Pavlow v. Mendenilla - G.R. No. 181489 - April 19, 2017 - Remedial Law

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Steven Pavlow vs.

Cherry Mendenilla
G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017

Facts:

Respondent’s daughter (Maria Sheila) filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for slight
physical injuries and maltreatment. But due to her failure to substantiate her allegations, the
Assistant City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaint. Ten (10) years later, respondent filed
with the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Maria Sheila's benefit, praying for the issuance of a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or Permanent Protection Order (PPO) under the Anti-VAWC
Law (R.A. No. 9262). A temporary restraining order (TPO) was issued by the RTC in favor of
respondent’s daughter. When service of summons with the Temporary Protection Order attached
was attempted on September 7, 2005, Pavlow was out of the country. Thus, summons was served
instead through his employee, Tolentino, who also resided at Pavlow's own residence.

Issues:

(1) Whether respondent Cherry L. Mendenilla had personality to file a petition for the issuance
of a protection order under Section 8 of the Anti-VAWC Law for the benefit of her daughter;

(2) Whether respondent Mendenilla engaged in forum shopping by filing a petition for the
issuance of a protection order after a criminal complaint under the Anti-VAWC Law was
dismissed by the prosecutor; and

(3) Whether summons was properly served on petitioner Steven R. Pavlow and jurisdiction over
his person was validly acquired.

Ruling:

(1) Yes. The mother of a victim of acts of violence against women and their children is expressly
given personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order by Section 9(b) of the
Anti-VAWC Law. However, the right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to
file such a petition is suspended when the victim has filed a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in
this case, respondent Mendenilla filed her petition after her daughter's complaint-affidavit had
already been dismissed. A petition for the issuance of protection order is not limited to the
alleged victim herself. The victim's mother - as is the case with respondent Mendenilla - is
explicitly given the capacity to apply for a protection order for the benefit of her child. Hence,
Mendenilla had the requisite personality to file a petition for the issuance of a protection order in
favor of Maria Sheila.

(2) No. Jurisprudence has long settled that preliminary investigation does not form part of
trial. Investigation for the purpose of determining whether an actual charge shall subsequently be
filed against the person subject of the investigation is a purely administrative, rather than a
judicial or quasi-judicial, function. It is not an exercise in adjudication: no ruling is made on the
rights and obligations of the parties, but merely evidentiary appraisal to determine if it is worth
going into actual adjudication.

The dismissal of a complaint on preliminary investigation by a prosecutor "cannot be considered


a valid and final judgment." As there is no former final judgment or order on the merits rendered
by the court having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties, there could not have
been res judicata — actual or looming as to bar one (1) of several proceedings on account of litis
pendentia — as to bar Mendenilla's petition for being an act of forum shopping.

In applying to the case at bar, Assistant City Prosecutor Odronia's dismissal of the complaint-
affidavit filed by Maria Sheila came as a result of a preliminary investigation. This meant that, to
begin with, there was not even a prior judicial proceeding which could lead to the issuance of a
protection order. The criminal action in which Maria Sheila would have been deemed to have
impliedly instituted her own petition for the issuance of a protection order did not even
commence.

(3) Yes. The non-use of the precise term "summons" in the Anti-VAWC Law, its Implementing
Rules and Regulations, and its procedural rules provided in A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC does not
justify the equation of a temporary protection order with summons and the exclusion of the use
of summons.

Rule 14, Section 7 stipulates that substituted service may be resorted to "if, for justifiable causes,
the defendant cannot be personally served within a reasonable time.”

The exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of justifiable causes and how, by the convenience
of petitioner Steven Pavlow's temporary absence, immediate personal service was rendered
impossible. These exigencies justified substituted service of summons upon petitioner during his
temporary absence through Monette Tolentino, a person of suitable age and discretion, who also
resided at petitioner's own residence. Hence, jurisdiction over petitioner's person was then
validly acquired.

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