DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

AND
INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY
CO-OPERATION
 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY
AND
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
CO-OPERATION

By

Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia, PVSM, AVSM, SM (Retd)

Rear Admiral Vijai S Chaudhari, NM (Retd)
Brigadier Ranjit Singh

Centre for Joint Warfare Studies

Kashmir House, Rajaji Marg, New Delhi-110 001
Tel. Nos : 011-23792446, 23006535, 23006538/9, Fax : 011-23792444
Website : http://cenjows.gov.in, e-mail : [email protected]
yy Lieutenant General Vinod Bhatia is a former Director
General of Military Operations with a lifetime of Operations
and combat experience. He is currently the Director of
the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

yy Vijai S Chaudhari, NM (Retd) is a former Rear Admiral
of the Indian Navy with a background in Anti-Submarine
Warfare, Joint Operations, Network Centric Operations,
Rules of Engagement, military diplomacy and defence
acquisition. He is currently Additional Director at the
Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

yy Brigadier Ranjit Singh is a serving officer of the Indian
Army. He is currently on a sabbatical at the Centre for Joint
Warfare Studies, New Delhi, researching International
Military Co-operation.

(This document is a compilation of information for research

purposes only. The information has been compiled solely for
private, academic and non-commercial use. The Centre for
Joint Warfare Studies makes no claim, implied or otherwise,
as to ownership of the information used
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 Introduction

International Relations is a discipline that is particularly difficult

to categorise. In practice, apart from “relations between
nations”, it is concerned with a vast range of expertise, issues
and types of knowledge.
Diplomacy is an ancient profession and military
cooperation as a practice is perhaps just as old. Military
alliances, coalitions and multi-national forces are part of
earliest recorded history and even feature in the epics.
However, defence diplomacy has become a separate field of
study only since the end of the Cold War. Evolving threats
and a changing world order have given greater prominence
to Military Operations Other Than War. However, two aspects
stand out. Firstly, study of Military Diplomacy is still in its
infancy. Secondly, Military Diplomacy is not a separate
discipline but only an extension of traditional diplomacy.
This summary is an edited compilation of views from
a wide spectrum of practitioners and writers, moderated with
the experience of the authors. While the authors have made
efforts to give credit to the original sources, the citations are
by no means complete or of research standards. The authors
therefore have only an editorial role in the compilation of this
summary.
The summary consists of three sections:-
• The Environment
• The Path Traversed
• More Bang for the Buck
The final outcome from effective international military
cooperation should be to maximise the contribution of the
Indian Armed Forces national power. Towards this end, the
rationale for and relevance of each section is tabulated
below.

1
 SECTION 1 WHAT? WHY?
The A theoretical Establishes
Environment background a context for
for Military recommen-
Diplomacy dations in the
and Military last section
Cooperation

SECTION 2 WHAT? WHY?

The Path A brief ac- To establish
Traversed count of a baseline
where we for further
stand with improvement
regard to in the Indian
International context
Defence
Cooperation

SECTION 3 WHAT? WHY?

More Bang Areas with Explore
for the Buck potential for more poten-
improvement tial for De-
fence Diplo-
macy and
Cooperation

2
 The Environment

International Relations

Defence Diplomacy and International Relations is a separate

and distinct field of study. However, much of this separateness
is illusionary. Formally, Inter – National – Relations is the study
of relations between nations. The ‘nations’ in these interactions
are nation-states – sovereign, territorially bounded political
units like Russia or France. Yet, many important actors in
International Relations are not nations at all. Actors on the
stage of global politics include international or trans-national
governmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN)
or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). There are numerous
regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU) or
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Then
there are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as
the Red Cross or Amnesty International. Increasingly, Nation-
states also have to contend with multinational corporations
(MNCs). The larger corporations have a bigger turnover than
the gross national product (GNP) of most countries. Many
issues also loom large in International Relations. Refugees,
climate change, human rights and HIV/AIDS as well as
outbreaks of infections such as Zika and Dengue are just a
few examples.

Clearly, there is more to International Relations than
merely ‘relations between nations’. International Relations
also draws on areas of study such as politics, economics, law,
development studies, geography, history, moral philosophy,
strategic and war studies. Each International Relations

3
specialist therefore focuses on a specific subarea. A more
accurate description of the specialists would categorise them
as experts in theory, security studies, international political
economy, foreign policy studies, international history or
international law (and many more). This establishes some
characteristics:

yy International Relations is a general term for a

complex, multi-disciplinary subject area.

yy One does not become a domain expert in every
aspect of world politics by working in this wide-ranging
and challenging area. Such an assumption may be
convenient but is simply not realistic because of the
range and extent of skills involved.

yy The practitioner needs to ‘cope’ with the
complexity and multi-disciplinary approach that are
inseparable from International Relations.1

Observation: The practice of International Relations

requires too vast a body of knowledge and expertise to rely
on a single discipline. Instead of being a self-contained body
of knowledge, it is an amalgam of diverse types of expertise,
skills, knowledge and issues. Successful international
relations is a team effort with participants changing according
to the situation.

Relations between Nations

The current world order has its roots in the Peace of Westphalia
that ended the Thirty Years’ War (1618 - 1648), one of the
most destructive conflicts in the history of Europe. The Thirty
Year War was a series of inter-connected wars. It began in

Peter Sutch and Juanita Elias, ‘International Relations the Basics’, Routledge,
1

Abingdon, Oxon, 2007. pp.1-3.

4
1618, over imposition of Roman Catholicism, over Protestant
subjects, in Bohemia. At some stage, the war pitted Protestant
against Catholic, the Holy Roman Empire against France,
the German princes and princelings against the emperor
and each other, and France against the Habsburgs of Spain.
The Swedes, the Danes, the Poles, the Russians, the Dutch
and the Swiss were all dragged in or dived in. Commercial
interests and rivalries also played a part, as did religion and
power politics.

Most of the fighting took place on German soil,

devastating the countryside as hordes of unpaid mercenaries
lived off the land. The peace conference to end the war opened
in Münster and Osnabrück in December 1644. It involved 194
states, big and small, represented by 179 plenipotentiaries.
Thousands of ancillary diplomats and support staff did well
for themselves well for close to four years, despite famine all
around. They spent the first six months arguing about who was
to sit where and who would enter ahead of whom. Slowly the
envoys hammered out deals. Even then, it took almost three
weeks just to organise the signing ceremony. The ceremony
began at two o’clock on the afternoon of Saturday, October
24th, 1648.

5
 The treaty gave the Swiss independence from Austria
and the Netherlands gained independence from Spain. The
German principalities secured their autonomy. Sweden gained
territory and a payment in cash. Brandenburg and Bavaria
also made gains while France acquired most of Alsace-
Lorraine. The prospect of a Roman Catholic reconquest of
Europe ended forever. However, more than anything else,
the treaty formed the basis for the system of international
relations that survives to this day.2

The Peace of Westphalia established several key

principles that explain its continuing significance and its effect
on the world today:
yy The principle of the sovereignty of states and
the fundamental right of political self determination.

yy The principle of legal equality between states.

yy The principle of non-intervention of one state in
the internal affairs of another state

The ‘realist’ school of international relations thinkers

supports these principles. This also explains why the
international system of states is referred to as ‘The Westphalian
System’. However, for more than half a century, scholars
have questioned the idea of Westphalian sovereignty and
its applicability. Many of these questions are connected with
ideas of internationalism and globalization. According to some
interpretations, these developments have eroded the concept
of Westphalian sovereignty.3

2
Richard Cavendish, ‘The Treaty of Westphalia’, History Today, Volume
48, Issue 10, November 1998, (accessed October 01, 2016). http://www.
historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/treaty-westphalia.
3
‘Westphalian Sovereignty’, Wikipedia, (accessed September 28, 2016). https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westphalian_sovereignty.

