in the standard of living in order to protect the environment
2 Many of the claims about environmental threats are exaggerated
3 Economic growth always harms the environment
4 If we continue like this, we shall head towards an environmental catastrophe
By age and country 2000

80% 18–39 years
1 40–59 years
60 years +
60%
40%
20%
*without
2 Northern
Ireland
0%
CH SE DE ES US UK*
Source: Swiss Survey on the Environment 1994, 2007; ISSP 2000
173
Indicators
Opinions on environmental policies

In the Swiss population, opinions on some of the environmental policies
vary considerably. There is a general consensus that particle filters should be
made compulsory (although this is far from being realised), whereas for the
other measures evaluated acceptance lies between 20 percent (higher parking
fees and lower speed limits on motorways) and 60 percent (higher taxes on
fuel). Higher education strengthens agreement with all measures, but the
association is variable and rather weak.
All measures are more readily accepted by respondents of left-wing rather
than centre or right-wing orientation; the item with the highest acceptance,
compulsory particle filters, shows the lowest differences.
The linguistic regions do not differ much. Some of the measures (particle
filters, fuel taxes, road pricing) show highest acceptance in the German-
speaking part of Switzerland and lowest in the Ticino, others (speed limits,
parking fees) highest acceptance in the German-speaking part, but lowest
in the French-speaking part, whereas the nuclear moratorium finds highest
acceptance in the French-speaking part of the country.
Overall there is a certain contradiction between the rather low accept-
ance of most of the measures proposed and the considerable agreement with
the idea of restrictions on the living standard (see the indicator of Ecological
awareness).
Question wording: ‘For the protection of the environment, different measures have been proposed.
What do you think of the following measures?’ Answer categories: ‘strongly against’, ‘mostly against’,
‘neither in favour nor against’, ‘mostly in favour’, ‘strongly in favour’. Percentages correspond to re-
spondents who were strongly/mostly in favour.
Sample size: Swiss Survey on the Environment 2007: 2789; weighted data.
Source: Swiss Survey on the Environment 2007, ETH Zurich.
174
Agreement with environmental measures in percent 2007

By education
100%
80%
60%
High education
Low education
40%
Intermediate
20%
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
By political orientation
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
Centre
Right
Left
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
By linguistic region
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Particle filters for diesel cars 5 Road pricing/City toll charge

2 Tax on petrol and diesel 6 Temporary speed limit 80 km/h on motor-
3 Moratorium for atomic power stations ways (reduction of particulate matter in winter)
4 Temporary speed limit 80 km/h 7 Increased parking fees in cities
on motorways (reduction of ozone 8 Speed limit 100 km/h on motorways
in summer)
Source: Swiss Survey on the Environment 2007
175
Indicators
Ecological commitment
The commitment to ecologist concerns has changed little since 1994, although
there is a slightly diminishing tendency to sign petitions and give money (see
indicator of Political mobilisation). More active forms of commitment are
rarer than these two, as can be expected (see indicator of Political activities),
but their frequency has hardly changed.
Higher education and leftist interests strongly favour ecologist commit-
ment; age differences are rather small.
Differences between the linguistic regions are not very pronounced. More
interestingly, they correspond only partly to popular stereotypes: German-
speaking respondents are least ready to sign petitions on this topic (but are
more willing when it comes to giving money), whereas the French-speaking
sign and participate in protest actions, etc., more often than the other two
language groups.
Switzerland shows the highest level of ecologist commitment in the in-
ternational comparison, at least concerning the two more frequent forms.
Personal engagement is similarly rare in all countries, in Spain monetary
contributions are as rare as personal commitment. In Germany, giving money
takes an intermediate position between signing and personal commitment,
whereas signing is only slightly below that in the other countries, including
Switzerland. More generally speaking, the international differences reflect
the well-known relationship between national wealth and strength of eco-
logical awareness: the richer the country, the more developed its ecologist
commitment is.
Question wording: ‘In the last five years, have you … signed a petition about an environmental issue?
… given money to an environmental group? … taken part in a protest or demonstration, collected
signatures or money, contributed in another way to the protection of the environment?’ For detailed
question wording lower diagram, see CD. Answer categories: ‘Yes I have’, ‘No I have not’. Percentages
correspond to respondents who answered ‘Yes I have’.
2789; ISSP 2000: 958–1501; weighted data.
Source: Swiss Survey on the Environment 1994 und 2007, ETH Zurich; ISSP 2000.
176
Ecologist commitment in the last five years in %
Development in Switzerland 1994–2007 Switzerland by education 2007

60%
50%
40%
30%
Intermediate
20%
10%
1994
2000
2007
High
Low
0%
1 2 3 1 2 3
Switzerland by political orientation 2007 Switzerland by linguistic region 2007

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
Centre
10%
Right
Left
0%
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 Signed a petition about an environmental issue

