3 - RD
3 - RD
* Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig and
ACTING REGISTRARS OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS OF PASAY
Makati vs. RTC, Branch 57, Makati, MM.
CITY, PASIG AND MAKATI, METRO MANILA, petitioners, vs. THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 57, IN MAKATI, METRO Casal. The Appellate Court’s judgment, a judgment sustained by this
MANILA PRESIDED OVER BY THE HONORABLE JUDGE Court, operates as, at the very least, the law of the case between the parties,
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, AND THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE that OCT No. 291 has been cancelled and the land covered has been
LATE DELFIN CASAL, represented by DOMINGO C. PALOMARES, conveyed and ceded to the National Government. The fact that AC-G.R.
ADMINISTRATOR, respondents. CV No. 00293 dealt with a petition for issuance of lost owner’s duplicate
copy is no argument because be that as it may, the private respondent can
G.R. No. 90176. April 26, 1990.* not rightfully say that the heirs of Delfin Casal still have title to the land. If
THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DELFIN CASAL, it can not secure a new owner’s copy, it can mean that they have lost title
represented by DOMINGO C. PALOMARES, ADMINISTRATOR, thereto.
petitioner, vs. HONORABLE CONRADO VASQUEZ, JR., Presiding Same; Same; Same; Owners of property over which reconveyance is
Judge, BRANCH 118, RTC, RICARDO P. SANTIAGO, ET asserted are indispensable parties.—While there is no presumption that
AL.,** respondents. property is Government property until otherwise shown, because the law
Civil Law; Ownership; Public Land; Presumption of ownership recognizes private ownership, thus: Art. 425. Property of private ownership,
issued by right of sovereignty.—Proclamation No. 192 (“RESERVING besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities, and
FOR THE VETERANS CENTER SITE PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCEL municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either
OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE PROVINCE individually or collectively. We find hard evidence on record that: (1) the
OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON”) and Proclamation No. 423 property covered by OCT No. 291 had been conveyed to the United States
(“RESERVING FOR MILITARY PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF of America; (2) it had been later ceded to the Republic of the Philippines;
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF and (3) as a consequence, OCT No. 291 was cancelled upon final orders of
PASIG, TAGUIG, AND PARAÑAQUE, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND Judge Ostrand.
PASAY CITY”) have the character of official assertions of ownership, and
the presumption is that they have been issued by right of sovereignty and in PETITION for certiorari to review the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
the exercise of the State’s dominical authority. We take not only judicial of Pasay City, Br. 118. Vasquez, Jr., J.
notice thereof but accept the same as a valid asseveration of regalian right
over property. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Same; Same; Judgment sustained by this Court operates as the law of Tañada, Vivo & Tan for the Intestate Estate of the Late Delfin Casal.
the case.—The decision in AC-G.R. No. 00293, dismissing the private Antonio J. Dalangpan for himself and the heirs of Delfin Casal.
respondent’s petition for the issuance of a new owner’s copy of OCT No. Pedro S. Ravelo for Gerardo Casal.
291, a dismissal affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 69834, also militates Filomeno Peralta, Jr. for Domingo C. Palomares.