6
Observation: Since there is no world government, there is no
world body with authority to make international law, leaving
many gaps in its scope as well as enforceability. (Domestic
legislatures fulfil this requirement for each country but are not
competent to do so in international affairs.) This makes it difficult
for nations to rely entirely on international law. Practitioners
consider various sources, principally treaties between states,
as authoritative statements of international law. Treaties are
the strongest and most binding type of arrangement because
they represent consensual agreements between the countries
that sign them. At the same time, as stated in the statute of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), rules of international
law exist in customary state practice, general principles of
law common to many countries, domestic judicial decisions,
and legal scholarship.4 The framework for relations between
nations is therefore a mixture of precedent, established
practice, natural justice, international law and treaties as well
as agreements.

Sovereignty

Woodrow Wilson in his 1898 book, ‘The State’, describes a

sovereign as:

“... a determinate person, or body of persons, to whom

the bulk of the members of an organized community
are in the habit of rendering obedience and who are
themselves not in the habit of rendering obedience to
any human superior.”

4
‘Globalisation 101’, Website of Suny Levin Institute, (accessed September 21,
2016). http://www.globalization101.org/what-are-the-sources-of-international-
law/.

7
 Historically, sovereignty is associated with four main
characteristics:5

yy First, a sovereign state enjoys supreme political

authority and monopoly over the legitimate use of force
within its territory.
yy Second, it is capable of regulating movements
across its borders.

yy Third, it can make foreign policy choices freely.

yy Fourth, other governments recognise the state
as an independent entity that has freedom from external
intervention.

These components of sovereignty were never

absolute, but together they offered a predictable foundation
for world order. What is significant today is that each of these
components-internal authority, border control, policy autonomy,
and non-intervention-is facing unprecedented challenges. For
example, the Charter of the United Nations places restrictions
on the circumstances under which members can wage war.
As British jurist J.G. Starke noted, “… it is probably more
accurate today to say that sovereignty of a state means the
residuum of power which it possesses within the confines laid
down by international law.”

There are two aspects of sovereignty, internal

sovereignty and external sovereignty:

5
Richard N. Haass, ‘Sovereignty: Existing Rights, Evolving Responsibilities’,
Remarks at the School of Foreign Service and the Mortara Center for
International Studies, Georgetown University, January 14, 2003, (accessed
September 18, 2016). http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/documents/haass_
sovereignty_200301 14.pdf.

8
 yy Internal Sovereignty means some persons,
assembly or group of persons in every independent
state have the final legal authority to command and
enforce obedience. This sovereignty gives absolute
authority over all individuals within the state.

yy External Sovereignty establishes that the State
is subject to no other authority. Thus, it is independent
of any compulsion on the part of other States. Every
independent state reserves the authority to renounce
trade treaties and to enter into military agreements.
Each independent State is at liberty to determine its
foreign policy and to join any bloc of powers it chooses
to. Other states do not have any right to interfere with
the external matters of an independent state. External
sovereignty therefore makes every state independent
of other states.6

State sovereignty is the concept that states are in
complete and exclusive control of all the people and property
within their territory. State sovereignty also includes the idea
that all states are equal as states. In other words, despite
their different land masses, population sizes, or financial
capabilities, all states, ranging from tiny islands of Micronesia
to the vast expanse of Russia, have an equal right to function
as a state and make decisions about what occurs within their
own borders. Since all states are equal in this sense, one state
does not have the right to interfere with the internal affairs of
another state.

Observation: Since a ‘sovereign’ acknowledges no higher

authority, rules regulating interaction between sovereigns are
weak and difficult to enforce. Moreover, at least in theory, all

6
Pooja, ‘Sovereignty: Meaning and Characteristics of Sovereignty’, (accessed
September 17, 2016). http://www.politicalsciencenotes.com/essay/sovereignty-
meaning-and-characteristics-of-sovereignty/254.

9
sovereigns big and small are sovereign and hence of equal
status in international affairs. This is a logical outcome of
the Treaty of Westphalia that transferred the monopoly over
violence to the state. No higher authority remained as the
treaty set aside the considerable temporal powers of the
Church of Rome to interfere in the internal affairs of states.
Today, the situation is largely unchanged. Religious power
continues to be confined to spiritual matters. The UN Charter
has effectively abolished war but the Right to self-defence
leaves considerable scope for the ingenuity of belligerents.

Anarchic World Order7

In the 16th Century, Jean Bodin proposed that sovereignty

must be absolute, perpetual, and undivided. In his view,
sovereignty was the highest power in a state. The sovereign
is subject to no laws but is itself the maker and master of them.
Sovereignty may reside in either one person or in a number
of persons. In either case, it is above law, incapable of any
limitation and having an absolute claim to the obedience of all.
Bodin, however, admitted that in some way the sovereign is
subject to the Law of God and laws of nature, and is therefore
bound to respect the rights of property and personal freedom.

In international relations theory, the concept of anarchy

follows from the idea that the world lacks any supreme authority
or sovereign. In an anarchic state, there is no hierarchically
superior, coercive power that can resolve disputes, enforce
law, or order the system of international politics. In international
relations, anarchy is the widely accepted starting point for
international relations theory. Many political scientists use
the term “anarchy” to signify a world in chaos, in disorder,
or in conflict. Others view it simply as a characteristic of the
international system that consists of independent states with

7
‘Anarchy (international relations) ‘, Wikipedia, (accessed October 05, 2016).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchy_(international_relations).

10
no central authority above them.

The word anarchy literally means “without a leader”.

In common usage, anarchy signifies both the absence of a
ruler and the disorder that some consider inevitable in the
absence of a ruler. Anarchy can be viewed through realist,
liberal, neorealist, and neoliberal paradigms of international
relations:

yy While the three established schools of thought
in international relations theory and their neo-
counterparts (Realism, Neo-realism, Liberalism, Neo-
liberalism and Constructivism) agree that the world
system is anarchic, they differ over how states should
deal with the problem.

yy The Realist theory of international relations
asserts that states are the main power players in
international politics. Realists respond to the anarchic
world system with a “self-help” doctrine, believing
they can rely on no one but themselves for
security. They believe that in this anarchical system,
states base their choices on survival. Moreover they
view it as a ‘zero sum game’ where each state’s gain
(or loss) is exactly balanced by the losses (or gains)
of the adversary. Thus, the increased security of one
state will always lead to a decrease in the security of
others. Thus, states have to accept that others might
have more power than them or are planning to gain
more power. This creates competition to acquire and to
balance power. According to Niccolò Machiavelli, the
desire for more power is rooted in the flawed nature
of humanity, extending into the political world. It leads
states to seek greater capabilities. Hans Morgenthau
elaborates: “international politics is struggle for power”
… the struggle for power is universal in time and
space”.

11

yy Realists define power in military terms. They
believe that more military power will help states to attain
their ultimate goals, be it as a hegemon or a balance
of power. In his 1988 article Anarchy and the Limits
of Cooperation, Joseph Grieco wrote: “… for realists,
international anarchy fosters competition and conflict
among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate
even when they share common interests”. Therefore,
realists see no reason to believe that states can ever
trust each other. Instead, they rely on themselves (the
self-help doctrine) in the anarchic world system. In the
course of providing for their own security, the states
in question will automatically fuel insecurity among
other states. This spiral of insecurity is described as
the security dilemma.

yy Neo-realists are often referred to as structuralists
as they believe that a lot of international politics can be
explained by the structure of the international system,
and its central feature, anarchy. While classic realists
attributed power politics primarily to human nature, neo-
realists emphasize anarchy. Kenneth Waltz posits that
the absence of an authority higher than states means
that they can only rely on themselves for survival. This
demands paranoid vigilance and constant preparation
for conflict. He argues that “wars occur because there
is nothing to prevent them”.

yy Liberalist theorists argue that international
institutions can mitigate constraining effects of anarchy
on interstate cooperation. This is where realist and
liberal thinking diverges. While liberalist theory accepts
that the international system is anarchic, it contends
that this anarchy can be regulated with various tools:
liberal democracy, economic interdependence and
liberal institutions. The liberalist goal is a completely
interdependent world. Liberal theory asserts that

12
 existence and spread of free trade reduces the
likelihood of conflict. Liberalists contend that it is not
in a country’s interest to go to war with a nation that
shares extensive economic and trade links.