2 Gave money to an environmental group
3 Took part in a protest or demonstration, collected signatures or money,
contributed in another way to the protection of the environment
By country 2000
60%
50%
1
40% 2
1 1
30%
2 1 2 1 2
20% 2
1
10% *without 2 3
3 3 Northern
Ireland 3 3 3
0%
CH DE UK* SE US ES
Source: Swiss Survey on the Environment 1994, 2007; ISSP 2000
177
Indicators
Ecological behaviour
Environmental stress results from human behaviour in many areas, one of
them being the area of consumption. Switching off the lights when leaving
a room remains the number-one example of eco-friendly behaviour over the
thirteen-year period. Using recycled paper has lost some of its attractiveness,
the use of energy-saving light bulbs has increased. Further practices are also
popular, others less so. Flying rarely for private purposes and rarely consum-
ing organic products are likely to be based on financial considerations rather
than on ecologist ones.
This is confirmed by the differences between income classes, especially for
private flying, but also for organic products. That people with higher incomes
more often have season tickets for public transport probably has less to do
with the cost aspect than with the fact that those with higher social status
travel more often. Some examples are ‘inversely’ associated with income: those
with higher income less often use recycled toilet paper and are less zealous
in switching off their TV completely. Ostensibly, eco-friendly behaviour is
easier if it also diminishes expenses.
The relationship with general political orientation is coherent and cor-
responds to other indicators: left-wing people are more prone to respect
ecological criteria in their everyday behaviour (except with regard to cold
temperatures indoors and flying).
Question wording: Example: ‘Do you turn off the light (with a normal bulb) when you leave a room for a
short time, for example, for a quarter of an hour?’ Answer categories: ‘Yes I do’, ‘No I don’t’. Percentages
correspond to respondents who answered ‘Yes’.
Income: Monthly equivalent household income: see Glossary.
3369; weighted data.
Source: Swiss Survey on the Environment 1994 and 2007, ETH Zurich.
178
'Which of the following measures do you put into practice?'

Percentage of replies with 'yes' 1994 and 2007
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
1994
2007
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percentage of replies with 'yes' by political orientation 2007

100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
Centre
Right
Left
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Percentage of replies with 'yes' by income 2007

100%
80%
60%
More than Fr. 6000
Less than Fr. 4000
Fr. 4000–6000
40%
20%
0%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Turning off lights 6 Public transport season ticket
2 Toilet paper made of recycled paper 7 Use of public transport in the last 7 days
3 Recycled paper 8 Reacting not by turning up the heating when
4 Energy-saving light bulbs
in winter the house gets colder,
but in another way
Turning TV completely off
5 9 Flying for private reasons
(not just remote control)
10 Eating organic food (often/very often)
Source: Swiss Survey on the Environment 1994, 2007
179
Indicators
Waste management and recycling

Refuse is one very obvious component of the pressure on the environment
through civilisation. Its increase since 1970 (or even longer) is less surprising
than its temporary weakening around 1990 and the diversification of refuse
composition.
More and more, various kinds of waste are being separated and treated
specifically, be it for recycling or for adequate disposal. The longest-lasting
tradition exists for paper and probably also glass (no data before 1985); PET
and tin have caught up, the collecting of used aluminium cans and batteries
is also widespread. As a consequence, a considerable part of recyclable refuse
(60–95 percent) is actually being recycled.
With respect to the production of municipal waste per capita, i.e., the
‘waste intensity’, Switzerland is positioned at the top of the ranking, but a
change in direction has been observed during the last five years, similar to
Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom (no data for the USA). Sweden’s
waste production is still increasing, but on a clearly lower level than in the
other six countries. These figures, of course, do not reveal the ecological
quality of waste disposal, only its volume.
Constant collection of recyclables is associated with age and education, even
if irregularly: in most countries, the younger and less educated collect less.
Upper diagram: Municipal waste without imports. Recycling of glass only recorded since 1985.
Middle diagram: Municipal waste is waste collected by or on the order of municipalities. It includes
waste originating from households, commercial activities, office buildings, institutions such as schools
and government buildings, and small businesses that dispose of waste at the same facilities used for
municipally collected waste (including bulky waste and separately collected waste). ES: Data from
2004 (instead of 2005). DE: 1990 data for West Germany only, 2000 and 2005 breaks in time series.
FR: Data from 1989 (instead of 1990) and 2004 (instead of 2005).
Lower diagram: Question wording: ‘How often do you make a special effort to sort glass or tins or
plastic or newspapers and so on for recycling?’ Answer categories: ‘always’, ‘often’, ‘sometimes’, ‘never’,
‘recycling not available where I live’. Percentages correspond to respondents who answered ‘always’.
Source: Two upper diagrams: FOEN, waste statistics. Middle diagram: OECD environmental data com-
pendium. Lower diagram: ISSP 2000.
180
Municipal waste and separate collections (recyclable waste) 1970–2006

6
Million tonnes
5
Other separate collections
4 Glass
3 Paper and cardboard
1 Municipal waste
0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006
Collection rate of separate collections (recyclable waste) in % of total use 1970–2006

100%
Aluminium cans
80%
Glass
60%
Batteries
40%
Paper
20%
PET
0% Tinplate (tins and lids)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006
Municipal waste by country in kg per capita 1980–2005

700
kg/person
600
500
1980
400
1985
300 1990
200 1995
2000
100 * 1990 only
2005 West Germany
0
ES CH DE* UK FR SE
Regular collection of recyclable waste in % by country 2000

By age By education
100%
80%
60%
40%
18–39 years Low
20%
40–59 years Intermediate
0% 60 years + High
DE CH SE US ES UK DE CH SE US ES UK
Source: FOEN, OECD, ISSP 2000
181
Indicators
Ecological footprint
The ecological footprint assesses whether a society uses its natural environ-
ment in a sustainable way or in an ‘exploitative’ one, and to what extent.
Currently, Switzerland’s footprint amounts to roughly 5 global hectares per
capita, its comparable biocapacity is about 1.5 global hectares per capita.
Hence, Switzerland overuses its environment by a ratio of 1 : 3.
At the beginning of the sixties, agriculture in the strict sense still con-
tributed to about half of the Swiss footprint, and farming on the whole to
about two-thirds. Since then, these proportions have fallen to a tenth and a
fifth, respectively. On the other hand, the consumption of fossil energy has
greatly increased in absolute and relative terms; it constitutes the major part
of the footprint nowadays. Overall, the Swiss footprint has increased by half
over the last 45 years, after having reached its maximal value around 1990
(possibly because of the recession at the beginning of the nineties, similar
to 1975 and 1982).
In the international comparison, Switzerland is less unfavourably placed
than other countries. Development shows a scissor-like motion everywhere,
with the footprint increasing (especially in the USA and Spain), the bioca-
pacity decreasing (especially in Sweden and the USA), and the gap between
the two measures widening. Only in Sweden is biocapacity still greater than
the footprint, and only Germany has succeeded in reducing its footprint
since the seventies.
The composition of the footprint varies between countries, especially in
relation to the specific profile of energy production and the contribution of
agriculture.
Ecological footprint: A scientific method for determining in what areas and how heavily humans im-
pact on the environment. The method employs the magnitude of the uses of, and stresses on, natural
capital, such as crop cultivation or energy and wood consumption, to calculate the area that would be
required to provide these resources in a sustainable manner (hypothetical area requirement in global
hectars). For the calculation of the ecological footprint in Switzerland: see von Stokar et al. (2006).
Biocapacity: ability of the environment to produce raw materials and break down pollutants (biological
productivity of an area).
Global hectare: one hectare with productivity equal to the average productivity of the biologically
productive hectares on earth.
Source: Global Footprint Network (www.footprintnetwork.org).
182
Ecological footprint and biocapacity in global hectares per person
Switzerland 1961–2003 by area

6
Global hectares Built-up land
per capita
5
Nuclear energy
Nuklearenergie
4
Total
3 Fossil energy Biocapacity
2
Fisheries
Pasture Forest
1
Arable land
0
1961 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2003
In the international comparison 1963–2003

12
Global hectares Ecological footprint 1963
per capita Biocapacity 1973
10
1983
1993
8 2003
0
US SE FR UK ES CH DE
Composition of the ecological footprint in % by country 2003

Built-up land
100%
Nuclear
energy
80%
Fossil
60% energy
40%
Fisheries
Forest
20% Pasture
Arable
land
0%
US SE FR UK ES CH DE
Source: Global Footprint Network
183
Synthesis
What conclusions can now be drawn from the Social Report 2008? These will
be explained below, whereby the first two sections are of rather a methodo-
logical nature, the remaining three relate more to content.
First of all, from the methodological viewpoint, why does the Report
concentrate on five core areas? Secondly, how useful are the explanatory
factors employed to analyse the indicators? For the main results, the Report
gives considerable space to the international comparison. Thus, change and
continuity will be discussed not only with regard to the temporal dimension
(third section), but also to the spatial one (fourth section). Finally, in the
fifth section, we discuss a few of the results – some expected, others more
surprising and less foreseeable.
The five dimensions of a social report

Social reporting is fundamentally a daring exercise. When describing a society,
everything is interesting a priori, as Gurvitch (1958, 157 ff.) emphasized in his
famous Traité de sociologie in which he developed the idea of a deep structure
where the smallest element contains clues to the general structure of society.
This does not mean, however, that all elements are equally meaningful in this
respect. It is, therefore, necessary to develop a general explanatory perspec-
tive, in order to be able to put the individual results into relation with each
other and to interpret them. In the preparations for the first Social Report,
a basic framework was created to distinguish the five core social areas: the
distribution of social goods, cultural diversity, social integration, political
shaping and the environment and society.
Each of these areas displays manifold facets which are reflected in the in-
dicators. For each of the five core areas, one facet is dealt with in a separate,
detailed review;1 these reviews go into greater depth – the authors being spe-
cialists in their specific fields – and take into consideration the latest research
status and current surveys and investigations. Corresponding to the sequence
of the core areas, these reviews are, firstly, education as a means of access to
a social resource, which plays a significant role in the distribution of goods;
secondly, language as a form of identity and belongingness, but also as an
instrument of integration providing opportunities to deal differently with
cultural borders; thirdly, voluntary work as an engagement in society and
an integrative element; fourthly, action that shapes the political scene and
1 These reviews are included in the German and French editions only.
185
Synthesis
finally, fifthly, the personal relationship with the environment as a potential

basis for ecological action. In this sense, the Social Report 2008 emphasizes
the importance of both structures and rules, but also points out that collec-
tive action represents a resource that must be taken into consideration – it
is not limited to the sum of individual ways of behaviour.
The Social Report 2008 also shows that the above-mentioned core areas –
the distribution of social goods, cultural diversity, social integration, political
shaping, and environment and society – are not islands or separate fields,
rather they are all related to each other. The social integration of foreigners
is, for example, a political topic par excellence, which latently accompanies
the debate about immigration held both in connection with popular initia-
tives as well as in the political positioning of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP).
Furthermore, the question of solidarity between generations is not purely a
symbolic one, as it is also associated with the distribution of goods in society.
In this way, the data presented in the individual chapters encourage us to
refer to further diagrams, tables and commentaries. In other words, when
looking at the Social Report 2008 and the analysis of social change, it would
be a mistake to regard the various perspectives on the economy, ecology,
political science, linguistics and sociology as isolated ones.
Here are one or two examples: the topic of migration, for instance, has
been assigned to the area of cultural diversity. However, it also stands in close
relation both with the topic of education, which belongs to the area of the
distribution of social goods, and with the topic of social integration. Similarly,
gender differences (more about these later) are of central importance in the
distribution of social goods, as well as in demography and the organization
of everyday life.
These preliminary remarks, when examined more closely, also influence
another discussion. Commentaries on our socio-political environment often
emphasize the increase in individualism; citizens seem to be increasingly free
from social constraints. Thanks especially to greater mobility, people are no
longer found to be subject to the social control which once prevailed in our
villages, or at least, that control is no longer as relevant as it used to be in
a world that was essentially determined by the conflict between employers
and employees. In other words, social rules seem to have lost in importance,
including those regarding the distribution of goods and integration, as
personal resources now appear to be equally as crucial. It must be said, and
we shall come back to this later, that our results do not all point in this di-
rection. On the contrary, there is a strong association between the five core
areas examined in the Social Report 2008, demonstrating that society has
not broken up, but that its structures are still firm and are producing clearly
186
Synthesis
recognizable effects. In short, to use a concept popularised by Bauman (2003,