against the return of the property to the heirs of Delfin
_______________ SARMIENTO, J.:
*
EN BANC. The petitioners ** charge His Honor, Judge Francisco Velez, of the Regional
**
Actual title of petition. Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati, Metro Manila, with grave abuse of
623 discretion in issuing an order authorizing the private respondent, through
VOL. 184, APRIL 26, 1990 623 Domingo Palomares, to perform acts of ownership over a 2,574-hectare
parcel of land known as Hacienda de Maricabanspread out in various parts
of Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay City, and Parañaque. There is no is not a juridical person authorized by law to bring suit; (2) the Registers of
controversy as to the facts. Deeds of Makati, Pasig, and Pasay City are not the real parties in interest,
but rather, the registered owners over which the court had not acquired
On November 5, 1985, the private respondent, Domingo Palomares, as jurisdiction; (3) the non-joinder of the real parties in interest is fatal; (4)
administrator of the heirs of Delfin Casal, commenced suit with the OCT No. 291 has long been cancelled; (5) Judge Gregorio Pineda of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati, Metro Manila for declaratory then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, had earlier denied
relief, quieting of title, cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192, prayers for the issuance of duplicate owner's copy of OCT No. 291 because
and cancellation of entries upon Original Certificate of Title No. 291. the land embraced therein had been validly delivered to the Government;
(6) the Supreme Court itself had denied the Casals' appeal; ***(7) as a
Palomares had earlier come to this Court (February 27, 1985) on a similar consequence, res judicata is a bar; (8) prescription has also set in; and (9)
petition, and in addition, to direct the Register of Deeds to issue a duplicate the Casal's claims can not validly override the titles of innocent purchasers
owner's copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 291, embracing allegedly for value.
Hacienda de Maricaban, in lieu of the (alleged) lost one. On September 9,
1985, the Court denied the petition for lack of merit. (G.R. No. 69834). On August 29, 1986, the respondent judge issued a temporary restraining
order, directing the petitioners to cease and desist from performing the acts
On December 19, 1985, the petitioners filed their answer. complained of.
On June 2, 1986, the private respondent filed a motion to admit amended In a subsequent memorandum, the petitioners alleged that Dolores Casal
complaint impleading the Republic of the Philippines and the Registers of had conveyed the property to the Government of the United States in 1906
Deeds of Pasig, Makati, and Pasay City as parties-respondents, and and the Manila Railroad Company on which Judge Ostrand, the Presiding
alleging, among other things, that: (1) on October 1, 1906, the Court of Judge of the Court of Land Registration, later Justice of this Court, had
Land Registration (James Ostrand, Presiding Judge) confirmed the title of stamped his imprimatur.
Dolores Pascual Casal y Ochoa, a native of Madrid, Spain, over the 2,574-
hectare parcel above-mentioned; (2) on October 17, 1906, the Register of On October 12, 1987, the respondent court issued an order in the tenor, as
Deeds of Rizal issued OCT No. 291 in her name; (3) upon her death, and follows:
successive deaths of her heirs, the property devolved on Gerardo, Reynaldo,
Lolita, and Erlinda, all surnamed Casal, great grandchildren of Dolores; (4) No other opposition having been registered, this Court hereby
no conveyances or dispositions of any kind have been allegedly made upon resolves to grant the plaintiffs' prayer in the OMNIBUS MOTION
the parcel; (5) TCT No. 192, which covers the same landholding, is in order to safeguard the integrity of the land embraced in OCT
allegedly spurious and inexistent; (6) the State itself, by placing 27,213,255 291, hereby authorizing for this purpose the plaintiff Domingo C.