Thus, for liberals, world peace is possible, even under
anarchy, if states seek common ground, forming alliances
and institutions for policing the world powers. Realists believe
that nations gain power through war or the threat of military
action. They assert that due to this power-grabbing system
there is no such thing as lasting alliances or peace. On the
other hand, Liberal thought, attributes more power to common
institutions than to states. Rather than focusing solely on the
military survival of states, liberals believe that common ideas
can lead states into interdependence. Liberalism emphasizes
that real power for states lies in mutually held ideas like
religion, language, economies, and political systems that will
lead states to form alliances and become interdependent.

Constructivist theory disputes that anarchy is a fundamental
condition of the international system. Alexander Wendt, for
example argued that, “anarchy is what states make of it”.
In other words, anarchy is not inherent in the international
system; rather it is a construct of the states in the system.

The fact that nation-states are sovereign means that

they are (to a large extent) legally and politically independent.
This makes international law less authoritative and effective
than domestic legal systems. Many scholars believe that
limitations of international law are the reason for continued
occurrence of war. These limitations also account for our in
ability to manage a globalized market more efficiently. More
positively, the international system also forms the basis for our
freedom, the political protection of our way of life against the
backdrop of social and cultural pluralism.

13
National Interest8

The national interest, often referred to by the French expression

raison d’état (“reason of State”), describes a country’s goals
and ambitions related to the economy and culture. The concept
serves an important purpose in International Relations, a field
characterised by anarchy. On the international stage, each
nation is a sovereign that acknowledges no higher authority.
There is no world government to regulate relations between
nation states. Thus, there are few rules in International
Relations that are binding and even fewer that are enforceable.
Under these circumstances, the pursuit of the national interest
not only provides a basis for conduct but also a measure of
consistency and stability.

8
‘The National Interest’, Wikipedia, (accessed September 12, 2016). https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_interest.

14
In early human history, the national interest was usually
secondary to religion or morality. To engage in a war, early
rulers had to justify the action on religious or moral grounds
even if the real motive was economic. Strategists often credit
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469 – 1527)as the first thinker to advocate
the primacy of the national interest in statecraft. However,
Chanakya9 (c.4th century BCE) predates Machiavelli, by more
than a millennium in this regard:

“Welfare of the state depends on an active foreign

Policy.”

-- Chanakya, Arthashastra, Book 6, Chapter 2, Verse 1

“A king weak in power shall endeavour to promote the

welfare of his people. for power comes from the
countryside which is the source of all activities.”

-- Chanakya, Arthashastra, Book 7, Chapter 14, Verse 18

9
Also known as Kauṭilya and Vishnugupt.

15
 Professor Balbir Singh Sihag, Professor Emeritus
at Massachusetts University, USA and author of ‘Kautilya:
The True Founder of Economics’ (2014) believes that the
Kautilyan approach to economics and prosperity has a
sounder foundation of ethics than Adam Smith’s idea of justice
as the guiding principle for the economy. Moreover, Kautilya
recommends a multi–pronged approach towards national
security, a rarity for his times. The Arthashastra postulates
two different approaches for domestic and foreign policy.
Internally, the king must follow an ethical code of conduct.
Externally, national interest must take precedence over all
other considerations. For Kautilya there was no room for
idealism in pursuing national interests. Kautilya understood
that a stronger nation was in a better position to extract extra
gains during negotiations and in making claims on common
resources. He understood that national security was not an
abstract concept and a nation needed to compare its strength
with potential adversaries.10

Max Weber once wrote that compared to Chanakya’s The

Arthashastra, “ Machiavelli’s The Prince is harmless.”

An early application of the National Interest is seen

in France under the direction of its Chief Minister, Cardinal
Richelieu, in the Thirty Years’ War. Despite being Catholic,
France intervened on the Protestant side to block the
increasing power of the Catholic Holy Roman Emperor. Jean
de Silhon defended the concept of reason of state as “a
mean between what conscience permits and affairs require.”
Over the following centuries, the notion of the national
interest soon came to dominate as European politics became
fiercely competitive. This introduced a form of reason on the
international stage that “born of the calculation and the ruse
of men”. It made the state “a knowing machine, a work of

Balbir S. Sihag, ‘Kautilya and National Security’, address at the Institute for
10

Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, October 20, 2014.

16
reason”, independent of the divine will and subject to its own
particular necessities (E. Thuau, 1966).These ideas cleared
the way for States to embark on wars purely out of self-interest.

Chanakya’s Principles of Foreign Policy

i. a king shall develop his state;
ii. the enemy shall be eliminated;
iii. those who help are friends;
iv. a prudent course shall always be adopted;
v. peace is to be preferred to war; and
vi. a king’s behaviour in victory and in defeat must be
just.
- L.N. Rangarajan, Kautilya - The Arthashastra
(1992) p.546

Foreign policy that pursues the national interest is the

foundation of the realist school of international relations. The
realist school reached its greatest heights at the Congress
of Viennawhere success depended on balancing the national
interest of several great and lesser powers. International
Relations were built anew based on national interest instead
of religion or tradition. These ideas came in for much criticism
after the bloody debacle of the First World War. Some sought
to replace the concept of the balance of power with the idea
of collective security, giving rise to the League of Nations.
However, even the League of Nationscould not arrest the slide
towards the Second World War. Part of the reason for the
League’s collapse was that the United States refused to join.
An additional burden was placed on the league by nations
that did not always find it “in the national interest” to deter
each other from the use of force.

The events of Second World War led to a rebirth of

Realism and then Neo-realist thought. Many blamed the
weakness of the League of Nations for its idealism. The
U.S expanded its concept of national interest to include the
maintenance of open sea-lanes and the expansion of free
trade.

17
 Today, the concept of “the national interest” is often
associated with political realists who fail to differentiate their
policies from “idealistic” policies, seeking to inject morality into
foreign policy. They promote solutions that rely on multilateral
institutions, which would reduce the independence of the
state. Considerable disagreement exists in every country
over what is or is not in “the national interest”. The term is
often invoked to justify isolationist and pacifistic policies or
to justify intervention or aggression. Scholars have posited
that the term is an euphemism used by powerful countries for
geopolitical aims such as non-renewable natural resources,
for energy security, territorial expansionism and for exploiting
precious minerals in smaller countries. In such cases,
euphemisms become necessary to overcome opposition to
overseas interventions or a hawkish foreign policy.

Defence Diplomacy

Defence Diplomacy is best viewed as a variant of soft power,

used in some way to co-opt the strategic thinking of another
state. Linking military diplomacy to the concept of soft power,
not only encapsulates practices used by governments today,
but also illustrates the underlying mechanism that makes
defence diplomacy an effective geopolitical tool. As the US
experience in Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria showed,
in quick succession, military strength alone is insufficient
to triumph in modern conflicts. Rather, in the Global War
on Terror and the conflicts to come, “success will be less a
matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping
behaviour – of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the
people in between” (Robert Gates). Increasingly, the ability
of military power lies not just in its capacity to drop bombs,
but also in its ability to look beyond the use of violence and
embrace alternative means of promoting national interests.

Military Diplomacy covers the entire range of non-

warlike activities, undertaken by the armed forces of any

18
country, intended to develop a positive attitude and trust
in the international community. While the term may be all
encompassing, it gives no clue as to what might actually be
involved. Reasons for undertaking military diplomacy typically
include:
yy To ‘dispel hostility, build and maintain trust.

yy To assist in the development of the democratically

accountable armed forces.

yy To contribute towards conflict prevention and

resolution.

Writers sometimes use the terms ‘Military Diplomacy’

and ‘Defence Diplomacy’ interchangeably. However, the
term ‘Defence Diplomacy’ gained currency only during the
British defence reforms of the 1990s. It describes all security
related diplomacy, going beyond the purely military. ‘Military
Diplomacy’ is mostly used in this document, as the scope
is limited to purely military aspects. The term ‘Defence
Diplomacy’, wherever it occurs refers to use of military as well
as other national resources.