2006, 2007) in various publications, we have not (yet?) arrived at the time
of a ‘liquid society’.
Validity of the tools used

Although, according to our diagnosis, ‘society’ is not dead, its role must
nevertheless be defined more exactly. The circumstances of social coexist-
ence bring forth a system of rules, norms, values and resources, as well as
organisational forms, which must be considered in order to explain ways of
behaviour. This is reflected in the indicators, where a fairly systematic, but
limited, analytical framework is used that in most cases includes age, sex and
social position – especially education – as explanatory factors.
This does not mean that all the mechanisms examined here were restricted
to this analytical framework, but nevertheless it may be useful to enlarge on
some of these characteristics.
– Age is de facto an explanatory factor of exceptional complexity: ‘young’
and ‘old’ are apparent categories which fall under this term, but do they
not also refer, even more so perhaps, to the way in which they are experi-
enced than to biological age? Age also denotes membership of a generation
which has experienced certain events or at least special moments: May 68
certainly did not have the same effect on the then 20 year-olds as it did
on the 60 year-olds! Age, therefore, points not only to a certain position
in the demographic structure of society, but also to membership of an age
cohort or generation. In addition, it represents a criterion that is easy to
handle for official authorities, for instance when defining conditions of
access or exclusion, which is confirmed by the varying age thresholds for
compulsory schooling, adulthood and retirement. Finally, as an explana-
tory factor, age shows that it describes not only a state, but also a process
– one that is characterized by the accumulation of experience over the
course of life.
– Gender is an explanatory factor of undiminished relevance. Even if the
demand for equality between the sexes is constantly gaining more accept-
ance, gender differences implying inequality still exist, for instance, in
the distribution of roles, in the prevailing practices in partnerships and
families, and also in the working world with the modes of selection and
promotion in firms and in politics. All indicators point to the relevance
of this problem, as in most cases the data for men and women vary con-
siderably.
187
Synthesis
– Education reveals itself to be a characteristic which is particularly mean-

ingful today: on the one hand, it has been subject to remarkable expan-
sion in the last 50 years and the topic of the knowledge society is more
present than ever; on the other hand, there are still grey areas and the
path of education which young people follow is far from being smooth
and straight. The detailed review on educational inequality in Switzerland
clearly shows how crucial this resource is.2 So, alone on the basis of the
expansion of the education system, we have to ask ourselves whether the
‘social value’ of a diploma, i.e. the recognition connected with it, remains
the same. The answer is, of course, that the educational categories, which
are represented homogenously in the indicators, do not have exactly the
same significance for all those concerned, for example, because of their
age, or their social or national origin.
– In general, the institutional context is important for understanding
everyday life. In the international comparison it takes first place, on the
regional and local levels though it is also important. In the comments on
voluntary work, for instance, it becomes clear that there are large regional
differences with regard to these practices in Europe. Similarly the relation-
ship between society and environment is not at all homogenous on the
regional level. The most remarkable example, however, is found in the area
of education: educational courses can vary greatly between the different
regions in Switzerland; this has an effect both on the economic potential
of these regions, as well as on the transition from school to work for the
young people concerned.
In no way, however, should these analyses be interpreted as confirmation of
the ‘rösti ditch’ or ‘Röstigraben’, a mythical ditch dividing the German- and
French-speaking regions, so-called because ‘rösti’ is a traditional dish on the
German-speaking side. Rather, the relationship between space and society is
simultaneously linked on several levels (local, regional, national, and trans
national), these in turn are superimposed by various social cleavages. Thus,
the core social questions often have local roots, but their full importance
becomes apparent only when considering the wider context. This spatial dif-
ferentiation can at times concur with language borders; other divisions are,
however, not only conceivable, they do in fact exist, for instance, between
centres and peripheries in the analysis of voting results or in the location
of cleavages between the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalisation. One of the
contributions made by the Social Report 2008 lies in the fact that it repeatedly
demonstrates the importance of the spatial dimension – this is reflected in the
consequent analysis of social cleavages existing within society. More generally
188
Synthesis
speaking, this means that political stakes are also organized as a function of
various interests, even if these are very diverse (left-right orientation, attitudes
towards with globalization, etc.).
Contrasting rhythms
With this third edition of the Social Report, which follows those in 2000
and 2004, one cannot but wonder about the rhythm of change: if this were
slow and continuous, then publications like this one would be justified, at
best, every ten years. With faster change, more frequent publication is ap-
propriate.
Furthermore, the decision to keep to a fixed rhythm of publication with
the same five core areas may seem implicitly based on the hypothesis that
change in these areas remains paradoxically constant. However, it is not as
simple as that; on the one hand, the indicators presented in the various edi-
tions are not systematically the same and, on the other hand, the compara-
tive perspective adopted opens up the possibility of analysing the rhythm of
change according to context. We shall come back to that later.
We have to distinguish, therefore, between fast change and considerably
slower change. Here an example of each: today two-thirds of the popula-
tion of Switzerland is connected to the internet and uses this at least once a
week, whereas a few years ago this proportion was considerably smaller (cf.
indicator Use of the media). In contrast to this, inequalities in the distribu-
tion of important social goods still exist almost unchanged: for instance, the
educational level of parents is just as significant for the educational success of
their children as it was 50 years ago, even if the school system has since been
reformed and the ‘democratisation of education’ has become the leitmotif (cf.
indicator Educational inheritance and homogamy). It is no coincidence that
the conflict linked with inequality, whether real or perceived, is mirrored in
the political field and has led to repolarisation there, as well as in the main
topics debated by the left- and right-wing parties.
Some further examples: the tertiarisation of Swiss industry is a long but
constant process; 40 years ago the number of workers and employees was
almost the same, today though the ratio is 1 to 3.3 Similarly, the area of fam-
ily life is constantly changing. The increase in age at marriage and birth of
first child and the growing divorce rates coincide with the ideals of equality
and pluralisation of personal circumstances, while the institutions control-
3 This is explained both by the increase in white-collar workers in companies, as