square meters thereof under a military reservation (Fort McKinley now Fort Palomares:
Bonifacio), by Proclamation No. 423, and fifty hectares thereof pursuant to
Proclamation No. 192, had been guilty of landgrabbing; (7) any and all 1. To order such subdivision and/or individual survey or
holders of any and all TCTs emanating therefrom or from TCT No. 192, are surveys within Parcel II, Parcel III and Parcel IV under
null, void, and of no force and effect; and (8) as a consequence thereof, the Survey Plan Psu-2031 by a licensed geodetic engineer or
heirs of Dolores Casal suffered various damages and attorney's fees. engineers at plaintiffs' expense in order to facilitate and
simplify the efficient administration of the property
On June 26, 1986, the petitioners filed an answer, stating, among other described in OCT 291; and
things, that: (1) the estate of Dolores Casal (or Delfin Casal, her grandchild)
2. To sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose (of) any A. Whether or not respondent Court can validly decide before trial
area or areas or portion or portions thereof, subject to the in favor of private respondent the ownership and possession of the
approval of the Intestate Estate Court, to cover expenses 25,743,514 square meters (of) land known as "Hacienda de
for the payment of taxes to which the property is subject, Maricaban", which is the main issue in this case;
as well as expenses of administration and for the
protection of the integrity of the said lands. B. Whether or not respondent Court can validly allow private
respondent to exercise and perform all acts of ownership and
SO ORDERED. 1 possession over the said land before trial
Eleven days later, or on October 23, 1987 to be precise, it issued another C. Whether or not respondent Court has acquired jurisdiction to
order, as follows: hear and decide this action;
Acting on the plaintiffs MOTION dated October 15, 1987 praying D. Whether of not respondent Court committed grave abuse of
for the issuance of a Writ of Execution implementing the Order of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not dismissing this
this Court dated October 12, 1987 before the expiration of the time action or allowing petitioners to appeal from the orders in
to appeal, and after inquiring from the plaintiff's counsel for their question. 5
reason in seeking the same, the Court hereby issues this
clarificatory order affirming the power of the plaintiff Domingo C. In their comment, the private respondent averred, among other things, that:
Palomares to execute and perform the acts authorized in the said (1) the respondent court, contrary to the petitioners' claim, did not decide
Order of October 12, 1987 without the need of a Writ of the case "before trial"; (2) OCT No. 291 had not been validly cancelled and
Execution, where no relief has been sought therefrom by any party, that the rubber stamp impression thereon, "CANCELLED" is a forgery; (3)
said Order being implementable at the instance of the said plaintiff the act of Judge Pineda, in denying issuance of OCT No. 291, duplicate
Domingo C. Palomares, anytime when the said Order becomes owner's copy, can not be considered res judicata because that case involved
final 15 days after the said plaintiff received copy of the same purportedly a mere petition for issuance of duplicate owner's copy; (4) non-
(see Section 39, Chapter IV, B.P. Blg. 129). Plaintiff Domingo C. joinder of proper parties is not a jurisdictional defect; (5) the TCTs issued
Palomares may therefore take whatever steps he considers thereafter are a nullity because OCT No. 291 had not been shown to have
appropriate for the implementation of the said Order without need been duly cancelled; (6) OCT No. 291 has become imprescriptible; and (7)
of further Orders or additional authority from this Court. the private respondent has a valid right of dominion over the property.
SIXTH, Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal to The Court has no doubt that Judge Velez is here guilty of grave abuse of
issue the Owner's Duplicate Copy of OCT No. 291. discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction to warrant certiorari.
As above-stated, what he gave away, by virtue of reconveyance, was
Petitioner-Appellant further prays for other just and equitable reliefs. **** property that inalienably belongs to the Government or its successors.
Worse, he gave away property without notice to the actual possessors, that
When we therefore denied that petition, we, in effect, held that is, the present registered owner. It is beyond debate, as we have indicated,
reconstitution (of lost duplicate owner's copy) was not possible because the that the land had been, since the cancellation of OCT No. 291, parcelled out
mother title (OCT No. 291) had been duly cancelled. And when we to a succession of buyers and owners. In the absence of notice, it acquired
therefore declared OCT No. 291 to have been cancelled, we perished all no jurisdiction to decree redelivery or reconveyance. It is well-established
doubts as to the invalidity of Mr. Palomares' pretenses of title to Maricaban. that owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted are
Our judgment was conclusive not only as to Mr. Palomares, but also as to indispensable parties, without whom no relief is available and without
the existing status of the property. As we have held: whom the court can render no valid judgment. 10
The lower Court correctly ruled that the present action is barred by Furthermore, the present holders of the land in question are innocent
the final judgment rendered in the previous case of Tuason & Co. purchasers for value, or presumed to be so in the absence of contrary
vs. Aguila, Civil Case No. Q-4275, of the Court of First Instance of evidence, against whom reconveyance does not lie. 11
Rizal. The reason is plain: if the herein appellants really had a
preferential right to a conveyance of the land from J.M. Tuason & (b)
Co., or if the certificate of (Torrens) title held by Tuason & Co.
were truly void and ineffective, then these facts should have been The respondent judge can not conceal his faults behind arguments that he
pleaded by these appellants in the previous case (Q-4275), since did not intend to convey the premises, but rather, to secure, allegedly,
such facts, if true, constituted a defense to the claim of Tuason & vacant portions thereof from interlopers. First, this is not stated in his order.