Writers sometimes use the terms ‘Military Diplomacy’ and

‘Defence Diplomacy’ interchangeably. However, the term
‘Defence Diplomacy’ gained currency only during the British
defence reforms of the 1990s. It describes all security
related diplomacy, going beyond the purely military. ‘Military
Diplomacy’ is mostly used in this document, as the scope
is limited to purely military aspects. The term ‘Defence
Diplomacy’, wherever it occurs refers to use of military as
well as other national resources.

Nations commonly seek to achieve the aims of military

diplomacy through contacts between officials; appointment of
defence attachés; cooperative arrangements of various kinds;
provision of material equipment or other material aid; contacts

19
and ship visits; and exchanges as well as training activities.
To this listing might be added activities at a relatively high
and politically charged level. For example, capacity building
for security sector reform or other reasons like cooperation in
the defence industrial sphere. In the India-Pakistan context,
communications between the Directors General of Military
Operations is a prime example. Military diplomacy can also
take more routine forms such as regularly communicating
official positions on issues, publication of professional journals,
publication of defence white papers, displays of solidarity with
like-minded countries and ceremonial activities to honour
international visitors.

Since the term ‘defence diplomacy’ came into use, in

the 1990s, to describe a mixed bag of pre-existing activities,
it has yet to develop into a full-fledged idea with distinct
boundaries. Rather, it has continued to exist as an umbrella
concept used to bundle together a loose collection of non-
violent military programs under a single title. Without a clear
conceptual structure and defined boundaries, it has become
virtually impossible to say what constitutes an act of defence
diplomacy. Instead, researchers either use their own definition
or simply adopt U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s
colloquialism on obscenity – “we may not be able to define
defence diplomacy, but we know it when we see it”.11

Just like international relations, Defence diplomacy

too has a large scope that ranges between the significant
and the mundane. None of the activities is particularly new.
Some like the appointment of defence attachés, date back
several centuries. Such activities once had a purely military
role designed primarily to further one’s own armed forces,
their position vis-à-vis other armed forces and their position

11
Gregory Winger, The Velvet Gauntlet: A Theory of Defense Diplomacy,
(accessed September 19, 2016). http://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-
visiting-fellows-conferences/vol-xxxiii/the-velvet-gauntlet.

20
in the world. Today these activities are an integral part of
most national strategies. However, the focus has shifted to
supporting the nation rather than the armed forces alone.
The activities have moved from being an end more or less in
themselves to being a means to wider national ends.

Defence Diplomacy Activities:-

yy Bilateral and multilateral contacts between

senior military and civilian defence officials.

yy Appointment of defece attaches to foreign
countries.

yy Bilateral defence cooperation agreements.

yy Training of foreign military and civilian defence
personnel.

yy Provision of expertise and advice on democratic
control of armed forces, defence management and
military technical areas.

yy Contacts and exchanges between military
personnel and units, and ship visits.

yy Placement of military or civilian personnel in
partner countries’ defence ministries and armed forces
(exchanges).

yy Deployment of training teams.

yy Provision of military equipment and other
material aid.

yy Bilateral or multilateral military exercises for
training purposes.

21
 ___________________________________________
Source: Andrew Cottey and Anthony Forster, “Adelphi
Paper 365: Reshaping Defence Diplomacy : New Roles for
Military Cooperation and Assistance.” (Oxford : Oxford
University Press, 2004).

Many scholars have suggested that there are two

facets of defence diplomacy: pragmatic and transformative.
The pragmatic form of defence diplomacy seeks to
maintain conditions, as they exist between two countries.
Transformative defence diplomacy seeks to significantly alter
existing conditions. In Asia, the majority of defence diplomacy
is actually of a pragmatic nature as South Asian countries
seek to preserve peaceful coexistence without aggressively
pursuing regional integration.

The nature of the international system is one of the

biggest difficulties in creating a theory of Defence Diplomacy.
The basic premise of international statecraft is that the world
exists in a state of anarchy. Countries are responsible for
protecting and promoting their own interests. The challenge
in this largely self-help world is, having identified the outcome
that would best serve national interests, how to make this
objective a reality? While countries may share the same or
similar interests, the unique characteristics of each state
produce different agendas that often conflict with one another.
In International Relations, the ability to get others to do what
you want is called power. Statecraft is the manner in which
a country wields power to shape the conduct of others in
the desired manner. Joseph Nye12 developed a concept of
power, its different variants and the modes of application.
Nye identifies three specific varieties of power: hard power,
economic power, and soft power. Of the three, hard power

Joseph Nye, ‘Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power’ (1991)
12

and ‘The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t
Go it Alone’ (2003).

22
is the most established. It uses pressure to coerce another
government into submitting to our will. Economic power
encourages compliance by another country in return for some
form of reward for its support. Among Nye’s three forms of
power, soft power is the most nebulous and hardest to discern.
Soft power relies on the concept of co-option and the ability to
convince another country and its leaders to do what we want.

The Types of Power :

Type of Power Mechanism Illustration

Hard Power Coercion Country B does Country
A wants because Country
A would harm B if it does
not comply
Economic Power Incentive Country B does what
Country A will reward
Country B for complying
Soft Power Co-Option Country B does what
Country A wants because
B is convinced that what
A wants is best.

In ‘The Future of Power (2011)’, Nye identifies two

approaches for using soft power to influence government
policy. The first method, the indirect model, works by
cultivating support for a preferred position within the general
public of another country. Winning over the general public to
the preferred position, shapes the political atmosphere in a
manner that soft power can provide the envisaged benefits.
This can occur when a population exerts pressure on its
government officials through democratic processes, forms
of civic engagement like street protests, or the creation of
conditions that limit the policy options available to leaders
(Nye, Future of Power 94-97).

23
 Indirect Model

The Indirect Model of soft power focuses largely on the use of

public diplomacy. Governments use education, development
and social programs to communicate directly with foreign
populations as a means of gaining their support.
Nye’s second method of soft power application is the
direct model with a government directly appealing to the
governing elites of another country in an effort to get the
leaders of that country to embrace a favoured position.

Direct Model

Traditional practices of diplomacy such as state visits and

international conferences are examples of this type of
soft power. Essentially, desired outcomes depend upon
government-to-government contacts. In such a situation,
rapport between senior leaders is vital. Indeed, the personal
ties between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were
an important factor in sustaining the Allied war effort through
the Second World War and in shaping the post-war order. 14

13
Winger, ibid.

24
Beyond Soft Power

Soft, economic and coercive power are convenient categories

for thinking about international power. However, there is no
reason for them to be mutually exclusive in promoting national
interest. This has given rise to the concept of smart power.
Joseph Nye, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, was
among the earliest to suggest that effective strategies in foreign
policy require a mix of hard and soft power.14 In the International
Relations environment, using only hard or soft power is often
inadequate. Nye uses the example of terrorism where soft
power would be ineffective without a hard power component.
In developing relationships with the mainstream Islamic world,
however, soft power resources are necessary and the use of
hard power could have damaging effects.

Joseph Nye, ‘Smart Power’, The Huffington Post, The Blog (May 25, 2011),
14

accessed on October 16, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.in/entry/smart-

power_b_74725.

25
 The Center for Strategic and International Studies
defines smart power as “an approach that underscores the
necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in
alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels …..”15.
According to Chester A. Crocker, smart power “involves the
strategic use of diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, and
the projection of power and influence in ways that are cost-
effective and have political and social legitimacy”– essentially
the engagement of both military force and all forms of
diplomacy.16 Nye notes that a smart power strategy indicates
the ability to combine hard and soft power depending on
whichever is more effective in a given situation. He states
that many situations require soft power; however, in stopping
North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, for instance, hard
power might be more effective than soft power.

The term smart power emerged only in the past decade,

but the United States has used smart power for more than a
century:
yy 1901: President Theodore Roosevelt proclaims:
“Speak softly and carry a big stick.”

yy 1948: The United States starts broadcasting,
under the Smith-Mundt Act, to combat the outreach of
the Soviet Union.

yy 1991: End of the Cold War and collapse of the
Berlin Wall through a combination of hard and soft
power. Hard power deterred Soviet aggression and

Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., CSIS Commission On Smart

15

Power, ‘A Smarter, More Secure America’,

CSIS Center for Strategic & International Studies (2007). https://csis-prod.
s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_
csissmartpowerreport.pdf.
Chester A Crocker, ‘Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a
16

Divided World’, US Institute of Peace Press (2007).

26
 soft power eroded faith in Communism. Joseph Nye
says:
“When the Berlin Wall finally collapsed, it
was destroyed not by artillery barrage but by
hammers and bulldozers wielded by those who
had lost faith in communism.”

yy 2007: The Center for Strategic and International

Studies releases the “Commission on Smart Power”
to introduce the concept of smart power The report
identifies five critical areas for the U.S. focus:

o Alliances
o Global Development
o Public Diplomacy
o Economic Integration
o Technology and Innovation.

Some scholars have sought to further differentiate

between smart power and soft power. Christian Whiton
described smart power in his book, ‘Smart Power: Between
Diplomacy and War’ (2013) as: “. . . the many financial,
cultural, rhetorical, economic, espionage-related, and military
actions that states can take, short of general war, to influence
political outcomes abroad. . . .”. He adds that:

“It most crucially should involve a revival of

political warfare: the non-violent push of ideas,
people, facts, and events with which our
adversaries would rather not contend.”

Conclusion: Smart power embraces as well as uses

multilateralism while enhancing foreign policy.

27
Anarchy versus Stability

The anarchical nature of Intermational Relations would, by

itself, lead to instability and uncertainity. However, there are
certain approaches that bring a degree of predictability and
stability to dealings between nations:

The balance of power theory17 is one of the oldest

and most fundamental concepts in international relations.
There are many variations of the balance of power theory.
They range from a widespread tendency towards balance
of power solutions to a law like recurrent equilibrium model.
According to this model, the great powers correct imbalances
among themselves and restore equilibrium. This ensures their
own survival in the international system. The great powers
have several ways of restoring the balance. These include
military build-ups that convert economic wealth into military
power, alliances and post-war peace settlements. Many
scholars find that secondary and tertiary states are more likely
to bandwagon or join powerful states or coalitions of states
rather than balance against them.

Based on structural realism, the self-help anarchic

system and shifting capabilities mean that new balances of
power keep forming in the international system. How states
balance depends on the distribution of capabilities among
the greater powers. In bipolar distributions of power (two
great powers) states balance through a military build-up. In
multipolar distributions of power (three or more) states will
balance through the formation of counterbalancing alliances.
Finally, in balanced multipolar distributions of power (three or
more equally powerful states), great powers are likely to pass
the buck as far as the responsibility for balancing is concerned.

Steven E. Lobell, ‘Balance of Power Theory’, November 25, 2014. (Accessed

17

on September 28, 2016). http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/

obo-9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0083.xml.

28
 In international relations and treaties, the principle of
reciprocity states that favours, benefits, or penalties granted
by one state to another, should be returned in kind. For
example, reciprocity has been used in the reduction of tariffs,
extending intellectual property rights, mutual recognition
and enforcement of judgments, and the relaxation of travel
restrictions and visa requirements. The principle of reciprocity
also governs extradition agreements.

Hegemony is a popular term in internatioal relations.

Hegemons are unusually well-endowed as far as the ingredients
of international power are concerned. Many practioners
believe that such an advantage gives considerable influence
over the actions of other nations. This influence is based on
a combination of incentives for compliance and imposition
of costs for non-compliance. Simple analaysis of bilateral
situations would seem to suuport the theory. However, reality
is more complex. Whenever a country tries to dominate its
region, ‘balance of power theory’ suggests that other countries
will resist by forming a coalition. Attempts towards hegemony
are likely to succeed only if the other countries share the
hegemon’s objectives. Else, the countervailing coalition must
be too weak to matter.

Established practices, Policies, Memoranda of

Understanding, agreements and treaties are additional ways
of bringing stability and predictability to international relations.
However, there is a need to balance national interest with
predictability. For example, Israel’s unstated policy of ‘an eye
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth and a nail for a nail’ or the ‘no
negotiations with terrorists’ policy in some countries. On the
other hand, policies can also constrain options by excessive
reliance on cut and dried solutions such as Non-Alignment or
Strategic Restraint.

The best strategy relies upon an unlimited set of options.

- Morihei Uehiba

29
Regional Defence Diplomacy18

Countries conduct bilateral cooperative activities at varying

levels. These range from exchange of attachés, through
high-level dialogues to capacity building, combined exercises
and arms transfers. Activities wax and wane according to
the state of relations between the countries and changes in
the environment. However, there is more bilateral defence
engagement between regional countries today than at any
other time in world history. The range and possibilities of such
activities include: taking medical support to remote areas,
disaster relief and visits by sports teams.

Regional multilateral defence and security cooperation

rely on a wide variety of forums. Purely military cooperation
occurs routinely and systematically through the various
alliance systems, through seminars and meetings, naval
exercises, and development of regional peacekeeping
centres. Regional multilateral military diplomacy also takes
place at the government level. For example, the ASEAN
Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM), established in 2006.

At the edge of multilateral defence diplomacy, and

expanding the concept of ‘comprehensive’, are activities
that deal with ‘security’ beyond purely defence matters.
For example, the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional
Meeting on Maritime Security (track 1, official linkages) and
the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (track 1.5, officials
and academics together). Both examine a wide range of
maritime security issues, contributing to regional security and
stability. At the track 2 level (that is, officials in their private
capacity and academics), there are two prominent examples

Jim Rolfe, Regional Defence Diplomacy: What Is It And What Are Its Limits?’
18

Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand, January 8, 2015, CSS Strategic
Background Paper – 21/2015/

30
from the Asia-Pacific Region. Again, they deal with security
rather than purely defence issues. The Council for Security
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), established in 1992,
now includes 21 member committees. Each has the backing
of a national organisation and is represented by a national
research centre. CSCAP primarily works to the agenda of the
track 1 ASEAN Regional Forum. In two decades of existence,
CSCAP has produced a range of memoranda on issues of
regional salience, as their contribution to track 1 regional
security processes.

31
The Shangri-La Dialogue has been described as Asia’s ‘most
prominent exercise in defence diplomacy’. It is a privately
organised (by the London-based International Institute for
Strategic Studies), and therefore track 2. Defence Ministers,
senior officials and analysts, from around the region, have
held annual meetings in Singapore since 2002. Shangri-La
has since evolved to the extent that all speakers are officials
and all speak in their official capacity and conduct much
business on the side-lines of the main conference. To that
extent, it qualifies as a track 1 or track 1.5 event.

An area on the fringes of Military Diplomacy is the

increasing cooperation between defence industries in different
countries. While marginal to the diplomatic process, the
importance of this co-operation should not be underestimated.
Today, large Multi-National Corporations hold roughly 70% of
defence technology. Reducing costs and expanding profits
the drivers for such cooperation. However, such cooperation
not only feeds on an atmosphere of trust and a favourable
business climate but also contributes to them. To that extent,
these activities too are exercises in military diplomacy.

32
 The underlying assumption behind all military diplomacy
is that there will be positive outcomes for each participant.
Moreover, military diplomacy offers a more beneficial option
than military force or hard power in achieving political ends.
The political objectives could be stability, security, influence,
status and a host of other possibilities. There are at least
nine broad intentions behind military cooperation processes,
whether the cooperation is between armed forces or between
armed forces and civilian agencies:

yy Reduction in hostility or tensions

yy Signalling a willingness to work with and trust
interlocutors
yy A more competent armed force with a
commitment to accountability mechanisms
yy Transparency in terms of capacity and intentions
yy Development and reinforcement of good
relationships with partners
yy Changing perceptions of each other
yy Confidence building
yy Encouragement through incentives and rewards
yy Building a domestic constituency for the armed
forces.

Military Diplomacy is not a single actor game and to

achieve objectives, each participant must invest in and remain
receptive to the messages being sent out. At different times,
some states are the ‘transmitters’ of military diplomacy signals
and others are the ‘receivers’. Defence diplomacy cannot
work if the transmitting state is seen to be equivocal about its
activities and it certainly cannot work if the intended recipient
disregards the messages.