well as by the transfer of further production to countries outside Switzerland.
189
Synthesis
ling family life remain rather rigid (see indicator Role distribution in couples).
These examples apply not only to Switzerland.
The European convergence

One of the most remarkable results is certainly the convergence observed in
the countries considered in our comparison. Large differences did indeed
exist at the beginning of the time period examined, but the situation at the
end looks considerably more homogeneous, whether the country considered
is a member of the European Union or not. The most impressive example is
Spain, where considerable differences existed 30 years ago – particularly in
the family area (low portion of women in employment and, above all, the
non-existent possibility of legal divorce until 1981). Today this has greatly
changed and conditions are similar to those in other countries (see, for in-
stance, indicators Full-time and part-time employment, Divorce).
In the majority of the indicators used, Switzerland occupies a middle
position. Just to mention one example, equality between men and women
has firmly established itself both in fact as well as in people’s attitudes in the
northern European countries, and this is shown in various fields, from work
through politics to demography. The situation in Switzerland has not progressed
quite so far, but it is also not at the other extreme. Nevertheless, a few areas
exist in which Switzerland differs considerably from other countries.
Here we could mention the victimization rate, which is lower in Switzerland
than in other places, and this is certainly connected with the comparatively
low unemployment, the more seldom occurrence of poverty and the relatively
high level of trust in the political authorities. The most remarkable element is,
however, the attitude towards foreigners: while the policy of the Swiss People’s
Party makes this a central theme, the acceptance of foreigners is higher than
in comparative countries, despite the particularly high immigration rate. Due
to the direct democracy, the topic of foreigners represents one of the most
important topics in the public political debate and has done so for more
than 30 years if one thinks of the first ‘Schwarzenbach’ initiative. It cannot
be ruled out that the fact that this is a ‘political’ topic may have contributed
to defusing the debate in everyday life by channelling it into its own arena.
Further elements could also be analysed here, such as voluntary work
in associations and organizations – on average Switzerland lies somewhere
between the North, with a high level of participation, and the South, where
other forms of sociability are to the fore – or the environment which is causing
great anxiety, although this seldom leads to concrete action, especially when
it requires individual engagement over and above the separation of waste.
190
Synthesis
Moreover, it should be mentioned that the comparative perspective has

only recently been made possible. Even just a decade ago, there were very few
international comparative projects able to provide the necessary data and,
where they existed, the quality was sometimes questionable, so Switzerland
took part only rarely. This shows just how important it is for the social sci-
ences to have high-quality international comparative data available.
Findings that seem obvious are not necessarily

well-founded
In addition to the results presented in the individual chapters, it is primarily
important to emphasize anything that is surprising and that goes beyond
common clichés, namely, the contradictions which lead to reflection on what
is said about Switzerland and its inhabitants.
Greatest priority must doubtless be given to the lot of the ‘middle class’.
Without going further into the debate about the definition of this middle
class, which de facto supposes a continuum between the ‘lower class’ and
the ‘upper class’, it is surprising to observe that the distribution of income
during the last 20 years has overall remained fairly comparable. Furthermore,
it is clear that the richest become richer depending on developments in the
economic cycles, without putting total distribution completely out of balance.
It should not be forgotten, however, that we are dealing partly with income
before social security deductions, which no doubt plays a central role in the
discussion on distribution, as yesterday’s promises sometimes seem no longer
tenable – for instance, the financing of pensions and the health service, to
mention just two areas – and put a considerable burden on a large part of
the population. Furthermore, the fiscal statistics fail to capture a significant
part of inequality.
Developments in the working world are just as paradoxical: work is
indeed becoming physically less dangerous, but nevertheless moral pressure
and stress should not to be neglected. Moreover, the hypothesis developed
primarily by Goldthorpe4 regarding constantly growing middle and upper
classes with long-term working contracts and career prospects, is not proving
to be well-founded. On many levels, risks – and even precariousness – are
being experienced from time to time and, at the very least, everyday anxi-
ety is felt even at the centre of this previously favoured milieu, while the
production of financial wealth, which other milieus are acquiring, is as high
as never before.
4 A summary of this debate can be found, for example, in Bidou-Zachariasen
(2000).
191
Synthesis
The last point we should like to make may result from the above-mentioned
convergence of the countries examined. As the detailed review5 in the chapter
on politics makes clear, Switzerland does tend to cultivate its non-membership
of the European Union and some parties insist on this distance. At the same
time though, a considerable number of European regulations are being inte-
grated into Swiss legislation. In view of the diagrams and data, this is not all
that astonishing: during the last decade there has been extensive European
convergence in which Switzerland has participated; thus Switzerland is no
longer the special case (‘Sonderfall’)6 which it perhaps used to be, or at least
believed itself to be.