Co. for recovery of possession. If appellants failed to plead such Second, that order is clear and unequivocal that Domingo Palomares has the
defenses in that previous case, they are barred from litigating the right "[t]o sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose of any area or areas or
same in any subsequent proceeding, for it is a well established rule portion or portions thereof . . . " 12 Third and last, the security of the
that as between the same parties and on the same subject and cause property is the lookout of the claimants, and not the court's. In case the
of action, a final judgment is conclusive not only on matters premises the respondent judge's injunctive writ have been directed belong to
others, let them air their plaints.
(c) title to or material interest therein. The use of said remedy in such
cases has invariably been considered unjustified, in open violation
The Court is also agreed that the challenged order was issued with no of the legal presumption that the bona fidepossessor of a certain
benefit of trial or hearing. The private respondent can not validly rely on piece of land and improvements thereon, holds the same under
AC-G.R. No. 00293 as the "trial or hearing" to justify the issuance of its claim of ownership and with a just title, and as an advanced
said order, in the first place, because it is a different proceeding. But above concession of the remedy to which the claimant might be entitled.
all, the private respondent itself says that AC-G.R. CV No. 00293 can not (Citations omitted) 16
be made a basis for denying reconveyance because "the . . . petition was
merely for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy . . . 13 Accordingly, x x x x x x x x x
it can not invoke that case and yet, repudiate its effects. It is the height of
contradiction. Injunction, moreover, is an extraordinary remedy. It lies only in certain
cases, to wit:
(d)
Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary
It was also grave error for the lower court to deny the Solicitor General's injunction may be granted at any time after the commencement of the action
notice of appeal. The Government had all the right to appeal because: (1) and before judgment when it is established:
the order of October 12, 1987 was in the nature of a final judgment, as
"final judgment" is known in law (however it is captioned), that is to say, (a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the
one that "finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission
done with it in the trial court; 14 (2) it did not merely maintain the status or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of
quo, but allowed Mr. Domingo Palomares to transact on the property by an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
near right of dominion over it.
(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of
Judge Velez had therefore no reason, indeed, excuse, to deny the during the litigation or the non-performance thereof would
Government's notice of appeal. What is plain is the fact that Judge Velez probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or
was hell-bent, so to speak, in blocking the Government's efforts to defend
what rightfully belongs to it. (c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of
What has obviously been lost on the parties, Judge Velez in particular, is the the plaintiffs rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending
established principle that injunction does not lie "to take property out of the to render the judgment ineffectual. 17
possession or control of one party and place it into that of another." 15 In this
wise it has also been held: x x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x The conspicuous and unusual zeal with which Judge Francisco Velez now
defends his acts 18 has not escaped us. His Honor should have borne in mind
It is a well established doctrine in this jurisdiction that an that in proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules, such as the present cases,
injunction is not the proper remedy for the recovery of possession the judge is included only as a nominal party. Unless otherwise ordained by
of real estate and the improvements thereon, as well as for the this Court, he is not called upon to answer or comment on the petition, but
ejectments therefrom of the actual occupants who claim to have
rather, the private respondent. It is indeed distressing to note that it is the Costs against the private respondent.
very judge who has taken the cudgels for the latter, in defending its
interests, when he, the judge, should have remained a neutral SO ORDERED.
magistrate. Res ipsa loquitor. 19 He must get his just deserts.
III
WHEREFORE: