Rule 110 (11-20)

PEOPLE V. MARIANO

GR NO. L-47437 SEPT. 29, 1983

FACTS:
Socorro Soria, a demented woman of 24 years, had been confined as a mental patient at the
National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Manila. Her parents brought her home to Burabod Daet,
Camarines Norte, to be treated by the appellant, known in the locality as a faith healer or "spiritista".
Appellant went to the residence of the Sorias to treat Socorro.  Mrs. Soria  was informed by her daughter-in-
law Elizabeth Albino Soria, that the door of Socorro's room was locked. Mrs. Soria proceeded to the room
and when she noted that the door was indeed locked from inside, she and Elizabeth peeped through a small
aperture and saw the appellant on top of Socorro in the act of sexual intercourse. A verified complaint for
rape, signed by Mrs. Maria Soria, was filed against appellant before the Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines
Norte. On the basis thereof, an information was filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte.

ISSUE:

WON the court acquired jurisdiction over the case which was filed by the mother of the victim?

RULING:

It is not sanctioned by section 4 of Rule 110 nor by article 344 of the Revised Penal Code whose provisions
do not categorically specify that the father has the preferential right to file the complaint for seduction,
abduction, rape or abusos deshonestos It is noteworthy that 'the father and mother jointly exercise parental
authority over their legitimate children who are not emancipated'. It is their duty to represent their
emancipated children 'in all actions which may redound to their benefit'

WILFRED N.CHIOK v. PEOPLE, GR No. 179814, 2015-12-07

Issues:

Whether or not the case is an exception to the rule on finality of acquittal and the doctrine of double jeopardy

Ruling:

II. The appeal from the judgment of acquittal will place Chiok in double jeopardy.

The 1987 Constitution, as well as its predecessors, guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
[53] Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the constitutional
proscription against double... jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double jeopardy to attach. For
double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent... jurisdiction; (3) the accused
has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed
without his express consent.[54]

In order to give life to the rule on double jeopardy, our rules on criminal proceedings require that a judgment of
acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory
upon its promulgation.[55]

This is referred to as the "finality-of-acquittal" rule. The rationale for the rule was explained in People v. Velasco:
[56]

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the
humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal
contest with the State, x x x." Thus, Green... expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with sill its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repealed attempts to convict an individual for an alleged... offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state
of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ
G.R. No. 175602

FACTS:

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in the RTC with three
counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson. The
accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
86, in Quezon City. They were penalized with reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered to pay to
the heirs’ actual damages civil indemnity, and moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
upheld the RTC with some modifications as to the civil indemnity. The accused came to the Court to
seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007 Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court
granted, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated. Hence, the Court hereby resolves only
the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez. In his appeal, PO2 Valdez contends among others that the State did
not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PO2 Valdez may be convicted of murder considering that the attendance of
treachery was not sufficiently allege in the information.

RULING:

The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are
mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. Every element
of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused
of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
The averments of the information to the effect that the two accused “with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault, attack
and employ personal violence upon” the victims “by then and there shooting *them+ with a gun, hitting
*them+” on various parts of their bodies “which *were+ the direct and immediate cause of [their]
death*s+” did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended
each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by
shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and
specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the
use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that
could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient
averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact.
In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in
murder were missing from the information. Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED
by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE.
Jose Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002

FACTS:

As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic
of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his family, his
associates, friends, and conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the Ombudsman.

The respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing with the
Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the other respondents therein.
One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents
was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.

ISSUE:

Should the charge against petitioner be dismissed on the ground that the allegation of conspiracy in the
Information is too general?

HELD:

No. In the crime of plunder, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the
different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality to help the former President amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the
different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is
not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a
portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle
Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions,
gifts, and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President
Estrada.

Under the Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is not a
crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in
conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion, and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement
or conspiracy itself is the gravamen of the offense.  When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring
and all the elements of the said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. The requirements on
the sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the
mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar.

There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of
the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused
in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in
the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the
acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all the details
thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein has performed, the evidence proving the common design
or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is
enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in
ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can
enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused
may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.

Following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of
an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms,
such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a
manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as
would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.

ENRILE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR NO. 213455 AUGUST 11, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RENATO alias BONG TORRECAMPO and RENE TORRECAMPO,
appellants. [G.R. No. 139297. February 23, 2004]
Issue:
W/N the decision of the trial court is not supported and contrary to the evidence adduced during trial.

Ruling:
No. The Court rejected this contention.

The trial court did not err in giving credence to Erlinda’s testimony in court as it is consistent with her sworn
statement on all other matters and is corroborated on material points by the testimony of Cherry Francisco.
Repeatedly, this Court has ruled that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in other
parts, depending on the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the
case.13 Moreover, the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light
of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent
position to discriminate between truth and falsehood

People vs Jugueta

FACTS:
That on or about 9:00 o‘clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay
Caridad Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short firearms of
undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by
the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of
Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would
have produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous
desistance of the accused, that is, the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel
Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina, both elementary pupils and
who are minors, were not hit. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal
Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace and
Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Finding appellant‘s defense to be weak, and
ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial court ruled that the
evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants,
conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of
Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal
Case No. 7702-G.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the information is valid
HELD:
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven
during trial, show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not
Double Murder, as the killing of the victims was not the result of a single act but of
several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4
counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple Attempted Murder in
Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case failed to
comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that
an information must charge only one offense. However, since appellant entered a plea
of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations,
he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. It is also well-settled that
when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses
as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.
MATALAM vs. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 165751
Facts:
An information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioner Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga and
Naimah Unte with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for
their alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of Kasan I.
Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan,
Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil. The accusatory portion of the information reads: On 14
August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. After the reinvestigation, the
public prosecutor filed a Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information
Deleting the Names of Other Accused Exept Datu Guimid Matalam. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss alleging that the amended information charges an entirely new cause
of action. The corpus delicti of the amended information is no longer his alleged refusal
to pay the backwages ordered by the Civil Service Commission, but the alleged willful,
unlawful and illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses.
Issue:
Whether or not Matalam was deprived of due process of law when the Sandiganbayan
admitted the Amneded Information without conducting another or new preliminary
investigation.
Ruling:
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: SEC. 14.
Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After
the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court
and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order
shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. After arraignment, a
substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused A
substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
The following have been held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations
which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or
distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not
alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and
affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; (5) an amendment that merely
adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new
and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is
already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by
the amendment has been said to be whether a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the
one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the
nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause
surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each
been held to be one of form and not of substance. In the case at bar, the amendment
was indeed substantial. According to Retired Senior Associate Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, before the plea is taken, the information may be amended in substance
and/or form, without leave of court; but if amended in substance, the accused is
entitled to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended charge is related to or
is included in the original charge. If the amended information contains a charge related
to or is included in the original information, a new preliminary investigation is not
required. If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the
amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his
right to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident
bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due process.
A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a
statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim
to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right
to due process. As to statement of the court a quo that the conduct of another
preliminary investigation would be merely a waste of time, it must be emphasized that
though the conduct thereof will hold back the progress of the case, the same is
necessary in order that the accused may be afforded his right to a preliminary
investigation. The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation should never be
compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
Fronda-Baggao v People GR No.151785 December 10, 2007

FACTS :
Sometime in 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 1, Bangued, four separate Informations for illegal
recruitment against Susan Fronda-Baggao, petitioner, and Lawrence Lee.
Petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade; hence, the cases against her
were archived. On July 25, 1999, petitioner was finally arrested. On July 26,
1999, the prosecutor filed with the trial court a motion to amend the
Informations. He prayed that the four separate Informations for illegal
recruitment be amended so that there would only be one Information for
illegal recruitment in large scale. On the same day, the trial court denied the
motion for lack of merit. On August 6, 1999, the prosecutor filed a motion for
reconsideration. In its Order dated January 26, 2000, the trial court granted
the motion and admitted the Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale.
ISSUE:
W/NOT the four Informations for illegal recruitment could be amended and
lumped into one Information for illegal recruitment in large scale.
HELD:
YES. As provided under Section 14 of Rule 110: Section 14. Amendment or
substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be
made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment before plea, which
downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused
from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The
court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order
shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. If it appears at
any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information
upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with
section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double
jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial. (Emphasis ours) A careful scrutiny of the above Rule
shows that although it uses the singular word complaint or information, it
does not mean that two or more complaints or Informations cannot be
amended into only one Information. Surely, such could not have been
intended by this Court. Otherwise, there can be an absurd situation whereby
two or more complaints or Informations could no longer be amended into
one or more Informations. On this point, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised
Rules of Court is relevant, thus: SEC. 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding

PEOPLE VS TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA

FACTS:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn SuaKho. On February 12, 2001,
at the condominium of Sua-Kho, the housemaid heard her employer screaming, and she
saw the accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to stop the accused,
shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. The victim was
brought to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors tried to revive her, but
failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victim‘s car. He was arrested soon
afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his home province. Appellant
Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an amended
Information. In the amended Information, it states that the accused, with intent to kill
and with evident premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y
Sua on the different parts of her body with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby
inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua stab wounds, which directly caused her death; that
the act was committed inside the dwelling of Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in
disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his (sic) rank, age or
sex. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued where
the accused raised the defense of selfdefense. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
rendered judgment finding Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is
sentenced to suffer the severe penalty of death by lethal injection. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court because the penalty imposed was death. However, the
case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
modifications the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals disregarded
appellant‘s claim of self defense for lack of evidence and for being incredible
considering the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and his flight
from the crime scene. However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation
was adequately established which qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it
appreciated abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance. As regards the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and age of the victim,
the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were included as amendments to
the information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the
same should not be allowed because it will prejudice the rights of the appellant.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA err in not allowing the amendments in the information regarding the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank,
age or sex
RULING:
YES. We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
appellant‘s claim of self-defense is selfserving hence should not be given credence. We
find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments in the
information regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard
of the respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 18
provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to
matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not
prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after
the accused had already been arraigned.
The insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the
respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial,
amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense
different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original information.
They relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant.
22 Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to
the offended party on account of rank, age or sex. 23 Without any objection by the
defense, the defect is deemed waived.