6 It is not by chance that the literature on the Swiss special case is so extensive, although
every other country in its way regards itself as an exception. The topic of the special
case of Switzerland was the subject of a congress organised by the Swiss Sociological
Association, the main contributions being published in Eberle and Imhof (2006).
Similarly, the synthesis issued by the social science research program ‘Switzerland
Towards the Future’ referred explicitly to the concept of the special case (see Kriesi
et al., 2005).
192
Glossary
AHV: Abbreviation of ‘Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung’, the compul-
sory Swiss pension system for old age and surviving family members, supposed
to guarantee a minimal living standard after retirement or bereavement. It is
the first pillar of the ‘three-pillar’ regime, which consists of the state retire-
ment pension, the occupational pension and individual savings.
Annual residence or yearly permit (official German term ‘Aufenthalter’): Legal
status for foreigners permitting residence in Switzerland for one year, renew-
able.
Apprenticeship: Institutionalised form of vocational training common to
German-speaking countries (Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Southern Tyrol)
and based on a dual training programme which takes place simultaneously in a
firm and at a vocational school. It generally lasts three years and its successful
completion is attested by a federally controlled certificate of qualification.
Biodiversity: Diversity of biotopes, plant and animal species, and of genetic
inheritance.
Biotope: Environmental area in which plant or animal species typically live,
e.g. an alluvial zone, a swamp, a lake shore or a meadow.
Cantons: The Swiss territory is subdivided into 26 cantons or half-cantons,
which form the political and administrative level below the national level
and are the equivalent of provinces or American federal states. The cantons
have a high level of autonomy in internal matters and together they form
the Swiss confederation.
Carbon dioxide (CO2 ): Important (non-toxic) component of ambient air (about
0.04%). Excessive emission of CO2 by combustion processes is considered
to be the major reason for the greenhouse effect which is in turn responsible
for global warming and climatic turbulences.
Carbon monoxide (CO): Invisible and odourless gas produced by incomplete
combustion of carbonaceous substances like fuel, mainly from road traffic.
It acts as a respiratory poison for humans and other warm-blooded animals
and contributes to the formation of ozone in the troposphere.
Concordance: Traditional, but informal, principle in Swiss politics according to
which decisions should not only be based on the majority’s will (‘winner takes
all’), but also to some degree on the interests of significant minorities.
193
Glossary
Correlation coefficient: Statistical measure of the strength of the association

between two variables. It can also be interpreted as a measure of the cer-
tainty or uncertainty with which the value of one variable can be predicted
when the value of the other is known. A coefficient of 1.00 means that both
variables vary strictly in parallel, a coefficient of –1.00 that they vary in a
perfectly inverse manner, and a value of 0 that there is no statistical associa-
tion between them.
Council of States: One of the legislative chambers in the bicameral federal
parliament. In this Council each canton is represented by two elected coun-
cillors (a half-canton by only one).
Equivalent household income: ‘Household income per capita’ – statistical
formula for comparison, reducing the income of a non-single household to
that of a one-person household, based on the fact that the members do not
all consume equal amounts. It divides the actual household income by the
number of its members weighted according to their age and position in the
household (most often one uses the disposable income, i.e. effective income
less compulsory payments like taxes and social security contributions). Often
the current modified OECD scale of equivalence is used, weighting the first
adult by 1.0, further adults by 0.5, children by 0.5 if they are 14 years old
or older, and 0.3 if they are younger.
EU-15: Member states of the European Union before its enlargement in 2004
(Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, United Kingdom,
Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Spain).
EU-25: Member states of the European Union before its enlargement in 2007
(EU-15 plus Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Republic of Cyprus).
Federal Council: The Swiss government, composed of seven ministers or
Federal Councillors, who are elected by parliament. By informal agreement,
the composition of the Federal Council reflects the electoral strength of the
major political parties, which implies that the Swiss government is consist-
ently a coalition one.
Gini index: Coefficient relating the area between the Lorenz curve and the
diagonal to the area under the diagonal (0 = perfect equality, 1 = maximal
inequality), thus quantifying distributional inequality.
Greenhouse effect: The glass cover of a greenhouse cumulates the incoming
solar heat, thus causing the internal temperature to rise well above that of
194
Glossary
the surrounding air. The global greenhouse effect is due to the so-called
greenhouse gases.
Greenhouse gases: Gases dispersed in the earth’s atmosphere prevent the reflec-
tion of incoming solar heat to a natural degree (a minimal greenhouse effect
is indispensable for life on earth). The most important greenhouse gases are
water vapour (H2O, among others in the form of clouds), carbon dioxide
(CO2 ), methane (CH4 ), laughing gas (N2O) and tropospheric ozone (O3 ).
During the past decades human activities – above all the combustion of
fossil fuel and the deforestation in the tropics – have greatly accelerated the
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. For instance, that of
CO2 has risen by 30% compared with the preindustrial period. This produces
an additional increase in global warming.
Gross domestic product (GDP): Total market value (goods and services) pro-
duced in a given year within the country.
Gross national income (GNI): Total market value (goods and services) produced
in a given year (within the country and abroad) and accruing to nationals
(persons and firms domiciled in the country).
Homogamy: Marriage between socially ‘equal’ partners (religious or educa-
tional homogamy etc.). If the male partner’s level is lower than the female’s,
one speaks of female hypogamy or of male hypergamy.
Initiative: One of Switzerland’s political rights by which any number of actors
can propose a (partial or total) modification of the constitution. In order to
be submitted to popular vote, an initiative must gain at least 100,000 valid
signatures from Swiss citizens within no more than 18 months of the text’s
submission to the Federal Chancellery. The amendment is accepted if the
majority of voters and the majority of cantons are in favour of it. Similar
rights exist on the cantonal and communal levels.
IV: Abbreviation of ‘Invalidenversicherung’, the compulsory Swiss state
insurance against invalidity.
Kyoto protocol: International treaty on climate policy, accepted in December
1997. It aims at reducing greenhouse gases and at fighting global warming.
Laughing gas (Nitrous oxide, N2O): Colourless gas belonging to the group
of nitrogen oxides and hence to the greenhouse gases; it has an exhilarating
effect.
Lorenz curve: Graphic representation of the distribution of a quantifiable
good in a given population. The X axis corresponds to the cumulative shares
195
Glossary
of the population (in percent) ranked in ascending order (in terms of their
share of the good in question), the Y axis to the shares of the good, again
cumulatively in percent. Departure of the resulting distribution curve from
the diagonal, which corresponds to perfect equality of distribution, indicates
distributional inequality; it can be quantified by the Gini index.
Matura, Maturität: Final exam in certain types of school on secondary level
II giving direct access to the university level.
Median: Value of a quantitative criterion or variable (e.g., income) that divides
a population ranked by this criterion in an upper and a lower half.
Meritocracy: Social order with privileges supposed to be based on achievement
or other criteria of personal merit (literally ‘dominance of the deserving’).
Contemporary societies mostly present themselves as meritocratic, although
this is true only to a certain degree; socially education is the most conse-
quential criterion of ‘merit’.
Methane (CH4 ): Inflammable gas produced, among others, by putrefaction
under the exclusion of air (e.g. by animal and human digestion, in bogs etc.).
Methane is a natural greenhouse gas.
Moving average: Mean value calculated by using several consecutive values
around the time point considered, used to ‘average out’ short-term fluctua-
tions and to increase the visibility of overall trends.
National Council: One of the legislative chambers in the bicameral federal
parliament, composed according to the principle of proportionality, i.e.
depending on the electoral strength of the political parties, with the cantons
functioning as electoral districts.
Net occupational earnings: Income after deduction of social security contribu-
tions at source.
Nitrate: Water-soluble salt of nitric acid that enters the groundwater through
the food chain or in the form of chemical fertilisers. In sufficient concen-
tration it is a health risk and an important factor in the overfertilisation of
waterbodies (excessive development of algae) and in the disequilibria of fauna
in nutrient-poor habitats such as swamps.
Nitrogen oxides (NO x ): Air pollutants (nitrogen monoxide and nitrogen
dioxide) produced by the combustion of fuels (above all in motor vehicles).
They can lead to respiratory problems, multiple damage to plants, and to the
overfertilisation of ecosystems. They are precursors of acid rain, of secondary
196
Glossary
aerosols and – in combination with volatile organic compounds – of photo-