For defence diplomacy to succeed, its methods

must be appropriate to the context and the environment. It
is not necessarily ‘diplomatic’ to provide arms transfers or
training skills to a region in which conflict is endemic and

33
tensions are high (although there may well be other reasons
for the activity). Underlying all of this is the concept of trust.
Conventional wisdom would have it that trust develops when
countries reinforce habits of cooperation. Establishing trust
is not an end in itself. States must be ready to follow up with
practical defence diplomacy to translate the trust into specific
outcomes.

Challenges that defence diplomacy faces are wide-

ranging and both material as well as conceptual:

yy Probably the biggest challenge is the need

for each partner in military diplomacy is to consider
‘partnership’ to be paramount. The participants must
meet as equals.

yy Participants are almost sure to have different
capacities. They must understand that there are
benefits for each in the relationship. If one partner in
the process seeks a ‘senior’ status, diplomacy is likely
to be less than successful.

yy There is a need to align the partners’ aims. Even
if each side seeks different benefits, both must allow for
the other’s needs. Ignoring this aspect will leave one
side or the other feeling deceived, to the detriment of
the relationship. States having different understandings
of what is being attempted is another pitfall to avoid.

yy Differing cultures lead to differing compulsions
and differing operational procedures. There are
commonalities between armed forces, but there are
also significant differences. While providing capacity-
building assistance, for example, it makes little sense
to assume that what works for the provider will also
work for the recipient.

34
yy Matching and harmonising priorities is a major
factor in the success of any Military Cooperation. Wide
differences in national priorities can cause even the
best plans to unravel.

yy Partners bring their own perspectives to issues.
This is most likely if the issue is contentious such
as an international intervention. However, differing
perspectives are equally common on lesser issues.
Differences are also possible about the appropriate level
of secrecy to be given to joint activities or ceremonial
honours for visitors. These differences are cultural
but may also depend on circumstances. Defence
diplomacy that ignores the partners’ perspectives
and lacks empathy towards them will always be less
successful. Military Diplomacy must therefore be based
on an understanding of what is important to each side,
what can be done together and what cannot.

yy Given that much defence diplomacy is about
cooperative activity, the partners must be able to work
together at a practical level. That might involve one
partner deliberately limiting its capabilities so that it
does not overshadow the other. It could also involve
ensuring that whatever is offered is useful rather than
just immediately available.

yy There is much scope for misunderstanding, no
matter how simple the shared event. Even if both sides
communicate in English, words can have different
meanings in different contexts and cultures. Military
diplomacy cannot be effective if the participants are
‘divided by a common language’. It is even more difficult
when the common language is a second language for
one side.

yy The reality is that there are limits to diplomacy
and cooperation is not a panacea. In a state-centred

35
 world, national interest will usually trump cooperation.
This can be a problem within a close grouping such
as ASEAN. The problem can become bigger in
relationships that are not as close.

All the challenges stated above can be overcome with
careful preparation and a determination to make the processes
work. It is more difficult to deal with a situation where a state
decides that the group interest hurts a core national interest.
One state might choose to make its own arrangements or
it may choose a national solution over a group solution. In
such cases, military diplomacy makes way for ‘strategic
compulsions’ or ‘sovereign imperatives’. However, Military
Diplomacy also offers certain unique advantages:

yy Military Diplomacy can be conducted quietly,
away from the media glare public scrutiny

yy In many states, Military Diplomacy can gain

informal access to higher levels of decision-making
than would otherwise be possible

yy The military has greater understanding of

requirements for military cooperation at the ground
level

yy The military culture of all armed forces has a lot

in common. This makes it easier to build relationships
quickly and informally, smoothing the way for more
durable arrangements.

Military Cooperation

Since the 1990s, a number of factors have transformed the

armed forces of most countries, often in unexpected ways.
Technological developments, dramatically escalating costs,
increasingly restricted defence budgets as well as new threats

36
have led to fewer and leaner or even ‘hollower’ armed forces.
The almost universal response has been to seek deeper
international cooperation to reduce costs, maintain capabilities
and achieve greater effect. Countries can, for example,
cooperate on development, purchases and maintenance, or
education and training, or to coordinate or share capabilities.
The deeper the integration, the more military capabilities it
provides access to, but at the same time places greater
restrictions on national freedom of action. There is also a
visible trend towards specialisation in terms of functions or
tasks, i.e. cooperative arrangements in which the participants
depend on one another when the necessity arises.19

Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific region have

widely adopted the concept of ‘common, comprehensive and
cooperative security’. The concept has such wide acceptance
that many in the region use it almost as a mantra to avoid
the perceived perils of confrontational approaches to security.
However, the approach cannot eliminate confrontation even if
it reduces the possibility and mitigated its effects. This thinking

Tomas Bertelman, ‘International Defence Cooperation Efficiency, Solidarity,

19

Sovereignty’, Report from the Inquiry on Sweden’s International Defence

Cooperation Stockholm, October 2014.

37
is visible in regional security architectures. For example, the
region-wide acceptance of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
1976, and the development of integrated supply chains that
reduce the ability of states to act autonomously against the
interests of the wider group.

‘Defence Diplomacy’ or ‘Military Cooperation’ is another
approach leading to a culture of non-confrontation and one
that encapsulates all three non-confrontational concepts. The
two ideas overlap, but are not identical. Military cooperation
is actually a sub-set of defence diplomacy.

Observation: Military Cooperation is a subset of Defence

Diplomacy.

Various forms of cooperation are possible for

developing a military capabilities while making the most
effective use of resources. It is also possible to cooperate on
use of the final product, through joint exercises and training,
joint operations, or planning for joint defence. However, joint
operational planning does lead to a high degree of mutual
dependence. This makes it necessary to establish a legal
basis such an inter-governmental agreement. Peacetime
military cooperation takes place under six broad categories:

yy Policy
yy Capabilities
yy Equipment
yy Personnel/Education
yy Training/Exercises
yy Operations.

The basic question for every country is: “How

integrated the cooperation is to be?” In other words, what
dependencies and restrictions, on national freedom of action,

38
are acceptable? Particularly when acquisition of equipment
and use of capabilities is involved, the advantages must be
weighed against the disadvantages. It is possible, for example,
to cooperate on development, purchases and maintenance, or
education and training, or to coordinate or share capabilities.
The deeper the integration, the more military capabilities it
provides access to. However, greater integration also imposes
greater restrictions on national freedom of action. If a country
belongs to an alliance, specialisation can go further. Denmark,
for example, has decided to manage without submarines of
its own. Belgium and the Netherlands have decided not to
have main battle tanks. Belgium and the Netherlands have
combined their naval forces, and the Baltic countries rely on
the combat aircraft of other NATO member states. Iceland
has no national military defence at all. In fact, no European
country, on its own, can now develop the military capabilities
required to meet a powerful adversary. Even all European
countries combined no longer have the capabilities required
for major crisis management operations.

Cost trends make it increasingly difficult to maintain

the traditional range of ‘balanced’ capabilities that the armed
forces need. The trend is towards specialisation in terms of
functions or tasks, i.e. cooperative arrangements in which the
participants depend on one another for specific resources.
For countries that are members of defence alliances, this is
natural. However, the impact of economic limitationslooms
over every aspect of defence spending. The figures below
refer to the Swedish armed forces but the problem is universal
and few armed forces escaped a similar fate. In the 1950s
and 1960s, Sweden maintained independent credible and
modern armed forces as well as a defence industrial base.
In half less than half a century, all this stands considerably
diminished and unsustainable on financial grounds alone.