oxydants (ozone, summer smog).
Ozone (O3 ): Air pollutant resulting from the chemical reaction of nitrogen
oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds under the impact of sunlight.
It creates atmospheric load in peri-urban regions and stems mainly from traf-
fic, industry and artisanship. Atmospheric ozone can irritate the mucosae,
provoke respiratory problems and reduce lung capacity; it is also damageable
to plants. In the stratosphere, ozone functions as a greenhouse gas.
Permanent residence (official German term ‘Niedergelassene’): Legal status for
foreigners permitting unlimited residence and freedom of choice with regard
to occupation as well as to the place of domicile, but no substantial political
rights.
Phosphorus (P): Chemical element that is essential for the build-up and
functioning of living organisms. Agriculture uses phosphated fertilisers to
increase plant yield. In waterbodies, too, the production of vegetal biomass
depends directly on the availability of phosphate. Additional input of nutrients,
particularly phosphate, increases the production of algae and water plants
which leads to eutrophication and consequently to suffocation, because the
decomposition and mineralization of dead algae consumes solved oxygen.
Thus, the more algae there are, the less oxygen remains in the water, especially
in the depths. Below a certain threshold (4 mg of oxygen per litre), the living
conditions become insufficient for aquatic flora and fauna.
Pre-vocational education (‘Anlehre’): ‘Light’ form of apprenticeship for young
people who are seemingly insufficiently qualified to start a full apprenticeship,
providing an officially acknowledged certificate of aptitude.
Primary school level: First level of the compulsory schooling period (first to
fifth or sixth year).
Quintile: Fifth (20%) of a population.
Quintile ratio: Measure of distributional inequality that compares the volumes
of a quantitative good accruing to the most endowed fifth (20%) to that of the
least endowed fifth of the population (typical examples: income, wealth).
Referendum: Federal laws, generalisable governmental ordinances and per-
manent international treaties (including membership of intergovernmental
organisations) are subject to optional referendum: they are submitted to
popular vote if at least 50,000 citizens request it by valid signature within
100 days of publication; they are accepted if a simple majority of voters is
achieved. Constitutional amendments undergo the referendum by definition,
197
Glossary
they are accepted if a double voting majority (i.e. of voters and of cantons) is
achieved. Similar rights exist on the cantonal and communal levels.
Reproduction: Re-establishment or perpetuation of a previous situation.
More specifically, reproduction of inequalities means that in the generation
changeover from parents to children, the inegalitarian positioning remains
the same, i.e. there is no upward or downward mobility of the younger gen-
eration. Demographic reproduction means that the population size does not
change. This terminological precision is necessary because social situations
do not exist naturally, but are socially constructed. This implies that their
possible perpetuation cannot be adequately explained by the sheer absence
of changing factors, but also depends on the prevalence of processes that
maintain the status quo.
Respirable dust: Small particles of nano size or slightly above, invisible to the
eye, that form a complex physico-chemical mix of natural and technical pol-
lutants (soot, geological material, abrasion dust, biological substances as well
as heavy metals, sulphate, nitrate, ammonium, organic carbon, hydrocarbon,
dioxins, furans). They stem above all from industry, agri- and sylviculture and
from motor traffic. Heavy metals, dioxins and furans in respirable dust are
noxious for health, particularly through the alimentary chain. Respirable dust
and soot are damageable to the respiratory and the cardiovascular systems,
thereby increasing the risk of cancer and mortality.
Rhaeto-Romanic: Fourth national language in Switzerland, of Latin origin,
spoken in some regions of the canton of the Grisons.
Romandie: French-speaking part of Switzerland (Romands: inhabitants of
that region).
Secondary level I: Types of schooling that follow the basic (primary) level and
belong to the compulsory schooling period (Sekundarschule, Bezirksschule,
Cycle d’orientation, Realschule).
Secondary level II: Types of schooling that follow secondary level I and can
take the form of general schooling or of vocational training (e.g. Gymnasium,
Fachmittelschule, Berufslehre = apprenticeship, Berufsmittelschule). Some of
them (Mittelschule, Gymnasium, Collège) end with the so-called maturity
exam that gives direct access to the university level.
Short-term residence (official German term ‘Kurzaufenthalter’): Legal status for
foreigners, existing in various forms, generally valid for not more than one
year and terminating on realisation of the specific objective of the stay in
Switzerland (e.g., obtaining a diploma).
198
Glossary
Stigmatisation: Ascription of social disesteem (negative labelling) to individuals