39
Defence cooperation often raises complicated issues.
Therefore, there is a tendency to limit participation to a relatively
small group of countries linked by geographical boundaries or
cultural proximity. This has given rise to a range of different
forms of cooperation that could be dubbed ‘minilateralism’.
The impulse towards cooperation in smaller groups is partly
a response to the difficulties faced by members of unwieldy
multinational institutions like the EU and NATO. Members
find it difficult to incorporate their own requirements in new
military capabilities. Even among allies, national interests
often stand against collective interests. At least one high-level
Swedish governmental inquiry20 has concluded that no form
of international defence cooperation can, under the present
conditions, offer increases in effectiveness or raise capabilities
to an extent that would have a decisive impact on the country’s
defence economy or defence capability. The study concedes

20
Ibid.

40
that international cooperation has achieved many positive
results through, increased effectiveness and savings. It has
also been possible to retain certain capabilities that might
otherwise have disappeared. However, in the final analysis
the effects remain marginal. They do not effectively address
the fundamental problem of the widening gap between the
tasks of the national Armed Forces and their capabilities.

Conclusion: For more than half a century, financial constraints

and soaring costs of advanced defence technology have been
a constant fact of life for all armed forces. As a result, there
has been an almost universal trend for the range of capabilities
and equipment numbers of major defence systems to dwindle.
Most armed forces are therefore faced with a widening gap
between their tasks and capabilities.

41
 The Path Traversed

India’s Defence Diplomacy

India maintains defence and military relations with

many countries including Mauritius, Seychelles, Maldives,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Cambodia,
Japan, Philippines, and Republic of (South) Korea, Thailand,
Vietnam and ARF, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Israel, Oman, Iran, UAE, Botswana,
Lesotho, Zambia, Namibia, Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea. Sudan,
Djibouti, Tanzania, Kenya, South Africa, USA, Brazil, UK,
France, Russia, Czech Republic, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary,
Belarus, Germany, Greece, Italy and Australia. Over the last
decade India’s military diplomacy contacts and activities have
increased exponentially. Indian defence forces exercise with
countries that include the US, UK, Russia, Japan, Bangladesh,
Mongolia, Thailand, Tajikistan, Seychelles and Singapore,
both at home and abroad.

Indo-Singapore military cooperation and the

consequently more mutually supportive relations has been
a success story. Singapore was looking for training areas
and skies closer home and found them both in an India that
was willing to explore new ways of defence cooperation. In
the past, India also has endeavoured to combine military
diplomacy or cooperation to support its larger strategic
interests as in Sudan for its oil, and in Yemen. However, India
has been unable to live up to its considerable potential in this
area. Even the cooperation with Singapore has fallen short
of its true potential. Some Singaporean training facilities that

42
went to Australia could well have come to India but for our
laid-back approach.21

The China Factor

With India’s spotty record of creating trust and goodwill has

led many neighbours to China as a countervailing option.
India therefore needs to review its bilateral and multilateral
relations in South Asia and the developing world. It must shift
focus to mutual gain and ‘interdependence’ (as in the Indo-
Bhutan equation) and away from a race with China. Chinese
jostling for space in the military diplomatic arena, especially in
the South Asian and Indian Ocean regions, should however
be of concern to India. As C. Raja Mohan states:22

“China is consciously promoting it (military diplomacy)

… Beijing (China) uses its armed forces as an
instrument of diplomacy to enhance China’s national
power. ….. Chinese ministry of defence promised to
intensify its military diplomacy by maintaining military
attaches in 109 countries: annually sending more than
100 military delegations abroad and receiving more
than 200 visiting military delegations. Beijing also
plans to conduct high-level strategic consultations and
professional and technical exchanges; and organizing
study abroad exchanges for mid-grade and junior
officers.”

Engaging South Asia

Some of the options for deepening India’s Military Cooperation

with South Asia include:

KA Muthanna, ‘Military DiplomacY’, Journal of Defence Studies Vol 5. No 1.

21

January 2011.
22
Ibid.

43
yy Military conferences – this could also include
exchanges and meetings at the levels of defence
ministers and senior civil servants of the Defence
Ministry.

yy Joint border interactions/meetings – bilateral
and tri-lateral.

yy Joint maritime patrol and surveillance to monitor
the sea-lanes of communication and EEZs. Sharing
domain awareness.

yy Joint humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief, as was highlighted by India’s speedy response
during the tsunami of December 2004. This could be
in the form of communications, joint relief operations,
mutual assistance, etc.

yy Joint combined exercises – bilateral and multi-
lateral - comprising forces from one or more military
service.

yy UN peace support and related activities.

yy Seminars, conferences and symposia on military
related subjects.

yy Training institution(s) exchanges and conclaves
for trainees and faculty.

yy Military sports events – at the local and central
levels.

yy Military adventure activities – at the local and
central levels.

yy Alumni get-togethers of Indian military training
institutions.

44
yy India could also set up a unilateral military
assistance programme covering areas ranging from
training to materiel assistance.

yy Institutions and security think tanks, such
as IDSA, USI, etc could offer, fully funded, research
fellowships to members of the defence establishment
and militaries of the region. These research fellows
would gain an insight into Indian defence thought
while providing insights into the defence thinking of
their own nations. America’s Pacific command funded
Asia-Pacific Centre for Strategic Studies in Hawaii is
an example of systematic outreach out to defence and
military establishments in the region.

45
 More Bang for the Buck

It is even better to act quickly and err than to hesitate until the
time of action is past.
- Carl von Clausewitz (1780 – 1831)
Limitations

Given the nature of the Indian bureaucratic decision making

processes India’s military diplomatic strengths often remain
underutilised or even unused. Some of the limitations are that
lead to this situation are listed below:
yy The over centralised approach of India’s
bureaucracy, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA),
and a convoluted and cumbersome decision-making
processes. Lack of a definite structure and a road map
for engaging other countries makes matters worse.
Defence cooperation flows from the foreign policy
of the nation. However, the broad contours of policy
framework for defence cooperation are not spelt out by
MEA/MoD in the form of short and long-term objectives.
Thus, defence cooperation is planned and executed by
each service according to its own understanding and
priorities, mostly at its own pace.

yy IDC Directorate, HQ IDS, albeit dealing with
International Defence Cooperation does not play any
role in coordinating and synergizing the substantial
effort by the Services towards defence cooperation.
This is largely due to lack mandate and inadequate
resources.

46

yy Absence of a Single Point Contact in the Armed
Forces. In the absence of a single point of contact
for defence cooperation, MEA and MoD are often
not clear about whom to address about a specific
requirement. Moreover, ad hoc arrangements also
create communication gaps amongst the Armed
Forces.

yy Interaction with MEA / MoD. Each Service
deals directly with MEA / MoD and more than one
agency within each Service may be involved. Such
issues could be handled more effectively by a single
agency.

yy In the past, a major portion of Indian military
diplomacy has consisted of promoting the Indian
Defence Public Sector rather than relationships built
on institutional and personal interactions at all levels.

yy Lack of consistency and dedicated funding for
military diplomacy prevents the development of a long-
term approach. The resultant uncertainty does not
inspire much confidence in any bilateral relationship.

yy In the absence of a nodal agency for Defence
Cooperation, follow up action and accountability is
often lacking. This often leads to loss of credibility and
conveys lack of seriousness.

Diplomacy is only an extension of foreign policy. The
MEA, MoD and the Armed Forces working in vertical silos
can hardly promote efficiency in implementing our foreign
policy. There is a manifest need for integration, not just
at the personnel level but also in terms of procedures and
processes.

yy Defence Diplomacy requires a military presence

47
 ‘on ground’. One of the authors was in the audience at
the third meeting of Joint Military Working Group. The
first question by the hosts was about when they would
actually see any Indian military presence on the Indian
side. The Indian side remained non-committal.

yy Inherent contradictions exist in the planning
and execution of defence cooperation. Funding is by
MEA and execution by MoD. There is a need to review
this policy and make funding of defence cooperation
activities integral to MoD. MoD could fund military
training under the Indian Technical and Economic
Cooperation (ITEC) Programme. Rules regarding
spending of ITEC funds also need a review. Archaic
distinctions between advanced and developing
countries could be abolished to start with. Defence
cooperation expenditure is insignificant compared
to the overall defence budget; as such, no major
imbalance would occur by realigning the budget on
functional lines.2324

Opportunities

India has the wherewithal to become a global hub for military

training and education. Possible focus areas include:25

yy Counter Terrorism.
yy Cyber Warfare.
yy CBRN Training.

23Muthanna, ibid.
24Brigadier Ranjit Singh, India : A Global Military Training Hub, Unpublished
monograph
25Ibid.

48
 yy Special Forces Training.
yy Para Training.
yy Training for UN Peace Keeping.
yy Disaster Management.
yy Instructors on Deputation to Friendly Foreign
Countries.
yy Faculty for conduct of specialised training in the
host countries.
yy Leverage Alumni of Premier Institutions.
Each service needs to formulate a policy to sustain
association of alumni with premier institutions.
yy Think Tanks affiliated to each Service and HQ
IDS can be important assets for conducting Military
Diplomacy.

Unexplored Areas

India has substantial assets in terms of Test and Evaluation

as well as firing ranges that could create huge leverage in the
area of military cooperation:
yy DRDO has a large network of test facilities
that could contribute towards Defence Cooperation
initiatives. There is also considerable potential in
following emerging trends of setting up expensive
research facilities on a multinational basis.
yy With vastly increased ranges of weapons and
constant pressure of urbanisation, it has become
difficult to conduct live weapon firings in many part of
the world. It would be in India’s interest to maintain and
constantly upgrade its existing facilities which are a
vital asset for the Armed Forces. Benefits form Military
Cooperation would be a bonus.

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 There is little that bureaucrats hate more than innovation,
especially innovation that produces better results than
the old routines. Improvements always make those at the
top of the heap look inept. Who enjoys appearing inept?
- Frank Herbert, Heretics of Dune

Weaknesses

As in many other areas, India’s Defence Diplomacy also

suffers from certain inherent weaknesses, structural as well
as attitudinal:
yy Prevarication: In 1992, an Indian frigate
chanced upon an Australian maritime patrol aircraft
at the Eastern edge of the Andaman Sea. The Indian
Fleet Commander considered it a case of intrusive
surveillance and initiated a strong protest. The
Australian side analysed the aircraft’s digital flight
records and concluded that there may have been a
difference of opinion but safety was not compromised.
This was roughly in line with the facts on ground. The
Australian Navy suggested that the two countries
establish a common radio frequency for on the
scene commanders to de-conflict the situation during
future incidents. This was minor decision without
any significant policy implications. However, despite
regular reminders, five years later the Australian side
had still not received any response whatsoever. There
are more recent examples but this should suffice to
highlight issues that can derail defence cooperation
besides showing the Armed Forces in poor light.
yy Implementation: Indian Defence Diplomacy
has traditionally been long on declarations and short
on implementation.
yy Simplification: The Indian system of

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 implementation, with its Byzantine system of controls
poses a formidable barrier for a potential partner.
Unfortunately, potential partners are more interested in
timelines and deliverables than in the complexity of our
decision-making processes. Simplification of delivery
mechanisms will go a long way towards boosting the
credibility of Indian defence cooperation programmes.
yy Competition: There is a sense of urgency,
particularly when equipment issues are involved.
This is because either a threat remains unaddressed
or a defence system is not available for use. In such
matters, speed is obviously of the essence. Potential
partners find it even more difficult to understand
inordinate delays when the request is relatively routine
and has only minor financial implications.

“Nine-tenths of wisdom is being wise in time.”

- Theodore Roosevelt

Enabling Change

The authors of this summary consider certain changes to be

essential to create conditions for vigorous Defence Diplomacy
and beneficial Defence Cooperation. These changes fall into
three broad categories: attitudinal, structural and procedural:

Attitudinal
yy Accept and cater for the fact that Defence
Cooperation takes place against a background that is
competitive and not benign.

yy Based Defence Cooperation on timeliness and
outcomes.

51
 yy Defence Diplomacy is a team effort. The team
must therefore work together as a single entity, without
fragmenting its efforts.
yy Smart Power is more complete use of diplomatic
resources than just relying on Soft Power.
yy Defence Diplomacy is part of the larger
diplomatic effort.

Structural
yy Strengthen the JS (PIC) organisation in the
Ministry of Defence. Appointment of the following
additional personnel could be considered, within four
months, in the first instance:

o 1 - Brigadier (equivalent) from existing
resources.
o 1 – Director (Civil/ Foreign Service).
o 3 – Colonel (equivalent) from existing
resources.
yy Revitalise and provide necessary resources to
International Defence Cooperation Directorate (IDC) in
Headquarters IDS.

Procedural
Commencing 2017 – 2018, shift the Defence Cooperation
budget to the Ministry of Defence.

yy Standardise Defence Cooperation policies

based on categorisation of countries. For example:

o Near Abroad
o Distant Abroad

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 o Strategic Partners
o Commercial
o Friendly Countries

yy Avoid terms such as ‘minor’ and ‘peripheral’

even in internal references.
yy Empower IDC Directorate in Headquarters IDS
to support JS (PIC) and to coordinate with the three
Services.
yy Undertake an overhaul of procedures for
Defence Cooperation to ensure:
o Systematic planning based on specific
outcomes.
o Timely decision-making and execution,
benchmarked against our competitors.
o Alignment of accountability, responsibility,
execution, budgets and financial authority.

Agenda for Reform

Despite the many disparate considerations, there are three

requirements that must underpin all Defence Diplomacy:

yy Timeliness: Defence Cooperation is linked with
core and emotive issues related to operational security
of the state. Some of these are policy issues that
may call for protracted deliberations and negotiations.
However, most are operational, training or equipment
issues that easily fit into existing policies and guidelines.
If the matter is inordinately delayed, there is always
some interested third country waiting to pick up the
slack. Instead of case by case by consideration, non-
policy matters need to be dealt with under pre-existing

53
categories such as Vital Countries, Strategic Partners,
Alliance Partners, Commercial, etc. A firm response and
a clear timeline within 3 months should be reasonable
and achievable target. Proposals languishing for years
at end are obviously not the answer.
yy Trust: Just because the other country is
significantly smaller does not entitle India to a
patronising attitude. Any relationship that is not imbued
with mutual trust and respect is doomed from the start.
yy Targeted Outcomes: In the end it is all about
‘deliverables’. Both sides must bring something that the
other values to the negotiating table. Agreed outcomes
must follow within a reasonable and mutually agreed
timeline. There is only so much that can be achieved
with repeated but empty statements of goodwill.

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 Index

Agenda for Reform, 47

Anarchic World Order, 10
Anarchy, 10
Anarchy versus Stability, 28
balance of power, 28
Bandwagon, 28
Berlin Wall, 27
Cardinal Richelieu, 18
Chanakya, 16
Change, enabling, 46
Collective security, 19
Congress of Vienna, 19
Constructivist theory, 13
Cooperative security, 35
Crocker, Chester A., 26
Defence diplomacy
differnces, 33
pragmatic, 22
transformative, 22
Direct Model, 24
Economic limitations, 37
Foreign policy, 17, 43
Hegemony, 29

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India’s Military Diplomacy, 39
Indirect Model, 24
Intermational Relations
characteristics, 5
International Relations, 5
schools of thought, 11
League of Nations, 19
Liberalists, 13
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 16
Military cooperation, 34
options, 40
peacetime, 36
processes, 32
Military diplomacy, 19, 30, 32
advantages, 34
challenges, 32
Military Diplomacy, 19
Military relations, 39
Military statecraft, 25
Minilateralism, 37
Mohan, C. Raja, 40
National Interest, 16, 18
Neo-realists, 12
Nye, Joseph, 23, 25
Power, 23
direct model, 24
indirect model, 23
Realism, 19
Realist school, 18
Realist theory, 11

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reciprocity, principle of, 29
Regional defence diplomacy, 30
Roosevelt, Theodore, 26
security dilemma, 12
Shangri-La Dialogue, 31
Silhon, Jean de, 18
Smart power, 25
soft power, 19
sovereign, 8
sovereignty
internal and external, 9
Sovereignty, 8
Thirty Years’ War, 6, 18
Unexplored Areas, 44
Weber, Max, 18
Westphalia, peace of, 6
Westphalia, Peace of, 7
Westphalian System, 7
Wilson, Woodrow, 8

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