or groups; plays a major role in discrimination (e.g. in the form of unequal
chances) and its legitimation.
Sulphur dioxide (SO2 ): Invisible, acrid air pollutant produced by the com-
bustion of sulphur-containing fuels (e.g. coal, heating oil). If concentrated,
it leads to respiratory troubles, to multiple damage to plants and sensitive
ecosystems, as well as to the erosion of buildings; acid rain results largely
from sulphur dioxide.
Tertiary level: University level of the educational system (university, polytechnic
high school, university of applied science).
Volatile organic compounds (VOC; if methane is not included, NMVOC is
used for non-methane volatile organic compounds): Compounds belonging to
various chemical families (such as aromatic carbohydrates, ketones, alcohols,
aldehydes) that evaporate easily at normal temperatures due to their low
boiling point and diffuse in the form of gas. They have an important role
in the formation of ground level ozone. These air pollutants are emitted by
construction material (isolating foams, paints, fitted carpets, linoleum, var-
nishes, treated wooden frames and floors), sprays (insecticides, cosmetics),
resins, combustion and cooking; cleaning products and glues are also punctual
sources. All these items cause direct emissions into the atmosphere.
Wage ratio: Share of wages in the national income.
199
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202
Notes on the authors
Pascale Gazareth (1970), MA in sociology, Research Fellow at the University
of Neuchâtel and at the Federal Statistical Office. Research areas: employment
precariousness, poverty and social exclusion, social reporting.
Dominique Joye (1955), Dr., Professor of Sociology at the University of Lausanne
and national coordinator of the ESS and the ISSP in Switzerland. Research
areas: social stratification and inequality, social change, methodology.
Ursina Kuhn (1979), MA in political science, Research Fellow at the Uni-
versity of Neuchâtel and at the Swiss Foundation for Research in Social
Sciences (FORS) at the University of Lausanne. Research domains: political
behaviour, methodology.
René Levy (1944), Dr., Honorary Professor at the University of Lausanne.
Research areas: social stratification, gender relationships, life course.
Silvia Perrenoud (1980), MA in sociology, Research Fellow at the University
of Neuchâtel and at the Federal Statistical Office. Research areas: market
research, social reporting.
Christian Suter (1956), Dr., Professor of Sociology at the University of Neuchâ-
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203
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Swiss Social Report 2008:

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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

English translation and checking: Rachel Matthey, Zurich

Switzerland measured and compared: an introduction 17

Distribution of social goods 25

Political reshaping 121

Environment and society 153

Notes on the authors 203

Distribution of social goods

Environment and society

SIDOS Swiss Information and Data Archive Service for the

Christian Suter, Silvia Perrenoud, René Levy, Ursina Kuhn,

Goal and orientation of the Social Report 2008

the economic, social, cultural, political and ecological situation in Switzer-

foreign languages in the chapter on Cultural Diversity, or the indicators on

Data bases used

Structure and organisation of the Report

3 This review is included in the German and French editions only.

6 This review is included in the German and French editions only.

Post-compulsory educational attainment of 20 year-old women and men 1990–2005

'Matura' 80% 'Matura'

Educational status of the cohort which completed compulsory schooling

20 to 24 year-olds by educational status, sex and country 2003

Educational attainment of the population

Percentage of the resident population in Switzerland with low education

Educational inheritance and homogamy

Educational inheritance 2006

By age and country

Educational homogamy of women who live with a partner by country 2006

Source: ESS 2006

Further education 1996–2006 Further education by purpose 2006

25–64 year-olds in employment 25–64 year-olds in employment

Change of sectors and industries

Percentage of employees in the three economic sectors 1960–2006

Increase and decrease in employment in certain economic subsectors 1991–2006

Publishing/printing trade, photocopying

Employees in industry and services in % by country

(from 1965) 1950

Employment rate by sex and nationality 1980–2007

Activity rate by sex and age Employment rate by sex

Activity rate by sex, age and country 2006

Full-time and part-time employment

Full-time employment by sex Women's level of employment

Part-time employment by sex, age and country 2006

Work-life balance by sex and country 2005

Entry into working life

Number of years after compulsory schooling By economic activity status 2006

Employment of 15 to 29 year-olds by sex and country 1991–2006*